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Sumitomo Ambatovy Nickel-Cobalt Exit Marks Costly Retreat From Madagascar Laterite Project

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Sumitomo Ambatovy Nickel-Cobalt Exit Marks Costly Retreat From Madagascar Laterite Project
Sumitomo

Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit marks a major strategic retreat from one of the world’s largest laterite nickel operations. The Japanese trading and mining group will divest its 54.17% stake in Madagascar’s Ambatovy project to Ambatovy Mineral Resources Investment.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit is unusually costly. The transaction value is negative $418mn, meaning Sumitomo will pay to leave the asset after more than two decades of involvement.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit reflects years of operational instability, high costs and weak profitability. Sumitomo joined Ambatovy in 2005 and invested around $3bn, but the project generated cumulative losses of about ¥400bn.

The sale is expected to close in the first half of Sumitomo’s financial year ending 31 March 2027. Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources will retain its 45.82% stake.

Operational Instability Undermines a Strategic Nickel Asset

Ambatovy remains strategically important because it produces refined nickel and cobalt. These materials serve stainless steel, battery raw materials, superalloys and industrial supply chains.

However, the project has struggled to operate consistently. Ambatovy combines laterite mining, slurry transport and refining, making it a complex integrated operation with high technical and maintenance demands.

The project was suspended in February before Cyclone Gezani struck eastern Madagascar. It has not yet fully restarted, although market participants expect operations to resume during the current quarter.

Recovery efforts are still continuing. The project has also faced slurry pipeline damage and other processing issues in previous years, which affected output and reliability.

Ambatovy produced about 30,000t of refined nickel in 2025. Cobalt output was estimated at roughly 10% of nickel production.

That production profile gives the asset continuing supply-chain relevance. But strategic metal exposure alone cannot offset weak operating economics if reliability, costs and weather-related risks remain unresolved.

New Ownership Faces Production Reliability Test

AMRI, the buyer, is a UK-based consortium led by mining investment firm Essenwood and South African private equity firm Zungu Investments. The transaction gives the new group control of Sumitomo’s stake in a difficult but potentially valuable nickel-cobalt platform.

For Sumitomo, the divestment removes a long-running drag on earnings. The company expects to record a loss of about ¥70bn in its consolidated April-June results and a non-consolidated loss of about ¥85bn for the full financial year.

Sumitomo said tax effects should limit the net consolidated impact, and the transfer has already been included in its full-year earnings forecast.

For the nickel market, the key issue is not ownership alone. The immediate question is whether the new structure can stabilise output, repair operating weaknesses and restore confidence in Ambatovy’s supply.

Madagascar nickel-cobalt supply remains strategically relevant as buyers look beyond Indonesia-dominated nickel growth. But Ambatovy must prove that it can deliver refined nickel and cobalt reliably before it can regain stronger market importance.

The sale also highlights a broader industry lesson. Large laterite nickel projects can offer scale and battery-metal exposure, but they often carry high capital intensity, technical risk and sensitivity to market cycles.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sumitomo’s exit shows that nickel-cobalt scale is not enough when operating reliability and cost control fail. Ambatovy’s next phase will depend on whether new owners can turn a strategically valuable asset into a commercially stable supplier.


Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Pause Raises New Supply Concerns for 2026

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Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Pause Raises New Supply Concerns for 2026
Sherritt International

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is now the company’s most immediate operational challenge for 2026. Sherritt said it will temporarily suspend mining at its Moa joint venture in Cuba because fuel deliveries cannot be fulfilled. The company also expects to place the processing plant on standby. As a result, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is creating new uncertainty around upstream supply and production planning.

This matters because Moa is a key source of nickel and cobalt feed for Sherritt’s wider business. The company said it does not yet know when fuel deliveries to the site will resume. That makes the interruption more serious than a short maintenance event. Therefore, Cuba nickel-cobalt supply is now facing a disruption with no clear restart timeline.

Sherritt is using the downtime to complete maintenance activities at the processing plant. That should help the site use the pause more productively while operations remain constrained. However, the core issue is still fuel access, not plant readiness. Consequently, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause may last longer than the market would prefer.

Fort Saskatchewan Refinery Buys Some Time

Fort Saskatchewan refinery gives Sherritt some short-term protection against the Cuban disruption. The company said its Alberta refinery should see no immediate impact and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed inventory is expected to last until mid-April. As a result, downstream production can continue for now.

That inventory buffer is important, but it is limited. If Moa mining and processing do not restart before the feed runs low, pressure could move downstream as well. Therefore, the Fort Saskatchewan refinery is buying time rather than fully solving the problem.

Nickel and Cobalt Output Guidance Now Looks Less Certain

Nickel and cobalt output guidance for 2026 now looks harder to defend. Sherritt had expected to produce 26,000-28,000t of finished nickel and 2,750-2,850t of finished cobalt this year. The company now says it will update guidance once it has greater certainty on a full restart. As a result, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is directly affecting market expectations for annual output.

One part of the business remains stable. Sherritt said its power division, Energas, should continue operating without issues. That limits the disruption to the metals side of the portfolio. Meanwhile, investors and buyers will focus on how quickly fuel deliveries can return to Moa.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This disruption shows how vulnerable nickel and cobalt supply chains can remain to non-market factors such as fuel availability. Sherritt still has some downstream breathing room, but that buffer is not large. If Moa stays offline for too long, the company may need to materially reset its 2026 metals outlook.

Chinese Cobalt Prices Expected to Decline Further in 2025 Amid Rising Supply and Weak Demand

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Chinese Cobalt Manufacturing

Oversupply and Weak Demand to Push Cobalt Prices Lower

The Chinese cobalt market is set to experience further price declines in 2025, as increasing nickel and copper production, from which cobalt is a by-product, leads to an oversupply that buyers are struggling to absorb.

Currently, Chinese-origin cobalt metal traded in Europe has already seen significant pressure due to a lack of floor pricing on raw materials, a trend expected to persist into the new year. Market insiders suggest that cobalt prices could drop below $9/lb, as fully integrated Chinese producers view cobalt as a credit to their primary metal production, particularly nickel and copper.

For these refiners, cobalt is a secondary concern. As one trading firm explained, some Chinese producers operate with production costs as low as $4,000 per ton while selling at $9,000 per ton. Even if they incur a $50 million loss on cobalt, they may still profit significantly from copper production, which can generate up to $700 million in gains.

Chinese Refiners Likely to Continue Production at a Loss

Unlike non-Chinese refiners, which may curtail supply if cobalt prices fall below $9/lb, some Chinese integrated mining firms and refiners could continue refining hydroxide into metal at a loss-making $7-8/lb.

While there is speculation that some Chinese metal producers may attempt to negotiate floor prices in their contracts, it remains uncertain whether these efforts will succeed. Market participants are closely watching how these negotiations unfold, as they could provide some level of price support if successful.

