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Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Chinese. Sort by date Show all posts

China’s Predatory Steel Exports : A Threat to Latin America

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The Latin American steel industry is grappling with a severe crisis precipitated by China’s predatory trade practices. The influx of cheap Chinese steel has flooded the market, imperiling local producers' livelihoods. Gabriela Fajardo Mejia, an expert in international relations at the University of Navarra, highlighted in her interview with Diálogo Américas that China’s steel overproduction endangers 1.4 million jobs across Latin America’s steel sector, compelling numerous companies to cease operations and lay off workers. Furthermore, Chinese steel production often bypasses established environmental and quality standards, with transparency regulations being routinely ignored.

Henry Ziemer, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pointed out that China's slowdown in real estate and construction has diminished domestic steel demand. Consequently, Chinese producers are compensating for reduced domestic sales through aggressive export strategies. With the U.S. market becoming increasingly inhospitable for Chinese steelmakers, they are now targeting Latin American countries, which present fewer trade barriers, to dispose of their surplus inventory.

The Chinese government's subsidies for steel production and exports during the pandemic exacerbated the issue, leading to a global proliferation of low-cost Chinese steel. In retaliation, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil have significantly raised tariffs on Chinese steel imports to safeguard their domestic industries, and other nations are expected to follow suit. Alejandro Wagner, the former Secretary-General of the Latin American Steel Association (Alacero), indicated in a BBC interview that the influx of inexpensive Chinese steel has caused significant damage to Latin American steel industries, forcing several major companies to halt their operations.

In March, Chilean steelmaker CAP suspended operations at its Huachipato plant due to the unsustainable business environment created by dumped Chinese steel. Operations resumed only after the Chilean government imposed substantial tariffs on Chinese steel. Similarly, Fabio Galan, president of Colombian steelmaker Acerías Pazdelrio, remarked on the devastating economic impact of cheap Chinese steel imports and called for fair competition.

Reports also suggest that Mexico’s iron ore mines, previously plundered by organized crime cartels, were pivotal in transporting stolen ore to China, highlighting the detrimental effects of China’s opaque and unfair trade practices.

Brazilian steel producer Gerdau temporarily laid off workers at its São José dos Campos plant in response to the unfair competition from Chinese steel. CEO Gustavo Werneck emphasized that this action was merely the initial step in tackling the surge of cheap Chinese steel imports.

Fajardo Mejia underscored the subsidies Chinese steel companies receive, enabling them to lower costs without adhering to quality and environmental standards. She also noted the considerable environmental impact, revealing that Chinese steel production emits 45% more CO2 per ton than Latin American production.

As a countermeasure, imposing tariffs on Chinese steel could escalate trade tensions between Latin American countries and China, with potential retaliatory actions from China, known for its coercive diplomacy. Historical instances, such as China’s bans on Argentine soybean products and Canadian canola seeds, exemplify possible consequences.

CSIS researcher Ziemer highlighted that China, the world’s largest steel producer, generates more steel than the combined output of the next nine largest producers, influencing international prices and destabilizing Latin American economies through dumping practices. He proposed that the current scenario offers an opportunity for the U.S. to collaborate with Latin American countries to counteract China’s unfair trade practices and safeguard domestic industries.

Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs in Brazil

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Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs in Brazil
Comexport

Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs marks a major shift in Brazil’s role within global EV supply chains. The Brazilian foreign trade firm will assemble GM’s new Spark EUV, a Chinese electric vehicle sold under the Chevrolet brand, at the former Ford-owned PACE industrial hub. As a result, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs deal turns a decommissioned plant into a regional platform for imported Chinese SKD units.

The project uses a flexible contract-assembly model rather than an equity partnership or joint venture. Comexport will import semi-knocked-down Spark units from China, already welded, painted and partially manufactured, and then complete final assembly at PACE. Meanwhile, GM will supervise production quality and pay Comexport per unit, ensuring OEM control over standards while limiting capital exposure. Therefore, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs contract gives GM fast market access with lower fixed costs.

PACE becomes Brazil’s first multi-brand EV assembly hub

PACE will emerge as Brazil’s first and only multi-brand vehicle assembly line once all client negotiations close. The plant, acquired by Comexport in 2024 from the state of Ceara, will serve at least three carmakers, with GM confirmed as the first anchor client. Initially, the facility will operate below its 80,000 vehicle per year capacity and gradually ramp up as the local supply chain matures.

GM plans for all Spark units sold in Brazil to be assembled as SKD imports over time. However, the company will first bring in fully built consumer-ready vehicles while Comexport stabilises processes and tooling. As the supply chain “nationalises”, more Brazilian auto-parts suppliers will enter the platform, supporting localisation targets and potentially unlocking tax and industrial policy incentives. This phased approach reduces ramp-up risk while anchoring long term EV manufacturing in northeastern Brazil.

Chinese EV platforms deepen their footprint in Latin America

The project highlights how Chinese EV platforms penetrate Latin America via global OEM brands and contract assemblers. The Spark is a Chinese-developed model from the joint venture between GM, SAIC and Wuling, sold domestically as the Baojun Yep Plus. Therefore, Brazilian consumers will buy a Chevrolet-badged vehicle that originates from a Chinese EV architecture. PACE will exclusively assemble hybrids and EVs, increasing the likelihood that future clients will also be Chinese or China-linked automakers.

For GM, this structure supports a broader strategy of leveraging Chinese small-EV know-how while maintaining brand control in key emerging markets. For Brazil, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs model could accelerate EV adoption, technology transfer and supplier upgrading, especially in battery, electronics and lightweight components. However, policymakers and local OEMs will also scrutinise the impact on domestic manufacturers and industrial competitiveness as Chinese-origin platforms gain share.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal illustrates how decommissioned legacy plants can be repurposed into EV assembly hubs bound into China-centric technology networks. By combining SKD imports, contract assembly and gradual localisation, Comexport and GM create a flexible template that other brands may copy across Latin America. Market participants should watch how quickly local suppliers move into higher value EV components and how Brazil balances openness to Chinese platforms with support for domestic champions.

Chinese Aluminium Investment Shifts Focus to Overseas Production Facilities

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Chinese Aluminium Investment Shifts Focus to Overseas Production Facilities
Chinese Aluminium

Chinese aluminium investment is pivoting toward international markets as domestic production approaches government-imposed capacity limits. China produced 43.4 million tonnes of aluminium in 2024 and already possesses capacity to reach the government's production cap of 45 million tonnes per year. Therefore, any new Chinese aluminium investment will concentrate on facilities outside China rather than expanding domestic capacity.

Production Growth Slows in China While Global Expansion Accelerates

China's aluminium production growth will decelerate dramatically to approximately 0.4% compound annual growth rate over the medium term. This represents a significant shift from China's previous rapid expansion that outpaced global competitors. Meanwhile, Chinese aluminium investment will target strategic locations including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Angola for new production facilities.

Indonesia emerges as the primary beneficiary of Chinese aluminium investment, with approximately 3 million tonnes of new annual capacity expected. The country has transformed from a bauxite supplier to China into a downstream aluminium producer. As a result, Indonesia's aluminium industry will receive substantial Chinese capital and technology transfer.

