First Solar Module Guidance Holds as US Solar Manufacturing Scales

First Solar

First Solar module guidance remains unchanged for 2026 as the US thin-film solar manufacturer continues expanding domestic production while managing trade and policy uncertainty. The company expects to sell 17-18.2GW of modules this year, supporting projected sales of $4.9bn-5.2bn.

First Solar module guidance was reaffirmed after first-quarter module sales reached 3.8GW. Sales totalled slightly more than $1bn, up from $845.6mn a year earlier.

First Solar module guidance also reflects strong demand across the US and India. The company booked $1.7bn of new orders in the first quarter, showing that solar demand remains robust despite uncertainty around tariffs, investigations and energy policy.

The company expects second-quarter module sales of 3.4-4GW. Its contracted backlog stood at 47.9GW at the end of the quarter, worth about $14.4bn, with deliveries scheduled through 2030.

Trade Policy Shapes US Booking Strategy

First Solar said it will take a highly selective approach to US bookings while waiting for key trade policy outcomes. The company is watching the Section 232 investigation into polysilicon imports and the Section 337 investigation into solar cells and modules.

This matters because US solar manufacturing is increasingly shaped by trade rules, tax credits and reshoring policy. Producers must balance demand growth with the risk that tariff changes could alter pricing, margins and customer decisions.

First Solar produced 4.3GW of modules in the first quarter. Around 3GW came from US facilities, while 1.3GW came from international operations.

The company’s US plants ran at a 96% utilisation rate. By contrast, its Malaysia and Vietnam facilities remained underutilised because of tariff and policy uncertainty.

That split shows the advantage of domestic production in the current policy environment. US-made modules can benefit from stronger customer confidence, tax incentives and lower exposure to trade restrictions.

First Solar also expects Section 45X tax credits of $330mn-400mn in the second quarter, assuming the current US policy environment remains in place. These credits are a major support for domestic solar manufacturing economics.

Domestic Expansion Supports Reshoring Strategy

First Solar’s South Carolina finishing facility is expected to start production in the second half of this year. The facility will provide finishing capacity for Series 6 modules that begin production at overseas factories.

This expansion supports First Solar’s broader reshoring and localisation strategy. It allows the company to increase US-linked manufacturing content while maintaining flexibility across its global production network.

The company also completed the launch of its copper replacement technology at its Perrysburg, Ohio, facility at the end of the first quarter. This supports product development and manufacturing efficiency.

First Solar’s profit rose by 65% to $346.6mn in the first quarter. The increase shows that strong sales, high US utilisation and policy support are improving earnings.

The wider market signal is clear. Solar module demand remains strong, but the competitive landscape is being reshaped by trade investigations, domestic incentives and regional manufacturing strategies.

For materials and supply chains, this matters because solar production depends on stable access to glass, semiconductor materials, metals, chemicals, laminates and high-quality manufacturing equipment. Policy uncertainty can therefore influence not only module sales, but upstream material demand and factory utilisation.

First Solar’s maintained guidance shows confidence in demand. But the company’s selective booking strategy also shows that solar manufacturing is now as much about policy positioning as production capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

First Solar’s quarter shows that US solar manufacturing is being pulled forward by demand, tax credits and reshoring policy. The strategic risk is that trade uncertainty may keep global capacity underused even while domestic factories run near full utilisation.

France Fossil Fuel Roadmap Sets Clear Timetable for Energy Transition

Fossil fuel roadmap

France fossil fuel roadmap marks an important step in turning climate targets into a structured energy transition plan. The roadmap does not introduce new targets, but it brings France’s energy policies, electrification strategy and climate goals into one document.

France fossil fuel roadmap is significant because it gives a clear schedule for reducing fossil fuel dependence. France aims to cut fossil fuels from around 60% of final energy consumption in 2023 to 40% in 2030 and 30% in 2035.

France fossil fuel roadmap also sets long-term phase-out dates for coal, oil and natural gas. The government plans to phase out coal by 2030, oil by 2045 and natural gas by 2050, while targeting net zero emissions by mid-century.

The roadmap matters beyond France. It gives other governments a practical example of how fossil fuel transition planning can connect emissions targets, energy security, electrification and industrial strategy.

Electrification Becomes the Core of Fossil Fuel Reduction

France’s roadmap links fossil fuel reduction directly to electrification. The country’s new electrification plan, released in April, now sits alongside its national low-carbon strategy and wider climate targets.

This connection is important because fossil fuel phase-out cannot happen only through policy declarations. It requires more electricity, cleaner generation, stronger grids, electric heating, electric transport, industrial efficiency and lower-carbon manufacturing.

France also has an energy security reason to move faster. More than 95% of fossil fuels burned in the country are imported, exposing households and industry to external price shocks, shipping risks and geopolitical disruption.

Reducing imported fossil fuel use therefore serves two goals. It lowers emissions and reduces exposure to volatile global energy markets.

The roadmap reiterates France’s target to cut gross greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. It also supports the longer-term objective of net zero emissions in 2050.

France’s remaining two coal-fired power plants are scheduled to close or be converted by next year. This makes coal the easiest part of the transition, while oil and natural gas will require deeper changes across transport, buildings and industry.

For metals and materials markets, the roadmap points to rising demand for the physical infrastructure behind electrification. Copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, rare earth magnets, grid equipment and power electronics will all become more important as France cuts fossil fuel use.

The policy also strengthens the case for clean energy investment. A clearer timetable can help utilities, manufacturers, grid operators and industrial users plan capital spending around future energy demand.

Fossil Fuel Transition Planning Gains Global Momentum

Think tanks welcomed the French roadmap because few countries address coal, oil and gas together under one transition framework. They noted that France did not raise ambition, but still provided a useful model by setting timelines and aligning policies.

This matters because global climate diplomacy is moving from broad pledges toward implementation. The first global stocktake agreed at Cop 28 called for a transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, but many countries still lack detailed national plans.

France’s roadmap gives that commitment a national structure. It shows how governments can translate climate summit language into domestic policy sequencing.

The document also creates pressure on fossil fuel-producing countries. If demand for fossil fuels declines over the coming decades, producer economies will need diversification plans, new industries and alternative sources of public revenue.

