DRC Mine Guard Plan Puts Critical Minerals Security at the Centre of Supply Chains

DRC, Inspectorate of Mines

DRC mine guard plans mark a major escalation in the country’s effort to secure critical minerals supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s General Inspectorate of Mines will develop a paramilitary unit to protect mine sites, ore transport routes, processors and border corridors.

The DRC mine guard will be created as part of a strategic partnership involving the US and UAE. The project is expected to cost up to $100mn and will use existing training facilities.

The DRC mine guard could deploy up to 20,000 troops over the next two years. Recruitment is expected to begin in May, with the first operational contingent of 2,500-3,000 officers targeted for deployment by December.

The plan reflects the growing strategic value of Congolese minerals. The DRC is a major producer of copper, cobalt, tantalum, tin and tungsten, all of which are critical to batteries, electronics, defence systems, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

Mineral Security Becomes a Formal State Priority

The mine guard will be tasked with securing mine sites across the DRC and protecting ore shipments from mines to processors and border posts. It will gradually replace forces currently deployed to defend mining assets.

The unit is expected to cover the Greater Katanga and Greater Eastern regions by the end of 2027. It is then planned to expand to all mining provinces by the end of 2028.

This regional focus is important. Greater Katanga is central to copper and cobalt production, while eastern DRC is tied to several strategic minerals and long-running security challenges.

The plan shows that mineral security is becoming part of formal state policy. Mine protection is no longer only a company-level issue involving private security, local forces or site-specific arrangements.

For producers, a more structured security framework could reduce disruption risk if implemented effectively. It could improve transport reliability, protect export flows and lower exposure to armed interference around mining corridors.

However, execution will be critical. A large paramilitary force operating across mining regions must be governed transparently to avoid creating new operational, political or human-rights risks.

US and UAE Partnership Signals Strategic Minerals Competition

The mine guard plan is linked to a broader US-DRC strategic partnership agreed in December 2025. That agreement included expanded US access to DRC critical minerals and a wider minerals-for-security-style framework.

The agreements were part of the Washington accords, a US-backed peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda designed to reduce conflict in eastern DRC. But fighting has continued, with the Rwanda-backed M23 group still controlling several major towns and mining assets. Rwanda denies backing the group.

This makes the security dimension central to mineral strategy. Western governments want more reliable access to DRC copper, cobalt and other critical minerals, but supply cannot be secured only through offtake agreements or financing.

Physical control of mine sites, transport routes and border flows is becoming just as important as ownership and processing capacity.

For the US, the DRC offers one of the fastest routes to large-scale copper and cobalt supply outside China-dominated value chains. For the DRC, security partnerships could bring funding, international backing and more leverage over strategic mineral flows.

The creation of a mine guard also signals that critical minerals are now treated as national security assets. Copper and cobalt are no longer only mining commodities. They are inputs for batteries, grids, defence manufacturing and geopolitical supply-chain competition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC mine guard plan shows that critical minerals security is moving from boardrooms into the field. The key question is whether this force can protect supply chains without adding new governance risks to one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Could Link DRC Supply to the US Critical Minerals Reserve

Ivanhoe DRC

Kipushi zinc concentrate could become part of a new supply route into the US critical minerals reserve. Ivanhoe Mines is discussing a deal involving Mercuria and Gécamines to channel production from its Kipushi mine toward the United States. The concentrate also contains germanium and gallium, which lifts its strategic value beyond zinc alone. As a result, Kipushi zinc concentrate now sits at the intersection of mining, trading, and US supply chain policy.

This matters because the proposed arrangement is not a standard offtake deal. Mercuria’s offtake would be assigned to the trading division of Gécamines under the structure being discussed. That could give Gécamines access to up to 50pc of the mine’s concentrate production, including sales to the US. Therefore, Kipushi zinc concentrate is becoming part of a broader geopolitical conversation around critical minerals access.

The timing is also important. The discussions come just as Washington launches Project Vault, the new $12bn domestic critical minerals stockpile for US manufacturers. That means the market is no longer talking only about future mine development. It is also talking about how existing production can be redirected into strategic reserve channels.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Carries More Than Zinc Value

Kipushi zinc concentrate stands out because it carries associated critical minerals that matter to advanced industry. The article notes that the material contains quantities of germanium and gallium. Those two metals are increasingly important in electronics, semiconductors, and strategic manufacturing. Consequently, Kipushi zinc concentrate could offer more supply chain value than a typical zinc stream.

That additional value helps explain why the United States could be interested. Project Vault is expected to target critical materials needed by domestic manufacturers, and recent commentary around the reserve has already highlighted metals such as gallium. Therefore, a zinc concentrate stream with embedded strategic by-products could fit well into the reserve’s broader procurement logic.