Secondary Aluminium Production Expands Despite Scrap Supply Constraints

Chinese secondary aluminium production will reach almost 30 million tonnes per year in 2025, doubling from 15 million tonnes five years ago. However, tight scrap supply continues to limit capacity utilization rates below 50% across the industry. This constraint affects the efficiency of Chinese aluminium investment in recycling infrastructure.

Ron Knapp, advisor to China Hongqiao Group chairman, emphasized that the production cap remains firm government policy. The cap prevents overcapacity issues similar to those experienced in China's steel industry. Therefore, Chinese companies must pursue aluminium investment opportunities in international markets to maintain growth trajectories.

Chinese aluminium demand growth will also moderate significantly in coming years. Primary aluminium consumption will increase by just 0.9% in 2025, falling to approximately 0.6% thereafter. Consequently, Chinese aluminium investment strategy focuses on securing global market share rather than serving domestic demand alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This strategic pivot reflects China's maturing aluminium sector and government commitment to sustainable industrial development through production caps. The shift toward overseas Chinese aluminium investment, particularly in resource-rich countries like Indonesia, will reshape global aluminium supply chains and create new competitive dynamics in international markets.

Southeast Asia Aluminium Premiums Could Decouple From Japan on Chinese Semi Flows

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Southeast Asia Aluminium Premiums Could Decouple From Japan on Chinese Semi Flows
Aluminium

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums could begin to decouple from Japan as Vietnamese buyers increasingly accept Chinese-origin semi-finished products for remelting. The shift suggests regional aluminium pricing may become more dependent on origin acceptance than on traditional Asian premium benchmarks.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums are still supported for Western-origin and free-trade-agreement cargoes, with some deals above $300/t on a cif Thailand and Vietnam basis. However, cheaper Chinese semi-finished products are creating a parallel supply route.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums may therefore face a different pricing path from Japan, where origin requirements and customer preferences can be more restrictive. Vietnam’s willingness to buy and remelt Chinese-origin material is changing the regional supply equation.

The key issue is whether low-priced Chinese semi exports remain available. If they do, southeast Asian buyers may have less reason to pay Japan-linked premiums for standard P1020 supply.

Chinese Semi-Finished Products Create a Remelting Alternative

Chinese semi-finished aluminium products are attracting stronger interest from Vietnamese and Korean buyers. Traders pointed to low-priced offers for products such as aluminium wires under HS code 76149000.

Offers for high-purity aluminium stranded wires were reported at between an $80/t discount and a $100/t premium to London Metal Exchange prices. That is below the more typical $50-100/t premium range seen in recent months.

The economics become competitive after remelting. With remelting costs estimated at $150-200/t, buyers can effectively convert wire into P1020-equivalent ingot at a total premium of about $200-300/t.

That is competitive against direct P1020 purchases, especially when standard ingot premiums remain elevated. For price-sensitive buyers, remelting offers a practical way to secure metal units while avoiding higher conventional premiums.

This does not mean all customers will accept the route. Some buyers still require Western-origin or free-trade-agreement cargoes because of compliance, quality, customer specification or trade-policy considerations.

But the presence of a cheaper remelting route can weaken the connection between southeast Asia and Japan premiums. If Vietnam accepts material that Japan will not, the two markets may price differently.

Export Rebates Could Decide Sustainability

China’s 13% export tax rebate for certain aluminium products is central to the pricing gap. Some Chinese suppliers can offer semi-finished products at very low premiums, or even discounts to LME, because the rebate supports export economics.

This creates a policy-driven arbitrage. Instead of exporting primary aluminium directly, suppliers can export semi-finished products that receive more favourable tax treatment.

The sustainability of the trend depends on Beijing’s response. If Chinese authorities decide export volumes are excessive or distortive, they could remove or adjust the rebate.

That would quickly change the economics. Without the rebate, low-priced Chinese semis may become less competitive as a remelting feedstock for southeast Asian buyers.

For now, the trade flow matters because western aluminium supply remains tight and regional premiums are elevated. Buyers are looking for workable alternatives, and Chinese semis provide one.

The broader market implication is clear. Aluminium premiums are becoming more segmented by origin, trade rules and customer acceptance. Regional benchmarks may no longer move together if buyers have different views on acceptable supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The possible split between southeast Asia and Japan premiums shows how trade policy can reshape aluminium pricing as much as physical supply. If Chinese semi exports remain cheap, Vietnam could become a more flexible remelting market while Japan stays tied to stricter origin premiums.

Minor Metals Security Premium Becomes Cost of Supply Chain Resilience

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Minor Metals Security Premium Becomes Cost of Supply Chain Resilience
Minor Metals

Minor metals security premium is becoming a structural cost for western buyers as China’s dominance in processing leaves supply chains exposed to disruption. Speakers at the FT Commodities Global Summit in Lausanne said consumers must pay more for non-Chinese minor metals if they want resilient supply.

The argument is no longer theoretical. Chinese export controls have reduced available supply in western markets and widened the price gap between China and Europe. Materials that once traded closely across regions now reflect very different fundamentals.

Minor metals security premium is most visible in dual-use products subject to Chinese export controls. European gallium prices are more than double Chinese export levels, while Rotterdam germanium prices are also close to twice Chinese fob values.

This premium is not only a temporary reaction to trade disruption. Speakers argued that higher western prices must persist even if export controls are eased, because alternative processing capacity outside China needs long-term economic support.

China Export Controls Break Traditional Price Links

China’s concentration in minor metals processing has created a major vulnerability for western manufacturers. Many critical materials are produced as by-products, refined in small volumes and traded through narrow supply chains.

That structure makes the market highly sensitive to policy changes. When China restricts exports, buyers in Europe and the US cannot easily replace supply because there are few alternative processors with qualified material.

The result is a geographic price split. European warehouse prices once tracked Chinese markets closely, but that relationship no longer reflects real availability outside China. Chinese prices now represent domestic conditions, while western prices reflect scarcity, logistics risk and origin security.

Gallium and germanium show this most clearly. Both metals are essential for semiconductors, optics, power electronics, defence systems, satellite communications and advanced manufacturing. Both are also heavily exposed to Chinese processing and export licensing.

For western buyers, the question is no longer whether Chinese prices look cheaper. The real question is whether material can be accessed, shipped, qualified and used without exposing factories to sudden supply interruptions.

That changes procurement behaviour. Buyers are increasingly willing to pay a security premium for material with reliable origin, clearer documentation and lower exposure to export restrictions.

The same logic is spreading to other by-product metals. Indium, bismuth and antimony are gaining strategic attention because they support electronics, flame retardants, solders, alloys, photovoltaics, semiconductors and defence-related applications.

These metals are often small in volume but large in industrial consequence. A missing input can stop production even if the dollar value of the metal is tiny compared with the final product.

This is why western buyers are treating minor metals differently from ordinary commodities. They are paying for continuity, not only material.

