CMOC Copper Output Rises as DRC Mines Strengthen China Supply

CMOC

CMOC copper output increased in the first quarter of 2026 as higher production from the company’s Democratic Republic of Congo copper-cobalt mines lifted supply. The Chinese diversified metals producer produced 187,880t of copper in January-March, up 10% from a year earlier.

CMOC copper output was supported by stronger production at the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. These assets are central to China’s copper and cobalt feedstock security because they supply large volumes of cathode and intermediate material from one of the world’s most important copper-cobalt districts.

CMOC copper output is expected to remain a major market focus this year. The company is targeting 760,000-820,000t of copper production in 2026, after producing 741,100t in 2025.

The result reinforces the DRC’s role as China’s largest imported copper cathode source. China imported 275,359t of copper cathode from the DRC in the first quarter, equal to 37.5% of total imports.

Tenke and Kisanfu Anchor CMOC’s Copper Growth

CMOC’s first-quarter copper growth reflects the scale and strategic importance of its DRC operations. Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu remain core assets for the company’s copper-cobalt portfolio.

The company plans to expand output at Kisanfu by adding 100,000 t/yr of copper cathode capacity. Completion is targeted for 2027.

The expansion could also lift cobalt capacity. CMOC has not disclosed the planned increase, but market participants expect Kisanfu’s cobalt capacity to rise by more than 30,000 t/yr.

This matters because copper and cobalt are increasingly linked in DRC project economics. Higher copper output can bring additional cobalt units into the market, depending on ore composition, processing rates and export rules.

The London Metal Exchange approval of CMOC’s TFM-1 copper cathode brand adds another layer of market significance. The brand, produced at Tenke Fungurume, was approved for listing on 27 March and has a registered production capacity of 270,000 t/yr.

Exchange approval improves brand visibility and market acceptance. It can also support trade liquidity, financing and customer confidence for DRC-origin copper cathode.
China’s copper cathode import structure shows why this is important. The DRC already supplies more than one-third of China’s imported cathode, making Congolese supply critical to Chinese refined copper availability.

The China grade-A copper cathode premium was steady at $55-70/t cif Shanghai on 23 April. The range narrowed from $55-75/t a week earlier, showing a relatively stable but cautious spot market.

Cobalt Output Stays Flat as Quotas Restrict Feedstock Flows

CMOC’s cobalt production was largely unchanged in the first quarter. The company produced 30,508t of cobalt, up only 0.3% from a year earlier.

The company set its 2026 cobalt output guidance at 100,000-120,000t. That is broadly stable against 117,549t produced in 2025.

The flat cobalt outlook reflects a more complicated market. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports from 22 February to 15 October 2025 before moving to a quota-based export system for the fourth quarter of 2025 and for 2026-27.

Administrative delays have slowed the quota system. The DRC extended fourth-quarter 2025 quotas to 31 March 2026 because of slow processing.

The effect on Chinese imports has been severe. China imported only 1,278t cobalt metal equivalent of cobalt intermediate feedstock in January-February, down 96% from a year earlier.

Cobalt hydroxide prices remained stable at $25.95-26.10/lb cif China on 23 April. But the stability masks a market still shaped by restricted DRC export flows, delayed allocations and uncertainty over quota administration.

For CMOC, the copper side of the portfolio is showing clear growth. The cobalt side remains more exposed to policy risk, export controls and administrative timing in the DRC.

The Kisanfu expansion could increase future cobalt availability, but the market impact will depend on whether DRC export rules allow material to move smoothly to downstream refiners.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CMOC’s first-quarter results show that DRC copper remains essential to China’s refined copper supply, while cobalt is increasingly constrained by policy rather than production alone. The strategic issue is no longer just mine output, but whether export quotas, brand approvals and logistics can keep critical metal flows moving.

DRC Copper Output Growth Accelerates as Cobalt Exports Collapse

DRC Copper mining

DRC copper output growth strengthened in 2025 as major producers lifted volumes across the country. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced 3.4mn t of copper in 2025, up from 3.1mn t in 2024. That marks a 10pc annual increase. As a result, DRC copper output growth remains one of the most important supply stories in the global copper market.

This increase matters because the DRC is already one of the world’s key copper jurisdictions. Higher output from CMOC, Ivanhoe, and other major operators supported the national result. The country is becoming even more important to global copper supply. Therefore, DRC copper production 2025 confirms the DRC’s rising weight in the energy and industrial metals chain.

CMOC led the market last year. Its Tenke Fungurume mine produced 519,000t of copper, while Kisanfu added 228,000t. Kamoa-Kakula, the joint venture between Ivanhoe and Zijin, produced 400,000t. Consequently, DRC copper output growth is being driven by a concentrated group of very large operations.

DRC Copper Production 2025 Shows Strong Mine-Level Momentum

DRC copper production 2025 reflects strong mine-level performance from the country’s biggest operators. Large-scale projects continued to deliver higher volumes even as the market remained focused on geopolitical risk and resource nationalism. That gives the DRC a stronger position in global copper negotiations. As a result, copper is becoming an even more strategic pillar of the country’s mining economy.

This growth also improves the DRC’s relevance to western supply chains. Copper demand remains closely tied to electrification, grid buildout, and industrial investment. Countries and companies looking for large-scale copper supply cannot ignore the DRC. Therefore, DRC copper output growth is not only a mining statistic. It is a strategic supply-chain signal.

Congo Cobalt Export Ban Has Changed the Other Side of the Metals Story

Congo cobalt export ban created a very different picture for the country’s other key battery metal. Cobalt shipments fell by almost 80pc in 2025 because of the export restriction. The government imposed the ban after global oversupply drove cobalt prices to record lows. As a result, the DRC used policy intervention to support value rather than pure export volume.

