DRC Mine Guard Plan Puts Critical Minerals Security at the Centre of Supply Chains

DRC, Inspectorate of Mines

DRC mine guard plans mark a major escalation in the country’s effort to secure critical minerals supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s General Inspectorate of Mines will develop a paramilitary unit to protect mine sites, ore transport routes, processors and border corridors.

The DRC mine guard will be created as part of a strategic partnership involving the US and UAE. The project is expected to cost up to $100mn and will use existing training facilities.

The DRC mine guard could deploy up to 20,000 troops over the next two years. Recruitment is expected to begin in May, with the first operational contingent of 2,500-3,000 officers targeted for deployment by December.

The plan reflects the growing strategic value of Congolese minerals. The DRC is a major producer of copper, cobalt, tantalum, tin and tungsten, all of which are critical to batteries, electronics, defence systems, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

Mineral Security Becomes a Formal State Priority

The mine guard will be tasked with securing mine sites across the DRC and protecting ore shipments from mines to processors and border posts. It will gradually replace forces currently deployed to defend mining assets.

The unit is expected to cover the Greater Katanga and Greater Eastern regions by the end of 2027. It is then planned to expand to all mining provinces by the end of 2028.

This regional focus is important. Greater Katanga is central to copper and cobalt production, while eastern DRC is tied to several strategic minerals and long-running security challenges.

The plan shows that mineral security is becoming part of formal state policy. Mine protection is no longer only a company-level issue involving private security, local forces or site-specific arrangements.

For producers, a more structured security framework could reduce disruption risk if implemented effectively. It could improve transport reliability, protect export flows and lower exposure to armed interference around mining corridors.

However, execution will be critical. A large paramilitary force operating across mining regions must be governed transparently to avoid creating new operational, political or human-rights risks.

US and UAE Partnership Signals Strategic Minerals Competition

The mine guard plan is linked to a broader US-DRC strategic partnership agreed in December 2025. That agreement included expanded US access to DRC critical minerals and a wider minerals-for-security-style framework.

The agreements were part of the Washington accords, a US-backed peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda designed to reduce conflict in eastern DRC. But fighting has continued, with the Rwanda-backed M23 group still controlling several major towns and mining assets. Rwanda denies backing the group.

This makes the security dimension central to mineral strategy. Western governments want more reliable access to DRC copper, cobalt and other critical minerals, but supply cannot be secured only through offtake agreements or financing.

Physical control of mine sites, transport routes and border flows is becoming just as important as ownership and processing capacity.

For the US, the DRC offers one of the fastest routes to large-scale copper and cobalt supply outside China-dominated value chains. For the DRC, security partnerships could bring funding, international backing and more leverage over strategic mineral flows.

The creation of a mine guard also signals that critical minerals are now treated as national security assets. Copper and cobalt are no longer only mining commodities. They are inputs for batteries, grids, defence manufacturing and geopolitical supply-chain competition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC mine guard plan shows that critical minerals security is moving from boardrooms into the field. The key question is whether this force can protect supply chains without adding new governance risks to one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

DRC Copper Output Growth Accelerates as Cobalt Exports Collapse

DRC Copper mining

DRC copper output growth strengthened in 2025 as major producers lifted volumes across the country. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced 3.4mn t of copper in 2025, up from 3.1mn t in 2024. That marks a 10pc annual increase. As a result, DRC copper output growth remains one of the most important supply stories in the global copper market.

This increase matters because the DRC is already one of the world’s key copper jurisdictions. Higher output from CMOC, Ivanhoe, and other major operators supported the national result. The country is becoming even more important to global copper supply. Therefore, DRC copper production 2025 confirms the DRC’s rising weight in the energy and industrial metals chain.

CMOC led the market last year. Its Tenke Fungurume mine produced 519,000t of copper, while Kisanfu added 228,000t. Kamoa-Kakula, the joint venture between Ivanhoe and Zijin, produced 400,000t. Consequently, DRC copper output growth is being driven by a concentrated group of very large operations.

DRC Copper Production 2025 Shows Strong Mine-Level Momentum

DRC copper production 2025 reflects strong mine-level performance from the country’s biggest operators. Large-scale projects continued to deliver higher volumes even as the market remained focused on geopolitical risk and resource nationalism. That gives the DRC a stronger position in global copper negotiations. As a result, copper is becoming an even more strategic pillar of the country’s mining economy.

This growth also improves the DRC’s relevance to western supply chains. Copper demand remains closely tied to electrification, grid buildout, and industrial investment. Countries and companies looking for large-scale copper supply cannot ignore the DRC. Therefore, DRC copper output growth is not only a mining statistic. It is a strategic supply-chain signal.

Congo Cobalt Export Ban Has Changed the Other Side of the Metals Story

Congo cobalt export ban created a very different picture for the country’s other key battery metal. Cobalt shipments fell by almost 80pc in 2025 because of the export restriction. The government imposed the ban after global oversupply drove cobalt prices to record lows. As a result, the DRC used policy intervention to support value rather than pure export volume.

This matters because the DRC remains the world’s largest cobalt producer. Cobalt is still important for electric vehicles and electronics, even as battery chemistry trends evolve. The government has since moved toward a quota system after the export ban. Therefore, Congo cobalt export ban shows that the DRC is willing to manage supply more actively when market conditions weaken.

The US-DRC minerals agreement adds another strategic layer. Officials said the December cooperation deal could improve investor confidence in minerals exploration. The agreement gives the United States preferential status to source critical minerals from the DRC and process them for global markets. Consequently, the DRC is trying to combine stronger copper growth with deeper geopolitical relevance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC now presents two very different metals stories at once. Copper is expanding through giant mines, while cobalt is being managed through policy restraint. That combination shows the country is no longer just a resource exporter. It is becoming a more active force in shaping how critical minerals reach the global market.

Kamoa-Kakula Copper Output Falls as Ivanhoe Shifts Toward Smelter Recovery

Ivanhoe

Kamoa-Kakula copper output fell sharply in the first quarter as Ivanhoe Mines continued to recover from seismic damage at the Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The complex produced 61,906t of copper in concentrate, down 54% from 133,120t a year earlier.

