Moil Manganese Ore Prices Fall as Indian Steel Demand Weakens

Moil, Manganese Ore

Moil manganese ore prices have been cut by 4% for May as weak downstream steel demand and sluggish export bookings pressure India’s manganese market. The state-owned producer reduced prices across ferro-grade ore, silico-grade ore and fines.

Moil manganese ore prices for ferro-grade material with manganese content of 44% and above, as well as below-44% material, were lowered by 4% from April levels. The cut follows a sharp 17.5% increase in April for ore below 44% manganese content.

Moil manganese ore prices for 25% and 30% silico-grade ore and fines were also reduced by 4% for May. The move reflects a softer market environment in which domestic buyers are cautious and export opportunities remain limited.

The price cut highlights a wider imbalance in India’s manganese ore chain. Lower export demand has pushed more material into the domestic market, creating surplus supply across major trading hubs.

Weak Steel Demand Pressures Ferro-Grade Ore

Ferro-grade manganese ore demand remains tied closely to steel and ferro-alloy production. When steel demand weakens, alloy producers reduce feedstock buying and ore prices come under pressure.

India’s downstream steel market has been sluggish, limiting demand for manganese alloys and the ore used to produce them. This has made buyers more cautious about restocking, especially after the April price increase.

The 4% reduction is therefore a market-clearing move. Moil is adjusting prices to reflect weaker consumer appetite and rising domestic availability.

Export weakness has added further pressure. Reduced overseas bookings mean more ore is staying inside India, increasing competition among suppliers and traders.

This domestic oversupply is especially important for ferro-grade ore. Alloy producers can delay purchases when they expect further weakness, which slows market activity and reinforces downward pressure.

Higher Output Adds to Domestic Supply Overhang

Moil’s production has continued to rise despite weaker demand. The company produced around 164,000t of manganese ore in March 2026, up from 159,000t a year earlier.

Full-year output for April 2025-March 2026 reached 1.9mn t, compared with 1.8mn t in the previous fiscal year. This higher supply has entered a market already facing softer domestic and export demand.

The result is a supply overhang across key trading hubs. Even if production growth is modest, weaker buying can quickly create surplus conditions in the manganese ore market.

For alloy producers, lower ore prices may ease cost pressure. But the benefit depends on whether ferro-manganese and silico-manganese demand recovers enough to support production margins.

For Moil, the challenge is balancing output growth with market absorption. Higher production supports volume targets, but weak demand forces price adjustments when inventories rise.

The May price cut therefore sends a clear signal. India’s manganese ore market needs stronger steel and alloy demand before pricing power can return.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Moil’s price cut shows that India’s manganese market is being driven by demand weakness, not raw material scarcity. Until steel and export bookings improve, higher mine output will continue to weigh on ore pricing.

Sumitomo Ambatovy Nickel-Cobalt Exit Marks Costly Retreat From Madagascar Laterite Project

Sumitomo

Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit marks a major strategic retreat from one of the world’s largest laterite nickel operations. The Japanese trading and mining group will divest its 54.17% stake in Madagascar’s Ambatovy project to Ambatovy Mineral Resources Investment.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit is unusually costly. The transaction value is negative $418mn, meaning Sumitomo will pay to leave the asset after more than two decades of involvement.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit reflects years of operational instability, high costs and weak profitability. Sumitomo joined Ambatovy in 2005 and invested around $3bn, but the project generated cumulative losses of about ¥400bn.

The sale is expected to close in the first half of Sumitomo’s financial year ending 31 March 2027. Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources will retain its 45.82% stake.

Operational Instability Undermines a Strategic Nickel Asset

Ambatovy remains strategically important because it produces refined nickel and cobalt. These materials serve stainless steel, battery raw materials, superalloys and industrial supply chains.

However, the project has struggled to operate consistently. Ambatovy combines laterite mining, slurry transport and refining, making it a complex integrated operation with high technical and maintenance demands.

The project was suspended in February before Cyclone Gezani struck eastern Madagascar. It has not yet fully restarted, although market participants expect operations to resume during the current quarter.

Recovery efforts are still continuing. The project has also faced slurry pipeline damage and other processing issues in previous years, which affected output and reliability.

Ambatovy produced about 30,000t of refined nickel in 2025. Cobalt output was estimated at roughly 10% of nickel production.

That production profile gives the asset continuing supply-chain relevance. But strategic metal exposure alone cannot offset weak operating economics if reliability, costs and weather-related risks remain unresolved.

New Ownership Faces Production Reliability Test

AMRI, the buyer, is a UK-based consortium led by mining investment firm Essenwood and South African private equity firm Zungu Investments. The transaction gives the new group control of Sumitomo’s stake in a difficult but potentially valuable nickel-cobalt platform.

For Sumitomo, the divestment removes a long-running drag on earnings. The company expects to record a loss of about ¥70bn in its consolidated April-June results and a non-consolidated loss of about ¥85bn for the full financial year.

Sumitomo said tax effects should limit the net consolidated impact, and the transfer has already been included in its full-year earnings forecast.

For the nickel market, the key issue is not ownership alone. The immediate question is whether the new structure can stabilise output, repair operating weaknesses and restore confidence in Ambatovy’s supply.

Madagascar nickel-cobalt supply remains strategically relevant as buyers look beyond Indonesia-dominated nickel growth. But Ambatovy must prove that it can deliver refined nickel and cobalt reliably before it can regain stronger market importance.

The sale also highlights a broader industry lesson. Large laterite nickel projects can offer scale and battery-metal exposure, but they often carry high capital intensity, technical risk and sensitivity to market cycles.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sumitomo’s exit shows that nickel-cobalt scale is not enough when operating reliability and cost control fail. Ambatovy’s next phase will depend on whether new owners can turn a strategically valuable asset into a commercially stable supplier.

Langeloth Molybdenum Plant Provisionally Restarts After January Explosion

Centerra

Langeloth molybdenum plant operations have provisionally resumed after Centerra Gold restarted the Pennsylvania conversion facility in April following a late-January explosion. The Canada-based mining group had suspended operations at the site after the incident near the acid plant.

The Langeloth molybdenum plant is an important US molybdenum conversion asset near Pittsburgh. It roasts molybdenum and supports downstream supply chains that rely on molybdenum products for steel, alloys, chemicals and industrial applications.

The Langeloth molybdenum plant restart remains provisional. Centerra identified additional items requiring testing during the April restart, which the company described as typical when bringing a processing facility back toward stable operations.

The company initially expected full operations to resume by May. However, it did not provide a new timeline for returning to full capacity in its first-quarter earnings release.

Repairs and Testing Slow Full Production Recovery

The explosion occurred on 29 January near the acid plant, with the impact contained at the site. The incident happened while a driver was pumping chemicals into a tank.

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency said 1,700-1,800 gallons of hydrogen peroxide and liquid magnesium were involved in the incident. Centerra suspended operations after the explosion to assess damage and manage safety requirements.