Colombia’s draft fossil fuel transition roadmap shows that this discussion is widening. The country aims to cut primary fossil fuel demand by 90% over 2026-50 while expanding energy access and managing dependence on oil and coal exports.

The EU is also moving in the same direction, even if its language focuses more on emissions reduction than explicit fossil fuel phase-out. The bloc targets net zero emissions by 2050, a 55% emissions reduction by 2030 and a 90% reduction by 2040 compared with 1990 levels.

The practical effect is similar. Deep emissions cuts cannot happen without a major reduction in fossil fuel use.

For industry, this creates a long-term signal. Companies should expect more electrification, stronger carbon rules, higher clean-energy investment and greater pressure to reduce fossil fuel exposure in operations and supply chains.

The strategic issue is execution. Roadmaps help, but governments still need permitting reform, grid investment, clean power capacity, financing, industrial incentives and raw material supply security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

France’s roadmap shows that fossil fuel transition is becoming an infrastructure plan, not just a climate slogan. The industrial winners will be countries that connect phase-out timelines with grids, clean power, critical minerals and manufacturing capacity.

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

EU Russian Energy Imports Ban Holds Firm Despite New Energy Crisis

EU Russian Energy

EU Russian energy imports will not return under the European Commission’s current policy direction, even as the bloc faces renewed energy pressure from the Middle East conflict. EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said Brussels will continue phasing out Russian gas and still plans to cut Russian oil imports.

EU Russian energy imports have become a strategic red line for Brussels. The Commission argues that returning to Russian supply would recreate the dependency that exposed Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

EU Russian energy imports are again being debated because higher oil and gas costs are hitting parts of the European economy. However, Brussels is treating the current disruption as a reason to accelerate energy diversification, not reopen Russian supply channels.

The position links energy security directly to industrial resilience. Europe now wants less exposure to both Russian energy and Middle East supply disruption, while shifting more demand toward domestic, renewable and alternative energy systems.

Russian Oil Phase-Out Remains Politically Sensitive

The Commission has not yet presented new legal measures to phase out Russian oil imports. It delayed a proposal originally scheduled for 15 April and has not set a new publication date.

Still, Brussels says a permanent Russian oil ban remains a priority. That matters because Hungary and Slovakia remain the only EU importers of Russian crude, keeping pipeline supply through Druzhba at the centre of political negotiations.

Hungary had opposed blocking Russian oil imports under Viktor Orban. His successor, Peter Magyar, has acknowledged that Hungary cannot end Druzhba imports immediately, but has pledged to eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.

Slovakia has also linked Russian oil flows to its support for further sanctions against Moscow. Bratislava has indicated it could support another sanctions package once Russian oil reaches Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline.

This shows the difficulty of EU energy policy. The bloc wants a unified strategic position, but member states still have different infrastructure, refinery configurations and supply dependencies.

The Druzhba pipeline therefore remains more than a crude route. It is a political lever in sanctions, energy security and Ukraine-related financing discussions.

Energy Crisis Reinforces Clean Supply Strategy

The current Middle East energy crisis has intensified the EU’s focus on supply security. Jorgensen said the disruption is comparable in seriousness to the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 Russian energy shock.

The Commission expects LNG prices to take years to stabilise. It also expects oil capacity to need months to normalise after the war ends, showing that energy disruption can outlast military events.

This strengthens the EU case for domestic and clean energy. The Commission wants to reduce import dependence through renewables, electrification, storage, hydrogen and alternative fuels.

For industry, the implication is clear. Europe’s energy security strategy will increasingly affect metals, grids, chemicals, transport fuels and clean technology supply chains.

Lower Russian energy dependence also raises demand for infrastructure. Europe will need more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, renewable equipment and grid materials to replace fossil fuel exposure with domestic power systems.

The policy challenge is execution. Europe must cut Russian dependence while managing fuel prices, refinery supply, LNG volatility, industrial competitiveness and political pressure from member states.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s refusal to return to Russian energy shows that energy security has become an industrial sovereignty issue. The next test is whether the EU can replace fossil dependency with real domestic energy infrastructure fast enough to protect industry from repeated external shocks.

Renewables Energy Security Message Shapes Cop 31 Climate Agenda

Renewables energy

Renewables energy security is becoming a central policy message ahead of the Cop 31 climate summit, as Turkey and Australia argue that fossil fuels no longer guarantee stable energy supply. The two countries said stronger decarbonisation, electrification and alternative energy sources are now essential to national resilience.

Turkey will host Cop 31 in Antalya, while Australia will lead climate negotiations. Both countries are preparing the summit against the backdrop of energy market disruption caused by the war in the Mideast Gulf and shipping interruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.

Renewables energy security is now being framed not only as a climate issue, but also as a sovereignty issue. Turkey’s environment minister Murat Kurum said countries should invest in clean energy sources, including renewables, hydrogen and ammonia, to support stable and independent development.

The message reflects a wider shift in energy policy. Fossil fuels once dominated energy security thinking because they offered high-density supply and established infrastructure. But recent geopolitical shocks have shown that oil, gas and coal supply chains can be exposed to sanctions, shipping blockages and regional conflict.

Fossil Fuel Risk Pushes Electrification Up the Policy Agenda

The Mideast Gulf energy crisis has strengthened the argument that fossil fuel dependence creates vulnerability. Supply routes can be disrupted, prices can spike and importing countries can quickly face inflation, industrial cost pressure and energy security concerns.

Australia’s climate and energy minister Chris Bowen said the crisis creates an opportunity to show that energy reliability, sovereignty and security can move together with strong decarbonisation. His message was clear: doubling down on fossil fuels is not the answer.

That argument gives renewables energy security a sharper industrial meaning. Wind and solar resources cannot be sanctioned in the same way as seaborne fossil fuels. They also reduce exposure to imported fuel prices once infrastructure is built.

Electrification will therefore become more important in the Cop 31 discussion. Germany has already pushed for a stronger debate on how countries can advance electrification before the summit.

This matters for metals and manufacturing. Electrification requires more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, rare earth magnets, batteries, power electronics, transformers, grid equipment and storage systems. The shift away from fossil fuels therefore increases demand for industrial materials that support clean power systems.

