Sherritt Stake Sale Plan Follows Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Exit

Sherritt

Sherritt stake sale plans have emerged as the Canadian metals firm faces a major strategic reset after moving to dissolve its Moa nickel-cobalt joint venture in Cuba. The company has entered into a non-binding agreement that could allow US investment firm Gillon Capital to acquire 55% of its shares.

Sherritt stake sale terms have not yet been finalised. The company expects the purchase price to be set at a discount to the current share price, with Gillon able to complete the acquisition no later than nine months from closing.

Sherritt stake sale discussions come directly after the company chose to dissolve the Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. That decision followed new US sanctions authority targeting Cuban entities and sectors, including metals and mining.

The transaction would mark a major ownership shift for Sherritt at a time when its core nickel and cobalt supply chain is under sanctions, fuel and feedstock pressure.

Cuba Sanctions Push Sherritt Toward Strategic Restructuring

Sherritt’s Moa joint venture has been central to its nickel and cobalt business. Ore is mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa in Cuba, then shipped to Canada for refining at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta.

That cross-border structure has become increasingly difficult. The Moa operation was already affected by fuel supply problems in Cuba, forcing a temporary mining suspension in February.

The situation worsened after the US issued an executive order on 1 May expanding sanctions powers against Cuban entities. Although Sherritt was not directly named, the order allows sanctions on companies operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt suspended direct participation in Moa joint venture activities on 7 May. It then announced plans to send a dissolution notice to its Cuban partner on 15 May.

The decision shows how sanctions risk can disrupt critical minerals supply chains even without a direct designation. Shipping, banking, insurance, financing and counterparty confidence can all be affected when operating exposure becomes politically sensitive.

Fort Saskatchewan Refinery Faces Feedstock Uncertainty

Sherritt’s Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it can produce finished nickel and cobalt in Canada. However, its feedstock link to Cuba is now the central weakness.

The Moa joint venture supplied mixed sulfide precipitate to the Alberta refinery. If that feedstock route remains disrupted or is dissolved permanently, Sherritt will need alternative material sources to keep refining operations stable.

This matters for North American supply chains. Nickel and cobalt are important for batteries, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-linked manufacturing.

The possible Gillon Capital transaction could give Sherritt a new ownership and financing path, but it will still require regulatory approval. The US Departments of State and Treasury do not oppose Gillon’s participation in negotiations, but any later transaction would need their approval.

That condition underlines the political sensitivity of Sherritt’s restructuring. The company’s future will depend not only on investor appetite, but also on sanctions compliance, government approval and feedstock strategy.

For the wider nickel and cobalt market, Sherritt’s situation is a warning. Refining capacity in a secure jurisdiction is not enough if upstream feedstock remains tied to a politically exposed source.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt is becoming a case study in how sanctions can force a critical minerals company into ownership and supply-chain restructuring. The key issue is whether a new investor can help rebuild the business around secure feedstock for Fort Saskatchewan.

Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Suspension Deepens Cuba Supply Chain Risk

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension has moved from sanctions review to direct operational action after the Canadian miner and refiner halted its participation in activities tied to the Moa joint venture in Cuba. The decision follows new US sanctions authority that could target entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension is significant because the Moa joint venture links Cuban mine and intermediate processing operations with Sherritt’s refining capacity in Alberta. Ore is mined and processed in Cuba into mixed sulfide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt, then shipped to Canada for refining.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension adds another layer of disruption to an already fragile supply route. The company had temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

Although Sherritt was not directly named in the new US sanctions, the company said the executive order is expected to create conditions that make operating in Cuba more difficult. That risk was enough for Sherritt to suspend direct participation in Moa-related activities.

Sanctions Risk Hits a Cross-Border Nickel and Cobalt Chain

The new US executive order expands sanctions authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It allows Washington to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, along with several other industries.

That broad language creates uncertainty for companies with Cuban exposure. Even without direct designation, counterparties may become more cautious around shipping, banking, insurance, payments, logistics and commercial contracts.

For Sherritt, the issue is not only legal exposure. It is the practical ability to keep a cross-border supply chain functioning when sanctions risk rises around the Cuban mining sector.

The Moa joint venture is co-owned by Sherritt and the General Nickel Company of Cuba. Its structure depends on Cuban ore mining, local MSP production and shipment to Canada for refining.

