Indonesia NPI Export Exemption Eases Nickel Trade Fears but Leaves Policy Risk

Nickel pig iron

Indonesia NPI export exemption has eased immediate concerns in the nickel market after sources said nickel pig iron will not need to be exported through Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia. The clarification reduces near-term disruption risk for Indonesia’s dominant nickel alloy product.

Indonesia NPI export exemption matters because more than 90% of Indonesia’s nickel-alloy output is nickel pig iron. NPI is mainly used in stainless steel production and forms the backbone of Indonesia’s nickel downstreaming model.

Indonesia NPI export exemption does not remove all uncertainty. Ferro-nickel exports are still expected to be traded through DSI, while the industry lacks an official definition that clearly separates ferro-nickel from NPI.

That ambiguity is important because ferro-nickel and NPI share the same HS code under global and Indonesian trade frameworks. Market participants usually distinguish them by nickel content, with ferro-nickel typically above 20% nickel and NPI usually around 10-14%.

NPI Exclusion Protects Indonesia’s Core Nickel Flow

The exclusion of NPI from the DSI export requirement is commercially significant. NPI is Indonesia’s largest nickel product by volume and a critical feedstock for stainless steelmakers.

If NPI had been included, the rule could have disrupted contracts, pricing, payment flows and export execution across a major share of Indonesia’s nickel industry. That risk has now been reduced, at least for the near term.

The clarification also helps Chinese and regional stainless steel buyers. These customers rely heavily on Indonesian NPI because it offers a cost-effective alternative to pure nickel metal in stainless production.

However, the inclusion of ferro-nickel still matters. A small number of Indonesian smelters produce higher-nickel ferro-nickel, and those exports may now face a more centralised transaction structure through DSI.

The policy could therefore split Indonesia’s nickel alloy market into two regulatory paths. NPI would remain outside the new state export channel, while ferro-nickel would fall under tighter government control.

The risk is classification. Without a formal technical definition, exporters may face uncertainty over which products qualify as NPI and which are treated as ferro-nickel.

Policy Clarity Still Matters for Investment

Indonesia announced on 20 May that exports of key commodities, initially including palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, must be routed through DSI. The aim is to centralise control over strategic commodity exports.

The nickel industry welcomed the NPI clarification, but investors remain cautious. Indonesia’s mining and metals policy has changed frequently, creating uncertainty around timing, scope and implementation.

This matters because downstream nickel projects require large capital commitments. Smelters, matte converters, HPAL plants and battery-material facilities all need stable rules before investors can justify long payback periods.

The DSI rule follows other policy shifts, including changes to ore pricing, royalty plans, export levies and RKAB approval processes. Even when policies support state revenue and downstreaming, sudden changes can raise financing risk.

Indonesia still holds enormous leverage in global nickel. Its dominance in NPI and stainless-linked supply gives Jakarta significant influence over trade flows and pricing.

But policy predictability is now becoming just as important as resource control. If rules change too quickly or remain unclear, investors may delay decisions even when Indonesia remains the strongest nickel platform.

The NPI exemption is therefore a useful correction. But the market still needs formal definitions, clear transaction rules and stable implementation before confidence fully returns.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has reduced immediate nickel disruption by excluding NPI from the DSI export channel. But the ferro-nickel ambiguity shows that policy risk remains embedded in the country’s downstreaming model.

EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal puts ferro-nickel supply at risk

MMG Anglo American

The EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal signals deep concern over European ferro-nickel security and stainless steel costs. Regulators fear the acquisition could divert low-carbon Brazilian ferro-nickel away from EU buyers and tighten an already fragile supply chain. As a result, the EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal sits at the intersection of antitrust, decarbonisation policy and China-related resource security.

EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal and ferro-nickel access

The EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal focuses on Anglo’s Barro Alto and Codemin ferro-nickel complexes in Brazil. These assets supply low-carbon ferro-nickel that European stainless mills increasingly value under upcoming CBAM rules. However, Brussels fears that MMG, controlled by China Minmetals, could redirect tonnages to Chinese or affiliated buyers.

The commission’s initial review found the business holds substantial market power in low-carbon ferro-nickel. European stainless producers have limited alternative options that meet both technical and carbon-intensity requirements. Therefore, any post-merger supply squeeze could raise input costs, compress margins and weaken EU mills against Asian competitors.

Market power, Chinese ownership and rejected remedies

Regulators rejected MMG’s first remedy package, which relied mainly on behavioural commitments and a supply agreement. Officials argued that these measures lacked structural guarantees and could be hard to monitor over time. Meanwhile, European industry groups warned that the deal would deepen Chinese influence over the nickel value chain.

European buyers also link the case to wider CBAM and decarbonisation pressures. They fear losing access to low-carbon ferro-nickel just as carbon costs rise and imports from Asia intensify. As a result, the EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal has become a test case for how Brussels balances open markets with strategic metals security. The commission now has until 20 March to clear, block or condition the acquisition, with possible timeline extensions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU probe MMG Anglo American nickel deal highlights how nickel and ferro-nickel have moved into the heart of Europe’s strategic calculus. Antitrust scrutiny now intertwines with carbon policy and China risk, raising the bar for deals involving critical alloy feedstocks. Stainless producers that rely on low-carbon Brazilian ferro-nickel should prepare contingency sourcing strategies, regardless of the eventual ruling.

Vale nickel furnace expansion reshapes Brazil’s ferro-nickel landscape

Vale

Vale nickel furnace expansion is set to change the balance of ferro-nickel supply in Brazil and beyond. The new unit at Onca Puma adds 15,000 t/yr of capacity and lifts nameplate output by 60pc to 40,000 t/yr. As a result, the operation now stands as Brazil’s largest ferro-nickel producer and a more visible player in global stainless steel and battery supply chains. Vale nickel furnace expansion therefore reinforces the company’s strategic pivot toward higher-value base metals at a time of growing long-term demand for nickel in EVs and energy storage.