This also strengthens the DRC’s role in the supply chain discussion. The country is already central to global critical minerals debates because of its copper and cobalt position. Now, DRC zinc concentrate with germanium and gallium content may gain more visibility as western buyers look for diversified supply routes. As a result, Kipushi may become more strategically relevant than its headline zinc volumes first suggest.

US Critical Minerals Reserve Strategy Is Moving Closer to Real Supply Flows

US critical minerals reserve policy is now moving beyond theory and closer to real transactional supply. Project Vault has created a framework for securing non-military critical minerals for domestic manufacturers. Traders such as Mercuria and Traxys are already being linked to that effort. Therefore, the Kipushi discussions show how reserve policy could quickly influence actual commodity flows.

The role of Mercuria and Gécamines is especially important in that context. This is not only about mine ownership. It is also about who controls marketing rights, trading channels, and final destination. That gives the proposed agreement more strategic significance than a conventional sales arrangement. Meanwhile, it shows that state-linked and private trading structures may increasingly work together in critical minerals procurement.

For Ivanhoe, the deal would also align its production with a bigger strategic trend. Western governments and manufacturers are looking for secure access to metals outside heavily concentrated supply chains. If Kipushi zinc concentrate becomes part of that effort, the mine could strengthen its position in both the zinc market and the wider critical minerals conversation. Consequently, this discussion may matter well beyond one offtake contract.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This story is important because it shows how quickly ordinary concentrate flows can become strategic flows. Once zinc concentrate includes metals such as germanium and gallium, the supply chain logic changes. If Project Vault starts drawing in mixed-value materials like Kipushi zinc concentrate, the next phase of critical minerals competition will be shaped as much by offtake design as by mine ownership.

Lobito Corridor Copper and Cobalt Shipment Signals a New Export Route for the DRC

Entreprise Generale du Cobalt

The Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment marks a strategic milestone for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Entreprise Generale du Cobalt and Trafigura agreed the first delivery of copper and cobalt to international markets using the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Initial cargoes will go to customers in the United States. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment strengthens the US-DRC minerals partnership. 

This matters because the shipment is tied to traceable artisanal cobalt. EGC reported production of its first 1,000t of traceable artisanal cobalt in November. Trafigura already markets cobalt supplied by EGC under an existing agreement. Therefore, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment is not only a logistics story. It is also a supply-chain transparency story. 

The route itself is strategically important. The Lobito Atlantic Railway offers the shortest path from Kolwezi to an Atlantic port. Inland transit times can fall to about seven days. Consequently, DRC critical minerals exports could become faster and more visible to international buyers. 

Traceable Artisanal Cobalt Gives the Corridor More Strategic Value

Traceable artisanal cobalt gives this shipment a different significance from a normal export cargo. EGC is mandated by the Congolese state to buy cobalt from artisanal producers. That gives the company a central role in formalising part of the country’s cobalt trade. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment connects logistics reform with artisanal sector reform. 

Trafigura’s role also matters. The trader signed a five-year supply agreement with EGC in 2020. That deal included funding for controlled artisanal mining zones, ore buying stations, and traceability systems aligned with OECD standards. Therefore, this first shipment reflects years of work on controlled sourcing rather than a one-off transaction. 

The wider objective is clear. The partnership aims to formalise artisanal mining, improve transparency, and eliminate child labour. Those goals matter to western buyers seeking more credible cobalt supply. Meanwhile, the new route may make traceable material more commercially attractive by improving export efficiency. 

DRC Critical Minerals Exports Gain a Faster Atlantic Route

DRC critical minerals exports have long faced costly and slow logistics. The Lobito corridor changes that equation by linking the Copperbelt more directly to the Atlantic. The railway runs from Lobito in Angola to the DRC border, with an extension into the Copperbelt. As a result, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment may become a model for wider export diversification. 

The infrastructure backing is also important. The Lar consortium recently secured $753mn in debt financing to support rehabilitation and expansion. That level of support shows that the route is being treated as a strategic trade corridor, not just a regional rail asset. Therefore, DRC critical minerals exports could gain a more durable logistics platform. 

This development also aligns with broader western policy. Initial cargoes are heading to US customers under the US-DRC strategic partnership on critical minerals. That makes the corridor part of a bigger effort to diversify metal flows away from more concentrated supply routes. Consequently, the Lobito corridor copper and cobalt shipment carries geopolitical meaning as well as commercial value. 

The Metalnomist Commentary

This shipment matters because it brings together three themes at once: traceability, logistics, and geopolitics. The DRC is not only trying to export more cobalt and copper. It is trying to export them through routes and systems that western buyers can trust. If Lobito keeps scaling, it could become one of the most important critical minerals corridors outside the traditional China-linked trade flow. 

DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

Gécamines Mercuria copper and cobalt joint venture draws DFC interest for DRC critical minerals

DRC, Critical Minerals

The Gécamines and Mercuria launched the Gécamines Mercuria copper and cobalt joint venture to expand global sales. The Gécamines Mercuria copper and cobalt joint venture targets stronger pricing and broader market access for copper and cobalt. Meanwhile, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation signaled potential support for the partnership.