Hydrogen and ammonia also remain part of Turkey’s energy transition vision. These fuels could support hard-to-abate sectors, industrial heat, shipping, fertilisers and long-duration energy storage, but they require large amounts of renewable electricity and new infrastructure.

The policy direction is not only about replacing fuels. It is about rebuilding energy systems around grids, storage, clean molecules and domestic generation capacity.

Cop 31 Could Turn Energy Security Into a Decarbonisation Driver

Cop 31 is expected to revisit the global transition away from fossil fuels. Nearly 200 countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels at Cop 28 in 2023, while developed countries agreed at Cop 29 to provide $300bn/yr to developing countries by 2035.

Turkey is now urging countries to fulfil earlier commitments on finance and energy. Kurum also called on countries that have not submitted updated nationally determined contributions to do so.

This creates pressure before Cop 31. Around 43 countries still need to submit climate plans, according to Kurum. Without credible national plans, the global transition risks remaining a statement rather than an implementation programme.

Australia pointed to three processes already under way before Cop 31. These include the Belem roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels, the global implementation accelerator and the Belem Mission to 1.5°C.

The challenge will be coordination. Countries have already agreed on high-level climate direction, but implementation remains uneven. Clean energy investment, grid expansion, permitting, financing and critical mineral supply all need to move faster.

For resource markets, the message is clear. Renewables energy security will not reduce dependence on supply chains. It will shift dependence from fossil fuel flows toward metals, minerals, equipment and industrial manufacturing capacity.

That creates a new form of energy security risk. Countries that build renewable power but lack access to copper, rare earths, battery metals, transformers, power electronics or grid equipment may still face strategic exposure.

Cop 31 could therefore strengthen demand for policies that connect climate action with supply-chain resilience. Energy transition goals will require not only emissions targets, but also mineral security, manufacturing investment and infrastructure deployment.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The renewables energy security argument marks a turning point in climate politics. The next energy security race will be fought through grids, storage, critical minerals and clean manufacturing capacity, not only through control of fossil fuel routes.

China Nuclear Capacity Expansion Strengthens Demand for Hafnium and Zirconium

the China Nuclear Energy

China nuclear capacity continues to expand as the country retains the global lead in nuclear power construction. China currently operates 60 commercial nuclear power units and has another 36 units under construction, according to the China Nuclear Energy Industry Association.

The scale of China nuclear capacity growth is significant for energy security and industrial materials demand. Projects under construction in China account for more than half of global nuclear capacity currently being built.

China nuclear capacity is also set to grow further because 16 additional units have already received approvals and are awaiting construction. The country has started construction on two nuclear power units so far this year and plans to complete seven units within the year.

The country’s installed nuclear power capacity has reached 125GW, ranking first globally, according to the association. This keeps China at the centre of global nuclear construction and strengthens downstream demand for strategic metals used in reactor systems.

Nuclear Buildout Raises Demand for Hafnium and Zirconium

China’s nuclear expansion is important for several minor metals, especially hafnium and zirconium. These materials sit deep inside the nuclear supply chain, but they are critical to reactor performance and safety.

Hafnium is mainly used in control rods for nuclear power plants. It has strong neutron absorption properties, making it valuable for regulating fission reactions inside reactors.

Nuclear-grade zirconium sponge is used as a core structural material for fuel assemblies. Zirconium is valued in nuclear systems because it has low neutron absorption and strong corrosion resistance under reactor operating conditions.

The growth in nuclear construction therefore creates direct demand for high-purity and nuclear-qualified materials. These materials require strict processing, quality control and certification, which makes supply more specialized than ordinary industrial metals.

China’s large buildout also creates a strategic demand signal for upstream zirconium minerals, zirconium sponge, hafnium separation and downstream nuclear components. As more units move from approval to construction and commissioning, material procurement will become more important.

Export Controls Tighten Strategic Minor Metals Supply

The nuclear sector is not the only source of demand for hafnium. Industrial gas turbines also use hafnium in high-performance alloy systems, creating additional competition for supply.

Prices have risen because of stronger demand from nuclear power and industrial gas turbine sectors, while supply has tightened because of reduced exports from China. This makes hafnium a more visible strategic material in global industrial supply chains.

China has included hafnium in its strict dual-use item export control scheme. This constrains global availability and increases supply risk for users outside China.

The issue highlights a broader trend in critical materials. Small-volume metals can become major chokepoints when they support high-value sectors such as nuclear power, aerospace, defence, turbines and advanced manufacturing.

For global nuclear developers, the supply chain challenge extends beyond uranium. Reactor construction also depends on certified zirconium, hafnium, specialty alloys, forgings, control rod materials and precision components.

China’s nuclear construction lead therefore has two effects. It supports domestic energy security while also increasing China’s influence over the strategic materials used in nuclear and high-temperature industrial applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s nuclear buildout shows how energy security is becoming a materials security issue. Hafnium and nuclear-grade zirconium may be small-volume markets, but they are critical bottlenecks for reactors, turbines and strategic industrial systems.

CBAM Article 27a Deletion Would Tighten EU Carbon Border Rules

CBAM

CBAM article 27a deletion would make the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism more rigid, predictable and difficult to suspend. The European Parliament’s environment committee is preparing to propose removing the clause that would allow temporary exemptions from CBAM under serious and unforeseen circumstances.

The proposal comes from a draft legal report prepared by Dutch centre-left MEP Mohammed Chahim. It signals that parliament may push for a tougher CBAM framework than some member states or industrial importers would prefer.

CBAM article 27a deletion matters because exemptions could weaken the market signal behind the carbon border system. If importers believe CBAM can be paused during disruption, the mechanism may lose some of its pricing certainty and investment value.

The draft instead proposes a narrower system for exceptional cases linked to prolonged military conflict. In those situations, the European Commission would assess whether affected operators can still comply with CBAM requirements.

This approach keeps the mechanism intact while recognising that war can disrupt reporting, verification, logistics and administrative compliance. It also avoids creating a broad exemption channel that could be used during ordinary market stress.

The proposal shows how CBAM is shifting from launch-stage implementation toward legal hardening. The EU is now debating how much flexibility the system should allow without undermining its role as a carbon-cost equalisation tool.

Parliament Seeks Fewer Exemptions and Rejects Article 6 Credits

The most important legal change is the proposed removal of article 27a. That article would allow goods to be temporarily exempted from CBAM during serious and unforeseen circumstances.