This matters because the DRC remains the world’s largest cobalt producer. Cobalt is still important for electric vehicles and electronics, even as battery chemistry trends evolve. The government has since moved toward a quota system after the export ban. Therefore, Congo cobalt export ban shows that the DRC is willing to manage supply more actively when market conditions weaken.

The US-DRC minerals agreement adds another strategic layer. Officials said the December cooperation deal could improve investor confidence in minerals exploration. The agreement gives the United States preferential status to source critical minerals from the DRC and process them for global markets. Consequently, the DRC is trying to combine stronger copper growth with deeper geopolitical relevance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC now presents two very different metals stories at once. Copper is expanding through giant mines, while cobalt is being managed through policy restraint. That combination shows the country is no longer just a resource exporter. It is becoming a more active force in shaping how critical minerals reach the global market.

Chinese Firms Intensify Investments in Cu-Co Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In a strategic maneuver to secure a steady supply of crucial resources, Chinese enterprises are significantly amplifying their investments in the copper-cobalt reserves of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This initiative addresses China's limited cobalt resources and the enduringly strong copper market.

Leading the charge are prominent entities such as diversified metals producer CMOC, China Railways Resources, China Nonferrous Metal Mining, Norin Mining, Excellent Mining, and Huayou Cobalt. According to data compiled by Metalnomist, the DRC produced approximately 167,000 metric tons of cobalt feedstock in 2023, with Chinese mining companies contributing around 59% of this total output. Presently, Chinese investments account for over 62% of the DRC’s total cobalt reserves, a remarkable increase from roughly 25% in 2016. This proportion is anticipated to expand further following Norin Mining's acquisition of Dubai-based Chemaf Resources (CRL).

China’s dependency on imported cobalt, which constitutes nearly 99% of its primary feedstock, has propelled these extensive investments. The DRC remains the foremost supplier of cobalt feedstock to China, accounting for 84% of China's total imports in 2023, trailed by Indonesia (10%), Papua New Guinea (1.6%), and New Caledonia (1.5%).

This domestic resource shortfall has driven Chinese mining firms to intensify their investments in the DRC’s copper and cobalt assets over recent years. CMOC, a global titan in mining cobalt, copper, tungsten, molybdenum, and niobium with operations spanning China, the DRC, Australia, and Brazil, acquired a 56% stake in the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) from US-based Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, later increasing its stake to 80% in 2017. Additionally, CMOC finalized its acquisition of the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in December 2020.

With copper prices maintaining an upward trajectory since early this year, achieving new heights on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) and London Metals Exchange (LME) in mid-May, mining firms have been further incentivized to augment their investments in the DRC’s copper-cobalt mines.

Norin Mining's acquisition of CRL, which controls two copper-cobalt mines in the DRC, underscores this trend. Norin Mining Kingco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norin Mining, has entered into a share purchase agreement with CRL’s parent company Chemaf to acquire all of Chemaf's shares in CRL. The financial details of the transaction remain undisclosed, yet CRL anticipates completing the deal in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Nevertheless, the state mining company Gecamines has expressed opposition to the sale of Chemaf Resources, potentially delaying the acquisition process. A source familiar with the matter noted, "The acquisition is expected to be delayed for a while because of Gecamines' opposition, but it will probably be resolved later without significantly impacting the acquisition."

Chemaf SA is progressing with the expansion of the Etoile mine (Etoile phase 2) to process mixed and sulphide ore, alongside developing a new Mutoshi mine. Both projects, in advanced stages of development, have the potential to collectively produce over 75,000 metric tons of copper and 20,000 metric tons of cobalt hydroxide annually. These new ventures are expected to commence production in 2025, post-acquisition.

Orion Glencore DRC Stake Sale Could Redraw Western Access to Copper and Cobalt

Glencore DRC

The Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could become one of the most important critical minerals deals of the year. Glencore has agreed to a possible sale of 40pc of its Kamoto and Mutanda mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The talks value the two assets at around $9bn. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could reshape western copper and cobalt access.

This matters because the buyer is not a normal financial investor. Orion Critical Mineral Consortium was set up with direct US backing and a clear supply security mission. The group wants long-life production from high-quality mines that can support western industry. Therefore, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale fits a much broader US critical minerals strategy.

The deal also has strategic structure. Orion would gain board seats and the right to route its share of metal to chosen buyers under the US-DRC partnership. Glencore would still keep day-to-day control of the mines. Consequently, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale looks designed to influence supply direction without forcing a full operating transfer.

US Critical Minerals Strategy Is Moving Closer to Producing Assets

US critical minerals strategy is no longer focused only on early-stage projects. Washington has been moving toward assets that are already close to production or already operating. Orion’s earlier Prieska term sheet showed that approach on a smaller scale. This DRC move would take that strategy much further.

Recent US actions support the same pattern. Washington has widened its reach through metal tenders, minimum price tools, and Project Vault. These measures all aim to secure real physical supply, not only future optionality. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale would fit neatly into a larger push for direct control over material flows.

That is especially important for copper and cobalt. Both metals remain essential to electrification, batteries, aerospace, and industrial technology. However, western buyers still face concentrated supply chains and strong Chinese influence. Therefore, any credible route to diversify western copper and cobalt access now carries major geopolitical value.

