China Critical Mineral Export Controls Tighten With New Enforcement Rules

China, Critical mineral

China critical mineral export controls are becoming more stringent as Beijing introduces new mechanisms to identify violations, prevent circumvention and strengthen oversight of strategic mineral shipments. The latest reporting framework takes effect on 1 July 2026 and specifically targets violations involving strategic mineral dual-use items.

China critical mineral export controls increasingly affect more than exporters themselves. Traders, processors, freight companies, overseas customers and intermediaries may need stronger documentation on product classification, end users, licensing and shipment routes as enforcement becomes more detailed.

China critical mineral export controls are also being reinforced by a separate supply-chain security investigation framework. The Ministry of Commerce can investigate foreign measures or commercial actions that it determines may damage China's industrial and supply-chain security.

The combined measures reinforce Beijing's use of regulatory oversight across critical mineral supply chains. For international buyers, compliance risk is becoming increasingly important alongside physical availability and price.

Circumvention and Third-Country Routing Face Greater Scrutiny

The new export-control reporting framework encourages organisations and individuals to report suspected violations. These include exports without licences, shipments outside approved licence conditions and exports of prohibited strategic mineral dual-use items.

The rules also explicitly address efforts to circumvent controls. They cover practices such as modifying or splitting controlled products into parts or components to avoid licensing requirements.

This is particularly important for complex industrial supply chains. Critical mineral products can move through multiple processors, traders and jurisdictions before reaching a final manufacturer.

China is therefore increasing pressure on companies to prove not only what they are exporting, but also where the material ultimately goes and how it will be used.

Authorities may provide rewards for verified reports of violations. Companies that identify potential non-compliance themselves are also encouraged to report voluntarily, with self-reporting potentially considered when penalties are determined.

The compliance burden will be especially significant for materials used in both civilian and defence applications. Rare earths, gallium, germanium, tungsten and antimony all have important roles in advanced electronics, aerospace, defence, semiconductors and industrial manufacturing.

Supply-Chain Security Rules Add Another Policy Layer

China's new supply-chain security investigation rules give the Ministry of Commerce authority to investigate certain foreign restrictions or discriminatory actions affecting Chinese industrial supply chains. The framework allows investigations into measures by foreign governments, organisations and individuals that may cause material harm or threats to China's supply-chain security.

The rules provide for investigations, information collection and other review procedures. Depending on findings, authorities may apply measures affecting trade or other economic activity.

This policy arrives alongside tighter entity-specific export controls. On 22 June, China added 10 US entities to its export control restricted list, including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, prohibiting exports of dual-use items to those companies except through approved exceptions.

The significance for global critical mineral markets is clear. Supply availability is increasingly determined not only by production capacity, but also by licences, end-use approvals, destination risk and geopolitical relations.

This raises the value of alternative processing and recycling capacity outside China. Companies that rely on Chinese-origin rare earths or other strategic minerals will need stronger compliance systems and more diversified supply strategies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is turning critical mineral exports into a more closely monitored strategic supply chain rather than a conventional commodity trade. For buyers, the emerging risk is not simply whether material exists, but whether it can legally and reliably move through the entire chain.

Sherritt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Canada’s Dependence on Cuban Nickel Feed

Sherritt International

Sherritt refinery shutdown plans will halt nickel and cobalt production at the company’s Fort Saskatchewan facility in Alberta after feedstock from Cuba’s Moa joint venture ran out. The move highlights how upstream disruption can strand downstream refining capacity even in a politically secure jurisdiction.

Sherritt refinery shutdown operations will remain in place until mining and processing at Moa can resume and mixed sulfide precipitate shipments to Canada are restored. The company has not given a restart timeline.

Sherritt refinery shutdown is strategically important because Fort Saskatchewan converts Cuban mixed sulfide precipitate into finished nickel and cobalt. The refinery therefore depends on continuity across mining, processing, shipping and sanctions-sensitive trade routes.

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to complete maintenance work. Fertilizer and sulfuric acid production will continue, preserving part of the site’s industrial activity while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

Moa Feed Disruption Strands Canadian Refining Capacity

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery relies on the Moa joint venture in Cuba for its nickel and cobalt feed. Ore is mined and processed at Moa into mixed sulfide precipitate before being shipped to Alberta for refining.

That supply chain began to weaken in February when fuel shortages forced the joint venture to suspend mining operations. Feed inventories in Canada subsequently declined, with Sherritt previously expecting available material to last only until mid-June.

The problem then became more complex in May. Sherritt suspended direct participation in the Moa joint venture after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

The company has maintained that suspension, leaving the future of Cuban production uncertain. Without fresh MSP shipments, Fort Saskatchewan cannot continue normal nickel and cobalt refining.

This illustrates a critical supply-chain weakness. Refining assets may sit inside Canada, but their security still depends on where upstream feed originates.

For North American critical minerals policy, that distinction matters. Domestic refining capacity does not create supply independence if raw materials remain tied to politically exposed jurisdictions.

Nickel and Cobalt Supply Security Shifts Toward Feedstock Control

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, superalloys, aerospace, industrial chemicals and defence-related manufacturing. Reliable refining capacity is therefore strategically valuable.

But Sherritt’s shutdown shows that feedstock security must be treated as part of refinery security. A plant without dependable concentrate or intermediate supply becomes an idle asset regardless of its technical capability.

The Fort Saskatchewan site still has value because its processing infrastructure and operating expertise remain in place. Maintenance during the shutdown may help preserve restart readiness if Moa supply resumes.

However, the absence of a clear restart timeline increases uncertainty. Sherritt must either restore the Cuban supply chain or eventually secure another viable feed route if the disruption becomes prolonged.

The situation also raises a broader question for western critical minerals strategies. Governments are investing heavily in domestic processing, but those projects need diversified and compliant raw material sources to remain resilient.

Sherritt’s experience shows why mining, intermediate processing and refining must be planned as one integrated supply chain rather than separate assets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan is a reminder that secure refining capacity is only as strong as its feedstock chain. Canada can host the refinery, but without reliable upstream material, geopolitical risk still determines whether nickel and cobalt actually reach the market.

China Heavy Rare Earth Exports Stall as Curbs Hit Japan and US

Ru

China heavy rare earth exports stalled in May as export restrictions continued to disrupt shipments of terbium, dysprosium and lutetium products to key buyers. The data show how Beijing’s licensing controls are reshaping trade flows for materials used in magnets, defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

China heavy rare earth exports were especially weak for products exposed to US and Japanese demand. China recorded no May exports of terbium oxide, dysprosium metal and several other key heavy rare earth products, while yttrium oxide shipments fell sharply from April.

China heavy rare earth exports are now being driven less by normal spot demand and more by policy clearance, end-use approval and bilateral tensions. This makes supply planning increasingly difficult for downstream users that need small but critical volumes.