The Gécamines Mercuria copper and cobalt joint venture also links trade flows to industrial security goals. The proposed structure can give US end-users a right of first refusal on select critical minerals. However, the final terms will matter for buyers that want stable supply and clearer governance.

DFC backing could reshape critical minerals offtake terms

DFC involvement can change how end-users negotiate offtake and inventory strategies. Buyers can use priority access to reduce exposure to price spikes and sudden export controls. As a result, the JV can pull more copper and cobalt into structured, contract-led channels.

The commercial model also raises expectations for traceability and compliance. Traders and producers must prove provenance and responsible practices to keep premium customers. Therefore, operational support must translate into transparent logistics and reliable delivery performance.

Peace diplomacy adds a new variable to Central Africa supply chains

A new diplomatic push can lower perceived risk in regional logistics over time. Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame backed a peace framework after talks in Washington, D.C.. Meanwhile, markets will watch whether stability improves cross-border transport and investment confidence.

However, miners still face scrutiny over ESG and community impacts. Investors will also track permitting and operating conditions for major assets. Therefore, credibility will depend on measured improvements, not announcements.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This JV signals a sharper blend of minerals trading and national security procurement. However, governance quality will decide whether buyers treat it as “de-risked” supply. The winners will deliver verified material with predictable logistics.

Orion Glencore DRC Stake Sale Could Redraw Western Access to Copper and Cobalt

Glencore DRC

The Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could become one of the most important critical minerals deals of the year. Glencore has agreed to a possible sale of 40pc of its Kamoto and Mutanda mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The talks value the two assets at around $9bn. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could reshape western copper and cobalt access.

This matters because the buyer is not a normal financial investor. Orion Critical Mineral Consortium was set up with direct US backing and a clear supply security mission. The group wants long-life production from high-quality mines that can support western industry. Therefore, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale fits a much broader US critical minerals strategy.

The deal also has strategic structure. Orion would gain board seats and the right to route its share of metal to chosen buyers under the US-DRC partnership. Glencore would still keep day-to-day control of the mines. Consequently, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale looks designed to influence supply direction without forcing a full operating transfer.

US Critical Minerals Strategy Is Moving Closer to Producing Assets

US critical minerals strategy is no longer focused only on early-stage projects. Washington has been moving toward assets that are already close to production or already operating. Orion’s earlier Prieska term sheet showed that approach on a smaller scale. This DRC move would take that strategy much further.

Recent US actions support the same pattern. Washington has widened its reach through metal tenders, minimum price tools, and Project Vault. These measures all aim to secure real physical supply, not only future optionality. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale would fit neatly into a larger push for direct control over material flows.

That is especially important for copper and cobalt. Both metals remain essential to electrification, batteries, aerospace, and industrial technology. However, western buyers still face concentrated supply chains and strong Chinese influence. Therefore, any credible route to diversify western copper and cobalt access now carries major geopolitical value.

DRC Cobalt Export Quota and Copper Priorities Are Shaping the Deal

The DRC cobalt export quota is one reason this deal makes sense now. Glencore’s operations remain central to the global cobalt chain, but they are increasingly shaped by policy limits rather than only geology. National exports are capped across 2026 and 2027, and Glencore’s own allocation is limited. Therefore, these mines can produce more cobalt than they can freely sell.

Glencore is also leaning harder into copper. Copper prices strengthened sharply in late 2025 and early 2026, while cobalt operations faced more pressure. The company has already shown it can shift plant time and logistics toward copper when returns are more attractive. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could help Glencore share risk while keeping focus on its preferred metal.

Operational pressure adds another layer. Kamoto and Mutanda have faced lower grades, stoppages, repair work, transport bottlenecks, and policy limits. These are still major assets, but they are no longer simple growth stories. Consequently, bringing in a new partner could help stabilize capital needs while giving western buyers a stronger foothold.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This possible sale matters because it combines geopolitics, mine ownership, and offtake control in one transaction. The bigger issue is not only who owns 40pc. It is who gets to direct future copper and cobalt units from some of the world’s most important DRC assets.

DRC Copper Output Growth Accelerates as Cobalt Exports Collapse

DRC Copper mining

DRC copper output growth strengthened in 2025 as major producers lifted volumes across the country. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced 3.4mn t of copper in 2025, up from 3.1mn t in 2024. That marks a 10pc annual increase. As a result, DRC copper output growth remains one of the most important supply stories in the global copper market.

This increase matters because the DRC is already one of the world’s key copper jurisdictions. Higher output from CMOC, Ivanhoe, and other major operators supported the national result. The country is becoming even more important to global copper supply. Therefore, DRC copper production 2025 confirms the DRC’s rising weight in the energy and industrial metals chain.

