Energy Security Investment Rises as IEA Sees $3.4 Trillion Global Spend

IEA

Energy security investment is accelerating as the war in the Middle East and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz push governments and companies to diversify supply. The IEA expects global energy investment to reach $3.4 trillion in 2026.

Energy security investment is now shifting strongly toward electricity, grids, storage, renewables, nuclear, low-emissions fuels and efficiency. The IEA expects around $2.2 trillion to flow into these areas, compared with about $1.2 trillion for fossil fuels.

Energy security investment also carries direct metals implications. More spending on grids, storage, solar, wind, nuclear and electrification will support demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other critical materials.

The IEA described the current crisis as the largest energy security crisis the world has faced. It expects decision-makers to prioritise resilience, diversification and trusted energy partners.

Electricity Spending Becomes the Core Security Response

Electricity-related investment is becoming the dominant theme in global energy spending. The IEA expects investment in electricity supply and infrastructure to reach nearly $1.6 trillion in 2026.

That figure rises to about $2 trillion when end-use electrification is included. This shows that energy security is no longer only about oil and gas supply. It is increasingly about reliable power systems.

Power grids will be central to this shift. Grid expansion, storage deployment and electrification require large volumes of copper, aluminium and electrical equipment.

Renewables will also remain a major investment channel. The IEA expects renewables spending to reach around $665bn in 2026, including $365bn for solar, $200bn for wind and $75bn for hydropower.

Annual renewables spending growth has moderated because of lower technology costs and policy changes in China and the US. However, low-emissions sources still account for more than 70% of global power investment.

The metals signal is clear. Energy security policy is reinforcing the same material demand base already supported by decarbonisation. Grid metals, battery materials and renewable energy inputs remain structurally important.

Fuel Supply Shock Keeps Fossil Investment Alive

Fossil fuel investment is also rising in selected areas. Total fossil fuel supply investment is expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026, returning to 2024 levels.

Oil investment is expected to fall for a third consecutive year to below $500bn. Long project lead times, supply-chain limits, offshore rig tightness and uncertainty over the duration of the price spike are limiting near-term spending outside the Middle East.

Natural gas investment is moving in the opposite direction. The IEA expects gas investment to reach $330bn, the highest level in a decade, supported by LNG export projects and demand from data centres.

Coal investment is also expected to rise to $180bn, the highest level since 2012. Around 70% of that spending is expected in China, while some Asian countries may keep existing coal-fired power plants running longer to protect energy security.

The IEA said past investments in renewables, nuclear, efficiency and electrification have already improved energy security in major fuel-importing regions. It estimated that China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, southeast Asia and India avoided around $260bn in fossil fuel imports in 2025.

The conflict is also forcing a search for new energy export routes to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Repair costs for damaged energy infrastructure are expected to reach tens of billions of dollars.

For industrial markets, the result is a more complex energy outlook. Electricity investment is rising fast, but gas and coal remain part of short-term security planning. That mix will shape metals demand, energy costs and industrial competitiveness.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The IEA’s outlook shows that energy security and electrification are now the same investment story. The winners will be supply chains that can deliver grids, storage, renewables and critical minerals at scale while reducing exposure to fragile fuel routes.

Aluminium Bahrain Profits Surge as Prices Offset War-Linked Output Losses

Aluminium Bahrain

Aluminium Bahrain profits rose sharply in the first quarter as higher London Metal Exchange aluminium prices and stronger delivery premiums outweighed lower production and sales volumes. The company reported profit of 75.3mn Bahraini dinars, more than four times the level recorded a year earlier.

Aluminium Bahrain profits were supported by a 22% year-on-year increase in average LME three-month aluminium prices to $3,195/t. Stronger regional premiums also helped lift earnings during a period of tightening aluminium supply.

Aluminium Bahrain profits still fell by almost a third from the previous quarter because of production disruption and shipping constraints linked to the Iran war. The company’s output and deliveries both declined as the Strait of Hormuz disruption affected raw material and product flows.

The result shows how aluminium producers can benefit from higher prices during supply shocks, while still facing direct operational pressure when logistics and plant reliability are disrupted.

Hormuz Disruption Cuts Alba Output and Sales

Alba produced 339,734t of aluminium in the first quarter, down 14% from a year earlier. Sales fell by 17% to 312,563t over the same period.

The volume decline followed Alba’s decision on 16 March to shut three reduction lines totalling about 300,000 t/yr of capacity. That represented around 19% of the company’s total output capacity.

The shutdown was a response to supply constraints caused by shipping delays through the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway is critical for Gulf industrial supply chains, including alumina, carbon products, spare parts and aluminium exports.

Alba’s facilities were then damaged by a missile strike on 28 March, adding physical asset risk to the logistics disruption. This turned a regional shipping issue into a direct production and repair challenge.

Despite lower volumes, value-added products remained important. They accounted for 71% of Alba’s sales, unchanged from a year earlier.

That product mix matters because value-added aluminium typically carries better margins and stronger customer relationships than standard ingot. In a disrupted market, maintaining value-added sales helps protect earnings quality.

Dunkerque Deal Could Expand Alba’s European Footprint

Alba’s agreement to acquire Aluminium Dunkerque in France adds a strategic European dimension to its current operating challenges. The company announced the acquisition plan on 4 March and signed a share purchase agreement on 6 May.

The deal remains subject to regulatory approval. If completed, it would give Alba a major European aluminium production asset at a time when western buyers are prioritising supply security.

The acquisition could also diversify Alba’s geographic risk. Current disruption in the Gulf has shown the vulnerability of aluminium producers exposed to Middle East shipping routes and regional conflict.