Light rare earth exports moved in the opposite direction. Shipments of cerium oxide, lanthanum carbonate and neodymium metal increased in May as stronger downstream demand and firmer export prices encouraged buyers to purchase more material.

Heavy Rare Earth Controls Tighten Supply to Japan

Japan has been the clearest casualty of China’s heavy rare earth restrictions. It was previously a major consumer of Chinese yttrium oxide, accounting for 57-60% of total shipments.

That flow has changed sharply since January, when Beijing banned exports of dual-use items for Japanese military use or any end-use that could enhance Japan’s military capabilities. The measure followed deteriorating relations after comments on Taiwan by Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi.

China exported only 7t of yttrium oxide to Japan in May, while total May yttrium oxide exports fell to 90t from 161t in April. Germany received 55t, France 14t, Russia 6.9t and South Korea 6.2t.

For January-May, China exported 454t of yttrium oxide. South Korea received 111t, Austria 100t, the US 80t, Germany 69t, Vietnam 40t, Russia 20t and Japan only 14t.

Dysprosium flows were also tightly controlled. China exported 8.4t of dysprosium oxide in May, up slightly from April and March, but all shipments in April-May went to South Korea.

Dysprosium metal exports stopped in May after 3t moved to South Korea in April. Exports to Japan have been suspended since January, after 2t was shipped in December 2025.

Terbium exports were even more constrained. China exported no terbium oxide in May after shipping only 0.2t in April. Total January-May exports reached 5.7t, mostly to South Korea.

Terbium metal exports were almost absent in May, while shipments to Japan have been suspended since January. Lutetium oxide exports were also almost absent after 5t moved to the US in April.

Magnet and Aerospace Users Face Licensing Risk

The latest export pattern matters because heavy rare earths are small-volume materials with large strategic importance. Dysprosium and terbium are used to improve high-temperature performance in rare earth permanent magnets.

Those magnets are critical for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace systems, defence equipment and high-performance industrial motors. Yttrium is also important for ceramics, phosphors, alloys, coatings and aerospace-related applications.

Lutetium is a smaller market, but its supply risk is strategically relevant because many specialty rare earths have few alternative sources. Even small interruptions can affect qualified users because substitution is difficult.

The May data show that South Korea has remained a permitted destination for some heavy rare earth products, especially dysprosium oxide. This could reflect licensing approvals for civilian or qualified end uses.

But the broader message is that buyers cannot rely only on market availability. They must also track export licences, end-user reviews and political relations with Beijing.

The divergence between light and heavy rare earth exports is also important. Light rare earth demand can still rise when prices and downstream consumption support trade, while heavy rare earth flows remain vulnerable to strategic controls.

For non-China supply chains, this reinforces the need for separation, metallization, magnet recycling and heavy rare earth sourcing outside China. However, building that capacity will take time, capital and customer qualification.

Japan’s exposure is especially important because the country has deep magnet, electronics, automotive and precision manufacturing industries. Reduced access to yttrium, dysprosium, terbium and lutetium could force buyers to accelerate inventory strategies and non-China sourcing.

The market should therefore treat May’s export data as more than a trade statistic. It is another signal that heavy rare earth supply is becoming a managed geopolitical channel.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s May export data show that rare earth risk is now concentrated in licensing, not only price. For Japan, the US and other advanced manufacturing economies, heavy rare earth security will depend on building supply routes that can survive political friction.

NioCorp Scandium Supply Plan Targets Latent Demand From Elk Creek

NioCorp

NioCorp scandium supply plans could reshape a small but strategically important market if the company brings its Elk Creek critical minerals project in Nebraska into production. The US junior miner says reliable scandium availability could unlock demand that has remained dormant because customers lack secure supply.

NioCorp scandium supply would come from a polymetallic carbonatite ore body that also contains niobium, titanium and rare earths. The company plans to produce neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium oxides alongside its main niobium product.

NioCorp scandium supply is important because scandium can strengthen and lighten aluminium alloys when added in small quantities. This gives the metal potential relevance for automotive, aerospace, defence and lightweight structural applications.

Construction at Elk Creek is expected to begin in the third or fourth quarter, once financing is secured. The company expects three years of construction, followed by ramp-up, with a full year of production targeted by 2030.

Elk Creek Financing Links Niobium, Scandium and Rare Earths

NioCorp is seeking a loan of around $780mn from the US Export-Import Bank. That financing could cover up to 65% of total capital expenditure through debt.

The company’s 2022 feasibility study estimated total capital expenditure at $1.2bn for underground and surface facilities. NioCorp has raised more than $500mn over the past 14 months and may still need another $200mn-400mn in cash support.

All planned production is covered under a 10-year commercial agreement with Traxys. This gives the project a route to market across its diversified product stream.

The diversified ore body reduces dependence on a single commodity. Niobium remains the main focus, but scandium, titanium and rare earths can broaden revenue and reduce exposure to one price cycle.

Niobium supply risk is a major strategic issue. Brazil produces about 95% of global niobium supply, while the US and EU import all the niobium they need.

That concentration creates geopolitical vulnerability. NioCorp argues that Brazil could use niobium as leverage in the same way China has used rare earths in trade and strategic disputes.

Elk Creek therefore matters for more than one mineral. It could give the US domestic access to niobium, scandium and rare earth oxides from a single integrated project.

Scandium Demand Case Depends on Reliable Domestic Supply

The global scandium market is currently tiny, with only about 30-35t produced annually. NioCorp plans to produce 100t, which has raised concerns that new supply could overwhelm demand.

The company takes the opposite view. It argues that applications are waiting on the shelf because users do not trust the availability of scandium supply.

NioCorp estimates latent demand could reach about 3,000 t/yr if secure supply becomes available. It is working with companies including Aston Martin and Jaguar Land Rover to demonstrate scandium-aluminium alloy performance.

This is the key industrial point. Scandium demand cannot develop without reliable supply, but reliable supply is difficult to finance without visible demand.

NioCorp is also building a downstream scandium chain in the US. The company plans to produce high-purity scandium oxide, scandium metal and scandium aluminium master alloy.

That approach fits defence and industrial supply-chain needs. Customers need not only mined material, but qualified products that can enter alloy systems and manufacturing routes.

Rare earth processing adds another layer of complexity. NioCorp says it has developed in-house capability to produce high-purity rare earth oxides, supported by staff with decades of solvent extraction experience.

Execution will decide the project’s market impact. Financing, construction, separation technology, customer qualification and downstream partnerships must all align before Elk Creek can become a meaningful US critical minerals platform.

The Metalnomist Commentary

NioCorp’s strategy shows why critical minerals demand often depends on supply confidence first. If Elk Creek reaches production, scandium could move from a niche laboratory metal into a practical aluminium alloying tool for lightweight manufacturing.