CMOC led the market last year. Its Tenke Fungurume mine produced 519,000t of copper, while Kisanfu added 228,000t. Kamoa-Kakula, the joint venture between Ivanhoe and Zijin, produced 400,000t. Consequently, DRC copper output growth is being driven by a concentrated group of very large operations.

DRC Copper Production 2025 Shows Strong Mine-Level Momentum

DRC copper production 2025 reflects strong mine-level performance from the country’s biggest operators. Large-scale projects continued to deliver higher volumes even as the market remained focused on geopolitical risk and resource nationalism. That gives the DRC a stronger position in global copper negotiations. As a result, copper is becoming an even more strategic pillar of the country’s mining economy.

This growth also improves the DRC’s relevance to western supply chains. Copper demand remains closely tied to electrification, grid buildout, and industrial investment. Countries and companies looking for large-scale copper supply cannot ignore the DRC. Therefore, DRC copper output growth is not only a mining statistic. It is a strategic supply-chain signal.

Congo Cobalt Export Ban Has Changed the Other Side of the Metals Story

Congo cobalt export ban created a very different picture for the country’s other key battery metal. Cobalt shipments fell by almost 80pc in 2025 because of the export restriction. The government imposed the ban after global oversupply drove cobalt prices to record lows. As a result, the DRC used policy intervention to support value rather than pure export volume.

This matters because the DRC remains the world’s largest cobalt producer. Cobalt is still important for electric vehicles and electronics, even as battery chemistry trends evolve. The government has since moved toward a quota system after the export ban. Therefore, Congo cobalt export ban shows that the DRC is willing to manage supply more actively when market conditions weaken.

The US-DRC minerals agreement adds another strategic layer. Officials said the December cooperation deal could improve investor confidence in minerals exploration. The agreement gives the United States preferential status to source critical minerals from the DRC and process them for global markets. Consequently, the DRC is trying to combine stronger copper growth with deeper geopolitical relevance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC now presents two very different metals stories at once. Copper is expanding through giant mines, while cobalt is being managed through policy restraint. That combination shows the country is no longer just a resource exporter. It is becoming a more active force in shaping how critical minerals reach the global market.

Mercuria Metals Project Financing Push Deepens Critical Minerals Strategy

Mercuria Metals

Mercuria metals project financing is set to increase sharply this year as the Swiss energy trader expands its role in copper, cobalt and other critical minerals. Chief executive Marco Dunand said the company will substantially increase pre-financing for mining projects, working more closely with producers and governments.

Mercuria metals project financing has become a major growth pillar since the company created its metals division in 2023. The unit began with copper in Zambia before expanding into cobalt and other strategic materials.

Mercuria metals project financing now supports a business that accounts for nearly 20% of group turnover. The company has already deployed almost $2bn, mainly in copper deals, and sees further growth in its project pipeline.

The strategy reflects a wider shift in commodity trading. Traders are no longer only moving material between buyers and sellers. They are increasingly financing production, securing offtake and shaping strategic mineral flows before material reaches the market.

Copper and Critical Minerals Move Trading Closer to Mining

Mercuria’s metals expansion started with copper because the market faces structural supply pressure. Copper demand is rising from grids, electrification, data centres, renewable energy and industrial policy, while new mine supply remains difficult to develop.

Pre-financing gives Mercuria earlier access to material. By front-loading capital, the company can support producers while securing commercial positions in future supply.

This model is becoming more important as mining projects require larger capital commitments. Producers need liquidity for development, operations and expansion. Traders that can provide capital can gain offtake, marketing rights and long-term supply relationships.

Mercuria is also moving into cobalt and other critical minerals. These markets are smaller than copper but strategically important for batteries, superalloys, semiconductors, defence systems and advanced manufacturing.

The company’s partnership with Gecamines in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows this direction. Mercuria is working with the state miner to market critical minerals such as gallium and germanium from the Kipushi mine.

Gallium and germanium are high-value minor metals with concentrated supply chains and growing strategic importance. Their inclusion shows that Mercuria is targeting not only bulk base metals, but also thinly traded materials where supply security commands a premium.

Government Partnerships Become Strategic Supply Tools

Mercuria is expanding joint ventures with governments, including partnerships in Zambia and the DRC. This matters because critical minerals supply is increasingly shaped by state policy, not only commercial contracting.

Resource-rich governments want more value from minerals. Buyers want secure supply. Traders can sit between them by providing financing, logistics, marketing and access to global customers.

The model also fits a period of rising geopolitical competition. Western governments and manufacturers are looking for alternatives to China-linked supply chains, especially in copper, cobalt, gallium, germanium and other strategic materials.

Mercuria plans to raise at least $200mn in new financing in Asia to support liquidity. The company said sovereign firms, private equity and banks have strong appetite to finance metals projects.

The financing requirement highlights one important trade-off. Metals project financing can create stronger strategic positions, but it is more cash-intensive than traditional trading. It requires balance-sheet capacity, risk management and long-term confidence in mineral demand.