Repairs are expected to cost $5mn-10mn. The company had already incurred $1.9mn of repair costs in the first quarter.

The provisional restart is positive, but it does not yet mean normalised output. Processing plants often need additional testing, equipment checks and operating adjustments after an incident and restart sequence.

That matters for molybdenum supply. Conversion capacity can become a bottleneck even when mine supply or concentrate availability remains intact.

Molybdenum is used in special steels, stainless steels, energy equipment, chemical processing, aerospace alloys and high-temperature industrial applications. Reliable conversion capacity is therefore part of the broader alloy materials supply chain.

Inventory Build Cushions Shipments During Restart

Centerra invested $73mn in working capital at Langeloth in the first quarter by building inventory during the temporary shutdown. The company expects to hold higher inventory levels through 2026 while operations and shipments normalise.

This inventory strategy should help reduce customer disruption as the plant returns toward stable operation. It also gives Centerra more flexibility while it ramps production under its commercial optimisation plan.

First-quarter operating figures show the impact of the outage. The plant roasted 1.3mn lb of molybdenum during the quarter, down 58% from a year earlier.

Molybdenum sales fell by 13% to 3.7mn lb. The smaller decline in sales compared with roasting output suggests inventory management helped support shipments despite lower plant activity.

Centerra expects to publish updated 2026 operating guidance for Langeloth with its second-quarter results. That guidance will be important for customers tracking US conversion availability and molybdenum product supply.

The key issue is not only restart status. Buyers will need to monitor how quickly the facility can move from provisional operation to stable full-capacity production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Centerra’s Langeloth restart shows that molybdenum supply risk can emerge at the processing stage, not only at mines. The plant’s recovery timeline matters because conversion reliability directly affects alloy, steel and chemical customers that depend on steady molybdenum units.

KoBold Mingomba Copper Project Advances as Zambia Targets Major Supply Growth

KoBold Metals

KoBold Mingomba copper project has broken ground in Zambia, moving one of Africa’s largest planned copper mines closer to development. The project is expected to cost more than $2.3bn and produce more than 300,000 t/yr of copper once fully ramped up.

KoBold Mingomba copper project is strategically important because Zambia wants to lift national copper production to about 3mn t/yr by the early 2030s. A project of this scale could become one of the country’s most important new supply sources.

KoBold Mingomba copper project also highlights the growing role of AI-led exploration in critical minerals. KoBold has used proprietary artificial intelligence and machine-learning tools to define a high-grade copper resource deep underground.

The company acquired Mingomba in December 2022. It is now beginning early construction work before completing all engineering studies, with a final cost estimate expected by early next year.

Zambia Copper Investment Gains Momentum

Mingomba could become one of Zambia’s largest copper investments. At more than 300,000 t/yr of planned output, it would rank with some of the largest single copper assets globally.

The project supports Zambia’s wider copper growth strategy. The country is trying to attract large-scale mining investment after years of operational, tax and policy uncertainty.

Other producers are also expanding in Zambia. Barrick and First Quantum are pursuing projects that could help rebuild national output growth.

This matters because copper demand is rising from grids, electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure and AI data centres. But new mine supply remains difficult to deliver.

Permitting delays, declining grades and higher capital costs continue to slow global copper development. This gives high-grade, large-scale African projects greater strategic value.

Zambia has a natural advantage because it already has mining infrastructure, workforce experience and established copper export channels. However, execution still depends on policy stability, power supply, transport and downstream processing capacity.

AI Exploration Adds New Dimension to Copper Supply

KoBold’s approach makes Mingomba more than a conventional copper project. The company has built its strategy around using AI and machine learning to analyse geological data and accelerate discovery.

Technology-led exploration is becoming more important as the mining industry searches for deeper, harder-to-find deposits. Many easy copper discoveries have already been developed.

Mingomba’s deep underground resource shows why new exploration methods matter. Future copper supply will increasingly depend on better data, faster targeting and more efficient drilling.

KoBold is backed by major technology and energy-transition investors, including Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos and Sam Altman. That investor base reflects copper’s growing role in electrification and strategic materials policy.

The company is still assessing smelting and refining options for Mingomba’s output. This will be important because mine production alone does not guarantee secure copper supply.

Processing, logistics and offtake structures will determine how Mingomba’s copper enters global markets. Zambia’s ability to capture more value domestically may also shape the project’s long-term impact.

KoBold is also expanding its African critical minerals strategy. It has outlined plans for lithium exploration in the Democratic Republic of Congo by 2027 and is reviewing lithium and nickel opportunities in Namibia. It has also begun early-stage copper exploration in Botswana.

The broader signal is clear. Africa is becoming central to the next phase of copper and critical minerals supply, while technology-led exploration is changing how new deposits are found and financed.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mingomba is important because it combines scale, grade and timing in a copper market short of credible new supply. If KoBold can convert AI-led discovery into mine execution, Zambia could gain one of the most strategically important copper assets of the next decade.

Vale Thompson Nickel Belt Restructuring Secures New Capital for Canadian Nickel Supply

Vale Base Metals

Vale Thompson Nickel Belt restructuring marks a strategic move to keep one of Canada’s established nickel districts operating while reducing Vale’s direct exposure. Vale Base Metals has agreed to form a consortium for its Thompson nickel operations following a strategic review.

Vale Thompson Nickel Belt assets will receive up to $200mn in partner commitments to support long-term sustainability. Vale will retain an 18.9% interest in the consortium, while also securing a nickel concentrate offtake agreement.

Vale Thompson Nickel Belt restructuring matters because western buyers are paying closer attention to non-Indonesian nickel supply, origin transparency and long-term feedstock security. Thompson offers a Canadian source of nickel concentrate at a time when the market remains heavily influenced by Indonesian production growth.

The consortium is expected to close by the end of 2026, subject to regulatory approvals. Vale did not name the consortium partners.

Thompson Deal Preserves Exposure While Reducing Operating Risk

The new structure suggests Vale wants to keep Thompson in production without carrying the full capital and operating burden alone. The company is reducing direct exposure but preserving strategic access through its retained stake and concentrate offtake.

This matters because Thompson has faced operational pressure. Production at the mine fell by 66.7% on the year to 12,000t in the first quarter after a pipeline blockage was aggravated by poor weather.

The consortium model could help stabilise the asset if new partners bring capital, operational focus and a longer-term investment plan. For a mature nickel operation, sustaining capital and reliability upgrades can be as important as headline resource size.

The concentrate offtake agreement is equally important. It gives Vale continued access to material while allowing outside capital to support the mine’s future.

For western nickel supply chains, Thompson has strategic relevance beyond its near-term production volume. Non-Indonesian nickel units are becoming more valuable for buyers seeking diversified supply, lower geopolitical concentration and clearer provenance.

This is especially relevant for stainless steel, alloy, battery and defence-linked customers that want alternatives to Indonesia-dominated supply growth. Canadian nickel concentrate can help support that diversification if the operation remains stable.

