DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

Electra tests North American cobalt feedstock to advance regional refining

Electra Battery Materials

Pilot work begins on domestic supply

Electra tests North American cobalt feedstock to strengthen a regional battery supply chain. The company evaluates concentrates at its Ontario laboratory. Preliminary results for the hydrometallurgical route are expected by year end. Electra tests North American cobalt feedstock while validating domestic ores alongside existing import contracts.

Electra tests North American cobalt feedstock from Ontario and Idaho

Electra sourced material from Ontario’s historic Cobalt Camp and Idaho’s Iron Creek. The team studies impurity profiles and leach kinetics. As a result, process adjustments can optimize cobalt sulfate quality for cathode makers. The company secured a decade-long exploration permit covering Iron Creek and nearby ground.

Electra continues to progress its cobalt sulfate refinery financing. The firm received $20mn from the US Department of Defense. An additional $20mn from a private partner complements the package. In March, Electra raised $3.1mn in equity to support the buildout. These funds back engineering, commissioning, and feedstock testing.

The program aims to reduce reliance on overseas intermediates. Domestic feedstock improves traceability and ESG credentials. Meanwhile, hydrometallurgy can lower carbon intensity versus pyrometallurgy. Successful trials could anchor long-term offtake for North American gigafactories. The project targets scalable cobalt sulfate for high-nickel and LFP blends.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Electra’s lab program matters because conversion capacity, not ore, often bottlenecks cobalt supply. If the tests confirm consistent sulfate quality, North American cell makers gain a shorter, de-risked route. Watch impurity management, reagent costs, and by-product credits, which will shape refinery margins.

Global Cobalt Supply Expected to Rise in 2025, Driven by Increased Production in Indonesia and China

Global cobalt supply is poised for significant growth in 2025, according to Fan Ruize, senior analyst at Antaike, a leading Chinese state-owned information provider. The expansion in production, fueled by rising output in Indonesia and China, is set to meet the increasing demand for cobalt in various high-tech industries, including electric vehicles (EVs), power batteries, and robotics.

Increased Global Cobalt Feedstock and Refined Production

At the 2024 Nickel and Cobalt Industry Annual Conference in Nanchang, China, Fan Ruize projected that global cobalt feedstock production would reach 290,000 tons of metal equivalent in 2025, up from 272,000 tons in 2024. A significant portion of this increase is expected to come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which will continue to be the world's largest producer, contributing 203,000 tons. Indonesia will also play a crucial role, contributing an additional 32,000 tons of cobalt feedstock.

Refined cobalt production is projected to rise to 240,000 tons of metal equivalent in 2025, marking a 4.8% increase from the previous year. This rise in refined cobalt production is primarily driven by increases in output from China and Indonesia, with China's contribution set to reach 195,000 tons in 2025, up from 179,000 tons in 2024. China's rapid expansion in refined cobalt capacity—anticipated to hit 75,000 tons by 2025—indicates the country's growing role as a key player in the global cobalt market.

Surplus Supply and Price Outlook

With refined cobalt consumption expected to reach 215,000 tons in 2025, up 3.4% from 2024, the cobalt market is likely to experience a continued supply surplus. Fan Ruize forecast that this oversupply will put downward pressure on cobalt metal prices in the near future. While China's refined cobalt consumption will continue to rise—projected to reach 130,000 tons in 2025—the increase in supply from Indonesia and China is expected to result in price fluctuations at lower levels.

Fan also noted that the increasing output of cobalt metal would diminish the price premium for cobalt over cobalt sulfate, further contributing to the price decline. Despite this, the continued demand for cobalt in sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and electric vehicles (EVs) is expected to drive long-term consumption.

Market Drivers: Cobalt in High-Tech Industries

The growing demand for cobalt in the power battery, alloy, and electric vehicle industries is a key driver behind the rise in cobalt consumption. Additionally, the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, robotics, and unmanned aerial vehicles will further contribute to the demand for this essential metal. As the global economy transitions to more sustainable technologies, cobalt’s role in powering innovation will continue to expand, supporting the metal's long-term market growth.

Conclusion

The cobalt market is set to see substantial changes in the coming years, with a sharp increase in supply expected in 2025, particularly from Indonesia and China. Despite potential price fluctuations caused by oversupply, the long-term demand for cobalt in high-tech applications, including EVs, AI, and power batteries, will ensure that cobalt remains a critical resource for the global economy.

CMOC Copper Output Rises as DRC Mines Strengthen China Supply

CMOC

CMOC copper output increased in the first quarter of 2026 as higher production from the company’s Democratic Republic of Congo copper-cobalt mines lifted supply. The Chinese diversified metals producer produced 187,880t of copper in January-March, up 10% from a year earlier.

CMOC copper output was supported by stronger production at the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. These assets are central to China’s copper and cobalt feedstock security because they supply large volumes of cathode and intermediate material from one of the world’s most important copper-cobalt districts.

CMOC copper output is expected to remain a major market focus this year. The company is targeting 760,000-820,000t of copper production in 2026, after producing 741,100t in 2025.

The result reinforces the DRC’s role as China’s largest imported copper cathode source. China imported 275,359t of copper cathode from the DRC in the first quarter, equal to 37.5% of total imports.

Tenke and Kisanfu Anchor CMOC’s Copper Growth

CMOC’s first-quarter copper growth reflects the scale and strategic importance of its DRC operations. Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu remain core assets for the company’s copper-cobalt portfolio.

The company plans to expand output at Kisanfu by adding 100,000 t/yr of copper cathode capacity. Completion is targeted for 2027.

The expansion could also lift cobalt capacity. CMOC has not disclosed the planned increase, but market participants expect Kisanfu’s cobalt capacity to rise by more than 30,000 t/yr.

This matters because copper and cobalt are increasingly linked in DRC project economics. Higher copper output can bring additional cobalt units into the market, depending on ore composition, processing rates and export rules.