A European asset would give Alba closer access to automotive, packaging, construction and industrial customers in the region. It could also support the company’s value-added product strategy.

However, the timing is complex. Alba must manage reduced output, damaged facilities and supply-chain disruption at home while pursuing a major overseas acquisition.

For the aluminium market, Alba’s first-quarter result reinforces the current contradiction. Prices and premiums are high because supply is tight, but the same disruption creating stronger pricing is also cutting physical production.

The key issue is how quickly Alba can stabilise operations and restore capacity. If Middle East disruption continues, Gulf aluminium supply could remain constrained, supporting premiums but limiting volumes available to customers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Alba’s quarter shows that higher aluminium prices cannot fully offset operational exposure to war, shipping disruption and plant damage. The Dunkerque acquisition may become more strategically valuable if Gulf producers need geographic diversification to protect long-term customer supply.

Rising Aluminium Prices Seen Unlikely to Derail Demand Growth

Aluminium

Rising aluminium prices are unlikely to destroy demand, despite higher premiums caused by Middle East supply disruption and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Speakers at an aluminium industry event in London said the sector’s medium-term demand drivers remain strong.

Rising aluminium prices have raised concerns among analysts that buyers could reduce consumption or switch to alternative materials. Those fears have grown as supply disruption has lifted global delivery premiums and tightened availability.

Rising aluminium prices are still being weighed against structural demand from packaging, automotive lightweighting, power infrastructure, energy transition projects and artificial intelligence-related growth. Industry speakers argued that these end-use trends are not easily reversed by short-term price movements.

The debate matters because aluminium demand forecasts remain strong. Consensus expectations have pointed to demand growth of around 40% in 2022-30, while newer forecasts suggest growth of about 5% per year over the next decade.

Packaging and Automotive Demand Look More Resilient Than Expected

Packaging demand appears relatively insulated from short-term aluminium price moves. Alcoa said it is seeing more products move into aluminium cans and that price is not the main factor driving packaging substitution.

This is important because beverage cans and packaging remain high-volume aluminium markets. Their appeal is tied not only to cost, but also to recyclability, light weight, consumer preference and established filling infrastructure.

Automotive demand is more price-sensitive. However, major material choices in vehicle platforms are not usually changed because of short-term price movements.

Automakers make aluminium decisions around lightweighting, crash performance, emissions rules, platform design and long-term supply strategy. This gives aluminium some demand stability even when prices and premiums rise.

Still, demand destruction cannot be ruled out completely. High interest rates, weak consumer purchasing power and elevated living costs may continue to limit consumption in some traditional markets.

Copper Prices Strengthen Aluminium’s Role in Electrification

Energy transition and AI infrastructure demand give aluminium a stronger long-term floor. These sectors require large volumes of conductive, lightweight and scalable material.

Copper remains the main competing material in electrical and cable applications. But copper prices are now so high that some buyers are more likely to consider substituting copper with aluminium than the reverse.

This strengthens aluminium’s position in power cables, grids, renewable energy, data centres and related infrastructure. Aluminium offers good conductivity, lower weight and more transparent supply-chain options in some applications.

The energy transition also supports demand through decarbonisation. Solar, wind, transmission systems, electric vehicles, battery enclosures and industrial electrification all require more aluminium.

AI infrastructure adds another layer. Data centres need power distribution, cooling systems, structural materials and electrical infrastructure, all of which can support aluminium use.

Therefore, the demand question is not only about price. It is about whether the world can build enough power, transport and digital infrastructure. Aluminium remains one of the core materials for that buildout.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The aluminium market is showing that strategic demand can absorb higher prices better than traditional models suggest. The real risk is not immediate demand destruction, but whether supply disruption, premiums and energy costs create uneven pressure across weaker end-use sectors.

Kamoa-Kakula Sulphuric Acid Output Turns Copperbelt Squeeze Into Margin Support

Ivanhoe

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid production has become a major earnings support for Ivanhoe Mines as tight acid availability across the African Copperbelt lifts by-product revenue. The company’s new direct-to-blister smelter in the Democratic Republic of Congo is turning a regional supply constraint into a margin advantage.

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid output reached 117,871t in the first quarter. Ivanhoe sold 107,700t to six offtakers at an average realised price of $467/t.

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid pricing is now moving higher. Ivanhoe recently signed a June delivery contract at $725/t and plans to re-tender and reprice remaining contracts by the end of the quarter.

The shift is strategically important because many copper producers in the DRC and Zambia consume sulphuric acid for leaching. Kamoa-Kakula, by contrast, produces acid as a by-product, giving Ivanhoe a natural hedge against the same squeeze hurting regional competitors.

Acid Credits Change the Kamoa-Kakula Cost Structure

Sulphuric acid has become one of the hidden drivers of Copperbelt copper economics. The DRC and Zambia rely heavily on acid for solvent extraction and leaching operations, and supply has tightened because of Middle East sulphur disruption, Zambian acid export controls and smelter maintenance in the region.

Ivanhoe said around 80% of sulphur imported into Africa moves through the Strait of Hormuz. That makes the Copperbelt highly exposed to disruption in Middle Eastern sulphur flows.

The Kamoa-Kakula smelter changes Ivanhoe’s exposure. Instead of paying higher acid costs, the operation is selling acid into a tight regional market.

Smelter operating costs averaged $0.27/lb in the first quarter. Sulphuric acid by-product credits more than offset that cost at $0.32/lb.

This cost structure helped lower Kamoa-Kakula’s cash cost to $2.58/lb from $2.99/lb in the previous quarter. The result was slightly below the lower end of Ivanhoe’s 2026 guidance range of $2.60-3.00/lb.