Vale nickel furnace expansion supports long-term growth targets

Vale nickel furnace expansion directly underpins the group’s near-term and long-term production targets. The company expects total nickel output to reach 150,000-175,000t this year, and it plans to lift production to 210,000-250,000 t/yr by 2030. This growth will come from additional capacity at Onca Puma and the ongoing ramp-up of underground production at Voisey’s Bay in Canada. Therefore, Vale nickel furnace expansion is part of a broader multi-asset strategy rather than a stand-alone upgrade. At the same time, Vale plans to build inventories ahead of planned maintenance at its Canadian sites, including five weeks of work at the Creighton mine in the third quarter and shorter outages at Thompson and Long Harbour. This pre-emptive stock build should help smooth customer deliveries and protect contractual reliability despite temporary disruptions.

Cost base improves as ferro-nickel capacity scales

Vale’s nickel business is also becoming more competitive as unit economics improve. The company reports global all-in nickel costs of $12,936/t, down from around $15,000/t a year earlier. Lower costs reflect operational efficiencies, better asset utilisation and the scale benefits associated with projects like the Onca Puma expansion. As a result, Vale can withstand periods of weaker nickel prices while still supporting capital spending on strategic growth assets. This cost profile matters for stainless steel mills and battery supply chain customers that are increasingly sensitive to both price and ESG performance when selecting long-term partners. Over time, expanded ferro-nickel capacity in Brazil could provide more diversified supply options for global buyers seeking to reduce dependence on a narrow set of producing regions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Vale nickel furnace expansion at Onca Puma reinforces the company’s position as a core supplier to stainless and future battery markets. The combination of higher nameplate capacity, lower unit costs and diversified production between Brazil and Canada makes Vale a pivotal player in the next phase of nickel supply growth. For downstream consumers, the key question will be how this new capacity interacts with evolving nickel demand from EVs and potential structural oversupply in certain market segments.

China's Ferro-Nickel Imports Surge in September, Bolstered by Indonesian Supply and Stainless Steel Demand

China's Ferro-Nickel

China’s ferro-nickel imports saw a robust recovery in September 2024, fueled by delayed shipments from Indonesia and heightened demand from the domestic stainless steel industry. Imports totaled 737,358 tons, representing a 41% increase from August and a 13% year-on-year rise.

Indonesian Supply Drives Recovery

Shipments from Indonesia nearly doubled month-on-month to 715,030 tons, thanks to increased production from new capacities, including Nadesico Nickel Industry (NNI) and Shuoshi. These facilities have significantly ramped up their operations, contributing to the surge in supply.

• Nadesico Nickel Industry (NNI): A collaboration between Delong, a leading nickel and stainless steel producer, and CNGR, a major Chinese battery material producer. Located in north Morowali, central Sulawesi, NNI has activated six of its planned eight rotary kiln electric furnaces (RKEF), with a production capacity of 80,000 tons per year in nickel metal equivalent. While primarily producing low-grade nickel matte, NNI can switch to ferro-nickel production based on market conditions.

• Shuoshi: A subsidiary of China’s Zhenshi Group, Shuoshi operates 12 RKEF lines in the Huabao Industrial Park, also in Morowali. With a capacity of 120,000 tons per year in nickel metal equivalent, Shuoshi is a significant contributor to Indonesia’s ferro-nickel output.

Year-to-Date Import Trends

From January to September 2024, China’s total ferro-nickel imports reached 6.41 million tons, a 6% increase compared to the same period in 2023. However, this growth is markedly slower than the 46% surge recorded in the previous year, reflecting a combination of factors:

1. Indonesian Restrictions: Indonesia’s regulatory limitations on pyrometallurgy process capacities have constrained supply growth.
2. Stainless Steel Demand Slowdown: China’s stainless steel sector, a key consumer of ferro-nickel, has faced a deceleration in growth, impacting import volumes.

Outlook

The revival of imports in September highlights the resilience of China’s ferro-nickel market amid fluctuating global dynamics. With new production capacities in Indonesia stabilizing, and the potential for further demand from the stainless steel sector, the coming months will determine whether this upward trend can sustain itself.

China’s FeNi and MHP Imports Decline in August, but Nickel Matte Surges

FeNi

China experienced a decline in Ferro-Nickel (FeNi) and mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) imports during August, largely due to shipment delays caused by typhoons. Despite this, the country saw a rise in nickel matte imports, reflecting increased availability of matte with lower nickel content.

Indonesia's Role in Nickel Supply Dominates

In August, China imported 522,315 metric tons of ferro-nickel, marking a significant 36% drop compared to the same period last year and a 43% decline from July. Although imports from other suppliers like New Caledonia, Brazil, and Colombia rose, the drop from Indonesia, China’s largest supplier, was much steeper.

Indonesia continues to dominate China’s nickel supply, providing 95% of nickel pig iron (NPI), 90% of nickel matte, and 80% of MHP imports. Indonesia’s expanding stainless steel output, driven by lower production costs, boosted NPI exports to markets like India, South Korea, Italy, and Germany, further emphasizing Indonesia’s role in the global nickel supply chain.

China’s nickel matte imports surged in August, increasing by 25% from the previous month and by 72% on the year. Much of this rise is attributed to low-nickel matte imports, which have a nickel content of around 20%, compared to high-nickel matte with about 70% nickel content. Low-nickel matte is processed in China to produce higher-value nickel sulphate or nickel cathode.

