Embraer export aircraft loan signals Brazil aircraft export financing push

Embraer

The Embraer export aircraft loan approved by Brazil’s development bank BNDES highlights a renewed push for Brazil aircraft export financing. The Embraer export aircraft loan totals R1.09bn and supports production of commercial jets for export markets. Meanwhile, the move aligns public finance with rising demand for Embraer’s regional aircraft lineup.

Embraer plans to deliver up to 85 commercial jets this year, up from 73 aircraft orders in 2024. The company points to stronger commercial aviation demand, especially for the E175 model. As a result, the Embraer export aircraft loan strengthens near-term production planning and delivery execution.

BNDES Exim Pre-boarding credit targets production capacity and delivery flow

The financing comes from the BNDES Exim Pre-boarding credit line, which supports export manufacturing before shipment. Embraer will use the capital to expand production capacity and optimize aircraft deliveries in the coming years. Therefore, Brazil aircraft export financing acts as a working-capital lever, not just a sales tool.

The Embraer export aircraft loan also builds on prior state-backed export support. BNDES previously extended another R1.7bn loan in October to finance jet sales to a US airline. Meanwhile, repeat financing signals a strategy to keep export pipelines moving despite tight global supply chains.

Export-linked funding reinforces aerospace supply chains and industrial competitiveness

This kind of Brazil aircraft export financing supports a broader industrial base beyond final assembly. Aerospace manufacturing pulls demand across aluminum, titanium, nickel alloys, electronics, and high-spec machining services. However, producers still face risks from component bottlenecks, certification timelines, and airline fleet planning cycles.

The Embraer export aircraft loan may also influence competition in the regional jet segment. Faster output and steadier delivery schedules can improve airline confidence and reduce procurement friction. As a result, export financing can translate into market share defense when global carriers prioritize delivery certainty.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Export finance now operates like industrial policy for strategic manufacturing sectors. However, execution will matter more than headline loan size. Therefore, Embraer’s delivery reliability will decide whether Brazil aircraft export financing creates a durable advantage.

EU CBAM export support moves to the top of Brussels agenda

EU CBAM

EU CBAM export support is moving closer as the European Commission considers a two-step aid mechanism. EU CBAM export support would offer “immediate” transitional relief for energy-intensive exporters facing rising carbon costs. As a result, EU CBAM export support is emerging as the key political trade-off between climate ambition and industrial competitiveness.

EU CBAM export support to start with transitional measures

The commission is preparing EU CBAM export support that begins with short-term, transitional tools. Officials indicated that a first phase of support would arrive “immediately,” ahead of a more permanent scheme. However, they have not clarified whether support will take the form of direct payments or carbon cost refunds.

Meanwhile, Brussels wants any EU CBAM export support to be WTO-compatible and legally robust. Industry groups argue that exporters cannot plan while details remain vague and timelines unclear. Fertilizers Europe is pushing to retain free ETS allocations for exports until 2030 as the “easiest solution.”

Debate deepens over free allocation and exporter ‘fairness’

The debate around EU CBAM export support centres on fairness for EU exporters under rising carbon prices. The commission is exploring using a share of CBAM revenues to finance long-term export support schemes. As a result, future CBAM cash flows could be recycled back into hard-pressed energy-intensive sectors.

However, fertilizer producers warn that simultaneous CBAM implementation and fast ETS phase-out could trigger widespread bankruptcies. They point to structurally higher EU energy prices that have already pushed margins to zero or below. Industry leaders now openly call for pausing the ETS reduction for CBAM-covered sectors until a final export mechanism is defined.

Politics, timing and the risk of policy fatigue

The political path for EU CBAM export support remains uncertain and highly contentious. Any legal act must pass the European Parliament and member states amid tight legislative calendars. Officials admit that securing agreement on all CBAM amendments before end-2025 would be “highly ambitious.”

At the same time, policymakers acknowledge that the fertilizer sector’s situation is “dire” and cannot absorb more shocks. Yet they are reluctant to dilute CBAM’s climate integrity or delay broader decarbonisation targets. This creates a narrow window where support must be generous enough to retain industry, yet disciplined enough to survive legal and political scrutiny.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brussels is effectively trying to retrofit a CBAM export leg that was politically postponed during the original negotiations. The eventual shape of EU CBAM export support will signal how far Europe is willing to go to protect its mid- and downstream metals, fertilizer and hydrogen value chains. If delays continue, we should expect more calls for ETS pauses, higher import prices, and accelerated de-industrialisation risk in exposed sectors.

Osaka Titanium Export Sales Target 15% Growth Despite Market Headwinds

Osaka Titanium

Osaka Titanium export performance targets significant improvement with projected sales rising 15% to ¥37.7 billion for fiscal 2026. The Japanese titanium producer's Osaka Titanium export strategy focuses on aerospace sector demand, particularly from European aircraft manufacturer Airbus, as the company seeks to offset domestic market weakness and Boeing-related disruptions.

Aerospace Demand Drives Export Optimism

Osaka Titanium export revenues benefit from sustained aerospace industry requirements across multiple segments. Titanium sponge demand from Airbus remains robust, supporting the company's international sales projections for the current fiscal year. Additionally, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services for aircraft engines continue generating strong titanium product demand.

Meanwhile, export sales represent approximately 86% of Osaka Titanium's total titanium business revenues. This heavy international focus positions the company to capitalize on global aerospace recovery trends while reducing dependence on volatile domestic markets. However, the company maintains confidentiality regarding actual export volume data.

