Lygend Nickel Capacity Reaches 400,000 t/yr at Obi Island

Lygend

Lygend nickel capacity in Indonesia has increased to around 400,000 t/yr in nickel metal equivalent following the commissioning of all phase 2 rotary kiln electric furnace lines at its Obi Island complex.

Lygend nickel capacity now spans nickel pig iron, mixed hydroxide precipitate and nickel sulphate, giving the Chinese producer exposure to both stainless steel and battery supply chains. The latest expansion highlights Lygend's ability to complete large projects despite weaker margins and tighter Indonesian nickel policies.

Lygend nickel capacity growth comes from 12 new RKEF lines commissioned in May. The phase 2 facilities add 185,000 t/yr of nameplate nickel metal equivalent capacity for NPI production in North Maluku.

The expansion strengthens Obi Island's position as one of Indonesia's major integrated nickel production centres and adds more supply to an already heavily concentrated global nickel market.

Obi Island Expansion Deepens Lygend's Integrated Nickel Position

The phase 2 project significantly expands Lygend's pyrometallurgical capacity. NPI produced through RKEF technology remains a major feedstock for stainless steel production, particularly across Asia.

Lygend also produces MHP and nickel sulphate, extending its position beyond stainless steel into battery materials. MHP can be refined into nickel sulphate for lithium-ion battery cathodes, giving the company exposure to multiple downstream markets.

This integrated structure can provide greater flexibility during weak nickel cycles. Producers focused entirely on one product face greater exposure to changes in stainless steel or battery demand.

Obi Island also gives Lygend scale advantages. Concentrating mining, smelting and downstream processing in one industrial location can reduce logistics costs and improve feedstock integration.

The company's ability to complete phase 2 is notable because other Indonesian nickel projects have faced delays, financing problems and weak economics. Higher operating costs and lower nickel prices have made new capacity increasingly difficult to justify.

Indonesian Policy Raises the Bar for New Nickel Projects

Lygend's expansion comes as Indonesia increases government control over nickel production, pricing and exports. Reduced RKAB mining quotas are tightening access to ore and increasing competition for feedstock.

Adjustments to the HPM pricing formula have also raised raw material costs for processors. At the same time, higher royalty rates are putting additional pressure on smelter margins.

These changes are affecting project development. Several NPI and HPAL projects have been delayed, slowed or cancelled as companies reassess returns under weaker market conditions.

The contrast with Lygend is important. Large integrated producers with existing infrastructure, financing and downstream capacity are better positioned to absorb policy changes than smaller standalone operators.

Indonesia's nickel industry may therefore enter a consolidation phase. Future growth could become increasingly concentrated among large producers capable of controlling ore supply, processing costs and multiple product routes.

For the global nickel market, Lygend's new capacity adds further supply pressure. But Indonesia's tighter policy framework could limit how quickly other projects follow.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lygend's Obi expansion shows that scale and integration are becoming decisive in Indonesia's nickel industry. As margins tighten and Jakarta strengthens control over ore and exports, smaller projects may struggle while established producers continue to consolidate supply.

Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets Indonesian MHP Growth Through Acquisitions

Tsingshan

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion will move forward through acquisitions rather than new project development as Indonesia tightens control over additional high pressure acid leach capacity. The Australian producer will acquire stakes in two MHP projects next to its existing Excelsior Nickel Cobalt operation in Central Sulawesi.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion is strategically important because Indonesia has stopped issuing licences for new HPAL developments since late 2025, according to the company. That makes existing permitted projects increasingly valuable to producers seeking battery-grade nickel growth.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion covers the planned Teluk Metal Industry and Chengsheng New Energy projects. Together, the stakes would give NI attributable MHP capacity of almost 17,000 t/yr.

Both projects are located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park and will use ore from NI’s Sampala mine. Their output will feed the electric vehicle battery supply chain.

TMI and CNE Add MHP Capacity Around Existing ENC Platform

NI will pay $169mn for a 17.5% stake in the Teluk Metal Industry HPAL project. TMI has planned nameplate MHP capacity of 38,640 t/yr, giving NI 6,775 t/yr of attributable output.

The transaction also carries construction protection from Tsingshan. The Chinese nickel and stainless steel producer has guaranteed that NI’s investment will be capped at $169mn and that TMI will reach nameplate production by September 2027.

This lowers construction risk for NI and reinforces its relationship with Tsingshan, which already owns an indirect 44% stake in the ENC project.

TMI’s remaining ownership includes Singapore-based Sumber International Investment and a South Korean-Japanese consortium involving LS MnM, Hanwa and another strategic investor. The structure shows how Asian industrial groups are positioning themselves around Indonesian battery nickel supply.

NI is also pursuing a 36% stake in the Chengsheng New Energy HPAL project together with a local partner. The acquisition will be funded by transferring 30% of their combined ownership in the Sampala nickel mine.

CNE has MHP capacity of 28,357 t/yr, with 10,208 t/yr attributable to NI. Commissioning is expected by mid-2027.

The CNE transaction still requires shareholder approval because an NI director is associated with the selling investment firm. That adds a governance step before completion.

Indonesia Licensing Limits Increase Value of Existing HPAL Assets

Indonesia’s decision to stop issuing new HPAL licences changes the economics of nickel expansion. Producers can no longer rely on greenfield development to add battery-grade processing capacity.

This gives existing permitted projects a scarcity premium. Companies seeking growth must acquire stakes, partner with current licence holders or expand existing operations.

For NI, TMI and CNE extend the company’s battery nickel platform around ENC. The 46%-owned ENC project is preparing to produce nickel cathode and nickel sulphate, giving NI exposure further downstream than MHP alone.

The strategy also integrates mining and processing. Ore from the Sampala project will supply both TMI and CNE, linking captive feedstock with HPAL conversion and battery-material output.

That integration matters because Indonesia’s nickel industry is increasingly constrained by ore availability, regulatory approvals and government efforts to manage oversupply.

The policy shift could support nickel prices by slowing future HPAL growth. But it also raises the value of projects already holding development rights.

For NI, acquisitions therefore become more than a growth option. They are now the main route to expanding Indonesian MHP production under a tighter licensing regime.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s HPAL licensing freeze is turning permitted projects into strategic assets. Nickel Industries is responding by buying access to existing capacity, showing how policy can shift competition from project development to asset acquisition.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth

Nickel Industries, Indonesian

Nickel Industries Indonesian output was mixed in the first quarter as lower mining volumes and declining nickel grades contrasted with higher nickel pig iron and mixed hydroxide precipitate production. The Australia-based producer reported weaker ore output but stronger downstream processing across its Indonesian RKEF and HPAL assets.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output reflects the increasingly complex operating environment for nickel producers in Indonesia. Mining permits, ore grades, sulphur availability and downstream ramp-up timing are all shaping production performance.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output also shows why Indonesia’s nickel market can no longer be viewed only through capacity additions. Feedstock access and ore quality are becoming just as important as new processing plants.