Strong Copper and Nickel Prices Lift Vale Base Metals Earnings

The Thompson restructuring came as Vale Base Metals reported a sharp improvement in first-quarter earnings. Net revenue rose by 37% on the year to $2.38bn, while adjusted Ebitda more than doubled to $1.2bn from $554mn.

Nickel earnings recovered strongly. Adjusted nickel Ebitda climbed to $277mn from $41mn a year earlier, supported by higher realised prices, stronger sales, lower unit costs and better by-product credits.

Vale’s average realised nickel price rose by 6% to $17,015/t. Nickel sales volumes increased by 15% to 45,000t.

Cost improvements at Sudbury, Voisey’s Bay and Long Harbour also supported the nickel result. This shows that Vale’s Canadian nickel platform still has earnings leverage when operating performance improves and prices firm.

Copper delivered an even stronger contribution. Copper-adjusted Ebitda rose by 74% year on year to $949mn in the first quarter.

Vale’s realised copper price jumped by 48% to $13,143/t, while copper sales volumes rose by 18% to 72,000t. Stronger gold by-product revenues and improved performance at Sossego also supported the result.

The company increased copper sustaining capital expenditure by 54% to $83mn, with spending on the Bacaba copper project a key driver. Total copper capex, including growth spending, rose by 56% to $89mn.

At group level, Vale’s adjusted Ebitda rose by 23% to $3.83bn. The result shows how stronger copper and nickel prices can quickly improve earnings when production, sales and by-product credits align.

For Vale, the strategic message is clear. Copper provides growth and margin strength, while nickel requires selective restructuring, cost discipline and stronger asset-level sustainability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Vale’s Thompson move shows that western nickel supply will increasingly depend on partnership models, not only mine ownership. The asset’s value lies in preserving Canadian concentrate supply at a time when buyers want alternatives to Indonesian nickel dominance.

Liontown Lithium Production Holds Flat as Kathleen Valley Shifts Underground

Liontown

Liontown lithium production was flat in January-March as the Kathleen Valley operation completed its first full quarter as a fully underground mine. The Australian miner produced 96,000t of spodumene concentrate during the quarter, unchanged from a year earlier but down 9% from the previous quarter.

Liontown lithium production is now being reshaped by the transition away from previously mined open-pit ore toward underground feed. The shift is important because underground ore is expected to support more stable grades and recoveries as Kathleen Valley moves deeper into its long-term operating model.

Liontown lithium production also faced shipment disruption from tropical cyclone Narelle, which temporarily affected port operations at Geraldton in Western Australia. Two shipments were delayed, including one that was deferred into early April.

The quarter shows a lithium producer moving through a technical transition rather than a demand-led slowdown. Kathleen Valley is still ramping toward its longer-term target of around 500,000 t/yr of spodumene concentrate.

Underground Feed Improves Recovery Outlook

Kathleen Valley’s underground mining performance improved during the quarter. Underground ore mined totalled 402,000t, up 31% from the previous quarter, with an average grade of about 1.4% lithium oxide.

Lithia recoveries improved in late March as underground ore became the dominant feed source. Liontown achieved its 70% recovery target, while underground ore accounted for 67% of the feed mix in the first weeks of April.

This is a key operational milestone. As the feed mix shifts away from open-pit stockpiles, Kathleen Valley should gain better consistency in processing performance, grade control and recovery rates.

However, the transition also affected quarterly output. Lower production volumes and variable recoveries pushed unit operating costs higher, showing that underground ramp-up periods can create temporary cost pressure before stable-state performance is reached.

Kathleen Valley has a 2.8mn t/yr mining capacity and is expected to produce around 500,000 t/yr of spodumene concentrate. Reaching that level will depend on sustained underground ore delivery, process stability and shipment execution.

Port Disruption and Cost Pressure Shape Near-Term Performance

Cyclone-related disruption affected sales during the quarter. Tropical cyclone Narelle interrupted operations at Geraldton for several days in March, delaying two shipments.

Liontown ended the quarter with 26,270 dry metric tonnes of concentrate in inventory. This was up from 13,800dmt in the previous quarter and 22,519dmt a year earlier, partly reflecting shipment timing.

Unit operating costs on a fob sales basis rose to A$981/t from A$910/t in the previous quarter. The increase was driven by lower production volumes and recoveries during a period of variable feed mix.

This cost movement matters because lithium markets remain highly competitive after the price correction of the past two years. Producers need scale, grade control and low operating costs to defend margins.

Kathleen Valley’s underground transition could improve cost performance over time if recoveries remain stable and mined volumes continue rising. But the quarter shows that ramp-up execution remains critical.

For the wider lithium market, Liontown’s flat output adds to a more disciplined supply picture. New spodumene supply is still entering the market, but operational transitions, weather disruptions and cost pressure continue to affect how quickly nameplate capacity becomes reliable production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Liontown’s quarter should be read as an underground ramp-up story, not a weak demand signal. Kathleen Valley’s recovery performance is improving, but cost control and shipment reliability will determine how competitive the operation becomes as lithium supply remains under pressure.

Appalachian Lithium Reserves Could Strengthen US Domestic Supply Security

USGS

Appalachian lithium reserves could give the US a much larger domestic resource base than previously recognised, according to a new assessment from the US Geological Survey. The agency said the eastern US Appalachian region may contain enough undiscovered, economically recoverable lithium to replace 328 years of US imports at 2025 levels.

Appalachian lithium reserves are hosted in pegmatites, large-grained rocks similar to granite. The southern Appalachian region is estimated to contain 1.43mn t of lithium oxide, while the northern Appalachian region holds another 0.90mn t.

Appalachian lithium reserves matter because the US still depends heavily on imported lithium. The country has only one current lithium producer and relied on imports for more than half of its supply in 2025.

The assessment adds another possible domestic supply route alongside lithium brine projects in the Smackover formation. Together, these resources could reshape US lithium strategy if they can be converted into permitted, economic and commercially scalable projects.

Pegmatite Resources Add a Hard-Rock Lithium Option

The Appalachian assessment points to hard-rock lithium potential in the eastern US. Pegmatite-hosted lithium is different from brine-based production because it usually requires mining, concentration and chemical conversion.

This gives the US another possible supply pathway. Hard-rock projects can produce spodumene concentrate, which can then be converted into lithium chemicals for batteries, energy storage and industrial uses.

Albemarle is already planning a lithium concentrator facility at Kings Mountain, North Carolina. The project is designed to produce 420,000 t/yr of lithium concentrate from spodumene.

That project is important because it could help rebuild a US hard-rock lithium supply chain. Domestic spodumene production would reduce reliance on foreign raw material and support future US conversion capacity.

However, resource estimates alone do not guarantee supply. Appalachian lithium projects would still need exploration, permitting, mine development, processing investment, environmental approvals and downstream customer qualification.

The strategic significance is still clear. The US lithium conversation is expanding beyond Nevada brines and western projects into eastern hard-rock resources with long-term supply potential.

