EU Launches Safeguard Investigation into Manganese, Silicon Alloys Imports

The European Commission

The European Commission has initiated a safeguard investigation into the import of manganese and silicon-based alloys and silicon metal, following concerns about the erosion of market share for EU producers. The probe, launched on December 19, focuses on a range of materials, including silicon metal, ferro-manganese, ferro-silicon, ferro-silico-manganese, ferro-silico-magnesium, and calcium-silicon.

The investigation, driven by industry body Euroalliages and certain member states, comes in response to a surge in global production capacity and rising imports, particularly from China, which has significantly impacted EU producers. Euroalliages Secretary-General Bob Lambrechts highlighted that China's excess production capacity could meet the EU’s demand multiple times over, raising alarm over increasing import shares.

Global spare production capacity for these materials exceeds 21 million tons per year, with another 13 million tons per year expected to be added. Meanwhile, declining demand in the EU’s steel and aluminium industries leaves the region unable to absorb these volumes.

Timeline and Possible Measures

The commission will accept comments, evidence, and information from stakeholders within 21 days of the announcement. If safeguard measures are deemed necessary, they could be implemented within nine months, with an optional two-month extension for exceptional circumstances.

In cases of urgent harm, the commission may impose provisional measures for up to 200 days while continuing its analysis. These actions are critical for stabilizing the market and protecting EU producers from potential dumping and unsustainable competition.

Strategic Materials and Trade Policies

Euroalliages emphasized the strategic importance of manganese, silicon alloys, and related materials to the EU’s industrial base. Lambrechts noted, “Times have changed, and you cannot primarily rely on countries that you cannot be sure will continue to supply.”

The investigation is part of a broader effort to strengthen the EU’s industrial value chain against external pressures and ensure long-term competitiveness. Lambrechts also underscored that this effort goes beyond traditional anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, signaling a more comprehensive approach to trade policy.

The Risk of Import Surges

The commission warned of potential imminent increases in imports due to trade protectionism measures in external countries, which could divert more volumes to the EU. Addressing these risks is crucial to preserving the EU’s industrial capacity and reducing reliance on unstable supply chains.

EU’s Copper Imports Increase in 2024 Despite Weak Demand in Germany

EU’s Copper Imports

Refined copper imports to the EU rose by 3.2% in 2024, led by Italy and Spain, despite falling demand in Germany.

Imports Rise, But Key Markets Show Strain

EU countries imported 1.71 million tonnes of refined copper in 2024, a 3.2% increase year on year, according to customs data. Italy remained the bloc’s top importer with 543,363 tonnes, representing 32% of total EU imports.

Germany, however, experienced a 13% drop in copper imports, falling to 413,245 tonnes. This reflects persistent challenges in Germany's industrial sectors due to rising energy prices and sluggish demand. The effects of the Covid-19 aftermath and Ukraine-related energy shocks have slowed recovery across EU economies.

Spain, Sweden, and the DRC See Significant Gains

Meanwhile, Spain increased its refined copper imports by 28%, reaching 142,231 tonnes, showing resilience in its industrial sectors. Sweden saw the largest year-on-year growth, with 119% more imports, totaling 107,794 tonnes.

On the supply side, Chile remained the largest exporter, delivering 307,885 tonnes to the EU — a 21% increase from 2023. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) overtook Poland as the second-largest supplier, with 200,992 tonnes, up 11%. Together, Chile, DRC, and Poland made up 40% of the EU’s total refined copper supply in 2024.

Despite an overall 2.9% rise in global copper consumption, the EU market remains fragile. According to the International Copper Study Group, weak demand from automotive and construction sectors continues to weigh on European copper use.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU’s rising copper imports contrast sharply with the weakening of its core manufacturing sectors. Germany’s downturn reflects broader industrial deceleration, while southern and northern Europe appear more resilient. As the energy transition accelerates, copper sourcing will remain a geopolitical and industrial priority — and import trends are the first signal to watch.

China Challenges EU's EV Tariffs at WTO

In a significant escalation of trade tensions, China has filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) over the European Union's (EU) imposition of provisional anti-subsidy duties on imports of Chinese battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Beijing argues that the EU's actions lack a solid factual and legal foundation and violate WTO rules, potentially undermining global efforts to combat climate change.

A spokesperson for China's Ministry of Commerce expressed strong dissatisfaction with the EU's decision, urging immediate rectification. "The EU's preliminary ruling is baseless and disrupts the stability of China-EU economic and trade relations, as well as the supply chain of electric vehicles," the spokesperson said.

The European Commission had imposed these additional duties on July 5th, targeting three major Chinese EV manufacturers. BYD, Geely, and SAIC faced new tariffs of 17.4%, 19.9%, and 37.6%, respectively. The duty on SAIC, China’s largest automaker, was slightly reduced from an initial 38.1%. The final determination on these duties, which could last for five years, will be made by EU member states.

SAIC, a key player in the EV market, with significant exports to the UK, France, Germany, and Spain, has formally requested a hearing on these temporary countervailing duties. The Chinese government also called for expedited consultations with the EU to reach a mutually agreeable solution.

