Switzerland Adopts EU’s Russian Aluminium Ban in Sanctions Alignment

Russian aluminium

Federal Council Moves to Restrict Russian and Belarusian Aluminium Imports

Switzerland has adopted the EU’s Russian aluminium ban, aligning with Brussels’ 16th sanctions package targeting Moscow’s industrial exports. The Focus Keyphrase "Switzerland Russian aluminium ban" marks a significant shift in Swiss trade policy, historically characterized by neutrality, as the country intensifies its stance against Russian aggression.

The Federal Council announced it will implement all remaining relevant EU sanctions, including a ban on Russian primary aluminium imports and a prohibition on chromium ore exports to Russia. These measures aim to reduce materials that contribute to Russia’s military and technological advancement. Switzerland imported approximately 173,000 tonnes of unwrought Russian aluminium in 2023, according to Global Trade Tracker.

Belarusian Aluminium Also Targeted as Sanctions Widen

In parallel, Switzerland will enforce additional sanctions on Belarus, citing its complicity in the Ukraine war. These include a ban on Belarusian primary aluminium imports and expanded restrictions on dual-use and military-enhancing goods.

The Council emphasized that aligning sanctions with the EU is intended to prevent circumvention via Belarus, ensuring a more unified and effective European sanctions regime. This harmonization reduces the risk of Russian commodities entering EU markets indirectly through Swiss or Belarusian channels.

Strategic Impact on European Aluminium Supply Chains

The Swiss ban on Russian aluminium imports adds further pressure on Europe’s primary aluminium supply, which is already constrained by energy costs and limited regional production. Traders and manufacturers must now reassess sourcing strategies, particularly for unwrought aluminium, as the region seeks alternatives from non-sanctioned producers such as Norway, Canada, and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the ban on chromium ore exports to Russia may impact specialty alloy production and stainless steel supply chains, especially those tied to aerospace and defense markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Switzerland’s adoption of the Russian aluminium ban underscores a growing consensus in Europe on restricting key industrial imports tied to Moscow. As sanctions converge and enforcement tightens, metals traders and manufacturers will need to recalibrate logistics and risk strategies in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Russian Aluminium Dominates LME Stocks Amid Decline in Indian-Origin Metal

Russian Aluminium Dominates LME Stocks Amid Decline in Indian-Origin Metal

The proportion of Russian aluminium stored in London Metal Exchange (LME) warehouses surged to 65% by the end of July, despite the overall quantity of Russian metal remaining largely stable. This shift in market share is primarily due to a significant reduction in the stock of Indian-origin aluminium, which depleted over the course of the month.

According to the latest report from the LME, Russian-origin aluminium on-warrant stocks totalled 233,775 tons at the end of July, marking a modest increase of 1,215 tons compared to the previous month. However, this relatively small increase led to Russian aluminium accounting for 65% of the total on-warrant LME stocks, a significant jump from 50% at the end of June. In contrast, the total on-warrant LME stocks fell to 359,250 tons, representing a 23% decline from the start of the month.

The LME distinguishes between two types of Russian aluminium warrants: Type-1, for metal stored before the LME's ban on Russian metals produced on or after April 13, and Type-2, which pertains to metal subject to trade restrictions imposed after that date. Type-1 Russian warrants decreased by 1.9% over the month to 225,450 tons, while Type-2 warrants increased from 2,775 tons to 8,325 tons.

Meanwhile, Indian-origin aluminium stocks in LME warehouses fell sharply, down by 37% to 119,575 tons by the end of July. This decline reduced the Indian share of total on-warrant LME stock to one-third, down from 41% at the end of June.

Earlier this year, Russian aluminium accounted for as much as 90% of LME stocks as Western consumers increasingly self-sanctioned against Russian metal in response to geopolitical tensions. This led to calls for a complete ban on Russian metal deliveries, which was eventually implemented by the LME in April, following new sanctions from the UK and US governments.

Rusal 2025 Loss Highlights Cost Pressure on Russian Aluminium Producer

Rusal

Rusal 2025 loss results show how currency pressure, higher raw material costs, and disrupted sales routes continue to weigh on Russia’s aluminium sector. The Russian aluminium producer posted a net loss of $455 million in 2025 despite higher revenue and stronger aluminium selling prices.

Rusal 2025 loss was driven largely by $431 million in exchange rate losses as the strong rouble reduced earnings. The company also faced a 12.4% rise in production costs to $2,276/t, mainly because raw petroleum coke prices increased by 21.8%.