Boeing Disruptions Impact Previous Performance

Nevertheless, Osaka Titanium faced challenges in the previous fiscal year ending March 2025. Export sales declined 4% year-on-year to ¥33.5 billion ($231 million), primarily due to operational disruptions at Boeing facilities. A seven-week strike at Boeing's Washington factories significantly impacted titanium demand throughout 2024.

Therefore, the company's current optimism reflects expectations that aerospace sector recovery will overcome lingering Boeing-related headwinds. Osaka Titanium sources raw materials from diversified global suppliers including Canada, Australia, India, and African nations, providing supply chain flexibility for international operations.

Pricing Pressures Challenge Revenue Projections

However, potential pricing adjustments could affect Osaka Titanium export revenue targets despite volume growth expectations. Company representatives indicated possible titanium product price reductions for export markets, driven by declining raw material costs and titanium ore price index movements. These pricing pressures suggest potential downward revisions to sales outlook projections.

Furthermore, domestic titanium sales face significant headwinds with overall revenues projected to decline 3% to ¥43.9 billion. Weak domestic demand for ordinary industrial applications and ongoing inventory adjustments weigh heavily on the Japanese titanium market, reinforcing the strategic importance of export growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Osaka Titanium's export-focused strategy exemplifies how specialized metals producers navigate market volatility through geographic diversification and aerospace sector positioning. While Boeing's operational challenges created near-term disruptions, the company's emphasis on European aerospace partnerships and MRO services demonstrates strategic adaptation to evolving industry dynamics in the critical titanium supply chain.

Samarium Oxide Export Prices Fall as Lynas Output Pressures Chinese Offers

Lynas

Samarium oxide export prices fell as Chinese suppliers lowered offers in response to Lynas’ first samarium oxide production at its Malaysian refinery. The 99.5% samarium oxide export range dropped to $6-8/kg fob China after reaching a record $11-14.50/kg in late February.

The price decline reflected a shift in market sentiment rather than a full easing of supply constraints. Chinese export permits remain difficult to obtain, especially for shipments to Japan, but Lynas start-up introduced a credible non-China supply route for downstream users.

Samarium oxide export prices had surged earlier because of China’s tighter export control framework for medium and heavy rare earths. The emergence of Lynas output has now weakened the pricing leverage of some Chinese sellers, even though China still dominates global samarium supply.

Lynas Start-Up Adds Non-China Supply for SmCo Magnet Producers

Lynas produced first samarium oxide at its Malaysian refinery on 19 March, adding another separated heavy rare earth product to its portfolio. The company is the only commercial producer of separated samarium, terbium and dysprosium outside China.

The Australian producer is expected by market participants to raise samarium output to about 1,100 t/yr. That volume could be enough to cover a meaningful share of downstream demand in Japan, where samarium-cobalt magnet manufacturing is concentrated outside China.

Samarium-cobalt magnets are used in high-temperature and high-reliability applications across aerospace, defense, automotive, electronics and advanced industrial systems. The material’s strategic value is higher than its market size suggests because SmCo magnets are difficult to replace in demanding environments.

Lynas also plans to expand its product line to include gadolinium, yttrium and lutetium over the next two years. This would further strengthen non-China supply options for selected medium and heavy rare earth oxides.

China Export Controls Still Shape Samarium Market Risk

China continues to control more than 90% of global samarium oxide supply, with global production estimated at about 4,900t in 2025. Output is expected to rise to around 5,000t in 2026 as Lynas adds volume and Chinese production remains steady.

Beijing’s export restrictions remain the main structural risk. China has placed samarium, gadolinium, dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, lutetium and scandium under tighter export controls from 4 April, adding uncertainty for buyers outside China.

Japan is particularly exposed because it is China’s largest buyer of samarium products, accounting for more than 85% of Chinese shipments. Japanese buyers have reported difficulties securing export permits for samarium products since late October, following a sharp deterioration in China-Japan relations.

The price correction therefore does not mean the market has fully normalised. Samarium oxide export prices are now being pulled in two directions: Lynas is weakening China’s supply monopoly, while Chinese licensing controls continue to restrict trade flows into key magnet markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lynas’ samarium start-up shows how even modest non-China output can change rare earth pricing psychology. However, China’s export licensing power remains decisive, especially for Japan’s SmCo magnet industry.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

Quota System Likely for DRC Cobalt Export Restart Amid Rising Global Prices

DRC cobalt

Market Expects DRC to Shift From Export Ban to Cobalt Quotas

The Democratic Republic of Congo is expected to transition from a cobalt export ban to a quota-based system, as global prices rise and domestic revenues remain frozen. This policy shift is emerging as the most probable path forward, according to market participants attending the Cobalt Institute’s annual conference in Singapore.

The Focus Keyphrase "DRC cobalt export quotas" has become central to ongoing discussions. Since the DRC imposed a blanket cobalt export ban in February, cobalt hydroxide prices have nearly doubled. However, no royalties have flowed into the Congolese treasury, prompting calls for a more dynamic system that maintains pricing leverage while restoring revenue.

Traders suggest the decision is being driven directly by Kinshasa and the presidential office, not just Gecamines. The political goal appears to be the establishment of a long-term supply management system, similar to OPEC’s oil model, to prevent global oversupply and capture more value for the DRC.

Stockpiles Shrinking as Market Braces for Supply Squeeze

Despite record production by CMOC (30,000t) and Glencore (9,500t) in Q1, the export halt has created dislocation. Cobalt hydroxide stocks are building up within the DRC, while inventories outside the country are being depleted. Estimates put global stockpiles at 50,000–70,000t, but availability varies by holder and strategy.