Mixed sulfide precipitate is a critical intermediate product because it carries both nickel and cobalt units into downstream refining. Any interruption in MSP flows can affect feed availability at the refinery level.

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing. That makes Moa strategically relevant despite its political and logistical complexity.

Alberta Refinery Continues but Feedstock Window Narrows

Sherritt said its Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta has not been affected by the suspension and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed at the site is expected to last until mid-June.

That timeline is now critical. If Cuban MSP flows do not resume or alternative feedstock is not secured, refinery operations could face greater pressure once inventories are depleted.

The situation shows how refining capacity can still be vulnerable when upstream feedstock depends on a politically exposed jurisdiction. A refinery may remain operational, but its production outlook depends on the continuity of intermediate material supply.

The February fuel-related suspension at Moa already showed that physical operating conditions in Cuba were difficult. The latest sanctions-driven action compounds that problem by adding policy risk to fuel and logistics constraints.

For customers, the key question is whether Sherritt can maintain finished nickel and cobalt output after mid-June. Buyers will also watch for any change in shipment schedules, inventory levels and alternative feed strategies.

For the wider market, Sherritt’s case highlights a broader critical minerals reality. Western supply security cannot be measured only by refining location. It must include mine jurisdiction, intermediate processing, sanctions exposure, energy availability and shipping routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s Moa suspension shows that critical minerals supply chains can be disrupted by policy risk even before a company is directly sanctioned. The lesson for nickel and cobalt buyers is clear: feedstock origin and political exposure now matter as much as refining capacity.

Sherritt Nickel Production Slumps as Moa Shutdown Starves Canadian Refinery

Sherritt International

Sherritt nickel production fell sharply in the first quarter after fuel shortages halted mining at the company’s Moa joint venture in Cuba. Finished nickel output dropped by 36% to 1,885t from 2,947t a year earlier.

Sherritt nickel production was hit by the collapse in mixed sulfide precipitate output at Moa, which supplies the company’s Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Canada. Finished cobalt production also fell by 34% to 213t.

Sherritt nickel production problems have now moved beyond quarterly underperformance. Feed inventories at Fort Saskatchewan were depleted on 22 June, forcing the refinery into a shutdown state with no restart date disclosed.

The disruption highlights a structural weakness in Sherritt’s supply chain. Canadian refining capacity depends on a single Cuban feed source that is exposed to fuel shortages, sanctions and political risk.

Moa Feed Collapse Cuts Nickel and Cobalt Output

Mixed sulfide precipitate production at Moa fell by 43% year on year to 1,811t in the first quarter after mining operations were suspended in February.

Moa operates as a 50:50 joint venture between Sherritt and Cuba’s General Nickel Company. Ore is mined and processed into MSP in Cuba before being shipped to Alberta for refining into finished nickel and cobalt.

Lower MSP availability forced Sherritt to reduce refinery utilisation during the quarter. The company did not secure replacement feedstock from alternative suppliers.

Finished nickel sales fell by 35% to 2,244t, while cobalt sales dropped to 203t from 456t a year earlier.

The declining volumes show how quickly an upstream interruption can affect downstream refining. Without sufficient MSP inventory, Fort Saskatchewan cannot maintain normal output regardless of its installed refining capacity.

The company exhausted its remaining feedstock on 22 June and is moving the refinery into shutdown. Maintenance will be carried out during the idle period, but Sherritt has not indicated when Moa can resume production.

Sanctions Add Strategic Risk to Sherritt’s Supply Chain

The operating disruption has been compounded by sanctions uncertainty. Sherritt suspended direct participation in the Moa joint venture on 7 May after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba.

The company initially considered fully dissolving the joint venture but later reversed that decision after consulting advisers, stakeholders and government authorities.

This leaves Sherritt in a difficult position. Its key refining asset remains operationally dependent on Moa, while its ability to participate directly in the Cuban operation is constrained.

Financial performance reflects the disruption. Sherritt reported a C$9.2mn loss in the first quarter on revenue of C$34mn, down 11% from a year earlier.

The company has also announced plans for US investment firm Gillon Capital to acquire 55% of its shares, adding a corporate restructuring element to the supply disruption.