The Rusal 2025 loss also reflects the cost of operating under sanctions. Selling expenses rose by 25% as logistics costs increased and the company continued to adjust sales chains after western markets restricted exchange-traded Russian-origin aluminium.

Higher Revenue Failed to Offset Sanctions and Cost Inflation

Rusal’s revenue rose by 22.6% to $14.81 billion in 2025, supported by stronger aluminium buying prices. Average aluminium selling prices increased by 5.23% to $2,652/t, while alumina prices fell by 23.26% to $386/t.

However, stronger sales did not translate into profit recovery. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation fell by 29.5% to $1.05 billion, showing that higher volumes and better aluminium prices were not enough to absorb cost inflation and foreign exchange losses.

Aluminium production declined by 1.85% to 3.92 million tonnes. However, sales rose by 16.35% to 4.49 million tonnes as Rusal sold down stocks that had built up in the previous year.

Upstream Growth Expands Alumina and Bauxite Supply Base

Rusal increased alumina output by 6.66% to 6.86 million tonnes in 2025. The increase was supported by its 30% stake in Chinese alumina producer Hebei Wenfeng New Materials and a 26% stake in India’s Pioneer Aluminium Industries.

The company also expanded bauxite production by 16.17% to 18.45 million tonnes. Growth came from capacity expansion projects at its Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia and Dian-Dian mines in Guinea.

These upstream gains strengthen Rusal’s raw material position. Still, they do not fully remove the strategic pressure from sanctions, logistics disruption, currency volatility, and rising input costs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Rusal’s results show that aluminium producers can face margin pressure even when headline prices improve. For Russian aluminium, the central challenge is no longer only production scale, but the cost of reaching markets under sanctions and fragmented trade routes.

Asian Aluminium Premiums Stay Subdued as QMJP Offers Test Buyer Resistance

Aluminum

Asian aluminium premiums remained subdued this week as buyers assessed sharply higher quarterly cif main Japan port offers for July-September delivery. Two major producers opened QMJP negotiations at $460/t and $480/t, far above the April-June settlement of $350-353/t.

Asian aluminium premiums are now being pulled in two directions. Western-origin metal has tightened after the Iran war disrupted supply, giving producers a basis for higher offers. However, weak demand and greater availability of alternative units are limiting spot-market momentum.

Asian aluminium premiums also remain below the new QMJP offers. Current spot indications are around $320-380/t, while P1020 fca Korea indications for non-Russian material were heard at $320-350/t.

The gap between producer offers and spot levels suggests buyers may resist paying the full proposed premium. If QMJP settles above $400/t, non-western brands could continue trading below the benchmark.

Western-Origin Tightness Supports Higher Producer Offers

The higher QMJP offers reflect tighter availability of western-origin aluminium in Asia. Supply disruption linked to the Iran war has reduced confidence in some traditional flows, pushing producers to test stronger premium levels.

This is important because QMJP remains a key reference for aluminium trade across Asia. A high settlement can influence physical premiums, contract pricing and buyer behaviour beyond Japan.

However, the market is not uniformly tight. Some Asian smelters have received enquiries and are willing to sell into Europe or offer small volumes in Asia. Others prefer to wait for clearer direction from the QMJP negotiations.

This cautious behaviour shows how benchmark talks can freeze spot activity. Buyers do not want to commit at high levels before the benchmark is settled, while sellers do not want to underprice material if premiums rise.

The immediate market signal is therefore uncertainty, not shortage. Western-origin units command support, but broader aluminium availability remains mixed.

Stranded Wire and Russian Units Cap Spot Upside

Alternative supply is limiting the impact of higher QMJP offers. Stranded wire and Russian-origin aluminium units are weighing on sales of other brands, especially where buyers are more price-sensitive.

China’s exports of aluminium stranded wire rose sharply in April. Shipments under HS code 761490 increased by 166% year on year to 15,567t.

South Korea and Vietnam absorbed much larger volumes. Chinese shipments to South Korea surged to 2,911t, while shipments to Vietnam climbed to 2,288t. Exports to Thailand also rose to 619t.

These flows matter because stranded wire can create substitute supply pressure in regional aluminium markets. When alternative units are available, buyers have less urgency to accept premium increases for standard brands.

Russian-origin aluminium also remains a price-sensitive factor. Some buyers continue to avoid Russian material for policy or corporate reasons, but availability still affects regional market balance and non-western brand pricing.

