Japan's Lithium Imports Drop Amid Slow EV Market in 2024

Lithium Mining

Decline in Lithium Carbonate Imports and Slight Increase in Lithium Oxide and Hydroxide

Japan has experienced a significant reduction in lithium carbonate imports in 2024, signaling a shift in the country’s energy and automotive sectors. While lithium oxide and hydroxide imports have seen a modest rise, the broader context of a sluggish global electric vehicle (EV) market has heavily influenced these changes.

Sharp Decline in Lithium Carbonate Imports

In 2024, Japan’s imports of lithium carbonate plunged by 40%, with a total of approximately 11,520 tons imported, according to data from Japan’s finance ministry. This represents a stark contrast to previous years when imports showed more consistent growth. Imports from Chile, the top supplier, saw a dramatic drop of 55%, with imports falling to about 5,143 tons. Argentina also experienced a decline in exports to Japan, falling by 5.6%, while Chinese imports dropped by 34%, totaling around 1,908 tons.

Increase in Lithium Oxide and Hydroxide Imports

On the other hand, Japan’s imports of lithium oxide and hydroxide showed a slight increase of 6% in 2024, reaching approximately 37,640 tons. A key contributor to this increase was a rise in imports from China, which edged up by 4.6%, amounting to about 32,354 tons. Interestingly, imports from Chile saw a significant uptick, rising to 1,872 tons, a notable increase from the 138 tons recorded in 2023. However, imports from the U.S. dropped by 24%, falling to 3,338 tons.

Declining EV Demand and Impact on the Domestic Market

Japan’s domestic electric vehicle market also faced challenges in 2024, with sales of passenger EVs falling by 33% due to weaker demand for local brand vehicles. According to preliminary data from industry associations, such as the Japan Automobile Importers Association (JAIA) and the Japan Light Motor Vehicle and Motorcycle Association, this drop in sales reflects broader trends in consumer preferences and economic conditions.

To stimulate the domestic EV market and boost the steel industry, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) announced plans to increase subsidies for EV purchases starting from April 2024. This initiative aims to encourage the adoption of electric vehicles and provide relief to Japan’s steel sector.

US Primary Aluminum Imports Decline in 2024

US Aluminum

Imports Drop 6%, Led by Decreases from the UAE, Australia, and South Africa

The United States saw a 6% decline in its primary aluminum imports in 2024, with a total of 3.917 million metric tonnes (mt), down from 4.158 million mt in 2023. The drop was notably driven by significant reductions in imports from key suppliers such as the UAE, Australia, and South Africa, as reported by US customs data.

Declines from Key Suppliers and Growth from Canada

Imports from the UAE, the second-largest supplier of unwrought aluminum to the US, fell by 23% to 435,200 tonnes in 2024. Australia's imports dropped sharply by 127,600 tonnes, falling to 82,400 tonnes. This decline caused Australia to drop from being the third-largest supplier to the sixth position in just one year. Additionally, imports from South Africa fell by 30,000 tonnes, reaching 131,600 tonnes in 2024.

In contrast, imports from Canada, the top supplier, rose by 91,800 tonnes, totaling 2.744 million tonnes in 2024. This increase helped offset some of the losses from other countries. Canada's share of total US aluminum imports grew to 70% in 2024, up from 64% in 2023, solidifying its dominance in the US market.

Tariff Concerns and Emerging Suppliers

The US is facing potential tariff issues, as former President Donald Trump proposed a 10% tariff on all imports from Canada. This could drive up prices for aluminum and aluminum products in the US, given Canada's role in supplying nearly a third of the US's aluminum needs.

On the other hand, imports from newer suppliers saw an uptick. India, now the seventh-largest supplier, sent 21,100 tonnes more aluminum, bringing its total to 73,000 tonnes in 2024. Argentina, a new third-largest supplier, saw a significant increase, sending 16,700 tonnes more to the US, bringing its total to 174,800 tonnes in 2024.

December 2024 imports also reflected these trends. The US imported 306,600 tonnes of unwrought aluminum, down by 14,700 tonnes compared to the previous year. Imports from Canada decreased by 20,300 tonnes, but Argentina helped balance the drop with an increase of 8,300 tonnes, reaching 30,200 tonnes in December.

US Bulk Alloy Imports Decline in 4Q 2024 Amid Global Supply Challenges

Silico-Manganese

Reduced shipments of ferro-alloys contribute to a 13% drop in bulk alloy imports.

In the fourth quarter of 2024, US imports of bulk alloys, including high-carbon ferro-chrome, silico-manganese, high-carbon ferro-manganese, and ferro-silicon, saw a notable decline. According to data from the US Commerce Department, total shipments dropped by 13% year-over-year, reaching 227,614 metric tonnes. This decrease reflects various challenges in global supply chains, including weather-related disruptions and production constraints in key export countries.

Surge in High-Carbon Ferro-Chrome Imports

Despite the overall decline, some specific alloys experienced significant shifts. High-carbon ferro-chrome shipments from Albania and Brazil saw substantial increases in the quarter. From just 25 tonnes last year, Albania's shipments surged to 14,948 tonnes, while Brazil's exports grew from zero to 8,997 tonnes. These gains helped partially offset the drops seen from other regions.

India’s Role in Silico-Manganese Imports

India played a critical role in boosting silico-manganese imports, with shipments to the US increasing by 15%, reaching 11,160 tonnes in the quarter. This rise in Indian exports helped balance declines from major suppliers like Georgia, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa. India's contribution to the overall import total for silico-manganese is a key development for the US alloy market.

Weather and Trade Issues Impact Other Imports

The drop in high-carbon ferro-manganese imports was particularly significant, falling by 45% due to weather-related events and production challenges in Malaysia and Australia. Additionally, the absence of Russian ferro-silicon from the US market further contributed to the year-over-year decline. The ongoing trade case targeting imports from Malaysia and Brazil also led to sharp decreases, with shipments from Malaysia dropping to zero and those from Brazil falling to 3,117 tonnes, down from 7,400 tonnes the previous year.

Full-Year Bulk Alloy Imports See Growth

Looking at the full year, total bulk alloy imports increased by 14% to 1.1 million tonnes, driven primarily by higher imports of high-carbon ferro-chrome and silico-manganese. Despite the quarterly decline, 2024 showed overall growth in bulk alloy imports compared to the previous year.