China, which accounted for 59% of global BEV sales in the first half of the year, sees this move as detrimental not only to its economic interests but also to the broader goal of global climate cooperation. Meanwhile, Europe’s EV market growth has slowed significantly, largely due to the reduction of fiscal subsidies, slow progress in building charging infrastructure, and broader economic challenges.

EIB and Deutsche Bank to Boost European Wind Power with €1 Billion Investment

In a significant push for renewable energy, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is set to provide a €500 million ($541 million) counter-guarantee to Deutsche Bank. This backing will enable Deutsche Bank to establish a €1 billion portfolio aimed at investing in wind farms across the European Union. This initiative marks the first step in the EIB's broader €5 billion plan to support wind power equipment manufacturers within Europe, a part of the EU's comprehensive wind power strategy designed to sustain a competitive and robust wind energy supply chain.

The EIB and Deutsche Bank's collaboration is expected to trigger private investments amounting to up to €8 billion. The EIB highlighted wind power as a significant success for the EU but acknowledged current challenges such as supply chain disruptions, inflation, and slow project permitting. The EU's net zero industry act, approved in May, aims to address these permitting issues and enhance the production rate of net zero technologies within the bloc.

The EIB's €5 billion initiative is projected to add 32GW of wind power capacity in the EU. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the share of wind and solar power in the EU's total energy supply is expected to increase to 30% this year, surpassing the output from fossil fuels.

As the EU's lending arm, owned by its member states, the EIB increased its climate finance to €44.3 billion last year. The bank ensures that all new projects it finances align with the Paris climate agreement and explicitly excludes investments in fossil fuels that do not contribute to CO2 emission reductions.

EU Prepares Countermeasures Against U.S. Import Tariffs

U.S. Tariffs

The European Union is finalizing a series of countermeasures in response to the U.S.'s decision to impose a 20% tariff on imports, effective April 9. These tariffs are in addition to the existing duties on various goods, particularly steel and aluminum, which have already been heavily impacted by U.S. trade policies. The European Commission is working on a first set of responses, and further actions may be introduced depending on how the tariffs affect EU industries.

EU's Strong Stance Against U.S. Tariffs

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the EU's firm position on combating what it perceives as unfair trade practices. Von der Leyen stated that Europe will not accept "dumping" in its markets, referring to the practice of selling products at artificially low prices. The EU’s commitment to protecting its markets from global overcapacity remains a key aspect of its response. Von der Leyen also expressed disappointment, noting that many Europeans feel let down by their “oldest ally” – a reference to the U.S.

Impact on Non-Ferrous Metals, Energy, and Minerals

The U.S. tariffs, set to begin on April 9, will apply to most foreign imports, with some key exceptions. Energy products, as well as various minerals, including non-ferrous metals, are exempt from the new tariffs. Additionally, oil products, base oils, coal, and some fertilizers and chemicals will not be subject to the new duties. However, the tariff will still target steel, aluminum, and automobiles, industries that have already been under the strain of separate, earlier tariffs.

A Changing Global Trade Landscape

These tariffs are expected to have significant effects on global trade, particularly in sectors that rely heavily on international imports and exports. With many European industries vulnerable to the impact of these tariffs, the EU is preparing to take action to mitigate any economic fallout. The bloc is closely monitoring indirect effects, which could involve shifts in trade patterns and increased pressure on affected sectors.

Conclusion: Europe's Preparedness in a Trade Conflict

As the EU finalizes its countermeasures, the bloc is determined to protect its markets and industries from the negative effects of U.S. tariffs. Although the initial measures focus on steel and aluminum, the broader scope of U.S. tariff policies could continue to challenge global trade dynamics. The EU’s response will likely shape future trade relations between Europe and the U.S. in the coming months.

China Stands Firm on Metals Export Controls, Future Moves Remain Unclear

China is intensifying its export controls on crucial materials and metals but has left the international community guessing about what might be next on the list. Beginning on September 15, antimony—a metal with significant dual-use applications—will fall under these new restrictions, a move consistent with recent measures applied to gallium, germanium, and graphite over the past year.

During a press briefing, when asked whether tungsten, another key material where China holds a dominant market share, might soon face similar controls, He Yadong, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, remained vague. He reiterated that China will continue to implement export controls "in accordance with laws and regulations," without specifying additional metals that might be affected.

He emphasized that the controls on antimony, used primarily in fire-retardant materials and solar glass, align with "prevailing international practices" and are not targeted at any particular country or region. Despite these assurances, the timing of the announcement has fueled speculation that China's tightening grip on critical materials could be a response to recent trade frictions with the European Union.

In particular, some analysts view the new controls as a reaction to the EU's countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles (EVs). After the EU imposed provisional duties in July, Beijing requested consultations, seeking to have the tariffs reduced or eliminated. However, the final duties remained only slightly adjusted. In retaliation, China has filed a case with the World Trade Organization (WTO) challenging these duties.

The impending antimony export controls have already driven up prices in China, with foreign buyers scrambling to secure supplies amid an increasingly tight market. European buyers, in particular, are finding it challenging to source antimony, exacerbating market pressures.