Demand remains the bigger constraint. Buyers are likely to reduce volumes if both LME prices and QMJP premiums stay high. This limits the ability of producers to convert tight western-origin supply into broad spot-market price gains.

The next quarter may therefore produce a divided market. Western-origin material could secure stronger contract premiums, while non-western and alternative units trade at discounts.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Asia’s aluminium market is not rejecting higher premiums; it is questioning which metal deserves them. The real split is between tight western-origin supply and a softer regional market still supported by stranded wire, Russian units and weak demand.

EU Russian Energy Imports Ban Holds Firm Despite New Energy Crisis

EU Russian Energy

EU Russian energy imports will not return under the European Commission’s current policy direction, even as the bloc faces renewed energy pressure from the Middle East conflict. EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said Brussels will continue phasing out Russian gas and still plans to cut Russian oil imports.

EU Russian energy imports have become a strategic red line for Brussels. The Commission argues that returning to Russian supply would recreate the dependency that exposed Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

EU Russian energy imports are again being debated because higher oil and gas costs are hitting parts of the European economy. However, Brussels is treating the current disruption as a reason to accelerate energy diversification, not reopen Russian supply channels.

The position links energy security directly to industrial resilience. Europe now wants less exposure to both Russian energy and Middle East supply disruption, while shifting more demand toward domestic, renewable and alternative energy systems.

Russian Oil Phase-Out Remains Politically Sensitive

The Commission has not yet presented new legal measures to phase out Russian oil imports. It delayed a proposal originally scheduled for 15 April and has not set a new publication date.

Still, Brussels says a permanent Russian oil ban remains a priority. That matters because Hungary and Slovakia remain the only EU importers of Russian crude, keeping pipeline supply through Druzhba at the centre of political negotiations.

Hungary had opposed blocking Russian oil imports under Viktor Orban. His successor, Peter Magyar, has acknowledged that Hungary cannot end Druzhba imports immediately, but has pledged to eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.

Slovakia has also linked Russian oil flows to its support for further sanctions against Moscow. Bratislava has indicated it could support another sanctions package once Russian oil reaches Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline.

This shows the difficulty of EU energy policy. The bloc wants a unified strategic position, but member states still have different infrastructure, refinery configurations and supply dependencies.

The Druzhba pipeline therefore remains more than a crude route. It is a political lever in sanctions, energy security and Ukraine-related financing discussions.

Energy Crisis Reinforces Clean Supply Strategy

The current Middle East energy crisis has intensified the EU’s focus on supply security. Jorgensen said the disruption is comparable in seriousness to the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 Russian energy shock.

The Commission expects LNG prices to take years to stabilise. It also expects oil capacity to need months to normalise after the war ends, showing that energy disruption can outlast military events.

This strengthens the EU case for domestic and clean energy. The Commission wants to reduce import dependence through renewables, electrification, storage, hydrogen and alternative fuels.

For industry, the implication is clear. Europe’s energy security strategy will increasingly affect metals, grids, chemicals, transport fuels and clean technology supply chains.

Lower Russian energy dependence also raises demand for infrastructure. Europe will need more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, renewable equipment and grid materials to replace fossil fuel exposure with domestic power systems.

The policy challenge is execution. Europe must cut Russian dependence while managing fuel prices, refinery supply, LNG volatility, industrial competitiveness and political pressure from member states.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s refusal to return to Russian energy shows that energy security has become an industrial sovereignty issue. The next test is whether the EU can replace fossil dependency with real domestic energy infrastructure fast enough to protect industry from repeated external shocks.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.

Rusal Begins Commercial Production of Low-Carbon Foundry Alloys

Rusal

Post-Consumer Scrap Boosts Low-Carbon Aluminium Output

Russian aluminium producer Rusal has commenced commercial production of low-carbon foundry alloys at its Irkutsk aluminium smelter. The new production line integrates post-consumer scrap into Rusal’s Allow brand, which is manufactured using renewable hydropower. This move strengthens the company’s position in the growing low-carbon aluminium market.

Rusal began trial production in early 2023 with scrap accounting for around 20% of feedstock. The proportion has now increased to approximately 40% for commercial output. According to the company, the process involves adding consumer scrap to molten low-carbon aluminium, ensuring both emissions reduction and efficient resource use.