MP Materials USAR Lawsuit Raises Stakes in US Rare Earth Magnet Race

MP Materials USAR

MP Materials USAR lawsuit has opened a new front in the race to build domestic rare earth magnet capacity, with MP accusing rival USA Rare Earth of misappropriating proprietary magnet technology through a former employee. The dispute centres on grain boundary diffusion technology, a key process used to improve high-performance neodymium-iron-boron magnets.

MP Materials USAR lawsuit was filed in Texas Business Court on 26 May. MP is seeking injunctions against all USAR entities and alleges that a former employee improperly disclosed sensitive formulas and processes to the rival company.

MP Materials USAR lawsuit is strategically important because both companies are building large US magnet production platforms. The dispute could affect investor confidence, customer qualification and the timing of domestic magnet supply for defence, automotive and industrial users.

The case also shows that the US rare earth sector has moved beyond mining and separation. Competition is now intensifying around process know-how, metallization, alloying, powder metallurgy and magnet finishing.

Grain Boundary Diffusion Becomes a Competitive Battleground

Grain boundary diffusion is an important technology in high-performance NdFeB magnet production. It can improve magnet performance and reduce the use of costly heavy rare earths in certain applications.

That makes the process commercially valuable. Rare earth magnets used in defence, electric motors, robotics and aerospace systems must meet strict performance, heat resistance and reliability requirements.

MP alleges that its proprietary grain boundary diffusion technology was developed through years of work and significant investment. The company claims former employee Kevin Elkins had access to extremely sensitive formulas and processes before joining USAR.

MP also alleges that USAR recruited several MP employees since 2025, including Elkins and at least seven other key staff. MP described this as part of a broader trade secret raiding campaign.

These remain allegations, and the court process will determine the outcome. But the filing highlights a real industrial issue: skilled people and protected know-how are now as important as rare earth feedstock in the US magnet supply chain.

Legal Dispute Adds Risk to Domestic Magnet Scale-Up

Both companies are trying to scale US magnet production quickly. MP is expanding its Independence facility in Fort Worth, Texas, to 3,000 t/yr, including metallization, alloying, powder metallurgy, grain boundary diffusion and magnet finishing.

MP is also building a larger Texas facility to raise total magnet production to 10,000 t/yr. That expansion is central to its ambition to create a fully integrated rare earth-to-magnet supply chain in the US.

USAR also plans to produce 10,000 t/yr of magnets by 2029, up from current capacity of 4,800 t/yr. The overlap between these expansion targets makes the legal dispute commercially sensitive.

For the US government and downstream customers, the case creates a difficult dynamic. Washington needs multiple domestic magnet suppliers, but those suppliers also need enforceable intellectual property protections.

The dispute could slow collaboration, complicate customer qualification or increase caution around hiring and technology transfer. It may also push rare earth companies to tighten controls over employee access, process documentation and proprietary manufacturing routes.

The broader message is clear. Domestic magnet capacity will not be secured only through capital spending. It will require protected process technology, skilled labour, validated production and trusted commercial behaviour.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The MP-USAR dispute shows that the rare earth magnet race is becoming a technology and intellectual property contest. The US needs faster magnet scale-up, but it also needs clear rules that protect proprietary process know-how while keeping domestic supply-chain development on track.

Dark-Fleet Vessel Recycling Enters Regulated Channel With US License for GMS

GMS

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has entered a new regulatory phase after Dubai-based ship and offshore asset recycler GMS secured a US government license to buy and recycle sanctioned vessels. The approval creates a formal pathway for disposing of ships tied to sanctions risk.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has historically operated through opaque channels, especially as older tankers linked to Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil trades moved outside mainstream shipping markets. GMS said this is the first time a cash buyer has legally acquired and recycled sanctioned vessels under a fully authorised US licensing framework.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling now has a potential model for governments seeking to combine sanctions enforcement, environmental oversight and asset disposal. The license followed nearly seven months of review by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, with support from the US State Department.

The company has not disclosed the number or names of vessels acquired. But the approval itself is significant because aging sanctioned tonnage is becoming a larger safety, compliance and environmental challenge for global shipping.

OFAC License Creates a Compliance Route for Sanctioned Vessel Disposal

The OFAC license gives GMS legal approval to purchase and recycle several sanctioned vessels from the dark fleet. This matters because sanctioned ships are difficult to handle through normal commercial channels.

Banks, insurers, brokers, ports, shipyards and recyclers often avoid sanctioned assets because of legal and reputational risk. That leaves vessels exposed to informal transactions, weak oversight and poor end-of-life management.

A regulated license changes that structure. It allows disposal to take place under documented compliance checks, government review and controlled transaction procedures.

The dark fleet consists of sanctioned and unsanctioned older tankers used to move oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela while bypassing western sanctions. Many of these vessels operate outside mainstream shipping systems and may carry higher safety and environmental risks.

GMS said more than 30 sanctioned vessels have been recycled in India and elsewhere in recent years through opaque and largely unregulated channels. A licensed route could reduce that leakage into informal markets.

The development could also influence Europe. GMS views the approval as a possible model for other governments that need a lawful way to remove sanctioned vessels from global trade.

Ship Recycling Becomes a Sanctions and Materials Issue

The industrial significance extends beyond vessel disposal. Ship recycling produces ferrous and non-ferrous scrap that can re-enter steel and metals supply chains if handled under proper environmental and compliance standards.

Older tankers contain large volumes of recyclable steel, along with machinery, copper-bearing equipment, aluminium components and other recoverable materials. But sanctioned origin and weak documentation can complicate resale and downstream acceptance.

Regulated recycling pathways can improve traceability. They can also help ensure that scrap generated from sanctioned vessels does not move through hidden channels that undermine sanctions policy.

This creates a new intersection between shipbreaking, sanctions enforcement and circular metals. Recycling is no longer only about recovering material value. It is also about proving legal origin, environmental responsibility and financial accountability.

The timing is important. Aging dark-fleet tonnage is likely to keep rising as sanctions, insurance limits and safety concerns restrict normal fleet operations. Without formal disposal routes, more vessels could end up in poorly monitored recycling channels.

For cash buyers and recyclers, the GMS license may create a more legitimate business model. For governments, it provides a tool to remove risky vessels while controlling the financial and material flow around them.

The broader market should watch whether this becomes a repeatable framework. If more sanctioned vessels are recycled under licensed systems, ship recycling could become a meaningful part of sanctions implementation and circular metals governance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GMS has turned sanctioned vessel recycling into a compliance business rather than a grey-market disposal problem. The next challenge is whether regulators can scale this model before aging dark-fleet tankers create larger safety, environmental and financial risks.

EU Mexico Trade Agreement Opens Clean Tech and Critical Materials Opportunities

EU, Mexico

EU Mexico trade agreement signing marks a major update to a commercial relationship already worth around €100bn/yr in goods and services. The revised deal aims to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers while creating new opportunities in clean technology, critical raw materials and agri-food trade.

EU Mexico trade agreement provisions will eliminate almost all high Mexican tariffs on EU imports. The affected sectors include machinery, mineral fuels, cars, car parts and a wide range of agri-food products.