The decline reflects the continuing effect of the May 2025 seismic shocks that forced Ivanhoe to shut, drain and rebuild the Kakula mine. The asset remains in a staged recovery process and has not yet returned to full production.

Kamoa-Kakula copper output now sits below earlier expectations, forcing Ivanhoe to lower its 2026 guidance to 290,000-330,000t from 380,000-420,000t. The company also cut its 2027 target to 380,000-420,000t from 500,000-540,000t, although it still expects output to exceed 500,000 t/yr from 2028.

The weaker concentrate output is important for the global copper market because Kamoa-Kakula is one of the most important growth assets in the DRC copper belt. Any delay in its recovery reduces near-term copper supply from a region that has become central to global mine growth.

Smelter Output and Acid Production Cushion the Disruption

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results also showed a shift in the site’s operating profile. While copper concentrate output fell sharply, the Kamoa-Kakula smelter produced 63,671t of anode during the quarter.

The company also produced 7,746t of copper in blister from the LCS smelter in Kolwezi. This shows that Ivanhoe is building more downstream processing capability even as underground mine recovery continues.

The smelter gives Kamoa-Kakula a strategic advantage in the DRC. Most producers in the African Copperbelt rely on sulphuric acid for leaching operations, while Kamoa-Kakula produces sulphuric acid as a byproduct.

The on-site copper smelter produced 117,871t of high-strength sulphuric acid in the first quarter. This has become more important because the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised concern over sulphur supply into African hydrometallurgical operations.

Sulphur and sulphuric acid availability can directly affect DRC copper production costs. Producers that rely on imported sulphur or purchased acid may face higher costs or operating constraints if Middle East disruptions persist.

Ivanhoe’s position is different. The company does not need sulphuric acid for its own main copper production route and can instead produce acid for regional demand. This could turn a regional input shortage into a commercial advantage.

The main external risk for Ivanhoe is diesel availability. Diesel remains important for on-site energy generation and logistics in the DRC. Ivanhoe has made advanced diesel purchases and implemented contingency measures to sustain operations.

The company also has a lower diesel exposure than many regional operators because it has access to 250MW of hydroelectric capacity. A further 60MW of solar power with battery storage is expected to come online soon, strengthening the site’s energy resilience.

Kipushi Zinc Growth Adds Diversification Despite Grid Instability

Ivanhoe’s Kipushi zinc-copper-lead-germanium mine delivered a stronger first-quarter result. The DRC mine produced a quarterly record of 65,044t of zinc in concentrate, up 52.2% from a year earlier and 5.9% from the previous quarter.

The result gives Ivanhoe an important diversification benefit while Kamoa-Kakula works through its recovery. Zinc concentrate output from Kipushi adds exposure to galvanizing, infrastructure, alloying and specialty metal supply chains.

Kipushi also carries strategic by-product relevance because the mine includes copper, lead and germanium. Germanium has become more important for semiconductors, fibre optics, infrared systems and defence applications.

However, Kipushi still faces infrastructure constraints. Ivanhoe said concentrator availability was affected by electrical grid instability, even as zinc output increased.

This highlights a wider challenge across the DRC mining sector. The country has high-grade resources and major growth potential, but reliable power, transport, reagents and logistics remain critical constraints.

For Kamoa-Kakula, the longer-term recovery depends on mine rebuilding, underground transport, smelter integration, acid market dynamics and energy reliability. The 2028 target of more than 500,000 t/yr remains achievable only if these systems stabilise together.

For the copper market, Ivanhoe’s first-quarter performance sends a mixed signal. Concentrate output remains sharply lower, but smelting and acid production are becoming more strategically valuable as regional supply chains face sulphur and fuel risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results show that Kamoa-Kakula is no longer just a copper volume story. Its smelter, sulphuric acid output and power mix could become strategic advantages in a DRC market exposed to reagent, fuel and logistics shocks.

OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains faces a new conflict test

ITSCI

OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains is under fresh pressure as conflict reshapes tantalum sourcing from central Africa. ITSCI warns that OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains cannot deliver mine-by-mine disclosure once material is smelted. However, the group argues that OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains should mean deeper engagement with upstream schemes, not blanket disengagement.

OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains has hard technical limits

OEMs increasingly ask which specific mine sits behind each component in their products. ITSCI stresses this is technically impossible after smelting. Smelters can receive ore from any of 3,000 ITSCI-monitored mine sites across the Great Lakes Region.

Through ITSCI, smelters know the precise mine origin of incoming tagged consignments. However, smelters routinely blend those inputs with concentrates from other countries. Once material is smelted, minerals lose mine-level identity and cannot be traced back. Therefore, OEM expectations of exact mine mapping at product level do not match process realities.

Instead, ITSCI says OEMs should plug into programme data on monitored mines, local context and production trends. Yet only seven downstream companies are associate members today. As a result, governance influence and feedback from the largest electronics and auto brands remains limited.

Disengagement from Great Lakes 3T supply hits conflict regions and buyers

Some OEMs, including Apple, have told suppliers to stop sourcing tantalum from DRC and Rwanda. They fear any link to non-state armed groups in contested mining areas. However, ITSCI argues that exiting these regions should be reserved for last-resort situations. Responsible sourcing from the Great Lakes Region remains possible under robust due diligence and monitoring.

The DRC is a major producer of tantalum, tungsten and tin concentrates, the so-called 3T conflict minerals. Tantalum feeds capacitor powders used in data centres, EVs, notebooks and wearables. Therefore, blanket withdrawal from the region risks shrinking legal supply just as demand for advanced electronics grows.

Meanwhile, China has consolidated its position as the largest buyer of central African tantalum and niobium concentrates. Chinese imports from Rwanda and DRC edged higher year on year in January–July. At the same time, many DRC mine sites fell under M23 control and can no longer be independently monitored. This combination of conflict, opaque trade flows and limited OEM engagement heightens systemic ESG risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

ITSCI’s message is blunt: perfect mine-level transparency is impossible, but better OEM upstream traceability in 3T supply chains is not. Brands that simply walk away from DRC and Rwanda may reduce headline risk, yet they also cede influence to buyers less concerned with ESG. The real test will be whether more OEMs join and fund upstream schemes, using their leverage to improve conditions rather than abandon challenging regions.