The London Metal Exchange approval of CMOC’s TFM-1 copper cathode brand adds another layer of market significance. The brand, produced at Tenke Fungurume, was approved for listing on 27 March and has a registered production capacity of 270,000 t/yr.

Exchange approval improves brand visibility and market acceptance. It can also support trade liquidity, financing and customer confidence for DRC-origin copper cathode.
China’s copper cathode import structure shows why this is important. The DRC already supplies more than one-third of China’s imported cathode, making Congolese supply critical to Chinese refined copper availability.

The China grade-A copper cathode premium was steady at $55-70/t cif Shanghai on 23 April. The range narrowed from $55-75/t a week earlier, showing a relatively stable but cautious spot market.

Cobalt Output Stays Flat as Quotas Restrict Feedstock Flows

CMOC’s cobalt production was largely unchanged in the first quarter. The company produced 30,508t of cobalt, up only 0.3% from a year earlier.

The company set its 2026 cobalt output guidance at 100,000-120,000t. That is broadly stable against 117,549t produced in 2025.

The flat cobalt outlook reflects a more complicated market. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025 before moving to a quota-based export system for the fourth quarter of 2025 and for 2026-27.

Administrative delays have slowed the quota system. The DRC extended fourth-quarter 2025 quotas to 31 March 2026 because of slow processing.

The effect on Chinese imports has been severe. China imported only 1,278t cobalt metal equivalent of cobalt intermediate feedstock in January-February, down 96% from a year earlier.

Cobalt hydroxide prices remained stable at $25.95-26.10/lb cif China on 23 April. But the stability masks a market still shaped by restricted DRC export flows, delayed allocations and uncertainty over quota administration.

For CMOC, the copper side of the portfolio is showing clear growth. The cobalt side remains more exposed to policy risk, export controls and administrative timing in the DRC.

The Kisanfu expansion could increase future cobalt availability, but the market impact will depend on whether DRC export rules allow material to move smoothly to downstream refiners.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s first-quarter results show that DRC copper remains essential to China’s refined copper supply, while cobalt is increasingly constrained by policy rather than production alone. The strategic issue is no longer just mine output, but whether export quotas, brand approvals and logistics can keep critical metal flows moving.

China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance as DRC export curbs reshape supply

CMOC

China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance for 2025 after steady performance at its DRC assets. China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance with 117,549 tonnes of cobalt from Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu. China’s CMOC meets cobalt output guidance despite DRC export restrictions that disrupted feedstock flows.

CMOC’s 2025 output rose slightly from 114,165 tonnes in 2024. The company kept its 2026 cobalt guidance at 100,000–120,000 tonnes, matching its 2025 range. Meanwhile, higher copper prices supported earnings because copper remains the main by-product.

Copper strength funds CMOC’s Kisanfu expansion

Copper prices stayed strong through 2025 and hit a new record in early January 2026. The rally reflected tight concentrate supply, rate cuts, and tariff risk expectations. Therefore, CMOC can finance growth while defending margins in a volatile cobalt market.

CMOC is investing $1.08bn in the Kisanfu Phase II project. The project targets an extra 100,000 tonnes per year of copper cathode output, with start-up expected in 2027. However, the company has not disclosed the cobalt capacity uplift, although the market expects a meaningful increase.

DRC export restrictions tighten the feedstock pipeline

DRC policy changes remain the core swing factor for cobalt availability. The government halted cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025, then shifted to a quota system for late 2025 and 2026–27. Meanwhile, procedural delays prevented any feedstock exports in the fourth quarter of 2025.

The government has now approved a limited number of hydroxide truck shipments. Those shipments have reached Lubumbashi, a key logistics hub. As a result, market participants expect the first new feedstock to reach China in April, after royalties are paid and cargoes clear onward transport.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s results show how copper economics can cushion cobalt volatility inside integrated Cu-Co systems. However, DRC export controls introduce timing risk that can ripple into battery chemical supply chains. Producers that diversify refining routes and secure compliant logistics will gain resilience.

CMOC meets 2025 cobalt guidance as copper strength offsets DRC export curbs and quota delays.

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Electra cobalt sulfate refinery restart boosts North American battery supply

Electra Battery Materials

Electra cobalt sulfate refinery restart marks a critical step in building a localized EV battery supply chain in North America. The Electra cobalt sulfate refinery restart in Ontario aims to deliver 6,500 t/yr of battery-grade cobalt from 2027. As a result, the Electra cobalt sulfate refinery restart strengthens regional security of supply and reduces reliance on imported cobalt chemicals.

Government-backed financing underpins refinery construction

Electra secured $82mn in project financing to restart construction after 2023 financial and supply chain setbacks. The funding includes $48mn from the US Department of Defense and the Canadian federal government, highlighting cobalt’s strategic importance. Meanwhile, Invest Ontario added C$17.5mn, reinforcing Ontario’s ambition to become a battery materials hub.

The refinery will produce battery-grade cobalt sulfate, a key precursor for high-nickel and cobalt-bearing cathode chemistries. This production will support EV and energy storage manufacturers seeking IRA-compliant and geopolitically secure feedstock. The project also fits broader efforts to onshore critical minerals refining in North America.

Integrated cobalt feedstock strategy across Canada and the US

Electra is already testing feedstock for the refinery at its Ontario laboratory. The company uses material sourced from historic Cobalt Camp and the Iron Creek copper-cobalt project in Idaho. This integrated approach links upstream mining projects directly with midstream refining capacity.

The firm plans a rapid scale-up in staffing as construction resumes. Headcount will rise from 30 to 150 early next year, supporting engineering, operations and ESG compliance. If execution stays on track, the refinery could become a cornerstone asset in the regional cobalt chemicals ecosystem.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Electra’s move shows how policy support and blended public-private capital can unlock stalled midstream projects in critical minerals. For cathode producers and automakers, an additional Western cobalt sulfate source offers both supply diversification and regulatory advantages. The key watchpoint now is execution risk on capex, commissioning, and reliable feedstock flows from Canada and the US.