DRC Cobalt Export Quota and Copper Priorities Are Shaping the Deal

The DRC cobalt export quota is one reason this deal makes sense now. Glencore’s operations remain central to the global cobalt chain, but they are increasingly shaped by policy limits rather than only geology. National exports are capped across 2026 and 2027, and Glencore’s own allocation is limited. Therefore, these mines can produce more cobalt than they can freely sell.

Glencore is also leaning harder into copper. Copper prices strengthened sharply in late 2025 and early 2026, while cobalt operations faced more pressure. The company has already shown it can shift plant time and logistics toward copper when returns are more attractive. As a result, the Orion Glencore DRC stake sale could help Glencore share risk while keeping focus on its preferred metal.

Operational pressure adds another layer. Kamoto and Mutanda have faced lower grades, stoppages, repair work, transport bottlenecks, and policy limits. These are still major assets, but they are no longer simple growth stories. Consequently, bringing in a new partner could help stabilize capital needs while giving western buyers a stronger foothold.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This possible sale matters because it combines geopolitics, mine ownership, and offtake control in one transaction. The bigger issue is not only who owns 40pc. It is who gets to direct future copper and cobalt units from some of the world’s most important DRC assets.

Glencore Copper Production Rises as DRC Cobalt Quota Reshapes Output Priorities

Glencore

Glencore copper production rose sharply in the first quarter as higher grades at its African copper mines and stronger throughput at Antamina lifted output. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group produced 199,600t of copper, up 19% from a year earlier.

Glencore copper production growth contrasts with a steep fall in cobalt output. Own-sourced cobalt production dropped by 39% to 5,800t, mainly because the Democratic Republic of Congo’s export quota system has changed how producers manage shipments and mine planning.

Glencore copper production is now becoming more important inside its DRC asset base because cobalt export limits have made copper the clearer operating priority. This shift shows how state policy can directly reshape output behaviour in multi-metal mining systems.

The company maintained full-year production guidance for copper, nickel and zinc, despite weaker output in several other metals. Copper guidance remains at 810,000-870,000t for the year.

DRC Quota System Pushes Cobalt Lower

The sharp fall in cobalt output reflects the DRC’s quota system, introduced after the country moved away from its earlier export ban framework. The system capped shipments and set annual limits for 2026-27, with an additional strategic pool.

For Glencore, the practical effect is clear. Its DRC assets are now prioritising copper production because copper can move through the market with fewer quota-related constraints.

This matters for battery and superalloy supply chains. The DRC remains the world’s dominant source of mined cobalt, so export policy can quickly affect availability, pricing and producer behaviour.

Cobalt is not produced in isolation at many Congolese operations. It is often linked to copper mining, which means policy limits on cobalt can influence mine sequencing, processing priorities and inventory decisions.

The first-quarter numbers therefore point to a more managed cobalt market. Supply is not only a function of ore grades and plant capacity. It is increasingly controlled by export approvals, quotas and state strategy.

Copper benefited from stronger grades at African operations and higher throughput at Antamina in Peru. That performance reinforces copper’s stronger strategic position at a time when demand from grids, electrification, industrial policy and data centres continues to attract market attention.

Nickel, Zinc and Ferro-Chrome Show Operational Pressure

Glencore’s nickel output fell by 9% to 17,200t. The decline was caused by a furnace disruption at the Sudbury complex in Canada, which affected matte shipment timing to Norway.

Nickel guidance remained unchanged at 70,000-80,000t. This suggests Glencore sees the first-quarter weakness as manageable rather than a full-year supply reset.

Zinc output fell by 17% to 176,900t. The decline was mainly linked to the closure of the Lady Loretta mine in Australia and lower output from Kazzinc in Kazakhstan.

Zinc guidance also remained unchanged at 700,000-740,000t. However, the first-quarter result shows how mine closures and regional production issues can still weigh on quarterly availability.

Ferro-chrome output collapsed by 95% to 13,000t because of continued care and maintenance at Glencore’s chrome smelting operations and the phased restart of the Lion Smelter in South Africa.

South African ferro-chrome remains under pressure from high energy prices and competition from lower-cost Chinese material. This has forced output cuts at major producers and weakened South Africa’s position in global ferro-alloy supply.

Glencore’s vanadium pentoxide production rose by 5% to 2,300t, offering a small positive signal in another strategic alloy material.

Overall, the quarter shows a company benefiting from copper strength while managing policy and cost pressures across cobalt, nickel, zinc and ferro-chrome. The most important signal is that copper and cobalt are now being shaped by very different forces: copper by grade and throughput, cobalt by DRC export control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Glencore’s results show how government policy can be as powerful as geology in multi-metal supply chains. The DRC cobalt quota is not only reducing cobalt output; it is pushing producers to prioritise copper in one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

US Copper Flows Shift West as Washington Targets African Supply Chains

Copper

US copper flows are becoming a strategic policy priority as Washington seeks to redirect African copper away from China-oriented supply chains and into western manufacturing networks. The shift shows how copper is moving beyond its traditional role as an industrial commodity.

US policymakers are pursuing a dual strategy. They want to accelerate domestic copper projects and processing while also securing international copper sources that can feed US and allied supply chains faster.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has become central to this effort. The country offers high-quality resources and faster supply potential than many long-dated greenfield copper projects.

US copper flows are therefore being reshaped through offtake agreements, financing structures, infrastructure plans and strategic partnerships. The goal is to create secure mine-to-end-use supply chains that support American manufacturing and reduce dependence on China-linked material routes.

African Copper Becomes a Strategic Supply Target

The DRC’s copper output has historically moved east into Chinese-controlled or China-oriented value chains. Washington now wants to build alternative routes that connect African copper to the US and allied industrial base.

