EU-India FTA Could Improve Indian Aluminium Access, but CBAM Still Limits the Upside

Hindalco Industries

The EU-India FTA could improve the position of Indian aluminium suppliers in Europe. The deal would reduce EU tariffs on Indian base metal imports to zero from 10pc. That change could give Indian aluminium exports a stronger commercial opening. As a result, the EU-India FTA may improve competitiveness for producers such as Hindalco and Vedanta.

The tariff change matters because Indian suppliers have faced a clear disadvantage in Europe. Duty-free suppliers such as Norway, Iceland, and Canada already held an edge. Removing the tariff could narrow that gap. Therefore, Indian aluminium suppliers may enter the EU market on more equal terms.

However, the agreement does not remove every barrier. EU CBAM will still apply to imported goods, even after the tariff cut. That means carbon costs will remain a major factor in future trade economics. Consequently, the EU-India FTA improves access, but does not create a fully open market.

Indian Aluminium Exports Could Gain on Tariffs but Still Face Carbon Pressure

Indian aluminium exports could benefit immediately from lower tariff friction. Price-sensitive buyers in Europe may find Indian material more attractive under a zero-duty regime. That could support better trade flows from India to the EU. Meanwhile, producers are still waiting for final clarity on aluminium in the completed legal text.

CBAM remains the deeper long-term issue. The European Commission has already confirmed that the FTA offers no exemption from the carbon border measure. Importers will still face carbon-related obligations under EU climate policy. Therefore, Indian aluminium suppliers must think beyond tariffs and prepare for emissions competitiveness.

This is why industry optimism remains cautious rather than aggressive. Lower tariffs help, but they do not neutralize non-tariff costs. A trader in the article described CBAM as a continuing trade barrier. As a result, the full commercial benefit of the EU-India FTA may prove smaller than the headline suggests.

EU-India FTA Arrives as Indian Aluminium Exports to Europe Have Already Declined

Indian aluminium exports to the EU have already weakened in recent years. Rising domestic demand in India has reduced export availability. Lower export incentives have also weighed on overseas shipments. Therefore, the industry is entering this trade opportunity from a lower export base.

The recent numbers show that decline clearly. India’s primary aluminium exports to the EU fell sharply in 2024 from the previous year. Shipments in January to November 2025 also remained subdued. Consequently, the EU-India FTA may help stabilise exports first before driving a major surge.

The real opportunity will depend on how Indian producers balance three pressures. They must manage domestic demand, EU carbon costs, and international price competition. Tariff relief helps with one of those problems. However, it does not solve the other two. Therefore, Indian aluminium suppliers may gain an edge, but only within tighter structural limits.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal improves trade access, but it does not remove the real future test. European aluminium trade will increasingly depend on carbon performance as much as tariff policy. For Indian suppliers, the EU-India FTA is helpful, but CBAM will still decide who wins long term.

CBAM Certificate Price Starts Reshaping EU Import Costs Across Fertiliser and Steel

CBAM Reshapes EU Fertiliser Import Economics

CBAM certificate price implementation is beginning to reshape EU import economics across carbon-intensive sectors, with fertilisers and steel showing the clearest early signs of disruption. The European Commission set the first-quarter 2026 CBAM certificate price at €75.36/t of CO2 equivalent, turning the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism into a measurable cost for importers.

The impact is uneven because each product carries a different embedded-emissions burden and a different ability to absorb added carbon costs. Urea imports remained workable in the first quarter, while calcium ammonium nitrate and urea ammonium nitrate became much harder to justify. Steel imports also faced pressure as default emissions values strengthened the relative competitiveness of EU-produced material.

CBAM certificate price exposure was partly delayed by heavy pre-buying in 2025. Many importers entered 2026 with inventories, which blunted the immediate effect of the mechanism. However, as stocks run down and EU free allocations begin to decline, CBAM is moving from a compliance issue into a commercial constraint.

The first quarter therefore marked an important transition. CBAM did not stop all imports. Instead, it began sorting the market between products, origins and suppliers that can manage carbon costs and those that cannot.

Fertiliser Imports Show How CBAM Separates Viable and Unviable Products

Fertiliser markets provided the clearest example of CBAM’s uneven effect. Urea imports continued because the additional carbon cost remained relatively small compared with delivered market prices.

Egyptian urea carried a default CBAM charge of €39.52/t in January-March. That represented roughly 5% of French urea prices by the end of March. Default costs for other major origins, including Algeria, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Nigeria, ranged around €41-53/t.

These charges were manageable for traders because urea prices rose sharply during the quarter. The Middle East conflict lifted French urea prices by 45% between late February and the end of March, reducing the relative weight of CBAM in total delivered costs.

As a result, urea continued moving into the EU, especially in March. European buyers returned to the market ahead of the spring application season, and higher global prices made the CBAM burden easier to absorb.

Nitrate products faced a very different outcome. Calcium ammonium nitrate imports were largely priced out because default CBAM costs reached €105-119/t across major exporting origins. That equalled roughly a quarter of prevailing German CAN prices.

This cost level made non-EU CAN structurally uncompetitive. Importers could not easily pass through the additional carbon cost without losing competitiveness against EU-produced material.

Urea ammonium nitrate faced similar pressure. Default CBAM charges started at €62.16/t for Trinidad and Tobago material and reached €86.52/t for US-origin product. By the end of March, these costs represented up to 20% of French UAN prices.

The economics became even harder when existing EU anti-dumping duties were added. Traders viewed imports from these origins as effectively unworkable under the combined burden of duties and CBAM.

Phosphate-based fertilisers were less exposed. Moroccan diammonium phosphate, a key EU import product, carried an additional charge of only €16.19/t in the first quarter. That equalled about 2% of delivered prices in northwest Europe.

Moroccan NPK 15-15-15 faced a larger default cost of €53.36/t, or around 10% of Belgian prices. But traders still described that burden as manageable. This means CBAM narrowed product choice rather than cutting fertiliser imports across the board.

The fertiliser market therefore shows CBAM’s real mechanism. It does not apply uniform pressure. It changes competitiveness product by product, depending on emissions intensity, delivered price, existing duties and the ability to provide certified actual emissions data.