Mercuria said it does not expect regulatory constraints to limit expansion. That confidence suggests the company sees strong institutional demand for capital-backed critical minerals strategies.

For metals markets, the implications are significant. Trading houses with capital can influence which projects advance, which producers receive liquidity and where future metal flows are directed.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mercuria’s strategy shows that critical minerals trading is becoming a financing business. The winners will be firms that can combine capital, offtake, government relationships and supply-chain control before the market tightens further.

Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding strengthens African critical minerals pipeline

Ivanhoe Mines

The Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding will inject fresh capital into one of Africa’s most important critical minerals portfolios. Ivanhoe Mines plans to raise $500mn from the Qatar Investment Authority through a 57.5mn share issue. As a result, the Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding will support exploration, development and mining across copper, zinc, PGMs and other critical minerals in southern Africa.

Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding underpins growth after Kamoa-Kakula setback

The Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding gives the Canadian miner balance sheet strength at a sensitive moment. Ivanhoe will issue new shares at C$12 each, equal to about 4pc of its total equity. Therefore, the QIA secures a meaningful strategic foothold in a multi-asset African growth story.

Capital will help offset the impact of weaker guidance at the flagship Kamoa-Kakula copper complex in the DRC. The project now expects 370,000–420,000t of copper in concentrate this year. This range is almost 30pc below the initial 520,000–580,000t outlook, after Ivanhoe suspended mining in some areas because of seismic activity. However, Kamoa-Kakula remains one of the world’s lowest-cost, largest-scale copper growth engines.

Funding supports broader African critical minerals portfolio

The Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding will not only stabilise Kamoa-Kakula but also advance other key assets. Ivanhoe intends to channel part of the proceeds into exploration and development of “critical minerals” across its portfolio. This portfolio includes copper, zinc, lead, germanium and platinum group metals.

In the DRC, the Kipushi mine has restarted as a zinc-copper-lead-germanium operation. The asset offers high-grade feed into markets sensitive to supply disruptions and ESG performance. Meanwhile, in South Africa, the Platreef project is moving toward first production in the fourth quarter. Platreef will add large-scale PGM, nickel and copper output, reinforcing Ivanhoe’s exposure to energy transition and automotive catalysts.

By backing this broader platform, the QIA diversifies beyond a single copper asset. Therefore, the Ivanhoe QIA $500mn funding represents a long-term bet on Africa as a core supplier of critical minerals. It also highlights the growing role of Gulf sovereign wealth in shaping mining capital flows.

The Metalnomist Commentary

QIA’s entry confirms Ivanhoe’s position as one of the most strategically important miners in the African copper and critical minerals space. The funding cushions near-term production setbacks while keeping long-dated projects like Platreef and Kipushi on track. Market participants should watch how quickly Ivanhoe converts this capital into stable output growth, especially as copper markets tighten and geopolitical competition for African resources intensifies.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

KoBold lithium permits in DRC intensify Manono stakes and battery-metal geopolitics

KoBold lithium

KoBold lithium permits in DRC widened the US start-up’s footprint with seven new exploration titles. The KoBold lithium permits in DRC cover lithium and other strategic minerals in Manono and Malemba Nkulu. As a result, KoBold lithium permits in DRC raise the project’s profile and the geopolitical temperature.

Manono resource scale and contested ownership

Manono ranks among the largest undeveloped lithium deposits. Estimates range from 400mn to 669mn tonnes of ore. At 1pc lithium, output could support 500mn to 1bn EV batteries. However, ownership remains contested around Dathcom and overlapping licences. AVZ claims at least 70pc of Dathcom after an ICC ruling. The firm also challenges a Zijin-linked permit overlap. Boundaries for KoBold’s new permits are not fully confirmed.

US critical minerals strategy and DRC governance risks

KoBold’s move aligns with a wider US push for critical minerals. The company signed a non-binding deal to buy AVZ’s Manono stake in May. That would mark the first significant US investment in DRC mining since 2016. Meanwhile, China’s position in African battery metals remains strong. Therefore, the permits add competition for future supply chains. Yet governance risks in the DRC stay material. Overlapping claims and opaque negotiations threaten timelines and capital discipline.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The permits strengthen KoBold’s options but do not resolve Manono’s legal knots. Watch licence boundary confirmations, arbitration outcomes, and any shift in offtake diplomacy as OEMs seek secure spodumene exposure.

DRC-Rwanda minerals pact aims to stabilise 3T supply chains

DRC-Rwanda minerals

The DRC-Rwanda minerals pact follows a US-brokered peace deal. Both governments pledged to respect borders and stop supporting armed groups. The DRC-Rwanda minerals pact launches a regional integration framework for investment. It targets transparent supply chains for tantalum, tungsten and tin. The agreement aims to restore stability after 18 months of disruption.