Supply Security Needs Processing Capacity and Long-Term Demand

Minor metals security premium must support investment, not only emergency buying. If higher prices disappear as soon as immediate disruption fades, new processing projects outside China will struggle to survive.

This is the key industrial challenge. Building non-Chinese supply requires refining capacity, technical know-how, environmental permitting, qualified output and customer commitments. These cannot be created quickly during a crisis.

A short-term price spike can help existing suppliers, but it does not guarantee new capacity. Investors need confidence that buyers will continue paying for secure supply after the market stabilises.

This is where security premiums differ from green premiums. Green premiums have often been debated because buyers could delay paying more for lower-carbon materials. But critical materials supply disruption leaves fewer choices.

If rare earths, gallium, germanium or antimony are unavailable, manufacturers may face production stoppages. In that situation, the premium becomes part of operating cost rather than a voluntary sustainability expense.

Governments can help bridge this gap through stockpiles, offtake support, price floors, procurement rules and financing tools. But industry also needs to accept that resilient supply chains cost more than the lowest-price global model.

For miners, by-product metals can improve project economics. Recovering indium, bismuth, antimony, gallium or germanium can add revenue streams to larger operations and strengthen the business case for complex ore bodies.

For refiners, sustained premiums can justify investment in separation and purification capacity. For manufacturers, long-term contracts can reduce the risk of sudden shortages and forced spot-market buying.

The larger strategic point is clear. Western supply chains cannot become more secure while continuing to benchmark only against Chinese domestic prices. Security, traceability and supply reliability require a different pricing model.

Minor metals security premium therefore represents a shift in how critical materials are valued. Buyers are beginning to price the risk of disruption, not just the cost of production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The security premium for minor metals is the market’s way of pricing geopolitical risk into industrial supply. Western buyers cannot build resilient supply chains while demanding Chinese-cost material from non-Chinese sources.

China and EU Resume Electric Vehicle Talks Amid Growing US Tariff Pressures

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US tariff, China

Negotiations on Price Commitments Could Ease Trade Friction in the EV Market

China and the European Union (EU) have decided to resume negotiations regarding a price commitment mechanism for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). This decision follows the EU's implementation of countervailing duties on Chinese BEV imports in 2024. The goal of these talks is to replace the tariffs imposed on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), addressing ongoing trade tensions between China and the EU.

EU's Countervailing Duties and the Push for a Price Commitment Mechanism

In October 2024, the European Commission finalized its ruling on countervailing duties on BEVs imported from China, which came into effect at the end of October. These duties ranged from 17% to 35.3%, impacting major Chinese automakers like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. The aim was to counter what the EU viewed as unfair pricing practices by Chinese EV manufacturers. However, these tariffs have faced opposition from both China and European companies seeking to expand their market share in the fast-growing electric vehicle sector.

Despite early talks on a price commitment mechanism in November 2024, the discussions stalled without significant progress. However, on April 10, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that both sides had agreed to resume negotiations on the price commitments and to discuss broader issues of investment cooperation in the automotive industry.

US Tariffs Intensify the Pressure on China and the EU

The resumption of talks between China and the EU comes amidst escalating trade tensions with the United States. As of April 11, 2025, the US imposed a 145% tariff rate on imports from China, adding additional pressure on Chinese manufacturers, particularly in the electric vehicle and battery sectors. US President Donald Trump's tariffs, which were initially implemented in 2024, compounded by those under the Biden administration, have made it nearly impossible for Chinese EVs and lithium-ion batteries to enter the US market.

In an effort to counterbalance the US's growing tariff measures, China has been seeking closer economic ties with the EU. Chinese Premier Li Qiang held discussions with EU President Ursula von der Leyen on April 8, 2025, addressing the need for structural solutions to re-balance bilateral trade relations. The talks have emphasized the urgency of enhancing market access for European businesses in China and forging a collaborative approach to the challenges posed by US tariffs.

Potential Impact on the Electric Vehicle Market

If China and the EU reach an agreement on the price commitment mechanism, it could significantly alter the landscape for Chinese EVs in Europe. Prior to the implementation of the countervailing duties, the EU accounted for about 28% of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) exports, which includes both BEVs and hybrid plug-in vehicles. However, the tariffs have drastically reduced Chinese EV exports to Europe.

The continuation of trade protectionist measures from both the US and the EU is putting immense pressure on China’s EV and battery markets, particularly as it struggles to enter key international markets. The future of Chinese electric vehicle exports largely hinges on these negotiations, and any breakthrough could bring Chinese-made EVs back into the competitive EU market.

Chinese Cobalt Prices Expected to Decline Further in 2025 Amid Rising Supply and Weak Demand

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Chinese Cobalt Manufacturing

Oversupply and Weak Demand to Push Cobalt Prices Lower

The Chinese cobalt market is set to experience further price declines in 2025, as increasing nickel and copper production, from which cobalt is a by-product, leads to an oversupply that buyers are struggling to absorb.

Currently, Chinese-origin cobalt metal traded in Europe has already seen significant pressure due to a lack of floor pricing on raw materials, a trend expected to persist into the new year. Market insiders suggest that cobalt prices could drop below $9/lb, as fully integrated Chinese producers view cobalt as a credit to their primary metal production, particularly nickel and copper.

For these refiners, cobalt is a secondary concern. As one trading firm explained, some Chinese producers operate with production costs as low as $4,000 per ton while selling at $9,000 per ton. Even if they incur a $50 million loss on cobalt, they may still profit significantly from copper production, which can generate up to $700 million in gains.

Chinese Refiners Likely to Continue Production at a Loss

Unlike non-Chinese refiners, which may curtail supply if cobalt prices fall below $9/lb, some Chinese integrated mining firms and refiners could continue refining hydroxide into metal at a loss-making $7-8/lb.

While there is speculation that some Chinese metal producers may attempt to negotiate floor prices in their contracts, it remains uncertain whether these efforts will succeed. Market participants are closely watching how these negotiations unfold, as they could provide some level of price support if successful.

Global Nickel and Copper Growth to Sustain Cobalt Oversupply

The primary factor driving cobalt’s oversupply is the continued expansion of nickel and copper production, as cobalt is a by-product of both metals.
  • Nickel production is set to rise again in 2025 with the launch of new Class 1 nickel refineries in China and Indonesia. This will likely keep London Metal Exchange (LME) three-month official nickel prices within the $15,000-17,000 per ton range, significantly lower than the $30,000 per ton peak in early 2023.
  • Copper production is also projected to increase due to expansions at mines such as Kamoa-Kakula in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although cobalt sales represent only a minor portion of copper mining revenues, producers still aim to extract value from it as a credit.

Weakened Demand from EV and Chemicals Sectors Further Pressures Prices
While cobalt demand in China has surged by 40%, this has not been enough to counteract weakening demand in other regions, particularly in Europe:
  • The electric vehicle (EV) sector in Europe has slowed down, leading to reduced demand for cathode active materials like cobalt.
  • The European chemicals industry, particularly in Germany, has struggled due to rising energy costs and broader economic challenges.
Even if prices do increase, China has ample spare refining capacity and could use third-party tolling arrangements to process hydroxide into metal, further maintaining downward price pressure.

