US New Tariffs Could Disrupt China's Non-Exempt Metals Exports

China Tariffs

New tariffs on lithium, rare earth magnets, and more could affect China's metal exports to the US.

The United States has announced significant new tariffs on Chinese imports, with a notable focus on metals. While many non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys have been exempted, some crucial exports from China, like lithium, rare earth magnets, and lithium-ion batteries, will face substantial increases in tariff rates. These changes are set to have a lasting impact on the trade between the US and China, especially in the energy storage and electric vehicle (EV) sectors.

High Tariffs on Lithium-Ion Batteries and Energy Storage

As of April 9, the US will implement an 82.4% tariff on electric vehicle (EV) power batteries and a 57.4% tariff on non-EV lithium-ion batteries from China. This substantial hike in tariffs will make Chinese-made batteries far more expensive and may eliminate the possibility of Chinese EV power batteries entering the US market. US consumers will likely absorb these costs, potentially leading to inflation in the US battery industry, especially in the energy storage sector.

China’s lithium-ion battery exports to the US had already been on the rise, with a 59% increase in exports during the first two months of the year. However, these new tariffs are expected to curb the growth of China's battery exports to the US and negatively affect lithium feedstock prices, which are currently at a four-year low.

Impact on Rare Earth Magnets

Rare earth magnets are another key area of concern, as these products were not exempted from the new tariffs. Despite some uncertainty about the exact tariff implementation, producers in China are anxious about the potential 54% tariff on rare earth magnets. China remains the dominant supplier of rare earth magnets globally, and while the US does have some alternatives, they are mostly focused on military applications with significantly higher prices. This makes it unlikely that the US can fully escape its dependence on China, especially for civilian applications.

China’s exports of rare earth magnets to the US in 2022 accounted for 12% of its total exports, and while tariffs could reduce this figure, China’s competitive pricing in the civil sector ensures its continued dominance in the global market.

Copper, Aluminium, and Hafnium: Other Affected Metals

While copper and aluminium are exempt from this latest round of tariffs, the copper industry remains on edge. US authorities are investigating the potential security implications of copper imports, and there’s speculation that a tariff may be imposed in the future. As for aluminium, Chinese exports are already subject to a steep 70% tariff, which is expected to discourage further aluminium exports to the US, pushing Chinese suppliers to seek alternative markets.

Hafnium, a critical metal used in aerospace applications, will also face a significant tariff hike, moving from 34% to 79%. This change could prompt US buyers to source hafnium from other regions, like Rotterdam, where the tariff is considerably lower.

Conclusion

The new US tariffs on Chinese metals exports are set to reshape the global metals market, particularly for lithium-ion batteries, rare earth magnets, and hafnium. While some sectors, like copper and aluminium, may have avoided immediate tariff hikes, long-term implications for the industry remain uncertain. The tariff increase on key metal exports from China to the US is expected to alter supply chains and increase costs for US consumers, especially in the EV and energy storage markets.

China Titanium Sponge Exports Rise in March as Asian Buyers Support Demand

China Titanium Sponge

China titanium sponge exports rose year on year in March, supported by stronger buying interest from South Korea, India, Vietnam and Slovenia. Chinese customs data showed exports reached 453t during the month, up 8.6% from 417t a year earlier.

China titanium sponge exports still declined by 7.4% from February’s 489t, showing that overseas buying remained selective. Some buyers were not under immediate pressure to purchase Chinese material because spot supply was sufficient.

China titanium sponge exports totalled 1,535t in January-March, down 5.7% from a year earlier. The decline reflected weaker buying from major consumers including Japan, South Korea and the US.

The data show a titanium sponge export market that is recovering unevenly. Asian demand helped March shipments, but inventory drawdowns, delayed purchasing and weaker aerospace-linked orders continued to limit broader export momentum.

Japan, South Korea and US Demand Weaken in First Quarter

Japan remained the largest destination for Chinese titanium sponge in January-March, receiving 347t. However, shipments fell by 37% from 548t a year earlier.

The decline was mainly caused by delayed purchasing from a major Japanese consumer. Purchases are expected to resume in May, which could support later-quarter export flows.

South Korean imports from China also fell. Shipments dropped by 33% to 172t as some buyers slowed procurement after failing to secure downstream aerospace original equipment manufacturer orders.

This matters because aerospace demand remains one of the most important drivers of higher-grade titanium sponge consumption. When downstream aerospace orders are delayed, sponge buyers often reduce spot intake and work through inventories.

US demand was almost absent in the first quarter. China exported only 0.2t of titanium sponge to the US, down 99.8% from a year earlier, as US consumers continued drawing down inventories.

The US result highlights the effect of inventory cycles and trade uncertainty. Even when Chinese material remains available, buyers may delay purchases if they have sufficient stock or face qualification, tariff and policy risk.

Export Prices Track Higher Domestic Sponge Market

Chinese 99.7% grade titanium sponge export prices averaged $6.70/kg fob China in January-March. This was up 1.5% from $6.60/kg a year earlier.

The increase tracked higher domestic titanium sponge prices. Export pricing therefore reflected cost support in China rather than a broad surge in overseas demand.

The modest price rise also shows that the market remains balanced. Chinese suppliers have support from domestic costs, but overseas buyers are still cautious and selective.

For global titanium supply chains, the key issue is not only volume. The quality, qualification status and end-use requirements of sponge matter, especially for aerospace and high-performance industrial applications.

China’s titanium sponge exports remain important for regional buyers in Asia and Europe. However, demand from aerospace-linked customers will depend on downstream order visibility, inventory levels and qualification confidence.

If Japanese buying resumes in May and South Korean aerospace-related demand improves, Chinese exports could recover further. But weak US flows suggest that trade and inventory factors will continue to limit upside in some markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China titanium sponge exports show a market supported by regional buying but still constrained by aerospace order timing and inventory drawdowns. The next signal will come from whether Japanese and South Korean buyers return with stronger qualified-material demand in the second quarter.

Acute Tungsten Shortage Drives Record Prices Across Global Supply Chains

Tungsten

The acute tungsten shortage is pushing global tungsten prices to record highs in 2026. Supply remains extremely tight across concentrate, APT, and downstream products. Low inventories and restricted Chinese export licences are worsening the squeeze. As a result, the acute tungsten shortage is becoming one of the most severe specialty metals disruptions in the market.

The current problem starts at the raw material level. Global production of tungsten concentrates has declined, while available western supply remains far below demand. Market participants now describe an estimated shortfall of around 13,000t of contained tungsten in the western market. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is no longer a regional issue. It is a structural supply crisis.