This is not only about copper cathode or concentrate volumes. It is about who controls logistics, financing, offtake, processing and final market access.

The US is already using state-backed financing and trading structures to compete for African copper and cobalt. The DRC, Zambia and Guinea are emerging as priority jurisdictions in this wider mineral strategy.

Glencore’s possible sale of a 40% stake in two DRC copper-cobalt mines to the US-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium shows how policy and capital are beginning to move together. More US interest is also emerging in Congolese copper-cobalt, manganese, gold and lithium assets.

This matters because China has built deep influence across African mining, processing and trading channels. Western buyers cannot change copper flows only by expressing demand. They need financing, infrastructure, political support and long-term offtake commitments.

The US strategy also reflects a broader recognition that copper supply security cannot rely only on domestic mines. US copper resources are substantial, including brownfield leach opportunities and idle stockpiles, but permitting remains a major constraint.

International supply partnerships can move faster than many US projects. That makes African copper strategically valuable as Washington tries to support manufacturing, grid expansion, defence supply chains and electrification.

Inventory Distortions Change Copper Market Economics

US copper flows are also being affected by tariff expectations and inventory shifts. Around 1.9mn-2mn t of copper metal inventory is now sitting globally, with roughly 1.2mn t located in the US.

That is an unusually high share because the US consumes about 2mn t/yr, while China consumes roughly 15mn t/yr. The result is a market where headline global stocks look large, but copper outside the US can feel much tighter.

This inventory concentration changes copper economics. The same copper unit can carry different value depending on location, policy exposure, tariff risk and available delivery route.

That marks a major shift from the older copper market model. Copper was once priced mainly around construction cycles, manufacturing demand and visible exchange stocks. It is now increasingly priced around jurisdiction, logistics and strategic access.

The CME-LME arbitrage has reopened to encourage flows into the US. This reflects how policy expectations can pull metal across regions even when global balances appear more comfortable.

Physical demand remains supportive. Chinese demand has stayed resilient, Yangshan premiums have strengthened, and Shanghai inventories have continued to draw. These signals suggest that the broader copper market remains tighter than simple stock numbers imply.

Copper’s role in grids, electrification and data centres has also changed how governments view the metal. Copper is now becoming a strategic asset for industrial policy, not only a material input for construction and manufacturing.

The biggest commercial opportunities may therefore shift from pure price arbitrage to control over flows. Traders, miners and governments will increasingly compete through logistics, financing, offtake and jurisdictional positioning.

US copper flows will remain central to that competition. The race is no longer only about producing more copper. It is about deciding where copper goes, who processes it and which industrial systems it supports.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Copper is becoming a policy metal because electrification has turned physical access into a strategic advantage. The next copper cycle will not be defined only by price, but by who controls African supply routes, financing and end-use allocation.

DRC Cobalt Supply Dynamics Shift as US-China Competition Deepens

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt supply dynamics are changing as geopolitical competition reshapes control over the country’s mineral flows. The Democratic Republic of Congo produced around 205,000t of cobalt in 2025. Chinese companies accounted for about 63pc of that output. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics now sit at the center of a wider US-China critical minerals contest.

This shift matters because the DRC remains the world’s most important cobalt feedstock source. For years, most Congolese cobalt moved toward Chinese refiners and battery material producers. That pattern is now facing pressure from export controls, quota systems, and new western-backed supply initiatives. Therefore, DRC cobalt supply dynamics are no longer defined by mining alone.

The policy environment is also changing quickly. The DRC suspended cobalt feedstock exports in 2025 before moving to a quota system for 2026 and 2027. Only 96,600 t/yr of cobalt feedstock will be authorized for export under the new structure. Consequently, DRC cobalt exports are becoming more managed and more strategic.

US-DRC Critical Minerals Partnership Is Challenging China’s Dominance

The US-DRC critical minerals partnership is beginning to challenge China’s dominant position in the sector. The proposed Orion investment in Glencore’s Kamoto and Mutanda mines could give the US-backed group direct board access and more influence over metal flows. That would create a new route for western buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt supply dynamics may become less concentrated around China.

Other moves reinforce that trend. Project Vault, the planned US critical minerals stockpile, shows Washington wants more control over future cobalt supply. The first EGC and Trafigura copper-cobalt cargoes through the Lobito corridor are also heading to US customers. Therefore, the US-DRC critical minerals partnership is now moving from policy language to physical supply.

This does not mean China is losing its position overnight. Around 90pc of DRC cobalt feedstock has typically been shipped to China. Chinese miners and traders still hold enormous influence across the country’s output base. Meanwhile, the new quota system still leaves Chinese firms with a large share of the authorized export volume.

DRC Cobalt Exports Could Tighten Further as Processing Competition Rises

DRC cobalt exports may tighten further because the new quota system limits available material while demand for non-Chinese supply grows. Feedstock availability was already restricted by the earlier export suspension. That tightness now meets new competition from western stockpiling and rerouting efforts. Consequently, DRC cobalt supply dynamics could become more constrained in 2026.

Indonesia adds another layer to the story. Cobalt output growth there may slow if nickel ore quotas are cut, because Indonesian cobalt is a by-product of nickel. Recycled cobalt and mixed hydroxide precipitate supply are also unlikely to fully close the gap. Therefore, global cobalt feedstock availability may stay tighter than many buyers expect.

China is also preparing its response. The removal of export rebates for ternary cathode materials and precursors suggests Beijing may increasingly favor domestic value retention. If feedstock tightens further, China may prioritize its own battery chain over overseas buyers. As a result, DRC cobalt exports are becoming part of a broader competition over who controls refined materials, not just mine output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The cobalt market is entering a more political phase. The DRC is still the core supplier, but the direction of its exports is becoming more contested. If quotas remain tight and western buyers gain more access, cobalt may become less about volume growth and more about strategic allocation.

