Q-Flex LNG Loading Outside Qatar Signals LNG Fleet Disruption After Hormuz Shock

Q-Flex LNG

Q-Flex LNG loading outside Qatar could mark a major shift in LNG shipping patterns after the US-Iran war stranded supply from Ras Laffan and disrupted normal QatarEnergy fleet operations. The 216,200m³ Mesaimeer is scheduled to load at Oman’s Qalhat export terminal, potentially making it the first Q-class vessel to load outside Qatar since the conflict began.

The move matters because Q-Flex LNG loading has been almost entirely tied to QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan terminal since 2008. These vessels were designed around Qatar’s large-scale LNG export model, with cargo sizes, port access and operating economics suited to dedicated long-haul flows.

Q-Flex LNG loading at Qalhat would show how the LNG market is adapting to a severe regional disruption. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has left Qatar’s LNG supply constrained and much of its specialised carrier fleet underutilised.

The cargo details remain uncertain. Mesaimeer could load a typical cargo of around 72,000t, or a much larger parcel closer to the vessel’s historical maximum.

QatarEnergy Fleet Faces Limited Alternative Deployment

Q-Flex and Q-Max vessels are the largest LNG carriers in the market. Their size gives QatarEnergy efficiency on established routes, but it also limits flexibility during a regional shipping crisis.

Many ports cannot handle Q-Flex or Q-Max dimensions. These vessels also carry larger cargoes than many buyers or terminals can easily absorb, making them less attractive in the open spot market.

QatarEnergy has offered some vessels into the spot relet market and through bilateral channels. But traders showed limited interest because of high boil-off, bunker consumption, port restrictions and large cargo sizes.

Mesaimeer’s planned Qalhat loading is therefore significant. The vessel has only loaded at Ras Laffan since entering service in 2009, so a non-Qatari loading would represent a rare operational shift.

Oman’s 11.4mn t/yr Qalhat terminal offers one possible route to keep QatarEnergy-controlled tonnage active while Ras Laffan flows remain disrupted. It is still unclear whether QatarEnergy sublet the vessel or purchased a free-on-board cargo from Qalhat.

The development highlights a key LNG market lesson. Large-scale export systems can be highly efficient in normal conditions, but specialised shipping assets become harder to redeploy when chokepoints close.

Golden Pass Could Offer Another Outlet for Q-Flex Vessels

QatarEnergy may also use Q-Flex vessels at the Golden Pass LNG terminal in the US, where it owns a 70% equity stake. ExxonMobil holds the remaining interest in the 18.1mn t/yr project.

Golden Pass is located at Sabine Pass, where typical Q-Flex vessel dimensions can transit. That makes the terminal a logical option if QatarEnergy needs alternative loading points for its large carrier fleet.

The Q-Flex vessel Al Nuaman is already holding offshore Golden Pass with an AIS declaration for Sabine Offshore Anchorage. This suggests QatarEnergy is evaluating practical deployment options outside the Gulf.

If Q-Flex vessels begin loading regularly outside Qatar, it could reshape short-term LNG logistics. It would also create new operational patterns for large LNG carriers that have historically served a highly concentrated Qatari export system.

The broader market issue is supply-chain resilience. The Strait of Hormuz disruption has exposed how LNG trade depends not only on production capacity, but also on shipping access, fleet compatibility and terminal flexibility.

For LNG buyers, the main concern is cargo availability. For shipowners and traders, the problem is whether large specialised vessels can be economically redeployed during a regional crisis.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Mesaimeer’s possible Qalhat loading shows that LNG logistics are being forced into emergency adaptation. The larger lesson is clear: energy security now depends on flexible shipping, diversified terminals and vessels that can operate beyond their original trade lanes.

China Titanium Sponge Exports Rise in March as Asian Buyers Support Demand

China Titanium Sponge

China titanium sponge exports rose year on year in March, supported by stronger buying interest from South Korea, India, Vietnam and Slovenia. Chinese customs data showed exports reached 453t during the month, up 8.6% from 417t a year earlier.

China titanium sponge exports still declined by 7.4% from February’s 489t, showing that overseas buying remained selective. Some buyers were not under immediate pressure to purchase Chinese material because spot supply was sufficient.

China titanium sponge exports totalled 1,535t in January-March, down 5.7% from a year earlier. The decline reflected weaker buying from major consumers including Japan, South Korea and the US.

The data show a titanium sponge export market that is recovering unevenly. Asian demand helped March shipments, but inventory drawdowns, delayed purchasing and weaker aerospace-linked orders continued to limit broader export momentum.

Japan, South Korea and US Demand Weaken in First Quarter

Japan remained the largest destination for Chinese titanium sponge in January-March, receiving 347t. However, shipments fell by 37% from 548t a year earlier.

The decline was mainly caused by delayed purchasing from a major Japanese consumer. Purchases are expected to resume in May, which could support later-quarter export flows.

South Korean imports from China also fell. Shipments dropped by 33% to 172t as some buyers slowed procurement after failing to secure downstream aerospace original equipment manufacturer orders.

This matters because aerospace demand remains one of the most important drivers of higher-grade titanium sponge consumption. When downstream aerospace orders are delayed, sponge buyers often reduce spot intake and work through inventories.

US demand was almost absent in the first quarter. China exported only 0.2t of titanium sponge to the US, down 99.8% from a year earlier, as US consumers continued drawing down inventories.

The US result highlights the effect of inventory cycles and trade uncertainty. Even when Chinese material remains available, buyers may delay purchases if they have sufficient stock or face qualification, tariff and policy risk.

Export Prices Track Higher Domestic Sponge Market

Chinese 99.7% grade titanium sponge export prices averaged $6.70/kg fob China in January-March. This was up 1.5% from $6.60/kg a year earlier.

The increase tracked higher domestic titanium sponge prices. Export pricing therefore reflected cost support in China rather than a broad surge in overseas demand.

The modest price rise also shows that the market remains balanced. Chinese suppliers have support from domestic costs, but overseas buyers are still cautious and selective.

For global titanium supply chains, the key issue is not only volume. The quality, qualification status and end-use requirements of sponge matter, especially for aerospace and high-performance industrial applications.

China’s titanium sponge exports remain important for regional buyers in Asia and Europe. However, demand from aerospace-linked customers will depend on downstream order visibility, inventory levels and qualification confidence.