Some traders are withholding shipments to capitalize on rising prices, while others warn of a looming shortage. By August, inventories in China could be critically low, leading to what one source described as a “crunch scenario” if no new material enters the pipeline.

The pressure is already visible in spot markets: Chinese hydroxide material trades at $15–16/lb, western standard at $17–18/lb, and alloy grade cobalt at $19–20/lb, depending on region and grade.

Export Enforcement Signals Shift to Strategic Resource Governance

The DRC’s export ban is being strictly enforced, with military-backed customs units now operating at Kasumbalesa, the country’s primary cobalt export route to Zambia. The sophisticated level of enforcement has convinced many in the market that a structured quota system is the inevitable next step.

Meanwhile, comparisons are being drawn with Indonesia’s nickel quota system, although differences in market structure mean the analogy is not perfect. Still, the strategic intent is clear: the DRC is asserting greater control over its cobalt exports to maximize pricing power and domestic benefit.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The move toward DRC cobalt export quotas reflects a broader trend: resource-rich nations are reclaiming leverage in critical mineral supply chains. As global cobalt demand grows, especially for EV batteries and aerospace alloys, market players must prepare for a more politically managed and price-sensitive landscape. The DRC’s emerging strategy could become a blueprint for other producers.

Indonesia Nickel Export Rule Creates New Uncertainty for Global Supply

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia nickel export rule changes have created fresh uncertainty in the nickel market as Jakarta moves to centralise key commodity exports through state-owned enterprises. Market participants are now waiting for clearer details on scope, pricing and implementation.

Indonesia nickel export rule plans were announced by president Prabowo Subianto on 20 May. The policy will require exports of key commodities to be routed through a state-owned enterprise, or BUMN, which would act as the sole counterparty to overseas buyers.

Indonesia nickel export rule uncertainty matters because the country is the world’s dominant nickel producer, accounting for more than 60% of global supply. Most of that output is nickel pig iron, a ferroalloy used mainly in stainless steelmaking.

The policy will initially target palm oil, coal and ferrous alloys. Nickel pig iron is expected to fall under the rule because it is a ferroalloy, although other nickel products have not yet been explicitly included.

Nickel Pig Iron Trade Faces Centralisation Risk

Nickel pig iron is central to Indonesia’s nickel position. It is a lower-cost nickel-bearing feedstock for stainless steel production, but it cannot be used directly in batteries.

To enter the battery chain, NPI must first be converted into nickel matte and then processed further into nickel sulphate for cathode manufacturing. This means any disruption to NPI flows can affect stainless steel first, but may also influence battery-related nickel routes over time.

Indonesia has already used centralised systems for other commodities. Tin exports must be traded through official domestic exchanges, such as ICDX or JFX.

The new system would go further by placing a state-owned enterprise at the centre of export contracts, transactions and payment flows. From June to August, exporters are expected to gradually transfer these functions to BUMN. From September, all export transactions are expected to move fully through the state-owned structure.

Market participants are sceptical about the timeline. Many believe implementation from 1 June is too early because the policy still appears under preparation.

The lack of broad industry consultation has also increased concern. Traders say Jakarta consulted only a limited number of stakeholders before announcing the policy, contributing to confusion and weak market confidence.

Pricing and Product Scope Remain Unclear

The main uncertainty is scope. Ferroalloys are expected to be covered, but other nickel products have not been clearly defined. Many participants expect the policy to eventually expand across more nickel products.

Pricing is another major question. Buyers and sellers do not yet know whether export prices will be set by BUMN or negotiated commercially between counterparties.

A separate pricing framework may be introduced, but details are still missing. This matters because Indonesia’s nickel market already faces policy-driven cost changes, including ore pricing formula updates and royalty uncertainty.

The new export rule could tighten supply conditions if it slows contracting, complicates payments or reduces flexibility for private exporters. Even if physical output remains unchanged, transaction friction can affect availability.

The market reaction has so far been cautious rather than dramatic. Indonesia’s Jakarta Composite Index fell, while LME nickel showed only limited movement after the announcement.

However, the longer-term implication is more significant. Indonesia is moving toward stronger state control over strategic natural resource flows.

For nickel buyers, this means procurement risk is no longer only about mine quotas, ore grades or processing costs. It now includes export governance, state counterparty risk and policy timing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is turning nickel from a commodity export into a managed strategic resource. The rule may support state control, but poor implementation could disrupt the very downstream supply chain Jakarta has worked so hard to build.

Indonesia Nickel Export Tax Delay Keeps Ore Pricing Uncertainty in Focus

Indonesia Nickel Factory

Indonesia nickel export tax implementation was postponed from its original 1 April start date as authorities continued to finalise the technical formula and applicable rates. The delay kept uncertainty high across the nickel ore and stainless steel supply chain.

Indonesia nickel export tax discussions now centre on how changes to the Harga Patokan Mineral pricing system will be calculated. Market participants are watching which reference prices and contained elements will be used in the revised ore pricing formula.

Indonesia nickel export tax uncertainty has already affected buying behaviour. With stainless steel demand broadly stable, some buyers have adopted a wait-and-see approach because future import costs could rise once the tax structure is confirmed.

HPM Formula Review Could Broaden Nickel Ore Valuation

The key issue is whether Indonesia will expand the HPM formula beyond nickel content. Cobalt content in nickel ore is considered one of the most likely additions, while iron and chromium are also being discussed.

This would mark a meaningful change from the previous pricing approach. The Harga Mineral Acuan has largely used London Metal Exchange nickel prices as the main benchmark, but cobalt, iron and chromium create a more complex valuation problem.