Global Nickel and Copper Growth to Sustain Cobalt Oversupply

The primary factor driving cobalt’s oversupply is the continued expansion of nickel and copper production, as cobalt is a by-product of both metals.
  • Nickel production is set to rise again in 2025 with the launch of new Class 1 nickel refineries in China and Indonesia. This will likely keep London Metal Exchange (LME) three-month official nickel prices within the $15,000-17,000 per ton range, significantly lower than the $30,000 per ton peak in early 2023.
  • Copper production is also projected to increase due to expansions at mines such as Kamoa-Kakula in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although cobalt sales represent only a minor portion of copper mining revenues, producers still aim to extract value from it as a credit.

Weakened Demand from EV and Chemicals Sectors Further Pressures Prices
While cobalt demand in China has surged by 40%, this has not been enough to counteract weakening demand in other regions, particularly in Europe:
  • The electric vehicle (EV) sector in Europe has slowed down, leading to reduced demand for cathode active materials like cobalt.
  • The European chemicals industry, particularly in Germany, has struggled due to rising energy costs and broader economic challenges.
Even if prices do increase, China has ample spare refining capacity and could use third-party tolling arrangements to process hydroxide into metal, further maintaining downward price pressure.

Peak Oversupply May Be Near, But Price Recovery Remains Uncertain

Some market participants believe that cobalt hydroxide oversupply may have already peaked. The shift towards lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, which do not use cobalt, has significantly impacted the demand for nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) battery chemistries, leading to lower demand for cobalt sulfate and cobalt hydroxide.

However, despite this potential supply peak, weak demand across key industrial sectors suggests that cobalt prices are unlikely to see a strong recovery in the near term.

Conclusion

In 2025, Chinese cobalt prices are expected to remain under pressure due to rising nickel and copper production, ongoing oversupply, and weak demand from the European EV and chemicals sectors. While some believe that the cobalt market may be nearing peak oversupply, prices are unlikely to experience significant upward momentum unless demand rebounds sharply or supply reductions occur.

Sherritt Nickel-Cobalt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Cuba Feedstock Risk

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Sherritt Nickel-Cobalt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Cuba Feedstock Risk
Sherritt

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery operations at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta will enter a shutdown state after feedstock from the company’s Moa joint venture in Cuba became unavailable.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery production depends on mixed sulfide precipitate shipped from the Moa mine, where nickel and cobalt ore is mined and processed before final refining in Canada.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery shutdown highlights the vulnerability of processing facilities that rely on a single international feed source. The company has not provided a timeline for restarting nickel and cobalt refining.

The shutdown follows fuel-related disruptions at Moa and increased US sanctions on Cuba, which led Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture.

Cuba Disruption Breaks the Mine-to-Refinery Supply Chain

The Moa joint venture is owned equally by Sherritt and Cuba’s General Nickel Company. Its operating model links Cuban mining and intermediate processing directly with Canadian refining.

Ore from Moa is processed into mixed sulfide precipitate before shipment to Fort Saskatchewan for conversion into finished nickel and cobalt products.

That structure becomes vulnerable when upstream operations stop. Sherritt had already warned that existing refinery feed inventories would last only until around mid-June.

Fuel shortages initially forced the Moa operation to suspend mining activity in February. Additional uncertainty followed after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba, prompting Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture in May.

The refinery will remain shut until Moa mining and processing resume and enough intermediate material is available to rebuild feed supply.

This shows that refining capacity alone does not guarantee critical mineral security. A plant can remain technically capable of producing metal while geopolitical or logistical problems interrupt the upstream feed required to operate it.

Nickel and Cobalt Output Stops While Byproduct Production Continues

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to carry out maintenance at Fort Saskatchewan.

The company will continue producing fertilizer and sulfuric acid, showing that some parts of the industrial complex can remain operational even while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

However, the loss of finished nickel and cobalt output reduces North American availability of two important materials used across stainless steel, superalloys, batteries and other industrial applications.

Cobalt is particularly relevant to aerospace, defence and battery supply chains, while refined nickel remains important for both conventional metallurgy and selected battery chemistries.

The disruption also underlines the strategic importance of diversified feedstock. Refiners that can process material from multiple mines or jurisdictions have greater resilience when one supply route fails.

For Sherritt, the key issue is therefore not refinery maintenance but restoration of a stable Cuban feed stream.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan shows that midstream capacity is only as secure as its upstream feed. North American critical minerals policy must address concentrate and intermediate supply alongside domestic refining capacity.

Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Suspension Deepens Cuba Supply Chain Risk

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Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Suspension Deepens Cuba Supply Chain Risk
Sherritt

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension has moved from sanctions review to direct operational action after the Canadian miner and refiner halted its participation in activities tied to the Moa joint venture in Cuba. The decision follows new US sanctions authority that could target entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension is significant because the Moa joint venture links Cuban mine and intermediate processing operations with Sherritt’s refining capacity in Alberta. Ore is mined and processed in Cuba into mixed sulfide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt, then shipped to Canada for refining.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension adds another layer of disruption to an already fragile supply route. The company had temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

Although Sherritt was not directly named in the new US sanctions, the company said the executive order is expected to create conditions that make operating in Cuba more difficult. That risk was enough for Sherritt to suspend direct participation in Moa-related activities.

Sanctions Risk Hits a Cross-Border Nickel and Cobalt Chain

The new US executive order expands sanctions authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It allows Washington to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, along with several other industries.

That broad language creates uncertainty for companies with Cuban exposure. Even without direct designation, counterparties may become more cautious around shipping, banking, insurance, payments, logistics and commercial contracts.

For Sherritt, the issue is not only legal exposure. It is the practical ability to keep a cross-border supply chain functioning when sanctions risk rises around the Cuban mining sector.

The Moa joint venture is co-owned by Sherritt and the General Nickel Company of Cuba. Its structure depends on Cuban ore mining, local MSP production and shipment to Canada for refining.

Mixed sulfide precipitate is a critical intermediate product because it carries both nickel and cobalt units into downstream refining. Any interruption in MSP flows can affect feed availability at the refinery level.

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing. That makes Moa strategically relevant despite its political and logistical complexity.

Alberta Refinery Continues but Feedstock Window Narrows

Sherritt said its Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta has not been affected by the suspension and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed at the site is expected to last until mid-June.

That timeline is now critical. If Cuban MSP flows do not resume or alternative feedstock is not secured, refinery operations could face greater pressure once inventories are depleted.

The situation shows how refining capacity can still be vulnerable when upstream feedstock depends on a politically exposed jurisdiction. A refinery may remain operational, but its production outlook depends on the continuity of intermediate material supply.

The February fuel-related suspension at Moa already showed that physical operating conditions in Cuba were difficult. The latest sanctions-driven action compounds that problem by adding policy risk to fuel and logistics constraints.

For customers, the key question is whether Sherritt can maintain finished nickel and cobalt output after mid-June. Buyers will also watch for any change in shipment schedules, inventory levels and alternative feed strategies.

For the wider market, Sherritt’s case highlights a broader critical minerals reality. Western supply security cannot be measured only by refining location. It must include mine jurisdiction, intermediate processing, sanctions exposure, energy availability and shipping routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s Moa suspension shows that critical minerals supply chains can be disrupted by policy risk even before a company is directly sanctioned. The lesson for nickel and cobalt buyers is clear: feedstock origin and political exposure now matter as much as refining capacity.

