DRC Copper Output Growth Accelerates as Cobalt Exports Collapse

DRC Copper mining

DRC copper output growth strengthened in 2025 as major producers lifted volumes across the country. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced 3.4mn t of copper in 2025, up from 3.1mn t in 2024. That marks a 10pc annual increase. As a result, DRC copper output growth remains one of the most important supply stories in the global copper market.

This increase matters because the DRC is already one of the world’s key copper jurisdictions. Higher output from CMOC, Ivanhoe, and other major operators supported the national result. The country is becoming even more important to global copper supply. Therefore, DRC copper production 2025 confirms the DRC’s rising weight in the energy and industrial metals chain.

CMOC led the market last year. Its Tenke Fungurume mine produced 519,000t of copper, while Kisanfu added 228,000t. Kamoa-Kakula, the joint venture between Ivanhoe and Zijin, produced 400,000t. Consequently, DRC copper output growth is being driven by a concentrated group of very large operations.

DRC Copper Production 2025 Shows Strong Mine-Level Momentum

DRC copper production 2025 reflects strong mine-level performance from the country’s biggest operators. Large-scale projects continued to deliver higher volumes even as the market remained focused on geopolitical risk and resource nationalism. That gives the DRC a stronger position in global copper negotiations. As a result, copper is becoming an even more strategic pillar of the country’s mining economy.

This growth also improves the DRC’s relevance to western supply chains. Copper demand remains closely tied to electrification, grid buildout, and industrial investment. Countries and companies looking for large-scale copper supply cannot ignore the DRC. Therefore, DRC copper output growth is not only a mining statistic. It is a strategic supply-chain signal.

Congo Cobalt Export Ban Has Changed the Other Side of the Metals Story

Congo cobalt export ban created a very different picture for the country’s other key battery metal. Cobalt shipments fell by almost 80pc in 2025 because of the export restriction. The government imposed the ban after global oversupply drove cobalt prices to record lows. As a result, the DRC used policy intervention to support value rather than pure export volume.

This matters because the DRC remains the world’s largest cobalt producer. Cobalt is still important for electric vehicles and electronics, even as battery chemistry trends evolve. The government has since moved toward a quota system after the export ban. Therefore, Congo cobalt export ban shows that the DRC is willing to manage supply more actively when market conditions weaken.

The US-DRC minerals agreement adds another strategic layer. Officials said the December cooperation deal could improve investor confidence in minerals exploration. The agreement gives the United States preferential status to source critical minerals from the DRC and process them for global markets. Consequently, the DRC is trying to combine stronger copper growth with deeper geopolitical relevance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC now presents two very different metals stories at once. Copper is expanding through giant mines, while cobalt is being managed through policy restraint. That combination shows the country is no longer just a resource exporter. It is becoming a more active force in shaping how critical minerals reach the global market.

DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

DRC Mine Guard Plan Puts Critical Minerals Security at the Centre of Supply Chains

DRC, Inspectorate of Mines

DRC mine guard plans mark a major escalation in the country’s effort to secure critical minerals supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s General Inspectorate of Mines will develop a paramilitary unit to protect mine sites, ore transport routes, processors and border corridors.

The DRC mine guard will be created as part of a strategic partnership involving the US and UAE. The project is expected to cost up to $100mn and will use existing training facilities.

The DRC mine guard could deploy up to 20,000 troops over the next two years. Recruitment is expected to begin in May, with the first operational contingent of 2,500-3,000 officers targeted for deployment by December.

The plan reflects the growing strategic value of Congolese minerals. The DRC is a major producer of copper, cobalt, tantalum, tin and tungsten, all of which are critical to batteries, electronics, defence systems, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

Mineral Security Becomes a Formal State Priority

The mine guard will be tasked with securing mine sites across the DRC and protecting ore shipments from mines to processors and border posts. It will gradually replace forces currently deployed to defend mining assets.

The unit is expected to cover the Greater Katanga and Greater Eastern regions by the end of 2027. It is then planned to expand to all mining provinces by the end of 2028.

This regional focus is important. Greater Katanga is central to copper and cobalt production, while eastern DRC is tied to several strategic minerals and long-running security challenges.

The plan shows that mineral security is becoming part of formal state policy. Mine protection is no longer only a company-level issue involving private security, local forces or site-specific arrangements.

For producers, a more structured security framework could reduce disruption risk if implemented effectively. It could improve transport reliability, protect export flows and lower exposure to armed interference around mining corridors.

However, execution will be critical. A large paramilitary force operating across mining regions must be governed transparently to avoid creating new operational, political or human-rights risks.

US and UAE Partnership Signals Strategic Minerals Competition

The mine guard plan is linked to a broader US-DRC strategic partnership agreed in December 2025. That agreement included expanded US access to DRC critical minerals and a wider minerals-for-security-style framework.

The agreements were part of the Washington accords, a US-backed peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda designed to reduce conflict in eastern DRC. But fighting has continued, with the Rwanda-backed M23 group still controlling several major towns and mining assets. Rwanda denies backing the group.

This makes the security dimension central to mineral strategy. Western governments want more reliable access to DRC copper, cobalt and other critical minerals, but supply cannot be secured only through offtake agreements or financing.

Physical control of mine sites, transport routes and border flows is becoming just as important as ownership and processing capacity.

For the US, the DRC offers one of the fastest routes to large-scale copper and cobalt supply outside China-dominated value chains. For the DRC, security partnerships could bring funding, international backing and more leverage over strategic mineral flows.