CBAM Turns Steel Imports Into a Trade Filter

Steel, EUA Volatility and Default Values Turn CBAM Into a Trade Filter

Steel markets showed a different but equally important effect. CBAM reinforced the cost advantage of EU-produced steel by making imported material more expensive under default emissions values.

Hot-rolled coil import offers into the EU rose through January-March. The increase reflected higher production costs at mills and rising freight rates. However, fewer delivered-duty-paid offers were seen because traders were also preparing for changes to EU safeguard measures.

Much of the steel sold on a delivered basis came from existing stock. This delayed the full pass-through of higher import costs into market transactions. But market participants broadly agreed that importing steel under default emissions values was economically difficult for most origins.

Brazil was cited as one limited exception, but most imported steel faced a structural disadvantage. This is important because steel has high embedded emissions and large delivered price sensitivity. Even a moderate carbon cost can change the landed-cost calculation.

Certified actual emissions data will become critical. Suppliers that can prove lower embedded emissions may preserve access to EU buyers. Suppliers relying on default values may find their products increasingly uncompetitive.

CBAM is therefore beginning to act as a trade filter. It rewards verified lower-carbon production and penalises imports that lack transparent emissions data. This could gradually shift EU import flows toward suppliers with stronger measurement, reporting and verification systems.

The EU emissions trading system added another layer of complexity. The Commission calculates the CBAM certificate price from the weighted average of primary EU ETS auction clearing prices. These auction prices are closely linked to secondary-market prices for EU allowances.

EUA prices were volatile in the first quarter. Structural tightening supported prices early in the period, including a 4.3% reduction in the ETS cap for 2026, the removal of 27mn allowances and a further 52mn cut linked to expanded maritime coverage.

Demand from maritime and aviation sectors also increased as those sectors moved into full ETS coverage. At the same time, some companies handling CBAM-covered goods began buying EUAs as a proxy hedge for future CBAM exposure.

However, political risk weakened the bullish case in February. Senior figures in key EU member states questioned the future of the ETS and called for reforms or even temporary suspension to reduce pressure on industry. Investment funds responded by cutting long positions, pushing prices lower.

The US-Iran war then added another source of volatility. The conflict created renewed energy price stress and revived political calls for ETS intervention. Although the Commission rejected suspension of the scheme, it acknowledged the need for reform, keeping regulatory uncertainty high.

This matters for importers because CBAM certificates cannot be traded or resold. Companies can use EUAs as a proxy hedge, but the hedge is imperfect because CBAM costs are tied to primary auction prices, not directly to tradable CBAM certificates.

The first quarter therefore exposed a new risk-management problem. Importers must now manage commodity prices, freight, duties, safeguard rules, emissions verification, EUA volatility and CBAM certificate exposure at the same time.

The outlook points to stronger pressure through 2026. Maritime and aviation demand will keep adding to ETS coverage. The linear reduction factor will keep shrinking the cap. Free allocations will continue to decline. Inventories built before CBAM will continue to unwind.

At the same time, the Market Stability Reserve and the upcoming ETS review could limit extreme price spikes or change market expectations. This means CBAM costs are likely to become more visible, but the exact price path remains exposed to policy risk.

For fertiliser and steel importers, the direction is already clear. Products with manageable carbon costs and strong emissions documentation will keep moving. Products with high default emissions, existing duties or weak verification will face higher barriers into the EU market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CBAM is becoming an industrial trade policy tool, not only a climate mechanism. The first-quarter data show that carbon costs are starting to decide which products can enter the EU competitively, and which supply chains must either decarbonise, verify emissions or lose market access.

EU Mexico Trade Agreement Opens Clean Tech and Critical Materials Opportunities

EU, Mexico

EU Mexico trade agreement signing marks a major update to a commercial relationship already worth around €100bn/yr in goods and services. The revised deal aims to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers while creating new opportunities in clean technology, critical raw materials and agri-food trade.

EU Mexico trade agreement provisions will eliminate almost all high Mexican tariffs on EU imports. The affected sectors include machinery, mineral fuels, cars, car parts and a wide range of agri-food products.

EU Mexico trade agreement rules also include legally binding commitments on environmental protection and climate change. This gives the deal a strategic industrial angle beyond conventional tariff reduction.

The interim trade agreement is expected to move faster than the wider modernised global agreement. It needs European Parliament approval and qualified-majority approval from EU member states, rather than ratification by all 27 countries.

Clean Technology and Raw Materials Gain Strategic Relevance

The agreement could strengthen EU-Mexico cooperation in clean technology and critical raw materials. This matters as Europe seeks more diversified supply chains for energy transition equipment, electric vehicles, industrial machinery and advanced manufacturing.

Mexico is already a major manufacturing base linked to North American automotive and industrial supply chains. Better EU access could support machinery, components and clean technology exports into a market positioned between Europe and the US.

The deal also includes strict rules of origin, including for electric vehicles. EU officials said these rules are designed to prevent circumvention and avoid the agreement becoming a backdoor for Chinese production.

That detail is important. As tariffs, subsidies and local-content rules reshape global EV trade, rules of origin are becoming a core tool of industrial policy.

For European manufacturers, clearer access to Mexico may support exports of vehicles, parts, machinery and clean technology systems. For Mexican producers, greater access to the EU could strengthen trade in food, consumer products and selected industrial goods.

Tariff Cuts Combine With Climate and Circular Economy Commitments

Mexico will remove tariffs on key European exports including pork, dairy, cereals, fruit and pasta. Sensitive products will receive limited access through tariff-rate quotas.

The agreement also gives EU exporters broader quota access for dairy, beef, poultry and pork products. In return, Mexican producers will gain more liberalised access to the EU for products including coffee, fruit, chocolate and agave syrup.

Alongside the trade deal, both sides signed a circular economy declaration covering climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, including plastics. This adds sustainability language to the commercial framework.

The agreement requires both parties to uphold international climate treaties, including the Paris Agreement. It also includes a dedicated dispute settlement procedure.

For metals and industrial supply chains, the wider message is clear. Trade agreements are increasingly combining market access, climate obligations, origin rules and supply-chain security.

The EU is using trade policy to support clean technology, critical raw materials cooperation and industrial competitiveness. Mexico gains deeper access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets while strengthening its role in global manufacturing networks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-Mexico deal shows how trade policy is becoming a supply-chain security instrument. The rules of origin for electric vehicles may prove as important as the tariff cuts, especially as Europe tries to protect clean technology markets from indirect Chinese competition.