Imports of nickel matte from Russia also saw notable growth, reaching 5,155 metric tons in August—a year-on-year increase of 18% and a doubling of imports from the previous month.

MHP Imports Drop Despite Lygend Project Growth

Mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) imports dropped by 11% compared to July, totaling 122,272 metric tons in August. This decline was driven by a 15% decrease in Indonesian arrivals, despite an 11% year-on-year rise fueled by the ramp-up of Indonesia’s Lygend project. Market participants are closely watching how these developments will shape future trends in China’s nickel imports.

Europe's Reliance on Nickel Pig Iron to Persist Until CBAM's Full Implementation

ANGLO AMERICAN

Europe’s stainless steel industry will continue to rely heavily on nickel pig iron (NPI) imports until the European Union's carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) enters its definitive phase in 2026. John Eastwood, head of sales for stainless and specialty steel raw materials at Anglo American, confirmed this trend during the Nickel Institute Seminar at LME Week, indicating that Europe’s current scrap shortage and rising material costs have pushed producers to depend on the cheaper, more carbon-intensive Indonesian NPI. According to Jim Lennon, managing director of Red Door Research, from January to July alone, European imports amounted to 10,000 tons of nickel metal content.

The driving factor behind the shift is the increasing cost of raw materials combined with a scarcity of stainless steel scrap in Europe. Even as scrap prices drop, Eastwood does not foresee any immediate changes. He emphasized that only CBAM, the EU's effort to limit carbon leakage, will likely curb this reliance. In its trial phase, CBAM requires European importers to account for CO2 emissions linked to imported goods by purchasing emissions certificates, further affecting the industry’s sourcing strategies.

Industry Facing a Third Year of Decline

The European stainless steel industry continues to struggle. With demand expected to shrink for a third consecutive year in 2025, many flat producers are operating far below capacity. Acerinox, a Spanish producer recovering from a five-month strike, has also committed to using NPI as feedstock. Despite the excess production capacity, profitability isn’t the issue, according to Eastwood. “The problem is excess capacity," he said. Even Acerinox’s market absence barely impacted ferro-nickel sales.

By mid-2025, Eastwood anticipates demand recovery, driven by improved macroeconomic conditions and relaxed monetary policies. However, he highlighted industry criticisms of CBAM, particularly its exclusion of scope 3 emissions and its perceived role as a protectionist policy. "There are many holes in CBAM," Eastwood noted, pointing out inconsistencies such as the inclusion of ferro-nickel but the omission of refined nickel.

Future Projections for Nickel and Freight Costs

Anglo American forecasts the class 1 nickel market to hold surpluses in the coming years, while the class 2 market, including NPI and ferro-nickel, remains balanced or tight. Eastwood predicts stable nickel prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME) through 2025, dismissing any expectations of price spikes. Additionally, high freight costs are likely to limit imports of finished stainless steel into Europe next year, further weighing on the industry.

Indonesia Nickel Pricing Sets Floor and Ceiling as HPAL Costs Rise

Huafei Nickel Cobalt

Indonesia nickel pricing is increasingly defining the global nickel market as ore quotas, benchmark pricing rules and sulphuric acid availability reshape supply economics. UK broker Sucden Financial said Indonesia is now setting both the floor and ceiling for nickel prices.

Indonesia nickel pricing has moved the market away from a simple oversupply story. The key question is no longer only how much nickel Indonesia can produce, but how tightly Jakarta chooses to manage supply.

Indonesia nickel pricing is also becoming more important because HPAL producers face rising costs for ore, sulphur and sulphuric acid. These inputs directly affect mixed hydroxide precipitate production, which feeds battery-grade nickel supply chains.

The London Metal Exchange nickel price settled at $19,500/t on Wednesday, while Sucden said Indonesia’s current policy stance is creating a firmer floor around $18,000/t. But upside may also be capped if higher prices encourage new quota approvals.

Indonesia Turns Ore Policy Into Market Control

Indonesia remains the central force in nickel because it controls the largest source of new supply. In recent years, Indonesian output growth, large exchange stocks and Chinese-linked processing capacity defined the market.

That structure is now changing. Sucden said Indonesia appears focused on supporting prices and discouraging weaker producers, rather than allowing unrestricted supply growth.

The country has reduced 2026 ore quotas by around 30% year on year. It has also revised its domestic benchmark ore pricing system, strengthening the link between ore valuation, contained metals and producer costs.

This policy approach gives Indonesia unusual pricing power. If supply is restricted, the market finds a firmer floor. If prices rise too far, Indonesia can relax quotas and allow more material through the system.

That means nickel’s upside is managed. Sucden warned that the market should become more cautious near $20,000/t, where additional supply approvals and producer hedging could begin to limit further gains.

This is why Indonesia now acts as both support and restraint. It can tighten ore availability to stabilise prices, but it can also prevent a strong rally from damaging downstream competitiveness.

The result is a more policy-driven nickel market. Traditional inventory and demand indicators still matter, but Jakarta’s quota and ore pricing decisions are now central to global price formation.

HPAL Costs Expose Battery Nickel Supply Risk

HPAL production is becoming the second major driver of nickel pricing. Unlike nickel pig iron and ferro-nickel, HPAL is highly dependent on sulphur and sulphuric acid.

This makes battery-grade nickel supply more vulnerable to chemical input availability. HPAL plants need stable acid supply to process limonite ore into MHP, and Indonesia’s inventory buffers are relatively tight.

Huayou’s decision to place half of its Huafei Nickel Cobalt MHP capacity into temporary care and maintenance from 1 May shows how quickly reagent costs can affect production. The company cited elevated sulphur costs and prolonged high operating rates.