Total nickel ore production fell by 30% from a year earlier to 3.96mn wet metric tonnes in January-March. However, output almost tripled from the previous quarter after mining activity recovered from RKAB quota delays late last year.

RKAB Quota Recovery Supports Ore Flow but Grades Weaken

Nickel Industries received 14.3mn wmt of 2026 RKAB nickel ore quota this year. This was 36% higher than its total approved quota of 10.5mn wmt in 2025.

The higher quota helped production recover from the December quarter, when mining was disrupted by RKAB delays. The company also plans to apply for additional RKAB quotas later this year.

The Hengjaya mine supplies ore to Nickel Industries’ RKEF and HPAL plants. These facilities produce nickel pig iron for stainless steel markets and mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material supply chains.

Total NPI output from the Hengjaya, Ranger, Oracle and Angel RKEF operations rose by 4.4% year on year and 1.7% quarter on quarter to 274,086t.

However, nickel-contained production fell to 30,264t because the average nickel content of NPI dropped to 11% from 12.1% a year earlier. This is a critical signal for margins because lower grades reduce metal output even when furnace volumes rise.

The result shows how Indonesian nickel producers face a tightening relationship between ore availability and processing efficiency. Higher RKEF output does not automatically mean stronger nickel production if feedstock grades weaken.

HPAL Growth Continues as ENC Start-Up Moves to Second Quarter

Nickel Industries’ Huayue Nickel Cobalt HPAL project produced 21,526t of nickel and 2,370t of cobalt in MHP form during the first quarter. Nickel output rose by 1.7% from a year earlier, while cobalt output increased by 23%.

This growth strengthens Nickel Industries’ exposure to battery materials. MHP remains a key intermediate product for nickel sulphate and other battery chemical supply chains.

The company’s next major step is the Excelsior Nickel Cobalt HPAL project. Commissioning has been delayed to the second quarter, with full ramp-up targeted by the end of October.

ENC had previously been expected to start commissioning in the first quarter. The delay matters because HPAL projects are technically complex and depend on stable feedstock, acid supply, utilities and commissioning discipline.

Nickel Industries said it has enough sulphur inventory to support ENC’s ramp-up until the third quarter. The company previously bought sulphur at an average price of $450/t.

Sulphur availability is now a strategic issue for HPAL producers. Any disruption in sulphur or sulphuric acid supply can raise costs and slow production growth across Indonesia’s battery nickel chain.

The company also plans to list nickel cathode produced at ENC on both the London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange. Exchange approval would support market acceptance and improve the project’s commercial flexibility.

Nickel Industries increased its stake in ENC by 2% for $46mn on 1 April, lifting its interest to 46% and making it the project’s largest shareholder. This gives the company greater exposure to Indonesia’s move from NPI and MHP toward Class I nickel products.

The broader implication is clear. Nickel Industries is moving across the Indonesian nickel value chain, from ore mining and RKEF production into HPAL, MHP and exchange-deliverable cathode.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel Industries’ quarter shows that Indonesia’s nickel growth is becoming more constrained by ore quality, RKAB permits and sulphur logistics. Capacity still matters, but the winners will be producers that control feedstock, manage HPAL complexity and secure recognised Class I nickel routes.

Indonesia NPI Export Exemption Eases Nickel Trade Fears but Leaves Policy Risk

Nickel pig iron

Indonesia NPI export exemption has eased immediate concerns in the nickel market after sources said nickel pig iron will not need to be exported through Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia. The clarification reduces near-term disruption risk for Indonesia’s dominant nickel alloy product.

Indonesia NPI export exemption matters because more than 90% of Indonesia’s nickel-alloy output is nickel pig iron. NPI is mainly used in stainless steel production and forms the backbone of Indonesia’s nickel downstreaming model.

Indonesia NPI export exemption does not remove all uncertainty. Ferro-nickel exports are still expected to be traded through DSI, while the industry lacks an official definition that clearly separates ferro-nickel from NPI.

That ambiguity is important because ferro-nickel and NPI share the same HS code under global and Indonesian trade frameworks. Market participants usually distinguish them by nickel content, with ferro-nickel typically above 20% nickel and NPI usually around 10-14%.

NPI Exclusion Protects Indonesia’s Core Nickel Flow

The exclusion of NPI from the DSI export requirement is commercially significant. NPI is Indonesia’s largest nickel product by volume and a critical feedstock for stainless steelmakers.

If NPI had been included, the rule could have disrupted contracts, pricing, payment flows and export execution across a major share of Indonesia’s nickel industry. That risk has now been reduced, at least for the near term.

The clarification also helps Chinese and regional stainless steel buyers. These customers rely heavily on Indonesian NPI because it offers a cost-effective alternative to pure nickel metal in stainless production.

However, the inclusion of ferro-nickel still matters. A small number of Indonesian smelters produce higher-nickel ferro-nickel, and those exports may now face a more centralised transaction structure through DSI.

The policy could therefore split Indonesia’s nickel alloy market into two regulatory paths. NPI would remain outside the new state export channel, while ferro-nickel would fall under tighter government control.

The risk is classification. Without a formal technical definition, exporters may face uncertainty over which products qualify as NPI and which are treated as ferro-nickel.

Policy Clarity Still Matters for Investment

Indonesia announced on 20 May that exports of key commodities, initially including palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, must be routed through DSI. The aim is to centralise control over strategic commodity exports.

The nickel industry welcomed the NPI clarification, but investors remain cautious. Indonesia’s mining and metals policy has changed frequently, creating uncertainty around timing, scope and implementation.

This matters because downstream nickel projects require large capital commitments. Smelters, matte converters, HPAL plants and battery-material facilities all need stable rules before investors can justify long payback periods.

The DSI rule follows other policy shifts, including changes to ore pricing, royalty plans, export levies and RKAB approval processes. Even when policies support state revenue and downstreaming, sudden changes can raise financing risk.

Indonesia still holds enormous leverage in global nickel. Its dominance in NPI and stainless-linked supply gives Jakarta significant influence over trade flows and pricing.

But policy predictability is now becoming just as important as resource control. If rules change too quickly or remain unclear, investors may delay decisions even when Indonesia remains the strongest nickel platform.

The NPI exemption is therefore a useful correction. But the market still needs formal definitions, clear transaction rules and stable implementation before confidence fully returns.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has reduced immediate nickel disruption by excluding NPI from the DSI export channel. But the ferro-nickel ambiguity shows that policy risk remains embedded in the country’s downstreaming model.

Eternal Nickel LME listing reshapes Indonesian nickel trade

Eternal Nickel

The Eternal Nickel LME listing marks a new phase for Indonesian nickel as PTENICO cathodes move toward global benchmark status and add fresh liquidity to a market already facing surplus pressure. Eternal Nickel, a subsidiary of China’s Tsingshan Group, has applied for the Eternal Nickel LME listing with full-plate nickel cathodes produced at Weda Bay in North Maluku, where nameplate capacity reaches 50,000 t/yr. As a result, the Eternal Nickel LME listing would cement Indonesia’s role in refined nickel, not just intermediate products, while also deepening the pool of deliverable brands for price discovery on the London Metal Exchange.