Further escalating trade tensions, China has launched an investigation into EU dairy product imports, following the EU's imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties on Chinese biodiesel imports. He Yadong downplayed suggestions that this move was retaliatory, explaining that it was initiated in response to a petition from China's domestic industry, contrasting it with the EU's unprompted investigation into Chinese EVs.

These developments underscore the growing strain in trade relations between China and several Western nations. As these tensions mount, concerns over the security of global supply chains have intensified. At the same time, Chinese companies are increasingly looking to expand their production capabilities overseas as a way to navigate these emerging trade barriers.

China Escalates Countermeasures in Response to EU Electric Vehicle Tariffs

China has intensified its response to the European Union's new countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) originating from China, highlighting growing trade tensions between two major economic blocs.

Beijing is now weighing an increase in tariffs on large-displacement fuel vehicles imported from Europe, a significant move given the EU’s status as a leading exporter of high-displacement cars to China. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, approximately 88,000 such vehicles with engine displacements over 2.5 liters were imported from Europe in the first seven months of this year alone.

Duties Target Major Chinese EV Producers

This escalation follows the EU's recent decision, enacted on October 4, to approve five-year tariffs on BEV imports from China, impacting the market for Chinese automakers. BYD, China’s largest new energy vehicle producer, will face a tariff rate of 17%, consistent with the EU's initial August proposal. Geely, another major player, saw its duty set at 18.8%, slightly down from an earlier proposed 19.3%. State-owned SAIC will face a significantly higher tariff of 35.3%, slightly reduced from an initial 36.6%. Notably, US-based Tesla, which manufactures in China for export, will contend with a 7.8% duty, down from a previously proposed 9%.

The Ministry of Commerce has indicated that it will continue to negotiate with EU counterparts but asserts it is prepared to take "firm" actions to protect Chinese commercial interests. BYD’s rapid expansion in the European market, selling over 23,000 BEVs between January and August—a doubling of last year’s figures—demonstrates China’s foothold in the region. Tesla, meanwhile, sold roughly 198,000 units in the same period, marking a 16% decrease from the previous year.

Tensions Expand Beyond the EU

China's retaliation isn’t limited to the EU alone. The country has launched a complaint with the World Trade Organization against Turkey over its recent imposition of a 40% tariff on Chinese EVs, a measure Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan introduced to stimulate Turkey's domestic electric vehicle market.

China has additionally undertaken countervailing and anti-dumping investigations into a variety of EU exports, including dairy products and pork. On October 8, Beijing imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on brandy imports from Europe, underscoring China’s readiness to diversify its retaliatory measures across multiple sectors.

Trade Measures to Dominate Steel Industry in 2025: Focus on Imports and Global Overcapacity

China Steel Factory

Trade protection measures have been the focal point of the global steel industry throughout 2024, with little indication of this trend slowing down in 2025. Steel producers, industry associations, and governments worldwide are increasingly advocating for stronger import barriers to safeguard domestic markets and improve the competitiveness of their industries. In particular, European steel mills have been at the forefront of this movement, calling for more robust action to combat what they view as unfair imports and growing overcapacity in the global market.

European Steel Industry Pushes for Stronger Import Protection

Eurofer, the industry association for European steel manufacturers, has been particularly vocal about the need for stronger trade defence instruments. The association has urged the European Union to implement short-term emergency measures, including import tariffication, to curb the influx of low-cost steel products. Eurofer's stance has been largely driven by the EU’s ambitious decarbonisation goals, with the bloc committing billions of euros in investment. Steel producers argue that the EU's current measures are insufficient, particularly in light of increasing steel imports from countries with lower production costs and fewer environmental regulations.

Significant progress has already been made, with Eurofer helping secure changes to the EU’s safeguard system for key products like hot-rolled coils (HRC) and wire rods. Additionally, the EU anti-dumping investigation targeting several HRC suppliers has gained traction, and further investigations are planned on downstream steel products. As European steel suppliers continue to collect evidence of unfair trade practices, more scrutiny is expected on countries like China, India, and Vietnam.

The Impact of Global Overcapacity and Chinese Steel Exports

The issue of global steel overcapacity has also been a major concern. The OECD has raised alarms about the growing steel production capacity, projecting a 158 million tonnes per year increase in global capacity between 2024 and 2026. This expansion, however, comes at a time when global steel demand remains uncertain. Despite this, steel exports from non-OECD countries have been recovering since 2023, particularly from China, whose steel exports surged by 22.6% from January to November 2024.

China has also been exporting record volumes of semi-finished steel, despite the country’s preference for exporting higher-value products. As China continues to ramp up exports, it has attracted the attention of both European and global policymakers, leading to new protectionist measures targeting Chinese steel. This includes potential investigations and pending duties on Chinese steel, which could affect up to 15 million tonnes per year of exports.

Countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are also seeing increases in steel exports, contributing to the global capacity glut. Turkey, a major market for Chinese steel, has already imposed duties on imports from China, India, Russia, and Japan in response to the increasing influx of steel from these regions. The EU is similarly considering the inclusion of Indonesia in its safeguard measures due to the country’s rising steel exports to Europe. From July to October 2024, Indonesia exported 494,650 tonnes of HRC to the EU, surpassing the previous half-year period, a trend that is expected to continue.