The HPAL sector now faces a double squeeze. Ore prices are rising because of Indonesia’s revised pricing framework, while sulphur and sulphuric acid costs are increasing because of tighter chemical supply.

This changes the nickel cost curve. Producers with secure ore, sulphur access and integrated infrastructure can operate more defensively. Those relying on external feedstock or exposed to high reagent prices face greater margin pressure.

The shift also matters for battery supply chains. MHP is a key intermediate for nickel sulphate and other battery chemicals. If HPAL margins weaken, battery-grade nickel output can become less responsive than headline capacity numbers suggest.

Sucden said tighter nearby spreads and higher trading volumes may indicate increased hedging and another shift in market balance. That suggests producers and traders are adjusting to a market where costs and policy now matter more than simple surplus.

Nickel is still not structurally tight like copper. But it is no longer a market where oversupply alone explains price direction. Indonesia’s supply discipline and HPAL cost inflation are giving nickel a stronger base, even if the rally remains capped.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has turned nickel into a managed market where policy controls supply and chemistry controls cost. The winners will be producers with secure ore, acid access and enough balance-sheet strength to survive Jakarta’s tighter discipline.

Record Highs in China's Ferro-Nickel Imports Amid Booming Stainless Steel Industry in 2024

Ferro-Nickel

Surging Demand Drives Unprecedented Import Volumes

In 2024, China's ferro-nickel imports reached a new record, driven by robust demand from its stainless steel mills and alloy producers, particularly those with operations in Indonesia. The total import volume surged to 8.98 million tons, marking a 6.2% increase from the previous year. A significant portion of these imports, amounting to 8.67 million tons, came from Indonesia, reflecting a 9.5% rise over the period.

Indonesian Production Boom Fuels Export Growth

The surge in imports from Indonesia is attributed to new production capacities at companies like Lygend, Nadesico Nickel Industry (NNI), and Shuoshi. These firms have effectively compensated for reduced shipments from other countries such as New Caledonia, Colombia, and Brazil, which saw declines in their export volumes to China by 27%, 0.9%, and 36% respectively.

Strategic Expansion and Technological Advancements in Nickel Production

The expansion in Indonesia includes significant developments like Shuoshi's commissioning of 12 Rotary Kiln Electric Furnaces (RKEF) and NNI's ongoing project, which involves six of eight planned RKEF lines. Moreover, Ningbo Lygend's nickel pig iron (NPI) project showcases substantial production, with its subsidiary HJF already at full capacity since August 2023, and its second phase under construction aiming for completion by 2026. NPI, with its high nickel content, remains crucial for stainless steel manufacturing, underscoring the strategic importance of these expansions.

New Caledonia Nickel Supply Gains Time, Not Certainty

Eramet

New Caledonia nickel supply has moved from crisis toward cautious stabilisation. SLN nickel stabilisation followed fresh state-backed funding and renewed guarantees from Eramet. However, the company has not returned to normal operations. Therefore, New Caledonia nickel supply remains fragile despite short-term relief.

SLN’s restart plan shows progress, but recovery will be slow. Thio, Kouaoua, and Poro are reopening after long disruption. Doniambo is still running at minimum technical capacity. Meanwhile, Poum remains shut until nickel prices improve. That means operational stabilisation does not yet equal strategic recovery.

SLN Nickel Stabilisation Depends on Funding, Grades, and Energy Costs

SLN nickel stabilisation now rests on financial support rather than market strength. A €240mn state-backed bond facility secured operations through 2026. The first tranche already arrived in late December. A second tranche is expected between April and August. As a result, SLN has bought time, not solved its structural weakness.

Ore grade improvement has become the main lever for margin recovery. SLN plans to raise average ore grade to 2.25pc in 2026. That compares with 2.1pc in 2025. Management believes each 0.1-point gain lifts ebitda materially. However, stronger grades cannot remove the energy cost burden.

Energy remains the core competitive problem for New Caledonia nickel supply. SLN still faces structurally high power costs. Indonesian nickel producers operate with lower energy and processing costs. Therefore, SLN remains exposed even if production and grades improve. Profitability targets for 2029-30 still look distant.

Non-Indonesian Nickel Supply Matters More Than Its Volume Suggests

Non-Indonesian nickel supply remains strategically important despite small tonnage. SLN’s ferro-nickel output rose to about 36,000t in 2025. Its 2026 target stands at 43,000t. Those volumes are modest globally. However, they matter for Pacific balance and diversified alloy supply chains.

The broader nickel market still looks oversupplied, but that headline hides deeper risk. High-cost producers outside Indonesia now survive mainly through public support. They cannot respond flexibly to future demand changes. Consequently, the market may face sharper disruptions in later cycles.

The Metalnomist Commentary

SLN’s stabilisation shows that non-Indonesian nickel supply now depends as much on policy as on geology. Global nickel oversupply has not removed strategic fragility. It has simply shifted the burden onto governments supporting diversity outside Indonesia.

Eramet Weda Bay Nickel Faces Care and Maintenance Risk as RKAB Quota Tightens

Eramet - Nickel

Eramet Weda Bay nickel operations face a potential care and maintenance move in May after Indonesia approved a sharply reduced 2026 nickel ore quota. The French mining group said PT Weda Bay Nickel received an initial RKAB permit covering only 12mn wet metric tonnes of nickel ore production and sales.

The Eramet Weda Bay nickel quota is more than 70% below last year’s authorised level. PT WBN initially received 32mn wmt in 2025, later revised up to 42mn wmt.

Eramet has requested an upward revision to the 2026 permit. The company said the current quota will be exhausted by the middle of next month, making the permit decision the most important near-term issue for its nickel business.