Eternal Nickel LME listing adds to Asian LME nickel capacity

The proposed Eternal Nickel LME listing comes only months after the first Indonesian brand, DX-zwdx, secured LME approval in 2024, lifting new Asian registered capacity to 232,600 t since mid-2023. PTENICO cathodes would be the second Indonesian nickel brand listed, reinforcing the rapid shift of refined nickel capacity toward Indonesia as high-pressure acid leach and conversion projects mature. Meanwhile, surplus nickel has been flowing into LME warehouses because many producers find LME delivery the most efficient route to immediate liquidity. LME nickel stocks climbed to 224,700 t in September from 162,336 t in January, with Chinese-origin material surging to 152,454 t from 81,564 t. Therefore, any additional Indonesian cathode tonnage registered on the LME is likely to weigh further on prices, even if it improves tradability and hedging options for consumers.

Surplus stocks pressure prices as more Indonesian cathodes line up

The Eternal Nickel LME listing would arrive in a market where the official three-month LME nickel price has stayed rangebound around $15,000–16,000/t, averaging just $15,432/t in 2024. However, producers continue to commission new cathode capacity and are actively preparing LME applications, treating warehouses as an outlet for surplus production rather than cutting supply. Indonesian producer Nickel Industries Limited plans to add nickel cathode output, while major producer QMB is upgrading its technology to produce LME-grade cathodes, both from plants in Central Sulawesi. As these projects advance, more Indonesian cathode brands are expected to seek registration, reinforcing the structural oversupply narrative and keeping spot prices under pressure, even as stainless steel and battery sectors look for cost advantages.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Eternal Nickel LME listing underlines how Indonesia is moving rapidly up the nickel value chain from ore and intermediates to globally deliverable cathode brands. For traders and hedgers, more Indonesian brands enhance liquidity and flexibility, but they also lock in a heavier overhang of exchange stocks that can cap rallies. Strategically, the trend raises important questions for non-Indonesian producers: competing on cost alone against the Weda Bay and Sulawesi hubs will be tough, making product differentiation, specialty alloys and long-term customer partnerships more critical than ever.

Stellantis Alliance Nickel offtake agreement unravels as nickel prices slump

Stellantis

Stellantis Alliance Nickel offtake agreement is ending, underscoring how weak nickel markets are reshaping EV battery contracts. The Stellantis Alliance Nickel offtake agreement covered nickel and cobalt sulphate from Australia’s NiWest project but failed on key milestones. As a result, the Stellantis Alliance Nickel offtake agreement now joins a growing list of battery metal deals under pressure from low prices and tight funding.

NiWest delays expose battery metals project risk

Alliance Nickel and Stellantis agreed in 2023 to supply 170,000t of nickel sulphate and 12,000t of cobalt sulphate. The volumes represented around 40pc of NiWest’s forecast production, anchoring the project’s commercial foundation. However, low nickel prices and tighter financing conditions have slowed NiWest’s development and triggered missed contractual milestones.

Market conditions have turned sharply since the deal was signed. Oversupply from Indonesia and softer demand from EV and steel sectors have hit prices. The LME three-month nickel price has dropped nearly 40pc since May 2023, falling to $15,117.50/t by 7 November. In this context, long-term offtake commitments are harder to sustain for both miners and OEMs.

The termination becomes effective on 3 December, formally ending the 2023 agreement. For Alliance, the loss of a top-tier automotive anchor customer complicates project financing. For Stellantis, it removes a fixed nickel sulphate commitment tied to a project still at the development stage.

EV supply chains tighten standards on battery materials

Stellantis is also recalibrating its broader battery materials portfolio. Earlier this week, it cancelled a supply agreement with Australian battery materials supplier Novonix over product specification issues. This second cancellation highlights how automakers now demand tighter performance, quality and timing certainty from upstream partners.

Battery metal developers face a tougher landscape as OEMs pursue flexibility and risk diversification. Projects like NiWest must now compete not only on resource quality and ESG credentials, but also on cost resilience under low-price scenarios. Stronger balance sheets, staged developments and diversified customer bases will be critical to securing future offtake.

At the same time, OEMs remain under pressure to secure long-term critical mineral supply for electrification targets. Strategic partnerships will likely shift toward more advanced projects, integrated value chains, and suppliers with proven technical and financial execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The collapse of the Stellantis Alliance Nickel offtake agreement illustrates how quickly the battery metals balance of power can shift. When nickel prices slide and capital tightens, marginal projects and early-stage offtakes become vulnerable, even with blue-chip OEM partners. For miners, bankable projects now require true cost competitiveness and technical robustness, not just strong EV narratives.

Indonesia HPM Formula Raises Nickel Ore Cost Risk for HPAL Producers

ESDM

Indonesia HPM formula changes will reshape nickel ore pricing from 15 April, adding new cost pressure across the country’s nickel processing chain. The energy and mineral resources ministry revised the mineral benchmark price mechanism for nickel and aluminium ore, with nickel valuation now expanded beyond nickel content alone.

The Indonesia HPM formula raises the correction factor for 1.6% nickel ore to 30%, compared with the previous 20% correction factor for 1.9% ore. Under the new framework, the correction factor rises or falls by one percentage point for every 0.1% change in nickel content.

This means the correction factor for 1.9% nickel ore will rise to 33%. The change increases the official value of nickel ore and could raise taxes, royalties and feedstock costs for processors that rely on HPM-linked transactions.

The Indonesia HPM formula also adds cobalt, iron and chromium into ore valuation. This is a major policy shift because these contained elements were not previously priced in the same way. Indonesia is now moving toward a more complete ore-value model, especially for laterite ores used in battery and stainless steel supply chains.

Cobalt, Iron and Chromium Inclusion Changes Nickel Ore Valuation

Indonesia’s new nickel HPM framework gives cobalt a correction factor of 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. This is particularly important for high-pressure acid leach producers because cobalt-bearing ore can generate additional value through mixed hydroxide precipitate.

The ministry also introduced a 10% correction factor for iron when ore contains 35% or less iron. Chromium content also carries a 10% correction factor. These additions make ore valuation more complex and link pricing more closely to the full chemistry of laterite deposits.

The inclusion of cobalt is the most strategically important change. Indonesia’s HPAL projects produce nickel-cobalt intermediates for battery supply chains, and cobalt content can materially affect project economics. By taxing cobalt-bearing value inside ore, Jakarta is capturing more upstream rent from battery-linked mineral flows.

The Indonesia HPM formula therefore moves beyond a simple nickel-grade benchmark. It pushes the country toward a broader mineral-value system that recognises by-product metals and secondary contained value.

The ministry kept the Harga Mineral Acuan reference price unchanged. This means the immediate policy impact comes from correction factors and added contained elements, rather than a change in the headline reference price.

Market participants are now assessing how the new rules will pass through to actual transactions. For nickel ore used in rotary kiln-electric furnace production, spot prices remain nearly double the HPM level. This limits the immediate impact on some stainless-linked ore trades because market prices already sit well above the official benchmark.