XTC GEM CAM feedstock deal tightens China’s battery materials supply chain

XTC

XTC GEM CAM feedstock deal marks a major step in securing China’s high-end battery materials supply. Under the XTC GEM CAM feedstock deal, XTC New Energy will lock in large volumes of cobalt, nickel and lithium inputs. This XTC GEM CAM feedstock deal supports long-term cathode active material output for NCM, LCO and LFP product lines. As a result, Chinese battery makers gain greater visibility on costs and availability during a volatile raw material cycle.

Long-term CAM feedstock deal anchors XTC’s growth strategy

XTC New Energy agreed to purchase 150,000 t/yr of CAM feedstock from GEM between 2026 and 2028. The package covers cobalt chloride, nickel sulfate, cobalt tetroxide, NCM precursor and lithium salts for large-scale cathode production. This diversified basket reduces single-material risk and helps XTC balance different chemistries across consumer and power batteries. The deal also deepens an existing partnership, signalling confidence in GEM’s ability to deliver consistent quality volumes. Consequently, both companies move closer to a vertically aligned, closed-loop battery materials ecosystem.

XTC has rapidly grown sales of lithium cobalt oxide on the back of device replacement cycles and AI-enabled electronics. Government subsidies that push consumers to upgrade phones and tablets are boosting high-end cobalt-rich cathode demand. Meanwhile, combined sales of NCM and LFP cathodes also rose, reflecting broader growth across energy storage and EV platforms. By locking in feedstock now, XTC can support more aggressive volume and product planning with key OEMs.

China CAM feedstock integration deepens links with global battery OEMs

The agreement reinforces China’s position at the centre of the global CAM and precursor value chain. GEM will channel critical precursors to XTC, which already supplies ATL, Samsung SDI, Murata, LG Chem and BYD. These relationships span mid to high-end consumer devices and extend into power lithium battery producers like CALB and CATL. Therefore, the enhanced feedstock pipeline will indirectly underpin cell production for phones, tablets, EVs and stationary storage worldwide.

Tighter integration between feedstock suppliers and cathode producers can also stabilise pricing and contract structures. Long-term supply deals encourage joint planning on capacity, quality and sustainability metrics, important for global OEM qualification. At the same time, dependence on Chinese CAM feedstock raises questions for western policymakers about diversification and supply security. However, until alternative precursor hubs reach scale, China’s integrated CAM ecosystem will remain a critical anchor for lithium-ion supply chains.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This agreement shows how Chinese CAM producers and recyclers are quietly locking in the next wave of battery growth. As XTC and GEM align on volumes and chemistries, their joint leverage over cobalt, nickel and lithium flows will rise. For non-Chinese OEMs, the deal underscores the urgency of building competitive precursor and CAM capacity outside China.

Chinese Firms Intensify Investments in Cu-Co Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In a strategic maneuver to secure a steady supply of crucial resources, Chinese enterprises are significantly amplifying their investments in the copper-cobalt reserves of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This initiative addresses China's limited cobalt resources and the enduringly strong copper market.

Leading the charge are prominent entities such as diversified metals producer CMOC, China Railways Resources, China Nonferrous Metal Mining, Norin Mining, Excellent Mining, and Huayou Cobalt. According to data compiled by Metalnomist, the DRC produced approximately 167,000 metric tons of cobalt feedstock in 2023, with Chinese mining companies contributing around 59% of this total output. Presently, Chinese investments account for over 62% of the DRC’s total cobalt reserves, a remarkable increase from roughly 25% in 2016. This proportion is anticipated to expand further following Norin Mining's acquisition of Dubai-based Chemaf Resources (CRL).

China’s dependency on imported cobalt, which constitutes nearly 99% of its primary feedstock, has propelled these extensive investments. The DRC remains the foremost supplier of cobalt feedstock to China, accounting for 84% of China's total imports in 2023, trailed by Indonesia (10%), Papua New Guinea (1.6%), and New Caledonia (1.5%).

This domestic resource shortfall has driven Chinese mining firms to intensify their investments in the DRC’s copper and cobalt assets over recent years. CMOC, a global titan in mining cobalt, copper, tungsten, molybdenum, and niobium with operations spanning China, the DRC, Australia, and Brazil, acquired a 56% stake in the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) from US-based Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, later increasing its stake to 80% in 2017. Additionally, CMOC finalized its acquisition of the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in December 2020.

With copper prices maintaining an upward trajectory since early this year, achieving new heights on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) and London Metals Exchange (LME) in mid-May, mining firms have been further incentivized to augment their investments in the DRC’s copper-cobalt mines.

Norin Mining's acquisition of CRL, which controls two copper-cobalt mines in the DRC, underscores this trend. Norin Mining Kingco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norin Mining, has entered into a share purchase agreement with CRL’s parent company Chemaf to acquire all of Chemaf's shares in CRL. The financial details of the transaction remain undisclosed, yet CRL anticipates completing the deal in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Nevertheless, the state mining company Gecamines has expressed opposition to the sale of Chemaf Resources, potentially delaying the acquisition process. A source familiar with the matter noted, "The acquisition is expected to be delayed for a while because of Gecamines' opposition, but it will probably be resolved later without significantly impacting the acquisition."

Chemaf SA is progressing with the expansion of the Etoile mine (Etoile phase 2) to process mixed and sulphide ore, alongside developing a new Mutoshi mine. Both projects, in advanced stages of development, have the potential to collectively produce over 75,000 metric tons of copper and 20,000 metric tons of cobalt hydroxide annually. These new ventures are expected to commence production in 2025, post-acquisition.