The environment committee draft argues that this flexibility could weaken CBAM’s strength and predictability. Predictability is central to the mechanism because importers, exporters and industrial buyers need to know how carbon costs will apply over time.

A broad exemption article could also create lobbying pressure during periods of high energy prices, trade disruption or geopolitical tension. Once a suspension route exists, affected industries may push to use it whenever CBAM costs become commercially painful.

CBAM article 27a deletion would therefore protect the mechanism from becoming too politically adjustable. That is important as the EU begins phasing down free allowances under the emissions trading system and shifting more carbon-cost exposure toward imports.

The draft does not ignore exceptional disruption entirely. It proposes a replacement article focused on prolonged military conflict and its impact on affected regions.

This is a narrower and more defensible framework. A military conflict can prevent companies from collecting emissions data, meeting verification requirements or maintaining normal trade documentation. But that is different from giving broad exemptions whenever market conditions become difficult.

The draft also proposes removing language that would allow the EU to consider carbon credits issued under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as part of the carbon price already paid on CBAM-covered goods.

This is strategically significant. Article 6 credits could, in theory, reduce CBAM liabilities if foreign producers claim they have already paid a carbon price through internationally recognised credits. But the draft calls this premature and counterproductive.

The concern is credibility. International carbon credits can vary widely in price, quality and environmental integrity. Allowing them into CBAM too early could weaken the mechanism and create disputes over whether credits represent real emissions reductions.

This is especially important for heavy industry. Steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers and other CBAM-covered sectors need clear rules on what counts as a paid carbon cost. If low-cost or low-integrity credits reduce CBAM exposure, EU producers may argue that the system fails to protect them from carbon leakage.

By rejecting Article 6 credits, the draft keeps CBAM tied more closely to direct carbon pricing and verifiable emissions. That would make the system stricter, but also simpler for enforcement.

The legal direction is clear. Parliament’s environment committee appears to favour a CBAM model with limited exemptions, cautious treatment of offsets and stronger predictability for industry.

For exporters into the EU, this raises the compliance threshold. They will need credible emissions data, verified reporting and direct carbon-cost evidence rather than relying on broad exemptions or international credit claims.

Sector Expansion and Indirect Emissions Could Widen CBAM’s Industrial Reach

The draft also points toward a broader CBAM after the next review, scheduled by the end of 2027. It says the EU should consider expanding the mechanism’s sectoral scope to additional industries.

The sectors identified include organic chemicals, polymers and scrap materials from pulp, paper and glass. These areas have already been assessed as technically feasible for inclusion by the Commission.

This matters because CBAM currently focuses on a narrower set of carbon-intensive sectors. Expanding into chemicals and polymers would move the mechanism deeper into industrial supply chains and downstream manufacturing.

Organic chemicals and polymers are especially important because they sit inside a wide range of finished goods. If CBAM expands into these materials, the mechanism could affect packaging, automotive parts, consumer goods, industrial components and many other value chains.

Including scrap materials from pulp, paper and glass would also widen the mechanism’s reach into recycling and secondary raw materials. This could create new reporting challenges because scrap flows often involve mixed origins, complex supply chains and variable embedded emissions.

The draft also calls for CBAM to gradually cover indirect emissions in more sectors. Indirect emissions are already included for fertilisers and cement, but not across all covered products.

This could become one of the most important future changes. Indirect emissions reflect the carbon intensity of electricity used in production. For sectors such as aluminium, steel and chemicals, power sourcing can materially change total embedded emissions.

If indirect emissions are added more broadly, exporters using coal-heavy power systems could face higher CBAM costs. Producers using renewable, nuclear or lower-carbon power could gain a competitive advantage.

This would sharpen CBAM’s industrial effect. The mechanism would no longer focus mainly on direct process emissions. It would also reward cleaner electricity systems and penalise high-carbon power inputs.

The draft asks the Commission to present a proposal by the end of 2027 after assessing technical and policy options. This creates a clear timeline for companies to prepare.

For metals producers, the direction is important. Aluminium and ferro-alloy production are highly electricity-intensive. If indirect emissions become more widely included, power procurement, renewable energy contracts and verified electricity data will become central to EU market access.

For chemical and polymer exporters, CBAM expansion could introduce carbon reporting into supply chains that have not yet faced the same level of scrutiny. This may force producers to improve emissions measurement well before formal inclusion.

The parliamentary timeline is also taking shape. The environment committee is expected to consider the proposed changes on 4-5 May and vote on whether to advance them on 6 July.

If approved, an indicative plenary vote is scheduled for 14 September. That vote would formalise the European Parliament’s position before negotiations with EU member states on the final legal text.

The draft follows a compromise proposed by the EU Council presidency, which had already suggested changes to article 27a. This means both parliament and member states are now actively shaping the flexibility, scope and legal strength of CBAM.

The key issue is balance. Industry wants clarity and workable compliance. Policymakers want to preserve the environmental and competitiveness purpose of the system. Exporters want flexibility during disruption. EU producers want strong protection against carbon leakage.

CBAM article 27a deletion sits at the centre of that debate. It would reduce the risk of temporary exemptions weakening the mechanism, but it would also make compliance more demanding during periods of market stress.

For global suppliers, the message is straightforward. CBAM is unlikely to become a soft or easily suspended regime. The EU is moving toward tighter verification, fewer loopholes and possible expansion into more industrial sectors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CBAM article 27a deletion would make the EU carbon border system more credible, but also less forgiving. The bigger strategic signal is that Brussels is preparing to expand CBAM from a narrow carbon-pricing tool into a wider industrial competitiveness framework.

CBAM Certificate Price Starts Reshaping EU Import Costs Across Fertiliser and Steel

CBAM Reshapes EU Fertiliser Import Economics

CBAM certificate price implementation is beginning to reshape EU import economics across carbon-intensive sectors, with fertilisers and steel showing the clearest early signs of disruption. The European Commission set the first-quarter 2026 CBAM certificate price at €75.36/t of CO2 equivalent, turning the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism into a measurable cost for importers.