The impact is likely to be much stronger for HPAL ore. Ore used in HPAL processing often trades without the same premium seen in RKEF feedstock. As a result, the revised HPM formula could lift transacted HPAL ore prices by more than a third.

That cost increase would move directly into battery-grade nickel economics. Market participants estimate that higher ore prices and taxes could raise mixed hydroxide precipitate production costs by more than $1,000/t in nickel metal equivalent.

This matters because Indonesia has become the centre of global MHP supply growth. Chinese-backed HPAL projects rely on Indonesian ore, sulphuric acid, energy and logistics to supply nickel and cobalt intermediates to global battery chains. Higher ore costs could narrow margins across MHP, nickel sulphate and cathode material supply.

The change also arrives during a period of wider nickel policy uncertainty. Indonesia has been tightening mining quotas, reviewing export taxes and seeking greater value capture from its mineral resources. The revised HPM formula fits that direction by increasing government control over pricing and taxable value.

Nickel Policy Shift Extends to Bauxite and Signals Broader Resource Control

Indonesia’s pricing reform did not stop at nickel. The ministry also revised the HPM formula for bauxite, changing the price basis to dollars per wet metric tonne from dollars per dry metric tonne.

The bauxite change adds a silica discount and raises the correction factor to $1.40/wmt for each one percentage point increase in aluminium oxide content. The previous formula used $1/dmt. This changes how moisture and ore quality are reflected in benchmark pricing.

The ministry also changed the price basis for lead ore to dollars per wet metric tonne from dollars per dry metric tonne. This effectively removes moisture content from the pricing formula and simplifies the benchmark around wet material values.

These changes suggest a broader policy direction. Indonesia is refining benchmark pricing across mineral commodities to improve tax collection, capture more contained value and align official pricing with ore quality.

For nickel, the change has immediate market significance because Indonesia dominates global laterite supply. Nickel ore pricing affects stainless steel, ferronickel, nickel pig iron, MHP, nickel sulphate and battery cathode supply chains.

The Shanghai Futures Exchange nickel price response showed that traders are treating the policy as price-supportive. Nickel closed at Yn136,900/t after rising from Yn133,010/t on 3 April, with participants citing support from the revised HMA-linked pricing framework.

However, the real market impact will depend on how producers, smelters and government agencies implement the rules. If HPM-based taxes rise sharply while spot ore prices remain high, margin pressure could build across processors with weaker cost positions.

HPAL producers are the most exposed because their feedstock pricing may move more directly with the revised benchmark. RKEF operators may see less immediate change because their ore costs already reflect strong market premiums.

For battery materials buyers, the risk is that Indonesia’s cost base becomes more expensive even as global nickel markets remain oversupplied. Higher ore valuation may not tighten physical supply immediately, but it can raise the floor for production costs in one of the world’s most important nickel processing hubs.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource sovereignty. The government is using pricing formulas, mining quotas, export controls and tax compliance to ensure that more mineral value stays inside the country. This could support domestic revenue and downstream investment, but it may also increase uncertainty for processors and foreign investors.

The new framework also creates a precedent. If Indonesia successfully captures more value from cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore, other resource-rich countries may consider similar contained-metal pricing models.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s revised HPM formula shows that nickel policy is moving from volume control to value capture. The biggest impact will fall on HPAL producers, where cobalt-bearing ore valuation could raise MHP costs and change battery nickel economics.

Hanrui Indonesian Nickel Smelter Nears Completion With Hot Commissioning Start

Hanrui Indonesian

Hanrui Indonesian nickel smelter development has moved into hot commissioning, signalling that Nanjing Hanrui’s delayed nickel matte project in Central Sulawesi is nearing completion. The Chinese cobalt producer launched the commissioning phase on 10 April at the Huabao Industrial Park in Morowali.

The Hanrui Indonesian nickel smelter is designed to produce 20,000 t/yr of nickel matte on a nickel metal equivalent basis. The project will use oxygen-enriched continuous blowing technology to convert nickel feedstock into matte for downstream processing.

Hanrui Indonesian nickel smelter progress matters because Indonesia remains the centre of global nickel capacity growth. New matte projects help connect Indonesian nickel resources with battery materials supply chains, especially where producers need feedstock for nickel sulphate and other battery-grade products.

Hot Commissioning Marks Final Step Before Commercial Output

Hot commissioning means production lines are being tested under operating conditions before full commercial production begins. This stage is important because it tests equipment integration, process stability, safety systems and product quality.

Hanrui had originally planned to start production in May 2025, but later deferred the schedule to March 2026. The start of hot commissioning now suggests the company is moving closer to operational readiness after earlier delays.

The project’s location in Morowali gives Hanrui access to one of Indonesia’s most important nickel industrial clusters. Morowali has become a major processing centre for Chinese-backed nickel investments, supported by integrated infrastructure, smelting capacity and downstream materials ambitions.

Chinese Producers Expand Nickel Matte Capacity in Indonesia

Hanrui’s project forms part of a broader Chinese investment wave in Indonesian nickel processing. Chinese companies are building matte, mixed hydroxide precipitate, ferronickel and other nickel products to serve both stainless steel and battery markets.

Huayou has also started construction of its Huaxing nickel matte project at the Indonesia Pomalaa Industry Park. That project is planned for 40,000 t/yr of nickel matte on a nickel metal equivalent basis, although Huayou has not disclosed its construction timeline or start-up date.

The expansion of nickel matte capacity gives Chinese producers more flexibility in feedstock flows. It also strengthens Indonesia’s position as a processing base, not only an ore supplier.

However, new capacity still faces execution risks. Power supply, sulphur availability, environmental controls, commissioning performance and market prices will determine how quickly these projects move from nameplate capacity to stable commercial production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hanrui’s hot commissioning shows that Indonesia’s nickel buildout continues despite delays and market uncertainty. The strategic issue is whether new matte capacity can ramp smoothly enough to support battery supply chains without adding further pressure to an already competitive nickel market.

Indonesia Nickel Ore Quotas Risk Tightening Feedstock Without Fixing Oversupply

Indonesia Nickel

Indonesia nickel ore quotas are becoming a more powerful market signal in 2026. Jakarta is expected to cut RKAB approvals to around 250mn–260mn t. That looks like a strong intervention on paper. However, Indonesia nickel ore quotas may tighten feedstock without solving Indonesian nickel oversupply in downstream products.

The core imbalance is no longer in ore. The real surplus sits in nickel pig iron, matte, and mixed hydroxide precipitate. Domestic ore prices remain elevated, which suggests ore availability is still tight. Therefore, Indonesia nickel ore quotas may create upstream stress while leaving downstream nickel products oversupplied.

This matters because policy and market structure are moving in opposite directions. Indonesia continues to expand smelting and HPAL capacity aggressively. At the same time, ore quotas are becoming harder to secure in full. As a result, the market may move toward feedstock shortages rather than a true rebalancing of refined nickel supply.