EQ copper premiums set to climb in 2026 as China embraces DRC supply

Copper

EQ copper premiums are poised to rise in 2026 as China deepens its adoption of equivalent-quality cathodes sourced from the DRC. Market participants expect EQ copper premiums to move sharply higher from today’s levels, reflecting tighter discounts in the DRC and shifting global trade flows. As a result, EQ copper premiums are becoming a critical signal for Chinese fabricators and global copper traders alike.

EQ copper premiums linked to DRC discounts and shifting trade flows

EQ copper premiums today sit around $30–35/t cif Shanghai, but traders already flag upside for 2026. This year’s term deals for EQ copper premiums were agreed at just $5–10/t, so a move toward $30/t would mark a structural reset. The key driver is cost escalation in the DRC, where discounts to LME prices have narrowed as local prices firm.

Meanwhile, rapid production growth in the DRC has transformed EQ copper’s role in China’s import mix. EQ copper cathode, largely DRC-origin, now accounts for more than a third of China’s cathode imports, up from about 10pc in 2020. At the same time, Chilean cathode has been diverted toward the US, amid tariff speculation, with China’s imports from Chile falling by 45pc year on year in January–August 2025. Therefore EQ copper premiums increasingly reflect both DRC mine economics and changing global copper trade patterns.

EQ copper premiums narrow the gap to exchange-listed cathode

The premium spread between exchange-registered cathodes and EQ copper premiums has narrowed to roughly $30/t this month. Previously, the spread hovered around $50/t in the second quarter, when Chinese buyers still favoured exchange-listed cathodes. However, rising flat prices and tighter LME–SHFE arbitrage have pushed many fabricators toward EQ material.

Chinese cable makers and fabricators now treat EQ cathode as a mainstream choice, thanks to reliable quality and lower all-in costs. As a result, EQ copper premiums are no longer a marginal discount indicator but a core benchmark in the Chinese physical market. At the same time, SuperMetalPrice launch of a dedicated EQ copper import premium assessment formalises this shift and gives traders a clearer pricing reference tied to the LME cash price.

EQ copper premiums sit within a wider zinc and copper premium realignment

EQ copper premiums are rising against a backdrop of broader base metal premium recalibration. Domestic Grade-A copper premiums in China, referenced to SHFE front-month, remain in a modest band from a slight discount to a small premium. Import arbitrage has improved, with the newly assessed copper cathode arbitrage at -Yn280/t, up from deeper negative levels earlier in September, which supports seaborne interest.

At the same time, zinc and other base metal premiums remain capped by weak downstream demand, even as LME stock draws offer support. This creates an unusual environment where EQ copper premiums strengthen on supply and trade-flow dynamics, while broader consumption indicators stay soft. For global traders, EQ copper premiums now sit at the intersection of DRC mine supply, Chinese import arbitrage, and evolving risk pricing around non-exchange material.

The Metalnomist Commentary

EQ copper premiums are emerging as a strategic barometer for China’s copper supply security and DRC exposure. If 2026 term negotiations lock in markedly higher EQ copper premiums, that will confirm EQ cathode’s shift from discount alternative to benchmark feedstock. Watch how Chile–US trade flows and DRC discount behaviour evolve, because both will dictate whether EQ copper premiums continue to climb beyond the $30/t threshold.

Alphamin to Restart Tin Production at DRC Mine Amid Improved Security

Alphamin Mining

Bisie Mine Operations Resume as M23 Rebels Withdraw

US-based tin producer Alphamin is restarting operations at its Bisie tin mine in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The company halted operations on March 13 due to advancing M23 rebel forces near the site.

However, the phased restart follows the withdrawal of rebel fighters toward Nyabiondo and Masisi, about 130km west of the mine. Alphamin confirmed that security remains under review as the area stabilizes.

During the shutdown, Alphamin still managed to sell and export 4,500 tonnes of tin between January 1 and April 8. An additional 280 tonnes remained in transit as of the latest update.

Tin Market Volatility Reflects Supply Concerns

The temporary closure of Bisie, combined with recent earthquakes in Myanmar, disrupted global tin supply. This led to a sharp rally in tin prices earlier this month.

On April 2, the LME three-month tin contract hit a three-year high of $38,175/t. However, news of Alphamin’s reopening, along with tariff-related uncertainty in the US, caused prices to correct. By today, tin prices settled at $31,000/t, down significantly but still elevated.

Tin production at the Bisie mine reached 4,270t in Q1, prior to the mid-March evacuation. Alphamin's ability to maintain logistical operations has helped stabilize exports despite the temporary halt in mining.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Alphamin’s return to production highlights how tin markets remain vulnerable to security risks in central Africa. With Myanmar also facing disruptions, the tin supply chain continues to face pressure. As geopolitical volatility becomes the norm, miners and manufacturers alike will need to build greater supply resilience.

DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

CMOC Copper Output Rose in 2025 on Stronger DRC Production

Copper Wire

CMOC copper output increased in 2025 as the Chinese diversified metals producer lifted production from its copper-cobalt operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The company produced 741,100t of copper during the year, up 14% from 2024.

The increase was driven by higher output from both the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine and the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine. These assets remain central to CMOC’s copper growth strategy and to China’s access to African copper cathode supply.

CMOC copper output is expected to rise again in 2026, with the company targeting production of 760,000-820,000t. CMOC also plans to expand copper production at Kisanfu by another 100,000 t/yr in 2027.

DRC Assets Strengthen CMOC’s Copper Growth Platform

CMOC’s production growth reinforces the strategic importance of the DRC in global copper supply. The country has become one of the most important sources of copper cathode for China, supported by large-scale mining, solvent extraction and electrowinning capacity.

Tenke Fungurume remains a key asset in this system. The mine has copper cathode capacity of 270,000 t/yr, and its TFM-1 copper cathode brand was approved by the London Metal Exchange for listing on 27 March.

The LME approval strengthens the marketability of CMOC’s DRC-produced copper. Exchange-listed status can improve brand recognition, liquidity and acceptance among global buyers, especially in refined copper markets where cathode quality and deliverability matter.