EU Mexico trade agreement rules also include legally binding commitments on environmental protection and climate change. This gives the deal a strategic industrial angle beyond conventional tariff reduction.

The interim trade agreement is expected to move faster than the wider modernised global agreement. It needs European Parliament approval and qualified-majority approval from EU member states, rather than ratification by all 27 countries.

Clean Technology and Raw Materials Gain Strategic Relevance

The agreement could strengthen EU-Mexico cooperation in clean technology and critical raw materials. This matters as Europe seeks more diversified supply chains for energy transition equipment, electric vehicles, industrial machinery and advanced manufacturing.

Mexico is already a major manufacturing base linked to North American automotive and industrial supply chains. Better EU access could support machinery, components and clean technology exports into a market positioned between Europe and the US.

The deal also includes strict rules of origin, including for electric vehicles. EU officials said these rules are designed to prevent circumvention and avoid the agreement becoming a backdoor for Chinese production.

That detail is important. As tariffs, subsidies and local-content rules reshape global EV trade, rules of origin are becoming a core tool of industrial policy.

For European manufacturers, clearer access to Mexico may support exports of vehicles, parts, machinery and clean technology systems. For Mexican producers, greater access to the EU could strengthen trade in food, consumer products and selected industrial goods.

Tariff Cuts Combine With Climate and Circular Economy Commitments

Mexico will remove tariffs on key European exports including pork, dairy, cereals, fruit and pasta. Sensitive products will receive limited access through tariff-rate quotas.

The agreement also gives EU exporters broader quota access for dairy, beef, poultry and pork products. In return, Mexican producers will gain more liberalised access to the EU for products including coffee, fruit, chocolate and agave syrup.

Alongside the trade deal, both sides signed a circular economy declaration covering climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, including plastics. This adds sustainability language to the commercial framework.

The agreement requires both parties to uphold international climate treaties, including the Paris Agreement. It also includes a dedicated dispute settlement procedure.

For metals and industrial supply chains, the wider message is clear. Trade agreements are increasingly combining market access, climate obligations, origin rules and supply-chain security.

The EU is using trade policy to support clean technology, critical raw materials cooperation and industrial competitiveness. Mexico gains deeper access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets while strengthening its role in global manufacturing networks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-Mexico deal shows how trade policy is becoming a supply-chain security instrument. The rules of origin for electric vehicles may prove as important as the tariff cuts, especially as Europe tries to protect clean technology markets from indirect Chinese competition.

ICJ Climate Ruling Gains UN Backing as Oil Powers Push Back

International Court of Justice

ICJ climate ruling support has gained global political weight after the UN general assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the court’s advisory opinion on states’ obligations to protect the climate system. The vote shows that climate policy is increasingly moving into legal and trade-risk territory.

The ICJ climate ruling is not legally binding, but it carries legal and moral authority that could influence future climate litigation. That makes it important for energy, mining, metals and industrial companies exposed to emissions, fossil fuels and transition-linked regulation.

The ICJ climate ruling was backed by 141 countries, including China. Only eight countries opposed the resolution, including the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia, the world’s three largest oil producers.

The divide highlights a growing strategic split. Most countries are accepting stronger legal language around climate responsibility, while major fossil fuel producers are resisting efforts that could accelerate pressure on oil, gas and coal.

Climate Duties Move From Politics Toward Legal Risk

The UN resolution calls on member states to take all possible steps to avoid significant damage to the climate and environment. It also urges countries to follow through on their Paris Agreement commitments.

Vanuatu, which led the resolution, framed the issue as a matter of legal obligation rather than political discretion. That language is important because it gives climate policy a stronger legal foundation.

For industry, the risk is clear. Even if the advisory opinion is not binding, it may support future lawsuits, regulatory challenges and pressure on governments to tighten climate rules.

The resolution also reinforces earlier climate summit outcomes. It points to keeping the global temperature rise to 1.5°C, tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling energy efficiency improvement rates by 2030, transitioning away from fossil fuels and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

That matters for metals demand. Stronger climate implementation supports long-term demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other materials tied to grids, renewables, batteries and electrification.

However, it also raises pressure on high-emission industrial sectors. Steel, aluminium, cement, chemicals, mining and refining will face closer scrutiny over emissions, power sources and supply-chain transparency.

Oil Producers Resist While Finance Divide Remains

The opposition from the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia shows that fossil fuel producers remain wary of climate language that could constrain future energy policy. The US objected to the resolution, arguing that it included inappropriate political demands related to fossil fuels.

Russia also opposed the measure, saying the resolution risked making the ICJ opinion mandatory in nature and selectively used the advisory opinion and climate summit outcomes.

Several developing and fossil fuel-producing countries focused on another issue: finance. India, Iraq and Algeria abstained, arguing that the resolution placed too much emphasis on emissions cuts while not adequately addressing climate finance and adaptation support.

This dispute will remain central to future climate negotiations. Developing economies want funding to support decarbonisation, adaptation and industrial transition, while developed countries and climate-vulnerable states want faster action on emissions.

Brazil, the Cop 30 president, supported the resolution. Turkey, which will host Cop 31 in Antalya, abstained, while Australia supported the text but said that support should not be read as agreement with every part of the advisory opinion.

For industrial markets, the vote confirms that climate policy is not retreating. It is becoming more legal, more geopolitical and more connected to trade, finance and supply-chain decisions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The UN vote turns climate responsibility into a stronger legal signal for governments and industry. For metals and mining, the opportunity is rising demand from electrification, but the risk is higher scrutiny over emissions, origin and financing.

China-Russia Energy Cooperation Deepens as Beijing and Moscow Broaden Industrial Ties

China-Russia

China-Russia energy cooperation is set to deepen after both countries agreed to expand collaboration across energy, chemicals, metallurgy, agriculture and manufacturing. The pledge followed Russian president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing on 19-20 May.

China-Russia energy cooperation remains the core of the bilateral relationship. Oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables all featured in the joint statement, showing that energy security remains central to both countries’ strategic alignment.

China-Russia energy cooperation also has wider industrial meaning. Stable Russian energy flows support China’s manufacturing base, while Russian suppliers gain a critical long-term market as western sanctions continue to reshape trade.

The two countries also agreed to extend their treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation. That move reinforces a long-term political framework for resource trade, industrial projects and supply-chain coordination.

Energy and Nuclear Ties Anchor Strategic Partnership

Energy remains the strongest pillar of China-Russia trade. Russia is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas, delivering through a 38bn m³/yr pipeline and accounting for about 45% of China’s pipeline gas imports.

However, the joint statement did not confirm progress on a second major gas pipeline. That omission suggests that both sides still have commercial or political issues to resolve before expanding pipeline capacity further.

Russian crude also remains important to China. China imported an average of 2.53mn b/d of Russian crude in January-April, up from 2.01mn b/d a year earlier.