Investigations and Measures Targeting Global Steel Exporters

The growing export volumes from India and Vietnam, along with the rise in Indonesia’s exports to Europe, have prompted investigations into dumping practices in these countries. The EU has already initiated anti-dumping investigations on steel products from Egypt, Japan, India, and Vietnam, with the preliminary results of these investigations expected in March 2025. If these investigations lead to findings of unfair trade practices, retroactive duties could be applied, further tightening global trade conditions.

In response, producers are gearing up for a potential wave of new safeguard measures and anti-dumping duties. Countries that are impacted by these measures may look to retaliate, creating a complex global trade landscape for steel. As trade protectionism increases, the global steel market is expected to undergo significant shifts in the coming years.

EU Unveils Green Industry Package with Raw Material Reforms and Decarbonisation Bank

EU

New Proposals Target Lithium Supply, Industrial Emissions, and Simplified Climate Compliance Across Europe

EU Launches Broad Economic and Climate Plan to Advance Clean Tech and Raw Material Security

The European Commission has introduced a comprehensive policy package aimed at strengthening the EU's clean energy transition and boosting industrial competitiveness. The new plan includes proposals for reducing energy costs, simplifying climate reporting, and scaling joint raw material procurement, with lithium among the targeted critical materials.

Demand aggregation schemes, originally designed for natural gas, will now extend to other strategic raw materials. A proposed EU Critical Raw Materials Centre would oversee joint purchasing for participating companies, helping to reduce import dependencies and improve supply chain resilience.

Decarbonisation Bank and CBAM Overhaul Reflect Deepening Industry Support

Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra reaffirmed the EU's commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040, while stressing that decarbonisation must be economically viable for industry. As part of this approach, the Commission proposed a new EU Bank for Industrial Decarbonisation, which could mobilize up to €400 billion—including €20 billion from the Emissions Trading System (ETS)—over the next decade.

Meanwhile, updates to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) promise to simplify procedures and offer temporary exemptions for 90% of currently affected firms. The revised CBAM will expand to include new products and eventually require carbon intensity labeling for steel (2025) and cement.

Clean Procurement, Hydrogen Incentives, and Corporate Sustainability Rules Updated

Public procurement rules will mandate the use of cleaner industrial products starting in 2026. However, the EU’s hydrogen industry has criticized the latest draft of state aid reforms for lacking the flexibility needed to stimulate demand and close cost gaps with fossil-based hydrogen.

Additionally, the Commission eased compliance rules for around 6,000 EU and 900 non-EU firms under the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). The new guidelines require alignment with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C climate goal. While Qatari officials voiced concern over the directive’s impact on LNG exports, the Commission clarified that fines up to 5% of global revenue would apply only to extreme violations, such as human rights abuses.

Switzerland Adopts EU’s Russian Aluminium Ban in Sanctions Alignment

Russian aluminium

Federal Council Moves to Restrict Russian and Belarusian Aluminium Imports

Switzerland has adopted the EU’s Russian aluminium ban, aligning with Brussels’ 16th sanctions package targeting Moscow’s industrial exports. The Focus Keyphrase "Switzerland Russian aluminium ban" marks a significant shift in Swiss trade policy, historically characterized by neutrality, as the country intensifies its stance against Russian aggression.

The Federal Council announced it will implement all remaining relevant EU sanctions, including a ban on Russian primary aluminium imports and a prohibition on chromium ore exports to Russia. These measures aim to reduce materials that contribute to Russia’s military and technological advancement. Switzerland imported approximately 173,000 tonnes of unwrought Russian aluminium in 2023, according to Global Trade Tracker.

Belarusian Aluminium Also Targeted as Sanctions Widen

In parallel, Switzerland will enforce additional sanctions on Belarus, citing its complicity in the Ukraine war. These include a ban on Belarusian primary aluminium imports and expanded restrictions on dual-use and military-enhancing goods.

The Council emphasized that aligning sanctions with the EU is intended to prevent circumvention via Belarus, ensuring a more unified and effective European sanctions regime. This harmonization reduces the risk of Russian commodities entering EU markets indirectly through Swiss or Belarusian channels.

Strategic Impact on European Aluminium Supply Chains

The Swiss ban on Russian aluminium imports adds further pressure on Europe’s primary aluminium supply, which is already constrained by energy costs and limited regional production. Traders and manufacturers must now reassess sourcing strategies, particularly for unwrought aluminium, as the region seeks alternatives from non-sanctioned producers such as Norway, Canada, and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the ban on chromium ore exports to Russia may impact specialty alloy production and stainless steel supply chains, especially those tied to aerospace and defense markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Switzerland’s adoption of the Russian aluminium ban underscores a growing consensus in Europe on restricting key industrial imports tied to Moscow. As sanctions converge and enforcement tightens, metals traders and manufacturers will need to recalibrate logistics and risk strategies in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

EUROFER Revises 2024 EU Steel Consumption Forecast Downwards

The European Steel Association (EUROFER) has revised its 2024 steel consumption forecast for the European Union, citing an array of economic challenges. These include the protracted period of elevated interest rates, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, resultant energy crises, inflation, labor shortages, and supply chain disruptions in the Red Sea region due to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

In its recent "2024-2025 Economic and Steel Market Outlook" report, EUROFER predicts a modest 1.4% year-over-year increase in nominal steel consumption within the EU, reaching 127 million tons in 2024. This is a notable downward adjustment from the previously anticipated 3.2% increase to 130 million tons.