The smelter also reduced logistics costs. Kamoa-Kakula exported 99.7% pure copper anodes instead of 35-40% copper concentrate, cutting logistics costs to $0.22/lb from $0.70/lb in the fourth quarter.

That shift matters because the smelter moves Ivanhoe further down the value chain. Higher-grade exported material reduces transport intensity, lowers logistics exposure and improves revenue capture.

Kamoa-Kakula generated revenue of $862mn, operating profit of $221mn and Ebitda of $397mn in the quarter. That represented an Ebitda margin of 46%.

However, Ivanhoe’s group results were still weaker. Adjusted Ebitda fell to $191mn from $226mn a year earlier, while the company reported a $2mn quarterly loss compared with a $122mn profit a year earlier.

The loss mainly reflected Ivanhoe’s $42mn share of loss from Kamoa Holding after Kamoa-Kakula booked a $183mn tax adjustment to settle DRC tax claims from previous years. This means the headline loss should be separated from the operational value of the smelter and acid credits.

Smelter Ramp-Up Links Copper Recovery to Regional Supply Strategy

Kamoa-Kakula’s copper output remains affected by disruption from last year’s seismic activity. The operation produced 61,906t of copper in concentrate in the first quarter, down from 133,120t a year earlier.

Contained copper in blister and anode totalled 71,417t. This included 63,671t from the on-site smelter and 7,746t from the Lualaba Copper Smelter in Kolwezi.

Ivanhoe maintained Kamoa-Kakula’s 2026 guidance at 290,000-330,000t of contained copper in anode or blister. Its 2027 guidance remains at 380,000-420,000t.

The company still expects production to return to more than 500,000 t/yr from 2028, with a target cash cost below $2/lb. Reaching that level will depend on mine recovery, smelter utilisation, power stability and logistics performance.

The smelter is currently operating at around 60% of design capacity. It is producing acid at about 1,350 t/d, but further ramp-up is constrained by concentrate availability.

Ivanhoe is assessing purchases and toll treatment of local third-party copper concentrates to raise smelter utilisation and improve margins. This could make Kamoa-Kakula more important to the regional concentrate market.

That point matters globally. Chinese smelters continue to face negative treatment charges, showing how tight copper concentrate supply has become. If Kamoa-Kakula becomes a larger third-party treatment option, it could offer an alternative regional route for selected Copperbelt concentrates.

Logistics are also changing. The first shipment of Kamoa-Kakula anodes moved through the Lobito railway corridor during the quarter and reached the Atlantic port of Lobito before shipment to Europe for refining.

Ivanhoe said the Lobito rail route takes around seven days from the DRC Copperbelt to the port. That compares with more than three weeks by truck to Durban or Dar es Salaam.

Flood damage in Angola temporarily halted Lobito shipments, but movements are expected to resume later this month. If reliable, the corridor could become a major strategic route for Central African copper exports.

Energy remains another critical variable. Ivanhoe has secured five months of diesel supply to protect operations from global supply-chain disruption.

The company is also developing a 60MW solar and battery storage project expected to deliver baseload power to Kamoa-Kakula from early in the third quarter. It plans to double on-site solar capacity to 120MW by the end of 2027.

These steps show that Kamoa-Kakula is no longer only a copper mine story. The asset now combines mining, smelting, acid supply, anode exports, rail logistics and on-site power strategy.

That integrated model gives Ivanhoe a stronger position in a region where other copper producers are exposed to acid shortages, sulphur disruption, diesel risk and long trucking routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s smelter has turned Kamoa-Kakula into a more strategic Copperbelt asset, not just a high-grade copper producer. In a market where acid, logistics and power can decide margins, the operation’s by-product and infrastructure advantages may become as important as its copper grade.

EGA Guinea Bauxite Supply Deal Restores Route to UAE Alumina Operations

Bauxite

EGA Guinea bauxite supply has moved closer to normalisation after Emirates Global Aluminium reached an amicable settlement with Guinea over the revocation of its bauxite mining licence. The agreement will allow Guinean producer CBG to resume bauxite shipments to EGA’s operations in the UAE.

EGA Guinea bauxite supply had been disrupted since Guinean customs suspended shipments from EGA subsidiary Guinea Alumina in October 2024. The suspension followed delays in EGA’s plan to build an alumina refinery in Guinea.

EGA Guinea bauxite supply became more uncertain in 2025 when Guinea revoked EGA’s bauxite mining licence and reassigned it to newly created state-owned firm Nimba Mining. GAC continued to seek redress through legal action before the latest settlement.

The agreement includes a lump-sum payment by Guinea to GAC for the transfer of assets to Nimba Mining. It also renews EGA’s bauxite supply agreements with CBG under mutually beneficial commercial terms.

Guinea Settlement Reopens a Strategic Bauxite Channel

The settlement is important because Guinea is one of the world’s most important bauxite supply sources. Its high-volume export role makes it central to alumina refineries and integrated aluminium producers.

For EGA, access to Guinean bauxite supports feedstock security for its Al Taweelah alumina refinery in the UAE. Stable bauxite supply is essential because alumina production depends on consistent ore quality, logistics and long-term commercial arrangements.

The dispute also shows how resource nationalism is reshaping aluminium raw material supply. Guinea has been pushing for more domestic value creation and stronger state control over mining assets.

The revocation of EGA’s licence formed part of a broader review of more than 50 mining licences granted over the past two decades. Those licences covered bauxite, iron ore, gold, diamonds and graphite.