DRC Mine Guard Plan Puts Critical Minerals Security at the Centre of Supply Chains

DRC, Inspectorate of Mines

DRC mine guard plans mark a major escalation in the country’s effort to secure critical minerals supply chains. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s General Inspectorate of Mines will develop a paramilitary unit to protect mine sites, ore transport routes, processors and border corridors.

The DRC mine guard will be created as part of a strategic partnership involving the US and UAE. The project is expected to cost up to $100mn and will use existing training facilities.

The DRC mine guard could deploy up to 20,000 troops over the next two years. Recruitment is expected to begin in May, with the first operational contingent of 2,500-3,000 officers targeted for deployment by December.

The plan reflects the growing strategic value of Congolese minerals. The DRC is a major producer of copper, cobalt, tantalum, tin and tungsten, all of which are critical to batteries, electronics, defence systems, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

Mineral Security Becomes a Formal State Priority

The mine guard will be tasked with securing mine sites across the DRC and protecting ore shipments from mines to processors and border posts. It will gradually replace forces currently deployed to defend mining assets.

The unit is expected to cover the Greater Katanga and Greater Eastern regions by the end of 2027. It is then planned to expand to all mining provinces by the end of 2028.

This regional focus is important. Greater Katanga is central to copper and cobalt production, while eastern DRC is tied to several strategic minerals and long-running security challenges.

The plan shows that mineral security is becoming part of formal state policy. Mine protection is no longer only a company-level issue involving private security, local forces or site-specific arrangements.

For producers, a more structured security framework could reduce disruption risk if implemented effectively. It could improve transport reliability, protect export flows and lower exposure to armed interference around mining corridors.

However, execution will be critical. A large paramilitary force operating across mining regions must be governed transparently to avoid creating new operational, political or human-rights risks.

US and UAE Partnership Signals Strategic Minerals Competition

The mine guard plan is linked to a broader US-DRC strategic partnership agreed in December 2025. That agreement included expanded US access to DRC critical minerals and a wider minerals-for-security-style framework.

The agreements were part of the Washington accords, a US-backed peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda designed to reduce conflict in eastern DRC. But fighting has continued, with the Rwanda-backed M23 group still controlling several major towns and mining assets. Rwanda denies backing the group.

This makes the security dimension central to mineral strategy. Western governments want more reliable access to DRC copper, cobalt and other critical minerals, but supply cannot be secured only through offtake agreements or financing.

Physical control of mine sites, transport routes and border flows is becoming just as important as ownership and processing capacity.

For the US, the DRC offers one of the fastest routes to large-scale copper and cobalt supply outside China-dominated value chains. For the DRC, security partnerships could bring funding, international backing and more leverage over strategic mineral flows.

The creation of a mine guard also signals that critical minerals are now treated as national security assets. Copper and cobalt are no longer only mining commodities. They are inputs for batteries, grids, defence manufacturing and geopolitical supply-chain competition.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC mine guard plan shows that critical minerals security is moving from boardrooms into the field. The key question is whether this force can protect supply chains without adding new governance risks to one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Jinchuan Copper Output Jumps as DRC Export Curbs Hold Back Sales

Jinchuan Copper

Jinchuan copper output rose sharply in the first quarter as production ramped up at the Musonoi mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, export restrictions prevented the company from converting higher mine production into equivalent sales growth.

Jinchuan copper output increased by 29.5% year on year to 18,021t. Copper sales moved in the opposite direction, falling by 2.2% to 11,689t after the DRC imposed an export ban during January-February.

Jinchuan copper output growth therefore reflects stronger mine performance rather than improved market access. The widening gap between production and sales shows how government export controls are becoming an increasingly important factor in Central African metals supply.

The effect was even more pronounced in cobalt. Jinchuan produced 2,139t during the quarter, compared with only 71t a year earlier, but sold just 7t as export quotas constrained shipments.

Musonoi Ramp-Up Creates Copper and Cobalt Stockbuild

Musonoi was the main driver of Jinchuan’s production growth, offsetting power-related difficulties at the Ruashi operation. The results show that the company can add significant copper and cobalt volumes when mining and processing assets operate normally.

But physical production is no longer the only constraint. DRC policy now determines how quickly those tonnes can reach international customers.

The country previously halted exports and now limits shipments to roughly half of production. This creates a structural gap between mine output and material available to international markets.

For cobalt, the impact is particularly visible. A production increase to more than 2,100t combined with sales of only 7t suggests substantial inventory accumulation or delayed shipments rather than weak underlying demand.

Copper is facing similar pressure, although the imbalance is less extreme. Jinchuan produced more than 18,000t but sold less than 12,000t during the quarter.

If export restrictions remain in place while Musonoi continues ramping up, inventories could continue to rise inside the DRC. The timing of future quota releases would then become increasingly important for international copper and cobalt availability.

DRC Policy Becomes the Key Variable for Cobalt Supply

The DRC occupies a dominant position in global cobalt supply, making export policy highly relevant to battery, aerospace and superalloy markets.

Chinese companies control around 63% of DRC cobalt supply and have expanded refining capacity to absorb material from the country. That gives Chinese firms a strong downstream position, but it does not eliminate exposure to Congolese export policy.

Jinchuan’s results illustrate this clearly. Investment in mining and processing can increase output, but actual sales still depend on export permits and quota allocations.