China’s FeNi and MHP Imports Decline in August, but Nickel Matte Surges

FeNi

China experienced a decline in Ferro-Nickel (FeNi) and mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) imports during August, largely due to shipment delays caused by typhoons. Despite this, the country saw a rise in nickel matte imports, reflecting increased availability of matte with lower nickel content.

Indonesia's Role in Nickel Supply Dominates

In August, China imported 522,315 metric tons of ferro-nickel, marking a significant 36% drop compared to the same period last year and a 43% decline from July. Although imports from other suppliers like New Caledonia, Brazil, and Colombia rose, the drop from Indonesia, China’s largest supplier, was much steeper.

Indonesia continues to dominate China’s nickel supply, providing 95% of nickel pig iron (NPI), 90% of nickel matte, and 80% of MHP imports. Indonesia’s expanding stainless steel output, driven by lower production costs, boosted NPI exports to markets like India, South Korea, Italy, and Germany, further emphasizing Indonesia’s role in the global nickel supply chain.

China’s nickel matte imports surged in August, increasing by 25% from the previous month and by 72% on the year. Much of this rise is attributed to low-nickel matte imports, which have a nickel content of around 20%, compared to high-nickel matte with about 70% nickel content. Low-nickel matte is processed in China to produce higher-value nickel sulphate or nickel cathode.

Imports of nickel matte from Russia also saw notable growth, reaching 5,155 metric tons in August—a year-on-year increase of 18% and a doubling of imports from the previous month.

MHP Imports Drop Despite Lygend Project Growth

Mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) imports dropped by 11% compared to July, totaling 122,272 metric tons in August. This decline was driven by a 15% decrease in Indonesian arrivals, despite an 11% year-on-year rise fueled by the ramp-up of Indonesia’s Lygend project. Market participants are closely watching how these developments will shape future trends in China’s nickel imports.

EU Zinc Imports Fell in 2025 as Dutch and German Demand Weakened

Zinc

EU zinc imports declined in 2025 as weaker buying from the Netherlands and Germany outweighed stronger flows into Italy and Belgium. EU countries imported 1mn t of refined 99.99pc grade unwrought zinc, down 3.2% from the previous year.

EU zinc imports remained closely tied to Europe’s uneven industrial demand. Zinc consumption depends heavily on galvanizing, construction, automotive parts, die casting, infrastructure and manufacturing activity, all of which faced mixed conditions across the region.

EU zinc imports also showed a shift in regional trade flows. The Netherlands remained the largest importer, but its volumes fell sharply, while Italy recorded a strong increase from May onward.

Netherlands and Germany Led the Import Decline

The Netherlands accounted for 22.5% of EU refined zinc imports in 2025, with about 225,950t. However, this was down by roughly 21% on the year, showing weaker intake from Europe’s main zinc import hub.

Germany, the second-largest importer, also reduced purchases. Its imports fell by 10.6% to nearly 198,400t, reflecting continued pressure from weak construction and manufacturing activity.

Belgium moved in the opposite direction, with imports rising by 1.1% to 171,600t. Italy posted the strongest increase among major buyers, with imports rising by 60% to 140,100t after firm year-on-year gains every month from May.

Spain Increased Zinc Supply as Finland and Belgium Fell

Spain became a stronger supplier within the EU refined zinc market in 2025. The country accounted for just over 180,800t of member states’ imports, up 42% from the previous year.

But Spain’s gains were offset by lower deliveries from Finland and Belgium. Finland’s exports fell by 27.4% to 156,180t, while Belgium’s exports declined by 17.7% to nearly 118,600t.

LME three-month zinc prices averaged $2,853/t in 2025, up 1.5% from the previous year. The modest price increase showed some recovery after weak construction and poor manufacturing activity weighed on zinc prices in 2024, but it did not signal a strong demand rebound.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The decline in EU zinc imports shows that Europe’s refined zinc market is still being shaped by weak industrial demand rather than supply shortage. Italy’s stronger buying is notable, but the broader picture remains cautious while construction and manufacturing activity stay uneven.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Fell to 2009 Low After Russian Ban

Ferro-Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports fell to their lowest level since 2009 in 2025 after sanctions blocked Russian material from entering the bloc directly or through Baltic transit routes. EU countries imported 30,171t of ferro-titanium last year, down 36% from 47,296t in 2024.

The sharp decline showed how deeply the European ferro-titanium market had depended on Russian supply and Baltic logistics. Estonia, Poland, and Latvia together accounted for 12,830t of EU supply, but the structure of that supply changed significantly once Russian-origin ferro-titanium was barred.

EU ferro-titanium imports from Estonia halved on the year to 6,384t. The decline suggests that Estonian flows now more closely reflect local production rather than Russian material transiting through the country.

Sanctions Shifted Supply Toward Estonia, Poland and India

Estonia remained the EU’s largest ferro-titanium supplier in 2025, while Poland became the second-largest intra-EU source. Polish shipments rose by a quarter to 3,834t, showing that European buyers were turning more heavily to regional producers after the Russian ban.

Imports from the UK fell 27% to 3,468t after the closure of TiVac last summer. Most of TiVac’s former volumes are expected to shift to Estonia, where FE Mottram is scaling up operations in Ahtme, while Transition Metals continues to operate in the UK.

India became a larger alternative supplier as exports to the EU rose 171% to 2,310t. Turkey’s shipments also surged to 1,000t, although these flows remain unclear because Turkey is not a known ferro-titanium producer.

Russian ferro-titanium imports fell to just 463t in 2025 after full implementation of EU sanctions on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. Russian exports largely moved to Asia, with Chinese imports from Russia reaching a record 6,381t last year.

Russian Scrap Flows Rose Before Late-Year Slowdown

Titanium scrap became a temporary workaround because Russian titanium scrap was not covered by EU sanctions. EU imports of Russian scrap doubled to 2,517t in 2025, with 2,406t entering Estonia.

Estonia then re-exported 2,277t of titanium scrap last year, showing how scrap flows supported the regional ferro-titanium supply chain after the ban on Russian ferro-alloys. However, this trade also weakened sharply toward year-end, with EU imports falling to 36t in December and 37t in January 2026.

European ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.98-5.33/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in 2025, down 28% from 2024. Weak steel mill consumption kept prices under pressure for most of the year.

The market later rebounded from multi-year lows in December. Supply concerns linked to Latvian producer LLR-Ecotech first supported the recovery, before higher scrap costs allowed other producers to raise offers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU ferro-titanium market is now being rebuilt around sanctions compliance, regional production, and scrap availability. The Russian ban reduced headline imports, but it also exposed Europe’s dependence on flexible titanium scrap flows and a small group of regional producers.

EU’s Copper Imports Increase in 2024 Despite Weak Demand in Germany

EU’s Copper Imports

Refined copper imports to the EU rose by 3.2% in 2024, led by Italy and Spain, despite falling demand in Germany.

Imports Rise, But Key Markets Show Strain

EU countries imported 1.71 million tonnes of refined copper in 2024, a 3.2% increase year on year, according to customs data. Italy remained the bloc’s top importer with 543,363 tonnes, representing 32% of total EU imports.

Germany, however, experienced a 13% drop in copper imports, falling to 413,245 tonnes. This reflects persistent challenges in Germany's industrial sectors due to rising energy prices and sluggish demand. The effects of the Covid-19 aftermath and Ukraine-related energy shocks have slowed recovery across EU economies.

Spain, Sweden, and the DRC See Significant Gains

Meanwhile, Spain increased its refined copper imports by 28%, reaching 142,231 tonnes, showing resilience in its industrial sectors. Sweden saw the largest year-on-year growth, with 119% more imports, totaling 107,794 tonnes.

On the supply side, Chile remained the largest exporter, delivering 307,885 tonnes to the EU — a 21% increase from 2023. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) overtook Poland as the second-largest supplier, with 200,992 tonnes, up 11%. Together, Chile, DRC, and Poland made up 40% of the EU’s total refined copper supply in 2024.

Despite an overall 2.9% rise in global copper consumption, the EU market remains fragile. According to the International Copper Study Group, weak demand from automotive and construction sectors continues to weigh on European copper use.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU’s rising copper imports contrast sharply with the weakening of its core manufacturing sectors. Germany’s downturn reflects broader industrial deceleration, while southern and northern Europe appear more resilient. As the energy transition accelerates, copper sourcing will remain a geopolitical and industrial priority — and import trends are the first signal to watch.

CBAM Certificate Price Starts Reshaping EU Import Costs Across Fertiliser and Steel

CBAM Reshapes EU Fertiliser Import Economics

CBAM certificate price implementation is beginning to reshape EU import economics across carbon-intensive sectors, with fertilisers and steel showing the clearest early signs of disruption. The European Commission set the first-quarter 2026 CBAM certificate price at €75.36/t of CO2 equivalent, turning the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism into a measurable cost for importers.

The impact is uneven because each product carries a different embedded-emissions burden and a different ability to absorb added carbon costs. Urea imports remained workable in the first quarter, while calcium ammonium nitrate and urea ammonium nitrate became much harder to justify. Steel imports also faced pressure as default emissions values strengthened the relative competitiveness of EU-produced material.

CBAM certificate price exposure was partly delayed by heavy pre-buying in 2025. Many importers entered 2026 with inventories, which blunted the immediate effect of the mechanism. However, as stocks run down and EU free allocations begin to decline, CBAM is moving from a compliance issue into a commercial constraint.

The first quarter therefore marked an important transition. CBAM did not stop all imports. Instead, it began sorting the market between products, origins and suppliers that can manage carbon costs and those that cannot.

Fertiliser Imports Show How CBAM Separates Viable and Unviable Products

Fertiliser markets provided the clearest example of CBAM’s uneven effect. Urea imports continued because the additional carbon cost remained relatively small compared with delivered market prices.

Egyptian urea carried a default CBAM charge of €39.52/t in January-March. That represented roughly 5% of French urea prices by the end of March. Default costs for other major origins, including Algeria, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Nigeria, ranged around €41-53/t.

These charges were manageable for traders because urea prices rose sharply during the quarter. The Middle East conflict lifted French urea prices by 45% between late February and the end of March, reducing the relative weight of CBAM in total delivered costs.

As a result, urea continued moving into the EU, especially in March. European buyers returned to the market ahead of the spring application season, and higher global prices made the CBAM burden easier to absorb.

Nitrate products faced a very different outcome. Calcium ammonium nitrate imports were largely priced out because default CBAM costs reached €105-119/t across major exporting origins. That equalled roughly a quarter of prevailing German CAN prices.

This cost level made non-EU CAN structurally uncompetitive. Importers could not easily pass through the additional carbon cost without losing competitiveness against EU-produced material.

Urea ammonium nitrate faced similar pressure. Default CBAM charges started at €62.16/t for Trinidad and Tobago material and reached €86.52/t for US-origin product. By the end of March, these costs represented up to 20% of French UAN prices.

The economics became even harder when existing EU anti-dumping duties were added. Traders viewed imports from these origins as effectively unworkable under the combined burden of duties and CBAM.

Phosphate-based fertilisers were less exposed. Moroccan diammonium phosphate, a key EU import product, carried an additional charge of only €16.19/t in the first quarter. That equalled about 2% of delivered prices in northwest Europe.

Moroccan NPK 15-15-15 faced a larger default cost of €53.36/t, or around 10% of Belgian prices. But traders still described that burden as manageable. This means CBAM narrowed product choice rather than cutting fertiliser imports across the board.

The fertiliser market therefore shows CBAM’s real mechanism. It does not apply uniform pressure. It changes competitiveness product by product, depending on emissions intensity, delivered price, existing duties and the ability to provide certified actual emissions data.

CBAM Turns Steel Imports Into a Trade Filter

Steel, EUA Volatility and Default Values Turn CBAM Into a Trade Filter

Steel markets showed a different but equally important effect. CBAM reinforced the cost advantage of EU-produced steel by making imported material more expensive under default emissions values.

Hot-rolled coil import offers into the EU rose through January-March. The increase reflected higher production costs at mills and rising freight rates. However, fewer delivered-duty-paid offers were seen because traders were also preparing for changes to EU safeguard measures.