Sherritt Stake Sale Plan Follows Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Exit

Sherritt

Sherritt stake sale plans have emerged as the Canadian metals firm faces a major strategic reset after moving to dissolve its Moa nickel-cobalt joint venture in Cuba. The company has entered into a non-binding agreement that could allow US investment firm Gillon Capital to acquire 55% of its shares.

Sherritt stake sale terms have not yet been finalised. The company expects the purchase price to be set at a discount to the current share price, with Gillon able to complete the acquisition no later than nine months from closing.

Sherritt stake sale discussions come directly after the company chose to dissolve the Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. That decision followed new US sanctions authority targeting Cuban entities and sectors, including metals and mining.

The transaction would mark a major ownership shift for Sherritt at a time when its core nickel and cobalt supply chain is under sanctions, fuel and feedstock pressure.

Cuba Sanctions Push Sherritt Toward Strategic Restructuring

Sherritt’s Moa joint venture has been central to its nickel and cobalt business. Ore is mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa in Cuba, then shipped to Canada for refining at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta.

That cross-border structure has become increasingly difficult. The Moa operation was already affected by fuel supply problems in Cuba, forcing a temporary mining suspension in February.

The situation worsened after the US issued an executive order on 1 May expanding sanctions powers against Cuban entities. Although Sherritt was not directly named, the order allows sanctions on companies operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt suspended direct participation in Moa joint venture activities on 7 May. It then announced plans to send a dissolution notice to its Cuban partner on 15 May.

The decision shows how sanctions risk can disrupt critical minerals supply chains even without a direct designation. Shipping, banking, insurance, financing and counterparty confidence can all be affected when operating exposure becomes politically sensitive.

Fort Saskatchewan Refinery Faces Feedstock Uncertainty

Sherritt’s Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it can produce finished nickel and cobalt in Canada. However, its feedstock link to Cuba is now the central weakness.

The Moa joint venture supplied mixed sulfide precipitate to the Alberta refinery. If that feedstock route remains disrupted or is dissolved permanently, Sherritt will need alternative material sources to keep refining operations stable.

This matters for North American supply chains. Nickel and cobalt are important for batteries, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-linked manufacturing.

The possible Gillon Capital transaction could give Sherritt a new ownership and financing path, but it will still require regulatory approval. The US Departments of State and Treasury do not oppose Gillon’s participation in negotiations, but any later transaction would need their approval.

That condition underlines the political sensitivity of Sherritt’s restructuring. The company’s future will depend not only on investor appetite, but also on sanctions compliance, government approval and feedstock strategy.

For the wider nickel and cobalt market, Sherritt’s situation is a warning. Refining capacity in a secure jurisdiction is not enough if upstream feedstock remains tied to a politically exposed source.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt is becoming a case study in how sanctions can force a critical minerals company into ownership and supply-chain restructuring. The key issue is whether a new investor can help rebuild the business around secure feedstock for Fort Saskatchewan.

GEM raises CAM and cobalt tetroxide sales amid shifting battery supply chains

GEM

GEM raises CAM and cobalt tetroxide sales in the first half of 2025. GEM raises CAM and cobalt tetroxide sales on stronger consumer electronics demand and Indonesian feedstock growth. As a result, GEM raises CAM and cobalt tetroxide sales while ternary precursor shipments decline.

Product mix shifts and headline numbers

GEM’s cobalt tetroxide shipments reached 14,590t, up 39% year on year. CAM sales rose 74% to 12,399t. However, ternary precursor shipments fell about 14% to 86,000t. The mix reflects electronics-led cobalt oxide demand and slower NCM and NCA precursor offtake.

Securing feedstock with Indonesian MHP capacity

GEM secures cobalt feedstock via Glencore contracts and its Indonesian MHP projects. Total smelting capacity reached 150,000 t/yr nickel metal equivalent in 2024. In January–June, Indonesia produced 43,977t nickel metal equivalent and 3,667t cobalt metal equivalent. Therefore, MHP output mitigated DRC export risks since the 22 February cobalt ban.

Downstream positioning and long-term contracts

GEM signed a supply deal with EcoPro for 265,000t of ternary precursors in 2025–28. The firm also supplies CATL, BYD, LGES affiliates, and Kennametal. Meanwhile, its closed-loop footprint spans battery recycling, cobalt salts, CAM, cobalt metal and powders, and nickel metal.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GEM’s strategy balances near-term cobalt oxide strength with longer-dated ternary commitments. Indonesian MHP integration meaningfully hedges geopolitical risk and price volatility. Watch precursor recovery timing versus EV demand, and CAM margin discipline.

Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Suspension Deepens Cuba Supply Chain Risk

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension has moved from sanctions review to direct operational action after the Canadian miner and refiner halted its participation in activities tied to the Moa joint venture in Cuba. The decision follows new US sanctions authority that could target entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension is significant because the Moa joint venture links Cuban mine and intermediate processing operations with Sherritt’s refining capacity in Alberta. Ore is mined and processed in Cuba into mixed sulfide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt, then shipped to Canada for refining.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension adds another layer of disruption to an already fragile supply route. The company had temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

Although Sherritt was not directly named in the new US sanctions, the company said the executive order is expected to create conditions that make operating in Cuba more difficult. That risk was enough for Sherritt to suspend direct participation in Moa-related activities.

Sanctions Risk Hits a Cross-Border Nickel and Cobalt Chain

The new US executive order expands sanctions authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It allows Washington to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, along with several other industries.

That broad language creates uncertainty for companies with Cuban exposure. Even without direct designation, counterparties may become more cautious around shipping, banking, insurance, payments, logistics and commercial contracts.

For Sherritt, the issue is not only legal exposure. It is the practical ability to keep a cross-border supply chain functioning when sanctions risk rises around the Cuban mining sector.