Indonesia HPM Formula Raises Nickel Ore Cost Risk for HPAL Producers

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Indonesia HPM Formula Raises Nickel Ore Cost Risk for HPAL Producers
ESDM

Indonesia HPM formula changes will reshape nickel ore pricing from 15 April, adding new cost pressure across the country’s nickel processing chain. The energy and mineral resources ministry revised the mineral benchmark price mechanism for nickel and aluminium ore, with nickel valuation now expanded beyond nickel content alone.

The Indonesia HPM formula raises the correction factor for 1.6% nickel ore to 30%, compared with the previous 20% correction factor for 1.9% ore. Under the new framework, the correction factor rises or falls by one percentage point for every 0.1% change in nickel content.

This means the correction factor for 1.9% nickel ore will rise to 33%. The change increases the official value of nickel ore and could raise taxes, royalties and feedstock costs for processors that rely on HPM-linked transactions.

The Indonesia HPM formula also adds cobalt, iron and chromium into ore valuation. This is a major policy shift because these contained elements were not previously priced in the same way. Indonesia is now moving toward a more complete ore-value model, especially for laterite ores used in battery and stainless steel supply chains.

Cobalt, Iron and Chromium Inclusion Changes Nickel Ore Valuation

Indonesia’s new nickel HPM framework gives cobalt a correction factor of 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. This is particularly important for high-pressure acid leach producers because cobalt-bearing ore can generate additional value through mixed hydroxide precipitate.

The ministry also introduced a 10% correction factor for iron when ore contains 35% or less iron. Chromium content also carries a 10% correction factor. These additions make ore valuation more complex and link pricing more closely to the full chemistry of laterite deposits.

The inclusion of cobalt is the most strategically important change. Indonesia’s HPAL projects produce nickel-cobalt intermediates for battery supply chains, and cobalt content can materially affect project economics. By taxing cobalt-bearing value inside ore, Jakarta is capturing more upstream rent from battery-linked mineral flows.

The Indonesia HPM formula therefore moves beyond a simple nickel-grade benchmark. It pushes the country toward a broader mineral-value system that recognises by-product metals and secondary contained value.

The ministry kept the Harga Mineral Acuan reference price unchanged. This means the immediate policy impact comes from correction factors and added contained elements, rather than a change in the headline reference price.

Market participants are now assessing how the new rules will pass through to actual transactions. For nickel ore used in rotary kiln-electric furnace production, spot prices remain nearly double the HPM level. This limits the immediate impact on some stainless-linked ore trades because market prices already sit well above the official benchmark.

The impact is likely to be much stronger for HPAL ore. Ore used in HPAL processing often trades without the same premium seen in RKEF feedstock. As a result, the revised HPM formula could lift transacted HPAL ore prices by more than a third.

That cost increase would move directly into battery-grade nickel economics. Market participants estimate that higher ore prices and taxes could raise mixed hydroxide precipitate production costs by more than $1,000/t in nickel metal equivalent.

This matters because Indonesia has become the centre of global MHP supply growth. Chinese-backed HPAL projects rely on Indonesian ore, sulphuric acid, energy and logistics to supply nickel and cobalt intermediates to global battery chains. Higher ore costs could narrow margins across MHP, nickel sulphate and cathode material supply.

The change also arrives during a period of wider nickel policy uncertainty. Indonesia has been tightening mining quotas, reviewing export taxes and seeking greater value capture from its mineral resources. The revised HPM formula fits that direction by increasing government control over pricing and taxable value.

Nickel Policy Shift Extends to Bauxite and Signals Broader Resource Control

Indonesia’s pricing reform did not stop at nickel. The ministry also revised the HPM formula for bauxite, changing the price basis to dollars per wet metric tonne from dollars per dry metric tonne.

The bauxite change adds a silica discount and raises the correction factor to $1.40/wmt for each one percentage point increase in aluminium oxide content. The previous formula used $1/dmt. This changes how moisture and ore quality are reflected in benchmark pricing.

The ministry also changed the price basis for lead ore to dollars per wet metric tonne from dollars per dry metric tonne. This effectively removes moisture content from the pricing formula and simplifies the benchmark around wet material values.

These changes suggest a broader policy direction. Indonesia is refining benchmark pricing across mineral commodities to improve tax collection, capture more contained value and align official pricing with ore quality.

For nickel, the change has immediate market significance because Indonesia dominates global laterite supply. Nickel ore pricing affects stainless steel, ferronickel, nickel pig iron, MHP, nickel sulphate and battery cathode supply chains.

The Shanghai Futures Exchange nickel price response showed that traders are treating the policy as price-supportive. Nickel closed at Yn136,900/t after rising from Yn133,010/t on 3 April, with participants citing support from the revised HMA-linked pricing framework.

However, the real market impact will depend on how producers, smelters and government agencies implement the rules. If HPM-based taxes rise sharply while spot ore prices remain high, margin pressure could build across processors with weaker cost positions.

HPAL producers are the most exposed because their feedstock pricing may move more directly with the revised benchmark. RKEF operators may see less immediate change because their ore costs already reflect strong market premiums.

For battery materials buyers, the risk is that Indonesia’s cost base becomes more expensive even as global nickel markets remain oversupplied. Higher ore valuation may not tighten physical supply immediately, but it can raise the floor for production costs in one of the world’s most important nickel processing hubs.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource sovereignty. The government is using pricing formulas, mining quotas, export controls and tax compliance to ensure that more mineral value stays inside the country. This could support domestic revenue and downstream investment, but it may also increase uncertainty for processors and foreign investors.

The new framework also creates a precedent. If Indonesia successfully captures more value from cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore, other resource-rich countries may consider similar contained-metal pricing models.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s revised HPM formula shows that nickel policy is moving from volume control to value capture. The biggest impact will fall on HPAL producers, where cobalt-bearing ore valuation could raise MHP costs and change battery nickel economics.

Indonesian Cobalt Production Capacity Set to Double by 2027

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Indonesian Cobalt Production Capacity Set to Double by 2027
Indonesian Cobalt

Indonesian cobalt production capacity will more than double to 114,000 tonnes by 2027 from 55,000 tonnes in 2024, according to National Economic Council member Septian Hario Seto. The expansion comes from Indonesia's high-pressure acid leach (HPAL) operations, which process nickel laterite ores to extract both nickel and cobalt. However, Indonesian cobalt production capacity growth will likely plateau after 2027 due to rising project costs and slower-than-expected nickel consumption growth.

HPAL Operations Drive Cobalt Output Growth Despite Rising Costs

Indonesia's cobalt capacity expansion relies heavily on HPAL technology, which extracts cobalt as a byproduct of nickel processing operations. China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association's Xu Aidong confirmed that capacity increases will probably stabilize given mounting economic pressures. Meanwhile, rising sulfur prices used in hydrometallurgical production lines are increasing HPAL project costs significantly.

Mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) production maintains 30-40% profit margins even with nickel prices around $15,000 per tonne, partly due to cobalt content value. Indonesia exported nearly 1.56 million tonnes of MHP last year, with cobalt exports reaching approximately 44,350 tonnes. Therefore, Indonesian cobalt production remains economically viable despite commodity price volatility.