Much of the steel sold on a delivered basis came from existing stock. This delayed the full pass-through of higher import costs into market transactions. But market participants broadly agreed that importing steel under default emissions values was economically difficult for most origins.

Brazil was cited as one limited exception, but most imported steel faced a structural disadvantage. This is important because steel has high embedded emissions and large delivered price sensitivity. Even a moderate carbon cost can change the landed-cost calculation.

Certified actual emissions data will become critical. Suppliers that can prove lower embedded emissions may preserve access to EU buyers. Suppliers relying on default values may find their products increasingly uncompetitive.

CBAM is therefore beginning to act as a trade filter. It rewards verified lower-carbon production and penalises imports that lack transparent emissions data. This could gradually shift EU import flows toward suppliers with stronger measurement, reporting and verification systems.

The EU emissions trading system added another layer of complexity. The Commission calculates the CBAM certificate price from the weighted average of primary EU ETS auction clearing prices. These auction prices are closely linked to secondary-market prices for EU allowances.

EUA prices were volatile in the first quarter. Structural tightening supported prices early in the period, including a 4.3% reduction in the ETS cap for 2026, the removal of 27mn allowances and a further 52mn cut linked to expanded maritime coverage.

Demand from maritime and aviation sectors also increased as those sectors moved into full ETS coverage. At the same time, some companies handling CBAM-covered goods began buying EUAs as a proxy hedge for future CBAM exposure.

However, political risk weakened the bullish case in February. Senior figures in key EU member states questioned the future of the ETS and called for reforms or even temporary suspension to reduce pressure on industry. Investment funds responded by cutting long positions, pushing prices lower.

The US-Iran war then added another source of volatility. The conflict created renewed energy price stress and revived political calls for ETS intervention. Although the Commission rejected suspension of the scheme, it acknowledged the need for reform, keeping regulatory uncertainty high.

This matters for importers because CBAM certificates cannot be traded or resold. Companies can use EUAs as a proxy hedge, but the hedge is imperfect because CBAM costs are tied to primary auction prices, not directly to tradable CBAM certificates.

The first quarter therefore exposed a new risk-management problem. Importers must now manage commodity prices, freight, duties, safeguard rules, emissions verification, EUA volatility and CBAM certificate exposure at the same time.

The outlook points to stronger pressure through 2026. Maritime and aviation demand will keep adding to ETS coverage. The linear reduction factor will keep shrinking the cap. Free allocations will continue to decline. Inventories built before CBAM will continue to unwind.

At the same time, the Market Stability Reserve and the upcoming ETS review could limit extreme price spikes or change market expectations. This means CBAM costs are likely to become more visible, but the exact price path remains exposed to policy risk.

For fertiliser and steel importers, the direction is already clear. Products with manageable carbon costs and strong emissions documentation will keep moving. Products with high default emissions, existing duties or weak verification will face higher barriers into the EU market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CBAM is becoming an industrial trade policy tool, not only a climate mechanism. The first-quarter data show that carbon costs are starting to decide which products can enter the EU competitively, and which supply chains must either decarbonise, verify emissions or lose market access.

Imports of Russian FeTi Redirect from EU to Asia

Russian ferro-titanium is increasingly being directed toward Asia as EU importers — whether steel mills or intermediaries — have tightened their purchasing strategies in compliance with EU sanctions against Russian ferro-alloys.

EU sanctions against Russian ferro-alloys came into force last December but permitted contracts that pre-dated sanctions to be fulfilled until December 20th this year. After this date, all purchases, imports, or transfers, directly or indirectly, of Russian ferro-alloys will be prohibited. While EU imports are dwindling but have not yet ceased, Asian importers are capitalizing on the surplus of Russian ferro-titanium that is no longer flowing to Europe.

EU imports in January and February were broadly consistent with the fourth quarter of last year, although the number of importing nations narrowed. Imports in March dipped, rebounded in April, and in May, reached their lowest level since September 2022 at 576t.

Non-EU imports increased by a third to 235t in the first quarter and then spiked to 492t in May alone, primarily driven by higher flows to China, alongside regular importers Turkey and South Korea. China imported 100t in April, 260t in May, and 100t in June from Russia. China is no stranger to importing Russian ferro-titanium, having received several thousand tonnes in 2018-21, but it imported only incremental volumes in 2022 and none last year.

China's re-emergence as an importer from Russia both highlights and offsets, as far as Russian sellers are concerned, the EU's gradual withdrawal from the Russian market. This demonstrates a fundamental shift in flows, yet Russia's overall exports are unaffected and even reached a nine-month high in May.

Market participants are unsure why China is importing these volumes from Russia, considering its own ample production capacity and domestic cost structures. Some have posited that these imports are being re-exported, but the cost of doing so to Europe is not profitable.

Chinese ferro-titanium exports in the second quarter hit their highest level in two years at 811t, coinciding with the spike in intake from Russia, underpinning speculation about re-exports of Russian ferro-titanium. Top recipients from China included Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and the UAE.

Turkish imports from Russia have been sporadic this year, with some market participants linked to banks refusing to clear payments on Russian material transiting through Turkey.

Supply Gap in EU Market Offset by Low Demand

European producers have sufficient capacity to fill any void of Russian units, Metalnomist understands, but they will require more raw materials in the form of sponge or scrap. Scrap availability is still tight in Europe, due to either lower generation or merchants holding on to inventories, and lower machining rates in July and August may compound this issue.

Stretched raw material access and lower imports from Russia initially drove bullish attitudes among producers that prices in the EU market would increase as steel mills would be able to purchase only from certain non-Russian sources.

But these expectations have been undermined in the past month by several third-quarter tenders that have demonstrated persistent availability at lower prices from sellers keen to secure sales in a weak demand environment.

The market, therefore, is caught between supply fundamentals pointing to higher prices, due to tightness in raw materials and a pending loss of Russian supplies, and demand being insufficient to provide impetus for stronger prices.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports from Russia Decline in Q2, Surge in June Amid Sanctions

In a complex geopolitical landscape marked by sanctions and shifting trade patterns, the European Union's(EU) imports of ferro-titanium from Russia witnessed notable fluctuations in the second quarter of 2024. According to recent trade data, while overall imports during April-June fell to their lowest quarterly levels since the fourth quarter of 2022, June alone saw a significant increase, reaching a nine-month high. This paradox highlights the uneven impact of EU sanctions targeting Russian ferro-alloys at the year's midpoint.