The impact is uneven because each product carries a different embedded-emissions burden and a different ability to absorb added carbon costs. Urea imports remained workable in the first quarter, while calcium ammonium nitrate and urea ammonium nitrate became much harder to justify. Steel imports also faced pressure as default emissions values strengthened the relative competitiveness of EU-produced material.

CBAM certificate price exposure was partly delayed by heavy pre-buying in 2025. Many importers entered 2026 with inventories, which blunted the immediate effect of the mechanism. However, as stocks run down and EU free allocations begin to decline, CBAM is moving from a compliance issue into a commercial constraint.

The first quarter therefore marked an important transition. CBAM did not stop all imports. Instead, it began sorting the market between products, origins and suppliers that can manage carbon costs and those that cannot.

Fertiliser Imports Show How CBAM Separates Viable and Unviable Products

Fertiliser markets provided the clearest example of CBAM’s uneven effect. Urea imports continued because the additional carbon cost remained relatively small compared with delivered market prices.

Egyptian urea carried a default CBAM charge of €39.52/t in January-March. That represented roughly 5% of French urea prices by the end of March. Default costs for other major origins, including Algeria, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Nigeria, ranged around €41-53/t.

These charges were manageable for traders because urea prices rose sharply during the quarter. The Middle East conflict lifted French urea prices by 45% between late February and the end of March, reducing the relative weight of CBAM in total delivered costs.

As a result, urea continued moving into the EU, especially in March. European buyers returned to the market ahead of the spring application season, and higher global prices made the CBAM burden easier to absorb.

Nitrate products faced a very different outcome. Calcium ammonium nitrate imports were largely priced out because default CBAM costs reached €105-119/t across major exporting origins. That equalled roughly a quarter of prevailing German CAN prices.

This cost level made non-EU CAN structurally uncompetitive. Importers could not easily pass through the additional carbon cost without losing competitiveness against EU-produced material.

Urea ammonium nitrate faced similar pressure. Default CBAM charges started at €62.16/t for Trinidad and Tobago material and reached €86.52/t for US-origin product. By the end of March, these costs represented up to 20% of French UAN prices.

The economics became even harder when existing EU anti-dumping duties were added. Traders viewed imports from these origins as effectively unworkable under the combined burden of duties and CBAM.

Phosphate-based fertilisers were less exposed. Moroccan diammonium phosphate, a key EU import product, carried an additional charge of only €16.19/t in the first quarter. That equalled about 2% of delivered prices in northwest Europe.

Moroccan NPK 15-15-15 faced a larger default cost of €53.36/t, or around 10% of Belgian prices. But traders still described that burden as manageable. This means CBAM narrowed product choice rather than cutting fertiliser imports across the board.

The fertiliser market therefore shows CBAM’s real mechanism. It does not apply uniform pressure. It changes competitiveness product by product, depending on emissions intensity, delivered price, existing duties and the ability to provide certified actual emissions data.

CBAM Turns Steel Imports Into a Trade Filter

Steel, EUA Volatility and Default Values Turn CBAM Into a Trade Filter

Steel markets showed a different but equally important effect. CBAM reinforced the cost advantage of EU-produced steel by making imported material more expensive under default emissions values.

Hot-rolled coil import offers into the EU rose through January-March. The increase reflected higher production costs at mills and rising freight rates. However, fewer delivered-duty-paid offers were seen because traders were also preparing for changes to EU safeguard measures.

Much of the steel sold on a delivered basis came from existing stock. This delayed the full pass-through of higher import costs into market transactions. But market participants broadly agreed that importing steel under default emissions values was economically difficult for most origins.

Brazil was cited as one limited exception, but most imported steel faced a structural disadvantage. This is important because steel has high embedded emissions and large delivered price sensitivity. Even a moderate carbon cost can change the landed-cost calculation.

Certified actual emissions data will become critical. Suppliers that can prove lower embedded emissions may preserve access to EU buyers. Suppliers relying on default values may find their products increasingly uncompetitive.

CBAM is therefore beginning to act as a trade filter. It rewards verified lower-carbon production and penalises imports that lack transparent emissions data. This could gradually shift EU import flows toward suppliers with stronger measurement, reporting and verification systems.

The EU emissions trading system added another layer of complexity. The Commission calculates the CBAM certificate price from the weighted average of primary EU ETS auction clearing prices. These auction prices are closely linked to secondary-market prices for EU allowances.

EUA prices were volatile in the first quarter. Structural tightening supported prices early in the period, including a 4.3% reduction in the ETS cap for 2026, the removal of 27mn allowances and a further 52mn cut linked to expanded maritime coverage.

Demand from maritime and aviation sectors also increased as those sectors moved into full ETS coverage. At the same time, some companies handling CBAM-covered goods began buying EUAs as a proxy hedge for future CBAM exposure.

However, political risk weakened the bullish case in February. Senior figures in key EU member states questioned the future of the ETS and called for reforms or even temporary suspension to reduce pressure on industry. Investment funds responded by cutting long positions, pushing prices lower.

The US-Iran war then added another source of volatility. The conflict created renewed energy price stress and revived political calls for ETS intervention. Although the Commission rejected suspension of the scheme, it acknowledged the need for reform, keeping regulatory uncertainty high.

This matters for importers because CBAM certificates cannot be traded or resold. Companies can use EUAs as a proxy hedge, but the hedge is imperfect because CBAM costs are tied to primary auction prices, not directly to tradable CBAM certificates.

The first quarter therefore exposed a new risk-management problem. Importers must now manage commodity prices, freight, duties, safeguard rules, emissions verification, EUA volatility and CBAM certificate exposure at the same time.

The outlook points to stronger pressure through 2026. Maritime and aviation demand will keep adding to ETS coverage. The linear reduction factor will keep shrinking the cap. Free allocations will continue to decline. Inventories built before CBAM will continue to unwind.

At the same time, the Market Stability Reserve and the upcoming ETS review could limit extreme price spikes or change market expectations. This means CBAM costs are likely to become more visible, but the exact price path remains exposed to policy risk.

For fertiliser and steel importers, the direction is already clear. Products with manageable carbon costs and strong emissions documentation will keep moving. Products with high default emissions, existing duties or weak verification will face higher barriers into the EU market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CBAM is becoming an industrial trade policy tool, not only a climate mechanism. The first-quarter data show that carbon costs are starting to decide which products can enter the EU competitively, and which supply chains must either decarbonise, verify emissions or lose market access.