Indonesia Nickel Ore Quotas Could Create an Upstream Bottleneck

Indonesia nickel ore quotas appear lower than expected ore demand for 2026. The approved ceiling now looks below estimated domestic ore requirements. That gap raises the risk of feedstock shortages for smelters. Consequently, nickel ore supply tightness may become the market’s next major problem.

Vale Indonesia shows how this pressure is already emerging. Market participants say its approved RKAB is only a fraction of requested volume. Yet the company is developing multiple HPAL projects that will require large limonite ore volumes. Therefore, limited quota approvals could constrain new downstream capacity before it reaches full utilisation.

The ore issue is also more complex than headline tonnage suggests. RKAB quotas are issued in wet tons, not uniform recoverable nickel units. Moisture content and ore grade can vary significantly. As a result, nominal quota levels may overstate real usable feedstock availability.

Regulatory uncertainty adds another layer of risk. Indonesia’s forestry crackdown has targeted a large area of mining land without valid permits. Nickel operations could be affected, especially smaller miners or forest-zone projects. Meanwhile, quota delays themselves can disrupt ore availability even before formal supply cuts take full effect.

Indonesian Nickel Oversupply Will Persist Unless Smelter Output Is Also Disciplined

Indonesian nickel oversupply is still concentrated in processed products, not in ore. Cutting ore quotas alone does not automatically solve NPI, matte, or MHP oversupply. Smelters can still try to secure imported feedstock from the Philippines or New Caledonia. However, those alternative sources remain limited and unreliable.

That means imported ore is a cost issue, not a structural solution. Greater reliance on foreign ore would lift smelter input costs and compress margins. It would not remove the global glut in downstream nickel products. Therefore, the policy may shift pressure upstream while preserving the same downstream oversupply.

Royalties could deepen that squeeze further. Higher nickel prices may trigger increased royalty rates on ore and processed products. That would raise costs across the chain at a time when refined markets remain weak. As a result, profitability could deteriorate even if LME prices stay temporarily supported.

The government may still adjust course later in the year. Producers can use part of earlier three-year approvals through the end of March, and market participants expect later reviews. That suggests the headline RKAB figure may not be a fixed ceiling. Even so, policy uncertainty is already becoming a stronger driver of nickel prices than actual market healing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is trying to influence prices through ore control, but the real surplus remains downstream. That mismatch could turn a refined nickel glut into an upstream bottleneck without delivering true market balance. Unless ore discipline is matched by smelter discipline, volatility will remain the defining feature of the nickel market.

Centaurus Glencore Nickel Offtake Strengthens Jaguar Project Financing Path

Centaurus Glencore

Centaurus Glencore nickel offtake has given the Jaguar nickel project a stronger commercial base as Centaurus Metals moves toward financing and development in Brazil. The binding agreement secures a major customer for future high-grade nickel concentrate and supports the company’s plan to reach a final investment decision.

Glencore will purchase 20,000 dry metric tonnes per year of 32% nickel concentrate from Jaguar for an initial five-year period starting in 2029. The volume is equivalent to about 6,400 tonnes per year of contained nickel.

The concentrate will be shipped to Glencore’s Sudbury smelting operations in Canada for processing. This gives the Centaurus Glencore nickel offtake clear downstream integration and links Brazilian mine development with established North American nickel smelting capacity.

Jaguar Nickel Project Gains Commercial Validation

The Jaguar nickel project is expected to produce 65,000 tonnes per year of nickel concentrate, meaning the Glencore contract covers roughly one-third of planned output. This contracted volume improves project bankability because lenders often require visible offtake before supporting mine development.

Pricing will be linked to the London Metal Exchange nickel cash settlement price. Nickel payability will vary with market conditions, while copper and cobalt by-products contained in the concentrate will also receive payability.

At current nickel prices of around $17,200 per tonne, the agreement could generate more than $450 million in revenue during the initial contract period. That revenue visibility matters as Centaurus works with Brazil’s national development bank on potential debt financing and seeks a strategic investor.

The agreement remains conditional on key development milestones. Centaurus must make a final investment decision by 30 September 2026, complete half of tailings dam construction by December 2027, and achieve first concentrate production by 15 January 2029.

Nickel Market Recovery Supports New Sulphide Supply

The Centaurus Glencore nickel offtake comes as nickel markets show signs of tightening after several years of weak pricing. Rapid growth from Indonesian laterite supply pressured global prices, but recent gains above $17,000 per tonne suggest the market may be moving closer to balance.

Jaguar’s sulphide concentrate profile gives the project strategic relevance. High-grade concentrate can feed conventional smelting routes and may become more valuable if buyers seek diversified nickel units outside the dominant Indonesian laterite chain.

Centaurus expects Jaguar to produce an average of 22,600 tonnes per year of contained nickel during its first seven years. The proposed 3.5 million tonne per year operation is forecast to produce nickel at all-in sustaining costs of about $9,764 per tonne.

The project also carries industrial history. Centaurus acquired Jaguar in 2019 after it was previously owned by Vale, giving the company a known Brazilian nickel asset at a time when battery, stainless steel, and alloy supply chains remain focused on secure feedstock.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Centaurus Glencore nickel offtake shows that disciplined sulphide nickel projects can still attract strategic buyers despite years of weak nickel prices. If the market keeps tightening, high-grade concentrate with smelter-ready characteristics could regain importance in global nickel supply chains.

Anglo American to Sell Brazilian Nickel Assets to MMG for Up to $500 Million

Anglo American

Strategic sale aligns Anglo’s focus on copper, iron ore, and crop nutrients amid nickel market shifts

Anglo American, the UK-South African mining major, has agreed to sell its Brazilian nickel business to MMG, a subsidiary of China’s Minmetals, for up to $500 million. The deal will streamline Anglo’s portfolio as it pivots toward copper, iron ore, and crop nutrients—sectors with stronger long-term demand.

The transaction includes an upfront $350 million cash payment, a $100 million price-linked earnout, and an additional $50 million contingent payment tied to development projects. MMG’s acquisition will be executed through its Singapore Resources arm, and the deal is expected to close by September 2025.

Brazilian ferronickel assets and greenfield projects included

The sale covers several key nickel operations in Brazil: the Barro Alto and Codemin ferronickel plants, as well as the Jacaré and Morro Sem Boné greenfield development projects. These assets provide MMG with direct access to high-grade nickel resources amid growing demand from battery and stainless steel industries.

In 2024, Anglo produced 39,400 tonnes of nickel (metal equivalent), down 1.5% year-on-year. It projects 2025 output between 37,000 and 39,000 tonnes. The sale will help Anglo prioritize high-margin projects in metals crucial to the global energy transition.

MMG expands presence as Brazil nickel exports to China fall

MMG, backed by state-owned China Minmetals Corporation, continues to secure upstream assets worldwide as China strengthens its control over energy transition metals. Despite the decline in Brazil's 2024 ferronickel exports to China—40,048 tonnes, down 36.3% from 2023—MMG’s acquisition signals confidence in long-term nickel demand.