During the second quarter, the EU imported 3,321 metric tons of Russian ferro-titanium, representing a 33% increase from the first quarter's 2,497 metric tons. However, this figure still marked an 11% year-on-year decline. Within the EU, member states accounted for 2,192 metric tons, while non-EU countries absorbed the remaining 1,129 metric tons— the highest share held by non-EU states since Q2 2022.

A significant trend observed in 2024 has been the redirection of Russian ferro-titanium exports towards non-EU states, particularly China and Turkey, amid increasing sanctions. Despite this, the Netherlands broke the pattern in June by importing 473 metric tons, the highest intake by any EU country this year, slightly surpassing Estonia's January intake of 468 metric tons.

Under Article 3i of the 12th EU sanctions package, the purchase, import, or transfer—directly or indirectly—of Russian ferro-titanium is prohibited, with allowances for pre-existing contracts. However, market insiders suggest that Russian ferro-titanium may still be entering the EU through specific channels.

Market analysts had anticipated a steady decline in EU imports throughout 2024 as contracts predating the sanctions expired. However, the surge in Dutch imports in June contrasts sharply with a notable decrease in Estonia's imports, which reached their lowest level this year. For the entire quarter, Estonia imported 910 metric tons, a decline compared to both prior periods.

In parallel, Estonia's re-exports of ferro-titanium in Q2 fell to 654 metric tons, with Latvia receiving 597 metric tons and the United States 57 metric tons. Interestingly, Latvia reported zero imports directly from Russia.

China's imports of Russian ferro-titanium surged to 460 metric tons in Q2, up from zero in both the previous quarter and the same period last year. Turkey also increased its imports to 483 metric tons during this period. The potential for any of this material to eventually enter the EU remains uncertain as the market adapts to the evolving sanctions regime.

Russian ferro-titanium prices in Europe averaged $5.80-6.23 per kilogram of titanium in Q2, up from $5.33-5.81 per kilogram in Q1. The price increase reflects rising production costs and, to some extent, follows Western market trends. As of August 15, prices were last assessed at $5.60-6.30 per kilogram, as Russian suppliers lowered their offers to clear stock ahead of more stringent sanctions set to take full effect by the end of the year.

Brazil Steel Market Faces Continued Pressure on Imports Amid Tariff Measures

Brazil steel market

Brazil's Government Tackles Rising Steel Imports

Brazil's steel industry is experiencing mounting pressure as the government considers further measures to curb steel imports, despite previous tariff and quota systems having limited impact on import volumes. In the latest development, Brazil's foreign trade committee, Gecex, tentatively approved the inclusion of additional steel products, such as wires and construction nails, in a tariff hike of 25%. This move follows a trend of rising steel imports that have been challenging the competitiveness of domestic producers.

Industry Reactions: Limited Tariff and Rising Antidumping Calls

Market participants were taken aback by the decision, as they had anticipated more substantial and widespread tariffs. According to one source, there was an expectation of a broader government intervention given the persistently high levels of imported steel. However, with the new measure, the decision did not specify a minimum volume to be taxed, leading to mixed reactions within the industry.

One notable shift in response to the government's actions is the growing preference for antidumping measures rather than broader tariff hikes. Steel producers argue that antidumping regulations are more effective in targeting specific products that disrupt the market, especially those imported at artificially low prices. Domestic manufacturers are reportedly increasingly inclined to pursue these measures as a more tailored approach to addressing the surge in cheap imports.

Support from Aço Brasil and Rising Concerns from Local Producers

Aço Brasil, the nation's steel industry association, expressed support for the 25% tariff, stating that it has long advocated for such a measure to protect the domestic market. Marco Polo de Mello Lopes, executive president of Aço Brasil, remarked that the industry had always supported this level of tariff and that the government’s approval would be in line with expectations.

This decision by Gecex follows a complaint from the national syndicate of ferrous metal drawing and rolling industries, Sicetel, which, with backing from Aço Brasil, argued that the influx of cheap imports was creating unfair competition. Sicetel reported that imports in the ferrous metal drawing and rolling sector rose by 24% in 2023, with China accounting for 57% of total imports during the first nine months of the year.

Ongoing Struggles and Future Outlook for Brazil’s Steel Industry

Despite the tariff increase and other protective measures, imports have continued to surge due to the significant price gap between foreign and domestic products. Market experts point out that the lack of a more balanced approach may continue to strain domestic steelmakers.

Gecex’s decision, however, still needs approval from members of the Mercosur trade bloc and publication in Brazil’s official gazette before it becomes final. In the meantime, the government continues to scrutinize the issue with additional antidumping investigations and reviews.

The situation reflects the ongoing struggle for Brazil's steel industry, balancing the need for protection against foreign competition while ensuring that measures do not excessively inflate costs for domestic consumers.

US Titanium Scrap Imports and Exports Decline in 4Q Amid Supply Chain Disruptions

US Titanium Scrap

Titanium Scrap Trade Faces Challenges as US Imports and Exports Fall in the Fourth Quarter

US titanium scrap imports and exports experienced a decline in the fourth quarter of 2024, according to recent US customs data. Weaker demand, especially triggered by a seven-week strike at Boeing, led to disruptions in supply chains, significantly affecting titanium scrap trade volumes. Imports fell by 5% to 6,779 metric tonnes (t), marking the lowest total since the first quarter of 2024.

Factors Behind the Decline in US Titanium Scrap Imports

The 5% decrease in imports can be attributed to reduced demand for titanium scrap. Boeing's strike had a substantial impact on supply chains, particularly in aerospace, which is a major consumer of titanium. As a result, the overall import volume dropped. The UK remained the top source of titanium scrap to the US, increasing shipments by 21% to 1,235t, which accounted for about 18% of US imports. On the other hand, imports from Canada fell by 27% to 588t, while shipments from Germany and Japan also decreased by double digits.

US Exports and Shifting Global Markets

US titanium scrap exports also declined, albeit slightly. Total exports fell by 1% to 2,701t. This was primarily driven by reduced prices from overseas markets and the typical seasonal slowdown in manufacturing during the holidays. India emerged as the top destination for US titanium scrap, with exports rising by 59% to 689t. Conversely, exports to Canada fell by 23% to 599t, while shipments to the UK rose by 24% to 397t.