The challenge is that not all of these elements have clear futures-based reference prices. Authorities therefore need to decide which benchmarks, market data or calculation methods should apply before the export tax can be implemented.

Export Tax Delay Still Leaves Cost Pressure on Buyers

Market participants expect the nickel export tax to follow a structure similar to Indonesia’s coal export levy. Potential rates could be set at 5%, 8% and 11%, depending on price levels.

However, it remains unclear which nickel products would ultimately fall under the tax. This lack of clarity matters because Indonesia’s nickel supply chain covers ore, intermediate products, stainless-related materials and battery-linked products.

The delay gives buyers short-term relief, but it does not remove the policy risk. Once implemented, the export tax could raise nickel import costs, affect procurement strategies and change the economics of ore supply into regional processing and stainless steel markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s nickel export tax delay shows how difficult it is to tax mineral value when ore chemistry becomes more complex. The inclusion of cobalt, iron or chromium could make the policy more sophisticated, but it also increases pricing uncertainty for buyers and processors.

China EU Dual-Use Export Controls Raise Rare Earth Supply Risk for Europe

China EU

China EU dual-use export controls have escalated after Beijing added seven military-related European entities to its export control list. The move signals a sharper trade dispute between China and the EU and could increase uncertainty around rare earths and critical metals supply to Europe.

China EU dual-use export controls prohibit domestic exporters from supplying listed entities with controlled dual-use goods, technologies and services. Overseas organisations and individuals are also barred from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to those entities.

China EU dual-use export controls are significant because rare earths, tungsten, antimony, germanium and gallium have all gained stronger military and strategic relevance. Many of these materials are already covered by China’s dual-use export control framework.

The targeted entities include defence, aerospace and military-linked companies in Europe. Beijing said the companies had engaged in arms sales to Taiwan or had links with Taiwan-related activity.

Rare Earths and Critical Metals Become Trade Policy Tools

China’s decision marks the first time Beijing has imposed dual-use export restrictions specifically targeting EU entities. It shows that critical materials policy is increasingly being used as a geopolitical instrument.

The move follows growing friction between China and the EU, including disputes around cybersecurity rules and alleged discriminatory treatment of Chinese companies. Beijing has warned that it could take broader countermeasures if Chinese firms continue to face restrictions.

This matters for Europe because the region remains a major buyer of Chinese rare earths and critical minerals. The Netherlands, Italy, France and Spain all received rare earth shipments from China in the first quarter.

Rare earths are essential for permanent magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace components and precision electronics. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are especially important for high-performance magnets used in demanding operating environments.

Other controlled critical metals also carry strategic weight. Tungsten is used in hard metals, defence systems and high-temperature applications. Antimony supports flame retardants, ammunition and alloys. Germanium and gallium are critical for semiconductors, optics, satellites and power electronics.

China’s use of export controls has become more systematic. Beijing has already tightened critical minerals exports to Japan this year, which disrupted shipments of dysprosium and terbium and forced buyers to seek alternative supply.

Europe Faces Higher Security Premiums for Heavy Rare Earths

Europe’s immediate risk is not a full loss of Chinese supply. The more likely impact is higher compliance risk, licensing uncertainty and greater pressure on buyers that need controlled materials for defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

This could widen the security premium for non-China rare earths and minor metals. Buyers without reliable export licences may need to pay more for material available in the Atlantic market.

Heavy rare earth prices outside China have already surged because of tight availability and stronger Japanese buying. Yttrium oxide prices in Europe have climbed sharply this year, reflecting the scarcity of prompt non-China supply.

If EU-China tensions continue, European buyers may accelerate efforts to diversify supply. That could benefit projects in Australia, Brazil, Estonia, the US and other jurisdictions trying to build rare earth separation, metal-making and magnet capacity outside China.

However, diversification will not be quick. Rare earth supply chains require mining, separation, refining, metal conversion, alloying and magnet manufacturing. Each stage needs qualification, capital and technical expertise.

For European manufacturers, the policy signal is clear. Critical metals procurement can no longer rely only on price and delivery time. Buyers must now evaluate origin risk, licensing exposure, dual-use classification and strategic inventory needs.

The broader market implication is that China’s critical minerals controls are becoming a routine part of trade policy. Europe must now treat rare earths and minor metals as supply-chain security issues, not just raw material inputs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s latest export control move shows that rare earths and minor metals are becoming geopolitical leverage points. Europe’s challenge is no longer just finding alternative supply, but building a complete industrial chain that can survive licensing shocks.

Australia's Export Revenues from Iron Ore and Metallurgical Coal Projected to Decline in FY2025

Australia's export revenues from iron ore and metallurgical coal are forecasted to decline significantly in FY2025 due to a general decrease in international prices, despite increased port inventories in China and rising demand from emerging markets.

The Australian Department of Industry, Science, and Resources recently released its "Q3 2024 Resources and Energy Report," predicting that export prices for iron ore will fall to $96 per ton in 2024, $84 per ton in 2025, and $77 per ton in 2026.

For the fiscal year 2025 (April 2024 - March 2025), Australia's iron ore export revenues are expected to drop by 17.4% from AUD 138 billion in the previous year to AUD 114 billion. Further decline is anticipated in FY2026 (April 2025 - March 2026) with revenues projected to be AUD 102 billion.

Earlier reports had estimated FY2025 iron ore export revenues to be AUD 107 billion. However, improved economic indicators from China, Australia's largest export market, have led to increased port inventories and improved market sentiment, prompting a revision of the forecasts.