Targeting the Automotive Industry’s Sustainability Demands

The adoption of low-carbon foundry alloys is driven by rising demand from industries prioritizing sustainability, particularly automotive manufacturing. Rusal aims to supply customers seeking environmentally responsible aluminium units for casting components. By combining recycled materials with hydropower-based aluminium production, the company aligns with global carbon reduction goals and offers a competitive advantage in markets with strict sustainability standards.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Rusal’s integration of post-consumer scrap into low-carbon aluminium reflects a critical industry trend toward circular production models. The ability to meet both environmental targets and performance standards will be key in capturing market share in sectors like automotive, where sustainability is becoming a procurement requirement. This approach also demonstrates how aluminium producers can reduce emissions without compromising product quality.

Challenging Market Conditions Limit Low-Carbon Aluminium Premium

Aluminium

Demand for low-carbon aluminium in Europe has grown steadily in recent years, with consumers willing to pay a premium for sustainable products like Hydro's Reduxa, Alcoa's EcoLum, and Rusal's Allow, which have a carbon footprint of 4t or less per tonne of aluminium. Despite this, tough market conditions have capped how much more buyers are willing to pay over regional premiums.

During the summer, some low-carbon aluminium was offered with no premium over standard aluminium, as overall demand in the aluminium sector remained weak. The upcharge for low-carbon aluminium continues to hover at lower levels, a result of sluggish demand across various industries, including automotive, construction, and packaging. This is compounded by the fact that the European premium for standard aluminium remains relatively high, driven by tight global supply and a shift away from Russian metal.

While the current market dynamics are challenging, the long-term outlook for low-carbon aluminium is optimistic. In recent years, manufacturers have increasingly prioritized sustainability, with life-cycle assessments and specific carbon footprint goals driving demand in industries like automotive, packaging, and construction. The introduction of market regulations, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, is expected to further accelerate demand for low-carbon aluminium, pushing companies to emphasize sustainability even more.

However, a liquid, widely available spot market for low-carbon aluminium is still far off. Most of the material is supplied to select customers through contracts, though some is sold on the broader market during slower periods, such as the summer months.

To secure its place in the broader market, low-carbon aluminium will need to solidify its definition and standardize how producers calculate carbon footprints, taking into account the raw materials they use. Investments in new technologies, such as inert anodes and carbon capture projects, are expected to lower emissions further, ensuring that low-carbon aluminium continues to evolve and meet future sustainability standards.

Rusal's 2024 Earnings Surge Despite Sanctions and Market Headwinds

Rusal

Aluminium giant increases EBITDA by 90% amid sanctions, falling costs, and domestic market pivot

Russia’s top aluminium producer Rusal reported a dramatic earnings increase in 2024, despite facing international sanctions and weak global demand. The company’s EBITDA soared to $1.49 billion, a 90% jump year-on-year, thanks to lower production costs and a strategic pivot to domestic markets.

Rusal’s revenues dipped slightly by 1.1% to $12.08 billion, but net profits surged to $803 million, up from $282 million in 2023. The producer boosted aluminium output to 3.99 million tonnes, up 3.7%, and alumina production by 25% to 6.43 million tonnes.

Notably, Rusal acquired a 30% stake in Hebei Wenfeng New Materials in late 2023, securing access to 1.4 million tonnes per year of alumina in China’s Hebei province. The company also lifted bauxite output by 18.8% to 15.89 million tonnes.

Sanctions Drive Market Realignment

In April 2024, the US and UK banned exchange-traded Russian aluminium, copper, and nickel, barring imports and services tied to these metals. The London Metal Exchange (LME) subsequently banned Russian-origin metals from its warehouses, intensifying pressure on Rusal.

Despite these barriers, Rusal successfully reorganized its export channels and expanded domestic sales, minimizing disruption. The company also lowered its overall cost of sales by 11.3%, aided by falling raw material and energy costs.

Aluminium prices rose 3.3% on average in 2024, while alumina prices surged nearly 47% due to global supply constraints.

Outlook Remains Cautious

Rusal noted that the global aluminium industry remained under pressure from volatile input prices, sluggish demand, and high interest rates. Yet, by shifting to local markets and improving operational efficiency, the company weathered macroeconomic turbulence and reinforced its production base.

Tight Supply: The Key Driver in Europe's Aluminium Market

European aluminium markets remain sluggish, showing little recovery from the typical summer slowdown. With demand in key sectors like automotive and construction failing to rebound, trading activity has yet to pick up, leaving traders and distributors with limited sales opportunities. Despite this, premiums held steady throughout September, driven primarily by the tight supply rather than demand fluctuations, a trend that has persisted since early 2023.