The buyer structure is shifting. State-owned Chinese refiners have reduced some purchases since tighter US sanctions began last October, while independent refiners remain more focused on margins and cargo economics.

Nuclear energy is another strategic link. China and Russia will continue work on the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear projects, which are expected to come online around 2026-28.

The two countries also plan to cooperate on advanced nuclear technologies, including fast reactors, fusion power and closed fuel cycle systems. This gives the relationship a long-term technology dimension beyond fossil fuel trade.

Renewable energy also appeared in the statement, including green power certificates. That language shows both sides want energy cooperation to cover low-carbon systems, even while oil, gas and coal remain central.

Agriculture, Metallurgy and Manufacturing Deepen Trade Flows

Agriculture is becoming a larger part of the partnership. China and Russia agreed to expand bilateral trade in meat, seafood, grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils and feed protein meals.

China already allows Russian beef and by-products that meet registration and disease-free zone requirements. It also lifted restrictions on Russian pork exports after a long ban linked to African swine fever.

Russia has become a key supplier of sunflower and rapeseed oils to China. It is also China’s largest source of non-GM soybean imports, making food security another strategic layer in the relationship.

Metallurgy and chemicals also remain important. China’s non-ferrous sector imports selected Russian raw materials, including antimony concentrate.

This matters because antimony is a critical material for flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, batteries and defence-related applications. Russian supply can help China manage raw material availability in niche but strategic metals.

The two countries also plan to deepen cooperation in automotive manufacturing, shipbuilding and civil aviation. Chinese automakers have already invested in Russian production, while Russia remains an important market for Chinese vehicles, including electric vehicles.

The wider industrial direction is clear. China and Russia are not only increasing commodity trade. They are building a broader economic partnership that connects energy, raw materials, food, manufacturing and strategic technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China and Russia are building a resource-and-industry bloc designed to withstand western pressure. The metals market should watch the metallurgy and critical minerals angle closely, because raw material flows such as antimony can become strategically important even when volumes are small.

China Boeing Aircraft Deal Signals Trade Thaw but Rare Earth Controls Remain

Boeing

China Boeing aircraft deal confirmation marks a concrete outcome from recent China-US trade talks, but Beijing’s position on tariffs and rare earth export controls shows that strategic supply-chain tensions remain unresolved. China’s Ministry of Commerce said the country will purchase 200 Boeing aircraft under commercial principles.

China Boeing aircraft deal terms also include US commitments to provide sufficient engine and related component supplies. Both sides described aviation as a key sector for mutually beneficial cooperation, giving the agreement wider industrial significance beyond aircraft sales.

China Boeing aircraft deal confirmation is important for aerospace supply chains because Boeing aircraft demand supports engines, titanium, aluminium, nickel superalloys, avionics, landing gear and precision manufacturing. A large Chinese order could improve long-term visibility across several high-value materials and components.

The readout also clarified China’s tariff stance. Beijing said any future US tariffs on Chinese goods should not exceed levels agreed under the joint arrangement reached at the Kuala Lumpur trade consultations.

Aviation Deal Supports Aerospace Supply Chains

The planned purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft could support a broad aerospace supply chain if deliveries move forward smoothly. Aircraft orders generate demand across airframes, engines, forgings, fasteners, castings, electronics and maintenance networks.

For metals markets, the deal is relevant to titanium, aluminium, nickel-based superalloys and specialty steels. Aircraft production and engine supply depend on qualified materials with long approval cycles and strict traceability requirements.

The US side’s commitment to engine and component supply is also significant. Aircraft sales are not only about airframes. Engines, spare parts and related systems determine delivery schedules, airline operations and aftermarket demand.

The agreement may also help stabilise one of the most politically sensitive parts of China-US industrial trade. Aviation has historically been a major commercial bridge between the two economies.

However, execution will matter. Aircraft deliveries require production slots, engine availability, regulatory coordination, financing and customer acceptance. The announcement gives direction, but the supply-chain impact will depend on actual delivery timing.

Tariffs and Rare Earth Controls Keep Strategic Tension Alive

China said future US tariffs on Chinese goods should stay within the levels agreed under the Kuala Lumpur framework. It also said it wants to remove unilateral US tariffs through follow-up negotiations.

Under the earlier arrangement, the US removed a 10% fentanyl-related tariff on Chinese goods and suspended a 24% reciprocal tariff for one year. It also suspended the 50% permeation rule under export controls for one year.

Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese products remain in place. This means the tariff dispute is not finished, even if both sides are discussing reciprocal reductions for goods worth at least $30bn on each side.

Critical minerals remain the sharper strategic issue. MOFCOM said China applies export controls on rare earths and other materials according to law, and that compliant civilian licence applications are being reviewed.

The materials named include yttrium, scandium, neodymium and indium. These inputs are important for aerospace, defence, semiconductors, magnets, displays, alloys and advanced manufacturing.

US rare earth buyers remain concerned that approved licence volumes are limited. Market participants expect approval cycles could shift from around one week of supply toward biweekly or monthly volumes, but uncertainty remains high.

This means the China-US trade thaw is selective. Aviation cooperation may improve, but Beijing is preserving control over critical mineral flows that give it leverage in strategic industries.

Agricultural products may also enter the reciprocal tariff reduction framework. China still applies 10-15% tariffs on US agricultural goods, which could affect whether private buyers can meet purchase commitments.

The broader message is that China and the US are trying to stabilise trade without fully removing industrial security barriers. Aircraft, agriculture and selected tariff reductions may advance, while rare earths and export controls remain managed pressure points.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Boeing deal shows that China and the US can still use aviation as a commercial stabiliser. But rare earth licensing remains the real strategic lever, and that will keep aerospace, defence and advanced manufacturing buyers focused on supply security rather than trade headlines.

Global Recycled Metals Output Rises as China and Emerging Regions Expand Capacity

Recycled Metals

Global recycled metals output increased further in 2025 as China maintained its leading position and emerging regions expanded recycling capacity. Production of recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc reached about 59.2mn t, up 5.6% from a year earlier.

Global recycled metals output is becoming more important to non-ferrous supply security as mining, processing and trade flows face rising geopolitical and cost pressures. Recycling now provides a larger secondary source of industrial metal units for manufacturers, smelters and battery supply chains.

Global recycled metals output accounted for around 34% of total non-ferrous metal production in 2025. The sector also delivered cumulative savings of about 1.2bn t of primary mineral resources, underlining its growing role in resource conservation.

The growth shows that recycled metals are no longer a secondary environmental story. They are becoming a core part of industrial raw material strategy across copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and battery metals.

China Leads as Regional Recycling Capacity Expands

China remained the world’s largest recycled base metals producer in 2025, with output of 20.57mn t. That represented 34.7% of global production.

The country’s scale gives it a major role in recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc supply. It also strengthens China’s position across non-ferrous metals at a time when primary raw material security is under pressure.