The Moa joint venture is co-owned by Sherritt and the General Nickel Company of Cuba. Its structure depends on Cuban ore mining, local MSP production and shipment to Canada for refining.

Mixed sulfide precipitate is a critical intermediate product because it carries both nickel and cobalt units into downstream refining. Any interruption in MSP flows can affect feed availability at the refinery level.

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing. That makes Moa strategically relevant despite its political and logistical complexity.

Alberta Refinery Continues but Feedstock Window Narrows

Sherritt said its Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta has not been affected by the suspension and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed at the site is expected to last until mid-June.

That timeline is now critical. If Cuban MSP flows do not resume or alternative feedstock is not secured, refinery operations could face greater pressure once inventories are depleted.

The situation shows how refining capacity can still be vulnerable when upstream feedstock depends on a politically exposed jurisdiction. A refinery may remain operational, but its production outlook depends on the continuity of intermediate material supply.

The February fuel-related suspension at Moa already showed that physical operating conditions in Cuba were difficult. The latest sanctions-driven action compounds that problem by adding policy risk to fuel and logistics constraints.

For customers, the key question is whether Sherritt can maintain finished nickel and cobalt output after mid-June. Buyers will also watch for any change in shipment schedules, inventory levels and alternative feed strategies.

For the wider market, Sherritt’s case highlights a broader critical minerals reality. Western supply security cannot be measured only by refining location. It must include mine jurisdiction, intermediate processing, sanctions exposure, energy availability and shipping routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s Moa suspension shows that critical minerals supply chains can be disrupted by policy risk even before a company is directly sanctioned. The lesson for nickel and cobalt buyers is clear: feedstock origin and political exposure now matter as much as refining capacity.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

Chengtun DRC Copper-Cobalt Project Stake Expands China’s Overseas Resource Push

Chengtun Mining

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project investment will give the Chinese mining company an indirect 30% interest in a designated mining asset in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The deal strengthens China’s overseas copper resource strategy as domestic smelting demand continues to rise.

Chengtun Mining’s wholly owned subsidiaries Hongsheng International Resources and Preeminence Holdings signed the agreement with Abu Dhabi-based Novel Mining and Services and its subsidiary Nkoyi Leopard Mining and Investment. Under the deal, Preeminence will acquire 50% of Nkoyi for $300mn.

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project exposure is strategically important because the DRC remains one of the world’s key copper and cobalt supply regions. The project’s technical assessment indicates an average copper grade of 1.66% and an associated cobalt grade of 0.67%.

DRC Asset Adds Copper and Cobalt Feedstock Optionality

The acquisition gives Chengtun access to a copper-cobalt asset at a time when Chinese firms are increasing control over upstream mineral resources. This reflects a wider push to secure feedstock for China’s expanding smelting, refining and battery materials sectors.

The companies plan to negotiate binding agreements covering mineral processing and product sales after the initial transaction documents are completed. These future agreements will determine how project output moves into downstream supply chains.

Chengtun expects mine and processing construction to take around 18 months, followed by a 24-month ramp-up period to full capacity. The company has not disclosed expected annual copper output, leaving the project’s full market impact unclear.

China’s Smelting Demand Drives Overseas Copper Ownership

China copper resource ownership is becoming more important as domestic refined copper output continues to grow. China’s refined copper production rose by 9% on the year in January-February, increasing pressure on companies to secure stable concentrate and mine supply.

The DRC has become a central region for Chinese copper and cobalt investment. Its high-grade copper resources and cobalt by-product value make it strategically attractive for companies exposed to both electrification and battery material demand.

The Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project deal shows that Chinese companies are still willing to deploy capital into African mining assets despite infrastructure, political and execution risks. For China, the priority remains long-term feedstock security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Chengtun’s DRC investment shows that China’s copper strategy is moving further upstream. As smelting capacity expands, control over mine supply will become just as important as processing scale.

China’s Cobalt Prices Surge Amid DRC Feedstock Supply Suspension

DRC Cobalt

Extended Supply Halt from DRC Fuels Price Rally in Chinese Cobalt Market

Cobalt prices in China are set to continue their upward trend as supply disruptions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) persist. Market participants anticipate that the rally will hold until the DRC government lifts its suspension on cobalt feedstock exports.

DRC Suspension Puts Pressure on Global Supply

Most traders expect Chinese cobalt metal prices to climb toward ¥300/kg under current supply conditions. “We may hit the ¥300/kg level soon,” said a Chinese trader. “But whether prices move beyond that will depend entirely on how long the DRC suspension continues.”

Despite stable production at DRC mines, the export restriction has reduced global feedstock availability. “If the suspension continues for four months, inventories outside the DRC could be exhausted,” warned a second source. Companies with lower inventory buffers may face serious operational risks.

China Relies Heavily on DRC for Cobalt Imports

China imported approximately 188,560 tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent in intermediate forms in 2024 — a 65% increase from 2023. Notably, 99% of these imports originated from the DRC. Key suppliers include CMOC and Glencore, which operate major copper-cobalt mines in the African nation.

As China remains the world’s largest cobalt refining hub, any prolonged supply disruption from the DRC could have far-reaching effects on the battery and electronics industries.

CMOC's Cobalt and Copper Output Soars in 2024, Boosting China's Supply

CMOC's

Chinese mining giant CMOC has reported a significant surge in its copper and cobalt production for 2024, primarily fueled by increased output from its operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  This production boost has subsequently impacted China's imports of these critical metals.

DRC Operations Drive Record Production

CMOC's cobalt production more than doubled in 2024, reaching 114,165 tonnes (metal equivalent), compared to 55,526 tonnes in 2023. This dramatic increase is attributed to higher output from the company's Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) and the newly developed Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in the DRC. KFM commenced production in the first half of 2023.  CMOC acquired a 56% stake in TFM from Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, increasing its ownership to 80% in 2017. The acquisition of KFM was completed in December 2020.  KFM is jointly owned by CMOC (71.25%), Brunp, a subsidiary of Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL), (23.75%), and DRC's state-owned Gecamines.