Smackover Brines and Appalachian Pegmatites Broaden US Lithium Strategy

The Appalachian estimate follows earlier USGS work on the Smackover formation in southwest Arkansas. In 2024, the agency assessed that Smackover brines contain 5mn-19mn t of lithium, although it did not define economically recoverable volumes.

Several companies, including Equinor, ExxonMobil, EnergyX and Standard Lithium, are developing lithium projects in the Smackover region. Some are targeting commercial output around 2027.

The Smackover and Appalachian resource bases are strategically different but complementary. Smackover projects depend on brine extraction and processing technologies, while Appalachian projects would likely depend on hard-rock mining and spodumene concentration.

This diversification matters for US supply security. A lithium strategy based on multiple geological sources is more resilient than one dependent on a single basin, technology or company.

The US will still need processing capacity. Mining lithium ore or extracting lithium from brine does not automatically create battery-grade lithium carbonate or hydroxide.

That midstream gap remains the critical issue. Domestic resources must be connected to refining, chemical conversion, permitting, infrastructure and offtake agreements before they can reduce import dependence.

For battery manufacturers, the Appalachian assessment offers a long-term signal. More domestic resource potential could support future supply chains for electric vehicles, grid storage and defence-related battery applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Appalachian lithium assessment is a resource-security signal, not an immediate supply solution. The US has the geology, but the decisive bottleneck will be converting resources into permitted mines, concentrators and battery-grade lithium chemicals.

Burundi Mining Suspension Raises 3T Conflict Minerals Supply Risk

Burundi mining

Burundi mining suspension measures have halted nearly all mining operations in the country, leaving only Sotrevo Mining and Sonalek Mining allowed to continue operating. The move creates new uncertainty for tantalum, tungsten and tin supply from one of Africa’s smaller but strategically important 3T mineral producers.

Burundi mining suspension measures require mining companies and co-operatives to apply for new operating permits before restarting. The government said operating approvals and the state’s share of production will be decided case by case.

Burundi mining suspension rules also introduce the threat of severe sanctions for companies that ignore the new requirements. This signals a stronger state push to control mineral production, permitting and revenue sharing.

The decision matters because Burundi supplies 3T concentrates at a time when buyers are already sensitive to conflict minerals risk, origin documentation and supply disruption across central and eastern Africa.

Permit Reset Raises Supply Risk for 3T Minerals

The suspension affects all mining sites except those operated by Sotrevo Mining and Sonalek Mining. Sotrevo produces tantalum, tungsten and tin, while Sonalek Mining also remains exempt from the suspension.

The ministry’s decision effectively resets the operating framework for much of Burundi’s mining sector. Producers that previously operated under existing arrangements must now seek new approval before they can resume work.

This creates immediate supply-chain uncertainty. Buyers may face delays in shipments, reduced availability and additional documentation requirements while companies wait for permit decisions.

Burundi produced 421t of 3T concentrates in 2024, according to industry supply-chain data referenced in the source material. That volume is not large compared with global mined supply, but it matters for buyers seeking diversified and traceable African material.

Tantalum is critical for capacitors used in electronics, aerospace, defence systems and medical devices. Tungsten supports hard metals, cutting tools, defence applications and industrial machinery. Tin is essential for solder, electronics assembly and coatings.

The suspension therefore affects more than local mining companies. It reaches downstream electronics, tooling, defence and manufacturing supply chains that depend on stable 3T material flows.

Conflict Mineral Markets Face New Compliance Pressure

Burundi has gained importance because conflict and instability in other major 3T-producing countries have increased demand for its material. Buyers looking to diversify regional supply have turned to Burundian concentrates as an alternative source.

The new suspension complicates that trend. Even if the government aims to strengthen oversight, the immediate effect is to reduce clarity for exporters, traders and downstream consumers.

The case-by-case permit process could also reshape the country’s mining structure. Companies with stronger compliance systems, clearer production records and better state relationships may be better positioned to restart.

For responsible sourcing programmes, the policy shift adds another layer of due diligence. Buyers will need to confirm not only mine origin and chain of custody, but also whether suppliers hold valid new operating permits.

The state’s share of production will also be decided individually. This could change project economics and create different cost structures across operators.

Burundi’s decision reflects a wider trend in critical minerals. Resource-holding governments increasingly want more control over production, exports and domestic value capture.

For 3T markets, the timing is sensitive. Supply chains already face scrutiny under conflict minerals rules, while manufacturers need stable feedstock for electronics, aerospace, defence and industrial applications.

If the suspension is resolved quickly, the market impact may stay limited. If permitting delays continue, Burundi’s role as a flexible alternative source of 3T concentrates could weaken.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Burundi’s mining suspension shows how even smaller suppliers can affect strategic mineral confidence. In 3T markets, regulatory clarity and traceability are now as important as mined volume itself.

South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens

South32 Manganese Ore

South32 manganese ore export prices to China have fallen for June shipments as weak alloy demand, ample port inventories and cautious buying pressure the import market. The Australian diversified metals producer lowered offers for both Australian and South African manganese ore, according to Chinese importers.

South32 manganese ore export prices for Australian 42% lumpy ore fell to $5.40/mtu cif China for June delivery. This was down by $0.50/mtu from May.

South32 also reduced its offer for South African 37% manganese ore to $5/mtu cif China. This was down by $0.40/mtu from the previous month.

South32 manganese ore export prices are an important signal for the wider manganese chain because China remains the largest global buyer of seaborne ore. When Chinese alloy plants slow purchases, overseas miners often need to adjust export offers to maintain sales momentum.

Chinese Alloy Weakness Cuts Restocking Appetite

Chinese importers have shown limited interest in restocking manganese ore because inventories remain sufficient and alloy prices are weakening. This has reduced spot buying urgency before the Labour Day holiday on 1-5 May.

Many alloy plants postponed ore feedstock purchases while waiting for clearer market direction after the holiday. This cautious behaviour has weakened the negotiating position of overseas ore suppliers.

The pressure is also visible in Chinese port prices. Australian 44-46% lumpy manganese ore fell to 43-47 yuan/mtu delivery ex quay on 28 April, down from 47-50 yuan/mtu on 31 March.

The decline shows that domestic buyers are not only resisting new import offers. They are also repricing available port material lower as downstream demand fails to improve.

Manganese ore demand is closely linked to ferro-manganese and silico-manganese production. These alloys are used in steelmaking, where manganese improves strength, deoxidation and performance.

When steel consumption slows, alloy plants reduce purchasing activity. This immediately affects ore demand because manganese alloy producers are the main consumers of imported ore.

Steel Demand Remains the Main Constraint

The deeper issue is weak steel demand in China. Slower economic growth and subdued construction activity have limited recovery in steel consumption, leaving alloy producers cautious about raw material buying.

Without a stronger steel recovery, manganese alloy prices are likely to remain under pressure. This limits the ability of alloy plants to pay higher ore prices, even when miners try to defend margins.