A key factor behind the limited supply has been a series of production cuts across Europe over the past two years. Additionally, Russian aluminium has been largely absent from the market due to both official sanctions from countries like the UK and the US, and self-sanctioning by consumers. This has compounded the strain on availability, as China has aggressively increased its imports from international suppliers, further squeezing European access to aluminium.

Although premiums initially edged back to a range of $320-340/t earlier in the summer, they have since remained stable, flatlining between $320-430/t throughout June, July, and August, even as demand declined. Many expected that autumn would bring an uptick in demand, particularly from the automotive sector, but no such recovery has occurred. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has been particularly affected, with its industrial production showing significant declines, especially in the construction sector, which has struggled throughout the decade. The automotive sector, led by giants like Volkswagen, has also suffered, with discussions of factory closures further dimming the outlook.

One market analyst noted, "There has been no bounce-back from the end of the summer. Stockists and distributors still have empty inboxes, which is very unusual for this time of year." Demand in both the automotive and construction sectors remains weak, yet premiums have not moved, reflecting the continued tightness in supply. China’s increasing aluminium imports, spurred by its near-cap on domestic production and energy efficiency mandates, have further limited supply in Europe.

Moreover, tightness in the alumina market, the primary input for aluminium production, has added additional pressure. A significant production drop from key supplier Rio Tinto, alongside high freight costs and limited exports from regions like the Middle East and India, have all contributed to the constrained supply environment. With demand expected to remain muted well into 2025, the European aluminium market seems likely to stay tight, making any small uptick in demand a potential trigger for premium increases.

Rusal Launches Scandium Oxide Pilot Plant to Boost Russia’s Rare Earth Capabilities

Rusal

New Facility at Bogoslovsky Smelter to Produce Scandium from Red Mud, Potentially Expanding Global Supply by 75%

Rusal Sets Up Pilot Scandium Plant at Krasnoturinsk Smelter

Russian aluminium giant Rusal has announced the launch of a pilot scandium oxide facility at its Bogoslovsky aluminium smelter in Krasnoturinsk, Russia, aiming to produce 1.5 tonnes per year of scandium oxide. Given the global scandium output of just 20–25 t/yr, this project marks a major addition to global capacity.

Rusal plans to extract scandium from red mud, a waste by-product of alumina refining, using proprietary technology developed at its Krasnoyarsk Engineering and Technology Center. This contrasts with conventional scandium sources, which are typically by-products of titanium dioxide or uranium production.

If scaled to full commercial operation, the plant could eventually produce up to 19 t/yr of scandium oxide, placing Rusal among the world’s top producers of this high-value rare earth element.

Scandium Alloy Demand Rising Across Aerospace and 3D Printing Sectors

Scandium oxide is used to create aluminium-scandium alloys for ultra-lightweight structural components in ships, aircraft, railcars, and additive manufacturing (3D printing). These alloys enhance strength while reducing weight—making them highly desirable in aerospace and defense applications.

Rusal’s investment in the pilot project totals 500 million roubles ($5.73 million), with commissioning expected by year-end 2025. The project also aligns with broader geopolitical trends, including Russia’s renewed push to increase rare earth production. President Vladimir Putin has recently emphasized rare earths as a strategic priority for the country.

Russia Eyes Rare Earth Deals Despite Sanctions Landscape

On 25 February, Russia signaled its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on developing rare earth assets, despite ongoing geopolitical tensions. This scandium oxide initiative positions Rusal—and Russia more broadly—as a significant player in non-Chinese rare earth supply chains, especially as nations look to diversify sources of strategic minerals.

Global Aluminium Production Hits Record Daily Output in June

Global aluminium production achieved a record-high daily output last month, driven by capacity expansions in China’s Inner Mongolia and restarts in Yunnan province following robust summer rainfall.

According to data from International Aluminium, global production reached 5.94 million tonnes in June, up by 3.18% year-on-year. Although total production fell below the revised May figure of 6.14 million tonnes due to June being a shorter month, daily output increased to 198,000 tonnes in June from 197,900 tonnes in May.

Chinese production rose by 4.22% year-on-year to 3.53 million tonnes. However, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that June output reached 3.67 million tonnes.

The output boost was attributed to the restart of previously curbed production capacity in Yunnan province. Power restrictions had been implemented earlier this year due to limited hydropower availability, but these restrictions were lifted following heavy rainfall in recent months. Additionally, capacity expansions in Inner Mongolia contributed to increased production, spurred by higher aluminium prices.