Indonesia’s rise in nickel pig iron (NPI) output has pressured Brazilian exports, especially in the stainless steel sector. Meanwhile, Brazilian mining giant Vale is also reviewing its nickel portfolio, possibly considering divestment to sharpen competitiveness in its vertically integrated business model.

This transaction highlights shifting dynamics in global nickel supply as miners recalibrate for market volatility and the EV-driven demand surge.

NPI–Class I Nickel Spread Narrows as Metal Oversupply Pressures Prices

Nickel cathode

NPI–class I nickel spread narrowed sharply in March as persistent oversupply in the class I nickel market pushed metal prices lower, while nickel pig iron prices stayed supported by elevated production costs. The average spread fell to $2,975/t in March, down from the 2025 annual average of $3,696/t.

The narrower NPI–class I nickel spread shows how differently the two nickel markets are behaving. Class I nickel remains under pressure from high exchange stocks and weak absorption from battery and alloy users. NPI, by contrast, is being held up by Indonesian ore costs and a firmer production cost floor.

The current spread also discourages additional class I output from NPI conversion. Estimated conversion costs from NPI to class I nickel remain around $4,000/t, meaning producers using NPI as feedstock would face negative margins at current price levels.

This creates an important signal for the nickel supply chain. Oversupply is still weighing on refined metal, but high feedstock and processing costs are preventing prices from falling evenly across all nickel products.

Class I Nickel Oversupply Keeps Metal Prices Under Pressure

Class I nickel oversupply remains the main reason behind the compressed spread. London Metal Exchange nickel stocks reached 289,506t on 26 February, the highest level since May 2018.

Ample exchange inventory has pressured class I nickel prices and opened an import arbitrage window into China. China’s nickel imports rose by 18% in January-February as lower overseas prices made imported metal more attractive.

However, end-user demand has not been strong enough to absorb the surplus. Battery and alloy-sector consumption remained insufficient to clear the additional metal units, pushing Shanghai Futures Exchange nickel stocks higher.

SHFE nickel inventories rose to 65,764t on 10 April from 45,544t on 9 January. This inventory build shows that imports and domestic availability are running ahead of immediate consumption.

The oversupply problem is structural in the near term. New class I capacity has continued to emerge, while demand from stainless steel, batteries and specialty alloys has not grown fast enough to rebalance the market.

The NPI conversion route is therefore unattractive. When the NPI–class I nickel spread sits below conversion cost, producers have little incentive to turn NPI into refined metal. This helps prevent additional supply from that route, but it does not immediately remove existing class I oversupply.

NPI prices have been more resilient because they are tied closely to Indonesian ore economics. Indonesian nickel ore prices remain elevated and continue to trade above the government-mandated price floor.

Concerns over tight ore availability have supported feedstock values. This has limited NPI producers’ willingness to cut prices, even though stainless steel demand remains only average.

That cost floor is important. NPI is not rising because downstream demand is exceptionally strong. It is holding because ore, mining quotas and Indonesian pricing policy are preventing a deeper fall.

The result is a distorted market structure. Class I nickel is being pulled down by inventory pressure, while NPI is being supported by feedstock costs. This explains why the spread has narrowed despite weak overall nickel sentiment.

MHP and HPAL Costs Could Rebuild the Spread Over Time

Mixed hydroxide precipitate is becoming the more important cost driver for future class I nickel production. Much of the newly added class I capacity relies on MHP feedstock rather than NPI.

Integrated producers with their own Indonesian MHP capacity have a cost advantage. Their MHP production costs are estimated at around $13,000/t in nickel metal equivalent, with conversion costs from MHP to metal at roughly $3,000/t.

This places the total cost of class I production through the MHP route at about $16,000/t. That cost base can still support production for integrated operators, but it leaves less room for producers relying on third-party MHP.

The market problem is that MHP supply is not sufficient to meet all feedstock requirements for new class I capacity. This creates competition for MHP units and limits how much low-cost refined nickel can be produced through this route.

Cost pressure is also rising across HPAL operations. Middle East tensions have tightened sulphur availability and lifted sulphur prices, which directly affects MHP producers that rely on sulphuric acid-intensive processing.

Sulphur and sulphuric acid are central to HPAL economics. Any disruption to sulphur flows can raise operating costs, reduce margins or force producers to curtail output if acid availability becomes constrained.

Indonesia’s revised nickel ore pricing formula adds another layer of pressure. The new formula is expected to have a greater impact on ore consumed by HPAL projects than on ore used by rotary kiln electric furnace operations.

This is because HPAL ore often trades closer to official pricing levels, while RKEF ore used for NPI already trades at premiums well above the benchmark. As a result, HPAL producers may feel the revised HPM framework more directly.

Higher ore prices and higher taxes could lift MHP production costs. That would eventually raise the cost floor for class I nickel produced through the MHP route, especially for integrated producers that had previously enjoyed lower feedstock costs.

This cost inflation may support class I nickel prices over time. While current oversupply is weighing on metal values, producers cannot keep adding supply indefinitely if feedstock and conversion costs rise.

NPI prices are also likely to remain anchored by costs. Indonesian ore tightness, quota uncertainty and pricing reforms should continue to support NPI even if stainless steel demand stays moderate.

As MHP costs rise and NPI prices remain cost-supported, the NPI–class I nickel spread may widen back toward the $3,500-4,000/t range over time. That would restore a more normal relationship between feedstock products and refined metal.

However, the timing depends on inventory absorption. Class I nickel prices will struggle to recover strongly until exchange stocks stop rising and downstream demand improves.

For battery supply chains, the key issue is cost pass-through. If MHP and HPAL costs rise while class I prices remain weak, margins across nickel sulphate and cathode material chains could tighten.

For stainless steel producers, NPI resilience means raw material costs may remain sticky even without strong demand. This could limit margin recovery if finished stainless prices do not rise in parallel.

The nickel market is therefore entering a complex adjustment phase. Oversupply is pushing refined metal lower, while policy, ore availability, sulphur costs and HPAL economics are raising the cost floor beneath intermediate products.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The narrowing NPI–class I nickel spread is not a sign of healthy convergence. It reflects class I oversupply on one side and cost-protected NPI on the other. The next shift will likely come from rising HPAL and MHP costs, not from a sudden recovery in nickel demand.

Nornickel Nickel Surplus Forecast Shrinks as Indonesia Supply Tightens

Nornickel

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast has been cut sharply for 2026 as Indonesian ore constraints, higher feedstock costs and sulphur shortages slow the supply growth that drove recent oversupply. The Russian producer now expects a marginal global surplus of around 20,000t, down from its previous forecast of 240,000t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast reflects a major shift in supply conditions. Global nickel production is expected to fall by 5% to 3.71mn t in 2026, marking the first annual decline in a decade, while demand is forecast to rise by 2% to 3.69mn t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast also places Indonesia at the centre of the market balance. Lower effective mining volumes, declining ore grades and sharply higher ore prices are tightening feedstock availability for NPI, HPAL and Class 1 nickel producers.