For nickel and cobalt markets, the immediate tonnage loss is modest relative to global supply. But the case is strategically important because it shows that processing assets in Canada can still be vulnerable when their feedstock remains tied to a politically exposed jurisdiction.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s problem is no longer simply lower Moa production; it is a broken mine-to-refinery chain. Fort Saskatchewan shows why western refining capacity needs diversified and politically secure feedstock, not just domestic processing assets.

Sherritt Cuba Sanctions Risk Clouds Moa Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has become a new uncertainty for Canadian metals miner and refiner Sherritt International after the US expanded its sanctions framework targeting Cuba. The company is consulting advisers and stakeholders to assess possible implications for its Cuban mining and refining exposure.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk centres on the company’s Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. The operation mines and processes nickel and cobalt ore in Cuba before shipping mixed sulphide precipitate to Sherritt’s refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has increased after US president Donald Trump issued an executive order on 1 May broadening existing Cuba-related restrictions. The order allows the US to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, as well as energy, defence, financial services, security and other parts of the Cuban economy.

The development matters because Moa is not only a Cuban mining asset. It is part of a cross-border nickel and cobalt processing chain that links Cuban ore production with Canadian refining capacity.

Moa Joint Venture Faces Sanctions and Fuel Supply Pressure

The Moa joint venture produces mixed sulphide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt. Ore is mined and processed at the Moa site in Cuba, then shipped to Alberta for refining.

This structure gives Sherritt exposure to two different risks. The first is sanctions policy. The second is physical supply continuity from Cuba.

The company had already suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba. That disruption reduced upstream feed availability and raised concerns over refinery inventory in Canada.

Sherritt said in February that its Fort Saskatchewan refinery feed inventory was expected to last until mid-April. The new sanctions uncertainty adds another layer of pressure to an already fragile supply chain.

Nickel and cobalt remain important materials for batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-related supply chains. Any disruption to feedstock or refining routes can affect customers that rely on qualified supply.

The Moa operation is therefore strategically important despite its geopolitical complexity. It supplies intermediate material that can be refined into products serving North American industrial demand.

US Policy Adds Complexity to Critical Minerals Trade

The executive order broadens the list of possible sanctions targets linked to Cuba. Metals and mining are now explicitly included, raising compliance risk for companies with Cuban operations or Cuban-linked material flows.

For Sherritt, the immediate issue is clarity. The company must determine whether its ownership structure, product flows, financing relationships, logistics providers or customers could be affected by the expanded sanctions framework.

This matters because sanctions risk can affect more than direct operations. It can influence shipping, banking, insurance, payment processing, customer contracts and counterparty willingness to handle material.

The case also highlights a difficult reality in critical minerals policy. Western governments want secure nickel and cobalt supply, but some existing supply chains run through politically sensitive jurisdictions.

Canada’s refining capacity at Fort Saskatchewan is valuable, but its feedstock connection to Cuba creates exposure to US policy decisions. That makes Sherritt’s position more complicated than a conventional mining or refining business.

The outcome will depend on how broadly Washington applies the new order and whether Sherritt’s activities become directly targeted. Until then, customers and investors are likely to watch for guidance on operational continuity, legal exposure and feedstock availability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s situation shows that critical minerals security is not only about mine reserves or refining capacity. Political jurisdiction, sanctions exposure and feedstock logistics can determine whether a nickel-cobalt supply chain remains bankable.

Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Pause Raises New Supply Concerns for 2026

Sherritt International

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is now the company’s most immediate operational challenge for 2026. Sherritt said it will temporarily suspend mining at its Moa joint venture in Cuba because fuel deliveries cannot be fulfilled. The company also expects to place the processing plant on standby. As a result, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is creating new uncertainty around upstream supply and production planning.

This matters because Moa is a key source of nickel and cobalt feed for Sherritt’s wider business. The company said it does not yet know when fuel deliveries to the site will resume. That makes the interruption more serious than a short maintenance event. Therefore, Cuba nickel-cobalt supply is now facing a disruption with no clear restart timeline.

Sherritt is using the downtime to complete maintenance activities at the processing plant. That should help the site use the pause more productively while operations remain constrained. However, the core issue is still fuel access, not plant readiness. Consequently, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause may last longer than the market would prefer.