The creation of a mine guard also signals that critical minerals are now treated as national security assets. Copper and cobalt are no longer only mining commodities. They are inputs for batteries, grids, defence manufacturing and geopolitical supply-chain competition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC mine guard plan shows that critical minerals security is moving from boardrooms into the field. The key question is whether this force can protect supply chains without adding new governance risks to one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Orion Glencore DRC Stake Sale Could Redraw Western Access to Copper and Cobalt

Glencore DRC

The Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could become one of the most important critical minerals deals of the year. Glencore has agreed to a possible sale of 40pc of its Kamoto and Mutanda mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The talks value the two assets at around $9bn. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could reshape western copper and cobalt access.

This matters because the buyer is not a normal financial investor. Orion Critical Mineral Consortium was set up with direct US backing and a clear supply security mission. The group wants long-life production from high-quality mines that can support western industry. Therefore, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale fits a much broader US critical minerals strategy.

The deal also has strategic structure. Orion would gain board seats and the right to route its share of metal to chosen buyers under the US-DRC partnership. Glencore would still keep day-to-day control of the mines. Consequently, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale looks designed to influence supply direction without forcing a full operating transfer.

US Critical Minerals Strategy Is Moving Closer to Producing Assets

US critical minerals strategy is no longer focused only on early-stage projects. Washington has been moving toward assets that are already close to production or already operating. Orion’s earlier Prieska term sheet showed that approach on a smaller scale. This DRC move would take that strategy much further.

Recent US actions support the same pattern. Washington has widened its reach through metal tenders, minimum price tools, and Project Vault. These measures all aim to secure real physical supply, not only future optionality. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale would fit neatly into a larger push for direct control over material flows.

That is especially important for copper and cobalt. Both metals remain essential to electrification, batteries, aerospace, and industrial technology. However, western buyers still face concentrated supply chains and strong Chinese influence. Therefore, any credible route to diversify western copper and cobalt access now carries major geopolitical value.

DRC Cobalt Export Quota and Copper Priorities Are Shaping the Deal

The DRC cobalt export quota is one reason this deal makes sense now. Glencore’s operations remain central to the global cobalt chain, but they are increasingly shaped by policy limits rather than only geology. National exports are capped across 2026 and 2027, and Glencore’s own allocation is limited. Therefore, these mines can produce more cobalt than they can freely sell.

Glencore is also leaning harder into copper. Copper prices strengthened sharply in late 2025 and early 2026, while cobalt operations faced more pressure. The company has already shown it can shift plant time and logistics toward copper when returns are more attractive. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could help Glencore share risk while keeping focus on its preferred metal.

Operational pressure adds another layer. Kamoto and Mutanda have faced lower grades, stoppages, repair work, transport bottlenecks, and policy limits. These are still major assets, but they are no longer simple growth stories. Consequently, bringing in a new partner could help stabilize capital needs while giving western buyers a stronger foothold.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This possible sale matters because it combines geopolitics, mine ownership, and offtake control in one transaction. The bigger issue is not only who owns 40pc. It is who gets to direct future copper and cobalt units from some of the world’s most important DRC assets.

CMOC Copper Output Rises as DRC Mines Strengthen China Supply

CMOC

CMOC copper output increased in the first quarter of 2026 as higher production from the company’s Democratic Republic of Congo copper-cobalt mines lifted supply. The Chinese diversified metals producer produced 187,880t of copper in January-March, up 10% from a year earlier.

CMOC copper output was supported by stronger production at the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. These assets are central to China’s copper and cobalt feedstock security because they supply large volumes of cathode and intermediate material from one of the world’s most important copper-cobalt districts.

CMOC copper output is expected to remain a major market focus this year. The company is targeting 760,000-820,000t of copper production in 2026, after producing 741,100t in 2025.

The result reinforces the DRC’s role as China’s largest imported copper cathode source. China imported 275,359t of copper cathode from the DRC in the first quarter, equal to 37.5% of total imports.

Tenke and Kisanfu Anchor CMOC’s Copper Growth

CMOC’s first-quarter copper growth reflects the scale and strategic importance of its DRC operations. Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu remain core assets for the company’s copper-cobalt portfolio.

The company plans to expand output at Kisanfu by adding 100,000 t/yr of copper cathode capacity. Completion is targeted for 2027.

The expansion could also lift cobalt capacity. CMOC has not disclosed the planned increase, but market participants expect Kisanfu’s cobalt capacity to rise by more than 30,000 t/yr.

This matters because copper and cobalt are increasingly linked in DRC project economics. Higher copper output can bring additional cobalt units into the market, depending on ore composition, processing rates and export rules.

The London Metal Exchange approval of CMOC’s TFM-1 copper cathode brand adds another layer of market significance. The brand, produced at Tenke Fungurume, was approved for listing on 27 March and has a registered production capacity of 270,000 t/yr.

Exchange approval improves brand visibility and market acceptance. It can also support trade liquidity, financing and customer confidence for DRC-origin copper cathode.
China’s copper cathode import structure shows why this is important. The DRC already supplies more than one-third of China’s imported cathode, making Congolese supply critical to Chinese refined copper availability.

The China grade-A copper cathode premium was steady at $55-70/t cif Shanghai on 23 April. The range narrowed from $55-75/t a week earlier, showing a relatively stable but cautious spot market.

Cobalt Output Stays Flat as Quotas Restrict Feedstock Flows

CMOC’s cobalt production was largely unchanged in the first quarter. The company produced 30,508t of cobalt, up only 0.3% from a year earlier.

The company set its 2026 cobalt output guidance at 100,000-120,000t. That is broadly stable against 117,549t produced in 2025.

The flat cobalt outlook reflects a more complicated market. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025 before moving to a quota-based export system for the fourth quarter of 2025 and for 2026-27.