Pricing shows how quickly the market has tightened. Tungsten concentrate prices in Rotterdam surged to record levels in late January. European APT prices also climbed sharply as concentrate costs and export restrictions combined. Consequently, global tungsten prices are rising across the entire value chain.

Chinese Supply Constraints Are Tightening the Tungsten Concentrate Shortage

Chinese supply constraints remain the core driver of the tungsten concentrate shortage. China produces about 80pc of global tungsten supply and still dominates export availability. However, domestic ore shortages have intensified after mine shutdowns and weak new project development. Meanwhile, China’s 2025 mining quota fell from the previous year.

Trade data reinforces that tightening pattern. Chinese exports of tungsten concentrate declined sharply in 2025, while Chinese imports rose strongly. That means even China is pulling in more raw material to support its own processing base. As a result, less material is reaching overseas buyers.

APT export licences have added another bottleneck. Western customers may secure limited licences, but actual shipment still depends on concentrate availability. That creates a second layer of uncertainty on top of already weak feedstock supply. Therefore, the tungsten concentrate shortage is now feeding directly into delayed APT deliveries and higher prices.

Consumers are also paying much more for feedstock. Payables for concentrate have risen sharply as buyers compete for scarce supply. That shift reflects a market where sellers hold stronger leverage and buyers have fewer alternatives. Consequently, procurement conditions are becoming more difficult even for experienced consumers.

Japan and Europe Face Growing Pressure as Recycling Lags Demand

Japan and Europe are now feeling the full pressure of the acute tungsten shortage. Europe faces critically tight APT availability because it depends heavily on Chinese supply and licensing. Japan faces similar pressure after new Chinese restrictions on dual-use exports added more uncertainty. Therefore, both regions are competing harder for a smaller pool of material.

Japan’s position is especially sensitive. The country has no domestic tungsten mining base and depends heavily on imported tungsten products. Buyers are now seeking tungsten-containing scrap, but that market is also tight. As a result, recycling cannot yet solve the immediate supply problem.

Recycling capacity may grow, but it will take time. Japan is expanding tungsten recycling capability in response to lower Chinese exports. However, significant new output will not arrive quickly. Meanwhile, downstream consumers still need metal today, not years from now.

This means the market will likely remain strained for some time. Concentrate shortages, limited export licences, and weak scrap availability are all reinforcing one another. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is likely to keep global tungsten prices elevated unless primary supply improves materially.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tungsten is now showing how vulnerable specialty metal supply chains become when one country dominates both mining and exports. This market is not just tight. It is structurally exposed. Unless new western supply or faster recycling emerges, tungsten buyers may face prolonged price pressure and continued allocation risk.

China Tungsten Exports Resume in Europe with Limited Volumes

China Tungsten

China tungsten exports restarted in European markets for the first time since February stoppages, though shipment volumes remain constrained at maximum 1 tonne per delivery. The resumption of China tungsten exports follows months of supply disruption caused by Chinese export controls announced February 4th, creating acute shortages for US and European buyers dependent on tungsten ingots for defense and industrial applications.

Small-Scale Shipments Signal Cautious Market Re-entry

China tungsten exports currently originate primarily from smaller state-owned manufacturers rather than major producers. Market sources report receiving new shipments in Rotterdam while additional material remains in transit to European destinations. However, volumes stay extremely limited compared to pre-control periods, reflecting continued regulatory uncertainty and cautious export policies from Chinese suppliers.

Meanwhile, delivery timelines extend significantly with current orders potentially shipping in July for immediate purchases. Traders quote current prices at $56 per kilogram on a cost-insurance-freight basis, representing substantial increases from historical levels. The extended lead times demonstrate supply chain disruptions that persist despite the resumption of limited export activities.

Export Controls Create Ongoing Market Uncertainty

However, tungsten metal products face complex regulatory environments despite not appearing on initial dual-use licensing lists. While other tungsten products required explicit export licenses from February 4th, tungsten ingots experienced de facto export halts through administrative restrictions. This regulatory ambiguity creates persistent uncertainty for international buyers seeking reliable supply sources.

Therefore, US and European buyers continue struggling to secure sufficient alternative tungsten sources outside Chinese production. The global tungsten market's dependence on Chinese suppliers becomes evident through months of supply shortages following export control implementation. Alternative sourcing efforts prove inadequate for meeting industrial demand requirements across defense and manufacturing sectors.

Tight European Market Maintains Price Pressure

Furthermore, European tungsten markets remain extremely tight with minimal warehouse inventory available for immediate delivery. Limited stock levels mean small resumptions in Chinese exports cannot immediately relieve price pressures or supply constraints. Market participants describe conditions as "total lottery" scenarios where securing tungsten ingots depends largely on timing and supplier relationships.

As a result, prompt tungsten prices maintain elevated levels despite the resumption of small-scale Chinese shipments. The constrained supply environment supports premium pricing while buyers compete for limited available material. Industrial consumers face continued procurement challenges that affect production planning and cost structures across tungsten-dependent manufacturing sectors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China's limited tungsten export resumption highlights the persistent vulnerability of global supply chains dependent on single-source suppliers for critical materials, particularly when geopolitical tensions influence trade policies. The constrained volumes and regulatory uncertainty demonstrate how export controls can fundamentally reshape commodity markets, forcing Western buyers to reassess supply security strategies for defense-critical materials like tungsten.

China’s Predatory Steel Exports : A Threat to Latin America

The Latin American steel industry is grappling with a severe crisis precipitated by China’s predatory trade practices. The influx of cheap Chinese steel has flooded the market, imperiling local producers' livelihoods. Gabriela Fajardo Mejia, an expert in international relations at the University of Navarra, highlighted in her interview with Diálogo Américas that China’s steel overproduction endangers 1.4 million jobs across Latin America’s steel sector, compelling numerous companies to cease operations and lay off workers. Furthermore, Chinese steel production often bypasses established environmental and quality standards, with transparency regulations being routinely ignored.

Henry Ziemer, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pointed out that China's slowdown in real estate and construction has diminished domestic steel demand. Consequently, Chinese producers are compensating for reduced domestic sales through aggressive export strategies. With the U.S. market becoming increasingly inhospitable for Chinese steelmakers, they are now targeting Latin American countries, which present fewer trade barriers, to dispose of their surplus inventory.