Fort Saskatchewan Refinery Buys Some Time

Fort Saskatchewan refinery gives Sherritt some short-term protection against the Cuban disruption. The company said its Alberta refinery should see no immediate impact and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed inventory is expected to last until mid-April. As a result, downstream production can continue for now.

That inventory buffer is important, but it is limited. If Moa mining and processing do not restart before the feed runs low, pressure could move downstream as well. Therefore, the Fort Saskatchewan refinery is buying time rather than fully solving the problem.

Nickel and Cobalt Output Guidance Now Looks Less Certain

Nickel and cobalt output guidance for 2026 now looks harder to defend. Sherritt had expected to produce 26,000-28,000t of finished nickel and 2,750-2,850t of finished cobalt this year. The company now says it will update guidance once it has greater certainty on a full restart. As a result, Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt pause is directly affecting market expectations for annual output.

One part of the business remains stable. Sherritt said its power division, Energas, should continue operating without issues. That limits the disruption to the metals side of the portfolio. Meanwhile, investors and buyers will focus on how quickly fuel deliveries can return to Moa.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This disruption shows how vulnerable nickel and cobalt supply chains can remain to non-market factors such as fuel availability. Sherritt still has some downstream breathing room, but that buffer is not large. If Moa stays offline for too long, the company may need to materially reset its 2026 metals outlook.

Sherritt Moa JV Dissolution Marks Break in Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution marks a major break in one of the more unusual cross-border nickel-cobalt supply chains linking Cuba and Canada. Sherritt International plans to deliver a dissolution notice to its joint venture partner, the General Nickel Company of Cuba, after expanded US sanctions made continued participation commercially and legally risky.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution will require the Canadian company to surrender its interests in the Cuban joint venture corporations. The company said immediate dissolution is the only way to preserve its ability to do business.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution is strategically important because the Moa structure linked Cuban mining and intermediate processing with Canadian refining. Ore was mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa, then shipped to the Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta.

Sherritt expects GNC to owe an equalization payment because it believes the Moa mine is more valuable than the Canadian refinery. That valuation issue could become a key point in the separation process.

US Sanctions Force Structural Exit From Moa

The US directly sanctioned the Moa joint venture on 7 May. The designation followed a 1 May executive order allowing Washington to sanction entities or people supporting the Cuban government across metals, mining, energy, financial services, security and other sectors.

Sherritt had already suspended direct participation in Moa-related activities earlier this month after assessing the implications of the executive order. The direct sanctions accelerated the need for a structural exit.

The company said the dissolution is necessary so it can be considered the sole owner of Canada Refinery Corporation, which owns the Fort Saskatchewan nickel-cobalt refinery. That step is central to preserving the Canadian refining business outside the sanctioned Cuban structure.

The Moa joint venture had been a 50/50 partnership between Sherritt and GNC. Its value came from combining Cuban ore and MSP production with Canadian refining expertise.

The latest move shows how sanctions can fracture supply chains even when downstream refining sits in an allied jurisdiction. Feedstock origin, ownership structure and sanctioned counterparties now matter as much as the location of final refining.

Canadian Refinery Faces Feedstock Repositioning Challenge

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it produces finished nickel and cobalt. These metals are used in batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing.

However, the refinery’s historic feedstock route depended on Moa mixed sulfide precipitate. Losing the Cuban joint venture means Sherritt must protect the refinery’s operating future through ownership clarity, alternative feed planning or new commercial structures.

The company had already faced operating pressure before the sanctions escalated. Sherritt temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

That earlier disruption showed the physical fragility of the Moa supply chain. The sanctions now add a legal and geopolitical break to an already strained operating model.

For nickel and cobalt buyers, the key issue is whether Fort Saskatchewan can remain a reliable source of refined metal without direct participation in Moa. The answer will depend on feedstock access, legal separation, inventory management and customer confidence.

The dissolution also highlights a broader critical minerals lesson. Western supply chains can still carry high exposure when mines, intermediates or partners sit in sanctioned or politically sensitive jurisdictions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s exit from Moa shows that critical minerals security cannot rely on refining capacity alone. The real test is whether the entire chain, from mine ownership to intermediate feedstock and final metal, can survive sanctions, fuel disruption and geopolitical pressure.