Supply risks and market impact

Conflict shut key monitored mine sites across eastern DRC. M23 seized Rubaya and advanced on Goma and Bukavu earlier this year. As a result, 3T concentrate flows tightened and logistics stalled. Traders face uncertainty until export channels clear under the pact.

US bilateral minerals deals may follow the peace agreement. Therefore, buyers could gain clearer access and improved traceability. Producers may restart shipments once security improves in North and South Kivu. However, timelines depend on enforcement and local compliance.

What changes for responsible sourcing

The pact prioritises investment and transparency across critical mineral supply chains. Meanwhile, miners expect oversight to separate legal output from illicit material. This could reduce price volatility for tantalum, tungsten and tin. The DRC-Rwanda minerals pact, if implemented, strengthens ethical sourcing claims.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The peace framework creates a pathway, but execution remains decisive. Investors should watch border security, export procedures, and on-site audits. If governance holds, premiums for verified 3T units may compress.

DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Could Reshape Tantalum Supply Chains

DRC Rwanda

Focus keyphrase: DRC-Rwanda peace deal

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal marks a turning point for mineral supply chains disrupted by over a year of regional conflict. On June 27, ministers from both nations are scheduled to sign a US- and Qatar-brokered draft agreement aimed at stabilizing eastern DRC. The agreement outlines disengagement of armed groups, territorial safeguards, and regional economic integration — all critical for restoring confidence in monitored mineral flows, especially tantalum.

However, market sentiment remains cautious as details about US investments are unclear and security conditions on the ground are still unstable. Even with this draft peace deal, many buyers and refiners continue to hesitate, concerned about conflict minerals and opaque sourcing risks. The tantalum supply chain — heavily dependent on artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in North Kivu — faces ongoing due diligence challenges.

Peace Agreement Tied to Strategic Mineral Talks with the US

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal lays the groundwork for potential US-DRC mineral agreements, which could reshape global sourcing strategies. DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Senator Pierre Kanda Kalambayi previously proposed a comprehensive minerals security deal with the US. The proposal includes extraction rights for US firms, control of the Banana deepwater port, a strategic stockpile, and military training partnerships.

If these proposals materialize, the DRC could see increased foreign investment in downstream processing, moving the country beyond raw mineral exports. However, the scope of actual US commitments and their implementation timeline remain unclear. This uncertainty limits the immediate bullish response from industrial buyers and critical mineral traders.

Tantalum Markets Still Disrupted by Rebel-Controlled Territory

Despite diplomatic progress, M23’s control of eastern DRC territory continues to threaten tantalum supply chains. The seizure of Rubaya, Goma, and Bukavu has cut off major sources of monitored tantalite. These areas are key hubs for tantalum exports, and their occupation has introduced smuggled material into global supply streams, complicating OECD-aligned due diligence efforts.

Until secure logistics corridors and third-party verification systems are reestablished, tantalum refiners and electronics manufacturers may turn to alternative suppliers or delay sourcing decisions. For now, smuggling and instability keep price volatility high and certification efforts constrained.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC-Rwanda peace deal is a long-needed diplomatic step, but its impact hinges on actual demilitarization and foreign engagement. Unless mineral security frameworks become enforceable, trust in DRC-origin material will remain fragile. The tantalum market, in particular, demands verified sourcing channels to rebuild supply chain confidence.

IXM cobalt force majeure highlights DRC export ban risks

IXM cobalt

Switzerland-based IXM has declared force majeure on its cobalt deliveries from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The announcement follows the DRC government’s decision to extend its cobalt export ban until September. This IXM cobalt force majeure underscores the rising risks in global cobalt supply chains.

Export ban pressures cobalt markets

The DRC cobalt export ban, first enacted in February, was designed to stabilize prices amid oversupply. However, its extension has made it “legally and practically impossible” for IXM suppliers, including Tenke Fungurume Mining and Kisanfu Mining, to ship material. IXM, owned by China Molybdenum (CMOC), said it could no longer meet customer obligations. As a result, no forward deliveries are guaranteed.

Market uncertainty and supply chain risks

The IXM cobalt force majeure does not halt mining production but blocks exports, which could lead to significant stockpiling inside the DRC. Market participants warn that inventories of intermediate products could be exhausted by March if the ban continues. CMOC, the world’s largest cobalt producer, aims to deliver 100,000–120,000t of cobalt this year, but much of it may never reach international buyers.

IXM global head of refined metal Tom Mackay called for “responsibility and certainty” in addressing the ban, reflecting industry frustration over the lack of clarity. The IXM cobalt force majeure highlights the vulnerability of downstream industries — from EV battery makers to aerospace suppliers — to geopolitical and regulatory shocks in the DRC, which controls the bulk of global cobalt output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The IXM cobalt force majeure represents a structural stress point in critical minerals supply chains. With the DRC holding overwhelming cobalt dominance, the extension of its export ban will likely intensify calls for diversification of supply sources and acceleration of recycling projects in North America, Europe, and Asia.

ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement tightens grip on DRC copper flows

ERG

The new ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement deepens trading control over Democratic Republic of Congo copper flows. Under the deal, Mercuria will prepay up to $100mn to ERG in return for a three-year secured copper supply stream. This ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement reinforces trade-finance links between miners and global commodity traders at a time of tightening credit conditions.

Prepayment structure anchors ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement

The agreement centres on structured prepayments that lock in volumes from ERG’s DRC assets. Frontier remains ERG’s main copper site in the country, providing primary concentrates and metal to back the ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement. Meanwhile, Metalkol reprocesses legacy tailings, supplying both copper and cobalt into global battery and alloy markets.

Mercuria’s prepayment reduces ERG’s funding risk and secures long-term offtake. As a result, the ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement strengthens both sides’ balance sheets by matching upstream production visibility with downstream marketing reach. The structure follows a proven model in commodity trade finance, where traders exchange early capital for future physical flows.

DRC copper, cobalt and ferrochrome in a strategic portfolio

ERG already ranks as a major producer of cobalt and ferrochrome, alongside its copper and iron ore businesses. Therefore the new deal gives Mercuria broader optionality across critical minerals and base metals exposure, starting with copper from the DRC. Frontier and Metalkol sit within a wider African portfolio that feeds global smelting, refining and battery precursor capacity.

However, growing reliance on DRC output keeps ESG, logistics and regulatory risk firmly in focus for both partners. Supply security, community relations and power availability will remain key constraints on how far the ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement can scale. Still, the deal underlines ongoing appetite from traders to tie up strategic volumes at the mine gate.

Focus keyphrases: ERG Mercuria copper supply agreement, DRC copper supply, Frontier copper mine, Metalkol cobalt and copper, commodity trade finance

The Metalnomist Commentary

This agreement highlights how prepay-backed copper offtakes remain central to funding DRC assets in a higher-rate world. By tightening links between ERG and Mercuria, the deal concentrates marketing power over high-grade African copper at a time of structural energy transition demand. For OEMs and smelters, it is another reminder that access to units increasingly runs through a handful of well-capitalised traders.

Goma Falls to Rebels, Sparking Regional War Fears

DRC

The DRC's mining hub, Goma, now falls under M23 control, escalating regional tensions. This takeover disrupts vital mineral supplies and raises fears of a wider conflict.

Mineral Supply Disrupted by Rebel Takeover

The M23 militant group seized Goma, a crucial mineral trading center for tantalum, tin, and tungsten. Consequently, this action directly impacts the global supply of these critical metals. North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, key producing regions, face severe disruption. Specifically, the DRC, a major tantalum concentrate producer, saw M23 seize Rubaya and Masisi territory earlier in 2024. Furthermore, the UN reports widespread illegal mining and human rights abuses, transforming these minerals into "conflict minerals."

Regional Conflict Threatens Energy Projects

Additionally, the conflict jeopardizes energy projects in the region. For instance, Rwanda's oil and gas development plans near Lake Kivu are at risk. Similarly, Uganda's oil fields, developed by TotalEnergies and CNOOC, face potential destabilization. Moreover, the DRC's own oil and gas blocks near Lake Kivu and Lake Albert are also under threat. Consequently, diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda have reached a critical low, with the DRC withdrawing diplomats and closing Rwanda's consulate. Ultimately, the UN and the US call for urgent dialogue to prevent further escalation.

DRC Miner Gecamines Set to Ship First Germanium Concentrates Amid Tight Global Supply

Gecamines

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) state-owned mining company, Gécamines, is poised to make its first-ever shipment of germanium concentrates, marking a significant milestone in the global supply chain for this critical mineral. The shipment will be exported to Umicore, a Belgian metals processor, for refining into high-tech downstream products.

A Strategic Move Amid a Global Germanium Crunch

Gécamines’ germanium concentrates are sourced from the Big Hill tailings site in Lubumbashi, a location that holds approximately 10 million tonnes of metal slag. The tailings contain valuable recoverable metals such as zinc, silver, cobalt, and copper, alongside germanium.

The company’s subsidiary, STL, recently established a state-of-the-art hydrometallurgical plant at Lubumbashi to process these tailings. This partnership with Umicore, formalized in May, involves both technological collaboration and an offtake agreement, ensuring a streamlined supply of germanium for the Belgian company.

This development is particularly significant as global germanium availability has been constrained since China, the world’s leading producer, introduced export controls in August 2023. As a result, China’s germanium exports dropped by 56% year-on-year between January and July 2024, totaling just 15,277 kilograms.

Market Dynamics: Rising Demand and Tight Supply

Germanium, a vital mineral for high-tech industries such as semiconductors, fiber optics, and infrared optics, has seen skyrocketing demand. The supply restrictions, coupled with China’s national stockpiling efforts and reduced feedstock from domestic zinc and lead mines, have caused a global supply crunch. Prices for germanium surged dramatically during the summer of 2024, underscoring the urgency for alternative sources.