If Japanese buying resumes in May and South Korean aerospace-related demand improves, Chinese exports could recover further. But weak US flows suggest that trade and inventory factors will continue to limit upside in some markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China titanium sponge exports show a market supported by regional buying but still constrained by aerospace order timing and inventory drawdowns. The next signal will come from whether Japanese and South Korean buyers return with stronger qualified-material demand in the second quarter.

China EU Dual-Use Export Controls Raise Rare Earth Supply Risk for Europe

China EU

China EU dual-use export controls have escalated after Beijing added seven military-related European entities to its export control list. The move signals a sharper trade dispute between China and the EU and could increase uncertainty around rare earths and critical metals supply to Europe.

China EU dual-use export controls prohibit domestic exporters from supplying listed entities with controlled dual-use goods, technologies and services. Overseas organisations and individuals are also barred from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to those entities.

China EU dual-use export controls are significant because rare earths, tungsten, antimony, germanium and gallium have all gained stronger military and strategic relevance. Many of these materials are already covered by China’s dual-use export control framework.

The targeted entities include defence, aerospace and military-linked companies in Europe. Beijing said the companies had engaged in arms sales to Taiwan or had links with Taiwan-related activity.

Rare Earths and Critical Metals Become Trade Policy Tools

China’s decision marks the first time Beijing has imposed dual-use export restrictions specifically targeting EU entities. It shows that critical materials policy is increasingly being used as a geopolitical instrument.

The move follows growing friction between China and the EU, including disputes around cybersecurity rules and alleged discriminatory treatment of Chinese companies. Beijing has warned that it could take broader countermeasures if Chinese firms continue to face restrictions.

This matters for Europe because the region remains a major buyer of Chinese rare earths and critical minerals. The Netherlands, Italy, France and Spain all received rare earth shipments from China in the first quarter.

Rare earths are essential for permanent magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace components and precision electronics. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are especially important for high-performance magnets used in demanding operating environments.

Other controlled critical metals also carry strategic weight. Tungsten is used in hard metals, defence systems and high-temperature applications. Antimony supports flame retardants, ammunition and alloys. Germanium and gallium are critical for semiconductors, optics, satellites and power electronics.

China’s use of export controls has become more systematic. Beijing has already tightened critical minerals exports to Japan this year, which disrupted shipments of dysprosium and terbium and forced buyers to seek alternative supply.

Europe Faces Higher Security Premiums for Heavy Rare Earths

Europe’s immediate risk is not a full loss of Chinese supply. The more likely impact is higher compliance risk, licensing uncertainty and greater pressure on buyers that need controlled materials for defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

This could widen the security premium for non-China rare earths and minor metals. Buyers without reliable export licences may need to pay more for material available in the Atlantic market.

Heavy rare earth prices outside China have already surged because of tight availability and stronger Japanese buying. Yttrium oxide prices in Europe have climbed sharply this year, reflecting the scarcity of prompt non-China supply.

If EU-China tensions continue, European buyers may accelerate efforts to diversify supply. That could benefit projects in Australia, Brazil, Estonia, the US and other jurisdictions trying to build rare earth separation, metal-making and magnet capacity outside China.

However, diversification will not be quick. Rare earth supply chains require mining, separation, refining, metal conversion, alloying and magnet manufacturing. Each stage needs qualification, capital and technical expertise.

For European manufacturers, the policy signal is clear. Critical metals procurement can no longer rely only on price and delivery time. Buyers must now evaluate origin risk, licensing exposure, dual-use classification and strategic inventory needs.

The broader market implication is that China’s critical minerals controls are becoming a routine part of trade policy. Europe must now treat rare earths and minor metals as supply-chain security issues, not just raw material inputs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s latest export control move shows that rare earths and minor metals are becoming geopolitical leverage points. Europe’s challenge is no longer just finding alternative supply, but building a complete industrial chain that can survive licensing shocks.

Asia-Pacific Growth Slows as US-Iran Conflict Raises Energy and Trade Risks

ADB(The Asian Development Bank)

Asia-Pacific growth is expected to slow in 2026 and 2027 as the US-Iran conflict and renewed trade uncertainty weigh on the region’s economic outlook. The Asian Development Bank now forecasts regional growth of 5.1% in both years, down from 5.4% in 2025.

Asia-Pacific growth was stronger last year because companies front-loaded exports before US tariff increases, semiconductor demand stayed high, and private consumption remained firm. But the ADB said the Middle East conflict now presents the largest risk to the region.

Asia-Pacific growth remains supported by domestic demand, steady labour markets and public infrastructure spending. However, prolonged disruption could raise energy and food prices, tighten financial conditions and weaken industrial momentum across key manufacturing economies.

Energy Shock Threatens Inflation and Industrial Demand

The ADB based its latest outlook on assumptions finalised in early March, shortly after the war began. Those assumptions expected the conflict to stabilise early, but the bank said later evidence now points to a higher risk of prolonged disruption.

Regional inflation is projected at 3.6% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027 under the early-stabilisation scenario. If the conflict lasts through the third quarter, inflation could rise to 5.6% in 2026.

This matters for metals and manufacturing because Asia remains central to global supply chains for steel, aluminium, copper products, batteries, semiconductors, electronics and automotive components. Higher energy costs could pressure margins, slow investment and reduce demand for industrial raw materials.

Trade uncertainty adds another risk. Export front-loading helped 2025 growth, but that support is fading as manufacturers adjust to tariffs, weaker global trade and shifting procurement strategies.

China, India and Asean Face Uneven Growth Paths

China’s growth is forecast to slow to 4.6% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027, from 5% last year. Subdued private consumption, property market weakness and slower export expansion are expected to weigh on activity.

The Chinese slowdown remains important for global metals markets. China is the largest consumer of many industrial and battery metals, so weaker growth can quickly affect copper, aluminium, nickel, zinc, rare earths and lithium demand expectations.

India’s growth is forecast to fall to 6.9% this year from 7.6% last year, before recovering to 7.3% in 2027. Resilient domestic consumption, recent trade agreements and structural reforms are expected to support the rebound.