Administrative delays have slowed the quota system. The DRC extended fourth-quarter 2025 quotas to 31 March 2026 because of slow processing.

The effect on Chinese imports has been severe. China imported only 1,278t cobalt metal equivalent of cobalt intermediate feedstock in January-February, down 96% from a year earlier.

Cobalt hydroxide prices remained stable at $25.95-26.10/lb cif China on 23 April. But the stability masks a market still shaped by restricted DRC export flows, delayed allocations and uncertainty over quota administration.

For CMOC, the copper side of the portfolio is showing clear growth. The cobalt side remains more exposed to policy risk, export controls and administrative timing in the DRC.

The Kisanfu expansion could increase future cobalt availability, but the market impact will depend on whether DRC export rules allow material to move smoothly to downstream refiners.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s first-quarter results show that DRC copper remains essential to China’s refined copper supply, while cobalt is increasingly constrained by policy rather than production alone. The strategic issue is no longer just mine output, but whether export quotas, brand approvals and logistics can keep critical metal flows moving.

DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Could Reshape Tantalum Supply Chains

DRC Rwanda

Focus keyphrase: DRC-Rwanda peace deal

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal marks a turning point for mineral supply chains disrupted by over a year of regional conflict. On June 27, ministers from both nations are scheduled to sign a US- and Qatar-brokered draft agreement aimed at stabilizing eastern DRC. The agreement outlines disengagement of armed groups, territorial safeguards, and regional economic integration — all critical for restoring confidence in monitored mineral flows, especially tantalum.

However, market sentiment remains cautious as details about US investments are unclear and security conditions on the ground are still unstable. Even with this draft peace deal, many buyers and refiners continue to hesitate, concerned about conflict minerals and opaque sourcing risks. The tantalum supply chain — heavily dependent on artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in North Kivu — faces ongoing due diligence challenges.

Peace Agreement Tied to Strategic Mineral Talks with the US

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal lays the groundwork for potential US-DRC mineral agreements, which could reshape global sourcing strategies. DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Senator Pierre Kanda Kalambayi previously proposed a comprehensive minerals security deal with the US. The proposal includes extraction rights for US firms, control of the Banana deepwater port, a strategic stockpile, and military training partnerships.

If these proposals materialize, the DRC could see increased foreign investment in downstream processing, moving the country beyond raw mineral exports. However, the scope of actual US commitments and their implementation timeline remain unclear. This uncertainty limits the immediate bullish response from industrial buyers and critical mineral traders.

Tantalum Markets Still Disrupted by Rebel-Controlled Territory

Despite diplomatic progress, M23’s control of eastern DRC territory continues to threaten tantalum supply chains. The seizure of Rubaya, Goma, and Bukavu has cut off major sources of monitored tantalite. These areas are key hubs for tantalum exports, and their occupation has introduced smuggled material into global supply streams, complicating OECD-aligned due diligence efforts.

Until secure logistics corridors and third-party verification systems are reestablished, tantalum refiners and electronics manufacturers may turn to alternative suppliers or delay sourcing decisions. For now, smuggling and instability keep price volatility high and certification efforts constrained.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal is a long-needed diplomatic step, but its impact hinges on actual demilitarization and foreign engagement. Unless mineral security frameworks become enforceable, trust in DRC-origin material will remain fragile. The tantalum market, in particular, demands verified sourcing channels to rebuild supply chain confidence.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

DRC Rejects M23 Rebel Ceasefire as Hoax Amid Escalating Conflict

DRC

UN Warns of Regional War as M23 Rebels Continue Advance in Eastern DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has dismissed the recent ceasefire declaration by the M23 rebel group as a "hoax," citing the continued military actions in the region. This comes after M23 rebels seized another town in eastern DRC, intensifying the ongoing conflict and raising concerns ahead of upcoming mediation talks.

M23 Advances Despite Ceasefire Claim

The M23 rebel group, which the DRC accuses of being backed by Rwanda, has taken control of Nyabibwe, a town on the eastern shore of Lake Kivu. Nyabibwe lies south of Goma, which the M23 captured in late January. Following this, the rebels declared a unilateral ceasefire, supposedly to facilitate peace talks scheduled to take place in Tanzania on February 8, 2025. However, the DRC government believes that the ceasefire is merely a tactic to deceive the international community.

DRC Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner condemned the ceasefire, claiming it was meant to "hoodwink" the world. Wagner pointed out that, instead of withdrawing their forces, the M23 has continued its actions, further complicating the situation. She also threatened the use of force to reclaim Goma if the rebels fail to vacate the area.

Economic and Regional Implications of the Conflict

The UN has highlighted that the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC is largely driven by the control of the country’s vast natural resources. Goma, a major mineral trading hub, particularly for tantalum, tin, and tungsten, plays a crucial role in this struggle. In 2023, DRC’s tantalum concentrate production, also known as tantalite or coltan, reached 6,095 tonnes, according to the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative.

The UN also reported that Rubaya, a key coltan mining town controlled by M23 rebels, generates around $800,000 per month in taxes from its mineral production and trade. This economic significance adds to the stakes of the conflict, as control of such resources is vital for the parties involved.

Growing Regional Tensions and International Concerns

While M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka claimed that the group does not plan to expand its territorial control for the time being, the situation remains volatile. The upcoming peace talks, involving Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, are seen as a critical opportunity to address the crisis.

However, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has expressed concerns about the escalating violence, warning that the M23 offensive could lead to a broader regional war. The conflict's impact could extend to the mining regions and potentially affect oil developments in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. In response to the growing tensions, Uganda has deployed 2,000 soldiers into DRC, adding to the 4,000 troops already stationed in northeast DRC to combat the Islamist group Allied Democratic Forces.