EU Steel Industry Faces Key Policy Shifts: A Call for Concrete Measures

EU Steel

The mood among European policy makers regarding the steel industry has notably shifted, with increasing support for the sector’s future. According to Axel Eggert, director-general of Eurofer, the European steel industry association, policymakers are beginning to recognize the importance of addressing the growing challenges in global steel production. However, while this shift in mood is encouraging, Eggert emphasized that these positive words must be followed by tangible actions.

Rising Political Support for EU Steel Industry

Eggert pointed out that there is more political backing for the European steel sector, especially as lawmakers become increasingly aware of the massive overcapacity in global steel production, particularly CO2-intensive steel. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts that global steel capacity will grow by 157 million tons over the next three years, which will likely negate the decarbonization efforts of the EU steel industry.

In response, the European Parliament has called for a European steel action plan, which has been embraced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, Eggert stressed that while these statements are promising, they must be followed by concrete measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of the industry.

Green Steel and Public Procurement as Key Measures

One of the critical measures that Eggert advocates for is the implementation of public procurement for green steel. With the EU's ambitious decarbonization targets — a 55% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050 — Eggert emphasized that EU governments should lead by example. This means prioritizing green steel in public sector construction, vehicles, and other products, which would support European producers committed to decarbonizing their operations.

Global Overcapacity and Trade Distortions Impacting EU Steel

The steel industry crisis is largely driven by global overcapacity and low demand in Europe, exacerbated by high energy costs. Compounding this issue is the low-priced steel being exported by countries like China, Japan, and India, which depresses global markets. China’s exports, in particular, have been an issue for EU steel producers, as the country benefits from state subsidies, leading to significant trade distortions.

Eggert discussed how the EU has implemented anti-dumping measures on stainless steel from Indonesia, but Indonesia has circumvented these by exporting processed steel to third-party countries like Taiwan, Vietnam, and Turkey, which then re-export the products back to the EU. This tactic, along with the support from Chinese investments in Indonesia’s steel industry, has made Indonesia’s steel sector one of the largest globally.

EU Trade-Defense Measures: Need for Improvement

Eurofer has called for enhanced EU trade-defense measures to tackle issues such as dumping and excessive capacity from third countries. Eggert emphasized the need for improved steel safeguards and more effective enforcement of existing trade defense instruments. Currently, anti-dumping duties on Chinese steel are too low, undermining the efficacy of EU trade policies.

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Concerns

The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) has been another point of contention. Third countries are already looking to export steel from their lowest CO2-emitting plants to avoid paying CBAM costs. Eggert advocated for including indirect CO2 emissions (Scope 2 emissions) in the CBAM, particularly for stainless steel, which is a major contributor to indirect emissions.

Scrap Export Concerns and India's Decarbonization Challenge

Finally, Eggert addressed concerns from India regarding the potential for a European export ban on scrap metal. While the EU does not currently have a scrap export ban, Eggert pointed out that India itself has export restrictions on scrap and needs to focus more on decarbonizing its domestic steel sector. He also warned that if India delays its decarbonization efforts until 2070, the EU will face a significant disadvantage in the global steel market.

EU-India FTA and CBAM Remain on Separate Tracks

EU-India, FTA

The EU-India FTA and CBAM remain on separate tracks. The European Commission confirmed that the trade deal gives India no exemption from the carbon border measure. India will not receive more favourable treatment than other countries. As a result, the EU-India FTA and CBAM will continue to shape trade under different rules.

The trade agreement still marks a major commercial breakthrough. The two sides concluded talks on tariff cuts or eliminations covering most EU goods exports to India. However, Brussels kept its climate border policy fully intact. Therefore, the EU-India FTA and CBAM now define both opportunity and constraint for industrial trade.

CBAM Stays Firm Even as the Trade Deal Expands

CBAM remained one of the toughest issues in the negotiations. EU officials said India first took a very hard line on the carbon border measure. However, the final outcome did not alter the EU’s legal obligations. That means exporters to Europe must still prepare for carbon-related compliance costs.

The agreement instead opens room for technical dialogue. EU officials said both sides can now discuss CBAM through a more structured channel. They also agreed to deepen cooperation on climate change and decarbonisation. Meanwhile, the EU is considering support for India’s greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.

This approach shows the EU’s broader trade logic. Brussels wants market access and climate discipline at the same time. It will cooperate on decarbonisation, but it will not dilute core climate tools. Consequently, EU trade policy now links commercial openness with tougher carbon accountability.

Industrial Trade Gains, but Carbon Compliance Still Matters

The industrial impact will extend beyond tariffs alone. Steel, cars, and carbon-intensive products remain highly sensitive in the EU-India relationship. Even with lower tariffs, exporters still face the strategic challenge of embedded emissions. Therefore, carbon performance will matter almost as much as price competitiveness.

The agreement also leaves some areas outside the deal. EU officials said there is no dedicated chapter on raw materials or energy. That omission matters for supply chain planning in metals and industrial manufacturing. It suggests the current deal focuses more on trade access than resource integration.

The entry into force process will also take time. Legal revision, translation, publication, and political consent still lie ahead. That means businesses should not expect immediate full implementation. Instead, companies should prepare for a phased trade opening alongside unchanged carbon obligations.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal confirms that the EU will not trade away CBAM for easier market access. That is an important signal for metals, chemicals, and other carbon-intensive sectors. The real lesson is clear: future trade competitiveness will depend on both tariff access and decarbonisation readiness.

EU Russian LNG ban reshapes Europe’s energy sanctions strategy

EU Russian LNG

The proposed EU Russian LNG ban marks a major escalation in the bloc’s energy sanctions. The EU Russian LNG ban would end direct Russian LNG imports into Europe earlier than previously planned. As a result, the EU Russian LNG ban could accelerate diversification, while testing unity among member states.

EU Russian LNG ban sits at core of 19th sanctions package

The European Commission has proposed a direct ban on Russian LNG imports into EU markets. The measure forms part of the EU’s 19th sanctions package and still requires unanimous approval from all 27 member states. However, Slovakia and Hungary have opposed energy sanctions in the past, raising risks of delay or dilution.