The initial 12mn wmt permit includes 3mn wmt for internal use. This leaves Eramet’s external sales target at only 9mn wmt for 2026, well below the level implied by the mine’s operating capacity.

Indonesia’s RKAB Limits Threaten Ore Supply and NPI Continuity

PT Weda Bay Nickel is preparing to enter care and maintenance if the quota is not increased. Eramet said its nickel pig iron plant will continue operating using ore stocks, but the mining restriction creates clear supply risk.

The permit issue matters because Weda Bay is a key ore supplier inside Indonesia’s nickel ecosystem. Its saprolite ore supports nickel pig iron and stainless steel production, while limonite ore feeds high-pressure acid leach plants producing battery intermediates.

PT WBN delivered strong first-quarter output before the quota risk escalated. Marketable nickel ore production rose by 10% on the year to 10mn wmt.

External ore sales climbed by 54% to 8.3mn wmt. Saprolite sales increased by 27% to 4.8mn wmt, while limonite sales jumped by 118% to 3.6mn wmt.

The limonite increase was driven by stronger demand from HPAL plants at the Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park. Internal ore consumption for Eramet’s NPI plant was 1mn wmt during the quarter.

Strong sales partly reflected a weak comparison with early 2025, when IWIP plants were destocking after ending 2024 with high inventories. Still, the result shows that downstream demand remains firm.

PT WBN also continued to benefit from premiums of more than 100% above Indonesia’s benchmark floor price for high-grade saprolite. This reflected tight domestic ore supply and stronger competition for available material.

Nickel Market Rebalancing Depends on Permits, Sulphur and Ore Costs

Eramet’s nickel ferro-alloy production was broadly stable in the first quarter. Output reached 9,000t of nickel, down only 1% from a year earlier.

Adjusted nickel turnover, excluding New Caledonia’s Societe Le Nickel, rose by 43% to €163mn. Eramet’s share of PT WBN turnover, excluding its offtake contract, increased by 59% to €116mn.

The company said first-quarter market conditions were supportive. The average London Metal Exchange nickel price rose by 12% on the year to $17,362/t, driven partly by uncertainty over Indonesian ore supply.

Global primary nickel demand rose by 3% to 900,000t in the first quarter. Stainless steel, batteries and aerospace supported consumption.

Global primary nickel production fell by 3%, although the market remained in a modest surplus. Eramet said the nickel market could gradually rebalance over the rest of the year.

Restricted Indonesian mine permits are one reason. Sulphur supply problems are another, because they are raising costs for HPAL producers that depend on sulphuric acid or sulphur feedstock.

PT WBN’s production costs are expected to rise from 2025 levels. Eramet cited authorised volume limits, mining plan adjustments and higher fuel prices.

Indonesia’s revised mineral benchmark formula could also reshape ore economics. The formula, effective from mid-April, now includes cobalt and other contained metals in ore valuation.

This change could increase costs for HPAL feedstock and alter the economics of limonite supply. It also strengthens the government’s ability to capture more value from contained metals in nickel ore.

For Eramet Weda Bay nickel operations, the quota decision will determine whether strong first-quarter performance can continue. Without a higher RKAB, the mine faces a sudden operating constraint despite firm downstream demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Eramet Weda Bay nickel is becoming a test case for Indonesia’s tighter control over ore supply. If the RKAB quota is not revised, the impact will reach beyond one mine and reinforce cost pressure across NPI, HPAL and battery-linked nickel supply chains.

Indonesia Carbon Market CBAM Strategy Targets Green Nickel and Stainless Steel Future

Indonesia Carbon

Indonesia is accelerating its carbon market development in coordination with the European Union ahead of the 2026 CBAM rollout. The Indonesia carbon market CBAM strategy aims to help domestic producers avoid punitive tariffs by establishing a mandatory emissions trading system (ETS) and promoting decarbonization.

ETS and Green Industrial Strategy in Development

Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry is working with the European Commission to design a carbon market aligned with the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). According to Apit Pria Nugraha, Head of the Centre for Green Industry, the goal is to use carbon credits to offset CBAM tariffs for sectors like stainless steel. Although nickel is not directly included in the CBAM, it faces indirect exposure through downstream products.

Indonesia is upgrading furnaces, enhancing ESG standards, and preparing export-focused green incentives. These include preferential treatment for certified green products and financing tools to support innovation. Nugraha emphasized that companies meeting CBAM and ESG targets early will benefit from price premiums and stronger global partnerships.

Nickel Industry Prepares for ESG-Driven Market Shift

Indonesia’s nickel sector, vital to the EV battery supply chain, is adapting quickly to ESG scrutiny. Nickel Industries, a major producer, announced plans to reduce its carbon footprint by deploying solar power and heat recovery systems in high-pressure acid leaching operations. The company’s carbon intensity is projected at 6.97 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne of nickel, nearly half the industry average.

M. Muchtazar, Head of Sustainability at Nickel Industries, noted that ESG is now a top competitive factor. Compliance with EU carbon regulations is no longer optional as automakers demand cleaner supply chains for EV materials.

CBAM to Reshape Global Trade Dynamics

CBAM will act as a de facto import tariff on high-emission goods entering the EU. Simon Goess of Carboneer estimated that importers of 85,000 tonnes of pig iron, ferro-nickel, and crude steel could face up to €40 million in charges by 2034. As CBAM expands to include Class 1 nickel and indirect emissions, producers must lower carbon intensity to remain globally competitive.