The company also saw a substantial rise in copper production, reaching 650,161 tonnes in 2024, a 55% increase year-on-year and 14% above its annual production guidance. This growth is partly due to the three new production lines at its mixed ore project at TFM reaching full capacity in the first half of 2024.  TFM now boasts five production lines with a combined capacity of 450,000 tonnes per year.  The KFM mine has achieved a copper capacity of 150,000 tonnes per year.

Impact on China's Metal Imports

The increased cobalt output from CMOC's DRC operations has significantly impacted China's feedstock imports.  Customs data reveals that China imported 172,580 tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent of intermediate products between January and November, a 74% surge compared to the same period the previous year.  Notably, approximately 98.7% of these imports originated from the DRC, a region where the world's two largest cobalt feedstock producers, CMOC and Glencore, operate copper and cobalt mines.  CMOC also holds a 30% stake in Huayue Nickel Cobalt, a joint venture with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan in Indonesia.

Looking ahead, CMOC is pursuing further production expansions as part of its five-year plan starting in 2025. These plans include the West Area project at TFM and the second phase of KFM, both of which are currently in the preliminary exploration stage.

Indonesia HPAL Nickel Ore Costs Rise as New HPM Formula Hits Limonite Feedstock

Nickel ore

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are set to rise sharply after the government’s revised mineral benchmark price lifted the mandated price floor for limonite ore. The new HPM formula is expected to increase limonite ore costs by at least 50%, adding immediate margin pressure to mixed hydroxide precipitate producers.

The revised HPM for limonite ore containing 1.2% nickel, 0.1% cobalt and 2% chromium is calculated at $45.24/wmt under the updated Harga Mineral Acuan. That is around 50% higher than early April transacted prices of about $30/wmt for 1.2% limonite ore.

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are also far above the previous benchmark level. Under the old formula, the HPM for similar ore was only $17.17/wmt, meaning the new benchmark is nearly three times higher.

The change matters because HPAL operations rely on limonite ore as feedstock to produce MHP, which is used in battery-grade nickel and cobalt supply chains. A higher government-mandated ore floor will raise raw material costs, increase royalty payments and pressure margins across Indonesia’s battery nickel industry.

Limonite Ore Repricing Raises MHP Cost Pressure

The new HPM framework has the strongest impact on limonite ore because this material typically trades closer to benchmark values than saprolite ore. HPAL producers therefore face a more direct cost increase than rotary kiln-electric furnace operators.

MHP producers will now have to absorb higher ore purchase costs and higher royalties. Since royalties are linked to official valuation, the total cost increase could exceed the headline 50% rise in limonite ore pricing.

The revised formula also changes how Indonesia captures ore value. It includes cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore valuation, making these contained elements taxable. This is especially important for limonite ore because cobalt content adds value to HPAL feedstock.

The correction factor for cobalt is set at 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. Iron carries a 30% correction factor when content is 35% or lower, while chromium carries a 10% correction factor.

This means Indonesia is no longer valuing nickel ore mainly by nickel grade. The government is moving toward a broader contained-metal pricing model, capturing more value from battery-related by-products and ore chemistry.

For MHP producers, this creates a structural cost problem. HPAL projects were built around access to Indonesian limonite ore, sulphuric acid and integrated processing infrastructure. If ore costs rise by more than a third to half, the cost floor for MHP production moves higher.

This could affect downstream nickel sulphate and cathode material economics. Producers with stronger integration, lower acid costs and better logistics will be better positioned. Higher-cost operators may face squeezed margins if MHP prices do not rise enough to offset the new ore benchmark.

The change also comes as Indonesia tightens wider nickel policy. Mining quota uncertainty, export tax discussions and stricter pricing formulas all point to a broader state strategy of capturing more mineral value before material moves downstream.

Sulphuric Acid Tightness Adds a Second Cost Shock

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are rising at the same time as sulphuric acid prices surge. This creates a double pressure point for MHP producers.

HPAL operations require large volumes of sulphuric acid to leach nickel and cobalt from limonite ore. Any disruption in sulphur or acid supply directly affects processing costs and production reliability.

The US-Iran conflict has stranded several sulphur cargoes bound for Indonesian HPAL producers, preventing them from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, producers have shifted toward buying sulphuric acid directly.

That market was already tight because of limited copper concentrate availability. Sulphuric acid supply is expected to tighten further as China suspends exports from May.

Southeast Asian sulphuric acid prices have risen sharply. Prices reached $277.50/t cfr on 9 April, up 71% from $162.50/t before the conflict.

This is a major issue for Indonesian HPAL plants. Higher limonite ore costs increase feedstock expenses, while higher sulphuric acid prices increase processing costs. Together, they raise the full cost of producing MHP and weaken the advantage of low-cost Indonesian battery nickel.

Saprolite ore faces less immediate disruption. Saprolite is mainly used in RKEF operations to produce nickel pig iron and ferronickel. Although the new HPM for typical saprolite ore containing 1.6% nickel, 18% iron and 2% chromium rises to $52.90/wmt from $29.94/wmt, it remains below early April transacted prices of about $70/wmt.

This means RKEF producers may see limited immediate transaction impact because market prices are already above the benchmark. HPAL producers, by contrast, face a direct reset of the cost floor.

The difference could reshape relative economics between Indonesia’s stainless-linked and battery-linked nickel chains. NPI producers remain supported by high saprolite prices, while HPAL producers now face rising limonite, royalty and acid costs.

For the global battery supply chain, the key risk is that Indonesia’s MHP cost curve shifts upward. That could support nickel sulphate prices over time, especially if acid tightness persists or HPM-linked royalty costs remain elevated.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource rent capture. The government is recognising that limonite ore contains not only nickel but also cobalt and other valuable elements. This gives Jakarta a stronger fiscal claim over battery material feedstock.