Asean growth is projected at 4.6% in both 2026 and 2027, slightly below 4.8% in 2025. Infrastructure spending and domestic demand should provide stability, but weaker exports and fading front-loading effects could limit manufacturing momentum.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The ADB forecast shows that Asia’s growth engine is still running, but energy security and trade risk are becoming stronger constraints. For metals markets, the key issue is whether infrastructure spending can offset weaker exports and higher industrial costs.

Indonesia Nickel Export Tax Delay Keeps Ore Pricing Uncertainty in Focus

Indonesia Nickel Factory

Indonesia nickel export tax implementation was postponed from its original 1 April start date as authorities continued to finalise the technical formula and applicable rates. The delay kept uncertainty high across the nickel ore and stainless steel supply chain.

Indonesia nickel export tax discussions now centre on how changes to the Harga Patokan Mineral pricing system will be calculated. Market participants are watching which reference prices and contained elements will be used in the revised ore pricing formula.

Indonesia nickel export tax uncertainty has already affected buying behaviour. With stainless steel demand broadly stable, some buyers have adopted a wait-and-see approach because future import costs could rise once the tax structure is confirmed.

HPM Formula Review Could Broaden Nickel Ore Valuation

The key issue is whether Indonesia will expand the HPM formula beyond nickel content. Cobalt content in nickel ore is considered one of the most likely additions, while iron and chromium are also being discussed.

This would mark a meaningful change from the previous pricing approach. The Harga Mineral Acuan has largely used London Metal Exchange nickel prices as the main benchmark, but cobalt, iron and chromium create a more complex valuation problem.

The challenge is that not all of these elements have clear futures-based reference prices. Authorities therefore need to decide which benchmarks, market data or calculation methods should apply before the export tax can be implemented.

Export Tax Delay Still Leaves Cost Pressure on Buyers

Market participants expect the nickel export tax to follow a structure similar to Indonesia’s coal export levy. Potential rates could be set at 5%, 8% and 11%, depending on price levels.

However, it remains unclear which nickel products would ultimately fall under the tax. This lack of clarity matters because Indonesia’s nickel supply chain covers ore, intermediate products, stainless-related materials and battery-linked products.

The delay gives buyers short-term relief, but it does not remove the policy risk. Once implemented, the export tax could raise nickel import costs, affect procurement strategies and change the economics of ore supply into regional processing and stainless steel markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s nickel export tax delay shows how difficult it is to tax mineral value when ore chemistry becomes more complex. The inclusion of cobalt, iron or chromium could make the policy more sophisticated, but it also increases pricing uncertainty for buyers and processors.

EU Zinc Imports Fell in 2025 as Dutch and German Demand Weakened

Zinc

EU zinc imports declined in 2025 as weaker buying from the Netherlands and Germany outweighed stronger flows into Italy and Belgium. EU countries imported 1mn t of refined 99.99pc grade unwrought zinc, down 3.2% from the previous year.

EU zinc imports remained closely tied to Europe’s uneven industrial demand. Zinc consumption depends heavily on galvanizing, construction, automotive parts, die casting, infrastructure and manufacturing activity, all of which faced mixed conditions across the region.

EU zinc imports also showed a shift in regional trade flows. The Netherlands remained the largest importer, but its volumes fell sharply, while Italy recorded a strong increase from May onward.

Netherlands and Germany Led the Import Decline

The Netherlands accounted for 22.5% of EU refined zinc imports in 2025, with about 225,950t. However, this was down by roughly 21% on the year, showing weaker intake from Europe’s main zinc import hub.

Germany, the second-largest importer, also reduced purchases. Its imports fell by 10.6% to nearly 198,400t, reflecting continued pressure from weak construction and manufacturing activity.

Belgium moved in the opposite direction, with imports rising by 1.1% to 171,600t. Italy posted the strongest increase among major buyers, with imports rising by 60% to 140,100t after firm year-on-year gains every month from May.

Spain Increased Zinc Supply as Finland and Belgium Fell

Spain became a stronger supplier within the EU refined zinc market in 2025. The country accounted for just over 180,800t of member states’ imports, up 42% from the previous year.

But Spain’s gains were offset by lower deliveries from Finland and Belgium. Finland’s exports fell by 27.4% to 156,180t, while Belgium’s exports declined by 17.7% to nearly 118,600t.

LME three-month zinc prices averaged $2,853/t in 2025, up 1.5% from the previous year. The modest price increase showed some recovery after weak construction and poor manufacturing activity weighed on zinc prices in 2024, but it did not signal a strong demand rebound.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The decline in EU zinc imports shows that Europe’s refined zinc market is still being shaped by weak industrial demand rather than supply shortage. Italy’s stronger buying is notable, but the broader picture remains cautious while construction and manufacturing activity stay uneven.

Australia EU Trade Deal Secures Critical Raw Materials Supply

Australia, EU trade

Australia EU trade deal negotiations have concluded after eight years, giving the EU a new framework to secure stable access to critical raw materials. The agreement targets minerals including lithium, bauxite, manganese, tantalum, nickel, cobalt, copper, and rare earth oxides.

The Australia EU trade deal will cut or remove bilateral tariffs on critical raw materials and value-added mineral products. This gives European manufacturers a more reliable supply route at a time when tariffs, export controls, and geopolitical pressure are reshaping global materials trade.

The agreement also strengthens Australia’s position as a preferred critical minerals partner for Europe. Australia produces around a third of global lithium and remains a major supplier of bauxite, iron ore, zirconium, and rare earth elements.

Critical Minerals Access Becomes Central to EU Trade Policy

The EU is using the Australia EU trade deal to reduce exposure to China-dominated supply chains and rising US tariff risks. The agreement reflects Brussels’ shift from traditional trade liberalisation toward strategic supply chain security.

Critical raw materials are now central to European industrial policy because they support batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy, defence systems, aerospace, electronics, and advanced manufacturing. Stable access to lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, and rare earths will determine how quickly Europe can scale clean-energy manufacturing.

The deal also includes deeper co-operation on critical raw materials, including possible co-financing of key projects. This matters because Europe needs not only raw mineral access, but also investment in processing, refining, and value-added material production.

Australia Gains Strategic Value as Europe Diversifies Supply

Australia stands to gain economically and strategically from the agreement. The deal is expected to add about $7 billion per year to the Australian economy, while European producers could save more than $1.1 billion in tariffs over the next decade.