DRC Export Ban Creates Market Uncertainty and Technology Shifts

The Democratic Republic of Congo's cobalt export ban threatens to drive prices higher while potentially reducing long-term cobalt demand through technology adaptation. Seto warned that sustained export restrictions could backfire by accelerating battery chemistry changes to reduce cobalt content. As a result, the industry witnessed massive adoption of nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) 811 technology during 2017-2018 price spikes.

Indonesia processes MHP directly into precursors without crystallizing nickel sulfate first, streamlining production efficiency and reducing costs. The country views cobalt as inseparable from nickel production rather than an independent mineral resource. However, Indonesia recognizes its responsibility as a major producer to ensure reliable global supply chains.

Seto emphasized that Indonesia's position on nickel mirrors the DRC's influence on cobalt markets, requiring careful market management. Major producers must balance supply control with market reliability to avoid being perceived as unreliable suppliers. Consequently, both countries face pressure to maintain sufficient global supply while maximizing domestic value addition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia's strategic approach to cobalt as a nickel byproduct positions the country advantageously in global battery supply chains while the DRC's export restrictions create market uncertainty. The doubling of Indonesian cobalt production capacity by 2027 could provide crucial supply diversification for battery manufacturers seeking alternatives to DRC sources, though technology shifts toward lower-cobalt chemistries may limit long-term demand growth.

Lygend Indonesian Nickel Output Drives Sharp Profit Growth in 2025

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Lygend Indonesian Nickel Output Drives Sharp Profit Growth in 2025
Lygend Indonesia

Lygend Indonesian nickel output drove a sharp increase in the company’s revenue and profit in 2025. China’s major nickel producer reported revenue of 40.24bn yuan, or about $5.85bn, up 379% from a year earlier.

Net profit attributable to shareholders rose by 61% to 2.85bn yuan. The improvement reflected higher production from Lygend’s Indonesian nickel operations and stronger cobalt prices after export controls in the Democratic Republic of Congo tightened the cobalt market.

Lygend Indonesian nickel output also strengthened the company’s position across both battery and stainless steel raw material chains. Its Indonesian assets produce mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulphate, cobalt sulphate and ferronickel, giving the company flexibility across demand cycles.

HPAL and RKEF Projects Lifted Nickel and Cobalt Volumes

Lygend’s Obi Island HPAL project operated at full capacity in 2025. The six-line facility produced 120,000t in nickel metal equivalent and 14,250t in cobalt metal equivalent during the year.

The HPAL project can produce mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulphate or cobalt sulphate depending on market demand. This flexibility matters because battery materials markets can shift quickly between intermediate products and refined sulphate demand.

The company’s HJF phase I project also ran at nameplate capacity, producing 95,000t in nickel metal equivalent through rotary kiln electric furnace technology. Meanwhile, Lygend ramped up output at its KPS phase II project, which has nameplate capacity of 185,000 t/yr in nickel metal equivalent.

Cobalt Prices Helped Offset Rising Input Costs

Lygend benefited from higher cobalt prices because its MHP contains cobalt. The DRC’s cobalt export controls lifted cobalt market sentiment and increased the value of cobalt-bearing intermediates.

Cobalt prices more than doubled during 2025, rising to about $25/lb in December from around $11.5/lb in January. This gave Lygend additional revenue support from MHP sales.

The stronger cobalt contribution helped offset higher costs for sulphur, energy and other consumables. These inputs remain critical for HPAL operations, where sulphuric acid availability and cost can directly affect processing economics.

Lygend also received approval from Indonesia for sulphuric acid import quotas. This allows partial substitution of sulphur with sulphuric acid when needed, improving feedstock flexibility and supply chain resilience.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lygend’s 2025 results show how Indonesia has become the operating center of China-linked nickel growth. The company’s advantage now comes from scale, HPAL flexibility and cobalt exposure, but sulphuric acid supply will remain a key cost variable.

Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth

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Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth
Nickel Industries, Indonesian

Nickel Industries Indonesian output was mixed in the first quarter as lower mining volumes and declining nickel grades contrasted with higher nickel pig iron and mixed hydroxide precipitate production. The Australia-based producer reported weaker ore output but stronger downstream processing across its Indonesian RKEF and HPAL assets.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output reflects the increasingly complex operating environment for nickel producers in Indonesia. Mining permits, ore grades, sulphur availability and downstream ramp-up timing are all shaping production performance.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output also shows why Indonesia’s nickel market can no longer be viewed only through capacity additions. Feedstock access and ore quality are becoming just as important as new processing plants.

Total nickel ore production fell by 30% from a year earlier to 3.96mn wet metric tonnes in January-March. However, output almost tripled from the previous quarter after mining activity recovered from RKAB quota delays late last year.

RKAB Quota Recovery Supports Ore Flow but Grades Weaken

Nickel Industries received 14.3mn wmt of 2026 RKAB nickel ore quota this year. This was 36% higher than its total approved quota of 10.5mn wmt in 2025.

The higher quota helped production recover from the December quarter, when mining was disrupted by RKAB delays. The company also plans to apply for additional RKAB quotas later this year.

The Hengjaya mine supplies ore to Nickel Industries’ RKEF and HPAL plants. These facilities produce nickel pig iron for stainless steel markets and mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material supply chains.

Total NPI output from the Hengjaya, Ranger, Oracle and Angel RKEF operations rose by 4.4% year on year and 1.7% quarter on quarter to 274,086t.

However, nickel-contained production fell to 30,264t because the average nickel content of NPI dropped to 11% from 12.1% a year earlier. This is a critical signal for margins because lower grades reduce metal output even when furnace volumes rise.

The result shows how Indonesian nickel producers face a tightening relationship between ore availability and processing efficiency. Higher RKEF output does not automatically mean stronger nickel production if feedstock grades weaken.

HPAL Growth Continues as ENC Start-Up Moves to Second Quarter

Nickel Industries’ Huayue Nickel Cobalt HPAL project produced 21,526t of nickel and 2,370t of cobalt in MHP form during the first quarter. Nickel output rose by 1.7% from a year earlier, while cobalt output increased by 23%.

This growth strengthens Nickel Industries’ exposure to battery materials. MHP remains a key intermediate product for nickel sulphate and other battery chemical supply chains.

The company’s next major step is the Excelsior Nickel Cobalt HPAL project. Commissioning has been delayed to the second quarter, with full ramp-up targeted by the end of October.

ENC had previously been expected to start commissioning in the first quarter. The delay matters because HPAL projects are technically complex and depend on stable feedstock, acid supply, utilities and commissioning discipline.

Nickel Industries said it has enough sulphur inventory to support ENC’s ramp-up until the third quarter. The company previously bought sulphur at an average price of $450/t.

Sulphur availability is now a strategic issue for HPAL producers. Any disruption in sulphur or sulphuric acid supply can raise costs and slow production growth across Indonesia’s battery nickel chain.

The company also plans to list nickel cathode produced at ENC on both the London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange. Exchange approval would support market acceptance and improve the project’s commercial flexibility.