This changes the risk profile of mining investment. Companies must now manage not only ore grades, power availability, processing capacity and commodity prices, but also government control over physical flows.

For cobalt buyers, this can tighten internationally available units even when mine production itself is rising. That distinction is critical when assessing market balance.

The same principle applies to copper. New African production cannot automatically be treated as immediate global supply if regulatory controls delay shipments.

Jinchuan’s expansion strategy therefore remains tied to the DRC’s policy framework. Its mines can produce more metal, but future revenue growth increasingly depends on how much material authorities permit to leave the country.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Jinchuan’s results show why mine production alone no longer tells the full cobalt supply story. In the DRC, export permissions are becoming as important as mining capacity in determining how much copper and cobalt actually reaches the global market.

CMOC's Cobalt and Copper Output Soars in 2024, Boosting China's Supply

CMOC's

Chinese mining giant CMOC has reported a significant surge in its copper and cobalt production for 2024, primarily fueled by increased output from its operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  This production boost has subsequently impacted China's imports of these critical metals.

DRC Operations Drive Record Production

CMOC's cobalt production more than doubled in 2024, reaching 114,165 tonnes (metal equivalent), compared to 55,526 tonnes in 2023. This dramatic increase is attributed to higher output from the company's Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) and the newly developed Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in the DRC. KFM commenced production in the first half of 2023.  CMOC acquired a 56% stake in TFM from Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, increasing its ownership to 80% in 2017. The acquisition of KFM was completed in December 2020.  KFM is jointly owned by CMOC (71.25%), Brunp, a subsidiary of Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL), (23.75%), and DRC's state-owned Gecamines.

The company also saw a substantial rise in copper production, reaching 650,161 tonnes in 2024, a 55% increase year-on-year and 14% above its annual production guidance. This growth is partly due to the three new production lines at its mixed ore project at TFM reaching full capacity in the first half of 2024.  TFM now boasts five production lines with a combined capacity of 450,000 tonnes per year.  The KFM mine has achieved a copper capacity of 150,000 tonnes per year.

Impact on China's Metal Imports

The increased cobalt output from CMOC's DRC operations has significantly impacted China's feedstock imports.  Customs data reveals that China imported 172,580 tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent of intermediate products between January and November, a 74% surge compared to the same period the previous year.  Notably, approximately 98.7% of these imports originated from the DRC, a region where the world's two largest cobalt feedstock producers, CMOC and Glencore, operate copper and cobalt mines.  CMOC also holds a 30% stake in Huayue Nickel Cobalt, a joint venture with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan in Indonesia.

Looking ahead, CMOC is pursuing further production expansions as part of its five-year plan starting in 2025. These plans include the West Area project at TFM and the second phase of KFM, both of which are currently in the preliminary exploration stage.

China’s Cobalt Prices Surge Amid DRC Feedstock Supply Suspension

DRC Cobalt

Extended Supply Halt from DRC Fuels Price Rally in Chinese Cobalt Market

Cobalt prices in China are set to continue their upward trend as supply disruptions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) persist. Market participants anticipate that the rally will hold until the DRC government lifts its suspension on cobalt feedstock exports.

DRC Suspension Puts Pressure on Global Supply

Most traders expect Chinese cobalt metal prices to climb toward ¥300/kg under current supply conditions. “We may hit the ¥300/kg level soon,” said a Chinese trader. “But whether prices move beyond that will depend entirely on how long the DRC suspension continues.”

Despite stable production at DRC mines, the export restriction has reduced global feedstock availability. “If the suspension continues for four months, inventories outside the DRC could be exhausted,” warned a second source. Companies with lower inventory buffers may face serious operational risks.

China Relies Heavily on DRC for Cobalt Imports

China imported approximately 188,560 tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent in intermediate forms in 2024 — a 65% increase from 2023. Notably, 99% of these imports originated from the DRC. Key suppliers include CMOC and Glencore, which operate major copper-cobalt mines in the African nation.

As China remains the world’s largest cobalt refining hub, any prolonged supply disruption from the DRC could have far-reaching effects on the battery and electronics industries.

Chinese Cobalt Prices Expected to Decline Further in 2025 Amid Rising Supply and Weak Demand

Chinese Cobalt Manufacturing

Oversupply and Weak Demand to Push Cobalt Prices Lower

The Chinese cobalt market is set to experience further price declines in 2025, as increasing nickel and copper production, from which cobalt is a by-product, leads to an oversupply that buyers are struggling to absorb.

Currently, Chinese-origin cobalt metal traded in Europe has already seen significant pressure due to a lack of floor pricing on raw materials, a trend expected to persist into the new year. Market insiders suggest that cobalt prices could drop below $9/lb, as fully integrated Chinese producers view cobalt as a credit to their primary metal production, particularly nickel and copper.

For these refiners, cobalt is a secondary concern. As one trading firm explained, some Chinese producers operate with production costs as low as $4,000 per ton while selling at $9,000 per ton. Even if they incur a $50 million loss on cobalt, they may still profit significantly from copper production, which can generate up to $700 million in gains.

Chinese Refiners Likely to Continue Production at a Loss

Unlike non-Chinese refiners, which may curtail supply if cobalt prices fall below $9/lb, some Chinese integrated mining firms and refiners could continue refining hydroxide into metal at a loss-making $7-8/lb.

While there is speculation that some Chinese metal producers may attempt to negotiate floor prices in their contracts, it remains uncertain whether these efforts will succeed. Market participants are closely watching how these negotiations unfold, as they could provide some level of price support if successful.

Global Nickel and Copper Growth to Sustain Cobalt Oversupply

The primary factor driving cobalt’s oversupply is the continued expansion of nickel and copper production, as cobalt is a by-product of both metals.