The EU had already pledged to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports, including LNG, by end-2027. Now, the proposal would introduce a full EU Russian LNG ban from 1 January 2027, effectively pulling the deadline forward in practice. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen framed the move as “turning off the tap” after three years of demand reduction and diversification.

Alongside the LNG measure, the package adds a full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazpromneft. These state-controlled groups already faced partial limitations, but the new rules target a broader range of crude and refined product dealings. As a result, Russia’s remaining oil revenue channels into Europe will come under tighter scrutiny.

Sanctions tighten on oil flows, shipping and financial channels

The EU Russian LNG ban is one pillar of a wider sanctions upgrade. The package expands asset freezes to more Russian firms and targets refineries, oil traders and petrochemical companies in third countries. The EU wants to clamp down on actors that help move Russian oil in breach of existing measures, though specific entities and enforcement tools were not disclosed.

The EU is also adding 118 vessels from Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” to its sanctions list. This brings the total to over 560 vessels and raises compliance risks for shipowners, insurers and charterers dealing with opaque Russian flows. Meanwhile, additional sanctions on banks and institutions linked to alternative payment systems and crypto platforms aim to close remaining financial loopholes.

Von der Leyen said Russia’s oil revenues from Europe have already fallen by more than 90pc in three years. The new measures, including the EU Russian LNG ban, aim to lock in that reduction and limit future circumvention. However, markets will watch how quickly LNG volumes reroute to Asia, and how smoothly Europe backfills supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU Russian LNG ban shifts the sanctions debate from crude and products to gas, where Europe still faces structural risks. If implemented as proposed, the ban will hard-wire diversification into LNG contracts and infrastructure planning over the next two years. Traders, utilities and shipowners should prepare for tighter compliance scrutiny and evolving trade routes as Brussels increasingly targets not just Russian exporters, but third-country facilitators.

EU stalls US trade deal as Greenland tariff row escalates

Greenland

EU stalls US trade deal as a direct response to President Trump's Greenland-linked tariff threats. EU leaders will meet on 22 January to coordinate a unified response and reassess transatlantic economic engagement. Meanwhile, the European Parliament is preparing to freeze implementing laws for the EU-US trade deal agreed last summer. As a result, EU stalls US trade deal at precisely the moment businesses across North America and Europe seek stability.

Greenland tariffs derail EU-US trade deal momentum

EU leaders are weighing a tough response after Trump threatened to annex Greenland and impose a new 10pc tariff. The measures would hit imports from France, Germany and five other European countries from 1 February, rising to 25pc in June. The threatened tariffs specifically target countries involved in a military mission in Denmark’s Greenland territory, widening the geopolitical rift.

The stalled EU-US trade deal had locked in a 15pc US baseline tariff and 0pc tariffs on selected EU-bound US exports. However, lawmakers now argue that EU stalls US trade deal implementation until Washington withdraws its Greenland-linked tariff threats. As a result, European politicians are signalling that no agreement offering 0pc tariffs can move forward under open coercive pressure.

European Parliament trade chair Bernd Lange urged using all available tools, including the anti-coercion instrument (ACI). Meanwhile, EPP group leader Manfred Weber said that approval of the pact is “not possible at this stage”. Their stance confirms that EU stalls US trade deal not just tactically, but as part of a wider strategic rethink.

Anti-coercion instrument raises stakes for supply chains

The EU’s anti-coercion instrument would allow Brussels to curb US access to goods, services and public procurement markets. Therefore, any escalation could hit key transatlantic value chains, including autos, machinery, chemicals and high-end manufactured goods. For metals, this would feed into steel, aluminium, copper and specialty alloy demand linked to these sectors.

The ACI also covers foreign direct investment and financial markets, increasing uncertainty for cross-border industrial projects. As a result, companies with integrated EU-US manufacturing footprints face higher risk premia and more complex trade planning. This comes as tariffs already feature prominently in US economic policy, further complicating capital allocation decisions.

The Greenland dispute will also follow leaders to Davos, where Trump and senior EU figures will share a stage. Any harsh rhetoric could harden positions and accelerate planning for retaliatory steps on both sides. Investors and industrial players will watch closely for signals on how far the EU is willing to push the ACI lever.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The current standoff shows how quickly geopolitics can override the economic logic of a hard-won trade deal. For metals and manufacturing supply chains, the real risk is not a single tariff move, but a sustained cycle of coercive measures and retaliation. Firms that diversify sourcing, build tariff resilience into contracts and hedge regulatory risk will be better positioned if this dispute drags on.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.

EU Brazil critical minerals agreement targets strategic autonomy

Brazil critical minerals

The EU Brazil critical minerals agreement signals a major shift in how Europe secures lithium, nickel and rare earths. The EU Brazil critical minerals agreement aims to underpin the bloc’s digital and clean transitions while reducing exposure to geopolitical shocks. By elevating Brazil as a strategic partner, the EU Brazil critical minerals agreement also diversifies away from single-country dependence in sensitive supply chains.

EU Brazil critical minerals agreement builds on Mercosur trade deal

The new framework for critical minerals cooperation comes as the EU signs a long-awaited free trade agreement with Mercosur. This broader deal creates a legal and commercial backbone for long-term investment in Brazil’s mining, processing and midstream industries. As a result, European OEMs and utilities gain clearer access to Brazilian lithium, nickel and rare earths under a stable trade regime.

EU leaders explicitly link critical minerals to the green and digital transitions, not just to raw material security. The EU wants Brazilian supply to feed battery plants, magnet producers and clean-tech manufacturers across the bloc. Meanwhile, joint projects in exploration, processing and ESG standards can lift Brazil’s role from simple ore exporter to integrated value chain partner.

The trade and minerals agenda also reflects Brazil’s own industrial policy. Brasília seeks to climb the value chain by promoting local processing, refining and technology transfer. EU financing, offtake contracts and technology cooperation can accelerate that goal and create more predictable long-term flows to European buyers.

China export controls keep rare earth risks in focus

China’s rolling export controls on medium and heavy rare earths remain the backdrop for this strategic pivot. Even with recent suspensions and simplified licensing, Beijing still holds powerful levers over global magnet and rare earth supply. European policymakers view these episodes as a warning that minerals can become tools of coercion in future disputes.