Nickel Industries increased its stake in ENC by 2% for $46mn on 1 April, lifting its interest to 46% and making it the project’s largest shareholder. This gives the company greater exposure to Indonesia’s move from NPI and MHP toward Class I nickel products.

The broader implication is clear. Nickel Industries is moving across the Indonesian nickel value chain, from ore mining and RKEF production into HPAL, MHP and exchange-deliverable cathode.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel Industries’ quarter shows that Indonesia’s nickel growth is becoming more constrained by ore quality, RKAB permits and sulphur logistics. Capacity still matters, but the winners will be producers that control feedstock, manage HPAL complexity and secure recognised Class I nickel routes.

Sherritt Cuba Sanctions Risk Clouds Moa Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

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Sherritt Cuba Sanctions Risk Clouds Moa Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain
Sherritt

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has become a new uncertainty for Canadian metals miner and refiner Sherritt International after the US expanded its sanctions framework targeting Cuba. The company is consulting advisers and stakeholders to assess possible implications for its Cuban mining and refining exposure.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk centres on the company’s Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. The operation mines and processes nickel and cobalt ore in Cuba before shipping mixed sulphide precipitate to Sherritt’s refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has increased after US president Donald Trump issued an executive order on 1 May broadening existing Cuba-related restrictions. The order allows the US to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, as well as energy, defence, financial services, security and other parts of the Cuban economy.

The development matters because Moa is not only a Cuban mining asset. It is part of a cross-border nickel and cobalt processing chain that links Cuban ore production with Canadian refining capacity.

Moa Joint Venture Faces Sanctions and Fuel Supply Pressure

The Moa joint venture produces mixed sulphide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt. Ore is mined and processed at the Moa site in Cuba, then shipped to Alberta for refining.

This structure gives Sherritt exposure to two different risks. The first is sanctions policy. The second is physical supply continuity from Cuba.

The company had already suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba. That disruption reduced upstream feed availability and raised concerns over refinery inventory in Canada.

Sherritt said in February that its Fort Saskatchewan refinery feed inventory was expected to last until mid-April. The new sanctions uncertainty adds another layer of pressure to an already fragile supply chain.

Nickel and cobalt remain important materials for batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-related supply chains. Any disruption to feedstock or refining routes can affect customers that rely on qualified supply.

The Moa operation is therefore strategically important despite its geopolitical complexity. It supplies intermediate material that can be refined into products serving North American industrial demand.

US Policy Adds Complexity to Critical Minerals Trade

The executive order broadens the list of possible sanctions targets linked to Cuba. Metals and mining are now explicitly included, raising compliance risk for companies with Cuban operations or Cuban-linked material flows.

For Sherritt, the immediate issue is clarity. The company must determine whether its ownership structure, product flows, financing relationships, logistics providers or customers could be affected by the expanded sanctions framework.

This matters because sanctions risk can affect more than direct operations. It can influence shipping, banking, insurance, payment processing, customer contracts and counterparty willingness to handle material.

The case also highlights a difficult reality in critical minerals policy. Western governments want secure nickel and cobalt supply, but some existing supply chains run through politically sensitive jurisdictions.

Canada’s refining capacity at Fort Saskatchewan is valuable, but its feedstock connection to Cuba creates exposure to US policy decisions. That makes Sherritt’s position more complicated than a conventional mining or refining business.

The outcome will depend on how broadly Washington applies the new order and whether Sherritt’s activities become directly targeted. Until then, customers and investors are likely to watch for guidance on operational continuity, legal exposure and feedstock availability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s situation shows that critical minerals security is not only about mine reserves or refining capacity. Political jurisdiction, sanctions exposure and feedstock logistics can determine whether a nickel-cobalt supply chain remains bankable.

Sherritt Stake Sale Plan Follows Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Exit

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Sherritt Stake Sale Plan Follows Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Exit
Sherritt

Sherritt stake sale plans have emerged as the Canadian metals firm faces a major strategic reset after moving to dissolve its Moa nickel-cobalt joint venture in Cuba. The company has entered into a non-binding agreement that could allow US investment firm Gillon Capital to acquire 55% of its shares.

Sherritt stake sale terms have not yet been finalised. The company expects the purchase price to be set at a discount to the current share price, with Gillon able to complete the acquisition no later than nine months from closing.

Sherritt stake sale discussions come directly after the company chose to dissolve the Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. That decision followed new US sanctions authority targeting Cuban entities and sectors, including metals and mining.

The transaction would mark a major ownership shift for Sherritt at a time when its core nickel and cobalt supply chain is under sanctions, fuel and feedstock pressure.

Cuba Sanctions Push Sherritt Toward Strategic Restructuring

Sherritt’s Moa joint venture has been central to its nickel and cobalt business. Ore is mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa in Cuba, then shipped to Canada for refining at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta.

That cross-border structure has become increasingly difficult. The Moa operation was already affected by fuel supply problems in Cuba, forcing a temporary mining suspension in February.

The situation worsened after the US issued an executive order on 1 May expanding sanctions powers against Cuban entities. Although Sherritt was not directly named, the order allows sanctions on companies operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt suspended direct participation in Moa joint venture activities on 7 May. It then announced plans to send a dissolution notice to its Cuban partner on 15 May.

The decision shows how sanctions risk can disrupt critical minerals supply chains even without a direct designation. Shipping, banking, insurance, financing and counterparty confidence can all be affected when operating exposure becomes politically sensitive.

Fort Saskatchewan Refinery Faces Feedstock Uncertainty

Sherritt’s Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it can produce finished nickel and cobalt in Canada. However, its feedstock link to Cuba is now the central weakness.

The Moa joint venture supplied mixed sulfide precipitate to the Alberta refinery. If that feedstock route remains disrupted or is dissolved permanently, Sherritt will need alternative material sources to keep refining operations stable.

This matters for North American supply chains. Nickel and cobalt are important for batteries, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-linked manufacturing.

The possible Gillon Capital transaction could give Sherritt a new ownership and financing path, but it will still require regulatory approval. The US Departments of State and Treasury do not oppose Gillon’s participation in negotiations, but any later transaction would need their approval.

That condition underlines the political sensitivity of Sherritt’s restructuring. The company’s future will depend not only on investor appetite, but also on sanctions compliance, government approval and feedstock strategy.

For the wider nickel and cobalt market, Sherritt’s situation is a warning. Refining capacity in a secure jurisdiction is not enough if upstream feedstock remains tied to a politically exposed source.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt is becoming a case study in how sanctions can force a critical minerals company into ownership and supply-chain restructuring. The key issue is whether a new investor can help rebuild the business around secure feedstock for Fort Saskatchewan.

Indonesia HPAL Nickel Ore Costs Rise as New HPM Formula Hits Limonite Feedstock

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Indonesia HPAL Nickel Ore Costs Rise as New HPM Formula Hits Limonite Feedstock
Nickel ore

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are set to rise sharply after the government’s revised mineral benchmark price lifted the mandated price floor for limonite ore. The new HPM formula is expected to increase limonite ore costs by at least 50%, adding immediate margin pressure to mixed hydroxide precipitate producers.