However, the policy also increases operating uncertainty. HPAL investors need predictable ore pricing, acid availability and tax treatment to justify large-scale expansion. A sharp change in HPM could force producers to revisit cost assumptions, procurement strategies and product pricing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s new HPM formula marks a turning point for HPAL economics. The country is capturing more value from limonite ore, but the combined shock of higher ore prices, royalties and sulphuric acid costs could reset the cost floor for global MHP supply.

Sherritt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Canada’s Dependence on Cuban Nickel Feed

Sherritt International

Sherritt refinery shutdown plans will halt nickel and cobalt production at the company’s Fort Saskatchewan facility in Alberta after feedstock from Cuba’s Moa joint venture ran out. The move highlights how upstream disruption can strand downstream refining capacity even in a politically secure jurisdiction.

Sherritt refinery shutdown operations will remain in place until mining and processing at Moa can resume and mixed sulfide precipitate shipments to Canada are restored. The company has not given a restart timeline.

Sherritt refinery shutdown is strategically important because Fort Saskatchewan converts Cuban mixed sulfide precipitate into finished nickel and cobalt. The refinery therefore depends on continuity across mining, processing, shipping and sanctions-sensitive trade routes.

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to complete maintenance work. Fertilizer and sulfuric acid production will continue, preserving part of the site’s industrial activity while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

Moa Feed Disruption Strands Canadian Refining Capacity

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery relies on the Moa joint venture in Cuba for its nickel and cobalt feed. Ore is mined and processed at Moa into mixed sulfide precipitate before being shipped to Alberta for refining.

That supply chain began to weaken in February when fuel shortages forced the joint venture to suspend mining operations. Feed inventories in Canada subsequently declined, with Sherritt previously expecting available material to last only until mid-June.

The problem then became more complex in May. Sherritt suspended direct participation in the Moa joint venture after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

The company has maintained that suspension, leaving the future of Cuban production uncertain. Without fresh MSP shipments, Fort Saskatchewan cannot continue normal nickel and cobalt refining.

This illustrates a critical supply-chain weakness. Refining assets may sit inside Canada, but their security still depends on where upstream feed originates.

For North American critical minerals policy, that distinction matters. Domestic refining capacity does not create supply independence if raw materials remain tied to politically exposed jurisdictions.

Nickel and Cobalt Supply Security Shifts Toward Feedstock Control

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, superalloys, aerospace, industrial chemicals and defence-related manufacturing. Reliable refining capacity is therefore strategically valuable.

But Sherritt’s shutdown shows that feedstock security must be treated as part of refinery security. A plant without dependable concentrate or intermediate supply becomes an idle asset regardless of its technical capability.

The Fort Saskatchewan site still has value because its processing infrastructure and operating expertise remain in place. Maintenance during the shutdown may help preserve restart readiness if Moa supply resumes.

However, the absence of a clear restart timeline increases uncertainty. Sherritt must either restore the Cuban supply chain or eventually secure another viable feed route if the disruption becomes prolonged.

The situation also raises a broader question for western critical minerals strategies. Governments are investing heavily in domestic processing, but those projects need diversified and compliant raw material sources to remain resilient.

Sherritt’s experience shows why mining, intermediate processing and refining must be planned as one integrated supply chain rather than separate assets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan is a reminder that secure refining capacity is only as strong as its feedstock chain. Canada can host the refinery, but without reliable upstream material, geopolitical risk still determines whether nickel and cobalt actually reach the market.

Sherritt Cuba Sanctions Risk Clouds Moa Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has become a new uncertainty for Canadian metals miner and refiner Sherritt International after the US expanded its sanctions framework targeting Cuba. The company is consulting advisers and stakeholders to assess possible implications for its Cuban mining and refining exposure.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk centres on the company’s Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. The operation mines and processes nickel and cobalt ore in Cuba before shipping mixed sulphide precipitate to Sherritt’s refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has increased after US president Donald Trump issued an executive order on 1 May broadening existing Cuba-related restrictions. The order allows the US to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, as well as energy, defence, financial services, security and other parts of the Cuban economy.

The development matters because Moa is not only a Cuban mining asset. It is part of a cross-border nickel and cobalt processing chain that links Cuban ore production with Canadian refining capacity.

Moa Joint Venture Faces Sanctions and Fuel Supply Pressure

The Moa joint venture produces mixed sulphide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt. Ore is mined and processed at the Moa site in Cuba, then shipped to Alberta for refining.

This structure gives Sherritt exposure to two different risks. The first is sanctions policy. The second is physical supply continuity from Cuba.

The company had already suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba. That disruption reduced upstream feed availability and raised concerns over refinery inventory in Canada.

Sherritt said in February that its Fort Saskatchewan refinery feed inventory was expected to last until mid-April. The new sanctions uncertainty adds another layer of pressure to an already fragile supply chain.

Nickel and cobalt remain important materials for batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-related supply chains. Any disruption to feedstock or refining routes can affect customers that rely on qualified supply.

The Moa operation is therefore strategically important despite its geopolitical complexity. It supplies intermediate material that can be refined into products serving North American industrial demand.

US Policy Adds Complexity to Critical Minerals Trade

The executive order broadens the list of possible sanctions targets linked to Cuba. Metals and mining are now explicitly included, raising compliance risk for companies with Cuban operations or Cuban-linked material flows.

For Sherritt, the immediate issue is clarity. The company must determine whether its ownership structure, product flows, financing relationships, logistics providers or customers could be affected by the expanded sanctions framework.

This matters because sanctions risk can affect more than direct operations. It can influence shipping, banking, insurance, payment processing, customer contracts and counterparty willingness to handle material.

The case also highlights a difficult reality in critical minerals policy. Western governments want secure nickel and cobalt supply, but some existing supply chains run through politically sensitive jurisdictions.