The shipment from Gécamines and its collaboration with Umicore signals a shift towards diversified germanium sourcing, which could help stabilize the market. By leveraging its Big Hill reserves, the DRC could emerge as a significant player in the critical minerals sector.

KoBold to Acquire Stake in Manono Lithium Project Amid US Push into DRC

Manono lithium

First major US lithium investment in DRC since 2016

KoBold Manono lithium project investment marks a strategic entry by the U.S.-based startup into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), securing critical battery metals amid intensifying global competition. KoBold Metals will acquire AVZ Minerals’ stake in the Manono lithium deposit—one of the world’s largest undeveloped hard rock lithium assets.

Over $1 billion planned for Western market access

KoBold, backed by prominent investors such as Breakthrough Energy Ventures, plans to invest over $1 billion to develop and commercialize Manono’s lithium supply chain for Western markets. This deal represents the first significant U.S. mining investment in the DRC since 2016, reinforcing U.S. efforts to diversify lithium sourcing away from China.

Dispute with Zijin Mining still unresolved

However, the Manono project remains entangled in an ownership dispute. Chinese firm Zijin Mining also claims rights to the project and is aiming for a 2026 production start. As part of the new agreement, AVZ will propose a temporary suspension of arbitration proceedings at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to facilitate negotiations. AVZ had earlier revised its joint venture with Suzhou CATH, granting CATH rights to purchase all spodumene output from Manono.

The Metalnomist Commentary

KoBold’s move into the Manono lithium project signals growing geopolitical urgency in securing battery metals outside China’s orbit. While the ownership dispute introduces short-term uncertainty, the scale of investment suggests long-term U.S. commitment to Africa’s critical mineral assets.

ITSCI Halts Tagging in Key DRC Mining Zones Amid Escalating Conflict

DRC

Security Crisis Forces Temporary Suspension of Mineral Traceability Operations in North and South Kivu

The International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) has suspended its due diligence and traceability operations in parts of North Kivu and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), citing serious security concerns. This decision follows the rapid territorial advance of the M23 rebel group, which seized control of North Kivu’s capital, Goma, on January 27.

Mineral Supply Chain Disrupted as Conflict Escalates

Amid the worsening conflict, both artisanal miners and state agencies have fled several mining sites across the affected provinces. ITSCI confirmed that it has suspended tagging activities in the Numbi sector of South Kivu, after M23 extended its control to the trading towns of Lumbishi and Numbi in Kalehe territory and began moving toward Nyabibwe. Despite these developments, ITSCI continues operations in other parts of Kalehe and South Kivu, maintaining a strong monitoring presence.

Operations Remain Active in Stable Regions

Although some operations have paused, ITSCI field teams remain active in Goma to assess and respond to the evolving situation. In Walikale territory, which has remained stable so far, the program’s traceability and due diligence activities are operating normally. ITSCI plays a critical role in verifying the supply chain for tin, tungsten, and tantalum—known as the 3Ts—across the Great Lakes region, ensuring compliance with responsible sourcing standards.

This disruption poses significant implications for the global 3T minerals market, as the DRC is a major source of these critical raw materials used in electronics and manufacturing. Stakeholders will closely watch developments in the region, as continued instability could impact global supply chains.

ITSCI Withdraws from Walikale Amid M23 Conflict, Tantalum Supply Tightens

ITSCI, DRC

M23 Takeover Forces ITSCI Exit from Key Mining Territory

The International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) has halted operations in Walikale, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This withdrawal follows the March takeover of the region by the M23 rebel group, escalating risks for artisanal mining activities. Walikale is a key sourcing area for conflict minerals, particularly tantalum, tin, and tungsten, collectively known as the 3Ts.

Supply of Tantalum and Tin Faces Further Pressure

ITSCI’s withdrawal adds to earlier suspensions in other North and South Kivu territories, worsening supply disruptions. The DRC is a major global producer of tantalum, and traceable material from this region is critical to many buyers. As a result, spot prices for 25% minimum tantalite have jumped 26% since January, now trading at $95–102/lb cif main port.

Tin Prices Climb Following Closure of Alphamin's Bisie Mine

Meanwhile, US-based Alphamin suspended production and evacuated its Bisie tin mine in Walikale due to growing insecurity. This high-grade tin mine is among the largest in the DRC and has played a pivotal role in global tin supply. Tin futures on the LME have risen 14% since the mine's closure, highlighting the market’s sensitivity to regional conflict.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The exit of ITSCI from Walikale underscores the fragility of critical mineral supply chains in conflict zones. With both traceability and production disrupted, supply-side shocks are expected to ripple across electronics and defense sectors. As the geopolitical stakes rise, so too will the pressure on downstream companies to secure ethical and resilient sourcing.