Therefore, the EU is racing to build parallel supply routes through partners like Brazil, Australia, Canada and the US. New agreements with Brazil complement EU critical raw materials partnerships already under way with other producer countries. In practice, this means more diversified sourcing of rare earths, battery metals and strategic by-products into European industry.

However, turning memorandums into molecules will take time and capital. Brazil must expand infrastructure, environmental permitting capacity and midstream processing to meet European demand. The EU, in turn, must mobilise public finance, de-risk long-term offtakes and align sustainability rules with commercial reality for miners and processors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal underlines how trade policy and critical minerals strategy now move in lockstep. For metals and mining players, EU–Brazil alignment could unlock new funding, offtake and joint-venture structures over the next decade. The key question is how fast projects can move from political announcements to bankable assets before the next supply shock hits.

China and EU Resume Electric Vehicle Talks Amid Growing US Tariff Pressures

US tariff, China

Negotiations on Price Commitments Could Ease Trade Friction in the EV Market

China and the European Union (EU) have decided to resume negotiations regarding a price commitment mechanism for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). This decision follows the EU's implementation of countervailing duties on Chinese BEV imports in 2024. The goal of these talks is to replace the tariffs imposed on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), addressing ongoing trade tensions between China and the EU.

EU's Countervailing Duties and the Push for a Price Commitment Mechanism

In October 2024, the European Commission finalized its ruling on countervailing duties on BEVs imported from China, which came into effect at the end of October. These duties ranged from 17% to 35.3%, impacting major Chinese automakers like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. The aim was to counter what the EU viewed as unfair pricing practices by Chinese EV manufacturers. However, these tariffs have faced opposition from both China and European companies seeking to expand their market share in the fast-growing electric vehicle sector.

Despite early talks on a price commitment mechanism in November 2024, the discussions stalled without significant progress. However, on April 10, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that both sides had agreed to resume negotiations on the price commitments and to discuss broader issues of investment cooperation in the automotive industry.

US Tariffs Intensify the Pressure on China and the EU

The resumption of talks between China and the EU comes amidst escalating trade tensions with the United States. As of April 11, 2025, the US imposed a 145% tariff rate on imports from China, adding additional pressure on Chinese manufacturers, particularly in the electric vehicle and battery sectors. US President Donald Trump's tariffs, which were initially implemented in 2024, compounded by those under the Biden administration, have made it nearly impossible for Chinese EVs and lithium-ion batteries to enter the US market.

In an effort to counterbalance the US's growing tariff measures, China has been seeking closer economic ties with the EU. Chinese Premier Li Qiang held discussions with EU President Ursula von der Leyen on April 8, 2025, addressing the need for structural solutions to re-balance bilateral trade relations. The talks have emphasized the urgency of enhancing market access for European businesses in China and forging a collaborative approach to the challenges posed by US tariffs.

Potential Impact on the Electric Vehicle Market

If China and the EU reach an agreement on the price commitment mechanism, it could significantly alter the landscape for Chinese EVs in Europe. Prior to the implementation of the countervailing duties, the EU accounted for about 28% of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) exports, which includes both BEVs and hybrid plug-in vehicles. However, the tariffs have drastically reduced Chinese EV exports to Europe.

The continuation of trade protectionist measures from both the US and the EU is putting immense pressure on China’s EV and battery markets, particularly as it struggles to enter key international markets. The future of Chinese electric vehicle exports largely hinges on these negotiations, and any breakthrough could bring Chinese-made EVs back into the competitive EU market.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Fell to 2009 Low After Russian Ban

Ferro-Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports fell to their lowest level since 2009 in 2025 after sanctions blocked Russian material from entering the bloc directly or through Baltic transit routes. EU countries imported 30,171t of ferro-titanium last year, down 36% from 47,296t in 2024.

The sharp decline showed how deeply the European ferro-titanium market had depended on Russian supply and Baltic logistics. Estonia, Poland, and Latvia together accounted for 12,830t of EU supply, but the structure of that supply changed significantly once Russian-origin ferro-titanium was barred.

EU ferro-titanium imports from Estonia halved on the year to 6,384t. The decline suggests that Estonian flows now more closely reflect local production rather than Russian material transiting through the country.

Sanctions Shifted Supply Toward Estonia, Poland and India

Estonia remained the EU’s largest ferro-titanium supplier in 2025, while Poland became the second-largest intra-EU source. Polish shipments rose by a quarter to 3,834t, showing that European buyers were turning more heavily to regional producers after the Russian ban.

Imports from the UK fell 27% to 3,468t after the closure of TiVac last summer. Most of TiVac’s former volumes are expected to shift to Estonia, where FE Mottram is scaling up operations in Ahtme, while Transition Metals continues to operate in the UK.

India became a larger alternative supplier as exports to the EU rose 171% to 2,310t. Turkey’s shipments also surged to 1,000t, although these flows remain unclear because Turkey is not a known ferro-titanium producer.

Russian ferro-titanium imports fell to just 463t in 2025 after full implementation of EU sanctions on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. Russian exports largely moved to Asia, with Chinese imports from Russia reaching a record 6,381t last year.

Russian Scrap Flows Rose Before Late-Year Slowdown

Titanium scrap became a temporary workaround because Russian titanium scrap was not covered by EU sanctions. EU imports of Russian scrap doubled to 2,517t in 2025, with 2,406t entering Estonia.

Estonia then re-exported 2,277t of titanium scrap last year, showing how scrap flows supported the regional ferro-titanium supply chain after the ban on Russian ferro-alloys. However, this trade also weakened sharply toward year-end, with EU imports falling to 36t in December and 37t in January 2026.

European ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.98-5.33/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in 2025, down 28% from 2024. Weak steel mill consumption kept prices under pressure for most of the year.

The market later rebounded from multi-year lows in December. Supply concerns linked to Latvian producer LLR-Ecotech first supported the recovery, before higher scrap costs allowed other producers to raise offers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU ferro-titanium market is now being rebuilt around sanctions compliance, regional production, and scrap availability. The Russian ban reduced headline imports, but it also exposed Europe’s dependence on flexible titanium scrap flows and a small group of regional producers.