Exports to Mexico surged by 590%, reaching 352t, while exports to South Korea and Germany dropped significantly. Exports to South Korea fell by 77% to 56t, and shipments to Germany declined by 59% to 41t. Despite these fluctuations, US titanium scrap exports for the full year saw a significant increase, rising by 18% to 11,756t, the highest in four years.

Conclusion: A Mixed Outlook for US Titanium Scrap Trade

The fourth-quarter data reveals both challenges and opportunities in the US titanium scrap trade. While imports faced declines due to supply chain disruptions, export volumes saw a notable rise for the full year. The shift in export destinations, particularly the rise in demand from India and Mexico, suggests evolving global market dynamics for US titanium scrap. Going forward, the US titanium scrap trade will need to navigate these changes while adjusting to the impact of global supply chain and economic conditions.

EU Russian Energy Imports Ban Holds Firm Despite New Energy Crisis

EU Russian Energy

EU Russian energy imports will not return under the European Commission’s current policy direction, even as the bloc faces renewed energy pressure from the Middle East conflict. EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said Brussels will continue phasing out Russian gas and still plans to cut Russian oil imports.

EU Russian energy imports have become a strategic red line for Brussels. The Commission argues that returning to Russian supply would recreate the dependency that exposed Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

EU Russian energy imports are again being debated because higher oil and gas costs are hitting parts of the European economy. However, Brussels is treating the current disruption as a reason to accelerate energy diversification, not reopen Russian supply channels.

The position links energy security directly to industrial resilience. Europe now wants less exposure to both Russian energy and Middle East supply disruption, while shifting more demand toward domestic, renewable and alternative energy systems.

Russian Oil Phase-Out Remains Politically Sensitive

The Commission has not yet presented new legal measures to phase out Russian oil imports. It delayed a proposal originally scheduled for 15 April and has not set a new publication date.

Still, Brussels says a permanent Russian oil ban remains a priority. That matters because Hungary and Slovakia remain the only EU importers of Russian crude, keeping pipeline supply through Druzhba at the centre of political negotiations.

Hungary had opposed blocking Russian oil imports under Viktor Orban. His successor, Peter Magyar, has acknowledged that Hungary cannot end Druzhba imports immediately, but has pledged to eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.

Slovakia has also linked Russian oil flows to its support for further sanctions against Moscow. Bratislava has indicated it could support another sanctions package once Russian oil reaches Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline.

This shows the difficulty of EU energy policy. The bloc wants a unified strategic position, but member states still have different infrastructure, refinery configurations and supply dependencies.

The Druzhba pipeline therefore remains more than a crude route. It is a political lever in sanctions, energy security and Ukraine-related financing discussions.

Energy Crisis Reinforces Clean Supply Strategy

The current Middle East energy crisis has intensified the EU’s focus on supply security. Jorgensen said the disruption is comparable in seriousness to the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 Russian energy shock.

The Commission expects LNG prices to take years to stabilise. It also expects oil capacity to need months to normalise after the war ends, showing that energy disruption can outlast military events.

This strengthens the EU case for domestic and clean energy. The Commission wants to reduce import dependence through renewables, electrification, storage, hydrogen and alternative fuels.

For industry, the implication is clear. Europe’s energy security strategy will increasingly affect metals, grids, chemicals, transport fuels and clean technology supply chains.

Lower Russian energy dependence also raises demand for infrastructure. Europe will need more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, renewable equipment and grid materials to replace fossil fuel exposure with domestic power systems.

The policy challenge is execution. Europe must cut Russian dependence while managing fuel prices, refinery supply, LNG volatility, industrial competitiveness and political pressure from member states.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s refusal to return to Russian energy shows that energy security has become an industrial sovereignty issue. The next test is whether the EU can replace fossil dependency with real domestic energy infrastructure fast enough to protect industry from repeated external shocks.

EU Ferro-Vanadium Imports Fell in 2025 as Demand Stayed Weak

Ferro-Vanadium

EU ferro-vanadium imports declined in 2025 as weak downstream demand and an oversupplied market reduced buying across Europe’s largest consuming hubs. EU countries imported 16,694 tonnes of ferro-vanadium during the year, down 6.4% from 2024.

The decline was led by the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, which together accounted for 66.2% of total EU ferro-vanadium imports. Lower buying in these markets shows that European steel and alloy demand remained under pressure through 2025.

EU ferro-vanadium imports are closely tied to steelmaking activity because ferro-vanadium is used to improve strength, toughness, and performance in steels. Weak demand therefore signals continued softness in construction, manufacturing, and specialty steel production.

Netherlands, Germany and Italy Drove the Import Decline

The Netherlands remained the largest EU ferro-vanadium importer, but its intake fell 15.7% on the year to 4,633 tonnes. Germany’s imports declined 14.6% to 3,162 tonnes, while Italy’s imports dropped 8.1% to 3,250 tonnes.

These reductions matter because all three markets serve important roles in European metals distribution, steelmaking, and alloy procurement. When buying slows in these countries, it usually reflects broader caution across the regional value chain.

The import decline also confirms that oversupply limited restocking appetite. Buyers had little urgency to secure additional ferro-vanadium when downstream orders remained weak and market availability stayed comfortable.

Export Flows Shifted as Austria Lost Share

Austria remained the top exporter of ferro-vanadium to other EU countries in 2025, but shipments fell sharply. Austrian exports declined 29.6% on the year to 3,414 tonnes.

The Czech Republic became the second-largest exporter into Europe, with deliveries rising 21.4% to 2,275 tonnes. This pushed it ahead of South Africa, South Korea, and the Netherlands compared with the previous year.

The shift suggests that European ferro-vanadium supply patterns are becoming more fluid. However, the broader market signal remains bearish: EU ferro-vanadium imports fell because demand was not strong enough to absorb available supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The ferro-vanadium market shows how alloy demand remains vulnerable when steel consumption weakens. Europe’s lower imports point to a market still waiting for a stronger industrial recovery, especially in construction, machinery, and specialty steel.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Hit Highest Level Since 2024 as Russian Supply Dries Up

Ferro Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports rose to their highest level in more than a year in the first quarter, supported by robust demand from steel mills and cored-wire producers. The increase also reflected a market shift as Russian receipts effectively disappeared and European suppliers captured more share.