Nonetheless, recent price declines pose challenges. Iron ore prices fell by $7-10 per ton in June compared to the previous month. As of June 28, iron ore on China's Dalian Commodity Exchange was 819 yuan per ton ($112.7 per ton), while on the Singapore Exchange it was $105.65 per ton.

The price drop is attributed to weakening steel demand in China during the off-season and increased port inventories. The most significant negative factor in the international iron ore market is the excess supply of iron ore not absorbed by China's existing demand.

Contrary to the Australian government's projections, HSBC Holdings, a British multinational commercial bank, anticipates that international iron ore prices will reach $100 per ton in 2024. The bank believes that strong demand from emerging markets will prevent a significant price drop despite China's real estate crisis.

Capital Economics, a British economic research firm, predicts that iron ore prices will fluctuate between $99 and $100 per ton this year. The firm forecasts prices at $100 per ton in Q2 and Q4, and $99 per ton in Q3, with a drop to $85 per ton by the end of next year. The firm attributes the expected decline to prolonged recessions in major economies and weak global steel demand.

For FY2025, metallurgical coal export revenues are projected to fall by 31.1% from AUD 61 billion in the previous year to AUD 42 billion.

While Australia's production of metallurgical coal is expected to increase during this period, the decline in export prices will likely reduce export revenues. Metallurgical coal export prices are anticipated to drop from $264 per ton in 2024 to $228 per ton in 2025, and further to $208 per ton in 2026.

The Australian government and mining industry forecast that reduced demand from China, the largest importer, along with adverse weather conditions such as La Niña, could negatively impact production. However, they do not foresee the price decline triggering a crisis for Australian mining companies.

China Imposes Export Controls on Heavy Rare Earths in Retaliation to US Tariffs

China Rare Earths

New Legislation Strengthens Dual-Use Item Export Control Scheme

In a move likely aimed at countering US President Donald Trump’s recent tariffs, China has extended its export control measures to cover several medium and heavy rare earths. The new controls, announced on April 4, target elements such as samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. These minerals are critical in various high-tech and defense applications, and their export restrictions will likely have significant geopolitical and market implications.

China’s Dual-Use Export Control Scheme

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce emphasized that the materials affected by these new controls possess "dual-use" properties, which means they can be used for both civilian and military applications. Export controls on such items are considered a standard international practice. This move aligns with China’s enhanced dual-use item management scheme, which was bolstered by new legislation passed in October 2023. The new regulations require exporters to submit detailed documents confirming the end-user and the intended use of the items. Should the end-user or the intended use change, exporters are required to halt the shipment immediately.

While the export control scheme is part of a broader effort to regulate strategic materials, it has been widely viewed as a retaliatory response to the US’s 34% reciprocal tariffs, announced on April 2. In recent years, China has also placed export controls on other critical minerals like gallium, germanium, and graphite, in response to escalating tensions with the US and Western nations.

Strategic Implications and Market Reactions

China is a dominant player in the global rare earth market, accounting for over 90% of global supplies. The country’s total shipments of rare earths dropped by 3% in January-February 2024, compared to the same period the previous year, according to customs data. The US, recognizing its dependence on China for these materials, has taken steps to boost domestic production and diversify its supply sources, including funding initiatives in countries like Greenland, which has significant rare earth reserves.

Most market participants previously expected China to hold back on using rare earths as a "last card" in the trade war due to the strategic importance of these materials in many high-tech applications. However, China’s decision to implement these export controls highlights its readiness to leverage its position in the rare earth market. This policy shift is expected to further strain the rare earth supply chain and could result in higher prices for materials such as antimony and bismuth, which have already seen price surges following previous export restrictions.

Indonesia NPI Export Exemption Eases Nickel Trade Fears but Leaves Policy Risk

Nickel pig iron

Indonesia NPI export exemption has eased immediate concerns in the nickel market after sources said nickel pig iron will not need to be exported through Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia. The clarification reduces near-term disruption risk for Indonesia’s dominant nickel alloy product.

Indonesia NPI export exemption matters because more than 90% of Indonesia’s nickel-alloy output is nickel pig iron. NPI is mainly used in stainless steel production and forms the backbone of Indonesia’s nickel downstreaming model.

Indonesia NPI export exemption does not remove all uncertainty. Ferro-nickel exports are still expected to be traded through DSI, while the industry lacks an official definition that clearly separates ferro-nickel from NPI.

That ambiguity is important because ferro-nickel and NPI share the same HS code under global and Indonesian trade frameworks. Market participants usually distinguish them by nickel content, with ferro-nickel typically above 20% nickel and NPI usually around 10-14%.

NPI Exclusion Protects Indonesia’s Core Nickel Flow

The exclusion of NPI from the DSI export requirement is commercially significant. NPI is Indonesia’s largest nickel product by volume and a critical feedstock for stainless steelmakers.

If NPI had been included, the rule could have disrupted contracts, pricing, payment flows and export execution across a major share of Indonesia’s nickel industry. That risk has now been reduced, at least for the near term.

The clarification also helps Chinese and regional stainless steel buyers. These customers rely heavily on Indonesian NPI because it offers a cost-effective alternative to pure nickel metal in stainless production.

However, the inclusion of ferro-nickel still matters. A small number of Indonesian smelters produce higher-nickel ferro-nickel, and those exports may now face a more centralised transaction structure through DSI.

The policy could therefore split Indonesia’s nickel alloy market into two regulatory paths. NPI would remain outside the new state export channel, while ferro-nickel would fall under tighter government control.

The risk is classification. Without a formal technical definition, exporters may face uncertainty over which products qualify as NPI and which are treated as ferro-nickel.