Quota System Likely for DRC Cobalt Export Restart Amid Rising Global Prices

DRC cobalt

Market Expects DRC to Shift From Export Ban to Cobalt Quotas

The Democratic Republic of Congo is expected to transition from a cobalt export ban to a quota-based system, as global prices rise and domestic revenues remain frozen. This policy shift is emerging as the most probable path forward, according to market participants attending the Cobalt Institute’s annual conference in Singapore.

The Focus Keyphrase "DRC cobalt export quotas" has become central to ongoing discussions. Since the DRC imposed a blanket cobalt export ban in February, cobalt hydroxide prices have nearly doubled. However, no royalties have flowed into the Congolese treasury, prompting calls for a more dynamic system that maintains pricing leverage while restoring revenue.

Traders suggest the decision is being driven directly by Kinshasa and the presidential office, not just Gecamines. The political goal appears to be the establishment of a long-term supply management system, similar to OPEC’s oil model, to prevent global oversupply and capture more value for the DRC.

Stockpiles Shrinking as Market Braces for Supply Squeeze

Despite record production by CMOC (30,000t) and Glencore (9,500t) in Q1, the export halt has created dislocation. Cobalt hydroxide stocks are building up within the DRC, while inventories outside the country are being depleted. Estimates put global stockpiles at 50,000–70,000t, but availability varies by holder and strategy.

Some traders are withholding shipments to capitalize on rising prices, while others warn of a looming shortage. By August, inventories in China could be critically low, leading to what one source described as a “crunch scenario” if no new material enters the pipeline.

The pressure is already visible in spot markets: Chinese hydroxide material trades at $15–16/lb, western standard at $17–18/lb, and alloy grade cobalt at $19–20/lb, depending on region and grade.

Export Enforcement Signals Shift to Strategic Resource Governance

The DRC’s export ban is being strictly enforced, with military-backed customs units now operating at Kasumbalesa, the country’s primary cobalt export route to Zambia. The sophisticated level of enforcement has convinced many in the market that a structured quota system is the inevitable next step.

Meanwhile, comparisons are being drawn with Indonesia’s nickel quota system, although differences in market structure mean the analogy is not perfect. Still, the strategic intent is clear: the DRC is asserting greater control over its cobalt exports to maximize pricing power and domestic benefit.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The move toward DRC cobalt export quotas reflects a broader trend: resource-rich nations are reclaiming leverage in critical mineral supply chains. As global cobalt demand grows, especially for EV batteries and aerospace alloys, market players must prepare for a more politically managed and price-sensitive landscape. The DRC’s emerging strategy could become a blueprint for other producers.

EQ copper premiums set to climb in 2026 as China embraces DRC supply

Copper

EQ copper premiums are poised to rise in 2026 as China deepens its adoption of equivalent-quality cathodes sourced from the DRC. Market participants expect EQ copper premiums to move sharply higher from today’s levels, reflecting tighter discounts in the DRC and shifting global trade flows. As a result, EQ copper premiums are becoming a critical signal for Chinese fabricators and global copper traders alike.

EQ copper premiums linked to DRC discounts and shifting trade flows

EQ copper premiums today sit around $30–35/t cif Shanghai, but traders already flag upside for 2026. This year’s term deals for EQ copper premiums were agreed at just $5–10/t, so a move toward $30/t would mark a structural reset. The key driver is cost escalation in the DRC, where discounts to LME prices have narrowed as local prices firm.

Meanwhile, rapid production growth in the DRC has transformed EQ copper’s role in China’s import mix. EQ copper cathode, largely DRC-origin, now accounts for more than a third of China’s cathode imports, up from about 10pc in 2020. At the same time, Chilean cathode has been diverted toward the US, amid tariff speculation, with China’s imports from Chile falling by 45pc year on year in January–August 2025. Therefore EQ copper premiums increasingly reflect both DRC mine economics and changing global copper trade patterns.

EQ copper premiums narrow the gap to exchange-listed cathode

The premium spread between exchange-registered cathodes and EQ copper premiums has narrowed to roughly $30/t this month. Previously, the spread hovered around $50/t in the second quarter, when Chinese buyers still favoured exchange-listed cathodes. However, rising flat prices and tighter LME–SHFE arbitrage have pushed many fabricators toward EQ material.

Chinese cable makers and fabricators now treat EQ cathode as a mainstream choice, thanks to reliable quality and lower all-in costs. As a result, EQ copper premiums are no longer a marginal discount indicator but a core benchmark in the Chinese physical market. At the same time, SuperMetalPrice launch of a dedicated EQ copper import premium assessment formalises this shift and gives traders a clearer pricing reference tied to the LME cash price.

EQ copper premiums sit within a wider zinc and copper premium realignment

EQ copper premiums are rising against a backdrop of broader base metal premium recalibration. Domestic Grade-A copper premiums in China, referenced to SHFE front-month, remain in a modest band from a slight discount to a small premium. Import arbitrage has improved, with the newly assessed copper cathode arbitrage at -Yn280/t, up from deeper negative levels earlier in September, which supports seaborne interest.

At the same time, zinc and other base metal premiums remain capped by weak downstream demand, even as LME stock draws offer support. This creates an unusual environment where EQ copper premiums strengthen on supply and trade-flow dynamics, while broader consumption indicators stay soft. For global traders, EQ copper premiums now sit at the intersection of DRC mine supply, Chinese import arbitrage, and evolving risk pricing around non-exchange material.