China’s Copper Supply Chain Leans Heavily on DRC Cathode

The DRC remained China’s largest source of copper cathode imports in 2025. China imported 1.44mn t of copper cathode from the country, accounting for 37.6% of total imports.

This trade flow highlights the depth of China’s dependence on DRC copper supply. As domestic demand from grids, manufacturing, electric vehicles and energy infrastructure continues, stable access to DRC cathode remains strategically important.

CMOC copper output growth also has wider market implications. Additional production from Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu can help offset disruptions in other copper regions, but it also increases the role of African supply in balancing global refined copper markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s 2025 copper growth shows how the DRC has become a core pillar of China’s refined copper security. The next strategic question is whether rising African cathode supply can remain reliable amid infrastructure, policy and geopolitical risks.

Chinese Firms Intensify Investments in Cu-Co Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In a strategic maneuver to secure a steady supply of crucial resources, Chinese enterprises are significantly amplifying their investments in the copper-cobalt reserves of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This initiative addresses China's limited cobalt resources and the enduringly strong copper market.

Leading the charge are prominent entities such as diversified metals producer CMOC, China Railways Resources, China Nonferrous Metal Mining, Norin Mining, Excellent Mining, and Huayou Cobalt. According to data compiled by Metalnomist, the DRC produced approximately 167,000 metric tons of cobalt feedstock in 2023, with Chinese mining companies contributing around 59% of this total output. Presently, Chinese investments account for over 62% of the DRC’s total cobalt reserves, a remarkable increase from roughly 25% in 2016. This proportion is anticipated to expand further following Norin Mining's acquisition of Dubai-based Chemaf Resources (CRL).

China’s dependency on imported cobalt, which constitutes nearly 99% of its primary feedstock, has propelled these extensive investments. The DRC remains the foremost supplier of cobalt feedstock to China, accounting for 84% of China's total imports in 2023, trailed by Indonesia (10%), Papua New Guinea (1.6%), and New Caledonia (1.5%).

This domestic resource shortfall has driven Chinese mining firms to intensify their investments in the DRC’s copper and cobalt assets over recent years. CMOC, a global titan in mining cobalt, copper, tungsten, molybdenum, and niobium with operations spanning China, the DRC, Australia, and Brazil, acquired a 56% stake in the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) from US-based Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, later increasing its stake to 80% in 2017. Additionally, CMOC finalized its acquisition of the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in December 2020.

With copper prices maintaining an upward trajectory since early this year, achieving new heights on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) and London Metals Exchange (LME) in mid-May, mining firms have been further incentivized to augment their investments in the DRC’s copper-cobalt mines.

Norin Mining's acquisition of CRL, which controls two copper-cobalt mines in the DRC, underscores this trend. Norin Mining Kingco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norin Mining, has entered into a share purchase agreement with CRL’s parent company Chemaf to acquire all of Chemaf's shares in CRL. The financial details of the transaction remain undisclosed, yet CRL anticipates completing the deal in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Nevertheless, the state mining company Gecamines has expressed opposition to the sale of Chemaf Resources, potentially delaying the acquisition process. A source familiar with the matter noted, "The acquisition is expected to be delayed for a while because of Gecamines' opposition, but it will probably be resolved later without significantly impacting the acquisition."

Chemaf SA is progressing with the expansion of the Etoile mine (Etoile phase 2) to process mixed and sulphide ore, alongside developing a new Mutoshi mine. Both projects, in advanced stages of development, have the potential to collectively produce over 75,000 metric tons of copper and 20,000 metric tons of cobalt hydroxide annually. These new ventures are expected to commence production in 2025, post-acquisition.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Could Link DRC Supply to the US Critical Minerals Reserve

Ivanhoe DRC

Kipushi zinc concentrate could become part of a new supply route into the US critical minerals reserve. Ivanhoe Mines is discussing a deal involving Mercuria and Gécamines to channel production from its Kipushi mine toward the United States. The concentrate also contains germanium and gallium, which lifts its strategic value beyond zinc alone. As a result, Kipushi zinc concentrate now sits at the intersection of mining, trading, and US supply chain policy.

This matters because the proposed arrangement is not a standard offtake deal. Mercuria’s offtake would be assigned to the trading division of Gécamines under the structure being discussed. That could give Gécamines access to up to 50pc of the mine’s concentrate production, including sales to the US. Therefore, Kipushi zinc concentrate is becoming part of a broader geopolitical conversation around critical minerals access.

The timing is also important. The discussions come just as Washington launches Project Vault, the new $12bn domestic critical minerals stockpile for US manufacturers. That means the market is no longer talking only about future mine development. It is also talking about how existing production can be redirected into strategic reserve channels.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Carries More Than Zinc Value

Kipushi zinc concentrate stands out because it carries associated critical minerals that matter to advanced industry. The article notes that the material contains quantities of germanium and gallium. Those two metals are increasingly important in electronics, semiconductors, and strategic manufacturing. Consequently, Kipushi zinc concentrate could offer more supply chain value than a typical zinc stream.

That additional value helps explain why the United States could be interested. Project Vault is expected to target critical materials needed by domestic manufacturers, and recent commentary around the reserve has already highlighted metals such as gallium. Therefore, a zinc concentrate stream with embedded strategic by-products could fit well into the reserve’s broader procurement logic.

This also strengthens the DRC’s role in the supply chain discussion. The country is already central to global critical minerals debates because of its copper and cobalt position. Now, DRC zinc concentrate with germanium and gallium content may gain more visibility as western buyers look for diversified supply routes. As a result, Kipushi may become more strategically relevant than its headline zinc volumes first suggest.

US Critical Minerals Reserve Strategy Is Moving Closer to Real Supply Flows

US critical minerals reserve policy is now moving beyond theory and closer to real transactional supply. Project Vault has created a framework for securing non-military critical minerals for domestic manufacturers. Traders such as Mercuria and Traxys are already being linked to that effort. Therefore, the Kipushi discussions show how reserve policy could quickly influence actual commodity flows.

The role of Mercuria and Gécamines is especially important in that context. This is not only about mine ownership. It is also about who controls marketing rights, trading channels, and final destination. That gives the proposed agreement more strategic significance than a conventional sales arrangement. Meanwhile, it shows that state-linked and private trading structures may increasingly work together in critical minerals procurement.