EU CBAM export support moves to the top of Brussels agenda

EU CBAM

EU CBAM export support is moving closer as the European Commission considers a two-step aid mechanism. EU CBAM export support would offer “immediate” transitional relief for energy-intensive exporters facing rising carbon costs. As a result, EU CBAM export support is emerging as the key political trade-off between climate ambition and industrial competitiveness.

EU CBAM export support to start with transitional measures

The commission is preparing EU CBAM export support that begins with short-term, transitional tools. Officials indicated that a first phase of support would arrive “immediately,” ahead of a more permanent scheme. However, they have not clarified whether support will take the form of direct payments or carbon cost refunds.

Meanwhile, Brussels wants any EU CBAM export support to be WTO-compatible and legally robust. Industry groups argue that exporters cannot plan while details remain vague and timelines unclear. Fertilizers Europe is pushing to retain free ETS allocations for exports until 2030 as the “easiest solution.”

Debate deepens over free allocation and exporter ‘fairness’

The debate around EU CBAM export support centres on fairness for EU exporters under rising carbon prices. The commission is exploring using a share of CBAM revenues to finance long-term export support schemes. As a result, future CBAM cash flows could be recycled back into hard-pressed energy-intensive sectors.

However, fertilizer producers warn that simultaneous CBAM implementation and fast ETS phase-out could trigger widespread bankruptcies. They point to structurally higher EU energy prices that have already pushed margins to zero or below. Industry leaders now openly call for pausing the ETS reduction for CBAM-covered sectors until a final export mechanism is defined.

Politics, timing and the risk of policy fatigue

The political path for EU CBAM export support remains uncertain and highly contentious. Any legal act must pass the European Parliament and member states amid tight legislative calendars. Officials admit that securing agreement on all CBAM amendments before end-2025 would be “highly ambitious.”

At the same time, policymakers acknowledge that the fertilizer sector’s situation is “dire” and cannot absorb more shocks. Yet they are reluctant to dilute CBAM’s climate integrity or delay broader decarbonisation targets. This creates a narrow window where support must be generous enough to retain industry, yet disciplined enough to survive legal and political scrutiny.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brussels is effectively trying to retrofit a CBAM export leg that was politically postponed during the original negotiations. The eventual shape of EU CBAM export support will signal how far Europe is willing to go to protect its mid- and downstream metals, fertilizer and hydrogen value chains. If delays continue, we should expect more calls for ETS pauses, higher import prices, and accelerated de-industrialisation risk in exposed sectors.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports from Russia Decline in Q2, Surge in June Amid Sanctions

In a complex geopolitical landscape marked by sanctions and shifting trade patterns, the European Union's(EU) imports of ferro-titanium from Russia witnessed notable fluctuations in the second quarter of 2024. According to recent trade data, while overall imports during April-June fell to their lowest quarterly levels since the fourth quarter of 2022, June alone saw a significant increase, reaching a nine-month high. This paradox highlights the uneven impact of EU sanctions targeting Russian ferro-alloys at the year's midpoint.

During the second quarter, the EU imported 3,321 metric tons of Russian ferro-titanium, representing a 33% increase from the first quarter's 2,497 metric tons. However, this figure still marked an 11% year-on-year decline. Within the EU, member states accounted for 2,192 metric tons, while non-EU countries absorbed the remaining 1,129 metric tons— the highest share held by non-EU states since Q2 2022.

A significant trend observed in 2024 has been the redirection of Russian ferro-titanium exports towards non-EU states, particularly China and Turkey, amid increasing sanctions. Despite this, the Netherlands broke the pattern in June by importing 473 metric tons, the highest intake by any EU country this year, slightly surpassing Estonia's January intake of 468 metric tons.

Under Article 3i of the 12th EU sanctions package, the purchase, import, or transfer—directly or indirectly—of Russian ferro-titanium is prohibited, with allowances for pre-existing contracts. However, market insiders suggest that Russian ferro-titanium may still be entering the EU through specific channels.

Market analysts had anticipated a steady decline in EU imports throughout 2024 as contracts predating the sanctions expired. However, the surge in Dutch imports in June contrasts sharply with a notable decrease in Estonia's imports, which reached their lowest level this year. For the entire quarter, Estonia imported 910 metric tons, a decline compared to both prior periods.

In parallel, Estonia's re-exports of ferro-titanium in Q2 fell to 654 metric tons, with Latvia receiving 597 metric tons and the United States 57 metric tons. Interestingly, Latvia reported zero imports directly from Russia.

China's imports of Russian ferro-titanium surged to 460 metric tons in Q2, up from zero in both the previous quarter and the same period last year. Turkey also increased its imports to 483 metric tons during this period. The potential for any of this material to eventually enter the EU remains uncertain as the market adapts to the evolving sanctions regime.

Russian ferro-titanium prices in Europe averaged $5.80-6.23 per kilogram of titanium in Q2, up from $5.33-5.81 per kilogram in Q1. The price increase reflects rising production costs and, to some extent, follows Western market trends. As of August 15, prices were last assessed at $5.60-6.30 per kilogram, as Russian suppliers lowered their offers to clear stock ahead of more stringent sanctions set to take full effect by the end of the year.

EU and UK Move Toward Linking Carbon Markets

EU and UK

The EU and UK have formally agreed to work toward linking their carbon emissions trading systems (ETS), a move expected to benefit both industries and climate policy alignment. The announcement, made during a summit in London, emphasized that a EU and UK carbon markets link would support fair trade and reduce carbon leakage between jurisdictions. According to the joint statement, such a link would also exempt both regions from their respective carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), providing a more level playing field for domestic industries while maintaining environmental ambition.

ETS Link Could Unlock Significant Economic Gains

The linking of the EU and UK carbon markets could generate significant cost savings. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed British businesses could save £800 million in EU carbon taxes, while a recent industry-commissioned study projected up to €1.2 billion in savings from lower hedging costs due to improved market liquidity. While there is no timeline for implementation, market participants note that linking the Swiss ETS to the EU’s system took nearly a decade. Still, the potential economic efficiency and regulatory clarity have made the EU and UK carbon markets discussion a top priority for energy-intensive sectors across Europe.