Sherritt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Canada’s Dependence on Cuban Nickel Feed

Sherritt International

Sherritt refinery shutdown plans will halt nickel and cobalt production at the company’s Fort Saskatchewan facility in Alberta after feedstock from Cuba’s Moa joint venture ran out. The move highlights how upstream disruption can strand downstream refining capacity even in a politically secure jurisdiction.

Sherritt refinery shutdown operations will remain in place until mining and processing at Moa can resume and mixed sulfide precipitate shipments to Canada are restored. The company has not given a restart timeline.

Sherritt refinery shutdown is strategically important because Fort Saskatchewan converts Cuban mixed sulfide precipitate into finished nickel and cobalt. The refinery therefore depends on continuity across mining, processing, shipping and sanctions-sensitive trade routes.

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to complete maintenance work. Fertilizer and sulfuric acid production will continue, preserving part of the site’s industrial activity while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

Moa Feed Disruption Strands Canadian Refining Capacity

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery relies on the Moa joint venture in Cuba for its nickel and cobalt feed. Ore is mined and processed at Moa into mixed sulfide precipitate before being shipped to Alberta for refining.

That supply chain began to weaken in February when fuel shortages forced the joint venture to suspend mining operations. Feed inventories in Canada subsequently declined, with Sherritt previously expecting available material to last only until mid-June.

The problem then became more complex in May. Sherritt suspended direct participation in the Moa joint venture after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

The company has maintained that suspension, leaving the future of Cuban production uncertain. Without fresh MSP shipments, Fort Saskatchewan cannot continue normal nickel and cobalt refining.

This illustrates a critical supply-chain weakness. Refining assets may sit inside Canada, but their security still depends on where upstream feed originates.

For North American critical minerals policy, that distinction matters. Domestic refining capacity does not create supply independence if raw materials remain tied to politically exposed jurisdictions.

Nickel and Cobalt Supply Security Shifts Toward Feedstock Control

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, superalloys, aerospace, industrial chemicals and defence-related manufacturing. Reliable refining capacity is therefore strategically valuable.

But Sherritt’s shutdown shows that feedstock security must be treated as part of refinery security. A plant without dependable concentrate or intermediate supply becomes an idle asset regardless of its technical capability.

The Fort Saskatchewan site still has value because its processing infrastructure and operating expertise remain in place. Maintenance during the shutdown may help preserve restart readiness if Moa supply resumes.

However, the absence of a clear restart timeline increases uncertainty. Sherritt must either restore the Cuban supply chain or eventually secure another viable feed route if the disruption becomes prolonged.

The situation also raises a broader question for western critical minerals strategies. Governments are investing heavily in domestic processing, but those projects need diversified and compliant raw material sources to remain resilient.

Sherritt’s experience shows why mining, intermediate processing and refining must be planned as one integrated supply chain rather than separate assets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan is a reminder that secure refining capacity is only as strong as its feedstock chain. Canada can host the refinery, but without reliable upstream material, geopolitical risk still determines whether nickel and cobalt actually reach the market.

Sherritt Nickel-Cobalt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Cuba Feedstock Risk

Sherritt

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery operations at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta will enter a shutdown state after feedstock from the company’s Moa joint venture in Cuba became unavailable.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery production depends on mixed sulfide precipitate shipped from the Moa mine, where nickel and cobalt ore is mined and processed before final refining in Canada.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery shutdown highlights the vulnerability of processing facilities that rely on a single international feed source. The company has not provided a timeline for restarting nickel and cobalt refining.

The shutdown follows fuel-related disruptions at Moa and increased US sanctions on Cuba, which led Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture.

Cuba Disruption Breaks the Mine-to-Refinery Supply Chain

The Moa joint venture is owned equally by Sherritt and Cuba’s General Nickel Company. Its operating model links Cuban mining and intermediate processing directly with Canadian refining.

Ore from Moa is processed into mixed sulfide precipitate before shipment to Fort Saskatchewan for conversion into finished nickel and cobalt products.

That structure becomes vulnerable when upstream operations stop. Sherritt had already warned that existing refinery feed inventories would last only until around mid-June.

Fuel shortages initially forced the Moa operation to suspend mining activity in February. Additional uncertainty followed after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba, prompting Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture in May.

The refinery will remain shut until Moa mining and processing resume and enough intermediate material is available to rebuild feed supply.