Europe produced more than 10mn t of recycled base metals, while the US produced more than 6mn t. India and southeast Asia reached around 6mn t and 4mn t, respectively.

These figures show that recycling capacity is becoming more geographically distributed. Emerging regions are no longer only consumers of recycled raw materials. They are becoming processing centres in their own right.

Battery-related recycling is also growing quickly. Nickel, cobalt and lithium recovery is supporting the new energy industry as electric vehicle and energy storage supply chains look for more secure material sources.

China aims to increase domestic recycled material recovery to 23mn t by 2030 under its next five-year plan. That target implies annual growth of around 7%.

The country is also expected to strengthen recycled product certification and explore the inclusion of recycled materials in carbon trading systems. This could make recycled metal more valuable for customers seeking traceable and lower-carbon supply.

Trade Flows and Technology Move Toward Asia

Global recycled raw material trade is becoming more regional, more Asia-focused and more diversified. Europe and North America remain major exporters of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock.

Europe exports around 2mn t/yr of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock, while North America exports about 4.2mn t/yr. China and India remain the largest importers, with imports exceeding 4mn t and 2mn t, respectively.

Southeast Asia is becoming a key transshipment hub. Regional recycled aluminium feedstock trade reached about 1.3mn t of imports and 900,000t of exports.

Black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries is also increasingly moving toward Asian processing centres. This reflects Asia’s stronger battery materials processing base and growing demand for recovered nickel, cobalt and lithium units.

Technology is improving the recycling value chain. Advances in laser sorting, intelligent dismantling, multi-metal battery recovery and digital process control are raising recovery rates and product quality.

Leading producers have achieved recycling rates above 94% for aluminium and 95% for lithium. These levels show how recycling is moving closer to industrial-grade resource recovery rather than simple scrap handling.

New products are also expanding. High-strength recycled aluminium alloys, high-purity recycled copper and recycled rare-earth permanent magnets are gaining traction.

This matters because recycled metal must meet customer specifications before it can displace primary material. Better sorting, cleaner chemistry and stronger certification will determine how much recycled metal can enter high-value applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Recycling is becoming a strategic metals supply pillar, not just a sustainability tool. The next competitive edge will come from producers that can turn complex scrap and battery waste into certified, high-purity and customer-ready materials.

Nevada North Lithium Project Resource Growth Strengthens US Lithium Supply Potential

Nevada North Lithium Project has increased its measured and indicated resource base, improving the scale potential of one of the more closely watched US lithium development assets. Canadian developer Surge Battery Metals updated the project’s estimate to 6.7mn t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

Nevada North Lithium Project now carries measured and indicated resources grading 3,820ppm lithium. That compares with 3.6mn t grading 4,016ppm in the project’s preliminary economic assessment.

Nevada North Lithium Project resource growth is strategically important because the US continues to seek domestic lithium supply for batteries, electric vehicles, energy storage and critical minerals security.

The project is jointly owned by Surge Battery Metals, with a 71% stake, and Evolution Mining, with 29%. Surge plans to deliver a comprehensive pre-feasibility study in the fourth quarter of 2026.

Larger Resource Base Improves Development Scale

The revised estimate shows a larger resource base, although the average lithium grade is slightly lower than in the preliminary economic assessment. That trade-off is common as projects expand and include broader mineralised zones.

The resource is constrained by an optimised pit shell based on a lithium carbonate equivalent price of $20,000/t. This assumption helps define what material could be economically considered under the current mine planning framework.

The increase to 6.7mn t of LCE improves the project’s strategic profile. Scale matters in lithium because battery supply chains need long-term, reliable and expandable sources of feedstock.

For Surge, the next milestone is the pre-feasibility study. That study will need to clarify mining design, processing route, capital cost, operating cost, recovery assumptions and permitting requirements.

Nevada North Li Project

US Lithium Projects Gain Momentum as Prices Improve

Recent lithium price increases are encouraging more exploration and development activity. Higher prices can improve project economics and attract financing, especially for assets in strategically important jurisdictions.

Nevada is already central to US lithium ambitions. The state offers domestic resource potential, established mining experience and proximity to battery and electric vehicle supply chains.

However, resource growth alone does not guarantee production. The project must still prove technical feasibility, commercial processing, environmental compliance and customer relevance.

The larger estimate gives Surge a stronger platform heading into the pre-feasibility stage. It also reinforces the wider US push to reduce dependence on imported lithium chemicals and battery raw materials.

If advanced successfully, Nevada North could become part of a more diversified North American lithium supply chain. Its value will depend on whether scale can translate into qualified, cost-competitive lithium production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Surge’s updated estimate strengthens Nevada North’s strategic relevance, but the real test now moves from resource size to development economics. US lithium security will depend on projects that can pass feasibility, permitting and processing hurdles, not only publish larger resource numbers.

Outokumpu Stainless Steel Deliveries Rise as EU CBAM Supports Local Demand

Outokumpu

Outokumpu stainless steel deliveries rose sharply from the previous quarter after the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism began applying to imports at the start of the year. The Finnish stainless steel producer shipped 465,000t in January-March, up 27% from the previous quarter.

Outokumpu stainless steel deliveries were still down 1% from a year earlier, showing that the recovery remains uneven. But the quarterly increase suggests CBAM is starting to shift some demand toward local European production.

Outokumpu stainless steel deliveries are expected to rise by up to 10% in the second quarter. The company is benefiting from European buyers reassessing imports as carbon-related costs begin to affect non-EU supply.

The result highlights the industrial importance of scrap-based stainless steel production. CBAM could improve the competitiveness of lower-carbon European producers if importers face higher carbon costs.

CBAM Gives European Stainless Producers a Demand Tailwind

CBAM imposes a carbon levy on imports from outside the EU. This changes the cost comparison between imported stainless steel and local European material.

For Outokumpu, the mechanism supports demand for European scrap-based stainless production. Scrap-based production generally carries a lower carbon footprint than more emissions-intensive routes.

European stainless shipments reached 324,000t in the first quarter, up 2% from a year earlier. This suggests regional demand held up better than some other markets.

Shipments to the Americas fell by 5% to 148,000t. However, the Americas business still delivered much stronger earnings because of higher average selling prices.

The commercial message is clear. Volume growth is beginning to appear in Europe, but pricing power remains stronger in the Americas.

Ferro-Chrome Volumes Rise but European Margins Weaken

Outokumpu’s ferro-chrome shipments rose by 15.8% year on year to 110,000t. Strong demand in Europe and the US supported the increase.

Ferro-chrome remains essential for stainless steel production because chromium provides corrosion resistance. Higher ferro-chrome shipments therefore show stronger activity across stainless and alloy supply chains.

Group adjusted Ebitda rose by 33% on the year to €65mn. The improvement was driven mainly by the Americas business, where Ebitda climbed to €52mn from €11mn.