The Metalnomist Commentary

EQ copper premiums are emerging as a strategic barometer for China’s copper supply security and DRC exposure. If 2026 term negotiations lock in markedly higher EQ copper premiums, that will confirm EQ cathode’s shift from discount alternative to benchmark feedstock. Watch how Chile–US trade flows and DRC discount behaviour evolve, because both will dictate whether EQ copper premiums continue to climb beyond the $30/t threshold.

China’s Cobalt Prices Surge Amid DRC Feedstock Supply Suspension

DRC Cobalt

Extended Supply Halt from DRC Fuels Price Rally in Chinese Cobalt Market

Cobalt prices in China are set to continue their upward trend as supply disruptions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) persist. Market participants anticipate that the rally will hold until the DRC government lifts its suspension on cobalt feedstock exports.

DRC Suspension Puts Pressure on Global Supply

Most traders expect Chinese cobalt metal prices to climb toward ¥300/kg under current supply conditions. “We may hit the ¥300/kg level soon,” said a Chinese trader. “But whether prices move beyond that will depend entirely on how long the DRC suspension continues.”

Despite stable production at DRC mines, the export restriction has reduced global feedstock availability. “If the suspension continues for four months, inventories outside the DRC could be exhausted,” warned a second source. Companies with lower inventory buffers may face serious operational risks.

China Relies Heavily on DRC for Cobalt Imports

China imported approximately 188,560 tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent in intermediate forms in 2024 — a 65% increase from 2023. Notably, 99% of these imports originated from the DRC. Key suppliers include CMOC and Glencore, which operate major copper-cobalt mines in the African nation.

As China remains the world’s largest cobalt refining hub, any prolonged supply disruption from the DRC could have far-reaching effects on the battery and electronics industries.

US Shifts DRC Strategy in Play for Minerals

DRC Mining

Washington’s pivot to resource diplomacy marks renewed interest in African lithium and cobalt amid China rivalry

KoBold Eyes Lithium as US Reengages in the DRC

The US is renewing its focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with minerals now central to diplomatic strategy. KoBold Metals, backed by Jeff Bezos, is in talks to acquire the Manono lithium project—America’s first major DRC investment since 2016. Meanwhile, the DRC offered the US access to mineral assets in return for help against the M23 insurgents in the northeast. As a result, the Manono mine, with 400mn tonnes at 1.65% lithium oxide, could become a strategic anchor for US battery supply chains.

Tshisekedi Looks to Trump, Presses for Security-Mineral Pact

President Felix Tshisekedi asked for US assistance during a recent Fox News interview, linking mineral rights to security support. He emphasized the need for American pressure and sanctions to suppress rebel groups threatening national stability. In return, the DRC hopes to forge a long-term economic and security partnership with Washington that echoes past Cold War-era ties.

US Seeks Leverage as China Dominates Cobalt Market

China owns 21 of 28 major cobalt mines in the DRC, including Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu, the world’s largest cobalt producers. However, Beijing has shown reluctance to provide military aid, prompting Kinshasa to court U.S. engagement as a counterweight. Meanwhile, the U.S. has eased corruption compliance rules, possibly paving the way for broader business involvement in high-risk jurisdictions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

America’s mineral diplomacy in the DRC may redefine Africa’s geopolitical alignment. KoBold’s bid is more than a business move—it's a signal of strategic intent. Yet risks remain. Any minerals-for-security pact will demand clear red lines to avoid entanglement in regional conflict. The DRC’s mineral wealth is unmatched, but its volatility is equally unparalleled.

Lobito Corridor Copper and Cobalt Shipment Signals a New Export Route for the DRC

Entreprise Generale du Cobalt

The Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment marks a strategic milestone for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Entreprise Generale du Cobalt and Trafigura agreed the first delivery of copper and cobalt to international markets using the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Initial cargoes will go to customers in the United States. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment strengthens the US-DRC minerals partnership. 

This matters because the shipment is tied to traceable artisanal cobalt. EGC reported production of its first 1,000t of traceable artisanal cobalt in November. Trafigura already markets cobalt supplied by EGC under an existing agreement. Therefore, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment is not only a logistics story. It is also a supply-chain transparency story. 

The route itself is strategically important. The Lobito Atlantic Railway offers the shortest path from Kolwezi to an Atlantic port. Inland transit times can fall to about seven days. Consequently, DRC critical minerals exports could become faster and more visible to international buyers. 

Traceable Artisanal Cobalt Gives the Corridor More Strategic Value

Traceable artisanal cobalt gives this shipment a different significance from a normal export cargo. EGC is mandated by the Congolese state to buy cobalt from artisanal producers. That gives the company a central role in formalising part of the country’s cobalt trade. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment connects logistics reform with artisanal sector reform. 

Trafigura’s role also matters. The trader signed a five-year supply agreement with EGC in 2020. That deal included funding for controlled artisanal mining zones, ore buying stations, and traceability systems aligned with OECD standards. Therefore, this first shipment reflects years of work on controlled sourcing rather than a one-off transaction. 

The wider objective is clear. The partnership aims to formalise artisanal mining, improve transparency, and eliminate child labour. Those goals matter to western buyers seeking more credible cobalt supply. Meanwhile, the new route may make traceable material more commercially attractive by improving export efficiency. 

DRC Critical Minerals Exports Gain a Faster Atlantic Route

DRC critical minerals exports have long faced costly and slow logistics. The Lobito corridor changes that equation by linking the Copperbelt more directly to the Atlantic. The railway runs from Lobito in Angola to the DRC border, with an extension into the Copperbelt. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment may become a model for wider export diversification. 