Production also grew across most other regions. North American output rose by 1.25% year-on-year to 325,000 tonnes in June, while Western Europe saw a 4.93% increase to 234,000 tonnes.

In Asia, excluding China, output grew by 2.87% to 394,000 tonnes. South American production increased by 3.31% to 125,000 tonnes.

Russian and Eastern European production rose by nearly 4% to 340,000 tonnes, and production in Australasia edged up by 0.65% to 154,000 tonnes.

Output slightly decreased in the Middle East by 0.59% to 507,000 tonnes and in Africa by 0.76% to 130,000 tonnes.

Treibacher Affirms Compliance with US Sanctions on Russian Vanadium, Ensures Stable Supply of FeV and V205

Treibacher

Austrian metals producer Treibacher announced today that it had proactively ended all dealings with suppliers connected to Russian-origin vanadium prior to the latest US sanctions taking effect last week. The company confirmed its compliance with these sanctions, which aim to restrict Russian vanadium supply chains and particularly affect major steelmaker Evraz Group’s operations, including its Vanadi Tula facility producing vanadium pentoxide (V205).

The US government’s August sanctions have intensified concerns among vanadium buyers, especially for products like ferro-vanadium and vanadium-aluminium alloys, essential in aerospace titanium grades. Treibacher has faced questions from buyers uncertain about the “clean” origin of its materials. In response, Treibacher issued a public statement to reassure clients, affirming that it strictly adheres to the sanctions.

"Treibacher continues to utilise its own substantial feedstock and its extensive global supplier network to secure the supply of vanadium oxide and ferro-vanadium to its customers," the company stated, highlighting its global resource network and robust supply chain.

Since the announcement of these sanctions, some market participants have reportedly raised their offer prices to leverage the uncertainty surrounding Russian vanadium supplies.

Trump 10pc tariffs plan raises fresh uncertainty for global trade

Trump tariffs

Trump 10pc tariffs are emerging as a backup weapon in Washington’s trade arsenal as legal scrutiny intensifies. Trump 10pc tariffs would act as a temporary bridge if the Supreme Court strikes down his 2025 emergency duties, reshaping how the White House uses trade law. For companies exposed to cross-border supply chains, Trump 10pc tariffs add another layer of risk on top of already complex tariff regimes.

Legal uncertainty around Trump 10pc tariffs and emergency powers

The administration is preparing a fallback plan that would immediately impose a temporary 10pc duty on imports if the Supreme Court overturns current emergency tariffs. Officials signal that Trump 10pc tariffs would likely rely on Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allows up to 15pc tariffs for 150 days to address balance-of-payments issues. However, any extension beyond that window would require explicit congressional approval, injecting political risk into what has so far been a unilateral tariff strategy.

At the same time, the White House is mapping a second phase based on well-tested authorities such as Section 232 and Section 301. These tools target specific products or countries on national security or unfair trade grounds but require investigations, public consultations and time. As a result, Trump 10pc tariffs would function as a legal stopgap while more targeted measures are built, rather than a permanent framework. The pending Supreme Court decision on the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) will determine how far presidents can stretch emergency powers into broad-based tariff policy.

The court’s ruling will directly impact emergency tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China justified by fentanyl-related “economic emergencies,” along with broader duties of 10pc and higher on nearly all US trading partners. It will also affect emergency measures aimed at Brazil and India, where tariffs were tied to alleged speech suppression and Russian crude imports. But tariffs on steel, aluminium, cars and auto parts imposed under traditional authorities would remain intact, preserving some of the most consequential industry-specific barriers.

Revenue, refunds and the corporate “tariff overhang”

A critical question troubling even conservative justices is whether sweeping tariffs function as taxes that only Congress may levy. The US Treasury has collected nearly $260bn in customs duties during the first 11 months of Trump’s second term, creating a massive “tariff overhang.” Hundreds of companies have already filed lawsuits seeking refunds, turning the Supreme Court decision into a potential trigger for complex, multi-year repayment disputes.

The administration argues that tariffs are policy instruments, not taxes, and warns that broad refunds would be administratively chaotic and fiscally painful. Trump himself has said repaying duties “would be a complete mess,” signalling that even if the court limits IEEPA, the White House will resist rapid, sweeping restitution. For global manufacturers, traders and end-users, this means that current and historic tariff exposure may remain a financial and legal uncertainty for years.