This shows that refining capacity alone does not guarantee critical mineral security. A plant can remain technically capable of producing metal while geopolitical or logistical problems interrupt the upstream feed required to operate it.

Nickel and Cobalt Output Stops While Byproduct Production Continues

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to carry out maintenance at Fort Saskatchewan.

The company will continue producing fertilizer and sulfuric acid, showing that some parts of the industrial complex can remain operational even while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

However, the loss of finished nickel and cobalt output reduces North American availability of two important materials used across stainless steel, superalloys, batteries and other industrial applications.

Cobalt is particularly relevant to aerospace, defence and battery supply chains, while refined nickel remains important for both conventional metallurgy and selected battery chemistries.

The disruption also underlines the strategic importance of diversified feedstock. Refiners that can process material from multiple mines or jurisdictions have greater resilience when one supply route fails.

For Sherritt, the key issue is therefore not refinery maintenance but restoration of a stable Cuban feed stream.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan shows that midstream capacity is only as secure as its upstream feed. North American critical minerals policy must address concentrate and intermediate supply alongside domestic refining capacity.

Sherritt Nickel and Cobalt Production Declines in Q1 2025

Sherritt International

Sherritt nickel and cobalt production dropped significantly in the first quarter of 2025. The Canadian miner reported an 18% decline in nickel output to 2,947 tonnes and a 6% decrease in cobalt production to 323 tonnes. Despite these setbacks, the company maintained its raised full-year guidance, signaling confidence in its operational outlook. The Sherritt nickel and cobalt production update reflects both current challenges and anticipated recovery.

Moa Expansion Faces Sanctions but Offers Hope

Operations at Sherritt’s Moa joint venture in Cuba were affected by intensified U.S. sanctions, limiting output capacity. However, the company initiated Phase 2 of its expansion project at the site. Full ramp-up is expected in the second half of the year, which could restore Sherritt nickel and cobalt production to targeted levels. CEO Leon Binedell emphasized that this expansion is critical to meeting future demand, especially in energy transition sectors.

Cobalt Sales Rise Despite Falling Prices

While production declined, cobalt sales rose 26% to 456 tonnes, outpacing actual output. This suggests strong downstream demand, particularly from battery manufacturers. In contrast, nickel sales fell 15% to 3,439 tonnes. Price trends diverged: cobalt’s average realized price fell 8% to C$13.29/lb, while nickel edged up 1% to C$9.98/lb. Sherritt expects cobalt prices to rebound in the second quarter, potentially improving margins.

The company posted a C$40.6 million loss, nearly flat from a year earlier. However, revenue rose 33% to C$38.4 million, supported by strategic inventory sales and resilient market demand. This financial performance demonstrates that even amid operational pressure, Sherritt’s market positioning remains strong.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s first-quarter results highlight the fragility of critical mineral supply chains under geopolitical stress. Yet its decisive investment in Moa and steady demand for cobalt offer a realistic path to recovery in 2025.

Sherritt Raises Nickel and Cobalt Output Guidance for 2025

Sherritt International

Sherritt International, a leading Canadian mining and metal producer, has increased its nickel and cobalt production guidance for 2025. The company is now expecting to produce between 31,000 and 33,000 metric tonnes (t) of nickel and between 3,300 and 3,600t of cobalt in 2025. This marks a slight increase from the 2024 output of 30,331t of finished nickel and 3,206t of cobalt, both of which met Sherritt's annual targets.

Sherritt's Recovery from Challenges in 2024

Despite facing significant challenges in 2024, including natural disasters and power infrastructure issues in Cuba, Sherritt has remained resilient. The company is well-positioned to tackle current market conditions and remain competitive, even amid supply pressures primarily driven by China. Sherritt's president and CEO, Leon Binedell, expressed confidence in the company's ability to maintain its performance through strategic initiatives and operational improvements.

Looking Ahead: 2025 Output and Strategic Initiatives

Sherritt's projected output for 2025 will be bolstered by the improved availability of mixed sulphides from the Moa mine site in Cuba. This will ensure a steady supply to the refinery, supporting the company's production targets. Production in 2025 is expected to be heavier in the second half of the year, contributing to a strong finish. Additionally, Sherritt is progressing with its mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) project, which is focused on the North American electric vehicle market, an important sector for future growth.