South32’s price cut also reflects wider seaborne competition. Mining firms outside China need to respond when Chinese buyers have enough stock and are unwilling to chase cargoes.

Australian high-grade lumpy ore usually commands stronger interest because of its quality and processing value. However, even higher-grade material can weaken when alloy margins are poor and port inventories are sufficient.

South African ore also remains exposed to Chinese demand swings. Lower-grade material can face sharper price pressure when buyers reduce procurement and focus only on immediate needs.

For the manganese market, the June price cut suggests that miners are prioritising volume discipline and customer access over holding elevated offers. The next price direction will depend on whether Chinese alloy plants return after the holiday with real restocking demand.

If steel demand remains weak, manganese ore prices could face further downside pressure. If alloy prices stabilise and inventories fall, importers may resume buying, but recovery is likely to be gradual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

South32’s price cut shows that the manganese market is being driven by demand absorption, not supply shortage. Until Chinese steel and alloy demand improves, seaborne manganese ore suppliers will remain exposed to cautious restocking and lower port prices.

Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth

Nickel Industries, Indonesian

Nickel Industries Indonesian output was mixed in the first quarter as lower mining volumes and declining nickel grades contrasted with higher nickel pig iron and mixed hydroxide precipitate production. The Australia-based producer reported weaker ore output but stronger downstream processing across its Indonesian RKEF and HPAL assets.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output reflects the increasingly complex operating environment for nickel producers in Indonesia. Mining permits, ore grades, sulphur availability and downstream ramp-up timing are all shaping production performance.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output also shows why Indonesia’s nickel market can no longer be viewed only through capacity additions. Feedstock access and ore quality are becoming just as important as new processing plants.

Total nickel ore production fell by 30% from a year earlier to 3.96mn wet metric tonnes in January-March. However, output almost tripled from the previous quarter after mining activity recovered from RKAB quota delays late last year.

RKAB Quota Recovery Supports Ore Flow but Grades Weaken

Nickel Industries received 14.3mn wmt of 2026 RKAB nickel ore quota this year. This was 36% higher than its total approved quota of 10.5mn wmt in 2025.

The higher quota helped production recover from the December quarter, when mining was disrupted by RKAB delays. The company also plans to apply for additional RKAB quotas later this year.

The Hengjaya mine supplies ore to Nickel Industries’ RKEF and HPAL plants. These facilities produce nickel pig iron for stainless steel markets and mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material supply chains.

Total NPI output from the Hengjaya, Ranger, Oracle and Angel RKEF operations rose by 4.4% year on year and 1.7% quarter on quarter to 274,086t.

However, nickel-contained production fell to 30,264t because the average nickel content of NPI dropped to 11% from 12.1% a year earlier. This is a critical signal for margins because lower grades reduce metal output even when furnace volumes rise.

The result shows how Indonesian nickel producers face a tightening relationship between ore availability and processing efficiency. Higher RKEF output does not automatically mean stronger nickel production if feedstock grades weaken.

HPAL Growth Continues as ENC Start-Up Moves to Second Quarter

Nickel Industries’ Huayue Nickel Cobalt HPAL project produced 21,526t of nickel and 2,370t of cobalt in MHP form during the first quarter. Nickel output rose by 1.7% from a year earlier, while cobalt output increased by 23%.

This growth strengthens Nickel Industries’ exposure to battery materials. MHP remains a key intermediate product for nickel sulphate and other battery chemical supply chains.

The company’s next major step is the Excelsior Nickel Cobalt HPAL project. Commissioning has been delayed to the second quarter, with full ramp-up targeted by the end of October.

ENC had previously been expected to start commissioning in the first quarter. The delay matters because HPAL projects are technically complex and depend on stable feedstock, acid supply, utilities and commissioning discipline.

Nickel Industries said it has enough sulphur inventory to support ENC’s ramp-up until the third quarter. The company previously bought sulphur at an average price of $450/t.

Sulphur availability is now a strategic issue for HPAL producers. Any disruption in sulphur or sulphuric acid supply can raise costs and slow production growth across Indonesia’s battery nickel chain.

The company also plans to list nickel cathode produced at ENC on both the London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange. Exchange approval would support market acceptance and improve the project’s commercial flexibility.

Nickel Industries increased its stake in ENC by 2% for $46mn on 1 April, lifting its interest to 46% and making it the project’s largest shareholder. This gives the company greater exposure to Indonesia’s move from NPI and MHP toward Class I nickel products.

The broader implication is clear. Nickel Industries is moving across the Indonesian nickel value chain, from ore mining and RKEF production into HPAL, MHP and exchange-deliverable cathode.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel Industries’ quarter shows that Indonesia’s nickel growth is becoming more constrained by ore quality, RKAB permits and sulphur logistics. Capacity still matters, but the winners will be producers that control feedstock, manage HPAL complexity and secure recognised Class I nickel routes.

Boliden Zinc and Copper Output Rises After Lundin Mine Acquisitions

Swedish Boliden

Boliden zinc and copper output increased in the first quarter as the Swedish mining and smelting group benefited from the 2025 acquisitions of Somincor in Portugal and Zinkgruvan in Sweden. The additions lifted concentrate production sharply from a year earlier, although operational disruptions limited quarter-on-quarter momentum.

Boliden zinc and copper output growth was strongest on a year-on-year basis. Zinc-in-concentrate production rose by 54% to 89,200t, while copper-in-concentrate output increased by 53% to 28,824t.

Boliden zinc and copper output still faced several short-term constraints. Seismic activity halted operations at Garpenberg in Sweden, poor ground conditions weighed on Tara in Ireland, and heavy rainfall affected Somincor in Portugal.

The first-quarter result shows the impact of Boliden’s larger asset base. Acquisitions increased scale, but operational reliability, grade control and smelter performance remain central to the company’s 2026 metals outlook.

Zinc Growth Masks Garpenberg and Tara Disruption

Boliden’s zinc-in-concentrate output rose strongly from a year earlier because Somincor and Zinkgruvan added new mine volumes. However, production fell by 3% from the previous quarter, showing that acquired capacity did not fully offset operational headwinds.

Tara produced 17,413t of zinc-in-concentrate, down 19% from a year earlier. Poor ground conditions and other operational challenges weighed on the Irish mine.

Garpenberg output fell by 22% to 19,329t after seismic activity disrupted operations in mid-March. Boliden expects production to resume gradually in the second quarter, but the disruption has materially reduced the site’s 2026 outlook.

The company now expects Garpenberg milled volumes of around 1.5mn t in 2026, down from previous guidance of 3.7mn t. It forecasts 2.3mn t of milled volumes in 2027 and lowered Garpenberg’s zinc grade guidance to 2.7% from 2.9%.

Refined zinc production also weakened. Output fell by 2% on the year to 107,931t, mainly because production at Odda in Norway dropped by 19%.

Odda’s performance was affected by two unplanned roaster stoppages and the delayed start-up of another roaster. The decline shows how smelter reliability can offset stronger mine-side additions.