Asia-Pacific Growth Slows as US-Iran Conflict Raises Energy and Trade Risks

ADB(The Asian Development Bank)

Asia-Pacific growth is expected to slow in 2026 and 2027 as the US-Iran conflict and renewed trade uncertainty weigh on the region’s economic outlook. The Asian Development Bank now forecasts regional growth of 5.1% in both years, down from 5.4% in 2025.

Asia-Pacific growth was stronger last year because companies front-loaded exports before US tariff increases, semiconductor demand stayed high, and private consumption remained firm. But the ADB said the Middle East conflict now presents the largest risk to the region.

Asia-Pacific growth remains supported by domestic demand, steady labour markets and public infrastructure spending. However, prolonged disruption could raise energy and food prices, tighten financial conditions and weaken industrial momentum across key manufacturing economies.

Energy Shock Threatens Inflation and Industrial Demand

The ADB based its latest outlook on assumptions finalised in early March, shortly after the war began. Those assumptions expected the conflict to stabilise early, but the bank said later evidence now points to a higher risk of prolonged disruption.

Regional inflation is projected at 3.6% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027 under the early-stabilisation scenario. If the conflict lasts through the third quarter, inflation could rise to 5.6% in 2026.

This matters for metals and manufacturing because Asia remains central to global supply chains for steel, aluminium, copper products, batteries, semiconductors, electronics and automotive components. Higher energy costs could pressure margins, slow investment and reduce demand for industrial raw materials.

Trade uncertainty adds another risk. Export front-loading helped 2025 growth, but that support is fading as manufacturers adjust to tariffs, weaker global trade and shifting procurement strategies.

China, India and Asean Face Uneven Growth Paths

China’s growth is forecast to slow to 4.6% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027, from 5% last year. Subdued private consumption, property market weakness and slower export expansion are expected to weigh on activity.

The Chinese slowdown remains important for global metals markets. China is the largest consumer of many industrial and battery metals, so weaker growth can quickly affect copper, aluminium, nickel, zinc, rare earths and lithium demand expectations.

India’s growth is forecast to fall to 6.9% this year from 7.6% last year, before recovering to 7.3% in 2027. Resilient domestic consumption, recent trade agreements and structural reforms are expected to support the rebound.

Asean growth is projected at 4.6% in both 2026 and 2027, slightly below 4.8% in 2025. Infrastructure spending and domestic demand should provide stability, but weaker exports and fading front-loading effects could limit manufacturing momentum.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The ADB forecast shows that Asia’s growth engine is still running, but energy security and trade risk are becoming stronger constraints. For metals markets, the key issue is whether infrastructure spending can offset weaker exports and higher industrial costs.

Argentina Glacier-Protection Reform Opens New Path for Copper Mining

Argentina glacier

Argentina glacier-protection reform has cleared the lower house, creating a major legal shift for the country’s copper industry. The reform allows provinces to decide which glaciers are functionally important to water resources and which areas may be opened to mining.

The approval followed senate backing on 27 February and passed the lower house late on 8 April by 137 votes to 111. President Javier Milei strongly supported the bill, making official promulgation likely.

Argentina glacier-protection reform could unlock copper resources located along the Andes, where many advanced projects overlap with glaciated areas. Supporters argue the change will reduce legal uncertainty and allow provinces to regulate their own natural resources.

Copper Projects Gain New Resource Expansion Potential

Argentina’s copper industry has remained underdeveloped despite a large resource base. The country holds 116mn t of copper resources, but exported only $4bn of the metal last year, far below Chile’s $50bn in copper sales.

The reform could materially change that outlook. Argentina’s 20 most advanced copper projects represent a combined $21.9bn in investment and may now be able to expand resource bases inside previously restricted glacier perimeters.

The mining secretary has forecast that Argentina could produce more than 1.5mn t/yr of copper by 2035, equal to 6.1% of global output. That target now looks more plausible if legal access improves and the government strengthens its large-investment incentive regime.

Argentina glacier-protection reform therefore comes at a critical moment for copper markets. Global demand from grids, electrification, renewable energy and industrial infrastructure needs large new projects, and Argentina is one of the few jurisdictions with major undeveloped copper potential.

Water Security Backlash Raises Political Risk

The reform has triggered strong opposition from environmental groups, lawmakers and parts of the public. Critics argue that easing glacier protections could threaten Argentina’s water security, especially because glacier meltwater supports rivers and agricultural systems.

Greenpeace activists protested outside the lower house in Buenos Aires and warned that the reform could open the way to damaging much of Argentina’s glacial environment. Opponents say drinking water reserves should not be exposed to mining risk.

Supporters of the reform insist that provinces will not permit mining on glaciers that are vital to water resources. However, implementation will depend on how provinces define “functional” and “non-functional” glaciers in practice.

This creates a new layer of project risk. Copper developers may gain legal opportunity, but they will still need political acceptance, environmental credibility and clear provincial rules to move projects into construction.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina glacier-protection reform could become one of the most important copper policy changes in Latin America. The opportunity is large, but the social licence risk is equally serious if water security concerns are not managed with transparency and science.

CBAM Certificate Price Set at €75.36/t for First Quarter of 2026

CBAM

CBAM certificate price levels for the first quarter of 2026 were confirmed at €75.36/t of CO2 equivalent, giving importers their first official carbon cost benchmark under the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The European Commission calculated the price using the weighted average of EU emissions trading system auction clearing prices during the quarter.

The CBAM certificate price matters directly for importers of carbon-intensive goods because it defines the cost exposure linked to embedded emissions. Steel, aluminium, cement, fertiliser, electricity and other covered sectors must now treat CBAM as a real financial planning issue, not only a reporting obligation.

The Commission will use the same quarterly calculation method for the remaining quarters of 2026. From 2027, the system will shift to a weekly average based on ETS auction prices, increasing the importance of active carbon cost monitoring.

Importers Turn to EUA Proxy Hedging Before Certificates Become Available

Companies have started proxy hedging CBAM exposure through EU ETS allowances because CBAM certificates will not enter circulation until February 2027. This has made the EUA market an important temporary tool for firms trying to manage carbon price volatility.