The timing is important because Europe is rapidly diversifying its strategic trade partnerships. The EU recently moved forward with trade agreements involving Mercosur and India, showing that Brussels is building a wider network of reliable raw material and manufacturing partners.

The Australia agreement still requires approval by a majority of EU member states and consent from the European Parliament before ratification is complete. However, the strategic direction is already clear: Europe wants critical minerals supply from partners with stable governance, developed mining capacity, and lower geopolitical risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Australia EU trade deal shows that critical minerals have moved from procurement strategy to trade architecture. Europe is no longer simply buying raw materials; it is building alliances to secure the minerals, processing capacity, and industrial resilience needed for the energy transition.

Battery Metals Mining Diesel Disruption Raises New Supply Chain Risk

Battery Metals Mining

Battery metals mining diesel disruption could become an immediate operational risk if the Middle East fuel crisis continues to restrict diesel and gasoil flows. Mining operations that rely heavily on diesel for haulage, transport, drilling, and remote-site activity are the most directly exposed.

The pressure will not affect every part of the battery supply chain equally. Upstream mining faces the clearest fuel availability and cost risk, while refining and processing may feel the impact later through logistics delays, higher freight costs, and reduced primary feedstock availability.

Battery metals mining diesel disruption is most relevant for parts of southern Africa, Australia, and southeast Asia. These regions host major copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel operations, but their fuel exposure differs sharply by power source, transport route, and mine configuration.

Southern African Copper and Cobalt Face Fuel Logistics Pressure

The DRC and Zambia could face early pressure if diesel flows remain disrupted. Ports in South Africa and Tanzania reportedly had around two months of diesel stock moving inland, but mining operators may need to reduce fuel use by mid-April if the Strait of Hormuz does not reopen soon.

The risk is significant because the copper-cobalt belt depends on diesel for logistics, open-pit haulage, mine-site activity, and some ore concentration processes. The DRC relies heavily on hydroelectricity for power, but diesel generators remain important in areas with limited grid access and for backup supply.

Zambia also plays a crucial logistics role between the copperbelt and key export ports, including Durban. Fuel shortages along these routes could slow truck movements, disrupt concentrate and cathode shipments, and add costs across copper and cobalt supply chains.

Australia Lithium and Indonesia Nickel Show Different Exposure Profiles

Australia appears acutely exposed because it imports most of its diesel from Asia, which in turn depends heavily on Middle East supply. The country has already lowered fuel standards in preparation for supply chain disruption, while cancelled fuel shipments have raised concerns about supply from the second half of April.

Hard-rock lithium mining in Australia could be one of the most fuel-sensitive parts of the battery metals chain. Major spodumene operations such as Greenbushes, Pilgangoora, and Mt Marion rely on diesel for haulage, drilling, and remote-site logistics, even though crushing, grinding, and concentration use more electricity.

Indonesia’s nickel sector is more insulated from immediate fuel disruption because many processing operations rely on captive coal-fired power. However, nickel mining still needs diesel for extraction and internal logistics, while the sector remains exposed to sulfur, sulfuric acid, shipping, and broader energy cost risks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Battery metals mining diesel disruption shows that energy security is now part of critical mineral security. The market often focuses on ore grades and processing capacity, but fuel logistics can decide whether copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel supply actually reaches the next stage of the value chain.

Brazil Critical Minerals Processing Stance Hardens as Lula Challenges Raw Export Model

Lula, Critical Minerals

Brazil critical minerals processing has become a tougher condition in the country’s negotiations with foreign partners. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has made local processing, refining, and upstream investment central requirements for companies seeking access to Brazil’s critical minerals projects.

The harder position followed a critical minerals and rare earths forum hosted by Amcham, where the state of Goias signed a preliminary cooperation agreement with the US on rare earth development. The federal government did not attend the forum, but the political signal was strong enough to trigger a sharper response from Lula.

Brazil critical minerals processing is now positioned as a sovereignty issue, not only a mining policy issue. Lula argued that Brazil and other resource-rich countries should no longer export raw minerals while higher-value processing and industrial gains are captured elsewhere.

Lula Pushes End-to-End Critical Minerals Value Chain

Lula’s position reflects a clear demand for an end-to-end critical minerals value chain inside Brazil. He said Brazil should earn more from its resources by adding processing capacity, rather than remaining only a raw mineral exporter.

The Goias agreement with the US allows cooperation on state-tax exemptions, financing, and technical knowledge. However, it does not grant exploration or research rights, which remain under federal authority.

This distinction matters. State governments can support investment conditions, but Brazil’s federal government still controls the strategic framework for mineral access. That gives Lula strong leverage over any broader US-Brazil critical minerals agreement.

US Negotiations Face Brazil’s Processing Conditions

The US has been seeking a critical minerals agreement with Brazil for months, but Brazil has proven to be one of the toughest negotiators in South America. Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru have already signed bilateral critical minerals agreements with the US.

Brazil is taking a different position because its resource base is unusually strong. The country has the world’s largest niobium reserves and production, the second-largest rare earths and graphite reserves, the third-largest nickel reserves, and the sixth-largest lithium reserves.

Brazil critical minerals processing is therefore becoming the key obstacle and the key opportunity. If foreign partners want access to Brazil’s rare earths, lithium, nickel, graphite, and niobium, Lula wants them to support domestic refining, processing, and industrial development.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil is trying to avoid becoming another raw-material supplier in the global critical minerals race. Lula’s stance may slow foreign agreements, but it could also force better terms for domestic processing, refining, and industrial value creation.

Japan US Critical Minerals Cooperation Expands Into Deep-Sea Resources and Recycling

US, Japan critical minerals Cooperation

Japan US critical minerals cooperation is moving into a broader strategic phase as both countries seek more resilient supply chains for rare earths, copper, nickel, and battery materials. Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi and US president Donald Trump agreed to expand collaboration during a summit in Washington.

Japan US critical minerals cooperation now includes an initial agreement on deep-sea mineral development. The agreement covers resources such as rare earth-rich mud around Minamitorishima and manganese nodules, which could become alternative supply sources outside conventional land-based mining.

Japan US critical minerals cooperation also reflects a shared concern over China’s dominant position in rare earth separation and refining. Both governments are trying to combine Japanese technology, US regulatory frameworks, and private-sector investment to accelerate non-China supply options.