The zinc market backdrop remains tight in concentrate terms. Global refined zinc demand fell by 7% from the previous quarter because of seasonal patterns, but was unchanged from a year earlier. Global zinc concentrate production rose by 4% year on year, while spot treatment charges fell from $35/t to $0/t during the quarter.

Falling treatment charges are important for zinc smelters and miners. They indicate that concentrate availability remains tight relative to smelter demand, shifting bargaining power toward miners with available feedstock.

Copper Concentrate Tightness Supports Strategic Value

Boliden’s copper-in-concentrate output rose by 53% from a year earlier to 28,824t. The increase was mainly driven by the addition of Somincor and Zinkgruvan.

Quarter-on-quarter copper output slipped by 3% from 29,690t. Boliden attributed the decline mainly to slightly lower copper grades at Aitik and lower production at Somincor.

Aitik remained the company’s core copper asset. Milled volumes were 9.8mn t, broadly in line with a year earlier, but lower copper grades weighed on output.

However, Aitik showed operational strengths. Boliden reported high mining rates and better recoveries than in the first quarter of 2025 because of less oxidised ore.

At the smelter level, copper cathode production rose by 12% on the year to 41,567t, although it fell by 2% from the previous quarter. Harjavalta performed better than a year earlier, when strikes in Finland and a lack of suitable concentrates weighed on operations.

Casted copper anode production rose by 4% year on year to 107,714t. This supports Boliden’s integrated copper position, linking mine output with smelting and refining capacity.

Boliden also highlighted tightening copper concentrate conditions. Global refined copper consumption fell by 10% from the previous quarter and by 1% from a year earlier, but concentrate production was stable quarter on quarter.

Spot treatment charges continued to fall, and Chinese benchmark contracts settled at zero treatment and refining charges. This underlines structural tightness in the copper concentrate market, even when refined demand indicators are mixed.

Nickel output was mixed. Nickel-in-concentrate production rose by 20% on the year to 3,282t and increased by 30% from the fourth quarter, supported by higher grades at Kevitsa.

Refined nickel performance moved lower. Nickel-in-matte production at Harjavalta fell by 17% on the year to 8,425t because of an unfavourable feed mix and higher pyrite consumption.

Boliden left 2026 guidance unchanged for all mines except Garpenberg. That means the main revision affects zinc and silver more than copper or nickel.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Boliden’s quarter shows how acquisitions can lift headline production while operational risks still shape real supply. The sharper signal is in treatment charges: zinc and copper concentrate markets remain tight enough that mine reliability and smelter feed quality now carry strategic value.

DRC Mine Guard Plan Puts Critical Minerals Security at the Centre of Supply Chains

DRC, Inspectorate of Mines

DRC mine guard plans mark a major escalation in the country’s effort to secure critical minerals supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s General Inspectorate of Mines will develop a paramilitary unit to protect mine sites, ore transport routes, processors and border corridors.

The DRC mine guard will be created as part of a strategic partnership involving the US and UAE. The project is expected to cost up to $100mn and will use existing training facilities.

The DRC mine guard could deploy up to 20,000 troops over the next two years. Recruitment is expected to begin in May, with the first operational contingent of 2,500-3,000 officers targeted for deployment by December.

The plan reflects the growing strategic value of Congolese minerals. The DRC is a major producer of copper, cobalt, tantalum, tin and tungsten, all of which are critical to batteries, electronics, defence systems, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

Mineral Security Becomes a Formal State Priority

The mine guard will be tasked with securing mine sites across the DRC and protecting ore shipments from mines to processors and border posts. It will gradually replace forces currently deployed to defend mining assets.

The unit is expected to cover the Greater Katanga and Greater Eastern regions by the end of 2027. It is then planned to expand to all mining provinces by the end of 2028.

This regional focus is important. Greater Katanga is central to copper and cobalt production, while eastern DRC is tied to several strategic minerals and long-running security challenges.

The plan shows that mineral security is becoming part of formal state policy. Mine protection is no longer only a company-level issue involving private security, local forces or site-specific arrangements.

For producers, a more structured security framework could reduce disruption risk if implemented effectively. It could improve transport reliability, protect export flows and lower exposure to armed interference around mining corridors.

However, execution will be critical. A large paramilitary force operating across mining regions must be governed transparently to avoid creating new operational, political or human-rights risks.

US and UAE Partnership Signals Strategic Minerals Competition

The mine guard plan is linked to a broader US-DRC strategic partnership agreed in December 2025. That agreement included expanded US access to DRC critical minerals and a wider minerals-for-security-style framework.

The agreements were part of the Washington accords, a US-backed peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda designed to reduce conflict in eastern DRC. But fighting has continued, with the Rwanda-backed M23 group still controlling several major towns and mining assets. Rwanda denies backing the group.

This makes the security dimension central to mineral strategy. Western governments want more reliable access to DRC copper, cobalt and other critical minerals, but supply cannot be secured only through offtake agreements or financing.

Physical control of mine sites, transport routes and border flows is becoming just as important as ownership and processing capacity.

For the US, the DRC offers one of the fastest routes to large-scale copper and cobalt supply outside China-dominated value chains. For the DRC, security partnerships could bring funding, international backing and more leverage over strategic mineral flows.

The creation of a mine guard also signals that critical minerals are now treated as national security assets. Copper and cobalt are no longer only mining commodities. They are inputs for batteries, grids, defence manufacturing and geopolitical supply-chain competition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC mine guard plan shows that critical minerals security is moving from boardrooms into the field. The key question is whether this force can protect supply chains without adding new governance risks to one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Argentina Lithium Growth Could Challenge Chile’s Regional Lead

Argentina Lithium

Argentina lithium growth could reshape Latin America’s lithium map over the next decade as new projects advance under more investor-friendly rules. Argentina is expected to match Chile’s lithium output by 2035, with some industry participants arguing it could overtake Chile even earlier.

Argentina lithium growth is being supported by faster permitting, large brine resources and stronger investment incentives. By contrast, Chile’s lithium expansion remains constrained by restrictive legislation, lengthy approval processes and uncertainty around new project development.

Argentina lithium growth is strategically important because lithium remains central to electric vehicles, energy storage and battery supply chains. Global buyers want large-scale, politically stable and western hemisphere supply outside more exposed jurisdictions.

Chile remains the region’s largest producer today. However, its future output growth depends heavily on existing producers and slow-moving new projects, while Argentina has a deeper pipeline of advanced developments.

Chile’s Lithium Policy Slows New Supply

Chile has long been Latin America’s dominant lithium producer, but its regulatory system is limiting new investment. Lithium remains non-concessionable and is still treated under legislation linked to nuclear materials.

Companies seeking to extract lithium in Chile must apply for special mining contracts. These contracts are granted through public bidding processes that can be lengthy, bureaucratic and uncertain.

This creates a major exploration problem. Companies may be reluctant to explore land if they cannot be confident of later securing extraction rights.