By transferring assets to Nimba Mining while renewing supply through CBG, Guinea preserves more state influence while allowing trade with EGA to resume. This gives both sides a practical route out of a prolonged dispute.

For the wider aluminium market, the settlement reduces one layer of uncertainty around bauxite flows. However, it also reinforces the need for producers to manage political risk in key mining jurisdictions.

Hormuz Disruption and Smelter Damage Still Cloud Recovery

The bauxite agreement does not immediately remove all operational risk for EGA. The resumption of shipments to Al Taweelah depends on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been disrupted by the US-Israel and Iran war.

This adds a logistics risk to the feedstock recovery. Even with commercial terms resolved, bauxite and alumina supply chains still depend on safe shipping routes through one of the world’s most strategic maritime chokepoints.

EGA is also dealing with damage at its Al Taweelah aluminium smelter after a missile attack on 28 March. Operations there could take a year to resume, creating a separate challenge for the company’s primary aluminium output.

The situation highlights the dual exposure of integrated aluminium producers. They need secure upstream bauxite and alumina supply, but they also need reliable power, smelter operations and shipping routes.

For EGA, the Guinea settlement is a major positive for raw material continuity. But the company’s near-term recovery will still depend on geopolitical stability, shipping access and the pace of repairs at Al Taweelah.

The broader industrial message is clear. Aluminium supply security now depends on more than ore availability. It requires political settlement, maritime access, energy security and resilient smelting infrastructure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

EGA’s settlement with Guinea shows that bauxite supply is becoming a political asset, not just a mining contract. The deal restores an important feedstock route, but Hormuz disruption and Al Taweelah damage show how fragile integrated aluminium supply chains have become.

Q-Flex LNG Loading Outside Qatar Signals LNG Fleet Disruption After Hormuz Shock

Q-Flex LNG

Q-Flex LNG loading outside Qatar could mark a major shift in LNG shipping patterns after the US-Iran war stranded supply from Ras Laffan and disrupted normal QatarEnergy fleet operations. The 216,200m³ Mesaimeer is scheduled to load at Oman’s Qalhat export terminal, potentially making it the first Q-class vessel to load outside Qatar since the conflict began.

The move matters because Q-Flex LNG loading has been almost entirely tied to QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan terminal since 2008. These vessels were designed around Qatar’s large-scale LNG export model, with cargo sizes, port access and operating economics suited to dedicated long-haul flows.

Q-Flex LNG loading at Qalhat would show how the LNG market is adapting to a severe regional disruption. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has left Qatar’s LNG supply constrained and much of its specialised carrier fleet underutilised.

The cargo details remain uncertain. Mesaimeer could load a typical cargo of around 72,000t, or a much larger parcel closer to the vessel’s historical maximum.

QatarEnergy Fleet Faces Limited Alternative Deployment

Q-Flex and Q-Max vessels are the largest LNG carriers in the market. Their size gives QatarEnergy efficiency on established routes, but it also limits flexibility during a regional shipping crisis.

Many ports cannot handle Q-Flex or Q-Max dimensions. These vessels also carry larger cargoes than many buyers or terminals can easily absorb, making them less attractive in the open spot market.

QatarEnergy has offered some vessels into the spot relet market and through bilateral channels. But traders showed limited interest because of high boil-off, bunker consumption, port restrictions and large cargo sizes.

Mesaimeer’s planned Qalhat loading is therefore significant. The vessel has only loaded at Ras Laffan since entering service in 2009, so a non-Qatari loading would represent a rare operational shift.

Oman’s 11.4mn t/yr Qalhat terminal offers one possible route to keep QatarEnergy-controlled tonnage active while Ras Laffan flows remain disrupted. It is still unclear whether QatarEnergy sublet the vessel or purchased a free-on-board cargo from Qalhat.

The development highlights a key LNG market lesson. Large-scale export systems can be highly efficient in normal conditions, but specialised shipping assets become harder to redeploy when chokepoints close.

Golden Pass Could Offer Another Outlet for Q-Flex Vessels

QatarEnergy may also use Q-Flex vessels at the Golden Pass LNG terminal in the US, where it owns a 70% equity stake. ExxonMobil holds the remaining interest in the 18.1mn t/yr project.

Golden Pass is located at Sabine Pass, where typical Q-Flex vessel dimensions can transit. That makes the terminal a logical option if QatarEnergy needs alternative loading points for its large carrier fleet.

The Q-Flex vessel Al Nuaman is already holding offshore Golden Pass with an AIS declaration for Sabine Offshore Anchorage. This suggests QatarEnergy is evaluating practical deployment options outside the Gulf.

If Q-Flex vessels begin loading regularly outside Qatar, it could reshape short-term LNG logistics. It would also create new operational patterns for large LNG carriers that have historically served a highly concentrated Qatari export system.

The broader market issue is supply-chain resilience. The Strait of Hormuz disruption has exposed how LNG trade depends not only on production capacity, but also on shipping access, fleet compatibility and terminal flexibility.

For LNG buyers, the main concern is cargo availability. For shipowners and traders, the problem is whether large specialised vessels can be economically redeployed during a regional crisis.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Mesaimeer’s possible Qalhat loading shows that LNG logistics are being forced into emergency adaptation. The larger lesson is clear: energy security now depends on flexible shipping, diversified terminals and vessels that can operate beyond their original trade lanes.

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

Renewables Energy Security Message Shapes Cop 31 Climate Agenda

Renewables energy

Renewables energy security is becoming a central policy message ahead of the Cop 31 climate summit, as Turkey and Australia argue that fossil fuels no longer guarantee stable energy supply. The two countries said stronger decarbonisation, electrification and alternative energy sources are now essential to national resilience.