Canada’s refining capacity at Fort Saskatchewan is valuable, but its feedstock connection to Cuba creates exposure to US policy decisions. That makes Sherritt’s position more complicated than a conventional mining or refining business.

The outcome will depend on how broadly Washington applies the new order and whether Sherritt’s activities become directly targeted. Until then, customers and investors are likely to watch for guidance on operational continuity, legal exposure and feedstock availability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s situation shows that critical minerals security is not only about mine reserves or refining capacity. Political jurisdiction, sanctions exposure and feedstock logistics can determine whether a nickel-cobalt supply chain remains bankable.

Cobalt Blue Glomar Nodule Processing Deal Targets US Critical Minerals Supply

Glomar Minerals x Cobalt Blue 

Cobalt Blue Glomar nodule processing plans have moved forward after Australian minerals processor Cobalt Blue signed an agreement with US deep sea miner Glomar Minerals to process seabed polymetallic nodules. The partnership will focus on testing whether nodules can become a reliable feedstock for critical metals including cobalt, copper, manganese, nickel and titanium.

The agreement gives both companies a pathway to assess processing feasibility before moving toward a larger industrial model. Pilot testing will take place at Cobalt Blue’s Broken Hill Technology Center in Australia.

Cobalt Blue Glomar nodule processing is strategically important because deep sea nodules contain multiple metals needed for batteries, stainless steel, alloys, electrification and defense-related supply chains. The main challenge is not only resource access, but proving that the material can be processed efficiently, responsibly and at commercial scale.

Broken Hill Pilot Testing Will Define Recovery Potential

Cobalt Blue will test recovery feasibility from polymetallic nodules across several metal streams. The work will help determine how cobalt, copper, manganese, nickel, titanium and other metals can be separated and converted into usable products.

This processing step is critical for deep sea mining economics. Polymetallic nodules may offer metal diversity, but commercial value depends on metallurgical performance, recovery rates, processing cost and environmental controls.

The Broken Hill Technology Center gives the partnership a practical testing platform. If pilot results are successful, the companies can move from early feasibility work toward engineering a larger processing route.

US Facility Plan Highlights Deep Sea Supply Chain Ambition

Cobalt Blue and Glomar eventually aim to develop a commercial-scale polymetallic nodule processing facility in the US. The planned facility would have capacity of 200,000 tonnes per year.

Glomar holds exploration licences in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a North Pacific region known for significant polymetallic nodule deposits. That position gives the company potential access to a major seabed mineral resource base.

For the US, the project fits a broader effort to diversify critical mineral supply beyond conventional land-based mining. However, deep sea mineral development will still face technical, environmental, regulatory and financing scrutiny before it can become a meaningful supply source.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Cobalt Blue Glomar nodule processing shows that deep sea mining is moving from resource promotion toward metallurgical validation. The real test will be whether seabed nodules can become a responsible and scalable feedstock for US critical minerals processing.

Sherritt Moa JV Dissolution Marks Break in Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution marks a major break in one of the more unusual cross-border nickel-cobalt supply chains linking Cuba and Canada. Sherritt International plans to deliver a dissolution notice to its joint venture partner, the General Nickel Company of Cuba, after expanded US sanctions made continued participation commercially and legally risky.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution will require the Canadian company to surrender its interests in the Cuban joint venture corporations. The company said immediate dissolution is the only way to preserve its ability to do business.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution is strategically important because the Moa structure linked Cuban mining and intermediate processing with Canadian refining. Ore was mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa, then shipped to the Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta.

Sherritt expects GNC to owe an equalization payment because it believes the Moa mine is more valuable than the Canadian refinery. That valuation issue could become a key point in the separation process.

US Sanctions Force Structural Exit From Moa

The US directly sanctioned the Moa joint venture on 7 May. The designation followed a 1 May executive order allowing Washington to sanction entities or people supporting the Cuban government across metals, mining, energy, financial services, security and other sectors.

Sherritt had already suspended direct participation in Moa-related activities earlier this month after assessing the implications of the executive order. The direct sanctions accelerated the need for a structural exit.

The company said the dissolution is necessary so it can be considered the sole owner of Canada Refinery Corporation, which owns the Fort Saskatchewan nickel-cobalt refinery. That step is central to preserving the Canadian refining business outside the sanctioned Cuban structure.

The Moa joint venture had been a 50/50 partnership between Sherritt and GNC. Its value came from combining Cuban ore and MSP production with Canadian refining expertise.

The latest move shows how sanctions can fracture supply chains even when downstream refining sits in an allied jurisdiction. Feedstock origin, ownership structure and sanctioned counterparties now matter as much as the location of final refining.

Canadian Refinery Faces Feedstock Repositioning Challenge

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it produces finished nickel and cobalt. These metals are used in batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing.

However, the refinery’s historic feedstock route depended on Moa mixed sulfide precipitate. Losing the Cuban joint venture means Sherritt must protect the refinery’s operating future through ownership clarity, alternative feed planning or new commercial structures.

The company had already faced operating pressure before the sanctions escalated. Sherritt temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

That earlier disruption showed the physical fragility of the Moa supply chain. The sanctions now add a legal and geopolitical break to an already strained operating model.

For nickel and cobalt buyers, the key issue is whether Fort Saskatchewan can remain a reliable source of refined metal without direct participation in Moa. The answer will depend on feedstock access, legal separation, inventory management and customer confidence.

The dissolution also highlights a broader critical minerals lesson. Western supply chains can still carry high exposure when mines, intermediates or partners sit in sanctioned or politically sensitive jurisdictions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s exit from Moa shows that critical minerals security cannot rely on refining capacity alone. The real test is whether the entire chain, from mine ownership to intermediate feedstock and final metal, can survive sanctions, fuel disruption and geopolitical pressure.