Chile’s national lithium strategy also requires all new projects to use direct lithium extraction. DLE is viewed as more environmentally friendly than traditional evaporation ponds, but it creates technical and cost challenges.

Each DLE process must be designed around the specific chemistry of each brine resource. That means technology used at one salar cannot simply be copied at another.

This raises development costs and lengthens project timelines. Industry participants estimate that DLE projects may require investment of up to $44,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate equivalent, compared with about $26,000/t for evaporation projects.

Chile’s new supply pipeline is therefore moving slowly. The first major new project, Rio Tinto’s Maricunga, is expected only by the end of 2030, with another new project expected in 2032.

Until then, Chile may rely mainly on capacity increases from existing producers. That could limit its ability to respond to rising lithium demand if Argentina’s project pipeline accelerates.

Argentina’s Rigi Regime Attracts Lithium Capital

Argentina is moving in the opposite direction. Its government has streamlined licensing and introduced the Rigi incentive regime for large investments.

Rigi provides tax exemptions, import-export benefits and legal protections for approved projects. It also allows companies to settle certain disputes in courts outside Argentina, improving investor confidence.

Ten lithium projects have already applied to Rigi, with three approved. The programme has become a major signal to international investors seeking policy stability and faster project execution.

Argentina now has more than 60 active lithium projects and seven producing assets, the most in Latin America. Two new developments are expected to come on line this year, lifting projected output to 159,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

That remains below Chile’s 305,000t in 2024. However, Argentina has more than 20 projects in advanced stages, including eight close to production.

Argentina’s mining ministry expects output to reach 583,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent by 2035. That would put the country in position to match or overtake Chile if Chile’s permitting regime does not change.

The investment logic is clear. Argentina offers large brine resources, a more open policy framework and exposure to western hemisphere supply chains. That combination is increasingly attractive to battery makers, automakers and mining companies.

Chile still has enormous lithium potential. But potential alone does not create supply. Without faster approvals and clearer rules, Chile risks losing regional leadership to Argentina.

For the lithium market, this shift matters. Argentina’s rise could increase competition, diversify supply and give buyers more options in South America. It could also make Latin America’s lithium growth less dependent on Chile’s policy choices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina’s lithium advantage is not only geological; it is regulatory. Chile still has world-class resources, but Argentina is turning policy speed into supply-chain momentum.

CMOC Copper Output Rises as DRC Mines Strengthen China Supply

CMOC

CMOC copper output increased in the first quarter of 2026 as higher production from the company’s Democratic Republic of Congo copper-cobalt mines lifted supply. The Chinese diversified metals producer produced 187,880t of copper in January-March, up 10% from a year earlier.

CMOC copper output was supported by stronger production at the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. These assets are central to China’s copper and cobalt feedstock security because they supply large volumes of cathode and intermediate material from one of the world’s most important copper-cobalt districts.

CMOC copper output is expected to remain a major market focus this year. The company is targeting 760,000-820,000t of copper production in 2026, after producing 741,100t in 2025.

The result reinforces the DRC’s role as China’s largest imported copper cathode source. China imported 275,359t of copper cathode from the DRC in the first quarter, equal to 37.5% of total imports.

Tenke and Kisanfu Anchor CMOC’s Copper Growth

CMOC’s first-quarter copper growth reflects the scale and strategic importance of its DRC operations. Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu remain core assets for the company’s copper-cobalt portfolio.

The company plans to expand output at Kisanfu by adding 100,000 t/yr of copper cathode capacity. Completion is targeted for 2027.

The expansion could also lift cobalt capacity. CMOC has not disclosed the planned increase, but market participants expect Kisanfu’s cobalt capacity to rise by more than 30,000 t/yr.

This matters because copper and cobalt are increasingly linked in DRC project economics. Higher copper output can bring additional cobalt units into the market, depending on ore composition, processing rates and export rules.

The London Metal Exchange approval of CMOC’s TFM-1 copper cathode brand adds another layer of market significance. The brand, produced at Tenke Fungurume, was approved for listing on 27 March and has a registered production capacity of 270,000 t/yr.

Exchange approval improves brand visibility and market acceptance. It can also support trade liquidity, financing and customer confidence for DRC-origin copper cathode.
China’s copper cathode import structure shows why this is important. The DRC already supplies more than one-third of China’s imported cathode, making Congolese supply critical to Chinese refined copper availability.

The China grade-A copper cathode premium was steady at $55-70/t cif Shanghai on 23 April. The range narrowed from $55-75/t a week earlier, showing a relatively stable but cautious spot market.

Cobalt Output Stays Flat as Quotas Restrict Feedstock Flows

CMOC’s cobalt production was largely unchanged in the first quarter. The company produced 30,508t of cobalt, up only 0.3% from a year earlier.

The company set its 2026 cobalt output guidance at 100,000-120,000t. That is broadly stable against 117,549t produced in 2025.

The flat cobalt outlook reflects a more complicated market. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025 before moving to a quota-based export system for the fourth quarter of 2025 and for 2026-27.

Administrative delays have slowed the quota system. The DRC extended fourth-quarter 2025 quotas to 31 March 2026 because of slow processing.

The effect on Chinese imports has been severe. China imported only 1,278t cobalt metal equivalent of cobalt intermediate feedstock in January-February, down 96% from a year earlier.

Cobalt hydroxide prices remained stable at $25.95-26.10/lb cif China on 23 April. But the stability masks a market still shaped by restricted DRC export flows, delayed allocations and uncertainty over quota administration.

For CMOC, the copper side of the portfolio is showing clear growth. The cobalt side remains more exposed to policy risk, export controls and administrative timing in the DRC.

The Kisanfu expansion could increase future cobalt availability, but the market impact will depend on whether DRC export rules allow material to move smoothly to downstream refiners.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s first-quarter results show that DRC copper remains essential to China’s refined copper supply, while cobalt is increasingly constrained by policy rather than production alone. The strategic issue is no longer just mine output, but whether export quotas, brand approvals and logistics can keep critical metal flows moving.

Grasberg Copper Mine Recovery Delay Tightens Indonesia Supply Outlook

Grasberg Copper Mine

Grasberg copper mine recovery has been delayed after Freeport-McMoRan reported slower progress at its Indonesian operation following last year’s fatal mud rush accident. The company now expects the Grasberg Block Cave to recover more gradually than previously planned.

The Grasberg copper mine recovery delay is important because Grasberg is one of the world’s largest copper assets. Any slower restart affects global mine supply at a time when copper demand remains tied to grids, data centres, electrification and industrial policy.

The Grasberg copper mine recovery outlook has been cut because wet drawpoints increased inside the mine after the incident and subsequent suspension of mining activity. Freeport said it must upgrade ore loading infrastructure before production can recover more fully.

Freeport now expects Grasberg to reach only 65% of production capacity by the second half of this year. It previously expected the mine to reach 85% in that period.

Grasberg Restart Slows After Underground Infrastructure Issues

The progressive restart of Grasberg Block Cave has been slower than expected. The increase in wet drawpoints has limited mining activity and created a need for infrastructure upgrades.