The report also recalibrates the 2025 forecast, lowering the expected growth from 5.6% to 4.1%, thereby predicting a total consumption of 133 million tons, down from the prior forecast of 137 million tons.

The first quarter of 2024 witnessed a 3.1% decline in EU nominal steel consumption year-over-year, totaling 31.9 million tons. This early-year contraction is expected to dampen the forecasted recovery for the remainder of the year. Significant uncertainties persist in steel consumption due to supply chain disruptions linked to the ongoing geopolitical conflicts, unprecedented surges in energy prices, and escalating production costs. Despite a gradual anticipated improvement towards the year's end, actual steel consumption is projected to remain below pre-pandemic levels.

EUROFER has also adjusted growth projections for steel demand industries downward. The Steel Weighted Industrial Production (SWIP) index fell by 1.9% in the first quarter of 2024, a stark contrast to the previous quarter's 0.5% rise. The decline in production across the EU’s steel-using sectors is attributed to the sustained impact of the Russia-Ukraine war, pervasive manufacturing weaknesses, global geopolitical tensions, and the long-term repercussions of the energy crisis.

The SWIP index decline highlights a persistent downturn in the construction, machinery, appliance, and metal product sectors, partially mitigated by continued growth in the automotive sector. The construction sector, which constitutes 35% of EU steel consumption, has been in recession since the third quarter of 2022, declining for seven consecutive quarters (-2.3%) through the first quarter of this year. High interest rates, labor shortages, and escalating material prices are expected to perpetuate the construction sector's downturn throughout the year.

The report states, "The positive trend in steel demand industries, which commenced post-pandemic, began to decelerate from the second half of 2022 due to rising energy costs and labor shortages following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, continuing through the fourth quarter of last year. This year’s deteriorating economic and industrial outlook for the EU is driven by high inflation and resultant interest rate hikes by the European Central Bank (ECB), with particularly adverse effects from the prolonged construction sector recession, ongoing geopolitical tensions, and worsening manufacturing conditions due to high interest rates."

The report continues, "Amid persistent adverse factors, the growth rate for steel demand industries is expected to decline to -1.6% in 2024, down from the previous forecast of -1%, with a rebound to 2.3% anticipated in 2025."

Notwithstanding the lowered forecasts for steel consumption and demand industries, import volumes have risen. According to the report, EU steel imports, including semi-finished products, increased by 12% year-over-year in the first quarter, mirroring the previous quarter's 11.3% rise.

Axel Eggert, EUROFER's Secretary General, emphasized, "While the EU's steel demand industries face a protracted downturn due to various adverse factors, import market share has risen significantly. This jeopardizes both European steel production and the associated clean technology value chains, necessitating urgent action at the EU level. The European Commission must swiftly conclude a European Clean Industry Agreement focused on the steel sector."

Japan Explores E-Scrap Opportunities in Southeast Asia Amid EU Supply Risks

Electronic Scrap

As concerns about European Union (EU) export restrictions grow, Japan is shifting its focus to Southeast Asia for electronic scrap (e-scrap) procurement to mitigate potential supply disruptions. This strategic pivot comes as the EU contemplates extending stringent controls on e-scrap exports, possibly affecting Japan, a nation heavily reliant on these resources for its non-ferrous metal production, including copper.

EU Regulations Tighten, Japan's Response

The recent implementation of the EU's Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR) in January 2023, which restricts scrap metal exports to non-OECD countries for environmental reasons, has raised alarms in Japan. Japanese custom data indicates that in 2023, Japan imported approximately 73,000 tons of e-scrap from the EU, accounting for about 40% of its total e-scrap imports. The Japanese Ministry of Environment highlights the country's dependence on imports to satisfy nearly half of its domestic e-scrap needs.

In response to the EU's policy shift and the consequent supply risk, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a circular economy initiative in August 2023, aiming to foster e-scrap procurement and processing in the region.

Challenges in Southeast Asia

Despite these efforts, the transition to Southeast Asian sources is not without challenges. A ministerial meeting between Japan and ASEAN in Laos in September revealed no specific advancements in circular economy discussions. The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (Eria) reported in 2023 that the region's smelting capacity for non-ferrous metals is significantly underdeveloped, with secondary production figures for aluminium and copper being notably low.

Moreover, the Global E-waste Monitor 2024 by the United Nations indicates a stark contrast in recycling rates between Asia (12% in 2022) and Europe (43%). Indonesia, while being the largest e-scrap producer in Southeast Asia, faces severe limitations in e-scrap management and infrastructure, often resorting to landfill disposal.

Conclusion

As Japan navigates these complex international dynamics, the necessity for diversified and secure e-scrap sources is more apparent than ever. The country's move towards Southeast Asia represents a cautious yet hopeful approach to securing the metals essential for its economic stability and technological advancements.