But the earnings mix was uneven. Ferro-chrome Ebitda fell by nearly 30% to €30mn, while the European stainless segment posted negative Ebitda of €13mn, down from positive €5mn a year earlier.

Outokumpu attributed weaker European profitability to lower average selling prices and lower fixed-cost absorption. This shows that CBAM may support volumes before it fully restores margins.

The first-quarter result therefore sends a mixed signal. European demand is improving, but pricing and cost absorption still need to recover for the regional stainless business to regain strength.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Outokumpu’s quarter shows that CBAM is beginning to change stainless steel trade behaviour. But the policy’s real test is whether it can improve European producer margins, not only redirect demand toward local supply.

 

Automotive Raw Material Supply Chains Hit Localisation Limits

Automotive

Automotive raw material supply chains are becoming the main constraint on electric vehicle localisation as carmakers seek more control over strategic components. Automakers want regional supply chains, but battery metals, rare earths and processed inputs still depend on global mining and refining networks.

Automotive raw material supply chains have shifted from pure efficiency toward resilience, security and geopolitical risk management. The industry is no longer trying only to minimise cost. It is trying to protect production from export controls, licensing delays, trade restrictions and raw material shortages.

Automotive raw material supply chains therefore cannot be fully localised by assembling batteries, motors or electronics closer to vehicle plants. The deeper constraint sits upstream, where lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and rare earth materials remain tied to global extraction and processing capacity.

The result is a more selective supply-chain model. Automakers will regionalise the components they can control, while still relying on global raw materials for the minerals and refined products they cannot replace quickly.

EV Localisation Still Depends on Global Critical Minerals

Jaguar Land Rover has decided to control three critical parts of electric propulsion: battery assembly, electric drive units and energy management systems. This gives the company more control over the final systems that define EV performance.

However, vertical integration has limits. Even if an automaker controls battery assembly or electric drive units, it may not control the lithium chemicals, nickel sulphate, cobalt, manganese, graphite or rare earth magnets inside those systems.

Permanent magnet motors remain one of the clearest pressure points. Electric drive units depend on rare earth materials that are still heavily exposed to Chinese processing, magnet production and export licensing.

Obtaining magnet raw materials from China has become more difficult from a licensing perspective. This shows how export controls can affect vehicle production even when the final assembly line is located in Europe or the US.

Battery supply chains face the same structural problem. Automakers can localise pack assembly, module production and software integration, but raw material exposure remains global.

Lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese supply depends on mine locations, refining capacity, chemical conversion and government policy. These inputs cannot be made local simply by building a battery plant near an auto factory.

This changes the meaning of automotive localisation. The next phase will be less about full independence and more about reducing exposure to single-country bottlenecks.

Recycling and Traceability Become Strategic Tools

Critical minerals recycling is becoming a strategic issue for automakers, not only an environmental goal. Black mass recovery can eventually return lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper and other materials into the supply chain.

Recycling can reduce raw material exposure over time. But it depends on enough end-of-life batteries, reliable collection systems, safe transport, processing capacity and customer acceptance of recovered materials.

The UK’s critical minerals strategy reflects this reality. Domestic production, partner-country supply agreements and recycling can improve resilience, but full self-sufficiency is not realistic.

That point matters for manufacturers. Supply security will depend on diversified sourcing, trusted partners, recycling loops and traceable material flows rather than a complete break from global markets.

The shift will also affect pricing. Materials may increasingly carry value based on origin, regulatory acceptability, sustainability documentation and licensing risk.

A battery metal or rare earth input from a secure and traceable source may command a premium over lower-cost material with higher geopolitical or compliance risk.

For automakers, the strategic challenge is clear. They must control more of the EV system while accepting that critical mineral supply will remain globally contested.

For metals suppliers, the opportunity is also clear. Producers that can offer traceable, compliant and secure supply will become more valuable to automotive customers than suppliers competing only on price.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Automakers are learning that EV localisation stops where raw material dependence begins. The winners in automotive supply security will be those that connect local manufacturing with diversified minerals, recycling capacity and credible traceability.

Century Aluminum 2026 Guidance Holds as US Smelter Restart Supports Supply

Century Aluminum

Century Aluminum 2026 guidance remains unchanged as the US primary aluminium producer continues to ramp idled and disrupted capacity in South Carolina and Iceland. The company maintained its full-year shipment target of 630,000t of primary aluminium.

Century Aluminum 2026 guidance is being supported by the restart of more than 50,000t of idled capacity at the Mt Holly smelter in South Carolina. The restart began on 16 April, and the plant is expected to return to full production by the end of June.

Century Aluminum 2026 guidance also depends on the recovery of the Nordural aluminium smelter in Iceland after an electrical equipment failure in October 2025. The company expects the facility to return to nearly full production by the end of July.

First-quarter shipments fell by 27% from a year earlier to 122,865t. However, revenue rose by 2.4% to $649.2mn, supported by stronger realised aluminium prices on the London Metal Exchange and higher regional premiums.

Mt Holly Restart Adds Domestic Aluminium During Supply Disruption

Mt Holly produced 40,000t of aluminium in the first quarter, down 4.8% from a year earlier. The restart of idled capacity should increase output through the second quarter and strengthen domestic US supply.

The timing is important. The US-Israel war with Iran has disrupted Middle East aluminium production and exports, tightening supply availability for western buyers.

Century has already placed volumes from the Mt Holly expansion with US customers. This shows that domestic primary aluminium is gaining strategic value as buyers seek supply outside disrupted maritime and regional trade routes.

The Mt Holly restart also fits the wider US policy environment. Higher Section 232 aluminium tariffs have made domestic primary aluminium production more attractive and encouraged investment in US capacity.

For downstream users, additional Mt Holly volumes can support packaging, automotive, construction, aerospace and industrial supply chains that need reliable domestic metal.

Iceland Recovery and Oklahoma Project Shape Growth Outlook

Nordural remains the key recovery asset outside the US. The Icelandic smelter produced only 29,000t in the first quarter, down 61% from a year earlier after the October electrical equipment failure.

Century expects Nordural to return to nearly full output by the end of July. That recovery is essential if the company is to meet its unchanged shipment guidance.

The company is also moving toward a larger strategic expansion. It expects to make a final investment decision and break ground by year-end on its joint Oklahoma smelter project with Emirates Global Aluminium.

That project would strengthen US primary aluminium capacity at a time when domestic supply security is becoming more important to industrial policy. It also links Century to EGA, one of the world’s major aluminium producers.

Century’s first-quarter profit increased sharply to $337.5mn from $29.7mn a year earlier. The result was boosted by the $287.9mn sale of its Hawesville, Kentucky, site to data centre infrastructure developer TeraWulf and a $33mn insurance gain related to the Iceland equipment failure.