Proxy hedging demand for spot and front-year EUAs was stronger early in the first quarter. It weakened toward the end of the quarter as companies gained more visibility on where the official CBAM certificate price would settle.

However, CBAM certificates cannot be traded or resold. This makes them different from EUAs and limits the ability of companies to manage exposure through a conventional tradable instrument.

Carbon Cost Management Becomes a Supply Chain Issue

CBAM cost exposure is tied to primary ETS market auction prices, although those prices move closely with the spot EU ETS market. Some companies therefore see EUA proxy hedging as useful but incomplete.

This creates a new risk-management challenge for importers, traders and industrial buyers. They must manage not only material prices, freight and tariffs, but also embedded carbon costs linked to EU climate policy.

The Commission will publish second-quarter CBAM certificate prices on 6 July, third-quarter prices on 5 October and fourth-quarter prices on 4 January 2027. These publication dates will become key reference points for purchasing, pricing and contract negotiations.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The first CBAM certificate price turns Europe’s carbon border system into a measurable cost line for global suppliers. The next challenge will be whether importers can build reliable hedging, pricing and verification strategies before full certificate trading mechanics begin in 2027.

EU CBAM Downstream Goods Expansion Targets Cars, Fridges and Components

EU CBAM

EU CBAM downstream goods coverage is set to expand from 1 January 2028 under a draft European Council compromise text. The proposal would apply the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism to steel-intensive finished goods and components, including cars, washing machines, fridges and a wider range of downstream products.

The move marks a significant shift in Europe’s carbon trade policy. Until now, CBAM has focused mainly on basic materials and selected upstream products, but the new proposal would extend protection further along the industrial value chain.

EU CBAM downstream goods expansion directly addresses a long-standing concern in the steel market. Without downstream coverage, importers could bypass carbon costs by bringing in finished products or components instead of covered steel inputs.

Downstream Protection Becomes Central to Steel Competitiveness

Downstream protection has been strongly supported by parts of the European steel market, including distributors association Eurometal. The argument is straightforward: CBAM cannot protect European steel producers if foreign manufacturers can export carbon-intensive finished goods into the EU without equivalent carbon costs.

The proposed expansion would therefore widen the policy shield around European steel-intensive manufacturing. Cars, appliances, machinery parts and components all contain embedded steel, and their inclusion could reduce the risk of carbon leakage moving further down the value chain.

This matters for European industrial competitiveness. Steelmakers, processors, distributors and manufacturers are all exposed if carbon pricing raises domestic production costs while finished imports remain outside the mechanism.

Verification Capacity Remains a Key Implementation Risk

The draft text also points to possible agreements for mutual recognition of third-country accreditation bodies. This is designed to address a major implementation bottleneck: the limited number of recognised verification bodies able to carry out CBAM audits.

Only six verification bodies have so far been recognised, which may be insufficient for the number of steel mills and exporters seeking approval before the deadline. Without broader verification capacity, CBAM implementation could face delays, disputes and administrative pressure.

The European Parliament is also moving through its own process. Dutch centre-left member Mohammed Chahim has been appointed to draft the legal report, with an environment committee vote expected on 6 July and an indicative plenary vote scheduled for September. That process will shape parliament’s position before final negotiations with EU member states.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU CBAM downstream goods proposal shows that Brussels is moving from carbon accounting toward industrial border protection. If adopted, it could reshape trade flows for steel, appliances, automotive components and machinery by forcing carbon costs deeper into finished-product supply chains.

Battery Energy Storage Systems Accelerate Data Center Deployment

Battery Energy Storage Systems

Battery energy storage systems are becoming a practical tool for accelerating data center deployment as hyperscalers search for faster access to power. Industry executives said storage, combined with solar and wind, can help large technology companies bring major facilities online more quickly.

The discussion reflects a growing reality in the power market. Data center demand is rising alongside broader electrification, placing pressure on grids that were not designed for such rapid large-load growth.

Battery energy storage systems help address this problem by providing flexibility where grid connections, peak demand, or local capacity constraints delay projects. For hyperscalers, speed to power is now as important as land, chips, cooling, and fiber connectivity.

Storage Becomes a Bridge Between Hyperscalers and Grid Constraints

Battery energy storage systems can help data centers manage peak demand, reduce grid stress, and support faster deployment when full baseload supply is not immediately available. This makes storage a bridge between large electricity users and constrained power systems.

Invenergy said a mix of solar, wind, and storage can give hyperscalers strong speed-to-power advantages while remaining affordable. That combination is increasingly attractive because data centers need large volumes of electricity but also face public scrutiny over power prices.

The affordability issue is becoming more sensitive. US electricity prices rose by 6.3% in January, and rising demand from data centers is one of the factors adding pressure. If households feel they are paying more while large-load users secure cheaper power, the political risk around data center growth will increase.

Flexible Power Models Could Reshape Battery Demand

Technology companies are responding with a wider power strategy. Instead of relying only on large central power plants, they are looking at solar, wind, on-site batteries, demand response, and distributed storage.

Google said that in locations where peaking capacity is the main issue, faster solutions may include ramping down for short periods, switching to on-site batteries, or paying other customers to install batteries in their homes. This approach turns batteries into grid flexibility assets, not only backup systems.

For the materials supply chain, this matters because data center growth could become a stronger demand driver for batteries, lithium, graphite, iron phosphate materials, copper, aluminium, transformers, power electronics, and grid equipment. As AI infrastructure scales, battery storage will increasingly sit at the intersection of digital infrastructure and energy security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Battery energy storage systems are moving from optional backup equipment to strategic infrastructure for hyperscaler growth. The next bottleneck for AI data centers may not be computing hardware alone, but the ability to secure flexible, affordable, and politically acceptable power.

Clean Energy Technology Market Set to Outgrow Oil by 2035

Clean energy

Clean energy technology market growth is accelerating across every major IEA scenario, even as manufacturing investment slows from recent peaks. The global market for electric vehicles, batteries, solar modules, wind turbines, heat pumps, electrolysers, zero-emissions trucks, and alternative propulsion ships reached almost $1.2 trillion in 2025.

The IEA said the clean energy technology market could reach around $2 trillion by 2035 under current policies and about $3 trillion under stated policies. In every scenario, its 2035 value exceeds the size of the global oil market in 2025.