Chinese PV Industry Faces Overcapacity and Profit Losses: IEA Reports

Iea(The International Energy Agency)

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has issued a concerning report highlighting the overcapacity and declining profitability in China’s photovoltaic (PV) industry, which is the dominant force in the global solar energy supply chain. The report, presented during a webinar this Thursday, sheds light on the financial struggles faced by major Chinese manufacturers such as JA Solar Technology and LONGi Green Energy Technology, which have reported significant losses in their recent financial statements.

According to Izumi Kaizuka, an analyst at the IEA, the mood at the 17th SNEC PV conference in Shanghai this June was grim. Kaizuka quoted the founder of GCL Group, a major PV manufacturer, who expressed concern that the Chinese PV industry is "entering an ice age" due to a severe imbalance in supply and demand. The report also highlighted the bankruptcy of Zhejiang Akcome, one of China’s leading PV manufacturers, earlier this year, with the IEA predicting more closures in the near future.

China's Dominance in Global PV Production

Despite the struggles at home, China continues to dominate the global PV industry. In 2023, China accounted for more than half of the 456GW of global solar power capacity added, and nine of the top 10 PV suppliers in the first half of 2024 were Chinese-owned. The country has increased its production share across all segments of the PV supply chain, including polysilicon, crystalline silicon wafers, solar cells, and PV modules, with its share reaching 92%, 98%, 92%, and 85%, respectively, in 2023.

The rapid expansion of China’s PV capacity is evident, with the country increasing its own year-on-year solar additions by 123% from 2022 to 2023, followed by Italy (113%) and Germany (109%). However, the global demand for PV capacity is pushing countries like the EU and the US to expand their own solar production capabilities, with the EU installing over 56GW in 2023 alone.

The EU's Push for Solar Manufacturing

In response to its growing reliance on Chinese imports, the European Union (EU) has set ambitious targets to scale up domestic production of PV panels. Under the Net-Zero Industry Act, the EU aims to produce at least 40% of its annual needs for strategic net-zero technologies—including solar panels—by 2030. With current production at under 5GW annually, the EU is planning to ramp up its manufacturing capacity to 30GW per year by 2030 in order to meet its renewable energy goals.

As the global PV market faces challenges like overcapacity and supply-demand imbalances, the role of China in driving production and the EU’s efforts to boost its domestic capabilities will shape the future of the solar industry.

China and EU Resume Electric Vehicle Talks Amid Growing US Tariff Pressures

US tariff, China

Negotiations on Price Commitments Could Ease Trade Friction in the EV Market

China and the European Union (EU) have decided to resume negotiations regarding a price commitment mechanism for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). This decision follows the EU's implementation of countervailing duties on Chinese BEV imports in 2024. The goal of these talks is to replace the tariffs imposed on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), addressing ongoing trade tensions between China and the EU.

EU's Countervailing Duties and the Push for a Price Commitment Mechanism

In October 2024, the European Commission finalized its ruling on countervailing duties on BEVs imported from China, which came into effect at the end of October. These duties ranged from 17% to 35.3%, impacting major Chinese automakers like BYD, SAIC, and Geely. The aim was to counter what the EU viewed as unfair pricing practices by Chinese EV manufacturers. However, these tariffs have faced opposition from both China and European companies seeking to expand their market share in the fast-growing electric vehicle sector.

Despite early talks on a price commitment mechanism in November 2024, the discussions stalled without significant progress. However, on April 10, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that both sides had agreed to resume negotiations on the price commitments and to discuss broader issues of investment cooperation in the automotive industry.

US Tariffs Intensify the Pressure on China and the EU

The resumption of talks between China and the EU comes amidst escalating trade tensions with the United States. As of April 11, 2025, the US imposed a 145% tariff rate on imports from China, adding additional pressure on Chinese manufacturers, particularly in the electric vehicle and battery sectors. US President Donald Trump's tariffs, which were initially implemented in 2024, compounded by those under the Biden administration, have made it nearly impossible for Chinese EVs and lithium-ion batteries to enter the US market.

In an effort to counterbalance the US's growing tariff measures, China has been seeking closer economic ties with the EU. Chinese Premier Li Qiang held discussions with EU President Ursula von der Leyen on April 8, 2025, addressing the need for structural solutions to re-balance bilateral trade relations. The talks have emphasized the urgency of enhancing market access for European businesses in China and forging a collaborative approach to the challenges posed by US tariffs.

Potential Impact on the Electric Vehicle Market

If China and the EU reach an agreement on the price commitment mechanism, it could significantly alter the landscape for Chinese EVs in Europe. Prior to the implementation of the countervailing duties, the EU accounted for about 28% of China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) exports, which includes both BEVs and hybrid plug-in vehicles. However, the tariffs have drastically reduced Chinese EV exports to Europe.

The continuation of trade protectionist measures from both the US and the EU is putting immense pressure on China’s EV and battery markets, particularly as it struggles to enter key international markets. The future of Chinese electric vehicle exports largely hinges on these negotiations, and any breakthrough could bring Chinese-made EVs back into the competitive EU market.