Peak Oversupply May Be Near, But Price Recovery Remains Uncertain

Some market participants believe that cobalt hydroxide oversupply may have already peaked. The shift towards lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, which do not use cobalt, has significantly impacted the demand for nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) battery chemistries, leading to lower demand for cobalt sulfate and cobalt hydroxide.

However, despite this potential supply peak, weak demand across key industrial sectors suggests that cobalt prices are unlikely to see a strong recovery in the near term.

Conclusion

In 2025, Chinese cobalt prices are expected to remain under pressure due to rising nickel and copper production, ongoing oversupply, and weak demand from the European EV and chemicals sectors. While some believe that the cobalt market may be nearing peak oversupply, prices are unlikely to experience significant upward momentum unless demand rebounds sharply or supply reductions occur.

Europe Rare Earth Prices Hold Steady as China’s NdPr Market Softens

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Europe Rare Earth Prices Hold Steady as China’s NdPr Market Softens
Rare Earth mining

Europe rare earth prices held broadly steady this week as tight heavy rare earth availability offset weakness in China’s neodymium and praseodymium market. Delivered European prices for light rare earths showed little movement, while prompt supply of restricted heavy rare earths remained extremely limited.

Europe rare earth prices are now being shaped by two different market structures. Light rare earths are tracking weaker Chinese sentiment more closely, but European demand remains modest and supply is sufficient. Heavy rare earths are trading under export-control pressure, with buyers outside China paying steep premiums for prompt material.

Europe rare earth prices therefore show a widening split between ordinary demand softness and strategic scarcity. The market is not moving as one rare earth complex. It is separating by licensing access, material origin, availability and end-use urgency.

Light Rare Earths Stay Flat Despite Chinese Market Drop

European delivered neodymium oxide prices remained steady at $115-130/kg cif Europe. Neodymium metal also held at $145-160/kg cif.

Praseodymium oxide stayed unchanged at $115-130/kg cif Europe, while praseodymium-neodymium oxide held at $110-115/kg cif. The stability came despite a sharp decline in China’s NdPr complex.

Chinese traders have been destocking ahead of the 1-5 May Labour Day holiday, expecting weaker domestic end-user demand. Several oxide producers suspended spot offers to assess market direction.

European prices did not follow the Chinese decline because regional spot demand remains limited. Delivered European prices are already below Chinese values on average, supported by sufficient supply from multiple sources.

Cerium oxide moved slightly higher, with the top end of the range rising to $2.55/kg cif Europe. Demand is being supported by increased use of cerium-based rare earth magnets and higher freight costs for material circulating outside China.

This light rare earth stability suggests that Europe is not facing immediate NdPr scarcity. However, buyers remain cautious because Chinese price movements still influence sentiment and replacement-cost expectations.

Heavy Rare Earths Remain Tight Under Export Controls

Heavy rare earth availability remains the main pressure point in Europe. Delivered prices for dysprosium oxide were unchanged at $1,000-1,200/kg cif Europe, while terbium oxide held at $3,800-4,500/kg cif.

Spot liquidity has been thin since the start of the year. Prompt availability outside China remains very tight, especially for buyers without export licences.

China’s export controls continue to reshape heavy rare earth pricing. End-users that cannot access licensed Chinese supply are still willing to pay steep premiums to secure material for magnets, defence systems, electronics and advanced manufacturing.

Japanese buying interest has added more pressure since Japan became subject to stricter export controls in January. This has increased competition for limited non-China prompt supply.

The same pattern is visible in gadolinium and yttrium. Gadolinium oxide remained at $700-1,200/kg cif Europe, while yttrium oxide held at $800-1,200/kg cif Europe.

These markets are no longer priced only by Chinese domestic fundamentals. They are being priced by export-control access, available inventories and the cost of avoiding production disruption.

For European buyers, the practical issue is security of supply. Even if Chinese domestic prices soften, restricted material outside China can remain expensive because availability is controlled by licensing and logistics.

The result is a rare earth market where light rare earths may soften with Chinese demand, while heavy rare earths retain a strategic premium. That premium is likely to persist as long as export controls limit access to dysprosium, terbium, gadolinium and yttrium.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s rare earth market is becoming increasingly divided between price-led light rare earths and security-led heavy rare earths. China’s NdPr weakness matters, but export-control pressure on dysprosium, terbium, gadolinium and yttrium is now the stronger strategic signal.

SHFE Indonesian Nickel Cathode Brands Strengthen Indonesia’s Class I Nickel Role

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SHFE Indonesian Nickel Cathode Brands Strengthen Indonesia’s Class I Nickel Role
The Shanghai Futures Exchange

SHFE Indonesian nickel cathode brands have gained a major credibility boost after the Shanghai Futures Exchange approved two Indonesian-produced nickel cathode brands for delivery against SHFE contracts. The approvals cover PTENICO from Eternal Nickel Industry and DX zwdx from CNGR Dingxing New Energy.

The approvals mark an important step in Indonesia’s move from nickel ore and intermediate products toward exchange-deliverable Class I nickel. Indonesia has already become the world’s dominant nickel processing hub, but exchange approval gives its refined metal greater financial-market recognition.

SHFE Indonesian nickel cathode brands also reinforce the role of Chinese-backed industrial parks in building Indonesia’s downstream nickel value chain. Both approved producers are linked to major Chinese groups with strong positions in stainless steel or battery materials.

The development matters because exchange-deliverable nickel sits at the intersection of physical supply, futures market liquidity and industrial procurement. Approval by SHFE gives the brands wider acceptance among Chinese market participants and strengthens Indonesia’s role in Class I nickel trade.

Tsingshan and CNGR Extend Indonesia’s Refined Nickel Platform

Eternal Nickel Industry’s PTENICO brand was approved by SHFE after previously being listed on the London Metal Exchange on 16 December 2025. The company is a subsidiary of Chinese stainless steel producer Tsingshan Holding Group.

The plant is located in the Weda Bay Industrial Park in Halmahera, North Maluku. It uses an electrolytic process and has 50,000 t/yr of nickel cathode capacity, with nickel content of 99.96%.

Tsingshan’s involvement is strategically important. The group transformed global nickel markets through Indonesian nickel pig iron and stainless steel expansion, and it is now extending that influence into refined Class I nickel.

CNGR Dingxing New Energy’s DX zwdx brand was also approved by SHFE. The plant is located at the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park and also uses an electrolytic process. It has 50,000 t/yr of nickel cathode capacity, with nickel content of 99.96%.

CNGR Dingxing is a subsidiary of CNGR, a major Chinese lithium-ion battery cathode active material precursor producer. This gives the brand a direct connection to battery materials supply chains, not only stainless steel demand.

The LME accepted CNGR Dingxing’s Indonesian nickel cathode brand in May 2024. It also approved cobalt cathode produced by CNGR in Qinzhou, Guangxi, in March, showing the company’s expanding exchange-approved metals footprint.