For Ivanhoe, the deal would also align its production with a bigger strategic trend. Western governments and manufacturers are looking for secure access to metals outside heavily concentrated supply chains. If Kipushi zinc concentrate becomes part of that effort, the mine could strengthen its position in both the zinc market and the wider critical minerals conversation. Consequently, this discussion may matter well beyond one offtake contract.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This story is important because it shows how quickly ordinary concentrate flows can become strategic flows. Once zinc concentrate includes metals such as germanium and gallium, the supply chain logic changes. If Project Vault starts drawing in mixed-value materials like Kipushi zinc concentrate, the next phase of critical minerals competition will be shaped as much by offtake design as by mine ownership.

Chengtun DRC Copper-Cobalt Project Stake Expands China’s Overseas Resource Push

Chengtun Mining

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project investment will give the Chinese mining company an indirect 30% interest in a designated mining asset in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The deal strengthens China’s overseas copper resource strategy as domestic smelting demand continues to rise.

Chengtun Mining’s wholly owned subsidiaries Hongsheng International Resources and Preeminence Holdings signed the agreement with Abu Dhabi-based Novel Mining and Services and its subsidiary Nkoyi Leopard Mining and Investment. Under the deal, Preeminence will acquire 50% of Nkoyi for $300mn.

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project exposure is strategically important because the DRC remains one of the world’s key copper and cobalt supply regions. The project’s technical assessment indicates an average copper grade of 1.66% and an associated cobalt grade of 0.67%.

DRC Asset Adds Copper and Cobalt Feedstock Optionality

The acquisition gives Chengtun access to a copper-cobalt asset at a time when Chinese firms are increasing control over upstream mineral resources. This reflects a wider push to secure feedstock for China’s expanding smelting, refining and battery materials sectors.

The companies plan to negotiate binding agreements covering mineral processing and product sales after the initial transaction documents are completed. These future agreements will determine how project output moves into downstream supply chains.

Chengtun expects mine and processing construction to take around 18 months, followed by a 24-month ramp-up period to full capacity. The company has not disclosed expected annual copper output, leaving the project’s full market impact unclear.

China’s Smelting Demand Drives Overseas Copper Ownership

China copper resource ownership is becoming more important as domestic refined copper output continues to grow. China’s refined copper production rose by 9% on the year in January-February, increasing pressure on companies to secure stable concentrate and mine supply.

The DRC has become a central region for Chinese copper and cobalt investment. Its high-grade copper resources and cobalt by-product value make it strategically attractive for companies exposed to both electrification and battery material demand.

The Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project deal shows that Chinese companies are still willing to deploy capital into African mining assets despite infrastructure, political and execution risks. For China, the priority remains long-term feedstock security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Chengtun’s DRC investment shows that China’s copper strategy is moving further upstream. As smelting capacity expands, control over mine supply will become just as important as processing scale.

China’s JCHX Expands Lonshi Copper Mine in DRC with $751.3M Investment

JCHX Mining

Strategic Expansion Aims to Boost Copper Concentrate Output

Chinese mining company JCHX Mining Management plans to expand copper concentrate production at its Lonshi Copper Mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This development includes the exploration of the east mining area, with a new copper ore processing capacity of 3.5 million tonnes per year (t/yr) and an estimated $751.3 million investment. The construction timeline spans 4.5 years, though the official start date remains undisclosed. Once fully operational, the east mining area is expected to reach full capacity within four years of commissioning.

Increasing Copper Production Capacity

JCHX launched the west mining area of the Lonshi mine in Q4 2023, achieving an annual copper concentrate production capacity of 40,000 t/yr. With the east mining expansion, the entire Lonshi mine is projected to produce 100,000 t/yr of copper concentrate. In the first half of 2024, JCHX reported a fourfold increase in copper concentrate production compared to the same period in 2023, reaching 13,213 tonnes.

JCHX’s Growing Presence in Africa and Beyond

In addition to Lonshi, JCHX operates the Dikulushi copper mine in the DRC and the Lubambe copper mine in Zambia. The company is also awaiting mining approval for its San Matias mine in Colombia. This expansion aligns with China’s broader strategy of securing copper supply for its growing smelting capacities.

China’s Expanding Global Copper Footprint

China produced 12.451 million tonnes of refined copper between January and November 2024, marking a 4.6% year-over-year increase, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Chinese mining firms, including Zijin Mining, have accelerated overseas copper acquisitions, with Zijin currently pursuing the La Arena copper-gold mine in Peru to bolster its global copper and gold output.

Market analysts anticipate a tight copper concentrate supply in 2025, as smelting capacity expansion is projected to outpace new mining projects. This dynamic reinforces China’s aggressive push into international copper mining investments.

Kamoa Kakula Copper Guidance Cut Highlights DRC Supply Recovery Risk

Kamoa Kakula

Kamoa Kakula copper guidance has been lowered for 2026 after seismic shocks forced Ivanhoe Mines to drain and rebuild parts of the complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Canadian miner now expects the asset to produce 290,000–330,000t of copper in 2026, down from its previous target of 380,000–420,000t.

The cut also affects the medium-term outlook. Ivanhoe’s 2027 target of 380,000–420,000t remains below the mine’s pre-shutdown guidance of 500,000–540,000t, although the company still expects output to exceed 500,000 t/yr from 2028.

Kamoa Kakula copper guidance matters because the project is one of the most important growth assets in the global copper pipeline. Any slower recovery from the complex affects expectations for DRC copper supply at a time when electrification, grid investment and industrial demand continue to support long-term copper consumption.

Seismic Damage Raises Costs and Delays Copper Recovery

Ivanhoe’s revised guidance shows how quickly geotechnical risk can affect large underground copper operations. The need to drain and rebuild the mine has delayed the return to earlier production targets and increased the cost of the recovery path.

Kamoa Kakula’s cash costs are now expected at $2.60–$3.00/lb this year and $2.10–$2.50/lb in 2027. That is higher than earlier expectations of around $2/lb, reflecting the combined impact of disruption, rebuilding work and inflation across key inputs.

The wider DRC copper belt remains one of the fastest-growing copper regions in the world. The country lifted output by 10% to 3.4mn t last year, but rapid growth still depends on reliable acid supply, power, transport and mine-site execution.