Policy Clarity Still Matters for Investment

Indonesia announced on 20 May that exports of key commodities, initially including palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, must be routed through DSI. The aim is to centralise control over strategic commodity exports.

The nickel industry welcomed the NPI clarification, but investors remain cautious. Indonesia’s mining and metals policy has changed frequently, creating uncertainty around timing, scope and implementation.

This matters because downstream nickel projects require large capital commitments. Smelters, matte converters, HPAL plants and battery-material facilities all need stable rules before investors can justify long payback periods.

The DSI rule follows other policy shifts, including changes to ore pricing, royalty plans, export levies and RKAB approval processes. Even when policies support state revenue and downstreaming, sudden changes can raise financing risk.

Indonesia still holds enormous leverage in global nickel. Its dominance in NPI and stainless-linked supply gives Jakarta significant influence over trade flows and pricing.

But policy predictability is now becoming just as important as resource control. If rules change too quickly or remain unclear, investors may delay decisions even when Indonesia remains the strongest nickel platform.

The NPI exemption is therefore a useful correction. But the market still needs formal definitions, clear transaction rules and stable implementation before confidence fully returns.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has reduced immediate nickel disruption by excluding NPI from the DSI export channel. But the ferro-nickel ambiguity shows that policy risk remains embedded in the country’s downstreaming model.

China Tungsten Exports Resume in Europe with Limited Volumes

China Tungsten

China tungsten exports restarted in European markets for the first time since February stoppages, though shipment volumes remain constrained at maximum 1 tonne per delivery. The resumption of China tungsten exports follows months of supply disruption caused by Chinese export controls announced February 4th, creating acute shortages for US and European buyers dependent on tungsten ingots for defense and industrial applications.

Small-Scale Shipments Signal Cautious Market Re-entry

China tungsten exports currently originate primarily from smaller state-owned manufacturers rather than major producers. Market sources report receiving new shipments in Rotterdam while additional material remains in transit to European destinations. However, volumes stay extremely limited compared to pre-control periods, reflecting continued regulatory uncertainty and cautious export policies from Chinese suppliers.

Meanwhile, delivery timelines extend significantly with current orders potentially shipping in July for immediate purchases. Traders quote current prices at $56 per kilogram on a cost-insurance-freight basis, representing substantial increases from historical levels. The extended lead times demonstrate supply chain disruptions that persist despite the resumption of limited export activities.

Export Controls Create Ongoing Market Uncertainty

However, tungsten metal products face complex regulatory environments despite not appearing on initial dual-use licensing lists. While other tungsten products required explicit export licenses from February 4th, tungsten ingots experienced de facto export halts through administrative restrictions. This regulatory ambiguity creates persistent uncertainty for international buyers seeking reliable supply sources.

Therefore, US and European buyers continue struggling to secure sufficient alternative tungsten sources outside Chinese production. The global tungsten market's dependence on Chinese suppliers becomes evident through months of supply shortages following export control implementation. Alternative sourcing efforts prove inadequate for meeting industrial demand requirements across defense and manufacturing sectors.

Tight European Market Maintains Price Pressure

Furthermore, European tungsten markets remain extremely tight with minimal warehouse inventory available for immediate delivery. Limited stock levels mean small resumptions in Chinese exports cannot immediately relieve price pressures or supply constraints. Market participants describe conditions as "total lottery" scenarios where securing tungsten ingots depends largely on timing and supplier relationships.

As a result, prompt tungsten prices maintain elevated levels despite the resumption of small-scale Chinese shipments. The constrained supply environment supports premium pricing while buyers compete for limited available material. Industrial consumers face continued procurement challenges that affect production planning and cost structures across tungsten-dependent manufacturing sectors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China's limited tungsten export resumption highlights the persistent vulnerability of global supply chains dependent on single-source suppliers for critical materials, particularly when geopolitical tensions influence trade policies. The constrained volumes and regulatory uncertainty demonstrate how export controls can fundamentally reshape commodity markets, forcing Western buyers to reassess supply security strategies for defense-critical materials like tungsten.

Tungsten Market Faces Disruptions as China Imposes Export Controls on APT

Ammonium Paratungstate

The recent announcement by China to place ammonium para-tungstate (APT) and tungsten concentrate under strict export controls has sparked significant price increases in the European market. As buyers scramble to secure material, European consumers are seeking to build "safety stocks" to ensure supply continuity amid the uncertainty surrounding these export restrictions.

China's Export Controls Create Supply Chain Concerns

China's decision to add APT and tungsten concentrate to its list of dual-use items has left global tungsten buyers on edge. With this new regulation, Chinese suppliers have hesitated to provide fresh price quotes, waiting for clearer instructions and permits from the Chinese government. This delay in pricing is expected to persist for around 45 days, further exacerbating concerns in the tungsten market.

As the export controls limit available material, European and Japanese markets are expected to feel the greatest impact. While U.S. buyers primarily rely on tungsten scrap for their needs, prices for this resource are also expected to rise due to the overall global tightness in tungsten supply. European buyers are particularly active in sourcing material outside of China, not due to increased demand, but to secure stock ahead of anticipated supply disruptions.

Verification of End-Use Creates Delays and Bottlenecks

The new export regulations require Chinese exporters to notify authorities of the final end-user and application of the tungsten products, adding another layer of complexity to the supply chain. The verification process, which ensures that the material isn't being used for military purposes, is expected to create significant delays. With approximately 70% of Japan's tungsten imports coming from China, these controls are likely to disrupt the Japanese market the most. The European Union also faces similar challenges, with imports from China making up a substantial portion of its tungstate needs.