Together, PTENICO and DX zwdx represent 100,000 t/yr of Indonesian nickel cathode capacity. Their SHFE approval gives Indonesia a stronger position in futures-linked refined nickel supply.

Exchange Approval Changes Nickel Market Positioning

The two brands are the first Indonesian-produced nickel cathodes approved by SHFE for delivery. That is significant because Indonesia’s nickel rise was initially built around ore, nickel pig iron, ferronickel, matte and mixed hydroxide precipitate.

Exchange-deliverable cathode is a different market category. It requires tighter quality control, brand recognition and acceptance by financial and physical market users.

SHFE has approved Chinese-produced nickel cathode brands totalling 121,000 t since 2024. Adding Indonesian brands expands the pool of deliverable material and shows how Indonesia is being integrated into China’s nickel pricing and delivery system.

This could gradually influence nickel market structure. More deliverable Indonesian metal may improve flexibility for Chinese buyers, increase acceptable supply for futures settlement and strengthen the link between Indonesian production and Chinese exchange pricing.

The approvals also come during a period of Class I nickel oversupply. LME and SHFE inventories have risen as new refined nickel capacity has entered the market faster than demand growth from batteries and alloys.

Against that backdrop, brand approval can become a competitive advantage. Producers with exchange-deliverable status may have better access to financing, trade channels and customers that require recognised specifications.

For Indonesia, the approval supports a broader industrial policy objective. The country wants to capture more value from its nickel resources by moving beyond raw ore and intermediate exports into higher-value metal and battery materials.

For China, the approvals deepen supply-chain integration with Indonesian assets. Chinese companies are not only investing in Indonesian mines and smelters; they are building exchange-recognised refined metal capacity that can serve Chinese industrial and financial markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

SHFE approval of Indonesian nickel cathode brands confirms that Indonesia is moving deeper into Class I nickel, not only bulk stainless and battery intermediates. The strategic issue now is whether this new exchange-deliverable capacity strengthens market liquidity or adds further pressure to an already oversupplied refined nickel market.

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply

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China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply
China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge exports are expected to rise over the next five years as western aerospace supply chains look for additional qualified raw material sources. Chinese producer Chaoyang Jinda Titanium expects international shipments of qualified aerospace-grade sponge to increase from around 1,000t this year to 10,000t by 2030.

The shift reflects a deeper change in the aerospace titanium supply chain. Western aircraft manufacturers and ingot melters are trying to reduce exposure to Russian supply, while aircraft build rates are expected to rise from 2027.

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge is therefore moving from a limited export niche into a potential supply-chain balancing tool. However, tariffs, qualification risk and geopolitical uncertainty will limit how quickly US and European buyers adopt Chinese material.

The opportunity is strongest in standard-quality structural titanium grades. Premium-quality sponge for engine, landing-gear and other critical applications is likely to remain controlled by established suppliers with long qualification histories.

Western Aerospace Buyers Face a Supply-Diversification Challenge

Aerospace-grade sponge demand is expected to recover from 2027 after a weaker 2026 caused by inventory normalisation. Mills have been reducing stocks of semi-finished titanium parts and raw materials, but aircraft production plans point to higher requirements later in the decade.

The timing is important. Airbus and Boeing both carry long aircraft backlogs, creating a decade of production visibility. This forces mills and original equipment manufacturers to look beyond short-term demand swings and secure raw material sources for future build-rate increases.

Western OEMs also continue to reassess Russian titanium exposure. If procurement from Russia declines, the market will need alternative aerospace-qualified sponge to fill the gap. Japan’s Toho Titanium and Osaka Titanium are expanding, while China is preparing to supply more qualified material.

Global approved aerospace-grade sponge supply excluding Russian products is expected to rise from about 74,000t this year to around 91,000t by 2030. Demand is expected to grow at a similar pace, leaving the market sensitive to which suppliers are included in purchasing programmes.

The supply-demand picture changes significantly depending on China and Russia. Excluding both suppliers creates a tighter market. Including them creates more apparent supply availability. This makes qualification and geopolitical acceptability just as important as physical capacity.

Some US ingot producers began qualifying Chinese titanium sponge in 2024. US imports from China rose to a 10-year high of 1,069t that year, showing that buyers were willing to test Chinese material when diversification pressure increased.

However, imports fell to 155t last year and no Chinese sponge imports were reported in January-February 2026. Tariff volatility, high mill inventories and policy uncertainty discouraged further purchasing.

This shows the main barrier for China aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Aerospace qualification requires multi-year commitments, stable documentation, repeatable quality and customer confidence. Buyers will not qualify a new source quickly if they fear trade rules could change again.

Titanium is exempt from the latest 10% US tariff, and overall duties have fallen back to 40% from 60%. But the rate itself is not the only issue. For aerospace buyers, volatility can be more damaging than the actual tariff level.

A mill can absorb or price a known tariff. It cannot easily build a long-term qualification strategy around unpredictable policy. This is why US buyers may limit Chinese sponge procurement to 15-20% of requirements, even if the material is technically acceptable.

Europe and Asia-Pacific may offer more immediate export channels. China already supplies aerospace-grade sponge to buyers in those regions, supporting shipments even when US demand is limited.

Capacity Expansion Could Change the Titanium Sponge Balance

China is preparing a large wave of aerospace-grade sponge capacity additions. Several major projects are scheduled to come on line soon, with combined new capacity of around 110,000 t/yr.

The scale is unprecedented. The planned additions exceed the combined existing capacity of Japan’s Toho and Osaka Titanium, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, and Saudi Arabia’s ATTM.

China’s expansion is driven by two demand streams. Domestic aerospace demand is rising from the Comac C919 programme and military aircraft production. At the same time, producers expect higher export demand as western OEMs diversify away from Russia.

China’s titanium mill product demand already has a meaningful aerospace base. Aerospace applications accounted for about 20% of China’s titanium mill product demand in 2025, or roughly 31,280t. The chemicals industry remained the largest segment at 48%.

The domestic base gives Chinese sponge producers a stronger platform for quality improvement. Aerospace production experience matters because sponge qualification depends on consistency over time, not only nameplate capacity.

Still, some market participants question whether all new capacity can secure international aerospace qualification. New lines may need years of operating history before western melters and OEMs accept material for aircraft applications.

This is a critical distinction. China may have large physical capacity, but aerospace supply depends on approved, audited and repeatable production. Capacity alone does not guarantee market access.

Price competitiveness may support adoption. Domestic China aerospace-grade sponge prices have recently held firm at 55,000-57,000 yuan/t ex-works because of cost pressure. That remains competitive against some western supply routes, especially if buyers need alternative non-Russian material.

However, qualification is likely to split the market by application. Standard structural titanium grades are more likely to accept Chinese sponge over time. These grades support airframes and less critical structural components where qualification remains strict but less restrictive than engine-grade applications.

Premium-quality sponge will be harder to penetrate. Engine, landing-gear and other demanding aerospace uses require deeper qualification, tighter chemistry control and stronger confidence from prime contractors and tier suppliers.