Deep-Sea Minerals Add a New Layer to Rare Earth Security

Deep-sea mineral development could become a strategic supply route for rare earths and other critical minerals. Japan has long studied rare earth-rich mud near Minamitorishima, while manganese nodules offer potential exposure to metals used in batteries, alloys, and advanced industrial systems.

The new working group between Japan’s trade and industry ministry Meti and the US Department of Commerce will focus on technical cooperation. This structure suggests both governments want to move beyond political statements and build practical project-level collaboration.

The industrial meaning is clear. Rare earth supply security depends not only on mining rights, but also on separation technology, environmental standards, financing, and downstream demand from magnets, EV motors, defense systems, and renewable energy equipment.

Recycling, Copper, and Nickel Projects Broaden the Supply Chain Agenda

The summit also highlighted private-sector initiatives that extend beyond deep-sea resources. Mitsubishi Materials is considering cooperation with ReElement Technologies on rare earth recycling in Indiana, targeting recovery from used magnets and other secondary sources.

This recycling angle is important because magnet scrap can become a strategic rare earth feedstock. It also reduces dependence on primary mining and supports a circular supply model for high-value elements such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.

Mitsubishi is also advancing a feasibility study for the Copper World project in Arizona, where it holds a 30pc stake alongside Hudbay Minerals. The project aims to produce around 100,000 tonnes per year of copper from around 2029, strengthening North American copper supply for electrification, grids, and manufacturing.

Sumitomo Metal Mining’s plan to expand nickel matte production at its Hyuga smelter adds another battery materials dimension. Supported by Meti subsidies under Japan’s economic security framework, the project links Japanese refining capacity with battery material security for both Japan and the US.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Japan-US agenda shows that critical minerals cooperation is no longer limited to mining deals. The real strategy is to connect deep-sea resources, recycling, copper projects, nickel refining, and government-backed industrial policy into one supply chain security framework.

US Chile Critical Minerals Talks Signal New Supply Chain Reset

US Chile Critical Minerals

US Chile critical minerals cooperation is moving onto a formal diplomatic track after the two countries signed a joint declaration to begin discussions on critical minerals and rare earths. The agreement was signed in Santiago during a meeting between Chilean president José Antonio Kast and US deputy secretary of state Christopher Landau.

US Chile critical minerals talks will focus on mechanisms to strengthen supply chains for strategic raw materials. Chile’s foreign affairs ministry said technical teams will examine projects of interest, scrap management for critical minerals and rare earths, and public-private financing mechanisms.

US Chile critical minerals cooperation carries direct industrial importance because Chile is one of the world’s most important resource economies. The country is the largest global copper producer and the third-largest lithium producer, while its large lithium reserves remain underdeveloped because of long-standing legal restrictions.

Chile’s Copper and Lithium Base Gives the Talks Strategic Weight

Chile’s mineral position gives the US a clear reason to rebuild cooperation. Copper is central to power grids, electrification, data centers, renewable energy, industrial equipment, and defense systems. Lithium remains essential for batteries, energy storage, and electric vehicles.

The new talks also include rare earths and scrap management. That broader scope suggests the discussions are not limited to mining projects. They may also cover recycling, secondary raw materials, processing routes, and financing structures that can support a more resilient supply chain.

Chile’s untapped lithium potential is especially important. The country has the world’s largest lithium reserves, but development has been constrained by legacy laws and policy limits. If cooperation creates more investable project structures, Chile could become a more active pillar in allied battery material supply.

US Policy Shift Reopens a Critical Minerals Channel With Chile

The declaration also marks a reset in US-Chile relations after a tense period under former president Gabriel Boric. Washington had moved ahead with critical minerals partnerships with other allies earlier this year, but Chile was not included in the initial initiative.

That omission made Chile’s absence notable. Any serious Western critical minerals strategy is difficult to build without Chile because of its copper and lithium position. The new declaration therefore signals a practical return to resource diplomacy.

For Chile, the discussions could open access to financing, technology, and downstream partnerships. For the US, they offer a pathway to reduce exposure to concentrated supply chains and secure materials needed for industrial competitiveness, energy security, and defense resilience.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US cannot build a credible critical minerals strategy without Chile. The key question is whether this declaration becomes a real project-financing framework or remains another diplomatic signal without industrial execution.

Panama Canal Ports Takeover Raises New Geopolitical Risk for Global Supply Chains

Panama Canal Ports

Panama canal ports have entered a new phase of geopolitical scrutiny after Panama formally took over the Cristobal and Balboa terminals. The move follows a supreme court ruling that cancelled concessions held by a Hong Kong-based operator and reshaped control at both entrances to the canal.

The Panama canal ports are strategically important because they sit on the Atlantic and Pacific sides of one of the world’s most critical trade corridors. For metals, mining, energy, and manufacturing supply chains, the canal remains a key logistics route linking the Americas, Asia, and Europe.

Panama’s government said the takeover will allow uninterrupted operations while it prepares a tender within 18 months for a long-term operator. APM Terminals will operate Balboa on the Pacific side, while MSC will run Cristobal on the Atlantic side.

Port Control Becomes a Strategic Trade Issue

The Panama port takeover reflects how infrastructure ownership has become a core industrial policy issue. Ports, canals, shipping terminals, and logistics hubs are no longer viewed as neutral assets. They are increasingly tied to national security, supply chain resilience, and geopolitical alignment.

CK Hutchison’s subsidiary PPC had managed the Cristobal and Balboa terminals under a 25-year contract renewed in 2021. However, Panama’s supreme court ruled that the operating terms violated the constitution and were no longer valid. CK Hutchison called the takeover unlawful.

The dispute also carries a wider geopolitical dimension. The US has repeatedly argued that CK Hutchison’s role at the ports created Chinese influence over canal logistics. Panama rejected claims that the canal had fallen under Beijing’s control, while stressing that the Panama Canal Authority operates as an autonomous agency.

Canal Logistics Remain Critical for Metals and Industrial Trade

Canal logistics are essential for global commodity flows because many industrial supply chains depend on predictable maritime routing. Copper concentrates, aluminum products, energy materials, steel inputs, manufactured goods, and mining equipment all rely on stable port and shipping networks.

The immediate operational risk appears contained because Panama has appointed APM Terminals and MSC to keep the ports running. However, the longer-term tender process will be closely watched by shipping groups, traders, manufacturers, and governments. Future operators will influence cost, reliability, and strategic confidence around the canal corridor.