EU ferro-titanium imports reached 8,431t in January-March, up 19% from a year earlier and 13% from the previous quarter. The total was the highest since the fourth quarter of 2024, when Russian material was still moving into the bloc in significant volumes.

EU ferro-titanium imports were concentrated in Estonia, Poland, Latvia and the UK. These destinations took a combined 5,119t, equal to 61% of the first-quarter total, up from 51% a year earlier.

The figures show how sanctions, scrap availability and steel-sector buying are reshaping the European ferro-titanium market. Demand has improved, but the supply base has changed sharply.

Sanctions Redirect Russian Ferro-Titanium Toward Asia

Russian ferro-titanium flows into Europe have effectively stopped since sanctions were imposed on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. That removed a major historical source of supply from the European market.

Before sanctions, the EU was still receiving 2,000-3,000 t/quarter of Russian ferro-titanium. Those flows helped lift imports to 11,661t in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Now, Russian material has shifted toward Asia. China has become the dominant buyer of Russian ferro-titanium, with imports from Russia rising to a record 3,855t in the first quarter, up from 816t a year earlier.

This shift matters because Europe still needs titanium units for steel and cored-wire production. Ferro-titanium is used to add titanium to steel, where it supports deoxidation, grain refinement and stabilisation in selected grades.

Market participants have said some Russian material may still be reaching Europe through third countries in circumvention of sanctions. That claim highlights the continuing importance of origin control, documentation and compliance in ferro-alloy trade.

Non-EU imports, excluding the UK, reached 1,388t in the first quarter, up from 1,179t a year earlier. India was the leading non-EU supplier, shipping 426t, double the year-earlier level but down 38% from the previous quarter.

Scrap Tightness Supports Ferro-Titanium Price Recovery

Titanium scrap availability became another pressure point. EU imports of unsanctioned titanium scrap from Russia fell sharply to just 37t in the first quarter, all into Germany.

This is a major change for the Baltic route. Estonia imported no Russian titanium scrap in the quarter, compared with an average of 601 t/quarter last year.

Lower scrap availability matters because titanium scrap is a key feedstock for ferro-titanium production. Tighter scrap supply can raise production costs and reduce prompt availability for alloy producers.

European standard-grade ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.70-4.97/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in the first quarter, down from $5.68-6.02/kg Ti a year earlier. However, the market strengthened through the quarter.

Prices opened at $4.30-4.60/kg Ti and closed at $4.85-5.30/kg Ti. The rally was initially triggered by the insolvency of Austrian trader LL-Resources, although its ferro-titanium subsidiary LLR-Ecotech said operations were unaffected.

The price rise then gained support from stronger mill demand under long-term contracts, prompt buying and quarterly spot enquiries. Tighter titanium scrap availability also added cost pressure.

The rally continued into the second quarter, suggesting that buyers remain sensitive to reduced Russian availability and constrained scrap flows.

For Europe, the key issue is not only volume. The region must secure compliant titanium units for steelmaking while avoiding sanctioned material and managing higher feedstock costs.

The first-quarter data therefore point to a more regionalised ferro-titanium market. Europe is relying more on domestic and approved suppliers, while Russian material is increasingly absorbed in Asia.

EU, Fe-Ti Import

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s ferro-titanium market is becoming a compliance-driven supply chain. The real advantage will go to producers that can secure clean titanium scrap, prove origin and deliver reliable alloy supply into steel and cored-wire demand.

Domestic Imports of Noble Alloys Fell in 2Q

Shipments of noble alloys to the United States declined in the second quarter, reflecting weaker demand from domestic steel producers and a narrower U.S. premium compared to the previous year.

- According to U.S. Commerce Department data released this week, total imports of noble alloys, including ferro-molybdenum, ferro-niobium, ferro-titanium, ferro-vanadium, and ferro-tungsten, fell by 14% to 6,352 metric tons.

- Shipments of ferro-molybdenum from Chile, the primary global supplier, dropped by 19% to 1,887 tons, while imports of South Korea-sourced alloys plunged by 34% to 683 tons.

- Ferro-niobium imports from Canada decreased by 11% to 1,009 tons but were largely offset by a 13% increase in shipments from Brazil, totaling 1,194 tons.

- Consolidated ferro-titanium imports from Eastern Europe—comprising Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine—plummeted by 71% to 123 tons, while U.K. shipments fell by 36% to 267 tons.

- U.S. imports of ferro-vanadium from Austria sank by 61% to 133 tons, though Canadian imports rose by 40% to 402 tons.

- South Korea shipped only 1 ton of ferro-tungsten to the U.S. from April to June, with no imports from regular suppliers Vietnam and Mexico.

US Lithium Salt Imports Decline in 2024 Amid Slower EV Adoption

Lithium Mining

Inventory Destocking and Market Shifts Contribute to Lower Import Figures

The United States saw a significant drop in lithium salt imports in 2024, with total imports falling to 16,170 metric tonnes (t), an 11% decrease compared to the previous year. This decline is attributed to a combination of inventory destocking and slower-than-expected adoption of electric vehicles (EVs).

Factors Behind the Decline in Lithium Salt Imports

The drop in imports can be linked to several factors, including price declines and the limited shelf life of lithium salts. As prices fell, US importers consumed lower stocks, adjusting to market conditions. Additionally, the shift towards lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, which favor lithium carbonate over other lithium salts, further contributed to the decreased demand for lithium oxide and hydroxide.

Impact of Lithium Carbonate and Hydroxide Preferences

Imports of lithium oxide and hydroxide saw a dramatic 25% decrease, amounting to just 705 tonnes in 2024. Meanwhile, imports of lithium carbonate, which is crucial for LFP batteries, dropped by 10% to 15,465 tonnes. This change in battery technology preference has driven the demand for lithium carbonate, particularly as more automakers adopt LFP batteries for their EVs.