The Metalnomist Commentary

For metals and industrial supply chains, the Trump 10pc tariffs debate is about far more than headline percentages. It is redefining the legal boundaries of presidential trade power, shaping how future administrations can weaponise tariffs in strategic sectors from steel and aluminium to critical minerals. Boardrooms should treat this not as a one-off legal drama, but as a structural shift toward more politicised, less predictable trade governance.

ATTM Titanium Sponge Operations Continue Despite Middle East Freight Risk

ATTM

ATTM titanium sponge operations remain normal despite rising logistics pressure from the war in the Middle East. The Saudi Arabian titanium sponge producer has reported no direct operational impact and does not expect material disruption to exports at this stage.

The company is a joint venture between Saudi group AMIC and Japan’s Toho Titanium. Its plant is located in Yanbu, on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, giving the facility strategic access to international titanium feedstock and export routes.

ATTM titanium sponge operations matter because the company supplies aerospace-grade titanium sponge to major Western markets, including the US, UK, France, and Italy. It also supplies ferro-titanium grades to Estonia, with smaller volumes shipped elsewhere.

Titanium Supply Chain Faces Freight and Feedstock Exposure

Regional freight markets have become more volatile as conflict disrupts shipping routes and energy-linked supply chains across the Middle East. Several aluminium production facilities have already faced production pressure because they could not secure imported feedstocks, energy supplies, or export access.

ATTM said it is actively managing logistics and does not anticipate material export disruption. This is important because Saudi Arabia imports most of its titanium ore and concentrate feedstocks from Mozambique and Australia.

ATTM titanium sponge operations therefore depend not only on plant performance, but also on inbound ore logistics and outbound sponge shipment routes. Any sustained disruption in freight availability, insurance costs, or port access could still affect titanium supply timing even if production remains stable.

Aerospace Sponge Output Remains Strategically Important

ATTM produced 12,000t of titanium sponge in 2025, compared with a nameplate capacity of 15,600 t/yr. That makes the company a meaningful non-Russian and non-Chinese titanium sponge source for aerospace and industrial customers.

The company’s relationship with Toho Titanium also strengthens its technical position. Aerospace-grade sponge requires strict control over chemistry, trace elements, and production consistency, making qualification and supplier reliability more important than spot-market availability.

For Western aerospace supply chains, stable ATTM titanium sponge operations provide reassurance during a period of geopolitical stress. However, the situation also highlights a broader vulnerability: titanium sponge supply remains concentrated in a small number of qualified producers, while feedstock logistics depend on long-distance maritime routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

ATTM’s stability is positive for aerospace titanium buyers, but the real risk sits in logistics rather than furnace operations. Titanium sponge customers should treat Middle East freight disruption as a supply-chain risk that can emerge before production itself is affected.

EU Green Procurement Rules Face Industry Criticism Over Weak Steel and Fertilizer Demand

Hydrogen Europe

EU green procurement rules are drawing sharp criticism from Hydrogen Europe after leaked draft legislation reduced the proposed low-carbon steel requirement in public procurement to 25pc from an earlier 70pc. The industry group said the change weakens the demand signal needed to support green steel, hydrogen, and low-carbon industrial investment.

EU green procurement rules in the latest draft require steel used in buildings, infrastructure, and transport projects to include at least 25pc low-carbon steel by volume. Hydrogen Europe argues that this level is too low to create a bankable market for emerging producers such as Stegra, Hydnum Steel, Saarstahl, and Salzgitter.

The dispute highlights a central problem in Europe’s industrial transition. Producers are being asked to invest in low-carbon steel, hydrogen, and cleaner fertilizers, but public procurement rules may not create enough guaranteed demand to justify those investments.

Low-Carbon Steel Requirement Falls Short of Industry Expectations

The reduction from 70pc to 25pc changes the industrial meaning of the proposal. A higher procurement target would have created a stronger lead market for European green steel, giving producers clearer demand visibility and helping justify capital spending on hydrogen-based and low-emission production routes.

Hydrogen Europe said the current draft does little to improve competitiveness against Chinese steel and Russian fertilizer imports. This is important because European producers face higher energy costs, strict carbon rules, and heavy investment requirements, while import competition continues to pressure margins.

The Industrial Accelerator Act still recognizes energy-intensive sectors through greenhouse gas intensity classification systems. These include fertilizers, chemicals, rubber, paper, plastics, coke, refined petroleum products, cement, glass, steel, and aluminium. However, the draft does not set green public procurement requirements for most of these product groups.