The Chinese government's subsidies for steel production and exports during the pandemic exacerbated the issue, leading to a global proliferation of low-cost Chinese steel. In retaliation, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil have significantly raised tariffs on Chinese steel imports to safeguard their domestic industries, and other nations are expected to follow suit. Alejandro Wagner, the former Secretary-General of the Latin American Steel Association (Alacero), indicated in a BBC interview that the influx of inexpensive Chinese steel has caused significant damage to Latin American steel industries, forcing several major companies to halt their operations.

In March, Chilean steelmaker CAP suspended operations at its Huachipato plant due to the unsustainable business environment created by dumped Chinese steel. Operations resumed only after the Chilean government imposed substantial tariffs on Chinese steel. Similarly, Fabio Galan, president of Colombian steelmaker Acerías Pazdelrio, remarked on the devastating economic impact of cheap Chinese steel imports and called for fair competition.

Reports also suggest that Mexico’s iron ore mines, previously plundered by organized crime cartels, were pivotal in transporting stolen ore to China, highlighting the detrimental effects of China’s opaque and unfair trade practices.

Brazilian steel producer Gerdau temporarily laid off workers at its São José dos Campos plant in response to the unfair competition from Chinese steel. CEO Gustavo Werneck emphasized that this action was merely the initial step in tackling the surge of cheap Chinese steel imports.

Fajardo Mejia underscored the subsidies Chinese steel companies receive, enabling them to lower costs without adhering to quality and environmental standards. She also noted the considerable environmental impact, revealing that Chinese steel production emits 45% more CO2 per ton than Latin American production.

As a countermeasure, imposing tariffs on Chinese steel could escalate trade tensions between Latin American countries and China, with potential retaliatory actions from China, known for its coercive diplomacy. Historical instances, such as China’s bans on Argentine soybean products and Canadian canola seeds, exemplify possible consequences.

CSIS researcher Ziemer highlighted that China, the world’s largest steel producer, generates more steel than the combined output of the next nine largest producers, influencing international prices and destabilizing Latin American economies through dumping practices. He proposed that the current scenario offers an opportunity for the U.S. to collaborate with Latin American countries to counteract China’s unfair trade practices and safeguard domestic industries.

China and EU Resume Electric Vehicle Talks Amid Growing US Tariff Pressures

US tariff, China

Negotiations on Price Commitments Could Ease Trade Friction in the EV Market

China and the European Union (EU) have decided to resume negotiations regarding a price commitment mechanism for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). This decision follows the EU's implementation of countervailing duties on Chinese BEV imports in 2024. The goal of these talks is to replace the tariffs imposed on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), addressing ongoing trade tensions between China and the EU.

EU's Countervailing Duties and the Push for a Price Commitment Mechanism

In October 2024, the European Commission finalized its ruling on countervailing duties on BEVs imported from China, which came into effect at the end of October. These duties ranged from 17% to 35.3%, impacting major Chinese automakers like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. The aim was to counter what the EU viewed as unfair pricing practices by Chinese EV manufacturers. However, these tariffs have faced opposition from both China and European companies seeking to expand their market share in the fast-growing electric vehicle sector.

Despite early talks on a price commitment mechanism in November 2024, the discussions stalled without significant progress. However, on April 10, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that both sides had agreed to resume negotiations on the price commitments and to discuss broader issues of investment cooperation in the automotive industry.

US Tariffs Intensify the Pressure on China and the EU

The resumption of talks between China and the EU comes amidst escalating trade tensions with the United States. As of April 11, 2025, the US imposed a 145% tariff rate on imports from China, adding additional pressure on Chinese manufacturers, particularly in the electric vehicle and battery sectors. US President Donald Trump's tariffs, which were initially implemented in 2024, compounded by those under the Biden administration, have made it nearly impossible for Chinese EVs and lithium-ion batteries to enter the US market.

In an effort to counterbalance the US's growing tariff measures, China has been seeking closer economic ties with the EU. Chinese Premier Li Qiang held discussions with EU President Ursula von der Leyen on April 8, 2025, addressing the need for structural solutions to re-balance bilateral trade relations. The talks have emphasized the urgency of enhancing market access for European businesses in China and forging a collaborative approach to the challenges posed by US tariffs.

Potential Impact on the Electric Vehicle Market

If China and the EU reach an agreement on the price commitment mechanism, it could significantly alter the landscape for Chinese EVs in Europe. Prior to the implementation of the countervailing duties, the EU accounted for about 28% of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) exports, which includes both BEVs and hybrid plug-in vehicles. However, the tariffs have drastically reduced Chinese EV exports to Europe.

The continuation of trade protectionist measures from both the US and the EU is putting immense pressure on China’s EV and battery markets, particularly as it struggles to enter key international markets. The future of Chinese electric vehicle exports largely hinges on these negotiations, and any breakthrough could bring Chinese-made EVs back into the competitive EU market.

Defense & Security 2025 turns Bangkok into Asia’s defense crossroads

Defense & Security 2025

Defense & Security 2025 opens in Bangkok with record scale and deep strategic signaling. Defense & Security 2025 hosts 580 companies, 28 national pavilions, and 26,000 visitors. Defense & Security 2025 runs 10–13 November at IMPACT under Thailand’s defense ministry.

China’s strategic push shapes the exhibition’s competitive landscape. Thailand has fielded Chinese VT-4 tanks, VN-1 IFVs, drones, and QBZ-195T rifles. Thailand has in recent years purchased more Chinese arms by value than US systems. Therefore, the halls highlight Chinese offerings across air, land, and maritime domains. Meanwhile, invited delegations exceed 350 senior officials from 35 countries.

Scale and content reinforce the show’s Asia-Pacific weight. Exhibits span missiles, tanks, UAVs, ships, satellites, and secure comms. Exhibitors also show electronic warfare, cyber, and counter-terror systems. As a result, the event functions as a tri-service marketplace with policy dialogue. Twenty seminars and conferences convene industry and government experts.

Defense & Security 2025, China Sector

China’s export expansion meets Thailand’s modernization

China’s export pattern concentrates on Asia and Oceania buyers. Asia-Oceania take 77% of Chinese arms exports, with Africa at 14%. Pakistan accounts for 63% of Chinese exports, followed by Bangladesh and Thailand. Consequently, regional procurement pipelines increasingly feature Chinese platforms and components.

Thailand’s modernization plan advances across multiple suppliers. The cabinet approved a phased purchase of 12 Gripen E/F jets over a decade. The estimated cost is 60 billion baht for the Gripen program. Thailand’s 2024 defense budget totals 198.3 billion baht, up 2% year on year. Therefore, procurement mixes US Strykers, Chinese VN-1s, and Israeli UAVs.