The infrastructure backing is also important. The Lar consortium recently secured $753mn in debt financing to support rehabilitation and expansion. That level of support shows that the route is being treated as a strategic trade corridor, not just a regional rail asset. Therefore, DRC critical minerals exports could gain a more durable logistics platform. 

This development also aligns with broader western policy. Initial cargoes are heading to US customers under the US-DRC strategic partnership on critical minerals. That makes the corridor part of a bigger effort to diversify metal flows away from more concentrated supply routes. Consequently, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment carries geopolitical meaning as well as commercial value. 

The Metalnomist Commentary

This shipment matters because it brings together three themes at once: traceability, logistics, and geopolitics. The DRC is not only trying to export more cobalt and copper. It is trying to export them through routes and systems that western buyers can trust. If Lobito keeps scaling, it could become one of the most important critical minerals corridors outside the traditional China-linked trade flow. 

CMOC Copper Output Rose in 2025 on Stronger DRC Production

Copper Wire

CMOC copper output increased in 2025 as the Chinese diversified metals producer lifted production from its copper-cobalt operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The company produced 741,100t of copper during the year, up 14% from 2024.

The increase was driven by higher output from both the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine and the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine. These assets remain central to CMOC’s copper growth strategy and to China’s access to African copper cathode supply.

CMOC copper output is expected to rise again in 2026, with the company targeting production of 760,000-820,000t. CMOC also plans to expand copper production at Kisanfu by another 100,000 t/yr in 2027.

DRC Assets Strengthen CMOC’s Copper Growth Platform

CMOC’s production growth reinforces the strategic importance of the DRC in global copper supply. The country has become one of the most important sources of copper cathode for China, supported by large-scale mining, solvent extraction and electrowinning capacity.

Tenke Fungurume remains a key asset in this system. The mine has copper cathode capacity of 270,000 t/yr, and its TFM-1 copper cathode brand was approved by the London Metal Exchange for listing on 27 March.

The LME approval strengthens the marketability of CMOC’s DRC-produced copper. Exchange-listed status can improve brand recognition, liquidity and acceptance among global buyers, especially in refined copper markets where cathode quality and deliverability matter.

China’s Copper Supply Chain Leans Heavily on DRC Cathode

The DRC remained China’s largest source of copper cathode imports in 2025. China imported 1.44mn t of copper cathode from the country, accounting for 37.6% of total imports.

This trade flow highlights the depth of China’s dependence on DRC copper supply. As domestic demand from grids, manufacturing, electric vehicles and energy infrastructure continues, stable access to DRC cathode remains strategically important.

CMOC copper output growth also has wider market implications. Additional production from Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu can help offset disruptions in other copper regions, but it also increases the role of African supply in balancing global refined copper markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s 2025 copper growth shows how the DRC has become a core pillar of China’s refined copper security. The next strategic question is whether rising African cathode supply can remain reliable amid infrastructure, policy and geopolitical risks.

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation starts with first 1,000 tonnes

DRC, Cobalt mining

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation has started with the first 1,000 tonnes of traceable artisanal cobalt. Democratic Republic of the Congo is moving to legalise supply that has long operated informally. DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation aims to improve oversight, reduce uncertainty, and tighten market discipline. Therefore, the initiative signals a shift from fragmented trading toward controlled sourcing and compliance-ready material.

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation also targets stronger price support. Officials expect formalisation to curb oversupply and improve quota enforcement. Meanwhile, buyers increasingly demand ESG assurance and end-to-end traceability for battery metals. As a result, traceable supply can attract a broader pool of compliant refiners and OEMs.

Traceability expands oversight and pulls informal mines into legal channels

Entreprise Generale du Cobalt is scaling beyond the initial 1,000 tonnes. Eric Kalala said the company will expand refining capacity to capture a larger share of artisanal cobalt. Meanwhile, the model aims to bring illegal mines into regulated business through purchasing and control points. Therefore, the programme can raise compliance standards while protecting miners’ incomes.

Traceability also reshapes the operational playbook. The company can standardise buying practices and document custody through the chain. However, success will depend on consistent enforcement and credible auditing. As a result, DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation could become a template for other high-risk minerals.

Quotas, livelihoods, and the Copperbelt raise the stakes

The DRC anchors global cobalt supply and holds about 70% of known cobalt reserves. Artisanal mines employ around two million people and support many more indirectly. Meanwhile, the richest deposits cluster in the Copperbelt, linking cobalt output to regional livelihoods and stability. Therefore, any formalisation effort must balance governance goals with local economic realities.

The government has also introduced export quotas after a months-long export ban. Formalisation can support these controls by improving visibility over volumes and flows. However, artisanal material still represents a meaningful share of global supply, often estimated at 20–30% of annual cobalt volumes. As a result, DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation can influence both near-term pricing and long-term OEM sourcing strategies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Traceability will not change cobalt fundamentals overnight, but it can reduce risk premiums for compliant buyers. Meanwhile, the real impact will come if the programme enforces quotas and consolidates fragmented supply. Therefore, the market will watch scale-up pace and audit credibility as the key signals.

China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance as DRC export curbs reshape supply

CMOC

China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance for 2025 after steady performance at its DRC assets. China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance with 117,549 tonnes of cobalt from Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu. China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance despite DRC export restrictions that disrupted feedstock flows.

CMOC’s 2025 output rose slightly from 114,165 tonnes in 2024. The company kept its 2026 cobalt guidance at 100,000–120,000 tonnes, matching its 2025 range. Meanwhile, higher copper prices supported earnings because copper remains the main by-product.