Impact on Global Markets and Price Forecasts

While the Chinese export restrictions are expected to drive prices up, particularly in Europe and Japan, the full impact remains uncertain. Tungsten is crucial for a variety of industrial applications, with APT serving as the intermediate material for producing tungsten oxides and powders. However, with limited available stock and supply chain disruptions, some market participants worry that the price increases could become more drastic.

The situation has drawn comparisons to China's antimony export delays, which have significantly disrupted the European market and caused prices to surge. The tungsten market may face similar challenges as supply becomes even more constrained, with both APT and tungsten concentrate prices continuing to climb.

Conclusion: A Fragile Market with Rising Prices

As the global tungsten market grapples with China's export controls, prices for APT and tungsten concentrates are likely to remain volatile. The duration and enforcement of these new controls will determine the severity of the price hikes, and the market will need time to adjust to the changing dynamics. With Europe and Japan facing the most significant challenges, the tungsten supply chain will need to adapt to avoid further disruption.

China export VAT rebate cuts reshape solar PV and battery exports

China Solar

China export VAT rebate cuts will raise the effective cost of exporting solar PV and batteries. China export VAT rebate cuts start on 1 April and tighten again in 2027. As a result, exporters face a faster push toward pricing discipline and higher-value products.

China will withdraw the export VAT rebate for solar photovoltaic products from 1 April. China supplies most global solar PV exports, so buyers will feel the shift quickly. Therefore, the policy targets over-expansion and the harsh price war across the sector.

Solar PV exporters face an immediate margin reset

Solar PV exporters will lose a rebate tailwind overnight. Producers will either accept lower margins or lift export prices where contracts allow. Meanwhile, weaker players may accelerate shutdowns, mergers, or capacity delays.

The change also encourages differentiation in higher-efficiency cells and modules. Companies will likely prioritize premium segments and branded channels. However, low-end volume exports will become harder to justify.

Battery exports move into a two-step phaseout

Battery export VAT rebates will fall to 6pc from 9pc between 1 April and 31 December 2026. The rebate will disappear from 1 January 2027. As a result, battery makers may adjust product mix, contract terms, and overseas inventory strategy.

China dominates battery materials and power battery supply, so the policy touches global EV and storage chains. Beijing also widened its export licensing scope to include BEVs from 1 January. Meanwhile, regulators are signaling stricter rules to standardize competition across batteries.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This policy looks like an industrial reset, not a trade accident. It pressures excess capacity and forces a quality-led export model. However, the biggest impact will land on low-margin suppliers first.

US Aluminum Scrap Export Controls: Trade Group Pushes Ban to Secure Supply

US Aluminum Scrap

US aluminum scrap export controls took center stage after the Aluminum Association urged an immediate UBC export ban. The group wants used beverage cans kept in North America to strengthen supply chain security. US aluminum scrap export controls also include potential limits on other mill-grade scrap.

Why a ban on UBC matters now

The association frames aluminum scrap as a strategic asset. It says the US exported 26% of generated scrap in 2024. As a result, foreign rivals benefit while US mills face shortages. US aluminum scrap export controls aim to backfill a 4mn t/yr primary deficit. The group also proposes clearer HS codes and funding for advanced sortation.

What stays exempt and what could tighten

The proposal exempts zorba and twitch until economical upgrading is possible. However, it seeks controls on higher-quality furnace-ready grades. Meanwhile, UBC bans would channel feedstock to rolling mills and extruders. US aluminum scrap export controls could lift domestic melt rates and recycled content. They may also reduce import exposure during tariff volatility.

Industry split and policy backdrop

ReMA opposes export limits and warns of market distortion. It argues global market access sustains recycling economics. However, recent 50% tariffs signal Washington’s industrial-policy tilt. The association’s plan echoes EU debates on outbound scrap. Therefore, restrictions could align with broader reshoring strategies.

Capacity, technology, and traceability

US mills need consistent scrap quality to replace primary metal. The plan calls for code refinements to track scrap grades. Funding would speed AI sorting, de-coating, and contamination removal. As a result, mills could absorb more domestic supply. Stronger traceability would also serve defense and autos.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Treating high-quality scrap as strategic fits the US reshoring playbook. The key risk is bottling up low-grade flows before upgrade capacity arrives. Watch for phased rules, tech grants, and state-level buy-recycled mandates to balance the system.

UK scrap export restrictions could cost jobs and billions, BMRA warns

UK scrap

The UK scrap export restrictions debate now carries major economic risk, according to a BMRA-commissioned study. The report finds UK scrap export restrictions would threaten thousands of jobs and curb growth. It argues UK scrap export restrictions would weaken an already strained recycling ecosystem.

EAF transition raises demand for scrap

UK steel is shifting to electric arc furnaces that consume more scrap. If all furnaces used only scrap by 2050, they would need two-thirds of UK supply. UK steelmakers used an estimated 2.6mn t in 2023 amid closures and reduced activity. The UK generates about 10mn t of scrap each year. However, export markets currently sustain prices and liquidity for recyclers.

Policy scenarios show heavy economic losses

The study models multiple restriction options and shows steep losses. A 10% export quota could cut nearly 3,000 jobs and £880mn in five years. A 50% quota could remove over £4bn and 23,000 jobs. A non-OECD ban risks £4.9bn and about 20,000 jobs. BMRA stresses exports are the sector’s “lifeblood” that anchor viable throughput. Meanwhile, government steel strategy consultations continue this year.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Restricting scrap flows to engineer availability risks shrinking the very supply base EAFs need. A smarter path ties domestic EAF ramp-up to price-transparent, open export channels plus quality upgrades. Calibrated incentives beat blunt quotas for long-run circular capacity.