EU Selects 47 Strategic Raw Materials Projects Under CRMA

EU

New Projects Aim to Boost European Raw Material Independence

The European Commission has announced 47 strategic raw materials projects across 13 EU countries under the Critical Raw Materials Act. These initiatives are part of the EU’s push to reduce foreign dependence and strengthen domestic supply chains by 2030.

The selected projects span extraction, processing, recycling, and substitution of key metals like lithium, nickel, and graphite. In total, they are expected to require €22.5 billion ($24.3 billion) in capital investment, with an accelerated permitting timeline.

Lithium and Nickel Dominate Strategic Focus

Among the 47 projects, 22 are focused on lithium, 12 on nickel, and 10 on cobalt—metals vital for green energy transitions. Projects also cover graphite, manganese, tungsten, and magnesium, all critical for battery, defense, and digital industries. The EU has set targets to meet 10% of its raw material extraction and 40% of processing needs internally by 2030. Savannah Resources’ Barroso lithium project in Portugal is among the featured initiatives with strategic classification status.

Stockpiling and Geopolitical Implications

The Commission is now gathering data on national stockpiles to assess safe storage levels for critical materials across the bloc. An EU raw materials center may coordinate stockpiling efforts starting next year, aligning with global practices in the US and China.

Given global geopolitical shifts, including US leadership changes, the EU is intensifying its focus on material security strategies. Officials stress that European clean tech independence should not lead to new forms of dependency—especially on China.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU's selection of 47 strategic raw materials projects signals a shift toward regional autonomy in critical mineral supply chains. If executed on time, the CRMA framework could reshape Europe's role in the global energy and defense materials landscape. However, execution speed and political cohesion across member states will ultimately determine the strategy’s success.

EU Russian Uranium Phase-Out Begins with New Nuclear Supply Restrictions

Russian Uranium

European Commission tightens rules on Russian uranium imports and nuclear fuel contracts

Member states shift to U.S., French, and Kazakh suppliers amid nuclear fuel diversification efforts

The EU Russian uranium phase-out is now officially underway as the European Commission enacts new measures targeting the region's dependency on Russian-origin nuclear materials. Beginning next month, the commission will block the Euratom Supply Agency from co-signing any new contracts involving uranium, enriched uranium, or related nuclear products sourced from Russia.

Enriched uranium imports from Russia to become “economically less viable”

While existing contracts—such as Finland’s Loviisa reactor fuel supply deal with Russia’s TVEL—will be honored through 2027 or 2030, the EU Russian uranium phase-out roadmap signals a clear pivot. The commission also plans to make importing enriched uranium from Russia economically unattractive, pushing member states toward non-Russian alternatives and internal supply chain development.

Last year, Russia supplied 14% of the EU’s total uranium, 23% of its uranium conversion services, and nearly 24% of enriched uranium. The move disproportionately affects five member states that operate Russian-designed VVER reactors: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia. However, several have already started transitioning to Western suppliers.

European utilities partner with Westinghouse, Framatome, and Kazatomprom

To support the phase-out, Westinghouse has signed fuel agreements with Bulgaria, Finland, and the Czech Republic. French nuclear firm Framatome will supply Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as well. Additionally, the Czech Republic has formed a new fuel partnership with Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s state-owned uranium producer.

These transitions underscore Europe’s growing effort to secure energy independence and reduce geopolitical risk in critical infrastructure sectors. The EU Russian uranium phase-out now stands as a major pillar of the bloc’s broader strategy to diversify its energy sources.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU’s decisive action on Russian uranium highlights how nuclear supply chains are now strategic assets. For metal and fuel producers outside of Russia—especially in North America and Central Asia—this opens new commercial and geopolitical opportunities in nuclear materials.

EU and UK Move Toward Linking Carbon Markets

EU and UK

The EU and UK have formally agreed to work toward linking their carbon emissions trading systems (ETS), a move expected to benefit both industries and climate policy alignment. The announcement, made during a summit in London, emphasized that a EU and UK carbon markets link would support fair trade and reduce carbon leakage between jurisdictions. According to the joint statement, such a link would also exempt both regions from their respective carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM), providing a more level playing field for domestic industries while maintaining environmental ambition.

ETS Link Could Unlock Significant Economic Gains

The linking of the EU and UK carbon markets could generate significant cost savings. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed British businesses could save £800 million in EU carbon taxes, while a recent industry-commissioned study projected up to €1.2 billion in savings from lower hedging costs due to improved market liquidity. While there is no timeline for implementation, market participants note that linking the Swiss ETS to the EU’s system took nearly a decade. Still, the potential economic efficiency and regulatory clarity have made the EU and UK carbon markets discussion a top priority for energy-intensive sectors across Europe.