Turkey will host Cop 31 in Antalya, while Australia will lead climate negotiations. Both countries are preparing the summit against the backdrop of energy market disruption caused by the war in the Mideast Gulf and shipping interruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.

Renewables energy security is now being framed not only as a climate issue, but also as a sovereignty issue. Turkey’s environment minister Murat Kurum said countries should invest in clean energy sources, including renewables, hydrogen and ammonia, to support stable and independent development.

The message reflects a wider shift in energy policy. Fossil fuels once dominated energy security thinking because they offered high-density supply and established infrastructure. But recent geopolitical shocks have shown that oil, gas and coal supply chains can be exposed to sanctions, shipping blockages and regional conflict.

Fossil Fuel Risk Pushes Electrification Up the Policy Agenda

The Mideast Gulf energy crisis has strengthened the argument that fossil fuel dependence creates vulnerability. Supply routes can be disrupted, prices can spike and importing countries can quickly face inflation, industrial cost pressure and energy security concerns.

Australia’s climate and energy minister Chris Bowen said the crisis creates an opportunity to show that energy reliability, sovereignty and security can move together with strong decarbonisation. His message was clear: doubling down on fossil fuels is not the answer.

That argument gives renewables energy security a sharper industrial meaning. Wind and solar resources cannot be sanctioned in the same way as seaborne fossil fuels. They also reduce exposure to imported fuel prices once infrastructure is built.

Electrification will therefore become more important in the Cop 31 discussion. Germany has already pushed for a stronger debate on how countries can advance electrification before the summit.

This matters for metals and manufacturing. Electrification requires more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, rare earth magnets, batteries, power electronics, transformers, grid equipment and storage systems. The shift away from fossil fuels therefore increases demand for industrial materials that support clean power systems.

Hydrogen and ammonia also remain part of Turkey’s energy transition vision. These fuels could support hard-to-abate sectors, industrial heat, shipping, fertilisers and long-duration energy storage, but they require large amounts of renewable electricity and new infrastructure.

The policy direction is not only about replacing fuels. It is about rebuilding energy systems around grids, storage, clean molecules and domestic generation capacity.

Cop 31 Could Turn Energy Security Into a Decarbonisation Driver

Cop 31 is expected to revisit the global transition away from fossil fuels. Nearly 200 countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels at Cop 28 in 2023, while developed countries agreed at Cop 29 to provide $300bn/yr to developing countries by 2035.

Turkey is now urging countries to fulfil earlier commitments on finance and energy. Kurum also called on countries that have not submitted updated nationally determined contributions to do so.

This creates pressure before Cop 31. Around 43 countries still need to submit climate plans, according to Kurum. Without credible national plans, the global transition risks remaining a statement rather than an implementation programme.

Australia pointed to three processes already under way before Cop 31. These include the Belem roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels, the global implementation accelerator and the Belem Mission to 1.5°C.

The challenge will be coordination. Countries have already agreed on high-level climate direction, but implementation remains uneven. Clean energy investment, grid expansion, permitting, financing and critical mineral supply all need to move faster.

For resource markets, the message is clear. Renewables energy security will not reduce dependence on supply chains. It will shift dependence from fossil fuel flows toward metals, minerals, equipment and industrial manufacturing capacity.

That creates a new form of energy security risk. Countries that build renewable power but lack access to copper, rare earths, battery metals, transformers, power electronics or grid equipment may still face strategic exposure.

Cop 31 could therefore strengthen demand for policies that connect climate action with supply-chain resilience. Energy transition goals will require not only emissions targets, but also mineral security, manufacturing investment and infrastructure deployment.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The renewables energy security argument marks a turning point in climate politics. The next energy security race will be fought through grids, storage, critical minerals and clean manufacturing capacity, not only through control of fossil fuel routes.

Indonesia HPAL Nickel Ore Costs Rise as New HPM Formula Hits Limonite Feedstock

Nickel ore

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are set to rise sharply after the government’s revised mineral benchmark price lifted the mandated price floor for limonite ore. The new HPM formula is expected to increase limonite ore costs by at least 50%, adding immediate margin pressure to mixed hydroxide precipitate producers.

The revised HPM for limonite ore containing 1.2% nickel, 0.1% cobalt and 2% chromium is calculated at $45.24/wmt under the updated Harga Mineral Acuan. That is around 50% higher than early April transacted prices of about $30/wmt for 1.2% limonite ore.

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are also far above the previous benchmark level. Under the old formula, the HPM for similar ore was only $17.17/wmt, meaning the new benchmark is nearly three times higher.

The change matters because HPAL operations rely on limonite ore as feedstock to produce MHP, which is used in battery-grade nickel and cobalt supply chains. A higher government-mandated ore floor will raise raw material costs, increase royalty payments and pressure margins across Indonesia’s battery nickel industry.

Limonite Ore Repricing Raises MHP Cost Pressure

The new HPM framework has the strongest impact on limonite ore because this material typically trades closer to benchmark values than saprolite ore. HPAL producers therefore face a more direct cost increase than rotary kiln-electric furnace operators.

MHP producers will now have to absorb higher ore purchase costs and higher royalties. Since royalties are linked to official valuation, the total cost increase could exceed the headline 50% rise in limonite ore pricing.

The revised formula also changes how Indonesia captures ore value. It includes cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore valuation, making these contained elements taxable. This is especially important for limonite ore because cobalt content adds value to HPAL feedstock.