The financial result therefore includes major one-time benefits. The operating story remains focused on whether Mt Holly and Nordural can ramp smoothly and whether the Oklahoma project can move from planning to execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Century’s unchanged guidance shows how valuable restart capacity has become in a disrupted aluminium market. The strategic question is whether US primary aluminium can move from temporary supply support to a durable investment cycle built around power, tariffs and domestic industrial demand.

AMG Chrome Metal Plant Strengthens US Aerospace Alloy Supply

AMG Critical Materials

AMG chrome metal plant start-up in Pennsylvania will add new US production capacity for a specialty metal used in aerospace, defence and energy applications. AMG Critical Materials plans to open the 6,500 t/yr aluminothermic chrome metal facility in New Castle on 17 June.

The AMG chrome metal plant is strategically important because the US remains heavily dependent on imported unwrought chromium and chromium powders. In 2025, the US imported 11,153t of these products, with the UK supplying 51% and China supplying 34.9%.

The AMG chrome metal plant will sit next to AMG’s existing titanium facility, which produces titanium master alloys and other specialty alloys for aerospace, defence and energy markets. That location creates a stronger domestic cluster for high-performance alloy inputs.

Chrome metal is used in superalloys because it improves corrosion resistance and high-temperature performance. These properties are essential for aircraft engines, defence systems, industrial turbines and other demanding applications.

New Castle Facility Adds Domestic Chrome Capacity

AMG’s new Pennsylvania facility will use aluminothermic production to make chrome metal. The process is important for producing material suitable for high-performance alloy markets.

AMG already has established chrome expertise through AMG Chrome, its UK-based subsidiary. The Rotherham site produces chrome metal, high-purity degassed chrome metals and chrome powders.

The New Castle plant extends that capability into the US market. This gives American aerospace and defence customers another domestic source of chrome metal at a time when supply-chain security has become a higher priority.

The facility’s proximity to AMG’s titanium operation also matters. Titanium master alloys, chrome metal and specialty alloy inputs often serve overlapping customers in aerospace, defence and energy.

That creates potential operational and commercial advantages. AMG can support customers that need multiple alloying materials with stronger domestic logistics, qualification support and supply visibility.

Tariffs and Russian Supply Loss Reshape Chromium Trade

The US chrome market has been reshaped by sanctions, tariffs and trade disruption. Russian supplies became less available after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, forcing buyers to rely more heavily on other sources.

China became a more important supplier as Russian material disappeared from western trade flows. However, the US imposed a 25% Section 301 tariff on Chinese-origin chrome metal in September 2024.

That tariff increased the cost and complexity of Chinese supply. It also strengthened the case for domestic production capacity, especially for aerospace and defence applications where supply continuity matters.

Europe’s own supply behaviour has also changed. The loss of Russian supplies pushed French producers to keep more material within Europe rather than ship volumes to the US.

This leaves the US exposed to a narrow set of import routes. AMG’s Pennsylvania plant helps reduce that vulnerability by adding domestic chrome metal capacity linked to an established specialty materials producer.

For aerospace superalloy supply chains, this is more than a metal availability issue. Engine and defence programmes require qualified, traceable and reliable materials. Domestic production can reduce risk around tariffs, sanctions, shipping and geopolitical disruption.

The Metalnomist Commentary

AMG’s New Castle plant shows that specialty alloy security is moving beyond titanium and nickel into smaller but critical inputs such as chrome metal. The US cannot build resilient aerospace and defence supply chains without domestic capacity for the alloying elements that make superalloys perform.

Ferroglobe Silicon Shipments Fall as European Plants Face Import Pressure

Ferroglobe

Ferroglobe silicon shipments fell in the first quarter after the company suspended production across its European silicon metal plants in October. The decline shows how weak demand and low-priced imports are reshaping Europe’s silicon metal market.

Ferroglobe silicon shipments dropped by 15.9% year on year to 30,533t in January-March. The company later restarted one of two furnaces at its Anglefort plant in France to maintain an EU operating presence.

Ferroglobe silicon shipments remain under pressure because European production costs are still struggling to compete against lower-cost third-country imports. The company warned that the current market structure is no longer viable during a prolonged period of depressed demand.

The issue is strategically important because silicon metal supports aluminium alloys, silicones, solar materials, semiconductors and industrial chemicals. If European smelting capacity continues to close, the region’s downstream industries will become more dependent on imported feedstock.

European Silicon Metal Faces Low-Cost Import Pressure

Ferroglobe said the European silicon metal market remains under pressure from China and Angola. Angola has emerged as a faster-growing supplier into the EU, increasing its market share during the first two months of 2026.

Angola supplied 993t of silicon metal to the EU in February, up by around two-thirds from a year earlier. Its EU market share more than doubled to 3.3% in January-February from 1.5% a year earlier.

This matters because even modest import share gains can influence pricing when demand is weak. European producers with higher energy and operating costs have limited room to absorb lower selling prices.

Ferroglobe has called for the EU to introduce anti-dumping duties on certain third-country suppliers selling at low prices into the bloc. The company made the request after the European Commission excluded silicon metal from last year’s safeguard investigation.

The policy question is now becoming more urgent. Europe wants strategic materials security, but it also needs trade tools that keep domestic production viable when imports undercut regional cost structures.

Without stronger protection or demand recovery, European silicon metal output could remain constrained. That would weaken the region’s ability to support aluminium, chemicals, solar and advanced manufacturing supply chains from local feedstock.

Ferro-Alloy Sales Offset Silicon Weakness

Ferroglobe’s broader first-quarter performance was supported by stronger silicon-based and manganese-based alloy shipments. This helped offset weaker silicon metal volumes.

Shipments of silicon-based alloys rose by 41.6% year on year to 60,674t. The increase was driven by stronger US demand for ferro-silicon.

However, average selling prices for silicon-based alloys fell by 4.9% to $2,016/t. Competitive conditions in the US and South Africa limited pricing power despite stronger volumes.

Manganese-based alloy sales also improved sharply. Shipments rose by 27.5% to 85,743t, supported by recently implemented safeguard measures.

The average selling price for manganese-based alloys increased by 12.8% to $1,250/t because of higher European prices. This shows how trade measures can directly support pricing when regional supply protection is in place.

Ferroglobe’s total sales rose by 13.2% year on year to $347.7mn. The increase came from higher silicon-based and manganese-based alloy volumes, along with stronger manganese alloy pricing.

Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation increased by 112.5% to $3.3mn. The improvement was meaningful, but margins remain thin for a company operating in volatile alloy and silicon markets.

The company is also considering reopening operations in Venezuela. Those assets are close to the US market and could benefit from low-cost energy, raw materials and favourable logistics.

That strategy reflects the changing economics of ferro-alloy and silicon production. Energy cost, trade access, import protection and proximity to customers are becoming more important than legacy European capacity alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ferroglobe’s results show that Europe’s silicon metal problem is not only weak demand; it is structural cost exposure against lower-priced imports. If the EU wants domestic critical industrial material capacity, silicon metal may need the same policy seriousness now being applied to batteries, magnets and semiconductors.