ASEAN’s rearmament cycle accelerates in parallel. Indonesia’s defense budget reached $13.2 billion in 2023. Singapore’s spending reached $13.4 billion in 2023 after a 10% rise. Singapore is acquiring eight F-35B fighters to expand airpower. Vietnam is upgrading naval capabilities to protect maritime claims.

Defense & Security 2025

Global spending pledges and exporter dynamics reframe supply chains

NATO members set a higher ambition at the June 2025 summit. Members committed to invest 5% of GDP in defense. This marks a major uplift from the earlier 2% benchmark. As a result, delivery slots, components, and workforce will tighten globally.

Exporter shares define competitive pressures through 2020–24. The United States held 43% of global arms exports. France and Russia followed in second and third positions. China accounted for 5.9% and ranked fourth. Therefore, Chinese vendors face strong US and European competition in premium segments.

Defense & Security 2025 serves more than a sales floor. Organizers prioritize invited government buyers and curated agendas. Discussions focus on autonomy, AI ISR, resilient logistics, and cyber. Exhibitors pitch lifecycle packages with training and local sustainment. Co-production, MRO, and data rights feature in many deal rooms.

The Metalnomist Commentary 

Bangkok’s show captures a decisive shift toward diversified sourcing and localization. Expect tougher offset terms, co-development, and data-centric sustainment as ASEAN hedges suppliers. Financing creativity will separate winners from followers in the next procurement wave.

Trade Measures to Dominate Steel Industry in 2025: Focus on Imports and Global Overcapacity

China Steel Factory

Trade protection measures have been the focal point of the global steel industry throughout 2024, with little indication of this trend slowing down in 2025. Steel producers, industry associations, and governments worldwide are increasingly advocating for stronger import barriers to safeguard domestic markets and improve the competitiveness of their industries. In particular, European steel mills have been at the forefront of this movement, calling for more robust action to combat what they view as unfair imports and growing overcapacity in the global market.

European Steel Industry Pushes for Stronger Import Protection

Eurofer, the industry association for European steel manufacturers, has been particularly vocal about the need for stronger trade defence instruments. The association has urged the European Union to implement short-term emergency measures, including import tariffication, to curb the influx of low-cost steel products. Eurofer's stance has been largely driven by the EU’s ambitious decarbonisation goals, with the bloc committing billions of euros in investment. Steel producers argue that the EU's current measures are insufficient, particularly in light of increasing steel imports from countries with lower production costs and fewer environmental regulations.

Significant progress has already been made, with Eurofer helping secure changes to the EU’s safeguard system for key products like hot-rolled coils (HRC) and wire rods. Additionally, the EU anti-dumping investigation targeting several HRC suppliers has gained traction, and further investigations are planned on downstream steel products. As European steel suppliers continue to collect evidence of unfair trade practices, more scrutiny is expected on countries like China, India, and Vietnam.

The Impact of Global Overcapacity and Chinese Steel Exports

The issue of global steel overcapacity has also been a major concern. The OECD has raised alarms about the growing steel production capacity, projecting a 158 million tonnes per year increase in global capacity between 2024 and 2026. This expansion, however, comes at a time when global steel demand remains uncertain. Despite this, steel exports from non-OECD countries have been recovering since 2023, particularly from China, whose steel exports surged by 22.6% from January to November 2024.

China has also been exporting record volumes of semi-finished steel, despite the country’s preference for exporting higher-value products. As China continues to ramp up exports, it has attracted the attention of both European and global policymakers, leading to new protectionist measures targeting Chinese steel. This includes potential investigations and pending duties on Chinese steel, which could affect up to 15 million tonnes per year of exports.

Countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are also seeing increases in steel exports, contributing to the global capacity glut. Turkey, a major market for Chinese steel, has already imposed duties on imports from China, India, Russia, and Japan in response to the increasing influx of steel from these regions. The EU is similarly considering the inclusion of Indonesia in its safeguard measures due to the country’s rising steel exports to Europe. From July to October 2024, Indonesia exported 494,650 tonnes of HRC to the EU, surpassing the previous half-year period, a trend that is expected to continue.

Investigations and Measures Targeting Global Steel Exporters

The growing export volumes from India and Vietnam, along with the rise in Indonesia’s exports to Europe, have prompted investigations into dumping practices in these countries. The EU has already initiated anti-dumping investigations on steel products from Egypt, Japan, India, and Vietnam, with the preliminary results of these investigations expected in March 2025. If these investigations lead to findings of unfair trade practices, retroactive duties could be applied, further tightening global trade conditions.

In response, producers are gearing up for a potential wave of new safeguard measures and anti-dumping duties. Countries that are impacted by these measures may look to retaliate, creating a complex global trade landscape for steel. As trade protectionism increases, the global steel market is expected to undergo significant shifts in the coming years.

Bushveld Mineral

South African Output Cuts to Boost China's Vanadium-Nitrogen Exports

Rising Exports Driven by Lower South African Production and Strong US Demand

China’s vanadium-nitrogen exports are expected to see significant growth in 2025, primarily due to output cuts from a major South African producer, increasing demand from the US, and strong export interest from Chinese producers. Market participants anticipate a boost in global vanadium-nitrogen trade, benefiting China’s export numbers.

Impact of South African Output Cuts on Global Vanadium-Nitrogen Supply

South African vanadium-nitrogen production has been notably impacted by ongoing equipment maintenance at Bushveld Minerals Vametco plant. From mid-December to March 2025, the plant will operate at reduced capacity due to a cash shortage. In 2024, Bushveld’s production fell by 19%, amounting to 1,387 tonnes. This reduction in South African output is expected to continue in 2025, with the producer operating at low run rates due to negative profit margins. Consequently, China is positioned to capitalize on these cuts by increasing its exports.

Global vanadium-nitrogen alloy production is heavily concentrated in China and South Africa, with other countries lacking the necessary technology due to intellectual property restrictions. While European and US steel mills often prefer using ferro-vanadium (80% grade) over vanadium-nitrogen, China’s export increase in vanadium-nitrogen reflects changing dynamics in the alloy market.

Surge in China’s Vanadium-Nitrogen Exports and US Market Demand

China’s vanadium-nitrogen exports more than doubled in 2024, reaching 2,523 tonnes, up from 945 tonnes in 2023. This growth can be attributed to South Africa’s lower output and China’s expanded export activities. Notably, in December 2024, China’s vanadium-nitrogen exports surged five-fold to 377 tonnes, compared to just 67 tonnes a year earlier.