Shared Climate Goals, Independent Ambitions

The agreement stressed that neither side should be constrained from pursuing more ambitious climate goals. The UK’s ETS remains guided by the legally binding Climate Change Act and its Paris Agreement commitments. The UK targets a 68% GHG reduction by 2030 and 81% by 2035, compared to 1990 levels. The EU aims for a 55% net reduction by 2030 and is still shaping its 2035 benchmark. Despite regulatory differences, both jurisdictions reaffirmed their commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050. The agreement also includes cooperation on hydrogen, CCS, biomethane, and a potential UK entry into the EU’s internal power market—further aligning EU and UK carbon markets within a broader clean energy framework.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The potential linkage of EU and UK carbon markets signals a return to pragmatic climate diplomacy. While structural alignment will take time, the economic and environmental incentives suggest both sides are committed to meaningful integration—setting a precedent for future carbon market collaborations globally.

Japan EU battery recycling alliance aims to cut China dependence

Japan, EU battery alliance

Japan EU battery recycling alliance marks a strategic push to reduce reliance on China in battery materials. The new Japan EU battery recycling alliance brings together key industry groups to strengthen recycling, black mass handling and data sharing. As a result, the Japan EU battery recycling alliance targets a more resilient and transparent battery supply chain across both regions.

Japan EU battery recycling alliance links tech strength and market scale

The Japan EU battery recycling alliance is built around three core industry associations. Japan’s Battery Association for Supply Chain, the European Battery Alliance and Brussels based Recharge have signed an initial agreement. Together, they will cooperate on improving recycling processes, materials flows and supply chain governance.

The agreement covers information exchange on issues such as data sharing and regulatory interpretation. It also includes joint studies on black mass classification, a key bottleneck for cross border recycling flows. Black mass refers to shredded cathode material containing nickel, cobalt and lithium from spent batteries. Therefore, clear definitions and standards for black mass are critical for trade, permitting and ESG compliance.

Japanese officials highlight the importance of combining Japan’s technology strength with Europe’s market size. Japan offers advanced recycling technologies and process know how developed over decades of battery manufacturing. Meanwhile, Europe provides a rapidly growing battery market driven by EV mandates and energy storage deployment. This mix gives the Japan EU battery recycling alliance strong industrial foundations.

Reducing strategic exposure to China dominated battery materials

The Japan EU battery recycling alliance clearly responds to geopolitical supply concerns. Officials from Japan’s trade and industry ministry note that the current battery supply chain depends heavily on one country. Although unnamed, the reference clearly points to China’s dominance in processed lithium, nickel, cobalt and anode materials.

By deepening cooperation, Tokyo and Brussels aim to reduce vulnerability to export controls or political friction. Recycling and black mass trade can partially offset primary supply risks from Chinese refineries and processors. In addition, improved data sharing should help track origin, quality and ESG performance of recovered materials. As a result, the Japan EU battery recycling alliance supports compliance with emerging battery passport and due diligence rules.

The initiative also fits within the broader Japan EU competitiveness alliance launched in July. That framework seeks closer coordination on semiconductors, clean energy, critical minerals and industrial standards. Battery recycling now becomes a visible test case for how quickly the partnership can move from statements to practical projects.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This partnership underlines how recycling is moving from a niche activity to a core pillar of battery security strategy. If the Japan EU battery recycling alliance can harmonise black mass standards and data systems, it will lower barriers for serious cross regional recycling investment. Market participants should watch for pilot projects, joint ventures and regulatory tweaks that follow this initial, largely framework level agreement.

EU-US Trade Agreement Moves Toward Approval as Steel and Aluminium Tariff Risks Remain

Steelmaking

EU-US trade agreement approval moved closer after the European Parliament’s trade committee backed legislation to implement the deal reached last July. The committee voted 29-9 with one abstention, signalling a clear majority before the expected plenary vote on 26 March.

The EU-US trade agreement is designed to provide stability in transatlantic trade after years of tariff pressure, industrial disputes, and geopolitical tension. However, the committee’s position shows that Europe wants stronger safeguards before implementation becomes final.

The EU-US trade agreement remains especially important for metals-intensive sectors. Steel, aluminium, machinery, automotive components, and industrial equipment all sit directly inside the tariff debate.

Parliament Seeks Safeguards Against New US Tariffs

The trade committee wants a suspension clause if the US imposes new tariffs on EU states. It also wants implementation to depend on US compliance with the agreement and stronger protection against steel import pressure.

German lawmaker Bernd Lange said the legislation aims to provide stability, but he warned that tariffs imposed on the EU or individual member states over foreign policy decisions would be unacceptable. His comments reflect European concern that trade policy could again become linked to wider political disputes.

The committee’s position also targets the treatment of EU products containing steel or aluminium. Lange called on the US to reduce tariffs on EU products containing less than 50pc steel or aluminium from 50pc to 15pc before the EU completes implementation.

Steel and Aluminium Remain Central to Transatlantic Trade Tensions

Section 232 tariffs remain the key industrial issue. Lange warned that if Section 232 tariffs rise from 10pc to 15pc, many EU products could face effective duties above the 15pc ceiling once most favoured nation tariffs are added.

That risk matters because many manufactured goods contain embedded steel or aluminium. Higher effective tariffs could hit machinery, automotive parts, appliances, industrial components, and downstream manufacturing supply chains.

The committee’s backing still suggests broad support for the deal. Swedish lawmaker Jorgen Warborn said the EU should uphold its commitments, while also calling for safeguards against new US tariffs. That position captures the political balance: Europe wants the stability of the agreement, but not at the cost of accepting future unilateral tariff measures.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-US trade agreement may reduce uncertainty, but metals remain the stress test for transatlantic trade. Steel and aluminium tariffs are no longer narrow trade tools; they are industrial policy instruments that shape competitiveness across entire manufacturing chains.

EU Steel Demand Faces CBAM Risk Before 2028 Downstream Extension

EU Steel

EU steel demand could face significant pressure between 2026 and 2028 as carbon border adjustment costs apply to steel before they fully extend to downstream steel-consuming goods. European market participants warn that this timing gap could encourage imports of finished steel derivatives and weaken demand for EU-made steel.

The risk comes from the structure of CBAM implementation. Steel products will carry annual CBAM-related mark-ups before many downstream products are covered. As a result, imported finished goods with high steel content could become more competitive than goods manufactured inside the EU using CBAM-exposed steel.