EU aluminium scrap export restriction consultation targets rising exports

EU, Aluminium scrap

EU aluminium scrap export restriction policy moved closer on 19 December. The European Commission opened a public consultation on limiting aluminium scrap exports. EU aluminium scrap export restriction aims to address tighter scrap availability in Europe. Therefore, recyclers and traders now face a clear policy timeline.

The consultation asks market participants to comment on trade defence options. Respondents must complete a questionnaire by 31 January. Meanwhile, the Commission will review responses before drafting final measures. The Commission plans to adopt the package in spring 2026.

The consultation tests export duties and tariff rate quotas

The consultation covers export duties and tariff rate quotas for aluminium scrap. These tools can slow outbound flows without banning trade outright. However, the Commission must calibrate measures to avoid unintended disruptions. Therefore, stakeholder feedback will shape the final design.

The Commission framed the process as an economic security and industrial resilience step. Officials want more scrap to stay within EU recycling loops. Meanwhile, downstream buyers want stable pricing and reliable secondary supply. As a result, the policy will influence contracting and inventory strategies.

Aluminium scrap exports squeeze recyclers and reshape pricing power

Aluminium scrap exports rose sharply over recent years. The Commission cited a 50% export increase from 2019 to 1.2mn tonnes in 2024. Higher external bids lifted European scrap prices. As a result, secondary aluminium producers saw margins tighten.

Secondary aluminium supports low-carbon aluminium goals and circular economy targets. However, scrap scarcity can push producers back toward primary metal. Therefore, the EU aluminium scrap export restriction debate links directly to decarbonisation policy. Companies will likely accelerate sorting, upgrading, and closed-loop scrap programs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This consultation signals a shift from monitoring to intervention in EU scrap flows. However, the final impact depends on quota levels and enforcement quality. The winners will secure domestic scrap streams before spring 2026 rules arrive.

Europe Rare Earth Prices Hold Steady as China’s NdPr Market Softens

Rare Earth mining

Europe rare earth prices held broadly steady this week as tight heavy rare earth availability offset weakness in China’s neodymium and praseodymium market. Delivered European prices for light rare earths showed little movement, while prompt supply of restricted heavy rare earths remained extremely limited.

Europe rare earth prices are now being shaped by two different market structures. Light rare earths are tracking weaker Chinese sentiment more closely, but European demand remains modest and supply is sufficient. Heavy rare earths are trading under export-control pressure, with buyers outside China paying steep premiums for prompt material.

Europe rare earth prices therefore show a widening split between ordinary demand softness and strategic scarcity. The market is not moving as one rare earth complex. It is separating by licensing access, material origin, availability and end-use urgency.

Light Rare Earths Stay Flat Despite Chinese Market Drop

European delivered neodymium oxide prices remained steady at $115-130/kg cif Europe. Neodymium metal also held at $145-160/kg cif.

Praseodymium oxide stayed unchanged at $115-130/kg cif Europe, while praseodymium-neodymium oxide held at $110-115/kg cif. The stability came despite a sharp decline in China’s NdPr complex.

Chinese traders have been destocking ahead of the 1-5 May Labour Day holiday, expecting weaker domestic end-user demand. Several oxide producers suspended spot offers to assess market direction.

European prices did not follow the Chinese decline because regional spot demand remains limited. Delivered European prices are already below Chinese values on average, supported by sufficient supply from multiple sources.

Cerium oxide moved slightly higher, with the top end of the range rising to $2.55/kg cif Europe. Demand is being supported by increased use of cerium-based rare earth magnets and higher freight costs for material circulating outside China.

This light rare earth stability suggests that Europe is not facing immediate NdPr scarcity. However, buyers remain cautious because Chinese price movements still influence sentiment and replacement-cost expectations.

Heavy Rare Earths Remain Tight Under Export Controls

Heavy rare earth availability remains the main pressure point in Europe. Delivered prices for dysprosium oxide were unchanged at $1,000-1,200/kg cif Europe, while terbium oxide held at $3,800-4,500/kg cif.

Spot liquidity has been thin since the start of the year. Prompt availability outside China remains very tight, especially for buyers without export licences.

China’s export controls continue to reshape heavy rare earth pricing. End-users that cannot access licensed Chinese supply are still willing to pay steep premiums to secure material for magnets, defence systems, electronics and advanced manufacturing.

Japanese buying interest has added more pressure since Japan became subject to stricter export controls in January. This has increased competition for limited non-China prompt supply.

The same pattern is visible in gadolinium and yttrium. Gadolinium oxide remained at $700-1,200/kg cif Europe, while yttrium oxide held at $800-1,200/kg cif Europe.

These markets are no longer priced only by Chinese domestic fundamentals. They are being priced by export-control access, available inventories and the cost of avoiding production disruption.

For European buyers, the practical issue is security of supply. Even if Chinese domestic prices soften, restricted material outside China can remain expensive because availability is controlled by licensing and logistics.

The result is a rare earth market where light rare earths may soften with Chinese demand, while heavy rare earths retain a strategic premium. That premium is likely to persist as long as export controls limit access to dysprosium, terbium, gadolinium and yttrium.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s rare earth market is becoming increasingly divided between price-led light rare earths and security-led heavy rare earths. China’s NdPr weakness matters, but export-control pressure on dysprosium, terbium, gadolinium and yttrium is now the stronger strategic signal.