The US was the largest buyer of Chinese vanadium-nitrogen in 2024, importing 892 tonnes, more than double the 335 tonnes purchased in 2023. Canada also saw a dramatic increase in imports, with 323 tonnes imported, a more than five-fold rise from 60 tonnes in 2023. India’s demand also increased by 69%, reaching 317 tonnes in 2024. The US demand for vanadium-nitrogen is expected to continue to rise, as the US government, under President Trump, has pledged to boost domestic construction activities, which will likely increase the demand for steel alloys.

Export Prices and Market Dynamics

Chinese export prices for vanadium-nitrogen are currently in the range of $20.30 to $21 per kilogram, lower than European prices of $23.80 to $24.20 per kilogram. Chinese smelters are more inclined to sell to overseas markets to address domestic oversupply issues. In 2024, China produced 41,500 tonnes of vanadium-nitrogen, surpassing domestic steel mills' consumption of 34,800 tonnes. However, some alloy smelters reduced production from 2023 levels due to negative profit margins and weaker steel demand.

DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

Leveraging Section 301 Tariffs to Combat Circumvention of Chinese Steel and Aluminum Exports

In light of significant government subsidies aiding low-cost Chinese steel and aluminum products, the U.S. steel and aluminum industries advocate for the extension of Section 301 tariffs beyond China to third-party countries. This strategic move aims to shield U.S. industries from the influx of cheap, subsidized materials. The Aluminum Association (AA) and the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) have both submitted statements to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), urging enhanced enforcement measures to prevent the circumvention of existing tariffs.

Industry Concerns and Actions

The AA emphasized the need to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese imports, which has effectively reduced China's direct exports to the U.S. However, the redirection of these exports to third-party countries has surged, threatening U.S. manufacturers who produce similar goods. Consequently, industry representatives are pushing for the expansion of Section 301 tariffs to encompass processed Chinese steel and aluminum products entering the U.S. via third countries.

The Biden administration, following a review of Section 301 tariffs applied from 2018 to 2022, announced an increase in tariffs on a series of products, including steel and aluminum, effective August 1. Despite this, U.S. industries call for broader application of these tariffs to include circumvention through third-party processing.

Detailed Proposals and Data

In their statement, AISI highlighted the necessity of reinforcing origin regulations for steel products processed in third countries using Chinese materials. The current determination of origin by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is based on the final substantial transformation location. AISI advocates for considering the melting and pouring locations to prevent unfair trade practices.

Data from the Department of Commerce’s Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System (SIMA) indicate that approximately 1.7 million metric tons of Chinese-origin steel have entered the U.S. since January 1, 2022, with 17% processed in third countries. AISI suspects that actual figures may be higher due to underreported origin data.

Strategic Importance and Recommendations

Expanding Section 301 tariffs to cover Chinese steel and aluminum products processed in third countries would send a strong message of the administration's commitment to combating unfair trade practices and protecting American jobs. The AA further recommended extending these tariffs to aluminum-intensive products manufactured using Chinese aluminum in third countries, aligning with USTR Katherine Tai's goals of protecting U.S. workers and bolstering supply chain resilience.

China Imposes Export Restrictions on Key Metals to the US Amid Trade Tensions

China's ministry of commerce

China has announced a significant decision to suspend exports of several critical metals to the United States, escalating trade tensions between the two global economic powerhouses. Effective immediately, exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony are halted, and stricter inspections are enforced on graphite exports, as per the directives issued by China's Ministry of Commerce on December 3rd.

Trade Implications and US Reliance on Chinese Metals

China, categorizing these materials as "dual-use" items, indicates their potential use in both civilian and military applications. The immediate prohibition of gallium and germanium exports could severely impact the US economy, given its substantial reliance on these metals for various technological and industrial applications. According to the US Geological Survey, a complete cessation could lead to a sharp decline in the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by approximately $3.1 billion within a year, potentially reaching $3.4 billion if germanium exports are also completely halted.

The US has been heavily dependent on Chinese supplies of these metals, with antimony imports from China constituting 22% of total US imports from January 2022 to October 2024. Antimony trioxide imports from China during the same period accounted for 69% of the total US intake.

Global Supply Chain and Economic Ramifications

This strategic move by Beijing is a direct countermeasure against the United States' third crackdown on China's semiconductor industry, which involved placing restrictions on semiconductor exports to 140 Chinese companies just a day before, on December 2nd. These restrictions by the US have been described by China's commerce ministry as a politicization and weaponization of economic and technological issues, severely undermining the stability of global supply chains and international trade rules.

China's stern response also includes new legislations passed in late October and a comprehensive list issued in mid-November aimed at controlling exports of dual-use items. With the new measures, exports to any US buyers with military end-use are explicitly prohibited.

Chinese Tantalum Smelters Push Back Against Rising Tantalite Feedstock Prices

Tantalum

Supply tightness and weak US demand cap upside despite recent price gains

Chinese tantalum smelters are resisting recent increases in tantalite feedstock prices, citing tight profit margins and weak downstream demand. Although prices for tantalite have been climbing since late January, smelters are holding firm due to ongoing cost pressures and limited pricing power.

For now, this standoff is unlikely to disrupt near-term production. Most Chinese smelters still maintain adequate inventories of tantalite and are operating steadily. However, rising feedstock costs are squeezing margins, especially since smelters have been unable to lift their offers for key intermediates like potassium fluotantalate and tantalum pentoxide.

African supply disruptions and speculative trading drive short-term volatility

Supply disruptions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have fueled short-term price speculation in the market. Armed conflict in the region has disrupted mining operations and reduced material flow, prompting traders to raise spot offers.

However, other African suppliers—including those outside Rwanda and the DRC—are stepping in to meet demand. Market participants expect that increasing alternative supply and cautious downstream buying will limit any significant upside in tantalite prices.

US tariffs weaken Chinese exports, limit demand outlook

China’s tantalum export outlook has deteriorated due to weakened demand from its largest buyer—the United States. Since September 2024, US importers have scaled back purchases following the implementation of a 25% tariff on unwrought tantalum exports from China.

This policy shift, introduced under former President Joe Biden’s administration, has significantly reduced orders for key Chinese producers. Currently, the US accounts for approximately 50% of China’s tantalum exports, making this a critical concern for the sector.

Without a reversal in trade policy or a pickup in global demand, Chinese smelters are expected to tread cautiously in their procurement strategies throughout 2025.