• Nickel production is set to rise again in 2025 with the launch of new Class 1 nickel refineries in China and Indonesia. This will likely keep London Metal Exchange (LME) three-month official nickel prices within the $15,000-17,000 per ton range, significantly lower than the $30,000 per ton peak in early 2023.

• Copper production is also projected to increase due to expansions at mines such as Kamoa-Kakula in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although cobalt sales represent only a minor portion of copper mining revenues, producers still aim to extract value from it as a credit.

Weakened Demand from EV and Chemicals Sectors Further Pressures Prices

While cobalt demand in China has surged by 40%, this has not been enough to counteract weakening demand in other regions, particularly in Europe:

• The electric vehicle (EV) sector in Europe has slowed down, leading to reduced demand for cathode active materials like cobalt.

• The European chemicals industry, particularly in Germany, has struggled due to rising energy costs and broader economic challenges.

Even if prices do increase, China has ample spare refining capacity and could use third-party tolling arrangements to process hydroxide into metal, further maintaining downward price pressure.

Peak Oversupply May Be Near, But Price Recovery Remains Uncertain

Some market participants believe that cobalt hydroxide oversupply may have already peaked. The shift towards lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, which do not use cobalt, has significantly impacted the demand for nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) battery chemistries, leading to lower demand for cobalt sulfate and cobalt hydroxide.

However, despite this potential supply peak, weak demand across key industrial sectors suggests that cobalt prices are unlikely to see a strong recovery in the near term.

Conclusion

In 2025, Chinese cobalt prices are expected to remain under pressure due to rising nickel and copper production, ongoing oversupply, and weak demand from the European EV and chemicals sectors. While some believe that the cobalt market may be nearing peak oversupply, prices are unlikely to experience significant upward momentum unless demand rebounds sharply or supply reductions occur.

Cobalt Supply Glut May Persist for Two Years, Glencore Warns

The global cobalt market is expected to experience an oversupply lasting up to two years, following an announcement from mining giant Glencore that it will halt stockpiling and release its cobalt hydroxide into the market, industry sources told Metalnomist. Glencore CEO Gary Nagle confirmed during the company’s recent second-quarter results that the cessation of stockpiling means cobalt from its Katanga and Mutanda operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will soon enter the market. The firm had been stockpiling since early 2023, but Nagle did not disclose the current stock levels.

"They are going to show more availability," one trader commented. "I don't think it's going to make a huge difference to anything; prices were going to come off further. Hydroxide prices could drift further down from where they are now."

In the first half of 2024, Glencore produced 15,900 metric tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent, a decrease of 5,800 tonnes from the same period in 2023. The company plans to increase production in the second half of the year.

"They'll see another 30,000 tonnes coming out of the African business," Glencore CFO Steve Kalmin noted. "That’s not just Katanga, it's also Mutanda as we look to increase throughput rates on both copper and cobalt in the second half."

Meanwhile, Glencore competitor China Molybdenum Co. (CMOC) produced 54,024 metric tonnes of cobalt metal equivalent from January to June, nearly tripling the 19,418 tonnes produced in the same period last year. This increase, driven by its Tenke Fungurume and newly developed Kisanfu mines in the DRC, has contributed to the ongoing supply glut that could persist for up to two years, according to Nagle.

As cobalt from Glencore and CMOC floods the market, prices across the cobalt complex are likely to continue their downward trend. Market participants believe that the high demand for copper, driven by electrification, will keep copper prices elevated, further contributing to the surplus of cobalt, which is often produced as a by-product.

"Copper is going to stay high for at least a few years," a trader told Metalnomist. "Some are predicting prices as high as $12,000 to $15,000 per tonne in the near term."

The continued oversupply of cobalt hydroxide, coupled with falling prices in the DRC, could result in further declines in cobalt metal prices. Metalnomist assessed European chemical grade metal prices at $11.90-$12.75 per pound yesterday, but lower prices are already being observed in the Chinese domestic market, with some traders reporting prices as low as $10.50 per pound.

"Single-figure metal is possible," one trader warned, "I don’t really want to see it."

Zijin Mining Boosts Copper Production in 2024 with Strong Serbian and African Output

Zijin Mining

Zijin expands copper output with Serbian and DRC project gains

Zijin Mining increased its copper production in 2024, driven by higher output from its Serbian mines and African operations. The company produced 1.068mn tonnes of mined copper last year, up 6.1% from 2023. Notably, combined production from Serbia's Cukaru Peki and Bor mines rose to 292,900t, up from 238,900t a year earlier. Zijin aims to boost these Serbian mines to 450,000t/year, although it has not revealed a timeline.

Meanwhile, its flagship Kamoa-Kakula project in the Democratic Republic of Congo began phase three production in August. This will raise copper capacity to 600,000t/year by 2025, up from 437,000t in 2024.

New mines and future capacity targets underline long-term growth

In China, Zijin plans to launch phase two of the Julong copper mine in late 2025, expanding output to 300,000–350,000t/year. Phase three will raise Julong’s capacity to 600,000t/year, though construction dates remain undisclosed. Additionally, the 76,000t/year Zhunuo copper mine in Tibet will start operating by late 2026.

Refined copper production rose 3.2% to 474,570t in 2024, while zinc and lead volumes saw mixed performance. Zijin produced 451,474t of mined zinc and lead, down 3.3%, but refined zinc output rose 11% to 371,057t.