Airbus’ titanium demand outlook adds another layer. The A350 is a high titanium-bearing platform, with titanium representing around 15% of aircraft weight. As A350 production rises toward 2027 and 2028, titanium demand visibility should improve across the supply chain.

That demand pull could make Chinese material more attractive if western supply tightens. But buyers will still balance cost, qualification, geopolitics and supply security.

For Chinese producers, the path is clear but difficult. They must prove consistent aerospace-grade quality, build long-term customer trust, manage export documentation and navigate trade policy risk.

For western OEMs, the decision is strategic. China aerospace-grade titanium sponge could reduce Russia exposure and improve supply flexibility. But it also introduces another geopolitical dependency at a time when aerospace and defence supply chains are under closer scrutiny.

The most likely outcome is partial adoption. Chinese sponge may become a growing supplement for standard-quality structural grades, while established Japanese, Kazakh, Saudi and other qualified suppliers remain central to premium aerospace applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge will become harder for western aerospace supply chains to ignore as aircraft build rates rise and Russian exposure narrows. The decisive issue is not capacity, but whether Chinese producers can convert new output into trusted, qualified and politically acceptable supply.

South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens

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South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens
South32 Manganese Ore

South32 manganese ore export prices to China have fallen for June shipments as weak alloy demand, ample port inventories and cautious buying pressure the import market. The Australian diversified metals producer lowered offers for both Australian and South African manganese ore, according to Chinese importers.

South32 manganese ore export prices for Australian 42% lumpy ore fell to $5.40/mtu cif China for June delivery. This was down by $0.50/mtu from May.

South32 also reduced its offer for South African 37% manganese ore to $5/mtu cif China. This was down by $0.40/mtu from the previous month.

South32 manganese ore export prices are an important signal for the wider manganese chain because China remains the largest global buyer of seaborne ore. When Chinese alloy plants slow purchases, overseas miners often need to adjust export offers to maintain sales momentum.

Chinese Alloy Weakness Cuts Restocking Appetite

Chinese importers have shown limited interest in restocking manganese ore because inventories remain sufficient and alloy prices are weakening. This has reduced spot buying urgency before the Labour Day holiday on 1-5 May.

Many alloy plants postponed ore feedstock purchases while waiting for clearer market direction after the holiday. This cautious behaviour has weakened the negotiating position of overseas ore suppliers.

The pressure is also visible in Chinese port prices. Australian 44-46% lumpy manganese ore fell to 43-47 yuan/mtu delivery ex quay on 28 April, down from 47-50 yuan/mtu on 31 March.

The decline shows that domestic buyers are not only resisting new import offers. They are also repricing available port material lower as downstream demand fails to improve.

Manganese ore demand is closely linked to ferro-manganese and silico-manganese production. These alloys are used in steelmaking, where manganese improves strength, deoxidation and performance.

When steel consumption slows, alloy plants reduce purchasing activity. This immediately affects ore demand because manganese alloy producers are the main consumers of imported ore.

Steel Demand Remains the Main Constraint

The deeper issue is weak steel demand in China. Slower economic growth and subdued construction activity have limited recovery in steel consumption, leaving alloy producers cautious about raw material buying.

Without a stronger steel recovery, manganese alloy prices are likely to remain under pressure. This limits the ability of alloy plants to pay higher ore prices, even when miners try to defend margins.

South32’s price cut also reflects wider seaborne competition. Mining firms outside China need to respond when Chinese buyers have enough stock and are unwilling to chase cargoes.

Australian high-grade lumpy ore usually commands stronger interest because of its quality and processing value. However, even higher-grade material can weaken when alloy margins are poor and port inventories are sufficient.

South African ore also remains exposed to Chinese demand swings. Lower-grade material can face sharper price pressure when buyers reduce procurement and focus only on immediate needs.

For the manganese market, the June price cut suggests that miners are prioritising volume discipline and customer access over holding elevated offers. The next price direction will depend on whether Chinese alloy plants return after the holiday with real restocking demand.

If steel demand remains weak, manganese ore prices could face further downside pressure. If alloy prices stabilise and inventories fall, importers may resume buying, but recovery is likely to be gradual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

South32’s price cut shows that the manganese market is being driven by demand absorption, not supply shortage. Until Chinese steel and alloy demand improves, seaborne manganese ore suppliers will remain exposed to cautious restocking and lower port prices.

EU BEV Industry Faces Challenges Without Strong CO2 Targets and Tariffs

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The European Union's battery electric vehicle (BEV) market is at risk of losing ground to Chinese-owned brands unless the EU enforces its planned CO2 emission reduction targets along with newly proposed tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs). According to Transport & Environment (T&E), a leading environmental lobby group, these measures are essential to maintaining the competitive edge of European carmakers. The European Commission announced today that it will proceed with provisional tariffs on Chinese-manufactured EVs, signaling a critical step in addressing market imbalances.

CO2 Targets Key to Curbing Chinese BEV Imports

T&E's analysis shows a significant increase in the market share of Chinese-owned BEV brands, projecting that imports will constitute over 12% of the EU market this year, up from 8% last year. In contrast, non-Chinese brands are expected to see a slight rise to 13%. Without the enforcement of CO2 reduction targets, T&E forecasts that Chinese brands could capture nearly 15% of the market by next year, a trend that could weaken local BEV producers unless incentives are aligned to encourage a shift towards carbon-neutral vehicles.

The EU has established CO2 targets that require all automakers to achieve net zero emissions across their fleets by 2035, with interim milestones starting next year. However, recent debates and scrutiny have created uncertainty, prompting resistance from industry players. Aurelien De Meaux, CEO of Electra, a Paris-based charging start-up, emphasized the need for policy stability, stating, "The path to 2035, including specific CO2 milestones, was established in 2014 and 2019. We rely on this stability to make informed and effective investments."

Tariffs Alone May Not Protect Western BEV Producers

While the European Commission's provisional tariffs aim to level the playing field, a report by the Rhodium Group suggests that tariffs alone might not suffice. Chinese brands continue to enjoy profit margins that can absorb the costs of EU tariffs, whereas Western brands like Tesla and BMW, which manufacture in China, could see diminished profitability if tariffs are enforced. This dynamic has led to concerns that the tariffs may inadvertently harm European carmakers with overseas production facilities.

Additionally, China's response to these tariffs has included the potential for retaliatory measures on other goods, and its automakers are considering expanding production capacity overseas. Since 2022, 11 Chinese-owned EV plants have been planned in Europe, but only three have advanced past initial planning, primarily due to tariff uncertainties.

The situation is further complicated by instability in the battery production sector. According to T&E, 59% of the planned battery production capacity in Europe is "less likely" to proceed by 2030, adding to the challenges faced by the EU's BEV industry. Maintaining a clear and consistent regulatory approach will be crucial to incentivizing local production and reducing dependency on imports, ensuring the long-term sustainability of Europe's BEV market.