Copper strength funds CMOC’s Kisanfu expansion

Copper prices stayed strong through 2025 and hit a new record in early January 2026. The rally reflected tight concentrate supply, rate cuts, and tariff risk expectations. Therefore, CMOC can finance growth while defending margins in a volatile cobalt market.

CMOC is investing $1.08bn in the Kisanfu Phase II project. The project targets an extra 100,000 tonnes per year of copper cathode output, with start-up expected in 2027. However, the company has not disclosed the cobalt capacity uplift, although the market expects a meaningful increase.

DRC export restrictions tighten the feedstock pipeline

DRC policy changes remain the core swing factor for cobalt availability. The government halted cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025, then shifted to a quota system for late 2025 and 2026–27. Meanwhile, procedural delays prevented any feedstock exports in the fourth quarter of 2025.

The government has now approved a limited number of hydroxide truck shipments. Those shipments have reached Lubumbashi, a key logistics hub. As a result, market participants expect the first new feedstock to reach China in April, after royalties are paid and cargoes clear onward transport.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s results show how copper economics can cushion cobalt volatility inside integrated Cu-Co systems. However, DRC export controls introduce timing risk that can ripple into battery chemical supply chains. Producers that diversify refining routes and secure compliant logistics will gain resilience.

CMOC meets 2025 cobalt guidance as copper strength offsets DRC export curbs and quota delays.

#Cobalt, #Copper, #CMOC, #DRC, #TenkeFungurume, #Kisanfu, #BatteryMaterials, #CriticalMinerals, #SupplyChainRisk, #TheMetalnomist

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation begins with first 1,000 tonnes

DRC, Cobalt

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation has started with a first 1,000 tonnes of traceable artisanal cobalt. Democratic Republic of the Congo produced the initial volume through Entreprise Generale du Cobalt, according to CEO Eric Kalala. Meanwhile, the program targets legal oversight and stronger control of the DRC cobalt supply chain.

DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation aims to reduce uncertainty across informal mining flows. The approach targets better tracking, fewer illicit routes, and clearer compliance checks. As a result, the initiative could tighten market discipline and reduce chaotic supply surges.

Scaling traceability and bringing illegal mines into legal channels

The next step expands volumes beyond the first 1,000 tonnes. The company plans to increase refining capacity to absorb more artisanal supply. However, scaling requires consistent buying, screening, and secure logistics.

The program also targets the transition of illegal sites into legal participation. The company says its model will align operations with international ESG expectations. Therefore, traceable artisanal cobalt could become a larger share of formal flows over time.

Managing quotas, prices, and livelihoods in the Copperbelt

Price support now drives government intervention across cobalt markets. The DRC introduced export quotas in October after a months-long export ban. Therefore, DRC traceable artisanal cobalt formalisation can help enforce quota discipline and reduce oversupply.

Artisanal mining remains central to national livelihoods. The DRC holds about 70% of global cobalt reserves, and informal mines employ around two million people. Much production sits in the Copperbelt, which extends into Zambia. Meanwhile, artisanal mining supplies about 20–30% of annual cobalt volumes and supports wider communities.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Traceability will only work if it pays miners fairly and blocks parallel illicit buying. Meanwhile, tighter quota enforcement could lift prices, but it may squeeze short-term supply. Therefore, battery buyers should secure verified volumes and plan for periodic market tightening.

DRC Cobalt Exports Pause Deepens Supply Risk After Assay Dispute

DRC, Cobalt

DRC cobalt exports have effectively paused after officials raised concerns over mismatched assay results for cobalt hydroxide shipments. The disruption adds another layer of uncertainty to a market still recovering from last year’s long export halt and the quota regime that followed.

The issue centers on differences between laboratory results used in export procedures. Border staff have reportedly held back paperwork while awaiting formal guidance from Kinshasa on how to treat discrepancies between assays from state-linked laboratories and private laboratories selected by exporters.

DRC cobalt exports are highly sensitive to administrative delays because the country remains the dominant global source of mined cobalt. Any pause in clearance can quickly affect hydroxide flows to refiners, especially in China, where cobalt intermediate supply depends heavily on Congolese material.

Assay Tolerance Rules Aim to Clarify Export Procedures

The new document sets a ±2pc tolerance for differences between assay results issued by the Arecoms laboratory, the CEEC laboratory, and the exporter’s chosen private laboratory. If the gap exceeds that threshold, a reference test would be required before export paperwork can proceed.

The document also introduces monthly reconciliation of assay data and quota volumes. This suggests the government wants tighter control over declared cobalt content, export volumes, and quota compliance.

However, exporters say the lack of a signed administrative instruction has created uncertainty at the border. Until the mining minister confirms how the rules should be applied, border officials appear reluctant to clear shipments.

Cobalt Market Faces Renewed Pressure From DRC Border Delays

The timing is important because mining companies have been trying to rebuild export flows after last year’s eight-month halt. The later quota system capped October–December shipments at 18,125t, already limiting the pace of market normalization.

Cobalt prices rose late last year as inventories outside the DRC declined and Chinese imports fell sharply. Border delays then continued into December because of paperwork backlogs and heavy rain, keeping pressure on the supply chain.

The current assay dispute may reflect confusion over normal lab-to-lab variation rather than clear evidence of fraud. Different laboratories can return different results on the same parcel, especially when sampling, moisture, preparation, and analytical methods vary. Still, the market reaction shows that buyers and traders remain nervous about any new restriction on DRC cobalt exports.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt exports pause shows how administrative control can become as important as mine output in critical mineral markets. For battery supply chains, the real risk is not only resource concentration, but also regulatory uncertainty at the export gate.