The adjustment follows a 2025 surplus of around 278,000t, when supply increased by 7% and demand rose by 6%. The market is therefore moving from structural oversupply toward a much tighter balance.

Indonesia Ore and Sulphur Constraints Reshape Supply

Indonesia mined around 320mn t of nickel ore in 2025 against an approved quota of 379mn t. For 2026, quotas are expected at around 300mn t, but actual mining could be closer to 270mn t if utilisation remains near 90%.

Lower ore grades further reduce contained nickel availability. Indonesian NPI production fell by 8% year on year in January-May, suggesting smelters are already feeling the impact.

Philippine ore imports could reach around 25mn t this year and offset part of the shortfall. However, Indonesia’s July quota review remains a critical market variable.

Ore economics are tightening as well. Indonesia’s revised pricing formula has doubled or tripled minimum ore prices for some grades.

Nornickel estimates the new system could add as much as $5,000/t to the cost of Class 1 nickel produced from Indonesian feedstock on a cathode-equivalent basis.

HPAL producers face another problem: sulphur.

Middle East disruption has pushed sulphur prices from around $300/t to above $1,000/t. HPAL operations require roughly 10-11t of sulphur for every tonne of nickel produced.

Indonesia sourced more than 75% of its sulphur imports from the Middle East in 2025, leaving battery nickel projects highly exposed to disrupted maritime supply.

Around one-third of HPAL capacity is currently idle, while HPAL production fell by 20% year on year in May.

Nornickel expects Indonesian NPI output to decline by 11% this year and mixed hydroxide precipitate production by 9%. Class 1 nickel supply is forecast to fall by 2%.

Demand Growth Stays Modest as Stainless Scrap Use Rises

Nickel demand is still growing, but not strongly enough to create a clear deficit.

Nornickel expects stainless steel nickel consumption to rise by only 1% this year. Chinese producers are using more scrap, reducing their need for primary nickel units.

China’s average stainless scrap share is expected to increase to 24% in 2026 from 19% in 2025. That change could keep Chinese primary nickel demand in stainless steel broadly flat at around 1.6mn t.

A higher share of 316 stainless partly offsets the scrap effect because 316 contains more nickel than 304. Chinese 300-series stainless output increased by 3% in the first five months of the year, while 200-series production rose by 11%.

Battery-related demand remains stronger.

China’s nickel sulphate output is forecast to rise by 15% to 421,000t of contained nickel in 2026 and reach 455,000t in 2027. Indonesian nickel sulphate production is expected to increase by 18% to 59,000t this year.

Matte output is another growth area. Indonesian nickel matte production is forecast to jump by 48% as conversion from NPI becomes more attractive.

The market could loosen again in 2027. Nornickel expects the surplus to widen modestly to around 55,000t if Indonesian ore quotas increase, sulphur availability improves and new processing capacity ramps up.

The near-term nickel story has therefore changed. Oversupply has not disappeared, but the margin between surplus and balance has narrowed sharply as Indonesian policy and feedstock economics begin to constrain output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel’s biggest bullish driver is no longer demand acceleration but supply discipline in Indonesia. If ore quotas remain tight and sulphur costs stay elevated, the market could remain far more balanced than recent oversupply trends suggested.

Indonesia Nickel Royalty Changes Delayed as Jakarta Balances State Revenue and Producer Costs

Indonesia Nickel

Indonesia nickel royalty changes have been delayed as the government reviews planned royalty increases and export taxes for nickel products. Jakarta is trying to balance higher state revenue with the cost pressure already facing miners, smelters and battery-material producers.

Indonesia nickel royalty changes were initially expected to take effect in June. But the energy and mineral resources ministry will now reassess the policy after industry consultations.

Indonesia nickel royalty changes are part of a wider policy reset covering nickel, copper, tin, gold, silver and other minerals. The government wants a formula that captures more value for the state without damaging investment in downstream processing.

The delay also applies to planned export duties on nickel products. Indonesia will continue finalising the pricing mechanism for the duty, but implementation has been pushed back.

Downstreaming Policy Meets Rising Cost Pressure

Indonesia’s nickel export duty plan is tied to its downstreaming strategy. The policy aims to push mining and metals companies to build more domestic value-added capacity instead of exporting lower-value materials.

The country has already become the world’s most important nickel processing hub. However, officials say the sector has developed only about 40% of its potential, leaving room for more investment in battery materials, stainless steel and other downstream products.

The royalty delay shows that Indonesia understands the risk of overloading producers with too many cost increases at once. Miners and processors are already dealing with tighter RKAB quotas, higher ore costs and rising input risks.

Indonesia updated its nickel ore pricing formula on 15 April. The new mechanism includes cobalt, iron and chromium in ore valuation, increasing raw material costs for downstream users.

This change is especially important for high-pressure acid leach projects, which consume limonite ore and produce mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery supply chains. Higher ore prices can raise costs for nickel intermediates and reduce margins.

Sulphur supply risk is another pressure point. Middle East disruption has raised concerns over sulphur availability, a key input for nickel processing. This has supported nickel prices but also increased uncertainty for producers.

Nickel Prices Supported by Policy and Supply Risk

Indonesia’s recent policy shifts have generally supported nickel prices. LME nickel rose to around $19,450/t on 6 May from $18,075/t on 15 April, supported by the revised ore pricing formula, sulphur supply concerns and lower 2026 RKAB quota expectations.

The delayed royalty and export tax changes may ease immediate producer pressure. But they do not reverse the broader direction of Indonesian policy.

Jakarta still wants to capture more value from its mineral resources. It also wants companies to keep investing in domestic processing and a more complete nickel supply chain.

For the nickel market, this creates a more policy-sensitive pricing environment. Ore quotas, benchmark formulas, export taxes, royalties and downstream investment rules can all influence costs and trade flows.

The delay gives producers time, but not certainty. Companies will still need to plan for higher government take, stricter ore valuation and stronger pressure to invest in domestic value-added products.

Indonesia’s nickel strategy is therefore entering a more complex phase. The country wants to remain the dominant global nickel hub, but it must avoid weakening the economics that attracted downstream investment in the first place.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s delay is not a retreat from resource nationalism; it is a recalibration. Jakarta wants more value from nickel, but it also knows that excessive cost pressure could slow the downstreaming model that made Indonesia central to global battery and stainless steel supply.

Macquarie Nickel Price Outlook Turns More Bullish on Indonesia Ore Tightness

Macquarie

Macquarie nickel price outlook has turned more constructive for 2026. The bank lifted its LME nickel forecast to $17,750/t from about $15,000/t. It argues that Indonesia ore tightness is slowing supply growth after years of surplus. As a result, Macquarie nickel price outlook now points to a firmer market floor.

This change matters because Indonesia has driven most global nickel growth in recent years. Rapid expansion in smelting and HPAL capacity pushed refined output well ahead of demand. However, tighter mining quotas and rising domestic ore prices are now changing that pattern. Therefore, the nickel market balance is starting to look less loose.