The company also expanded molybdenum and tungsten production, though cobalt output dropped 63% year-on-year. Looking ahead to 2025, Zijin targets 1.15mn t of copper, 440,000t of zinc and lead, and 40,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Zijin’s 2024 performance confirms its status as a global copper powerhouse. Strategic mine expansions in Serbia, Congo, and China signal long-term ambitions to dominate global refined and mined copper supply. Its diversification into lithium and molybdenum positions the firm to ride the clean energy and battery metals boom well into 2030.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Could Link DRC Supply to the US Critical Minerals Reserve

Ivanhoe DRC

Kipushi zinc concentrate could become part of a new supply route into the US critical minerals reserve. Ivanhoe Mines is discussing a deal involving Mercuria and Gécamines to channel production from its Kipushi mine toward the United States. The concentrate also contains germanium and gallium, which lifts its strategic value beyond zinc alone. As a result, Kipushi zinc concentrate now sits at the intersection of mining, trading, and US supply chain policy.

This matters because the proposed arrangement is not a standard offtake deal. Mercuria’s offtake would be assigned to the trading division of Gécamines under the structure being discussed. That could give Gécamines access to up to 50pc of the mine’s concentrate production, including sales to the US. Therefore, Kipushi zinc concentrate is becoming part of a broader geopolitical conversation around critical minerals access.

The timing is also important. The discussions come just as Washington launches Project Vault, the new $12bn domestic critical minerals stockpile for US manufacturers. That means the market is no longer talking only about future mine development. It is also talking about how existing production can be redirected into strategic reserve channels.

Kipushi Zinc Concentrate Carries More Than Zinc Value

Kipushi zinc concentrate stands out because it carries associated critical minerals that matter to advanced industry. The article notes that the material contains quantities of germanium and gallium. Those two metals are increasingly important in electronics, semiconductors, and strategic manufacturing. Consequently, Kipushi zinc concentrate could offer more supply chain value than a typical zinc stream.

That additional value helps explain why the United States could be interested. Project Vault is expected to target critical materials needed by domestic manufacturers, and recent commentary around the reserve has already highlighted metals such as gallium. Therefore, a zinc concentrate stream with embedded strategic by-products could fit well into the reserve’s broader procurement logic.

This also strengthens the DRC’s role in the supply chain discussion. The country is already central to global critical minerals debates because of its copper and cobalt position. Now, DRC zinc concentrate with germanium and gallium content may gain more visibility as western buyers look for diversified supply routes. As a result, Kipushi may become more strategically relevant than its headline zinc volumes first suggest.

US Critical Minerals Reserve Strategy Is Moving Closer to Real Supply Flows

US critical minerals reserve policy is now moving beyond theory and closer to real transactional supply. Project Vault has created a framework for securing non-military critical minerals for domestic manufacturers. Traders such as Mercuria and Traxys are already being linked to that effort. Therefore, the Kipushi discussions show how reserve policy could quickly influence actual commodity flows.

The role of Mercuria and Gécamines is especially important in that context. This is not only about mine ownership. It is also about who controls marketing rights, trading channels, and final destination. That gives the proposed agreement more strategic significance than a conventional sales arrangement. Meanwhile, it shows that state-linked and private trading structures may increasingly work together in critical minerals procurement.

For Ivanhoe, the deal would also align its production with a bigger strategic trend. Western governments and manufacturers are looking for secure access to metals outside heavily concentrated supply chains. If Kipushi zinc concentrate becomes part of that effort, the mine could strengthen its position in both the zinc market and the wider critical minerals conversation. Consequently, this discussion may matter well beyond one offtake contract.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This story is important because it shows how quickly ordinary concentrate flows can become strategic flows. Once zinc concentrate includes metals such as germanium and gallium, the supply chain logic changes. If Project Vault starts drawing in mixed-value materials like Kipushi zinc concentrate, the next phase of critical minerals competition will be shaped as much by offtake design as by mine ownership.

DRC Miner Gecamines Set to Ship First Germanium Concentrates Amid Tight Global Supply

Gecamines

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) state-owned mining company, Gécamines, is poised to make its first-ever shipment of germanium concentrates, marking a significant milestone in the global supply chain for this critical mineral. The shipment will be exported to Umicore, a Belgian metals processor, for refining into high-tech downstream products.

A Strategic Move Amid a Global Germanium Crunch

Gécamines’ germanium concentrates are sourced from the Big Hill tailings site in Lubumbashi, a location that holds approximately 10 million tonnes of metal slag. The tailings contain valuable recoverable metals such as zinc, silver, cobalt, and copper, alongside germanium.

The company’s subsidiary, STL, recently established a state-of-the-art hydrometallurgical plant at Lubumbashi to process these tailings. This partnership with Umicore, formalized in May, involves both technological collaboration and an offtake agreement, ensuring a streamlined supply of germanium for the Belgian company.

This development is particularly significant as global germanium availability has been constrained since China, the world’s leading producer, introduced export controls in August 2023. As a result, China’s germanium exports dropped by 56% year-on-year between January and July 2024, totaling just 15,277 kilograms.

Market Dynamics: Rising Demand and Tight Supply

Germanium, a vital mineral for high-tech industries such as semiconductors, fiber optics, and infrared optics, has seen skyrocketing demand. The supply restrictions, coupled with China’s national stockpiling efforts and reduced feedstock from domestic zinc and lead mines, have caused a global supply crunch. Prices for germanium surged dramatically during the summer of 2024, underscoring the urgency for alternative sources.

The shipment from Gécamines and its collaboration with Umicore signals a shift towards diversified germanium sourcing, which could help stabilize the market. By leveraging its Big Hill reserves, the DRC could emerge as a significant player in the critical minerals sector.