Chengtun DRC Copper-Cobalt Project Stake Expands China’s Overseas Resource Push

Chengtun Mining

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project investment will give the Chinese mining company an indirect 30% interest in a designated mining asset in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The deal strengthens China’s overseas copper resource strategy as domestic smelting demand continues to rise.

Chengtun Mining’s wholly owned subsidiaries Hongsheng International Resources and Preeminence Holdings signed the agreement with Abu Dhabi-based Novel Mining and Services and its subsidiary Nkoyi Leopard Mining and Investment. Under the deal, Preeminence will acquire 50% of Nkoyi for $300mn.

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project exposure is strategically important because the DRC remains one of the world’s key copper and cobalt supply regions. The project’s technical assessment indicates an average copper grade of 1.66% and an associated cobalt grade of 0.67%.

DRC Asset Adds Copper and Cobalt Feedstock Optionality

The acquisition gives Chengtun access to a copper-cobalt asset at a time when Chinese firms are increasing control over upstream mineral resources. This reflects a wider push to secure feedstock for China’s expanding smelting, refining and battery materials sectors.

The companies plan to negotiate binding agreements covering mineral processing and product sales after the initial transaction documents are completed. These future agreements will determine how project output moves into downstream supply chains.

Chengtun expects mine and processing construction to take around 18 months, followed by a 24-month ramp-up period to full capacity. The company has not disclosed expected annual copper output, leaving the project’s full market impact unclear.

China’s Smelting Demand Drives Overseas Copper Ownership

China copper resource ownership is becoming more important as domestic refined copper output continues to grow. China’s refined copper production rose by 9% on the year in January-February, increasing pressure on companies to secure stable concentrate and mine supply.

The DRC has become a central region for Chinese copper and cobalt investment. Its high-grade copper resources and cobalt by-product value make it strategically attractive for companies exposed to both electrification and battery material demand.

The Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project deal shows that Chinese companies are still willing to deploy capital into African mining assets despite infrastructure, political and execution risks. For China, the priority remains long-term feedstock security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Chengtun’s DRC investment shows that China’s copper strategy is moving further upstream. As smelting capacity expands, control over mine supply will become just as important as processing scale.

Glencore Copper Production Rises as DRC Cobalt Quota Reshapes Output Priorities

Glencore

Glencore copper production rose sharply in the first quarter as higher grades at its African copper mines and stronger throughput at Antamina lifted output. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group produced 199,600t of copper, up 19% from a year earlier.

Glencore copper production growth contrasts with a steep fall in cobalt output. Own-sourced cobalt production dropped by 39% to 5,800t, mainly because the Democratic Republic of Congo’s export quota system has changed how producers manage shipments and mine planning.

Glencore copper production is now becoming more important inside its DRC asset base because cobalt export limits have made copper the clearer operating priority. This shift shows how state policy can directly reshape output behaviour in multi-metal mining systems.

The company maintained full-year production guidance for copper, nickel and zinc, despite weaker output in several other metals. Copper guidance remains at 810,000-870,000t for the year.

DRC Quota System Pushes Cobalt Lower

The sharp fall in cobalt output reflects the DRC’s quota system, introduced after the country moved away from its earlier export ban framework. The system capped shipments and set annual limits for 2026-27, with an additional strategic pool.

For Glencore, the practical effect is clear. Its DRC assets are now prioritising copper production because copper can move through the market with fewer quota-related constraints.

This matters for battery and superalloy supply chains. The DRC remains the world’s dominant source of mined cobalt, so export policy can quickly affect availability, pricing and producer behaviour.

Cobalt is not produced in isolation at many Congolese operations. It is often linked to copper mining, which means policy limits on cobalt can influence mine sequencing, processing priorities and inventory decisions.

The first-quarter numbers therefore point to a more managed cobalt market. Supply is not only a function of ore grades and plant capacity. It is increasingly controlled by export approvals, quotas and state strategy.

Copper benefited from stronger grades at African operations and higher throughput at Antamina in Peru. That performance reinforces copper’s stronger strategic position at a time when demand from grids, electrification, industrial policy and data centres continues to attract market attention.

Nickel, Zinc and Ferro-Chrome Show Operational Pressure

Glencore’s nickel output fell by 9% to 17,200t. The decline was caused by a furnace disruption at the Sudbury complex in Canada, which affected matte shipment timing to Norway.

Nickel guidance remained unchanged at 70,000-80,000t. This suggests Glencore sees the first-quarter weakness as manageable rather than a full-year supply reset.

Zinc output fell by 17% to 176,900t. The decline was mainly linked to the closure of the Lady Loretta mine in Australia and lower output from Kazzinc in Kazakhstan.

Zinc guidance also remained unchanged at 700,000-740,000t. However, the first-quarter result shows how mine closures and regional production issues can still weigh on quarterly availability.

Ferro-chrome output collapsed by 95% to 13,000t because of continued care and maintenance at Glencore’s chrome smelting operations and the phased restart of the Lion Smelter in South Africa.

South African ferro-chrome remains under pressure from high energy prices and competition from lower-cost Chinese material. This has forced output cuts at major producers and weakened South Africa’s position in global ferro-alloy supply.

Glencore’s vanadium pentoxide production rose by 5% to 2,300t, offering a small positive signal in another strategic alloy material.

Overall, the quarter shows a company benefiting from copper strength while managing policy and cost pressures across cobalt, nickel, zinc and ferro-chrome. The most important signal is that copper and cobalt are now being shaped by very different forces: copper by grade and throughput, cobalt by DRC export control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Glencore’s results show how government policy can be as powerful as geology in multi-metal supply chains. The DRC cobalt quota is not only reducing cobalt output; it is pushing producers to prioritise copper in one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.