Sulphuric Acid and Lobito Rail Shape DRC Copper Economics

Sulphur and sulphuric acid costs remain a major pressure point for DRC copper producers. A squeeze in Middle East sulphur flows pushed delivered sulphur prices close to $900/t into Kolwezi, increasing acid costs for leaching operations.

Ivanhoe’s new smelter could reduce some of this exposure. The smelter began producing anodes and sulphuric acid late last year and could add up to 700,000 t/yr of acid once it reaches steady operation.

Transport capacity is another constraint. The first low-carbon anodes moved out of Kamoa Kakula through the Lobito corridor in February, but available rail freight still falls short of the complex’s full logistics needs.

These bottlenecks show that DRC copper growth depends on more than orebody quality. Acid integration, rail access and underground transport capacity will decide how quickly Kamoa Kakula can return to higher output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s guidance cut shows that the copper market cannot treat DRC growth as risk-free supply. Kamoa Kakula remains a world-class asset, but seismic recovery, acid costs and logistics will determine how fast its tonnes return to market.

Orion Glencore DRC Stake Sale Could Redraw Western Access to Copper and Cobalt

Glencore DRC

The Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could become one of the most important critical minerals deals of the year. Glencore has agreed to a possible sale of 40pc of its Kamoto and Mutanda mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The talks value the two assets at around $9bn. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could reshape western copper and cobalt access.

This matters because the buyer is not a normal financial investor. Orion Critical Mineral Consortium was set up with direct US backing and a clear supply security mission. The group wants long-life production from high-quality mines that can support western industry. Therefore, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale fits a much broader US critical minerals strategy.

The deal also has strategic structure. Orion would gain board seats and the right to route its share of metal to chosen buyers under the US-DRC partnership. Glencore would still keep day-to-day control of the mines. Consequently, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale looks designed to influence supply direction without forcing a full operating transfer.

US Critical Minerals Strategy Is Moving Closer to Producing Assets

US critical minerals strategy is no longer focused only on early-stage projects. Washington has been moving toward assets that are already close to production or already operating. Orion’s earlier Prieska term sheet showed that approach on a smaller scale. This DRC move would take that strategy much further.

Recent US actions support the same pattern. Washington has widened its reach through metal tenders, minimum price tools, and Project Vault. These measures all aim to secure real physical supply, not only future optionality. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale would fit neatly into a larger push for direct control over material flows.

That is especially important for copper and cobalt. Both metals remain essential to electrification, batteries, aerospace, and industrial technology. However, western buyers still face concentrated supply chains and strong Chinese influence. Therefore, any credible route to diversify western copper and cobalt access now carries major geopolitical value.

DRC Cobalt Export Quota and Copper Priorities Are Shaping the Deal

The DRC cobalt export quota is one reason this deal makes sense now. Glencore’s operations remain central to the global cobalt chain, but they are increasingly shaped by policy limits rather than only geology. National exports are capped across 2026 and 2027, and Glencore’s own allocation is limited. Therefore, these mines can produce more cobalt than they can freely sell.

Glencore is also leaning harder into copper. Copper prices strengthened sharply in late 2025 and early 2026, while cobalt operations faced more pressure. The company has already shown it can shift plant time and logistics toward copper when returns are more attractive. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could help Glencore share risk while keeping focus on its preferred metal.

Operational pressure adds another layer. Kamoto and Mutanda have faced lower grades, stoppages, repair work, transport bottlenecks, and policy limits. These are still major assets, but they are no longer simple growth stories. Consequently, bringing in a new partner could help stabilize capital needs while giving western buyers a stronger foothold.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This possible sale matters because it combines geopolitics, mine ownership, and offtake control in one transaction. The bigger issue is not only who owns 40pc. It is who gets to direct future copper and cobalt units from some of the world’s most important DRC assets.

CMOC Copper Output Rises as DRC Mines Strengthen China Supply

CMOC

CMOC copper output increased in the first quarter of 2026 as higher production from the company’s Democratic Republic of Congo copper-cobalt mines lifted supply. The Chinese diversified metals producer produced 187,880t of copper in January-March, up 10% from a year earlier.

CMOC copper output was supported by stronger production at the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. These assets are central to China’s copper and cobalt feedstock security because they supply large volumes of cathode and intermediate material from one of the world’s most important copper-cobalt districts.

CMOC copper output is expected to remain a major market focus this year. The company is targeting 760,000-820,000t of copper production in 2026, after producing 741,100t in 2025.

The result reinforces the DRC’s role as China’s largest imported copper cathode source. China imported 275,359t of copper cathode from the DRC in the first quarter, equal to 37.5% of total imports.

Tenke and Kisanfu Anchor CMOC’s Copper Growth

CMOC’s first-quarter copper growth reflects the scale and strategic importance of its DRC operations. Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu remain core assets for the company’s copper-cobalt portfolio.

The company plans to expand output at Kisanfu by adding 100,000 t/yr of copper cathode capacity. Completion is targeted for 2027.

The expansion could also lift cobalt capacity. CMOC has not disclosed the planned increase, but market participants expect Kisanfu’s cobalt capacity to rise by more than 30,000 t/yr.

This matters because copper and cobalt are increasingly linked in DRC project economics. Higher copper output can bring additional cobalt units into the market, depending on ore composition, processing rates and export rules.

The London Metal Exchange approval of CMOC’s TFM-1 copper cathode brand adds another layer of market significance. The brand, produced at Tenke Fungurume, was approved for listing on 27 March and has a registered production capacity of 270,000 t/yr.

Exchange approval improves brand visibility and market acceptance. It can also support trade liquidity, financing and customer confidence for DRC-origin copper cathode.
China’s copper cathode import structure shows why this is important. The DRC already supplies more than one-third of China’s imported cathode, making Congolese supply critical to Chinese refined copper availability.

The China grade-A copper cathode premium was steady at $55-70/t cif Shanghai on 23 April. The range narrowed from $55-75/t a week earlier, showing a relatively stable but cautious spot market.

Cobalt Output Stays Flat as Quotas Restrict Feedstock Flows

CMOC’s cobalt production was largely unchanged in the first quarter. The company produced 30,508t of cobalt, up only 0.3% from a year earlier.