Freeport now expects Grasberg to reach about 85% of capacity by mid-2027. The company expects the mine to approach full capacity by the end of 2027.

That marks a clear delay from the previous plan. Freeport had earlier expected Grasberg to return to full production capacity by the end of 2027.

The production impact was visible in the first quarter. Freeport’s Indonesian copper output fell by 68% on the year to 95mn lbs because of the Grasberg disruption.

Across Freeport’s global operations, copper output fell by 24% on the year to 662mn lbs. The decline shows how heavily the company’s production profile depends on a stable Grasberg recovery.

US operations partly offset the Indonesian weakness. Copper production from Freeport’s seven mines in the southwest US rose by 3% on the year to 309mn lbs.

Output from the company’s mines in Peru and Chile fell by 4.8% to 258mn lbs. Lower leach placements weighed on production across those assets.

Higher Copper Prices Offset Lower Production

Freeport’s first-quarter financial results were supported by stronger copper prices. Average copper prices rose by 30.1% on the year to $5.78/lb.

Unit production costs also improved. Freeport’s per-unit costs fell by 7.7% to $1.91/lb.

This helped offset lower production and sales volumes. Copper sales volumes fell by 25% from a year earlier, although they were 3% above Freeport’s January estimate.

Freeport’s profit more than doubled to $881mn in the first quarter. Revenue rose by 8.8% to $6.2bn.

The result shows the current copper market tension. Operational supply is weaker, but higher prices are protecting margins for major producers.

Molybdenum performance was mixed. Consolidated molybdenum production fell by 4% to 22mn lbs, while sales volumes rose by 20% to 24mn lbs.

For the copper market, the delayed Grasberg recovery adds another supply-side risk. Indonesia has been expected to support global copper growth, but mine-level disruptions continue to limit output.

The issue also reinforces a broader industry problem. Large underground copper mines can take years to stabilise after major incidents, and infrastructure bottlenecks can delay recovery even when restart work has begun.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Grasberg delay shows why copper supply cannot be judged only by long-term resource size. A single underground disruption at a world-class mine can reshape near-term supply and strengthen copper’s strategic premium.

Luanshya Copper Mine Restart Supports Zambia’s Copper Growth Ambition

Luanshya Copper Mine

Luanshya copper mine restart plans are moving forward in Zambia, with the upper mine expected to resume production in August after two decades of care and maintenance. The mine is mainly controlled by China Nonferrous Mining Corporation.

The Luanshya copper mine restart follows a dewatering process after severe flooding damaged infrastructure at the site. Zambia’s mines ministry said the upper mine is set to restart first, while the lower mine is expected to begin production in 2029.

The Luanshya copper mine restart could become a meaningful addition to Zambia’s long-term copper supply base. Once fully operational by 2030, the mine is expected to produce around 100,000 t/yr of copper.

The project matters because Zambia is trying to raise national copper output sharply. The country produced more than 890,000t of copper in 2025, up 8% from a year earlier, and is targeting 1mn t this year.

Restart Adds Near-Term Momentum to Zambia’s Copper Pipeline

Luanshya’s return is important because it brings an idled asset back into Zambia’s operating copper base. Restarting an existing mine can be faster than building a new greenfield project, although dewatering, infrastructure repair and operational stabilisation still create execution risk.

The upper mine restart in August gives Zambia a near-term production milestone. The lower mine start-up in 2029 would then support a second phase of output growth.

If the mine reaches full output of 100,000 t/yr by 2030, it would make a material contribution to Zambia’s production targets. It would also strengthen the country’s position as one of Africa’s key copper suppliers.

Zambia wants to lift copper output to 3mn t by 2032. That target will require restarts, expansions, new projects, processing investment and more reliable infrastructure across the mining sector.

CNMC Role Highlights China’s African Copper Position

CNMC’s control of Luanshya reinforces China’s continuing role in African copper supply. Chinese companies have become major investors in copper assets across Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This has strategic importance for global copper flows. As copper demand rises from grids, electrification, data centres and industrial policy, ownership and offtake structures in Africa are becoming more politically and commercially significant.

Luanshya’s restart also comes as western governments seek greater access to African copper supply. Zambia is therefore becoming a more important battleground for investment, financing, logistics and long-term offtake.

For the copper market, the project adds supply visibility but not immediate full-scale relief. The larger impact depends on whether the mine can ramp steadily, manage water and infrastructure risks, and reach its 2030 production target.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Luanshya’s restart shows why brownfield copper assets are regaining strategic value. In a market short of fast supply growth, Zambia’s ability to revive idled mines could matter as much as discovering new deposits.

Eramet Argentina Lithium Plant Reaches 80% Capacity as Ramp-Up Recovers

Eramet Argentina Lithium Plant

Eramet Argentina lithium plant performance improved sharply in March as the Centenario-Ratones project reached around 80% of its designed capacity. The French mining group said the plant operated near 80% of its 24,000 t/yr nameplate capacity after recovering from February production setbacks.

The Eramet Argentina lithium plant is strategically important because Argentina is becoming one of the fastest-growing lithium supply regions globally. Stronger output from Centenario-Ratones supports the country’s push to challenge Chile’s long-standing lithium leadership.

The Eramet Argentina lithium plant produced 3,720t of lithium carbonate in the first quarter. Output was limited by downstream equipment shutdowns and natural gas supply constraints, but operations normalised in March.

Centenario-Ratones Recovers After February Disruptions

Eramet temporarily shut part of its downstream equipment in February for an extended period. The work was designed to implement improvements and support the ramp-up process.

Natural gas supply constraints also limited production during the quarter. These disruptions show that lithium brine projects depend not only on resource quality, but also on reliable processing equipment and energy supply.

Centenario-Ratones achieved its highest production rate to date in March. This suggests the project is moving closer to stable commercial performance after early ramp-up challenges.

The ramp-up is expected to be completed by July at the latest. If achieved, this would strengthen Eramet’s position in Argentina’s lithium supply chain and improve near-term lithium carbonate availability.

Lithium Sales Highlight Stronger Price Environment

Eramet sold 3,920t of lithium carbonate in the first quarter, generating €57mn in revenue. That implies an average realised price of roughly $16,986/t.

The first-quarter lithium revenue already exceeded Eramet’s lithium revenue for all of 2025. This highlights the impact of stronger lithium carbonate prices and improving sales volumes.

The result matters for project economics. Higher lithium prices can support ramp-up costs, equipment improvements and working capital needs during the early production phase.

For Argentina, Centenario-Ratones adds to a growing pipeline of lithium projects backed by more investor-friendly policies. Successful ramp-up would reinforce Argentina’s role as a major future source of lithium carbonate for battery supply chains.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Centenario-Ratones shows both the opportunity and execution risk in Argentina’s lithium growth story. Strong prices improve project economics, but stable energy supply and processing reliability will decide whether ramp-up targets become sustained production.