Nugraha concluded that “green nickel” is more than a buzzword—it’s a strategic imperative for Indonesia’s industrial future.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s proactive stance on carbon pricing and ESG compliance signals a significant policy shift. By integrating CBAM-aligned mechanisms and promoting low-carbon nickel, Indonesia positions itself as a preferred supplier in the evolving global metals supply chain.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

EU sets ferro-alloy, stainless steel CBAM benchmarks for 2026–2030 imports

CBAM, Stainless Steel

The European Union sets ferro-alloy, stainless steel CBAM benchmarks to shape 2026 import liabilities. EU sets ferro-alloy, stainless steel CBAM benchmarks using provisional values tied to production periods. As a result, importers can estimate deductions from free allocation benchmarks once charges begin in 2026.

The provisional benchmark reduces CBAM liability by deducting a free-emissions allocation. Meanwhile, the draft applies charges only to direct process emissions at first. It excludes energy-source emissions from the early ferro-alloy and steel scope.

The draft splits ferro-alloy benchmarks into 2026–2027 and 2028–2030 values. Therefore, suppliers face a tightening standard after 2027. EU sets ferro-alloy, stainless steel CBAM benchmarks with lower values in 2028–2030.

Ferro-alloy benchmarks tighten after 2027 across key products

Ferro-chrome receives a benchmark of 2.005 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2027. It then drops to 1.881 tCO2 per tonne for 2028–2030. Meanwhile, the draft applies the same values across low- and high-carbon ferro-chrome classes.

Ferro-manganese receives a benchmark of 1.397 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2027. It then falls to 1.31 tCO2 per tonne for 2028–2030. Therefore, exporters must document process efficiency to protect netbacks.

Ferro-nickel carries the highest benchmark among the listed ferro-alloys. It starts at 3.376 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2027. It then declines to 3.167 tCO2 per tonne for 2028–2030.

Stainless steel benchmarks add defaults and a process-data option

Stainless steel receives more benchmark values because products vary widely. Cold-rolled stainless flat products carry a default of 2.152 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2027. The default drops to 2.047 tCO2 per tonne for 2028–2030.

Hot-rolled stainless flat products carry a default of 2.021 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2027. The default drops to 1.92 tCO2 per tonne for 2028–2030. Meanwhile, the draft adds process-related benchmarks when importers provide verified actual data.

Cold-rolled stainless adds a process-related benchmark of 0.165 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2030. Hot-rolled stainless adds a process-related benchmark of 0.11 tCO2 per tonne for 2026–2030. Therefore, strong measurement and reporting can lower default exposure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

These benchmarks will reward producers that can prove direct emissions with audited data. Meanwhile, stainless importers will gain leverage by replacing defaults with verified process figures. Therefore, exporters should invest now in MRV systems and product-level carbon accounting.

Glencore Copper Production Rises as DRC Cobalt Quota Reshapes Output Priorities

Glencore

Glencore copper production rose sharply in the first quarter as higher grades at its African copper mines and stronger throughput at Antamina lifted output. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group produced 199,600t of copper, up 19% from a year earlier.

Glencore copper production growth contrasts with a steep fall in cobalt output. Own-sourced cobalt production dropped by 39% to 5,800t, mainly because the Democratic Republic of Congo’s export quota system has changed how producers manage shipments and mine planning.

Glencore copper production is now becoming more important inside its DRC asset base because cobalt export limits have made copper the clearer operating priority. This shift shows how state policy can directly reshape output behaviour in multi-metal mining systems.

The company maintained full-year production guidance for copper, nickel and zinc, despite weaker output in several other metals. Copper guidance remains at 810,000-870,000t for the year.

DRC Quota System Pushes Cobalt Lower

The sharp fall in cobalt output reflects the DRC’s quota system, introduced after the country moved away from its earlier export ban framework. The system capped shipments and set annual limits for 2026-27, with an additional strategic pool.

For Glencore, the practical effect is clear. Its DRC assets are now prioritising copper production because copper can move through the market with fewer quota-related constraints.

This matters for battery and superalloy supply chains. The DRC remains the world’s dominant source of mined cobalt, so export policy can quickly affect availability, pricing and producer behaviour.

Cobalt is not produced in isolation at many Congolese operations. It is often linked to copper mining, which means policy limits on cobalt can influence mine sequencing, processing priorities and inventory decisions.

The first-quarter numbers therefore point to a more managed cobalt market. Supply is not only a function of ore grades and plant capacity. It is increasingly controlled by export approvals, quotas and state strategy.

Copper benefited from stronger grades at African operations and higher throughput at Antamina in Peru. That performance reinforces copper’s stronger strategic position at a time when demand from grids, electrification, industrial policy and data centres continues to attract market attention.

Nickel, Zinc and Ferro-Chrome Show Operational Pressure

Glencore’s nickel output fell by 9% to 17,200t. The decline was caused by a furnace disruption at the Sudbury complex in Canada, which affected matte shipment timing to Norway.

Nickel guidance remained unchanged at 70,000-80,000t. This suggests Glencore sees the first-quarter weakness as manageable rather than a full-year supply reset.

Zinc output fell by 17% to 176,900t. The decline was mainly linked to the closure of the Lady Loretta mine in Australia and lower output from Kazzinc in Kazakhstan.

Zinc guidance also remained unchanged at 700,000-740,000t. However, the first-quarter result shows how mine closures and regional production issues can still weigh on quarterly availability.

Ferro-chrome output collapsed by 95% to 13,000t because of continued care and maintenance at Glencore’s chrome smelting operations and the phased restart of the Lion Smelter in South Africa.

South African ferro-chrome remains under pressure from high energy prices and competition from lower-cost Chinese material. This has forced output cuts at major producers and weakened South Africa’s position in global ferro-alloy supply.

Glencore’s vanadium pentoxide production rose by 5% to 2,300t, offering a small positive signal in another strategic alloy material.