The correction factor for cobalt is set at 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. Iron carries a 30% correction factor when content is 35% or lower, while chromium carries a 10% correction factor.

This means Indonesia is no longer valuing nickel ore mainly by nickel grade. The government is moving toward a broader contained-metal pricing model, capturing more value from battery-related by-products and ore chemistry.

For MHP producers, this creates a structural cost problem. HPAL projects were built around access to Indonesian limonite ore, sulphuric acid and integrated processing infrastructure. If ore costs rise by more than a third to half, the cost floor for MHP production moves higher.

This could affect downstream nickel sulphate and cathode material economics. Producers with stronger integration, lower acid costs and better logistics will be better positioned. Higher-cost operators may face squeezed margins if MHP prices do not rise enough to offset the new ore benchmark.

The change also comes as Indonesia tightens wider nickel policy. Mining quota uncertainty, export tax discussions and stricter pricing formulas all point to a broader state strategy of capturing more mineral value before material moves downstream.

Sulphuric Acid Tightness Adds a Second Cost Shock

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are rising at the same time as sulphuric acid prices surge. This creates a double pressure point for MHP producers.

HPAL operations require large volumes of sulphuric acid to leach nickel and cobalt from limonite ore. Any disruption in sulphur or acid supply directly affects processing costs and production reliability.

The US-Iran conflict has stranded several sulphur cargoes bound for Indonesian HPAL producers, preventing them from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, producers have shifted toward buying sulphuric acid directly.

That market was already tight because of limited copper concentrate availability. Sulphuric acid supply is expected to tighten further as China suspends exports from May.

Southeast Asian sulphuric acid prices have risen sharply. Prices reached $277.50/t cfr on 9 April, up 71% from $162.50/t before the conflict.

This is a major issue for Indonesian HPAL plants. Higher limonite ore costs increase feedstock expenses, while higher sulphuric acid prices increase processing costs. Together, they raise the full cost of producing MHP and weaken the advantage of low-cost Indonesian battery nickel.

Saprolite ore faces less immediate disruption. Saprolite is mainly used in RKEF operations to produce nickel pig iron and ferronickel. Although the new HPM for typical saprolite ore containing 1.6% nickel, 18% iron and 2% chromium rises to $52.90/wmt from $29.94/wmt, it remains below early April transacted prices of about $70/wmt.

This means RKEF producers may see limited immediate transaction impact because market prices are already above the benchmark. HPAL producers, by contrast, face a direct reset of the cost floor.

The difference could reshape relative economics between Indonesia’s stainless-linked and battery-linked nickel chains. NPI producers remain supported by high saprolite prices, while HPAL producers now face rising limonite, royalty and acid costs.

For the global battery supply chain, the key risk is that Indonesia’s MHP cost curve shifts upward. That could support nickel sulphate prices over time, especially if acid tightness persists or HPM-linked royalty costs remain elevated.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource rent capture. The government is recognising that limonite ore contains not only nickel but also cobalt and other valuable elements. This gives Jakarta a stronger fiscal claim over battery material feedstock.

However, the policy also increases operating uncertainty. HPAL investors need predictable ore pricing, acid availability and tax treatment to justify large-scale expansion. A sharp change in HPM could force producers to revisit cost assumptions, procurement strategies and product pricing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s new HPM formula marks a turning point for HPAL economics. The country is capturing more value from limonite ore, but the combined shock of higher ore prices, royalties and sulphuric acid costs could reset the cost floor for global MHP supply.

Kamoa-Kakula Copper Output Falls as Ivanhoe Shifts Toward Smelter Recovery

Ivanhoe

Kamoa-Kakula copper output fell sharply in the first quarter as Ivanhoe Mines continued to recover from seismic damage at the Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The complex produced 61,906t of copper in concentrate, down 54% from 133,120t a year earlier.

The decline reflects the continuing effect of the May 2025 seismic shocks that forced Ivanhoe to shut, drain and rebuild the Kakula mine. The asset remains in a staged recovery process and has not yet returned to full production.

Kamoa-Kakula copper output now sits below earlier expectations, forcing Ivanhoe to lower its 2026 guidance to 290,000-330,000t from 380,000-420,000t. The company also cut its 2027 target to 380,000-420,000t from 500,000-540,000t, although it still expects output to exceed 500,000 t/yr from 2028.

The weaker concentrate output is important for the global copper market because Kamoa-Kakula is one of the most important growth assets in the DRC copper belt. Any delay in its recovery reduces near-term copper supply from a region that has become central to global mine growth.

Smelter Output and Acid Production Cushion the Disruption

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results also showed a shift in the site’s operating profile. While copper concentrate output fell sharply, the Kamoa-Kakula smelter produced 63,671t of anode during the quarter.

The company also produced 7,746t of copper in blister from the LCS smelter in Kolwezi. This shows that Ivanhoe is building more downstream processing capability even as underground mine recovery continues.

The smelter gives Kamoa-Kakula a strategic advantage in the DRC. Most producers in the African Copperbelt rely on sulphuric acid for leaching operations, while Kamoa-Kakula produces sulphuric acid as a byproduct.

The on-site copper smelter produced 117,871t of high-strength sulphuric acid in the first quarter. This has become more important because the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised concern over sulphur supply into African hydrometallurgical operations.

Sulphur and sulphuric acid availability can directly affect DRC copper production costs. Producers that rely on imported sulphur or purchased acid may face higher costs or operating constraints if Middle East disruptions persist.

Ivanhoe’s position is different. The company does not need sulphuric acid for its own main copper production route and can instead produce acid for regional demand. This could turn a regional input shortage into a commercial advantage.