U.S. Tariff Hike Puts Pressure on China’s Tantalum Feedstock Market

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Tantalum

The recent U.S. decision to impose a 25% tariff on Chinese unwrought tantalum is set to create significant challenges for the tantalum feedstock market. This move, part of the Section 301 tariffs, will come into effect on September 27, having been delayed from August. The new tariffs will impact the demand for tantalum feedstock materials, including ores, pentoxide, and potassium fluotantalate, creating uncertainty within the market.

Impact of U.S. Tariff on Chinese Exports

China has long been a leading supplier of unwrought tantalum to the U.S., responsible for around 40% of total U.S. imports of this critical material between 2020 and mid-September 2024. In the first seven months of 2024 alone, the U.S. imported 177 tons of unwrought tantalum, a figure that already surpasses the total imports for all of 2023.

However, the volume of Chinese tantalum exported to the U.S. has been steadily declining. The U.S. imported 321 tons in 2023, a 56% drop from the 730 tons imported in 2022. Of this, only 131 tons came from China, marking the lowest level in years. This downward trend is likely to accelerate further as the tariffs come into effect, prompting U.S. buyers to reconsider their reliance on Chinese tantalum.

Lower Demand for Tantalum Feedstock

As a result of the anticipated reduction in downstream demand, producers of tantalum feedstock in China are already feeling the pressure. For instance, Chinese potassium fluotantalate producers have reported receiving lower bids from tantalum smelters in recent days. Bid prices have dropped to approximately ¥830-840/kg, down from ¥850/kg before the mid-autumn holiday in mid-September.

The electronics industry, a major consumer of tantalum, is also likely to be affected. Some companies are now required to avoid sourcing tantalite from Africa due to a dispute between the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) and the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI). This dispute, combined with the U.S. tariff hike, is leading to further hesitation among tantalum smelters to source feedstock from Africa.

Chinese Smelters' Response and Outlook

Despite the current challenges, some Chinese smelters are optimistic about domestic supply. “We are not short of feedstock because there is ample tantalum scrap feedstock supply, which is sufficient to feed China’s domestic tantalum production,” commented a source from a South China-based smelter. However, many smelters and traders remain cautious, focusing on fulfilling domestic orders while closely monitoring global market developments.

With the U.S. tariff hike set to take effect, the outlook for China's tantalum feedstock market remains uncertain. Tantalum suppliers are attempting to raise their prices, but market participants believe the increased tariffs will make it difficult to conclude new deals at elevated prices.

As the U.S. prepares to implement its new tariffs on Chinese tantalum, the ripple effects are being felt throughout the supply chain. From lower demand in the electronics sector to falling bid prices for feedstock, the market faces a challenging road ahead. While Chinese producers remain resilient with alternative feedstock sources, the long-term impact of the tariffs could reshape global supply chains and market dynamics.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV Production Plan Signals Localised Chinese EV Strategy

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Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV Production Plan Signals Localised Chinese EV Strategy
Stellantis

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production plans could mark a new phase in Europe’s electric vehicle supply chain, as western automakers look to combine local assembly with lower-cost Chinese components. Stellantis and Leapmotor are considering new battery electric vehicle lines at Zaragoza and Villaverde in Spain through their Leapmotor International joint venture.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production would move the partnership beyond vehicle imports and toward European manufacturing. That shift matters because local content rules, tariff risk and regional supply security are becoming more important in the EV market.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production could also help the companies respond to weaker European affordability conditions. Chinese component sourcing can lower cost, while Spanish assembly may improve regulatory and commercial positioning inside Europe.

The companies have not disclosed production targets, utilisation rates or investment figures. This leaves the scale of the plan uncertain, but the strategic direction is clear.

Spain Could Become a European Platform for Leapmotor Models

Zaragoza could gain a new all-electric SUV line as early as this year. The plant has long been associated with Opel production and could become a base for new BEV output under the joint venture.

Villaverde in Madrid may also become more important to Leapmotor International. The plant faces a production gap after Citroen C4 output ends and may shift entirely to Leapmotor models by 2029.

That potential transition would give Stellantis a way to protect industrial activity at existing Spanish plants while adding lower-cost BEV models to its European portfolio.

The plan reflects a broader industry pattern. European automakers are trying to defend market share against Chinese EV competition while also using Chinese platforms, components and cost structures to improve competitiveness.

Stellantis bought a 21% stake in Leapmotor in 2023 and created a 51-49 joint venture to sell and manufacture Leapmotor vehicles outside China. Spain could now become one of the key production bases for that strategy.

For Spain, the opportunity is industrial. More BEV assembly could support jobs, supplier activity and demand for local logistics, batteries, wiring, aluminium components and electronics integration.

Local Assembly Meets Cost Pressure and Supply-Chain Rules

The move from imports to local production is strategically important. European BEV manufacturing is increasingly shaped by tariffs, local content rules, battery sourcing requirements and political pressure to keep vehicle production inside the region.

Leapmotor brings cost-competitive EV engineering and components. Stellantis brings European plants, distribution, regulatory experience and manufacturing scale.

This combination could help address one of Europe’s biggest EV problems: producing affordable electric vehicles while maintaining regional industrial capacity.

However, the lack of disclosed volumes makes the market impact difficult to judge. Without production targets, it is unclear whether the Spain plans will materially change Stellantis’ European BEV output.

Stellantis needs stronger BEV momentum. Its BEV sales accounted for around 13% of output in the first half of last year, behind Volkswagen and BMW, and the company later reported a major write-down after cutting prices.

Leapmotor is growing much faster. Its EV sales, including plug-in hybrids, more than doubled last year to 596,000 units. That growth gives Stellantis access to a Chinese partner with clear scale momentum.

The industrial implication extends into materials. More European BEV production increases demand for aluminium body and structural parts, copper wiring, electrical steel, battery materials, power electronics and lightweight components.

If the model works, Stellantis and Leapmotor could create a template for Chinese-designed, Europe-built EVs. That would reshape competition not only in vehicles, but also in the upstream materials and component chains that support regional BEV manufacturing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Stellantis and Leapmotor are not only discussing new Spanish EV lines; they are testing a hybrid supply-chain model for Europe. Local assembly with Chinese components may become a practical route for automakers caught between cost pressure, tariff risk and the need to keep European factories active.

LME Copper Cathode Supply Could Rise as Chinese Smelters Push EQ Listings

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LME Copper Cathode Supply Could Rise as Chinese Smelters Push EQ Listings
Chinese Copper

LME copper cathode supply could increase as more Chinese smelters seek to register equivalent quality cathodes on the London Metal Exchange. The move reflects a push to capture higher premiums for material that is close to LME-registered brands in quality.

The near-term impact on LME copper cathode supply is likely to be limited. However, more registrations could gradually widen deliverable copper availability and give buyers more alternatives to traditional registered cathode brands.

Chinese smelters are targeting the premium gap between EQ cathode and fully registered material. African-origin registered copper usually earns a higher premium than EQ cathode, but it still trades below Chilean registered brands because many African cathodes are solvent-extraction and electrowinning products with slightly higher impurity levels.

DRC Cathode Listings Expand China-Linked LME Supply

The London Metal Exchange recently approved China Nonferrous Mining’s SMD copper cathode brand for listing. The brand is produced at the Deziwa project in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has copper cathode capacity of 80,000 t/yr.