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge exports are expected to rise over the next five years as western aerospace supply chains look for additional qualified raw material sources. Chinese producer Chaoyang Jinda Titanium expects international shipments of qualified aerospace-grade sponge to increase from around 1,000t this year to 10,000t by 2030.

The shift reflects a deeper change in the aerospace titanium supply chain. Western aircraft manufacturers and ingot melters are trying to reduce exposure to Russian supply, while aircraft build rates are expected to rise from 2027.

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge is therefore moving from a limited export niche into a potential supply-chain balancing tool. However, tariffs, qualification risk and geopolitical uncertainty will limit how quickly US and European buyers adopt Chinese material.

The opportunity is strongest in standard-quality structural titanium grades. Premium-quality sponge for engine, landing-gear and other critical applications is likely to remain controlled by established suppliers with long qualification histories.

Western Aerospace Buyers Face a Supply-Diversification Challenge

Aerospace-grade sponge demand is expected to recover from 2027 after a weaker 2026 caused by inventory normalisation. Mills have been reducing stocks of semi-finished titanium parts and raw materials, but aircraft production plans point to higher requirements later in the decade.

The timing is important. Airbus and Boeing both carry long aircraft backlogs, creating a decade of production visibility. This forces mills and original equipment manufacturers to look beyond short-term demand swings and secure raw material sources for future build-rate increases.

Western OEMs also continue to reassess Russian titanium exposure. If procurement from Russia declines, the market will need alternative aerospace-qualified sponge to fill the gap. Japan’s Toho Titanium and Osaka Titanium are expanding, while China is preparing to supply more qualified material.

Global approved aerospace-grade sponge supply excluding Russian products is expected to rise from about 74,000t this year to around 91,000t by 2030. Demand is expected to grow at a similar pace, leaving the market sensitive to which suppliers are included in purchasing programmes.

The supply-demand picture changes significantly depending on China and Russia. Excluding both suppliers creates a tighter market. Including them creates more apparent supply availability. This makes qualification and geopolitical acceptability just as important as physical capacity.

Some US ingot producers began qualifying Chinese titanium sponge in 2024. US imports from China rose to a 10-year high of 1,069t that year, showing that buyers were willing to test Chinese material when diversification pressure increased.

However, imports fell to 155t last year and no Chinese sponge imports were reported in January-February 2026. Tariff volatility, high mill inventories and policy uncertainty discouraged further purchasing.

This shows the main barrier for China aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Aerospace qualification requires multi-year commitments, stable documentation, repeatable quality and customer confidence. Buyers will not qualify a new source quickly if they fear trade rules could change again.

Titanium is exempt from the latest 10% US tariff, and overall duties have fallen back to 40% from 60%. But the rate itself is not the only issue. For aerospace buyers, volatility can be more damaging than the actual tariff level.

A mill can absorb or price a known tariff. It cannot easily build a long-term qualification strategy around unpredictable policy. This is why US buyers may limit Chinese sponge procurement to 15-20% of requirements, even if the material is technically acceptable.

Europe and Asia-Pacific may offer more immediate export channels. China already supplies aerospace-grade sponge to buyers in those regions, supporting shipments even when US demand is limited.

Capacity Expansion Could Change the Titanium Sponge Balance

China is preparing a large wave of aerospace-grade sponge capacity additions. Several major projects are scheduled to come on line soon, with combined new capacity of around 110,000 t/yr.

The scale is unprecedented. The planned additions exceed the combined existing capacity of Japan’s Toho and Osaka Titanium, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, and Saudi Arabia’s ATTM.

China’s expansion is driven by two demand streams. Domestic aerospace demand is rising from the Comac C919 programme and military aircraft production. At the same time, producers expect higher export demand as western OEMs diversify away from Russia.

China’s titanium mill product demand already has a meaningful aerospace base. Aerospace applications accounted for about 20% of China’s titanium mill product demand in 2025, or roughly 31,280t. The chemicals industry remained the largest segment at 48%.

The domestic base gives Chinese sponge producers a stronger platform for quality improvement. Aerospace production experience matters because sponge qualification depends on consistency over time, not only nameplate capacity.

Still, some market participants question whether all new capacity can secure international aerospace qualification. New lines may need years of operating history before western melters and OEMs accept material for aircraft applications.

This is a critical distinction. China may have large physical capacity, but aerospace supply depends on approved, audited and repeatable production. Capacity alone does not guarantee market access.

Price competitiveness may support adoption. Domestic China aerospace-grade sponge prices have recently held firm at 55,000-57,000 yuan/t ex-works because of cost pressure. That remains competitive against some western supply routes, especially if buyers need alternative non-Russian material.

However, qualification is likely to split the market by application. Standard structural titanium grades are more likely to accept Chinese sponge over time. These grades support airframes and less critical structural components where qualification remains strict but less restrictive than engine-grade applications.

Premium-quality sponge will be harder to penetrate. Engine, landing-gear and other demanding aerospace uses require deeper qualification, tighter chemistry control and stronger confidence from prime contractors and tier suppliers.

Airbus’ titanium demand outlook adds another layer. The A350 is a high titanium-bearing platform, with titanium representing around 15% of aircraft weight. As A350 production rises toward 2027 and 2028, titanium demand visibility should improve across the supply chain.

That demand pull could make Chinese material more attractive if western supply tightens. But buyers will still balance cost, qualification, geopolitics and supply security.

For Chinese producers, the path is clear but difficult. They must prove consistent aerospace-grade quality, build long-term customer trust, manage export documentation and navigate trade policy risk.

For western OEMs, the decision is strategic. China aerospace-grade titanium sponge could reduce Russia exposure and improve supply flexibility. But it also introduces another geopolitical dependency at a time when aerospace and defence supply chains are under closer scrutiny.

The most likely outcome is partial adoption. Chinese sponge may become a growing supplement for standard-quality structural grades, while established Japanese, Kazakh, Saudi and other qualified suppliers remain central to premium aerospace applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge will become harder for western aerospace supply chains to ignore as aircraft build rates rise and Russian exposure narrows. The decisive issue is not capacity, but whether Chinese producers can convert new output into trusted, qualified and politically acceptable supply.

Minor Metals Security Premium Becomes Cost of Supply Chain Resilience

Minor Metals

Minor metals security premium is becoming a structural cost for western buyers as China’s dominance in processing leaves supply chains exposed to disruption. Speakers at the FT Commodities Global Summit in Lausanne said consumers must pay more for non-Chinese minor metals if they want resilient supply.