The main external risk for Ivanhoe is diesel availability. Diesel remains important for on-site energy generation and logistics in the DRC. Ivanhoe has made advanced diesel purchases and implemented contingency measures to sustain operations.

The company also has a lower diesel exposure than many regional operators because it has access to 250MW of hydroelectric capacity. A further 60MW of solar power with battery storage is expected to come online soon, strengthening the site’s energy resilience.

Kipushi Zinc Growth Adds Diversification Despite Grid Instability

Ivanhoe’s Kipushi zinc-copper-lead-germanium mine delivered a stronger first-quarter result. The DRC mine produced a quarterly record of 65,044t of zinc in concentrate, up 52.2% from a year earlier and 5.9% from the previous quarter.

The result gives Ivanhoe an important diversification benefit while Kamoa-Kakula works through its recovery. Zinc concentrate output from Kipushi adds exposure to galvanizing, infrastructure, alloying and specialty metal supply chains.

Kipushi also carries strategic by-product relevance because the mine includes copper, lead and germanium. Germanium has become more important for semiconductors, fibre optics, infrared systems and defence applications.

However, Kipushi still faces infrastructure constraints. Ivanhoe said concentrator availability was affected by electrical grid instability, even as zinc output increased.

This highlights a wider challenge across the DRC mining sector. The country has high-grade resources and major growth potential, but reliable power, transport, reagents and logistics remain critical constraints.

For Kamoa-Kakula, the longer-term recovery depends on mine rebuilding, underground transport, smelter integration, acid market dynamics and energy reliability. The 2028 target of more than 500,000 t/yr remains achievable only if these systems stabilise together.

For the copper market, Ivanhoe’s first-quarter performance sends a mixed signal. Concentrate output remains sharply lower, but smelting and acid production are becoming more strategically valuable as regional supply chains face sulphur and fuel risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results show that Kamoa-Kakula is no longer just a copper volume story. Its smelter, sulphuric acid output and power mix could become strategic advantages in a DRC market exposed to reagent, fuel and logistics shocks.

Goldman Sachs Copper Price Outlook Cut as 2026 Surplus Forecast Widens

Goldman Sachs

Goldman Sachs copper price outlook has been lowered for 2026 as the bank expects weaker demand growth from the Middle East energy shock to outweigh stable supply assumptions. The bank now forecasts the global refined copper market will record a 490,000t surplus in 2026, up from its previous estimate of 380,000t.

Goldman Sachs copper price outlook for average 2026 copper prices was cut to $12,650/t from $12,850/t. The revision reflects a downgrade in expected global refined copper demand growth to 1.6% from 2%, based on the assumed effect of higher energy prices on world economic growth.

Goldman Sachs copper price outlook remains volatile in the near term because markets are still assessing the impact of the Iran conflict and potential disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. The bank expects prices to average $12,700/t in the second quarter under its base case, before drifting toward a medium-term fair value near $12,000/t later in 2026.

Energy Shock Weakens Near-Term Copper Demand

The main driver of Goldman’s downgrade is weaker macroeconomic demand rather than a change in mine or refined supply assumptions. The bank assumes the energy price shock will cut world real GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points, reducing copper demand growth accordingly.

Goldman estimates that a one percentage point slowdown in global real GDP growth typically reduces copper demand growth by around 0.9 percentage points. That relationship implies a larger inventory build and a softer price path than previously expected.

The bank expects ex-US copper balances to remain close to flat this year, but the global refined market is now expected to carry a larger surplus. This reinforces the near-term view that copper prices may face pressure if demand recovery slows or energy costs remain elevated.

Downside risk remains linked to the duration of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. If energy flows do not recover from mid-April as assumed, higher fuel prices could further weaken industrial activity, manufacturing demand and copper consumption.

DRC Sulphur Risk Could Narrow the Surplus

Goldman has not included direct Middle East-related supply disruption in its base-case forecast. However, the conflict could still affect copper production in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where some solvent extraction-electrowinning output depends on sulphur moving through Middle East trade routes.

The DRC accounts for about 15% of global copper mine production. The country reportedly holds up to three months of sulphuric acid inventories, which means a short disruption may have limited impact on copper supply.

A longer interruption would be more significant. If sulphur exports through Hormuz remain constrained, acid availability could tighten, leaching costs could rise and DRC copper output could fall. That would narrow the projected refined copper surplus and provide some support to prices.

Goldman maintained its longer-term bullish copper view despite the 2026 downgrade. The bank still expects copper to rise to $15,000/t by 2035, supported by constrained supply growth and stronger demand from grid and energy infrastructure, which it sees accounting for 60% of global copper demand growth to 2030.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Goldman’s revision shows that copper’s near-term risk is shifting from supply shortage to demand sensitivity. However, the long-term copper story remains tied to grids, electrification and energy security, where structural demand still looks stronger than the 2026 surplus headline suggests.

Titanium Prices Hold as Inventory Drawdown Limits Spot Buying

Titanium

Titanium prices held steady in Europe and the US over the past month as mills, forgers and OEMs continued to rely on inventories instead of placing larger new orders. The market remained under pressure from surplus melt capacity and slower demand for standard-quality titanium used in airframe structures.

US 6Al 4V ingot prices stayed at $10-10.75/lb fob domestic producer, with some spot purchases still taking place near $10/lb. Mills kept offers broadly stable below $11/lb, although at least one producer quoted above that level for larger orders.

Titanium prices also remained flat in Europe, with 6Al 4V ingot assessed at $19.50-21.50/kg du Rotterdam. Forgers continued to work through high inventories of mill products before committing to new intermediate material purchases.