The revised HPM for limonite ore containing 1.2% nickel, 0.1% cobalt and 2% chromium is calculated at $45.24/wmt under the updated Harga Mineral Acuan. That is around 50% higher than early April transacted prices of about $30/wmt for 1.2% limonite ore.

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are also far above the previous benchmark level. Under the old formula, the HPM for similar ore was only $17.17/wmt, meaning the new benchmark is nearly three times higher.

The change matters because HPAL operations rely on limonite ore as feedstock to produce MHP, which is used in battery-grade nickel and cobalt supply chains. A higher government-mandated ore floor will raise raw material costs, increase royalty payments and pressure margins across Indonesia’s battery nickel industry.

Limonite Ore Repricing Raises MHP Cost Pressure

The new HPM framework has the strongest impact on limonite ore because this material typically trades closer to benchmark values than saprolite ore. HPAL producers therefore face a more direct cost increase than rotary kiln-electric furnace operators.

MHP producers will now have to absorb higher ore purchase costs and higher royalties. Since royalties are linked to official valuation, the total cost increase could exceed the headline 50% rise in limonite ore pricing.

The revised formula also changes how Indonesia captures ore value. It includes cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore valuation, making these contained elements taxable. This is especially important for limonite ore because cobalt content adds value to HPAL feedstock.

The correction factor for cobalt is set at 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. Iron carries a 30% correction factor when content is 35% or lower, while chromium carries a 10% correction factor.

This means Indonesia is no longer valuing nickel ore mainly by nickel grade. The government is moving toward a broader contained-metal pricing model, capturing more value from battery-related by-products and ore chemistry.

For MHP producers, this creates a structural cost problem. HPAL projects were built around access to Indonesian limonite ore, sulphuric acid and integrated processing infrastructure. If ore costs rise by more than a third to half, the cost floor for MHP production moves higher.

This could affect downstream nickel sulphate and cathode material economics. Producers with stronger integration, lower acid costs and better logistics will be better positioned. Higher-cost operators may face squeezed margins if MHP prices do not rise enough to offset the new ore benchmark.

The change also comes as Indonesia tightens wider nickel policy. Mining quota uncertainty, export tax discussions and stricter pricing formulas all point to a broader state strategy of capturing more mineral value before material moves downstream.

Sulphuric Acid Tightness Adds a Second Cost Shock

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are rising at the same time as sulphuric acid prices surge. This creates a double pressure point for MHP producers.

HPAL operations require large volumes of sulphuric acid to leach nickel and cobalt from limonite ore. Any disruption in sulphur or acid supply directly affects processing costs and production reliability.

The US-Iran conflict has stranded several sulphur cargoes bound for Indonesian HPAL producers, preventing them from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, producers have shifted toward buying sulphuric acid directly.

That market was already tight because of limited copper concentrate availability. Sulphuric acid supply is expected to tighten further as China suspends exports from May.

Southeast Asian sulphuric acid prices have risen sharply. Prices reached $277.50/t cfr on 9 April, up 71% from $162.50/t before the conflict.

This is a major issue for Indonesian HPAL plants. Higher limonite ore costs increase feedstock expenses, while higher sulphuric acid prices increase processing costs. Together, they raise the full cost of producing MHP and weaken the advantage of low-cost Indonesian battery nickel.

Saprolite ore faces less immediate disruption. Saprolite is mainly used in RKEF operations to produce nickel pig iron and ferronickel. Although the new HPM for typical saprolite ore containing 1.6% nickel, 18% iron and 2% chromium rises to $52.90/wmt from $29.94/wmt, it remains below early April transacted prices of about $70/wmt.

This means RKEF producers may see limited immediate transaction impact because market prices are already above the benchmark. HPAL producers, by contrast, face a direct reset of the cost floor.

The difference could reshape relative economics between Indonesia’s stainless-linked and battery-linked nickel chains. NPI producers remain supported by high saprolite prices, while HPAL producers now face rising limonite, royalty and acid costs.

For the global battery supply chain, the key risk is that Indonesia’s MHP cost curve shifts upward. That could support nickel sulphate prices over time, especially if acid tightness persists or HPM-linked royalty costs remain elevated.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource rent capture. The government is recognising that limonite ore contains not only nickel but also cobalt and other valuable elements. This gives Jakarta a stronger fiscal claim over battery material feedstock.

However, the policy also increases operating uncertainty. HPAL investors need predictable ore pricing, acid availability and tax treatment to justify large-scale expansion. A sharp change in HPM could force producers to revisit cost assumptions, procurement strategies and product pricing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s new HPM formula marks a turning point for HPAL economics. The country is capturing more value from limonite ore, but the combined shock of higher ore prices, royalties and sulphuric acid costs could reset the cost floor for global MHP supply.

China's GEM Increases Battery Material Sales in 1H

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Sales Surge Driven by Full Capacity

Green Eco-Manufacture (GEM), a leading Chinese cobalt refiner and lithium cathode active material (CAM) precursor producer, reported a significant increase in sales of CAM precursors, cobalt, and nickel for the first half of the year. The company attributed this rise to full capacity operations across its main product lines.

GEM's sales of ternary precursors, including lithium nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) and lithium nickel-cobalt-aluminium (NCA), surged by 45% year-on-year to exceed 100,000 tons. The firm also experienced a remarkable 133% increase in ternary CAM sales, reaching 7,119 tons.

Expansion and Strategic Partnerships

In August, GEM secured a supply agreement with South Korean lithium-ion battery CAM manufacturer Ecopro for 265,000 tons of ternary precursors from 2025 to 2028. The company is also expanding its production capabilities, with a new 50,000 tons per year ternary precursor plant in Indonesia set to start operations in the latter half of this year.

GEM's cobalt tetroxide sales soared by 163% year-on-year to 10,500 tons, driven by higher demand from the consumer electronics sector. The company sources cobalt from long-term contracts with Switzerland-based Glencore and from its mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) projects in Indonesia.

Nickel Production and Cost Reduction Goals

GEM's nickel MHP shipments from its QMB project in Indonesia doubled to over 20,000 tons nickel metal equivalent during January-June, with a full capacity rate. The firm plans to expand its nickel smelting capacity to 150,000 tons per year by year-end and aims to ship 60,000 tons of MHP in 2024. GEM also targets reducing MHP smelting costs to $7,500 per ton by the end of the year, benefiting from decreased sulfuric acid costs.

The company is involved in recycling power batteries, cobalt, nickel, and tungsten scrap, with recycled cobalt shipments reaching 8,987 tons and power battery recycling up by 37% to 16,300 tons or 1.84 GWh in the first half of the year.

GEM serves a global client base, including South Korean firms like Ecopro, Samsung SDI, SK On, and LGC, Chinese companies such as XTC New Energy Materials and BYD, as well as international entities like Umicore, Sandvik, and Kennametal.

Vale Labor Deal Reduces Strike Risk at Ontario Copper and Nickel Operations

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Vale Labor Deal Reduces Strike Risk at Ontario Copper and Nickel Operations
Vale

Vale labor deal discussions have produced a tentative collective agreement with United Steelworkers locals representing production and maintenance workers at Vale Base Metals operations in Ontario. The agreement could reduce strike risk at a key Canadian copper, nickel, cobalt and precious metals production base.