The dispute also shows how global infrastructure transactions face stronger political review. BlackRock’s planned purchase of Cristobal, Balboa, and other terminals from CK Hutchison had already been delayed amid objections from China. That delay underlines how ports are now contested assets in the wider competition for supply chain control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Panama canal ports dispute shows that logistics infrastructure is becoming as strategic as raw materials themselves. For industrial companies, the lesson is clear: supply chain risk now includes port ownership, political alignment, and maritime chokepoint governance.

US-Ecuador Trade Deal Could Open a New Path for Ecuadorian Copper Exports

US-Ecuador

The US-Ecuador trade deal could reshape trade flows for metals and other industrial goods. Ecuador and the US completed negotiations on a reciprocal agreement that will allow about half of Ecuadorian exports to enter the US tariff-free. That group includes copper, lead, and gold. As a result, the US-Ecuador trade deal could create a new opening for Ecuadorian copper exports.

This matters because copper concentrate from Ecuador currently faces tariffs in the US. Those duties raise the cost of entry and reduce Ecuador’s competitiveness in the American market. Removing that barrier could improve the commercial case for future shipments. Therefore, the US-Ecuador trade deal may become more important for copper trade than current export patterns suggest.

At present, Ecuadorian copper exports are heavily concentrated elsewhere. Most copper concentrate shipments go to China, with smaller volumes going to Peru and South Korea. Ecuador exported no copper to the US in 2025 despite strong overall copper concentrate growth. Consequently, the US-Ecuador trade deal could diversify export destinations even if change is gradual at first.

Ecuadorian Copper Exports Could Become Less China-Centric

Ecuadorian copper exports have grown strongly, but they remain concentrated in one market. From January to November 2025, Ecuador exported more than 605,000t of copper concentrate globally. Revenue reached about $1.5bn over that period. However, 96.5pc of that volume went to China.

That concentration creates both scale and risk. China offers strong demand, but overdependence on one destination can limit bargaining power and trade flexibility. A tariff-free path into the US would give Ecuador another strategic outlet. As a result, Ecuadorian copper exports could become more balanced over time.

The shift will not happen automatically. Trade agreements can open doors, but actual volumes depend on commercial relationships, treatment terms, logistics, and buyer interest. Even so, tariff-free copper trade would improve Ecuador’s position in future negotiations. Therefore, the US-Ecuador trade deal gives Ecuador more optionality in a critical export sector.

Ecuador Non-Oil Exports Gain a Broader Strategic Boost

Ecuador non-oil exports could also benefit far beyond copper. The agreement covers dozens of products, including metals, agricultural goods, and fisheries products. Ecuador expects the deal to lift non-oil exports to the US by about 15pc each year. That would support a broader diversification strategy across the economy.

This wider context matters for metals as well. A stronger trade framework can improve investor confidence in export-oriented mining and processing. It can also encourage companies to think more seriously about the US as a destination market. Meanwhile, tariff-free copper trade would fit neatly into a broader non-oil export expansion plan.

The agreement also arrives at a time when the US wants more secure and diversified supply chains across the Americas. That creates a favorable backdrop for Ecuadorian producers seeking new buyers. As a result, the US-Ecuador trade deal could gain strategic value beyond its immediate tariff effects.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal matters because it gives Ecuador a chance to reduce export concentration without abandoning its strongest market. The biggest opportunity is not instant copper volume to the US. It is the creation of a second serious commercial path for Ecuador’s growing metals sector.

US-India Trade Deal Could Reshape Energy, Metals, and Industrial Supply Chains

India, US energy

The US-India trade deal could become a major reset for energy, metals, and industrial supply chains. India has committed to buying $500bn of US energy commodities, coking coal, aircraft, precious metals, and technology products over five years. The agreement also includes planned US tariff relief for Indian imports. As a result, the US-India trade deal could deepen strategic trade ties between two major industrial economies.

This matters because the deal reaches far beyond consumer goods. It covers energy, aviation, metals, technology, and data-server components. These are the same sectors now shaping global manufacturing security. Therefore, the US-India trade deal looks like an industrial alignment package, not only a tariff adjustment.

The White House also plans to cut the general tariff on Indian imports to 18pc from 25pc. President Donald Trump separately removed an additional 25pc tariff tied to pressure over Russian crude imports. Consequently, US India tariff relief could improve India’s access to the American market while supporting broader trade normalization.

India US Energy Purchases Could Strengthen Strategic Trade Flows

India US energy purchases are the largest headline in the agreement. The $500bn commitment includes US energy commodities and coking coal, both important for India’s industrial growth. That could support long-term flows in LNG, oil, coal, and related energy trade. As a result, India may become an even more important demand center for US energy exporters.

The inclusion of coking coal is especially relevant for steel and infrastructure. India continues to expand its manufacturing and construction base. Secure access to metallurgical coal can support steel output and industrial investment. Therefore, India US energy purchases also carry implications for metals and infrastructure supply chains.

Tariff Relief Could Support Metals, Aircraft, and Technology Trade

US India tariff relief may open new opportunities across industrial categories. The US plans to remove tariffs on some aircraft and parts imported from India. It also plans relief for certain steel and copper imports. Consequently, Indian manufacturers could gain better access to US industrial buyers.

The agreement also includes a preferential tariff quota for Indian cars and auto parts. This could support India’s ambition to become a larger global automotive manufacturing hub. Meanwhile, India plans to reduce or eliminate tariffs on US industrial goods and many agricultural products. Therefore, the deal works in both directions, with each side seeking broader market access.

Data-server components add another important layer. Both countries committed to increasing trade in key products used to build data servers. That connects the agreement directly to AI infrastructure and digital supply chains. As a result, the US-India trade deal could support technology manufacturing as much as traditional commodity trade.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This agreement matters because it links trade policy with industrial strategy. Energy, coking coal, copper, steel, aircraft, and data-server components all sit inside the same strategic supply-chain conversation. If finalized as outlined, the deal could make US-India trade a stronger pillar of global industrial realignment.