The argument is no longer theoretical. Chinese export controls have reduced available supply in western markets and widened the price gap between China and Europe. Materials that once traded closely across regions now reflect very different fundamentals.

Minor metals security premium is most visible in dual-use products subject to Chinese export controls. European gallium prices are more than double Chinese export levels, while Rotterdam germanium prices are also close to twice Chinese fob values.

This premium is not only a temporary reaction to trade disruption. Speakers argued that higher western prices must persist even if export controls are eased, because alternative processing capacity outside China needs long-term economic support.

China Export Controls Break Traditional Price Links

China’s concentration in minor metals processing has created a major vulnerability for western manufacturers. Many critical materials are produced as by-products, refined in small volumes and traded through narrow supply chains.

That structure makes the market highly sensitive to policy changes. When China restricts exports, buyers in Europe and the US cannot easily replace supply because there are few alternative processors with qualified material.

The result is a geographic price split. European warehouse prices once tracked Chinese markets closely, but that relationship no longer reflects real availability outside China. Chinese prices now represent domestic conditions, while western prices reflect scarcity, logistics risk and origin security.

Gallium and germanium show this most clearly. Both metals are essential for semiconductors, optics, power electronics, defence systems, satellite communications and advanced manufacturing. Both are also heavily exposed to Chinese processing and export licensing.

For western buyers, the question is no longer whether Chinese prices look cheaper. The real question is whether material can be accessed, shipped, qualified and used without exposing factories to sudden supply interruptions.

That changes procurement behaviour. Buyers are increasingly willing to pay a security premium for material with reliable origin, clearer documentation and lower exposure to export restrictions.

The same logic is spreading to other by-product metals. Indium, bismuth and antimony are gaining strategic attention because they support electronics, flame retardants, solders, alloys, photovoltaics, semiconductors and defence-related applications.

These metals are often small in volume but large in industrial consequence. A missing input can stop production even if the dollar value of the metal is tiny compared with the final product.

This is why western buyers are treating minor metals differently from ordinary commodities. They are paying for continuity, not only material.

Supply Security Needs Processing Capacity and Long-Term Demand

Minor metals security premium must support investment, not only emergency buying. If higher prices disappear as soon as immediate disruption fades, new processing projects outside China will struggle to survive.

This is the key industrial challenge. Building non-Chinese supply requires refining capacity, technical know-how, environmental permitting, qualified output and customer commitments. These cannot be created quickly during a crisis.

A short-term price spike can help existing suppliers, but it does not guarantee new capacity. Investors need confidence that buyers will continue paying for secure supply after the market stabilises.

This is where security premiums differ from green premiums. Green premiums have often been debated because buyers could delay paying more for lower-carbon materials. But critical materials supply disruption leaves fewer choices.

If rare earths, gallium, germanium or antimony are unavailable, manufacturers may face production stoppages. In that situation, the premium becomes part of operating cost rather than a voluntary sustainability expense.

Governments can help bridge this gap through stockpiles, offtake support, price floors, procurement rules and financing tools. But industry also needs to accept that resilient supply chains cost more than the lowest-price global model.

For miners, by-product metals can improve project economics. Recovering indium, bismuth, antimony, gallium or germanium can add revenue streams to larger operations and strengthen the business case for complex ore bodies.

For refiners, sustained premiums can justify investment in separation and purification capacity. For manufacturers, long-term contracts can reduce the risk of sudden shortages and forced spot-market buying.

The larger strategic point is clear. Western supply chains cannot become more secure while continuing to benchmark only against Chinese domestic prices. Security, traceability and supply reliability require a different pricing model.

Minor metals security premium therefore represents a shift in how critical materials are valued. Buyers are beginning to price the risk of disruption, not just the cost of production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The security premium for minor metals is the market’s way of pricing geopolitical risk into industrial supply. Western buyers cannot build resilient supply chains while demanding Chinese-cost material from non-Chinese sources.

Haisheng to Build Advanced Tungsten Plant in Thailand Amid Growing Global Demand

Ganzhou Haisheng

Ganzhou Haisheng, a leading Chinese tungsten producer, has received local government approval to construct a state-of-the-art tungsten processing plant in Thailand. The facility, with a total investment of 180 million yuan ($25 million), underscores China's strategic move to expand its tungsten production capacity beyond domestic borders.

The planned plant boasts an impressive production lineup, including:

•  3,000 t/yr of ammonium paratungstate (APT)
•  2,000 t/yr of tungsten powder
•  1,200 t/yr of tungsten carbide
•  400 t/yr of tungsten bar
•  300 t/yr of cemented carbide

While the exact completion and production dates remain unconfirmed, the project represents a significant milestone for Haisheng, known for its comprehensive production lines in China spanning from ore processing to downstream products like powders, metals, and wires.

Strategic Expansion Amid Trade Tensions

This development comes as Chinese tungsten exporters face increasing challenges due to trade conflicts with the United States. Since the US imposed a 25% tariff on Chinese tungsten products in September, Chinese exports have declined. Data from January to August reveals a 12% year-on-year drop, with exports totaling 11,718 tons of tungsten metal equivalent.

In response, Chinese tungsten producers are exploring overseas projects to mitigate the impact of trade barriers and diversify their markets. Haisheng's Thailand facility could serve as a model for other producers aiming to navigate geopolitical uncertainties while meeting rising global demand for tungsten, a critical material in electronics, aerospace, and industrial tooling.

A Boon for Thailand’s Economy

Thailand stands to benefit economically and technologically from Haisheng's investment. The new plant could bolster the country's industrial capacity, create jobs, and attract further foreign direct investment in the metals sector.

Conclusion

Haisheng’s move to establish a tungsten plant in Thailand highlights a pivotal shift in the global tungsten supply chain. As geopolitical pressures reshape trade dynamics, Chinese producers like Haisheng are strategically positioning themselves to remain competitive in the evolving global metals market.

U.S. Tariff Hike Puts Pressure on China’s Tantalum Feedstock Market

Tantalum

The recent U.S. decision to impose a 25% tariff on Chinese unwrought tantalum is set to create significant challenges for the tantalum feedstock market. This move, part of the Section 301 tariffs, will come into effect on September 27, having been delayed from August. The new tariffs will impact the demand for tantalum feedstock materials, including ores, pentoxide, and potassium fluotantalate, creating uncertainty within the market.