Fertilizer Sector Waits for Stronger Demand Measures

The fertilizer sector appears to receive limited support in the current draft. Industry sources said the sector may need to wait for the Fertiliser Action Plan, expected in the second quarter, for more concrete demand-side measures.

Low-carbon fertilizers matter because they connect clean ammonia, hydrogen demand, agriculture, and food supply chains. However, procurement requirements are more politically complex because agriculture remains highly sensitive to cost increases and supply security concerns.

The final clean product procurement percentage will be negotiated over the next 12-18 months by the European parliament and EU member states. That process will determine whether EU green procurement rules become a serious industrial policy tool or remain a limited climate-labeling framework.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s problem is no longer only technology readiness; it is market creation. Without stronger demand rules for low-carbon steel, hydrogen, and fertilizers, the EU risks asking companies to invest in clean capacity without giving them a reliable customer base.

Dark-Fleet Vessel Recycling Enters Regulated Channel With US License for GMS

GMS

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has entered a new regulatory phase after Dubai-based ship and offshore asset recycler GMS secured a US government license to buy and recycle sanctioned vessels. The approval creates a formal pathway for disposing of ships tied to sanctions risk.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has historically operated through opaque channels, especially as older tankers linked to Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil trades moved outside mainstream shipping markets. GMS said this is the first time a cash buyer has legally acquired and recycled sanctioned vessels under a fully authorised US licensing framework.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling now has a potential model for governments seeking to combine sanctions enforcement, environmental oversight and asset disposal. The license followed nearly seven months of review by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, with support from the US State Department.

The company has not disclosed the number or names of vessels acquired. But the approval itself is significant because aging sanctioned tonnage is becoming a larger safety, compliance and environmental challenge for global shipping.

OFAC License Creates a Compliance Route for Sanctioned Vessel Disposal

The OFAC license gives GMS legal approval to purchase and recycle several sanctioned vessels from the dark fleet. This matters because sanctioned ships are difficult to handle through normal commercial channels.

Banks, insurers, brokers, ports, shipyards and recyclers often avoid sanctioned assets because of legal and reputational risk. That leaves vessels exposed to informal transactions, weak oversight and poor end-of-life management.

A regulated license changes that structure. It allows disposal to take place under documented compliance checks, government review and controlled transaction procedures.

The dark fleet consists of sanctioned and unsanctioned older tankers used to move oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela while bypassing western sanctions. Many of these vessels operate outside mainstream shipping systems and may carry higher safety and environmental risks.

GMS said more than 30 sanctioned vessels have been recycled in India and elsewhere in recent years through opaque and largely unregulated channels. A licensed route could reduce that leakage into informal markets.

The development could also influence Europe. GMS views the approval as a possible model for other governments that need a lawful way to remove sanctioned vessels from global trade.

Ship Recycling Becomes a Sanctions and Materials Issue

The industrial significance extends beyond vessel disposal. Ship recycling produces ferrous and non-ferrous scrap that can re-enter steel and metals supply chains if handled under proper environmental and compliance standards.

Older tankers contain large volumes of recyclable steel, along with machinery, copper-bearing equipment, aluminium components and other recoverable materials. But sanctioned origin and weak documentation can complicate resale and downstream acceptance.

Regulated recycling pathways can improve traceability. They can also help ensure that scrap generated from sanctioned vessels does not move through hidden channels that undermine sanctions policy.

This creates a new intersection between shipbreaking, sanctions enforcement and circular metals. Recycling is no longer only about recovering material value. It is also about proving legal origin, environmental responsibility and financial accountability.

The timing is important. Aging dark-fleet tonnage is likely to keep rising as sanctions, insurance limits and safety concerns restrict normal fleet operations. Without formal disposal routes, more vessels could end up in poorly monitored recycling channels.

For cash buyers and recyclers, the GMS license may create a more legitimate business model. For governments, it provides a tool to remove risky vessels while controlling the financial and material flow around them.

The broader market should watch whether this becomes a repeatable framework. If more sanctioned vessels are recycled under licensed systems, ship recycling could become a meaningful part of sanctions implementation and circular metals governance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GMS has turned sanctioned vessel recycling into a compliance business rather than a grey-market disposal problem. The next challenge is whether regulators can scale this model before aging dark-fleet tankers create larger safety, environmental and financial risks.