The Deziwa project is jointly owned by CNMC and the DRC’s state-owned mining company. It hosts 4.6mn t of copper metal resources and 420,000t of cobalt metal resources, giving it strategic value across both copper and battery metal supply chains.

CNMC’s production profile also shows a shift toward more refined copper output. The group produced 130,232t of copper cathode in 2025, up 3% from a year earlier, while copper blister output fell by 33% to 192,266t.

The LME has also approved CMOC’s TFM 1 copper cathode brand for listing. That brand is produced at Tenke Fungurume in the DRC, reinforcing the country’s growing role in exchange-deliverable copper supply.

Premium Strategy Could Reshape Refined Copper Trade Flows

LME copper cathode supply strategy is becoming more important as Chinese-linked producers look to improve market access and price realisation. Listing cathode brands can improve buyer acceptance, increase liquidity and narrow discounts against established registered brands.

The DRC is already China’s largest source of copper cathode imports. China imported 1.44mn t of copper cathode from the DRC in 2025, equal to 37.6% of total imports.

More LME-approved DRC brands could change how buyers view African cathode. If quality, documentation and deliverability improve, some buyers may become less dependent on higher-premium registered material from other origins.

Still, the immediate effect should remain modest. LME registration does not automatically mean large volumes will flow onto warrant, but it does increase optionality for producers, traders and consumers in a market where brand status affects pricing power.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Chinese EQ cathode push shows that copper competition is moving into brand approval, deliverability and premium capture. The bigger implication is that DRC copper is becoming not only a Chinese import source, but a growing part of the LME-recognised refined copper system.

Acute Tungsten Shortage Drives Record Prices Across Global Supply Chains

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Acute Tungsten Shortage Drives Record Prices Across Global Supply Chains
Tungsten

The acute tungsten shortage is pushing global tungsten prices to record highs in 2026. Supply remains extremely tight across concentrate, APT, and downstream products. Low inventories and restricted Chinese export licences are worsening the squeeze. As a result, the acute tungsten shortage is becoming one of the most severe specialty metals disruptions in the market.

The current problem starts at the raw material level. Global production of tungsten concentrates has declined, while available western supply remains far below demand. Market participants now describe an estimated shortfall of around 13,000t of contained tungsten in the western market. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is no longer a regional issue. It is a structural supply crisis.

Pricing shows how quickly the market has tightened. Tungsten concentrate prices in Rotterdam surged to record levels in late January. European APT prices also climbed sharply as concentrate costs and export restrictions combined. Consequently, global tungsten prices are rising across the entire value chain.

Chinese Supply Constraints Are Tightening the Tungsten Concentrate Shortage

Chinese supply constraints remain the core driver of the tungsten concentrate shortage. China produces about 80pc of global tungsten supply and still dominates export availability. However, domestic ore shortages have intensified after mine shutdowns and weak new project development. Meanwhile, China’s 2025 mining quota fell from the previous year.

Trade data reinforces that tightening pattern. Chinese exports of tungsten concentrate declined sharply in 2025, while Chinese imports rose strongly. That means even China is pulling in more raw material to support its own processing base. As a result, less material is reaching overseas buyers.

APT export licences have added another bottleneck. Western customers may secure limited licences, but actual shipment still depends on concentrate availability. That creates a second layer of uncertainty on top of already weak feedstock supply. Therefore, the tungsten concentrate shortage is now feeding directly into delayed APT deliveries and higher prices.

Consumers are also paying much more for feedstock. Payables for concentrate have risen sharply as buyers compete for scarce supply. That shift reflects a market where sellers hold stronger leverage and buyers have fewer alternatives. Consequently, procurement conditions are becoming more difficult even for experienced consumers.

Japan and Europe Face Growing Pressure as Recycling Lags Demand

Japan and Europe are now feeling the full pressure of the acute tungsten shortage. Europe faces critically tight APT availability because it depends heavily on Chinese supply and licensing. Japan faces similar pressure after new Chinese restrictions on dual-use exports added more uncertainty. Therefore, both regions are competing harder for a smaller pool of material.

Japan’s position is especially sensitive. The country has no domestic tungsten mining base and depends heavily on imported tungsten products. Buyers are now seeking tungsten-containing scrap, but that market is also tight. As a result, recycling cannot yet solve the immediate supply problem.

Recycling capacity may grow, but it will take time. Japan is expanding tungsten recycling capability in response to lower Chinese exports. However, significant new output will not arrive quickly. Meanwhile, downstream consumers still need metal today, not years from now.

This means the market will likely remain strained for some time. Concentrate shortages, limited export licences, and weak scrap availability are all reinforcing one another. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is likely to keep global tungsten prices elevated unless primary supply improves materially.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tungsten is now showing how vulnerable specialty metal supply chains become when one country dominates both mining and exports. This market is not just tight. It is structurally exposed. Unless new western supply or faster recycling emerges, tungsten buyers may face prolonged price pressure and continued allocation risk.

Leveraging Section 301 Tariffs to Combat Circumvention of Chinese Steel and Aluminum Exports

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In light of significant government subsidies aiding low-cost Chinese steel and aluminum products, the U.S. steel and aluminum industries advocate for the extension of Section 301 tariffs beyond China to third-party countries. This strategic move aims to shield U.S. industries from the influx of cheap, subsidized materials. The Aluminum Association (AA) and the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) have both submitted statements to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), urging enhanced enforcement measures to prevent the circumvention of existing tariffs.

Industry Concerns and Actions

The AA emphasized the need to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese imports, which has effectively reduced China's direct exports to the U.S. However, the redirection of these exports to third-party countries has surged, threatening U.S. manufacturers who produce similar goods. Consequently, industry representatives are pushing for the expansion of Section 301 tariffs to encompass processed Chinese steel and aluminum products entering the U.S. via third countries.

The Biden administration, following a review of Section 301 tariffs applied from 2018 to 2022, announced an increase in tariffs on a series of products, including steel and aluminum, effective August 1. Despite this, U.S. industries call for broader application of these tariffs to include circumvention through third-party processing.

Detailed Proposals and Data

In their statement, AISI highlighted the necessity of reinforcing origin regulations for steel products processed in third countries using Chinese materials. The current determination of origin by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is based on the final substantial transformation location. AISI advocates for considering the melting and pouring locations to prevent unfair trade practices.

Data from the Department of Commerce’s Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System (SIMA) indicate that approximately 1.7 million metric tons of Chinese-origin steel have entered the U.S. since January 1, 2022, with 17% processed in third countries. AISI suspects that actual figures may be higher due to underreported origin data.

Strategic Importance and Recommendations

Expanding Section 301 tariffs to cover Chinese steel and aluminum products processed in third countries would send a strong message of the administration's commitment to combating unfair trade practices and protecting American jobs. The AA further recommended extending these tariffs to aluminum-intensive products manufactured using Chinese aluminum in third countries, aligning with USTR Katherine Tai's goals of protecting U.S. workers and bolstering supply chain resilience.