Vale labor deal terms still require union ratification. USW Local 6500 will hold information sessions on 27-28 May, followed by online voting from Thursday morning to Friday evening.

Vale labor deal approval would come just before the current five-year collective agreement expires on 31 May. The timing is important because union members had already voted strongly in favour of a strike mandate earlier this month.

The tentative agreement therefore matters for supply continuity. Vale’s Ontario operations remain an important source of finished nickel and copper for North American industrial and critical minerals supply chains.

Sudbury Operations Remain Strategically Important

Vale’s Sudbury operations include several mines, a mill, smelter and refinery. The complex produces copper, nickel, cobalt and precious metals, making it one of the most important integrated base metals operations in Canada.

The site’s role is especially important because nickel and cobalt remain critical to batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, defence applications and advanced manufacturing. Copper supports electrification, grids, data centres and industrial equipment.

Vale produced 59,400t of finished nickel at Sudbury in 2025. That accounted for about 34% of the company’s total finished nickel output that year.

Sudbury also produced 63,800t of finished copper in 2025, equal to about 17% of Vale’s total finished copper production. Any labour disruption would therefore carry company-level and regional supply-chain significance.

The Port Colborne refinery adds another downstream dimension. It produces electro-cobalt, processes precious metals and distributes finished nickel products.

Ratification Will Decide Supply Continuity

The tentative agreement is not yet final. Union members must approve the deal before it becomes the new labour contract.

That vote will be closely watched because Local 6500 members voted 97.64% in support of a strike mandate earlier this month. Such a strong mandate gave the union significant leverage during negotiations.

A ratified agreement would provide operational stability for Vale Base Metals in Ontario. It would also reduce uncertainty for customers that depend on Canadian nickel, copper, cobalt and refined products.

For North American critical minerals policy, labour stability matters. Governments and manufacturers are trying to build secure supply chains, but mine and refinery output still depends on workforce agreements, site reliability and downstream processing capacity.

The broader market impact depends on the vote. If workers approve the deal, Vale can avoid immediate disruption at a strategically important metals complex. If not, strike risk could quickly return as the current agreement expires.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Vale agreement shows that critical minerals security is not only about geology, capital or policy. Labour stability at integrated mining, smelting and refining assets is just as important to reliable nickel, copper and cobalt supply.

Sherritt Moa JV Dissolution Marks Break in Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

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Sherritt Moa JV Dissolution Marks Break in Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain
Sherritt

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution marks a major break in one of the more unusual cross-border nickel-cobalt supply chains linking Cuba and Canada. Sherritt International plans to deliver a dissolution notice to its joint venture partner, the General Nickel Company of Cuba, after expanded US sanctions made continued participation commercially and legally risky.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution will require the Canadian company to surrender its interests in the Cuban joint venture corporations. The company said immediate dissolution is the only way to preserve its ability to do business.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution is strategically important because the Moa structure linked Cuban mining and intermediate processing with Canadian refining. Ore was mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa, then shipped to the Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta.

Sherritt expects GNC to owe an equalization payment because it believes the Moa mine is more valuable than the Canadian refinery. That valuation issue could become a key point in the separation process.

US Sanctions Force Structural Exit From Moa

The US directly sanctioned the Moa joint venture on 7 May. The designation followed a 1 May executive order allowing Washington to sanction entities or people supporting the Cuban government across metals, mining, energy, financial services, security and other sectors.

Sherritt had already suspended direct participation in Moa-related activities earlier this month after assessing the implications of the executive order. The direct sanctions accelerated the need for a structural exit.

The company said the dissolution is necessary so it can be considered the sole owner of Canada Refinery Corporation, which owns the Fort Saskatchewan nickel-cobalt refinery. That step is central to preserving the Canadian refining business outside the sanctioned Cuban structure.

The Moa joint venture had been a 50/50 partnership between Sherritt and GNC. Its value came from combining Cuban ore and MSP production with Canadian refining expertise.

The latest move shows how sanctions can fracture supply chains even when downstream refining sits in an allied jurisdiction. Feedstock origin, ownership structure and sanctioned counterparties now matter as much as the location of final refining.

Canadian Refinery Faces Feedstock Repositioning Challenge

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it produces finished nickel and cobalt. These metals are used in batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing.

However, the refinery’s historic feedstock route depended on Moa mixed sulfide precipitate. Losing the Cuban joint venture means Sherritt must protect the refinery’s operating future through ownership clarity, alternative feed planning or new commercial structures.

The company had already faced operating pressure before the sanctions escalated. Sherritt temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

That earlier disruption showed the physical fragility of the Moa supply chain. The sanctions now add a legal and geopolitical break to an already strained operating model.

For nickel and cobalt buyers, the key issue is whether Fort Saskatchewan can remain a reliable source of refined metal without direct participation in Moa. The answer will depend on feedstock access, legal separation, inventory management and customer confidence.

The dissolution also highlights a broader critical minerals lesson. Western supply chains can still carry high exposure when mines, intermediates or partners sit in sanctioned or politically sensitive jurisdictions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s exit from Moa shows that critical minerals security cannot rely on refining capacity alone. The real test is whether the entire chain, from mine ownership to intermediate feedstock and final metal, can survive sanctions, fuel disruption and geopolitical pressure.

Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets More Indonesian MHP Supply

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Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets More Indonesian MHP Supply
Nickel Ore

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion will add stakes in two Indonesian high-pressure acid leach projects next to its existing Excelsior Nickel Cobalt operation in Central Sulawesi. The acquisitions give the company access to additional mixed hydroxide precipitate capacity for the electric vehicle battery market.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion comes as Indonesia restricts new HPAL project development. The government stopped issuing new licences in late 2025, making acquisitions of existing permitted projects increasingly important for producers seeking growth.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion covers the Teluk Metal Industry and Chengsheng New Energy projects, both located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park. Together, the transactions could add nearly 17,000 t/yr of attributable MHP capacity to Nickel Industries.

The strategy deepens the company’s downstream exposure beyond nickel ore and conventional smelting into battery-grade nickel intermediates, nickel sulphate and cathode production.

HPAL Licence Restrictions Increase the Value of Existing Projects

Nickel Industries will pay $169mn for a 17.5% stake in the planned Teluk Metal Industry HPAL project.

TMI has nameplate MHP capacity of 38,640 t/yr. Nickel Industries’ equity share will provide around 6,775 t/yr of attributable production.

Tsingshan has provided a construction guarantee covering the project, capping Nickel Industries’ investment at $169mn and targeting nameplate production by September 2027.

The company will also gain exposure to the Chengsheng New Energy project through a separate transaction involving equity in its Sampala nickel mine.

CNE has MHP capacity of 28,357 t/yr, with around 10,208 t/yr attributable to Nickel Industries. Commissioning is expected by mid-2027.

The two acquisitions are especially valuable because Indonesia is no longer approving new HPAL developments. This effectively raises the strategic value of existing permits and projects already in development.