Shared Climate Goals, Independent Ambitions

The agreement stressed that neither side should be constrained from pursuing more ambitious climate goals. The UK’s ETS remains guided by the legally binding Climate Change Act and its Paris Agreement commitments. The UK targets a 68% GHG reduction by 2030 and 81% by 2035, compared to 1990 levels. The EU aims for a 55% net reduction by 2030 and is still shaping its 2035 benchmark. Despite regulatory differences, both jurisdictions reaffirmed their commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050. The agreement also includes cooperation on hydrogen, CCS, biomethane, and a potential UK entry into the EU’s internal power market—further aligning EU and UK carbon markets within a broader clean energy framework.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The potential linkage of EU and UK carbon markets signals a return to pragmatic climate diplomacy. While structural alignment will take time, the economic and environmental incentives suggest both sides are committed to meaningful integration—setting a precedent for future carbon market collaborations globally.

European Aluminium Calls for Unified CO2 Calculation Standards

European Aluminium

Industry Push for Harmonised Emissions Methodology

European Aluminium has urged the EU to establish a universal methodology for calculating carbon emissions across aluminium value chains. The industry body warned that fragmented national approaches create compliance burdens and hinder the EU’s decarbonisation targets. Member states are currently using varied methods that include renewable energy credits, recycled inputs, and innovative processes, but lack of alignment reduces comparability and efficiency.

The association addressed its concerns directly to European Commission leaders, stressing that inconsistent emissions reporting undermines transparency. It highlighted the need for alignment to support the EU’s broader climate strategy, particularly as aluminium plays a critical role in low-carbon industries such as automotive, construction, and packaging.

Regulatory Landscape and Policy Recommendations

European Aluminium pointed to ongoing regulatory frameworks such as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) standards for EV batteries. These regulations demonstrate momentum toward emissions accountability but also expose gaps caused by inconsistent calculation methods.

The group expressed support for the European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal (CID), which aims to streamline reporting across EU institutions. However, it warned that achieving a single emissions calculation framework might require adjusting legislative deadlines to allow industry and regulators sufficient time for harmonisation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

A harmonised carbon calculation system would significantly reduce compliance costs for aluminium producers and ensure fair competition across the EU market. Without it, fragmented rules risk weakening Europe’s industrial base at a time when decarbonisation and strategic autonomy are top priorities. The call from European Aluminium underscores the urgency for the EU to deliver clarity and consistency.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.

EU Steel Industry Faces Key Policy Shifts: A Call for Concrete Measures

EU Steel

The mood among European policy makers regarding the steel industry has notably shifted, with increasing support for the sector’s future. According to Axel Eggert, director-general of Eurofer, the European steel industry association, policymakers are beginning to recognize the importance of addressing the growing challenges in global steel production. However, while this shift in mood is encouraging, Eggert emphasized that these positive words must be followed by tangible actions.

Rising Political Support for EU Steel Industry

Eggert pointed out that there is more political backing for the European steel sector, especially as lawmakers become increasingly aware of the massive overcapacity in global steel production, particularly CO2-intensive steel. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts that global steel capacity will grow by 157 million tons over the next three years, which will likely negate the decarbonization efforts of the EU steel industry.

In response, the European Parliament has called for a European steel action plan, which has been embraced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, Eggert stressed that while these statements are promising, they must be followed by concrete measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of the industry.

Green Steel and Public Procurement as Key Measures

One of the critical measures that Eggert advocates for is the implementation of public procurement for green steel. With the EU's ambitious decarbonization targets — a 55% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050 — Eggert emphasized that EU governments should lead by example. This means prioritizing green steel in public sector construction, vehicles, and other products, which would support European producers committed to decarbonizing their operations.

Global Overcapacity and Trade Distortions Impacting EU Steel

The steel industry crisis is largely driven by global overcapacity and low demand in Europe, exacerbated by high energy costs. Compounding this issue is the low-priced steel being exported by countries like China, Japan, and India, which depresses global markets. China’s exports, in particular, have been an issue for EU steel producers, as the country benefits from state subsidies, leading to significant trade distortions.

Eggert discussed how the EU has implemented anti-dumping measures on stainless steel from Indonesia, but Indonesia has circumvented these by exporting processed steel to third-party countries like Taiwan, Vietnam, and Turkey, which then re-export the products back to the EU. This tactic, along with the support from Chinese investments in Indonesia’s steel industry, has made Indonesia’s steel sector one of the largest globally.

EU Trade-Defense Measures: Need for Improvement

Eurofer has called for enhanced EU trade-defense measures to tackle issues such as dumping and excessive capacity from third countries. Eggert emphasized the need for improved steel safeguards and more effective enforcement of existing trade defense instruments. Currently, anti-dumping duties on Chinese steel are too low, undermining the efficacy of EU trade policies.

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Concerns

The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) has been another point of contention. Third countries are already looking to export steel from their lowest CO2-emitting plants to avoid paying CBAM costs. Eggert advocated for including indirect CO2 emissions (Scope 2 emissions) in the CBAM, particularly for stainless steel, which is a major contributor to indirect emissions.

Scrap Export Concerns and India's Decarbonization Challenge

Finally, Eggert addressed concerns from India regarding the potential for a European export ban on scrap metal. While the EU does not currently have a scrap export ban, Eggert pointed out that India itself has export restrictions on scrap and needs to focus more on decarbonizing its domestic steel sector. He also warned that if India delays its decarbonization efforts until 2070, the EU will face a significant disadvantage in the global steel market.