Pakistan-Flagged Vessels Through Hormuz Offer a Limited but Important Shipping Signal

Hormuz

Pakistan-flagged vessels through Hormuz now offer one of the clearest signs of limited maritime easing. Iran approved 20 Pakistani-flagged ships to sail through the strait. The agreement allows two vessels per day. As a result, Pakistan-flagged vessels through Hormuz have become an important confidence signal for regional shipping.

The move matters because the strait has remained heavily restricted since the war began. Vessel traffic has been constrained by the threat of Iranian attack. Even small reopening measures can influence tanker sentiment and freight expectations. Therefore, Pakistan-flagged vessels through Hormuz now matter beyond Pakistan alone.

Two Pakistani-linked crude shipments have already shown that selective transit remains possible. One cargo moved from Das Island toward Karachi. Another passed Hormuz carrying crude from Ras Tanura to Karachi. Consequently, the agreement suggests controlled flows can continue under political protection.

Strait of Hormuz Shipping Still Faces Selective Access, Not Full Normalisation

Strait of Hormuz shipping remains far from normal despite this development. The new arrangement covers only a limited number of Pakistani-flagged vessels. It does not represent a broad reopening for global tanker traffic. However, it does show that diplomatic channels can still produce narrow shipping corridors.

This distinction is critical for energy and freight markets. Selective access may help individual cargoes move, but it does not remove wider war risk. Insurers, shipowners, and commodity buyers will still price in disruption. As a result, Gulf crude flows remain vulnerable to sudden policy or military shifts.

The political message also deserves attention. Pakistani officials described the arrangement as a step toward peace and diplomacy. Iran’s recent public appreciation of Pakistan’s support adds context to the deal. Therefore, the shipping approval appears linked to both maritime necessity and political alignment.

Gulf Crude Flows Gain a Small Relief Valve but Not a Lasting Solution

Gulf crude flows may gain temporary relief from this agreement. Allowing two vessels per day creates a narrow outlet for cargo movement. That could slightly ease local congestion and support short-term trade continuity. Meanwhile, the broader market still faces deep uncertainty over sustained access.

For oil and industrial supply chains, the implications remain mixed. Any successful passage supports confidence in regional logistics. Yet selective approvals also highlight how politicised shipping has become. Consequently, freight planning now depends as much on diplomacy as on port and tanker availability.

The wider lesson is clear. Markets should not mistake limited transit approvals for structural stability. Pakistan-flagged vessels through Hormuz may reduce immediate pressure for some cargoes. However, they do not remove the core risk surrounding the strait.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This is a useful shipping signal, but not a true reopening story. The Strait of Hormuz remains a geopolitical chokepoint where access can still depend on politics more than market logic. Until broader vessel traffic normalises, oil, freight, and industrial supply chains will stay exposed to volatility.

EU aluminium scrap export restriction consultation targets rising exports

EU, Aluminium scrap

EU aluminium scrap export restriction policy moved closer on 19 December. The European Commission opened a public consultation on limiting aluminium scrap exports. EU aluminium scrap export restriction aims to address tighter scrap availability in Europe. Therefore, recyclers and traders now face a clear policy timeline.

The consultation asks market participants to comment on trade defence options. Respondents must complete a questionnaire by 31 January. Meanwhile, the Commission will review responses before drafting final measures. The Commission plans to adopt the package in spring 2026.

The consultation tests export duties and tariff rate quotas

The consultation covers export duties and tariff rate quotas for aluminium scrap. These tools can slow outbound flows without banning trade outright. However, the Commission must calibrate measures to avoid unintended disruptions. Therefore, stakeholder feedback will shape the final design.

The Commission framed the process as an economic security and industrial resilience step. Officials want more scrap to stay within EU recycling loops. Meanwhile, downstream buyers want stable pricing and reliable secondary supply. As a result, the policy will influence contracting and inventory strategies.

Aluminium scrap exports squeeze recyclers and reshape pricing power

Aluminium scrap exports rose sharply over recent years. The Commission cited a 50% export increase from 2019 to 1.2mn tonnes in 2024. Higher external bids lifted European scrap prices. As a result, secondary aluminium producers saw margins tighten.

Secondary aluminium supports low-carbon aluminium goals and circular economy targets. However, scrap scarcity can push producers back toward primary metal. Therefore, the EU aluminium scrap export restriction debate links directly to decarbonisation policy. Companies will likely accelerate sorting, upgrading, and closed-loop scrap programs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This consultation signals a shift from monitoring to intervention in EU scrap flows. However, the final impact depends on quota levels and enforcement quality. The winners will secure domestic scrap streams before spring 2026 rules arrive.

IMF pressure on China trade surplus intensifies as exports surge

IMF

IMF pressure on China trade surplus is rising as exports accelerate. International Monetary Fund flagged an undervalued currency signal in its 10 December update. As a result, IMF pressure on China trade surplus could widen policy debate in Beijing.

China’s trade surplus reached $1tn during January–November. That level already topped the prior record set in 2024. Meanwhile, trade frictions with the United States and the European Union have intensified.

Currency and inflation dynamics now sit at the center

China manages the yuan through a flexible peg to the US dollar. Therefore, any appreciation can cool exports and lift imports. However, policymakers also weigh growth stability against external criticism.

The IMF linked low inflation versus trading partners to real exchange rate depreciation. That dynamic can amplify export competitiveness. Consequently, it can also worsen external imbalances during a record surplus.

Commodity demand ties back to export-led growth

China remains the world’s largest commodity importer across key raw materials. However, that demand still leans on an export-driven engine. For example, strong goods exports can support naphtha use and related crude imports.

The IMF urged reforms to reduce debt and rebalance growth toward consumption. Kristalina Georgieva warned that export-led growth can raise global trade tensions. Therefore, IMF pressure on China trade surplus may persist until domestic demand strengthens.

China still showed resilience in the IMF assessment. The IMF said China contributes about 30% of global growth. It also lifted China’s GDP outlook to 5% this year and 4.5% in 2026.

The Metalnomist Commentary

A prolonged surplus can reshape metals flows through policy, tariffs, and FX moves. However, a stronger yuan could cool export-linked industrial demand. Therefore, traders should watch currency signals alongside stimulus headlines.

Aircraft supply chain delays to last into 2030s

IATA

Aircraft supply chain delays will constrain airline growth into the 2030s, IATA warns. Aircraft supply chain delays now reflect worsening bottlenecks across engines, materials, and electronics. Therefore, airlines cannot replace older jets fast enough.