For producers seeking to expand battery-nickel capacity, buying into permitted facilities may now be more realistic than pursuing greenfield HPAL projects.

MHP Growth Strengthens Battery-Nickel Integration

Both TMI and CNE will operate alongside Nickel Industries’ 46%-owned Excelsior Nickel Cobalt project in the Morowali industrial complex.

ENC is expected to produce nickel cathode and nickel sulphate, extending the company further downstream into products used in battery supply chains.

TMI and CNE will produce MHP using ore from the Sampala project, strengthening the link between mine supply and downstream processing.

This integration can improve control over ore quality, operating costs and feedstock availability.

Indonesia’s policy shift also suggests that future nickel growth may become more concentrated among producers that already control mines, processing infrastructure and approved HPAL projects.

That could slow the pace of new supply while strengthening larger integrated groups with existing licences and partnerships.

For the global battery market, the acquisitions reinforce Indonesia’s central role in nickel intermediates even as Jakarta tries to limit oversupply and support prices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s HPAL restrictions are turning existing licences into strategic assets. Nickel Industries is responding by buying into permitted projects, allowing it to expand battery-grade nickel supply without relying on new greenfield approvals.

Sherritt Nickel and Cobalt Production Declines in Q1 2025

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Sherritt Nickel and Cobalt Production Declines in Q1 2025
Sherritt International

Sherritt nickel and cobalt production dropped significantly in the first quarter of 2025. The Canadian miner reported an 18% decline in nickel output to 2,947 tonnes and a 6% decrease in cobalt production to 323 tonnes. Despite these setbacks, the company maintained its raised full-year guidance, signaling confidence in its operational outlook. The Sherritt nickel and cobalt production update reflects both current challenges and anticipated recovery.

Moa Expansion Faces Sanctions but Offers Hope

Operations at Sherritt’s Moa joint venture in Cuba were affected by intensified U.S. sanctions, limiting output capacity. However, the company initiated Phase 2 of its expansion project at the site. Full ramp-up is expected in the second half of the year, which could restore Sherritt nickel and cobalt production to targeted levels. CEO Leon Binedell emphasized that this expansion is critical to meeting future demand, especially in energy transition sectors.

Cobalt Sales Rise Despite Falling Prices

While production declined, cobalt sales rose 26% to 456 tonnes, outpacing actual output. This suggests strong downstream demand, particularly from battery manufacturers. In contrast, nickel sales fell 15% to 3,439 tonnes. Price trends diverged: cobalt’s average realized price fell 8% to C$13.29/lb, while nickel edged up 1% to C$9.98/lb. Sherritt expects cobalt prices to rebound in the second quarter, potentially improving margins.

The company posted a C$40.6 million loss, nearly flat from a year earlier. However, revenue rose 33% to C$38.4 million, supported by strategic inventory sales and resilient market demand. This financial performance demonstrates that even amid operational pressure, Sherritt’s market positioning remains strong.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s first-quarter results highlight the fragility of critical mineral supply chains under geopolitical stress. Yet its decisive investment in Moa and steady demand for cobalt offer a realistic path to recovery in 2025.

Indonesia Nickel Pricing Sets Floor and Ceiling as HPAL Costs Rise

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Indonesia Nickel Pricing Sets Floor and Ceiling as HPAL Costs Rise
Huafei Nickel Cobalt

Indonesia nickel pricing is increasingly defining the global nickel market as ore quotas, benchmark pricing rules and sulphuric acid availability reshape supply economics. UK broker Sucden Financial said Indonesia is now setting both the floor and ceiling for nickel prices.

Indonesia nickel pricing has moved the market away from a simple oversupply story. The key question is no longer only how much nickel Indonesia can produce, but how tightly Jakarta chooses to manage supply.

Indonesia nickel pricing is also becoming more important because HPAL producers face rising costs for ore, sulphur and sulphuric acid. These inputs directly affect mixed hydroxide precipitate production, which feeds battery-grade nickel supply chains.

The London Metal Exchange nickel price settled at $19,500/t on Wednesday, while Sucden said Indonesia’s current policy stance is creating a firmer floor around $18,000/t. But upside may also be capped if higher prices encourage new quota approvals.

Indonesia Turns Ore Policy Into Market Control

Indonesia remains the central force in nickel because it controls the largest source of new supply. In recent years, Indonesian output growth, large exchange stocks and Chinese-linked processing capacity defined the market.

That structure is now changing. Sucden said Indonesia appears focused on supporting prices and discouraging weaker producers, rather than allowing unrestricted supply growth.

The country has reduced 2026 ore quotas by around 30% year on year. It has also revised its domestic benchmark ore pricing system, strengthening the link between ore valuation, contained metals and producer costs.

This policy approach gives Indonesia unusual pricing power. If supply is restricted, the market finds a firmer floor. If prices rise too far, Indonesia can relax quotas and allow more material through the system.

That means nickel’s upside is managed. Sucden warned that the market should become more cautious near $20,000/t, where additional supply approvals and producer hedging could begin to limit further gains.

This is why Indonesia now acts as both support and restraint. It can tighten ore availability to stabilise prices, but it can also prevent a strong rally from damaging downstream competitiveness.

The result is a more policy-driven nickel market. Traditional inventory and demand indicators still matter, but Jakarta’s quota and ore pricing decisions are now central to global price formation.

HPAL Costs Expose Battery Nickel Supply Risk

HPAL production is becoming the second major driver of nickel pricing. Unlike nickel pig iron and ferro-nickel, HPAL is highly dependent on sulphur and sulphuric acid.

This makes battery-grade nickel supply more vulnerable to chemical input availability. HPAL plants need stable acid supply to process limonite ore into MHP, and Indonesia’s inventory buffers are relatively tight.

Huayou’s decision to place half of its Huafei Nickel Cobalt MHP capacity into temporary care and maintenance from 1 May shows how quickly reagent costs can affect production. The company cited elevated sulphur costs and prolonged high operating rates.

The HPAL sector now faces a double squeeze. Ore prices are rising because of Indonesia’s revised pricing framework, while sulphur and sulphuric acid costs are increasing because of tighter chemical supply.

This changes the nickel cost curve. Producers with secure ore, sulphur access and integrated infrastructure can operate more defensively. Those relying on external feedstock or exposed to high reagent prices face greater margin pressure.

The shift also matters for battery supply chains. MHP is a key intermediate for nickel sulphate and other battery chemicals. If HPAL margins weaken, battery-grade nickel output can become less responsive than headline capacity numbers suggest.

Sucden said tighter nearby spreads and higher trading volumes may indicate increased hedging and another shift in market balance. That suggests producers and traders are adjusting to a market where costs and policy now matter more than simple surplus.

Nickel is still not structurally tight like copper. But it is no longer a market where oversupply alone explains price direction. Indonesia’s supply discipline and HPAL cost inflation are giving nickel a stronger base, even if the rally remains capped.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has turned nickel into a managed market where policy controls supply and chemistry controls cost. The winners will be producers with secure ore, acid access and enough balance-sheet strength to survive Jakarta’s tighter discipline.