EU steel demand is therefore exposed to a policy mismatch. CBAM aims to protect European industry from carbon leakage, but an uneven rollout could shift pressure from steel imports to finished product imports. That would create a new competitiveness problem for service centres, distributors, fabricators, machinery producers, vehicle parts makers, and appliance manufacturers.

Downstream Imports Could Undermine European Steel Consumption

Downstream steel-consuming goods are becoming a central concern for European industry. Product categories under discussion include car parts, specialised vehicle components, home appliances, machinery parts, and yellow goods. These sectors consume large volumes of steel and play a major role in sustaining regional industrial demand.

A proposed response is to create safeguards for selected downstream products before the 2028 CBAM expansion. The idea is to identify key HS codes for EU-manufactured products with high steel content and establish a quota system similar to existing steel safeguards.

This approach reflects a growing concern that steel protection alone may not protect the steel value chain. If downstream manufacturers lose competitiveness, EU steel demand could weaken even if direct steel imports fall. The strategic issue is not only steel trade, but the survival of manufacturing demand inside Europe.

Steel Safeguards and Weak Orders Add Pressure to the Market

The new version of EU steel safeguard measures is still expected to take effect in July. However, market participants remain concerned about World Trade Organisation compliance, especially as the EU negotiates free-trade agreements that may include country-specific quotas.

Market sentiment is already weak. European service centres reported soft order intake in February, with some seeing volumes 10-20pc lower than a year earlier. This points to sluggish industrial activity and limited confidence across the steel distribution chain.

Import reliance may also decline this year. Some service centres expect imported material to fall to around 20pc of flat steel use, compared with as much as 40pc in previous years. That shift may support EU mills, but it also reflects a more controlled and uncertain market environment rather than a broad recovery in demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU’s steel challenge is no longer only about protecting mills from imported coil. The real risk is demand leakage, where downstream production moves outside Europe before CBAM fully covers finished steel-intensive goods.

EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Gains Parliamentary Support for 50-Tonne Threshold

EU CBAM

The EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) received decisive parliamentary backing as the European Parliament's environment committee voted to implement proposed regulatory changes. The committee approved a minimum mass threshold of 50 tonnes for goods covered by the carbon border adjustment mechanism, effectively exempting approximately 90% of importers from CBAM requirements. This significant modification will streamline compliance while maintaining environmental effectiveness across key industrial sectors.

Parliamentary Vote Confirms CBAM Exemptions for Small-Scale Importers

The environment committee overwhelmingly supported the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism changes with 85 members voting in favor, only one against, and one abstention. Environment committee chair Antonio Decaro emphasized that amendments did not reopen other provisions of existing CBAM legislation. Therefore, the core framework of the carbon border adjustment mechanism remains intact while reducing administrative burden on smaller importers.

Meanwhile, the amendments clarify that CBAM applies to electricity importers but excludes power generated exclusively in European Economic Area countries. This exemption covers electricity from Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway imported into the EU. As a result, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism maintains its focus on third-country imports while preserving regional energy cooperation.

Industrial Sectors Maintain Comprehensive CBAM Coverage Despite Exemptions

The revised EU carbon border adjustment mechanism will continue covering 99% of total CO2 emissions from imports of iron, steel, aluminum, cement, and fertilizers. This comprehensive coverage ensures that the carbon border adjustment mechanism achieves its environmental objectives despite the small-importer exemption. However, the 50-tonne threshold significantly reduces compliance costs for smaller trading companies and specialized importers.

Parliamentary negotiations with EU member states will finalize the legal text under Antonio Decaro's leadership. EU states aim to agree their position by the end of May, setting the stage for final approval. Therefore, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism implementation timeline remains on track for full enforcement across affected industrial sectors.

The carbon border adjustment mechanism represents a cornerstone of EU climate policy, targeting carbon leakage from high-emission industries. These amendments balance environmental effectiveness with practical implementation concerns raised by industry stakeholders.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This parliamentary approval demonstrates the EU's commitment to implementing CBAM while addressing legitimate concerns about administrative burden on smaller importers. The 50-tonne threshold strikes a practical balance that maintains environmental integrity while reducing compliance costs, positioning the carbon border adjustment mechanism as a more workable trade policy tool for the global metals and minerals industry.

EU to Launch Aluminium Safeguard Probe Amid Rising Import Pressure

EU Aluminium

New U.S. Tariffs and CBAM Adjustments Prompt EU to Rethink Aluminium Trade Policy

Brussels Acts to Shield European Aluminium Industry

The European Commission will launch a safeguard investigation on 19 March to assess the need for trade defense measures on aluminium imports. This move responds to fears that U.S. tariffs will redirect global aluminium flows into Europe.

Washington reintroduced 25% import tariffs on steel and aluminium on 12 March, prompting the EU to act. European producers risk losing U.S. market access while facing increased inflows of diverted metal. Unlike steel, aluminium is not yet protected by EU safeguard measures.

Since 2021, over half of Europe’s aluminium smelting capacity has been curtailed. Today, just 46% of EU aluminium demand is sourced domestically. The Commission warns that continued pressure from imports threatens the survival of remaining producers.

New 'Melt and Pour' Rule and CBAM Reform

In addition to safeguard measures, the Commission will implement a new “melt and pour” rule. This rule defines the origin of metal products based on where they were originally melted—not where they were later processed. It aims to block minimal transformations that allow products to bypass tariffs or dumping duties.

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will also undergo revisions. The proposed update would extend the carbon levy to more aluminium- and steel-intensive downstream products. This adjustment addresses concerns that carbon-intensive imports could undercut EU-made goods, which comply with stricter climate rules.

The EU also plans to address carbon leakage. It will design compensation mechanisms for CBAM-regulated goods exported from the EU, with new anti-circumvention rules due in Q4 2025, before CBAM fully activates in 2026.

Scrap Export Restrictions and Demand Boosts Ahead

To secure domestic raw materials, the EU plans to tighten scrap metal export controls. The Commission will explore reciprocal restrictions on countries that limit scrap exports to the EU and may impose new charges on outbound scrap.

By the end of 2026, the EU will propose new demand-side targets for steel and aluminium usage in critical sectors like construction. These measures aim to support domestic producers while aligning with climate and circular economy goals.