Indonesia Ore Tightness Is Reshaping the Supply Story

Indonesia ore tightness is becoming the key issue in the global nickel market. Macquarie expects lower mining quotas in 2026 to constrain laterite feedstock for smelters and HPAL projects. That will likely slow refined nickel output growth even as downstream capacity still expands. Consequently, upstream limits are beginning to matter more than downstream ambition.

This shift could also reduce the pace of stock builds. Macquarie expects exchange inventories and producer stocks to stabilize rather than keep rising sharply. That would remove part of the pressure that has weighed on nickel prices. As a result, the market may start pricing scarcity risk more seriously.

Macquarie now sees the 2026 surplus at only 89,000t, down from its earlier 250,000t view. It also expects global nickel supply to dip slightly this year. That is a major change from the 10pc supply growth seen in 2025. Therefore, the nickel market balance looks materially tighter than before.

Stainless Steel Demand Still Anchors the Market

Stainless steel demand remains the strongest pillar of nickel consumption. Macquarie expects stainless production to rise 4.4pc to 67mn t in 2026. That should keep underlying nickel demand firm even as battery chemistry trends become more mixed. Consequently, stainless steel continues to anchor the nickel demand profile.

Battery demand is still growing, but not explosively. Lower-nickel chemistries such as LFP have reduced expectations for EV-related nickel intensity. Even so, Macquarie still expects nickel use in batteries to rise 5pc to 542,000t in 2026. Therefore, battery demand is still supportive, just less dominant than some expected.

This demand mix gives the market a more diversified foundation. Stainless steel provides steady volume support, while batteries still add incremental growth. That combination is healthier than relying on one major demand theme alone. As a result, Macquarie nickel price outlook reflects stronger balance on both sides of the market.

Higher Prices May Be Needed to Sustain Non-Indonesian Supply

Higher nickel prices may now be necessary to keep non-Indonesian supply alive. Macquarie said many producers outside Indonesia remain under margin pressure near or below $15,000/t. Some may need $18,000-19,000/t to operate profitably and justify reinvestment. Therefore, a higher LME nickel forecast also reflects a higher incentive price.

Indonesia still remains the lowest-cost producer on average. However, its cost advantage is narrowing as ore gets more expensive and regulations tighten. That reduces the chance of another unchecked supply wave. Consequently, the market may be moving away from chronic oversupply and toward more managed growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Macquarie’s upgrade matters because it reframes nickel from an oversupply story into an upstream constraint story. The biggest change is not demand. It is that Indonesia may no longer be able to expand ore and refined supply without friction. If that holds, nickel prices may stay firmer than the market has been used to.

Nickel Deficit Forecast Emerges as Indonesia Tightens Ore Supply

Nickel manufacturing

Nickel deficit conditions are expected to return in 2026 as Indonesia tightens ore supply controls and stainless steel demand continues to grow. The International Nickel Study Group forecasts global primary nickel production of 3.715mn t against usage of 3.747mn t, implying a deficit of 32,000t.

The nickel deficit would mark a sharp change after three consecutive years of surplus. The market recorded surpluses of 175,000t in 2023, 116,000t in 2024 and 283,000t in 2025.

The nickel deficit forecast remains modest, but it carries strategic significance because it depends heavily on Indonesian policy. Indonesia has been the main driver of global nickel supply growth, and tighter controls on ore mining could slow the expansion that previously pushed the market into surplus.

The Middle East conflict is adding another layer of uncertainty. Higher energy prices, inflation pressure and disrupted sulphur flows could affect nickel production costs, especially for high-pressure acid leach operations in Indonesia.

Indonesia Ore Controls Reshape Nickel Supply Growth

Indonesia’s approved nickel ore mining quota for 2026 has been set significantly lower than in 2025. The quota can still be revised, but the initial reduction has already changed market expectations.

The country’s revised mineral benchmark pricing mechanism also took effect on 15 April. The new HPM formula raises base prices for all nickel ore grades and includes cobalt, iron and chromium in the valuation for the first time.

This matters because Indonesian nickel supply is no longer expanding under the same low-cost conditions that drove rapid output growth. Ore access, ore pricing, royalties and contained metal values are all becoming more tightly managed.

The policy impact is not evenly distributed. Eramet’s PT Weda Bay Nickel mine is preparing to enter care and maintenance in May after receiving an initial ore quota of just 12mn wet metric tonnes. This is far below last year’s final permit of up to 42mn wmt.

In contrast, Nickel Industries received quota approvals of 14.3mn wmt, up from 10.5mn wmt in 2025. This shows that Indonesia’s controls are not simply cutting all supply. They are also reshaping which operators receive ore access.

The quota system could therefore become a major competitive factor. Producers with larger approved volumes may gain stronger operating flexibility, while others face lower utilisation, higher costs or temporary shutdowns.

HPAL producers are especially exposed. These plants require steady limonite ore supply and large volumes of sulphuric acid or sulphur-linked feedstock. Tighter ore availability and higher reagent costs can quickly pressure margins.

Disrupted sulphur flows from the Middle East conflict have raised concern over HPAL feedstock availability. This is important because Indonesian HPAL projects have become key suppliers of mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material production.

If sulphur costs remain elevated and ore prices rise under the new HPM formula, HPAL production costs could increase materially. That would weaken the low-cost supply advantage that helped Indonesia dominate battery-linked nickel intermediates.

Stainless Steel Supports Demand as Batteries Disappoint

Stainless steel remains the main support for nickel demand. INSG said the stainless steel sector grew in 2025 and is expected to expand further in 2026.

This is important because stainless steel still consumes far more nickel than the battery sector. Demand from stainless steel, alloys and industrial uses continues to anchor the primary nickel market.

Battery demand has grown more slowly than earlier expectations. Lithium iron phosphate chemistries have gained market share, reducing nickel intensity in parts of the electric vehicle market.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle demand has also outpaced fully battery-electric vehicle demand in some markets. This has limited the speed at which nickel-rich battery chemistries absorb new supply.

The result is a market caught between two forces. Supply growth is slowing because of Indonesian ore controls and higher input costs. However, battery demand is not rising fast enough to create a large structural shortage.

This makes the 2026 nickel deficit highly sensitive to policy and disruption. If Indonesia raises quotas, supply could recover. If sulphur, energy or ore costs worsen, the deficit could deepen.

The forecast also changes the market narrative. Nickel has spent recent years under pressure from surplus supply and rising inventories. A move into deficit, even a small one, could stabilise sentiment and support prices.

Still, the deficit is not yet a sign of broad scarcity. It is a warning that Indonesia’s supply discipline, not battery demand alone, is now determining the market balance.

For producers, cost control and ore access will become more important. For buyers, the focus will shift toward supplier reliability, feedstock route and exposure to Indonesian policy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The nickel market is not tightening because batteries suddenly absorbed the surplus. It is tightening because Indonesia is putting discipline into ore supply while HPAL costs rise. That makes the nickel deficit more policy-driven than demand-driven.