Overall, the quarter shows a company benefiting from copper strength while managing policy and cost pressures across cobalt, nickel, zinc and ferro-chrome. The most important signal is that copper and cobalt are now being shaped by very different forces: copper by grade and throughput, cobalt by DRC export control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Glencore’s results show how government policy can be as powerful as geology in multi-metal supply chains. The DRC cobalt quota is not only reducing cobalt output; it is pushing producers to prioritise copper in one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Glencore's 3Q Metals Output: Copper, Zinc, and Cobalt Decline, Ferro-Chrome Surges

Glencore

Global mining giant Glencore reported a mixed performance in its base metals production for the third quarter of 2024. While the company saw a decline in the output of several key metals, its ferro-chrome production experienced a sharp rise.

Base Metals Production Declines

• Copper: Glencore produced 242,600 tonnes of refined copper in Q3 2024, marking a 2% decline compared to the same quarter last year. This brings the total for January-September 2024 to 705,200 tonnes, down 4% year-on-year, though the decrease was somewhat mitigated by the sale of the Cobar mine in Australia in June 2023.

• Cobalt: Cobalt production also saw a 2% decline in Q3, totaling 10,600 tonnes. For January-September 2024, the total cobalt output fell by 18% to 26,500 tonnes, primarily due to reduced run rates at the Mutanda mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which adjusted operations in response to the challenging cobalt pricing environment.

• Zinc: Zinc output decreased by 5% to 226,400 tonnes in Q3, and by 4% for the January-September period. Contributing to the decline was lower output from the Antamina mine in Peru, caused by mining sequences with lower zinc grades and higher copper grades, as well as operational disruptions due to a tropical cyclone at the McArthur River operation in Australia.

• Nickel: Glencore's nickel production also saw a significant decrease of 18% to 18,100 tonnes in Q3. This was primarily driven by the transition of the Koniambo operation in New Caledonia into care and maintenance starting in February 2024. Despite a slight increase in output from the Murrin Murrin mine in Australia, total nickel production for January-September 2024 fell 9% year-on-year to 62,300 tonnes.

Ferro-Chrome Production Surge

In a positive development, Glencore's ferro-chrome production surged by 89% in Q3 2024, reaching 295,000 tonnes. This helped bring the total for January-September to 894,000 tonnes, up 2% compared to the same period in 2023. This increase is especially notable after a 16% decline in ferro-chrome production during the first half of 2024, attributed to the continued idling of the Rustenburg smelter. Glencore did not specify whether the surge in Q3 ferro-chrome production was due to the restart of the Rustenburg smelter, but the company indicated that higher production rates and fewer offline days at its other smelter complexes in South Africa may have contributed to the positive results.

India’s JSL Proposes Zero Import Duty on Critical Raw Materials to Strengthen Domestic Steel Industry

Jindal Stainless Steel

Jindal Stainless Steel Calls for Reduced Import Duties on Molybdenum and Other Key Materials

Jindal Stainless Steel (JSL), a major Indian steelmaker, has proposed that the Indian government eliminate import duties on essential raw materials like molybdenum ore. Currently, ferro-molybdenum imports face a 5% duty. The proposal, made by JSL’s managing director, Abhyuday Jindal, comes ahead of India’s budget announcement on February 1 for the 2025-2026 fiscal year. Along with molybdenum ore, JSL recommends maintaining zero duties on other materials such as pure nickel, ferro-nickel, stainless steel scrap, and mild steel.

Boosting India’s Infrastructure and Stainless Steel Production

JSL’s proposal also calls for continued government focus on infrastructure spending, particularly in areas like inland waterways, rail infrastructure, and coastal shipping. This, Jindal argues, will support the stainless steel industry by improving operational efficiency and ensuring competitive raw material prices. Additionally, the Indian Stainless Steel Development Association (ISSDA) supports reducing customs duties on graphite electrodes and charge chrome to zero, which would further enhance industry operations.

However, to protect against cheap stainless steel imports, JSL suggests raising the basic customs duty on stainless steel products to 15% for countries outside of free trade agreements. This measure, JSL believes, would safeguard India’s domestic stainless steel market and contribute to the country’s Viksit Bharat 2047 vision.

Europe Faces Deindustrialization Crisis Amidst Unfair Competition and Policy Struggles

Aperam

Europe’s stainless steel industry is at a critical crossroads, facing existential challenges due to high raw material costs and increasing competition from Asian producers. According to Timoteo di Maulo, CEO of Aperam, the European sector is particularly vulnerable due to its reliance on more expensive, environmentally-friendly processes, while Asian producers benefit from cheaper, carbon-intensive nickel pig iron (NPI). Speaking at the SMR International and Special Steels Conference in Rome, di Maulo warned, “Europe will die if it cannot create a level playing field,” likening the current situation to playing European football against American football, a game neither possible nor fair.

Stainless Steel Demand Decline and Unequal Standards

Market data from SMR revealed that real stainless steel demand in Europe is expected to fall by 6% in 2024, following a decline of 3% in 2022 and 8% in 2023. The gap in production methods between Europe and Asian competitors is widening, as Indian and Chinese producers are not required to use high scrap ratios, giving them a distinct cost advantage. European steelmakers, driven by stringent EU decarbonization policies, are forced to use higher-priced scrap, further straining the industry's competitiveness.

Di Maulo emphasized that while both Europe and Asia rely on ferro-nickel and NPI, European producers face additional financial burdens that threaten the industry’s long-term viability. The decarbonization measures that Europe imposes on its steelmakers are not mirrored in Asia, where efforts to reduce carbon emissions fall short of European standards.