Aircraft supply chain delays may not ease before 2031–2034, according to IATA’s assessment. Delivery shortfalls total about 5,300 aircraft, while the backlog exceeds 17,000. Meanwhile, that backlog equals nearly 12 years of current production capacity.

Engine shortages and tariffs amplify production bottlenecks

Engine output now lags airframe output, creating parked “gliders” awaiting powerplants. As a result, final deliveries slip even when factories finish fuselages and wings. However, this imbalance also disrupts tier suppliers across castings, forgings, and precision machining.

Tariffs linked to United States–China trade tensions raise costs for metals and electronics used in aircraft builds. Therefore, input inflation can slow procurement and extend lead times. Meanwhile, aerospace-grade metals markets face choppier demand signals from shifting schedules.

Airlines pay the fuel and maintenance bill

Next-generation aircraft typically deliver more than 20% better fuel efficiency than older fleets. However, aircraft supply chain delays keep older aircraft flying longer. As a result, airlines burn more jet fuel than they would with faster fleet renewal.

An Oliver Wyman study with IATA estimated excess 2025 fuel costs above $4.2bn from older aircraft use. Meanwhile, average fleet age has reached about 15.1 years. Therefore, maintenance intensity rises and reliability planning becomes harder.

The same study estimated additional 2025 maintenance costs at about $3.1bn. As a result, the total cost burden from these delays reaches roughly $11bn for 2025. However, airlines still face demand growth that outpaces available capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Aircraft supply chain delays now look structural, not cyclical, for this decade. Therefore, metals suppliers should plan for volatile call-offs and stricter qualification demands. Meanwhile, OEMs will likely pursue tighter vertical control and dual sourcing.

US-China critical minerals trade masks big strategic risks

US-China Critical minerals

The US-China critical minerals trade looks small in dollar terms but carries outsized strategic risks for key industries. The US-China critical minerals trade was worth just $2bn in 2024, only 3pc of US critical mineral imports. However, the US-China critical minerals trade underpins defence, high-tech manufacturing and energy systems that generate trillions in economic value.

Small trade volumes, large exposure to China

Macquarie research shows US critical mineral imports totalled $65bn in 2024 under the new 60-mineral list. Bulk materials like aluminium, copper and PGMs dominate the import bill and come mainly from partners such as Canada and Chile. By contrast, China supplied only $2bn, far below Canada’s $21bn or Chile’s $6.6bn.

However, China’s leverage rests in concentration, not value. It controls about 70pc of global rare earth mining and 90pc of processing. As a result, even small tonnages of Chinese exports can be mission-critical for US defence and advanced manufacturing. Any targeted export controls could therefore disrupt high-value supply chains well beyond the trade numbers.

Export controls could hit US GDP and strategic sectors

Macquarie estimates Chinese export controls on select minerals could each cut US GDP by more than $1bn in a year. Samarium restrictions show the highest impact, at an estimated $4.5bn loss, because of its critical role in defence. Meanwhile, curbs on lutetium could shave $2.1bn from GDP, mainly affecting refineries and semiconductor producers.

Controls on terbium, dysprosium and gallium would similarly reverberate across magnets, EV motors, wind turbines and high-frequency electronics. Therefore the economic risk from the US-China critical minerals trade lies in concentrated choke points, not headline trade flows. That reality is now shaping US industrial policy, stockpiling strategies and onshoring of processing capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This analysis reinforces why Washington treats rare earths and related metals as strategic assets, not simple commodities. Even modest Chinese export controls could ripple through defence, semiconductor and energy transition value chains. Expect continued moves by the US and allies to diversify sourcing, build domestic refining and expand recycling to reduce this asymmetric exposure.

Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments slide as trade defenses set stage for 2026 rebound

Ferroglobe

Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments dropped sharply in the third quarter, but Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments could stabilise as trade defenses strengthen. The company expects US and EU protectionist measures to support Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments and prices from 2025 into 2026. As a result, the producer is positioning for a cyclical rebound after a year of weak demand and heavy import pressure.

Silicon and FeSi under pressure from weak demand and low-priced imports

Ferroglobe’s silicon metal shipments fell 41pc year on year in the third quarter to 33,561t as chemicals demand weakened. Average silicon metal prices dropped 13.3pc to $2,950/t, pressured by low-priced imports from third countries into the EU market. This combination of lower volumes and softer prices hit revenue and margins across its silicon portfolio.

Meanwhile, silicon-based alloy shipments slipped 5.5pc to 42,968t, reflecting reduced activity in steel and foundry sectors. Average selling prices for silicon-based alloys declined 3.9pc to $2,149/t, again under pressure from Asian imports into Europe. However, manganese-based alloys proved more resilient, with shipments rising 7.8pc to 69,552t and partially offsetting weakness in other segments.

European shutdown and trade protection reshape market outlook

Ferroglobe suspended all silicon metal production in Europe in October, citing an “urgent need” for EU trade measures. The decision highlights the strain facing European smelters exposed to high power costs and cheap imports. It also tightens regional supply, which could improve pricing power if safeguard measures take effect.

In the US, preliminary anti-dumping margins on silicon metal imports already support domestic producers. In the EU, a final decision on safeguard measures is due by 19 November and will be pivotal for market balance. If approved, these tools should reduce unfairly priced inflows and support a recovery in Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments and alloy utilization rates.

Looking ahead to a 2026 recovery cycle

Management acknowledges that current market conditions remain challenging, but guidance points to a more constructive backdrop from 2026. Trade defenses in the US and EU should gradually restore a more level playing field for integrated silicon producers. That will matter for Ferroglobe silicon metal shipments, which remain highly sensitive to both industrial demand and import price competition.

At the same time, any cyclical rebound in chemicals, steel and foundry sectors would lift alloy volumes and support margins. The firm’s diversified exposure to manganese-based alloys also provides some buffer during the silicon downturn. However, the timing and strength of recovery will depend on how quickly EU and US measures bite and how energy prices evolve.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ferroglobe’s strategy now rests on regulatory tailwinds as much as on market fundamentals. If EU safeguards and US anti-dumping actions materialise as expected, European silicon pricing could reset higher from 2026. For downstream consumers, that would mean structurally tighter silicon availability and greater incentive to lock in long-term, de-risked supply.