Source Countries and Global Lithium Supply Chain

Chile and Argentina played a dominant role in supplying lithium salts to the US, accounting for 98% of the total imports. Chile supplied 9,105 tonnes, while Argentina provided 6,779 tonnes. These two countries remain key players in the global lithium supply chain, with their resources being crucial to meeting the US's demand for lithium salts.

Titanium Exempted from US Tariffs: Aerospace Industry Impact Remains Unclear

Titanium

New US Tariff Exemptions for Titanium Could Affect the Aerospace Supply Chain

On April 2, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced new tariffs on several foreign imports, including an exemption for titanium, titanium scrap, and ferro-titanium. While the exemption helps protect titanium trade, the broader implications for the aerospace industry remain uncertain.

Titanium Exemption and Its Effects

The US tariffs announced include a list of exemptions, with titanium in its various forms being spared. However, other metals like hafnium, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel scrap, and aluminum scrap were not exempted. The new tariff scheme does not affect pre-existing duties on Chinese titanium products, including a 20% duty on titanium products from China, which has been in place since March 4, 2025. Despite the exemption for certain forms of titanium, Chinese titanium sponge imports will still be subject to a 60% duty, which remains unchanged.

Additionally, imports of unwrought titanium from Japan, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia will still face a 15% tariff, though efforts to remove this tariff for sponge imports are underway. For US titanium scrap imports, particularly from the EU and UK, which make up over half of the US intake, the tariff exemption is crucial. Without it, US scrap dealers, processors, and consumers would face substantial challenges, as the US does not produce enough vacuum-grade titanium scrap domestically to meet demand.

Aerospace Industry and Supply Chain Impact

While the titanium exemption provides relief for many manufacturers, the broader impact of the tariffs on the aerospace industry is still unclear. Aerospace manufacturers are uncertain about the tariff's effects on finished parts, components, and engines, particularly regarding supply chains that involve cross-border production of engine parts like the Leap-1A and Leap-1B engines for the A320neo and Boeing 737 Max.

Canada and Mexico were excluded from the new US tariffs, alleviating concerns for companies like Bombardier, Airbus, RTX, and Heroux-Devtek, which operate in those regions. Still, some titanium producers believe the situation could change rapidly, as it is difficult to define the boundaries between parts made from titanium and assembled components that use other materials, such as nickel-based alloys or aluminum.

China’s 34% Tariff on US Exports

In response to US tariffs, China has imposed a 34% tariff on all US imports, which will affect titanium imports from the US. Despite importing limited amounts of titanium from the US, China still relies on US imports for critical aerospace components, including parts for its C919 aircraft. The C919 uses the CFM Leap-1C engine, which is assembled in both the US and France.

India Proposes 12% Safeguard Duty on Steel Imports to Curb Surge

India steel

DGTR Moves to Protect Domestic Mills Amid Import Spike and Global Trade Shifts

India Responds to Steel Import Surge with Temporary Protection

India’s Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) has proposed a 12% provisional safeguard duty on flat steel imports to support the struggling domestic steel industry. The measure, if approved, would remain in effect for 200 days, according to a DGTR notice released on 18 March.

The recommendation comes in response to a sharp rise in imports of hot-rolled coils (HRC), cold-rolled sheets, galvanized, and color-coated steel. The agency cited a “sudden, sharp and significant increase” in volumes that threatens local producers. Indian steel mills had earlier pushed for a higher 25% duty, but the DGTR settled on a lower rate.

Trade Diversion Drives Surge in Imports

The investigation began in December, following a complaint from the Indian Steel Association. The DGTR linked the import surge to trade flow shifts caused by U.S. Section 232 tariffs and similar global protectionist actions. These measures redirected steel exports from major producers like South Korea, China, and Japan toward India.

India turned into a net steel importer in the 2023–24 fiscal year. Between April 2024 and January 2025, finished steel imports rose 21% year-over-year to 8.4 million tonnes, government data show. South Korea led the inflows, followed by China and Japan, who together made up over 75% of total imports.

Selective Exemptions and Domestic Price Reactions

The proposed duty will not apply to HRC imports priced above $675/t cif, offering a price-based exemption. Furthermore, most developing countries will be exempt, except for China and Vietnam, which each account for more than 3% of India’s total steel imports.

The expectation of protectionist measures has already pushed domestic HRC prices higher, reversing the multi-year lows seen earlier in 2024. Market participants had warned of continued price weakness without government intervention.

A final ruling will follow a public hearing, the DGTR said.

Japan’s Imports of Russian Palladium Rise for First Time Since Ukraine Invasion

Russian Palladium

2024 Sees 22% Year-on-Year Growth Despite Lingering Uncertainty

Japan’s palladium imports from Russia increased in 2024 for the first time since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, signaling a potential shift in trade dynamics. According to Japan’s Finance Ministry, total imports reached 12 tonnes, up 22% from the previous year, breaking a six-year streak of decline.

Despite this rebound, it remains uncertain whether Russian deliveries will return to pre-invasion levels of 17–20 tonnes per year. The modest growth comes amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and evolving global trade strategies.

Import Diversification Efforts Appear Short-Lived

Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Japan dramatically cut Russian palladium imports, which fell to 14.5t in 2022 (−19%) and then further to 9.9t in 2023 (−32%). Although palladium was not subject to direct sanctions, Japanese firms voluntarily reduced purchases over stakeholder concerns.

In response, Japan diversified supply in 2022, doubling imports from the U.S. (6.4t) and Italy (1t), while Taiwan and South Korea also saw sharp increases. However, these gains proved short-lived: in 2023, U.S. imports fell by over 50% to 2.8t, Taiwan’s dropped to 56kg, and South Korea’s dropped to 256kg, down 75% from 2022.

Since June 2024, Russian palladium shipments to Japan have exceeded 1 tonne monthly for seven consecutive months, suggesting tentative signs of recovery—but not yet a strong trend.

South Africa Remains Japan’s Dominant Supplier

While Russian supply fluctuates, Japan continues to lean heavily on South Africa, which delivered 23 tonnes in 2024—up 1.7% year-on-year. South Africa now accounts for 58% of Japan’s total palladium imports, marking the third consecutive year above 50%.

Analysts caution that despite recent increases, Japanese imports of Russian palladium are still well below historical averages. Whether a long-term recovery is underway will depend on market signals, policy sentiment, and the global palladium trade environment in 2025 and beyond.