This shift shows that clean energy is no longer a niche transition segment. It is becoming a core industrial market tied to manufacturing competitiveness, energy security, power infrastructure, and critical minerals demand.

Manufacturing Investment Slows as Capacity Surplus Builds

Clean energy technology manufacturing investment has started to cool after a major expansion wave. Global investment in key clean energy manufacturing fell from $220 billion in 2023 to just below $200 billion in 2024, with a further gentle decline expected through 2025.

The slowdown partly reflects surplus production capacity in solar modules and batteries. This creates pressure on margins, intensifies trade disputes, and pushes governments to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.

However, deployment continues to rise across all IEA scenarios. This means the next bottleneck may not be factory construction alone, but the infrastructure needed to absorb clean energy technologies at scale.

Grids and Supply Chain Resilience Become the Critical Battleground

Power grids are becoming one of the most important enabling sectors for clean energy growth. The IEA estimated investment in enabling infrastructure, mostly grids, at nearly $430 billion in 2025.

Low-emissions fuels also gained industrial relevance. Investment in low-emissions fuel production plants reached about $30 billion in 2025, matching expected investment in oil refineries.

The biggest strategic risk remains geographic concentration. China still holds the largest share of clean energy manufacturing, and the IEA warned that every major supply chain has at least one weak link where less than a quarter of demand could be met without the largest producer.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The clean energy technology market is now large enough to reshape global metals, manufacturing, and trade policy. The next decade will reward countries that can build resilient supply chains for batteries, grids, solar, wind, and critical minerals without relying on a single manufacturing hub.

India Critical Minerals Auctions Expand Supply Push for Clean Energy Manufacturing

India, auction for critical minerals.jpg

India critical minerals auctions have entered a new phase as the government launched the seventh tranche of critical and strategic mineral block auctions. The Ministry of Mines is offering 19 blocks under mining lease and composite licence across several states.

The latest India critical minerals auctions cover minerals needed for clean-energy manufacturing, advanced technologies, fertilisers, and strategic industries. The move reflects New Delhi’s effort to reduce import dependence and build domestic supply chains for high-value minerals.

India critical minerals auctions have become a central tool in the country’s resource security strategy since the August 2023 amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act. That reform classified 24 minerals as critical and strategic and gave the central government authority to auction them.

Regulatory Reforms Aim to Speed Up Mineral Development

India is tightening its auction framework to improve project execution after bidding. The Mineral Auction Second Amendment Rules, 2025, are designed to streamline post-auction procedures and reduce delays between award and development.

The 2026 rules also introduce insurance surety bonds as an alternative to bank guarantees. This could ease financial pressure on bidders and support broader participation from mining companies, technology firms, and downstream industrial players.

Auction revenues will go to the respective state governments, creating a stronger link between central mineral policy and state-level resource development. This structure could help states support permitting, infrastructure, and local industrial ecosystems around critical mineral projects.

Lithium, Graphite and Rare Earths Drive Industrial Strategy

The Ministry of Mines has already launched six tranches and auctioned 46 blocks. Industry participation has strengthened as demand rises for lithium, graphite, rare earth elements, tungsten, vanadium, titanium, and other rare metals.

These minerals are becoming essential for batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, aerospace, electronics, specialty alloys, fertilisers, and defense-related applications. India’s challenge is not only discovering resources, but also building processing, refining, and manufacturing capacity around them.

The seventh tranche therefore fits into a broader industrial policy agenda. India wants to position itself as a manufacturing hub while securing the mineral inputs needed for energy transition technologies and strategic supply chains.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India’s auction program shows that critical mineral security is becoming a state-backed industrial race. The real test will come after auction awards, when India must convert mineral blocks into mines, processing capacity, and downstream manufacturing strength.

Global Average Temperature Rise Reinforces Urgency of Industrial Decarbonisation

WMO(the World Meteorological Organisation)

Global average temperature in 2025 reached 1.43°C above pre-industrial levels, reinforcing the urgency of industrial decarbonisation and faster deployment of low-carbon energy systems. The World Meteorological Organisation said 2025 was either the second- or third-hottest year in the 176-year observational record.

The finding keeps the world close to the 1.5°C threshold pursued under the Paris climate agreement. The WMO’s estimate includes a margin of uncertainty of 0.13°C, meaning 2025 may have temporarily exceeded 1.5°C above the pre-industrial average.

Global average temperature data also show a clear long-term trend. The past 11 years were the 11 warmest on record, while 2023, 2024, and 2025 were the three hottest years across all nine datasets reviewed by the WMO.

Greenhouse Gas Levels Keep Pressure on Energy and Industrial Policy

Greenhouse gas concentrations continued to rise, increasing pressure on governments and heavy industry to accelerate emissions reduction. CO2 reached 423.9 parts per million in 2024, its highest level in at least two million years.

The annual rise in CO2 concentration in 2024 was the largest since modern measurements began in 1957. The WMO linked the increase to continued fossil fuel emissions and weaker absorption by land and ocean carbon sinks.

Methane and nitrous oxide also reached record levels in 2024, standing at 1,942 parts per billion and 338 parts per billion, respectively. These gases add further pressure on agriculture, energy, chemicals, mining, and industrial sectors to reduce emissions across supply chains.

Climate Targets Depend on Metals, Grids, and Clean Manufacturing

Global average temperature trends have direct implications for metals and mining. Faster decarbonisation will require larger volumes of copper, aluminium, nickel, lithium, rare earths, silicon, electrical steel, and other materials used in renewable power, grids, storage, electric vehicles, and efficient industrial systems.

The transition also increases pressure on producers to cut the carbon intensity of mining, smelting, refining, and manufacturing. Low-carbon aluminium, recycled metals, renewable-powered refining, green hydrogen, and electrified process heat will become more important as customers and regulators tighten emissions standards.

At the same time, climate stress raises operational risk for the materials sector. Extreme weather can disrupt mines, ports, power supply, shipping routes, and water availability, making resilience a core part of future industrial competitiveness.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The climate data confirm that decarbonisation is no longer a distant policy theme. It is becoming a materials, infrastructure, and supply chain challenge that will define the next investment cycle in energy and industry.