The situation is compounded by the upcoming European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), set to take effect in 2026. Di Maulo described CBAM as an experimental policy that risks accelerating deindustrialization by limiting raw material imports while incentivizing the import of finished goods. Other industry leaders echoed these concerns, warning that CBAM, conceived as a tax but transformed into a green policy tool, is impractical and will further weaken Europe's position in global trade.

Industry Leaders Call for Pragmatic Solutions

At the same conference, Indian producer Jindal Stainless highlighted India’s dependence on NPI due to rapid industrial growth and a shortage of scrap metal. Ratan Jindal, chairman of the company, pointed out that proposed restrictions on scrap imports, such as the EU Waste Shipment Regulation, will only exacerbate this issue.

The consensus among European stainless steel executives is that CBAM, as it currently stands, is deeply flawed. Spanish producer Acerinox’s CEO, Bernardo Velazquez, stressed the difficulty of applying CBAM uniformly across Europe due to differing national tax systems. Italian steelmaker Marcegaglia’s CEO, Antonio Marcegaglia, criticized CBAM for being limited to early stages of the production cycle and for failing to address the broader economic realities of the stainless steel industry. Dimitri Menecali of Arvedi AST added that without addressing Scope 3 emissions—those created further down the supply chain—CBAM would not effectively promote sustainability.

The industry is calling for more coordinated policies and international alliances to ensure Europe's stainless steel sector remains competitive. As di Maulo stated, “There is a role for industrialization in Europe, in innovation, high performance, and service-oriented materials.”

Glencore Q1 Cobalt and Copper Production Shows Divergent Trends in Volatile Market

Cobalt

Cobalt Output Soars While Copper and Nickel Face Steep Declines

Glencore Q1 cobalt and copper production revealed mixed results, highlighting the challenges of commodity volatility and mine-specific dynamics. The company’s cobalt output surged 44% year-on-year to 9,500 tonnes, driven by improved grades at its Mutanda mine in the DRC. In contrast, copper production dropped 30% to 167,900 tonnes due to lower grades and recovery rates at Chilean operations like Collahuasi and Antapaccay.

Zinc Rises, Nickel and Ferro-Chrome Falter

Meanwhile, nickel production fell 21% to 18,800 tonnes, largely due to the Koniambo mine transition in New Caledonia. On the positive side, zinc production rose 4% to 213,600 tonnes, supported by strong output from Antamina in Peru and Australian operations. Ferro-chrome production declined 7%, with Glencore citing market-driven management decisions and high energy costs in South Africa.

Cobalt Supply Tightness and Copper Recovery Outlook

The Q1 performance positions Glencore to benefit from tight cobalt supply, especially following the DRC’s export suspension that lifted China’s cobalt hydroxide prices. However, copper’s poor start may weigh on H1 earnings, though CEO Gary Nagle anticipates a rebound in output later in the year. Glencore maintained full-year guidance for all core metals, signaling confidence in operational recovery despite short-term setbacks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The latest Glencore Q1 cobalt and copper production figures reflect a market caught between supply shocks and operational setbacks. While cobalt shows strength amid geopolitical friction, copper’s rebound will be crucial for sustaining Glencore’s broader portfolio performance in 2024.

India Waives Duties on Critical Minerals in 2024-25 Budget

In a strategic move to bolster key industrial sectors, India has announced the reduction or elimination of custom duties on 25 critical minerals, including lithium, copper, cobalt, and rare earths. However, the government will maintain its tax on copper scrap. This announcement was made by India's finance minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, during her 2024-25 fiscal year budget speech.

The full list of the 25 critical minerals has not been disclosed, but these minerals are deemed essential for industries such as nuclear energy, renewable energy, space, defense, telecommunications, and high-tech electronics. Of these 25 minerals, 23 will be fully exempt from custom duties, while the remaining two will see a reduction in duties.

Additionally, India is launching a critical mineral mission to strengthen the supply chain for these essential minerals, encouraging both private and public sectors to enhance their long-term competitiveness.

The budget also includes significant reductions in customs duties on precious metals. Duties on gold and silver have been lowered to 6%, and platinum to 6.4%. Furthermore, the basic customs duty on ferro-nickel, crucial for stainless steel production, has been waived to improve domestic production efficiency.

The duty on copper scrap remains at 2.5%, but the duty on blister copper has been reduced to zero from 2.5%. This measure aims to support the domestic copper industry by lowering import costs.

In its efforts to support environmental goals, the government has continued the zero customs duty on ferrous scrap and nickel cathode, aligning with its commitment to achieving net-zero carbon emissions. A new carbon market will also be established to aid the steel and cement sectors in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. The government plans to launch this domestic compliance carbon market by the end of the year to help industries meet their emissions intensity targets.

Glencore's Base Metals and Cobalt Output Dips in 2024

Glencore

Glencore's 2024 production of copper, zinc, and cobalt saw slight declines, while nickel production experienced a more significant drop. Ferro-chrome output remained relatively stable.

Copper, Zinc, and Cobalt Production Declines

Glencore's copper output fell 6pc to 951,600t, hitting the lower end of its guidance. This decline resulted from planned lower production at Antapaccay and Collahuasi, alongside unplanned downtime and reduced grades at KCC. Zinc production decreased 1pc to 905,000t, primarily due to lower Antamina output. This was partially offset by increased production at Zhairem. Cobalt production dropped 8pc to 38,200t, attributed to expected lower grades at Mutanda.

Nickel Production Significantly Reduced

Nickel production saw a 16pc decrease to 82,300t. This was largely due to the Konaimbo operation transitioning to care and maintenance. Higher production at Murrin Murrin partially mitigated the impact. Ferro-chrome production remained nearly unchanged, with a slight increase to 1.2mn t. Glencore will provide its 2025 production guidance on February 19th.