The company set its 2026 cobalt output guidance at 100,000-120,000t. That is broadly stable against 117,549t produced in 2025.

The flat cobalt outlook reflects a more complicated market. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025 before moving to a quota-based export system for the fourth quarter of 2025 and for 2026-27.

Administrative delays have slowed the quota system. The DRC extended fourth-quarter 2025 quotas to 31 March 2026 because of slow processing.

The effect on Chinese imports has been severe. China imported only 1,278t cobalt metal equivalent of cobalt intermediate feedstock in January-February, down 96% from a year earlier.

Cobalt hydroxide prices remained stable at $25.95-26.10/lb cif China on 23 April. But the stability masks a market still shaped by restricted DRC export flows, delayed allocations and uncertainty over quota administration.

For CMOC, the copper side of the portfolio is showing clear growth. The cobalt side remains more exposed to policy risk, export controls and administrative timing in the DRC.

The Kisanfu expansion could increase future cobalt availability, but the market impact will depend on whether DRC export rules allow material to move smoothly to downstream refiners.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s first-quarter results show that DRC copper remains essential to China’s refined copper supply, while cobalt is increasingly constrained by policy rather than production alone. The strategic issue is no longer just mine output, but whether export quotas, brand approvals and logistics can keep critical metal flows moving.

Copper Supply Chain Fragility Is Underpriced Despite Price Rally

Ivanhoe

Copper supply chain risk is still being underpriced even after London Metal Exchange prices rallied above $13,000/t, according to Ivanhoe Mines chairman Robert Friedland. He warned that higher prices alone will not quickly unlock new mine investment or solve the operational bottlenecks now shaping copper supply.

The copper supply chain is facing a more complex problem than headline market balances suggest. Friedland pointed to sulphur, sulphuric acid, diesel and other critical inputs as increasingly important constraints for mining operations, especially in Africa.

The copper supply chain is particularly exposed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a large share of production depends on acid leaching. If sulphuric acid availability tightens further, Friedland said about half of the DRC’s low-grade leached copper could be at risk unless higher copper prices offset sharply higher acid costs.

This warning comes as the Middle East conflict affects copper markets indirectly. The immediate threat is not concentrate supply, but sulphur-linked cost inflation that can raise operating costs for solvent extraction and leaching operations.

Sulphuric Acid and Diesel Risks Expose Mining Cost Vulnerability

Sulphuric acid has become a central issue for copper supply because much of the DRC’s production relies on acid leaching. A prolonged disruption in sulphur flows could affect roughly 3mn t/yr of DRC copper output, making the country one of the most exposed parts of the global copper market.

The DRC’s vulnerability is different from that of traditional concentrate producers. Concentrate supply depends on mining, milling, logistics and smelter demand. Leached copper also depends on steady sulphur or sulphuric acid access, which creates another layer of supply-chain risk.

Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula complex is unusually positioned because it produces sulphuric acid as a by-product rather than relying only on external supply. The operation produced more than 100,000t of sulphuric acid in the first quarter of 2026, with annual output expected to reach 600,000-700,000 t/yr once the new smelter is fully ramped up.

That acid production gives Ivanhoe a strategic advantage. It can reduce exposure to imported acid costs while supporting copper output in a market where other DRC producers may face tighter reagent availability.

Diesel is another operational risk. Remote mines depend on diesel for haulage, power generation and logistics, especially where grid access is weak or transport routes are long.

Friedland said highly exposed mining firms should consider securing up to a year of diesel supply. He also argued that the DRC may be less vulnerable than some expect because refined products can arrive through India, Nigeria and southern Africa.

Still, the full operational impact may not yet be visible. Supply-chain shocks often appear first through higher costs, longer lead times and working-capital pressure before they become production losses.

This is why the copper market may be misreading risk. Visible inventories and annual balances can suggest moderate surplus, while the physical supply chain becomes more fragile beneath the surface.

A copper price above $13,000/t helps margins, but it does not immediately create acid, diesel, spare parts, qualified labour or new mine capacity. Mine investment still depends on permitting, capital cost, political risk and long development timelines.

AI, Data Centres and Critical Metals Raise Copper’s Strategic Value

Friedland linked copper’s long-term importance directly to electrification, cooling systems, data centres and artificial intelligence. These sectors are turning copper from a conventional industrial metal into a strategic infrastructure material.

AI data centres need large amounts of power infrastructure. That means more copper for grids, substations, transformers, cooling systems, cabling, backup power and electrical distribution.

The growth of AI also reinforces demand for metals beyond copper. Friedland highlighted gallium, scandium, dysprosium, rhenium and tantalum as thinly traded materials with low liquidity but high industrial dependence.

This is an important market signal. The next phase of industrial competition will not depend only on bulk metals. It will also depend on access to small-volume strategic materials that support semiconductors, aerospace, defence, magnets and high-performance alloys.

Copper remains the anchor metal because it connects electrification, grid expansion, industrial automation and data infrastructure. Friedland described copper as the “king of metals” because no large-scale energy transition can move without it.

However, copper’s strategic value also exposes the market to policy pressure. The US is beginning to understand mining’s national security role more clearly, especially as domestic supply concentration and import dependence become more visible.

Market participants expect moderate global copper surpluses this year, helped by last year’s supply windfall. But US physical balances are expected to remain tight, with the CME-LME arbitrage reopening to encourage flows into the country.

That regional tightness matters. Copper may look balanced globally, while specific markets face procurement pressure because of tariffs, logistics, exchange spreads, domestic manufacturing needs or strategic stockpiling.

The broader lesson is that copper pricing must account for supply-chain resilience, not only mine output. A mine that lacks acid, fuel or logistics capacity cannot deliver metal reliably, even if ore is available.

For investors, this strengthens the value of hard assets with low obsolescence. Mines, smelters, acid plants, power infrastructure and logistics corridors are becoming more valuable as supply chains become less predictable.