Impact of U.S. Tariff on Chinese Exports

China has long been a leading supplier of unwrought tantalum to the U.S., responsible for around 40% of total U.S. imports of this critical material between 2020 and mid-September 2024. In the first seven months of 2024 alone, the U.S. imported 177 tons of unwrought tantalum, a figure that already surpasses the total imports for all of 2023.

However, the volume of Chinese tantalum exported to the U.S. has been steadily declining. The U.S. imported 321 tons in 2023, a 56% drop from the 730 tons imported in 2022. Of this, only 131 tons came from China, marking the lowest level in years. This downward trend is likely to accelerate further as the tariffs come into effect, prompting U.S. buyers to reconsider their reliance on Chinese tantalum.

Lower Demand for Tantalum Feedstock

As a result of the anticipated reduction in downstream demand, producers of tantalum feedstock in China are already feeling the pressure. For instance, Chinese potassium fluotantalate producers have reported receiving lower bids from tantalum smelters in recent days. Bid prices have dropped to approximately ¥830-840/kg, down from ¥850/kg before the mid-autumn holiday in mid-September.

The electronics industry, a major consumer of tantalum, is also likely to be affected. Some companies are now required to avoid sourcing tantalite from Africa due to a dispute between the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) and the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI). This dispute, combined with the U.S. tariff hike, is leading to further hesitation among tantalum smelters to source feedstock from Africa.

Chinese Smelters' Response and Outlook

Despite the current challenges, some Chinese smelters are optimistic about domestic supply. “We are not short of feedstock because there is ample tantalum scrap feedstock supply, which is sufficient to feed China’s domestic tantalum production,” commented a source from a South China-based smelter. However, many smelters and traders remain cautious, focusing on fulfilling domestic orders while closely monitoring global market developments.

With the U.S. tariff hike set to take effect, the outlook for China's tantalum feedstock market remains uncertain. Tantalum suppliers are attempting to raise their prices, but market participants believe the increased tariffs will make it difficult to conclude new deals at elevated prices.

As the U.S. prepares to implement its new tariffs on Chinese tantalum, the ripple effects are being felt throughout the supply chain. From lower demand in the electronics sector to falling bid prices for feedstock, the market faces a challenging road ahead. While Chinese producers remain resilient with alternative feedstock sources, the long-term impact of the tariffs could reshape global supply chains and market dynamics.

India's Vanadium Pentoxide Imports from China Surge Amid Policy Shift

Vanadium

Removal of Indian Import Duty Boosts V2O5 Flake Trade, Reshaping Global Vanadium Supply Chain

India's demand for vanadium pentoxide flake (V2O5) from China is expected to keep growing in 2025, fueled by a strategic shift in trade policy and booming domestic steel production. The lifting of India’s 5% import duty on V2O5 in July 2024 significantly boosted Chinese exports, with volumes hitting 5,659 tonnes that year — a 2% increase from 2023, largely attributed to India’s buying spree.

December’s V2O5 exports from China to India spiked fourfold year-over-year to 462 tonnes, showcasing India's aggressive restocking. Although this was down 30% from November's peak of 663 tonnes, the trend clearly favors continued growth into 2025.

India Shifts Focus from Ferro-Vanadium to Flake Feedstock

India’s Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification requirement for foreign ferro-vanadium suppliers, introduced in September 2024, has added barriers to ferro-alloy imports. Many Chinese producers resist applying for BIS due to the intrusive approval process, which includes third-party inspections and disclosure of proprietary production data. As a result, Indian buyers have increasingly turned to V2O5 flake as a substitute for direct alloy imports.

India’s strategic move aims to strengthen its domestic ferro-vanadium industry by incentivizing the use of vanadium pentoxide feedstock. While ferro-vanadium imports still incur a 5% duty, V2O5 imports are now duty-free, giving Indian alloy producers a significant cost advantage. This policy shift aligns with India’s growing steel output — up 6.3% year-on-year to 149.6 million tonnes in 2024 — which naturally lifts vanadium demand.

Global Trade Dynamics Rebalance as India Rises

China, the world’s largest vanadium producer with 70% of global output, saw its V2O5 production rise 3.3% to 165,000 tonnes in 2024. As traditional buyers like South Korea, Japan, and Germany scaled back imports due to sluggish steel demand, India stepped in as a key growth market. Indian imports of Chinese V2O5 soared to 470 tonnes in 2024 from zero the previous year — a monumental shift.

Even as ferro-vanadium exports from China to India jumped to 200 tonnes in 2024 — 33 times more than in 2023 — the rising preference for vanadium flake suggests a long-term structural pivot. With India’s BIS certification deadline looming in March 2025, foreign ferro-vanadium suppliers without certification will be locked out, reinforcing India’s reliance on Chinese V2O5 flake.

Looking ahead, India’s rising crude steel output and policy-driven demand for vanadium flake are poised to reshape vanadium trade flows. As China ramps up its production capacity, both nations may find themselves increasingly entwined in the evolving global vanadium market.

China’s Antimony Export Restrictions Reshape Global Supply and Prices

Antimony

China’s antimony export restrictions tightened in June, choking overseas flows and straining supply chains. As China’s antimony export restrictions intensified, shipments of metal and trioxide collapsed year on year. The policy shift underscores Beijing’s firmer control over strategic critical minerals.

Exports collapse across products

Antimony metal exports plunged to 20t in June, all to South Korea. A year earlier, flows reached 153t. First-half exports fell 84pc to 267t from 1,720t last year. Meanwhile, antimony trioxide exports slid to 87t in June from 3,228t a year earlier. June volumes went to Egypt, Kazakhstan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Policy crackdown sustains price strength

China suspended gallium, germanium, and antimony exports to the US in December 2024. The US had taken one-third of China’s trioxide exports in 2023. Beijing then vowed a continued crackdown on smuggling of strategic minerals on 19 July. As a result, European prices held at multi-year highs in Rotterdam. Regulus grade II metal and trioxide grade traded around $58,000-60,000/t duty unpaid. The geographic shift in stocks further tightened access for downstream users.

The supply squeeze reflects new compliance hurdles and tougher licensing reviews. Traders report slower approvals and narrower eligible end uses. Flame retardant and alloy producers face longer lead times and higher working capital. Therefore, buyers diversify toward non-Chinese feedstock where possible. Still, China’s antimony export restrictions remain the defining market driver.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tighter Chinese controls have reset the antimony trade’s risk premium. Prices should stay elevated while enforcement curbs leakages and re-exports. Watch European restocking patterns and US substitution to gauge demand resilience.