For manufacturers, copper procurement is becoming a strategic function. Buyers linked to grids, data centres, defence, cooling systems and energy infrastructure will need more secure supply agreements, not only exposure to exchange prices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Friedland’s warning cuts through the headline copper rally: the market is pricing metal, but not enough supply-chain fragility. Copper’s next constraint may come less from ore availability and more from acid, diesel, logistics and the minor metals needed to build the electrified economy.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

MMG copper output 2025 hits seven-year high on Las Bambas surge

MMG

MMG copper output 2025 hit a seven-year high as the Chinese miner leveraged strong performance at Las Bambas in Peru. MMG copper output 2025 reached 506,899t, with growth underpinned by record ore mined, processed and recovered across its global portfolio. As a result, MMG copper output 2025 highlights how Chinese-backed assets are reshaping global copper supply and treatment charge dynamics.

Las Bambas and Khoemacau anchor MMG’s copper growth

Las Bambas drove most of the increase in MMG copper output 2025. The Peruvian mine produced 410,834t of copper in concentrate, up 27pc year on year. Higher ore mining rates, improved plant throughput and stronger recovery combined to lift site performance.

MMG set a 400,000t production target for Las Bambas in 2026, signalling confidence in the mine’s stability. However, community risks and logistics in Peru will remain key watchpoints for traders and smelters. Higher sustained output from Las Bambas will reinforce Peru’s position as a core supplier to Asian and Atlantic copper markets.

Khoemacau in Botswana added new growth momentum to MMG’s profile. The mine delivered 42,120t of copper concentrate in 2025, up 36pc from 2024. MMG plans to expand Khoemacau’s capacity to 130,000 t/yr by 2028, with longer-term potential to reach 200,000 t/yr after further studies.

DRC expansion and tightening treatment charges

MMG’s Kinsevere operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo contributed to the stronger MMG copper output 2025. Copper cathode production at Kinsevere rose 18pc to 52,791t. An expansion project, which delivered its first cathode in late 2024, should push annual output to 65,000–75,000t in 2026. This reinforces the DRC’s role as a key growth hub for refined copper supply.

Meanwhile, MMG reported a mixed picture in other base metals. Zinc output increased by 6pc to 232,060t, while lead production slipped 5pc to 39,608t. However, the broader copper concentrate market remained the tightest stress point for smelters. Concentrate supply lagged new smelting capacity, pushing treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs) deep into negative territory.

Smelter TC/RC benchmarks turned sharply lower through 2025, reflecting a continued shortage of clean copper concentrate. The Metalnomist smelter purchase index fell from slightly positive levels in early 2025 to significantly negative by year-end. Trader purchase indices weakened even further as competition intensified for spot tonnes. This environment favours well-positioned miners like MMG with scalable, low-cost concentrate streams.

Strategic implications for global copper supply

The step-up in MMG copper output 2025 underscores the influence of Chinese state-linked capital in strategic copper regions. Las Bambas, Khoemacau and Kinsevere together form a diversified platform across Peru, Botswana and the DRC. This geographic spread reduces single-asset risk while deepening China’s indirect exposure to offshore copper units.

For smelters, MMG’s growth slightly eases concentrate tightness but does not fully resolve structural deficit. New Asian and European smelting projects continue to outpace mine supply growth, keeping downward pressure on TC/RCs. As a result, smelters face margin squeeze unless by-product credits or premiums can offset weaker treatment terms.

Downstream, strong MMG copper output 2025 supports long-term energy transition demand. Additional tonnes from Las Bambas and future Khoemacau expansions will feed wiring, renewables, EVs and grid investments. However, the aggressive project pipeline also depends on stable permitting, local community relations and predictable fiscal regimes in host countries.

Focus keyphrases: MMG copper output 2025, Las Bambas copper, Khoemacau Botswana copper, Kinsevere DRC copper, copper concentrate TC/RCs, global copper supply growth

The Metalnomist Commentary

MMG copper output 2025 reinforces the miner’s position as a pivotal supplier into a structurally tight copper concentrate market. While rising volumes from Las Bambas, Khoemacau and Kinsevere are welcome news for smelters and traders, they arrive in a world where new refining capacity still outstrips mine growth. Expect continued pressure on TC/RCs and a premium for diversified, scalable copper producers like MMG as the energy transition accelerates.

Global Refined Copper Market Records Surplus in January-August

Copper

The global refined copper market saw a surplus of 535,000 tons (t) in the first eight months of 2024, up sharply from a surplus of 75,000t during the same period last year, according to preliminary data from the International Copper Study Group (ICSG). This increase in surplus reflects a rise in production, particularly in China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Refined Copper Supply Outpaces Demand

From January to August, refined copper production increased by 5.1% year-on-year to 18.3 million tons (mn t). Primary refined copper output, which includes electrolytic and electrowinning processes, rose by 5.2%, while secondary refined production from scrap increased by 4.6%.

The expansion of refining capacity played a critical role, with China and the DRC leading the charge. China expanded its capacity by 6.5%, while the DRC achieved a significant 16% increase. Together, these two regions accounted for 54% of global refined copper production. Other notable contributors were Japan (+3.8%) and the US (+8%). Conversely, production in the EU declined by 2%, driven by the shutdown of Boliden's Ronnskar refinery in Sweden in June 2023.

Mine Production Recovers

Global copper mine output rose by 2% year-on-year to 14.9mn t, driven by recovery from production constraints in 2023 and new mining projects. Key highlights include:

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Mine output grew by 11%, largely due to expansions at the Kamoa-Kakula mine, operated by Canadian firm Ivanhoe Mines.

Indonesia: Production surged by 22%, recovering from operational disruptions in 2023.

Chile: Mine output increased by 3% with improved operations.

However, production fell in Peru (-0.7%) and the US (-5%) due to local challenges.

Copper Demand Grows Moderately

Global refined copper consumption rose by 2.5% to 17.8mn t during January-August. China's apparent demand led the growth with a 2.7% increase, while demand in the EU, Japan, and the US remained weak. Other Asian countries and regions like the Middle East and North Africa helped offset this decline, contributing to a 2% rise in consumption outside of China.

August Performance: A Month in Surplus

In August alone, the global refined copper market produced 2.32mn t and consumed 2.27mn t, resulting in a monthly surplus of 54,000t.

Outlook

With production outpacing demand, the refined copper market may continue to face surplus conditions in the near term. The global shift toward increased production capacity and moderate demand growth, led by China and the DRC, will shape the market dynamics going forward.