Aerospace Inventory Drawdown Keeps Pressure on Standard Titanium

Aerospace demand remained uneven as Boeing and Airbus continued inventory drawdowns. This primarily affected standard-quality titanium used in airframe structures, where consumption has been slower than in higher-specification applications.

Surplus melt capacity kept pressure on ingot prices. Market participants said lead times for basic Grade 5 ingot were around eight to 10 weeks, while some producers could likely deliver within six weeks if pushed.

Demand was stronger in premium-quality ingot for engine applications. Defence and medical markets also showed pockets of resilience, giving titanium producers some support outside standard aerospace structures.

Sponge and Commercially Pure Titanium Markets Stay Stable

Titanium sponge contract prices also remained stable. TG100 grade sponge long-term contract prices were assessed at $11-12/kg du Rotterdam in March, in line with standing 2026 contracts.

Saudi Arabian producer ATTM continued to operate normally, despite wider Middle East conflict risks and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict has affected regional freight routes and disrupted some metals supply chains, but no direct titanium sponge impact was reported.

Commercially pure titanium ingot prices were also unchanged. CP Grade 1 ingot held at $12-14/kg cif main port, while CP Grade 2 ingot stayed at $11.10-12/kg cif main port.

Buyers avoided finalising new contracts as they focused on reducing stocks. However, inventory clearing remains difficult because lower-cost Chinese material continues to compete aggressively in downstream industrial markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Titanium prices are stable, but the market is not yet strong. The real divide is between standard aerospace titanium, where inventories still weigh on demand, and premium-quality, defence and medical applications, where strategic consumption remains firmer.

Codelco Copper Output Stabilises as Middle East Crisis Raises Cost Risk

Codelco

Codelco copper output stabilised in 2025, but rising energy, diesel, reagent and logistics costs linked to the Middle East crisis could complicate the company’s recovery path. Chile’s state-owned copper producer reported a 0.5% increase in copper output to 1.33mn t, while total attributable production reached 1.44mn t.

The modest improvement showed that Codelco copper output has started to recover after several years of operational pressure. However, the company still faced mixed performance across major divisions, including lower output at El Teniente, Chuquicamata and Gabriela Mistral.

Codelco copper output is expected to rise only slightly in 2026 to 1.331mn–1.357mn t. That guidance highlights the limited pace of supply growth at one of the world’s most important copper producers, even as demand from grids, electrification and industrial investment remains structurally strong.

Fuel and Sulphuric Acid Costs Threaten Copper Margins

The Middle East crisis is creating a new cost risk for copper producers. If disruption around the Strait of Hormuz persists, higher diesel prices, tighter logistics and rising input costs could feed directly into mining cost structures.

Diesel is a key cost driver for haulage, power generation, processing and mine-site operations. Market participants estimate that copper mining costs can rise by 5–10% for every $50/bl increase in oil prices, making fuel volatility a direct margin threat.

Sulphur supply is another concern because it is used to produce sulphuric acid for copper leaching. This risk is especially acute for hydrometallurgical producers in the African Copperbelt, but higher global acid costs could still affect broader copper market sentiment.

Codelco’s own cost base was already rising before the latest geopolitical shock. Direct cash costs increased 4.8% to $2.09/lb in 2025, while total costs rose 14% to $3.73/lb because of higher operating activity, exchange-rate effects and inflation.

Stable Output Masks Deeper Structural Pressure

Codelco described 2025 as a year of stabilisation and productive transition. Ministro Hales lifted output by 25% to 153,000t, while Radomiro Tomic increased production by 9.2% to 295,000t.

However, several core assets remained under pressure. El Teniente output fell 13% to 310,000t, Chuquicamata declined 8% to 265,800t, and Gabriela Mistral dropped 20% to 82,000t.

The company also reported record capital expenditure of $5.07bn in 2025, showing the rising investment required to sustain production. Deeper deposits, lower ore grades and more complex operations are making copper supply more capital-intensive.

This reinforces the longer-term copper supply challenge. Even with stabilising production, Codelco’s guidance points to only incremental growth, while cost inflation could delay marginal projects and pressure higher-cost operations if the conflict continues.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Codelco’s results show that copper supply risk is shifting from simple output loss to cost inflation and capital intensity. The market may still focus on tonnes, but diesel, sulphuric acid and project execution costs will increasingly decide how much copper supply can grow profitably.

Battery Metals Mining Diesel Disruption Raises New Supply Chain Risk

Battery Metals Mining

Battery metals mining diesel disruption could become an immediate operational risk if the Middle East fuel crisis continues to restrict diesel and gasoil flows. Mining operations that rely heavily on diesel for haulage, transport, drilling, and remote-site activity are the most directly exposed.

The pressure will not affect every part of the battery supply chain equally. Upstream mining faces the clearest fuel availability and cost risk, while refining and processing may feel the impact later through logistics delays, higher freight costs, and reduced primary feedstock availability.

Battery metals mining diesel disruption is most relevant for parts of southern Africa, Australia, and southeast Asia. These regions host major copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel operations, but their fuel exposure differs sharply by power source, transport route, and mine configuration.

Southern African Copper and Cobalt Face Fuel Logistics Pressure

The DRC and Zambia could face early pressure if diesel flows remain disrupted. Ports in South Africa and Tanzania reportedly had around two months of diesel stock moving inland, but mining operators may need to reduce fuel use by mid-April if the Strait of Hormuz does not reopen soon.

The risk is significant because the copper-cobalt belt depends on diesel for logistics, open-pit haulage, mine-site activity, and some ore concentration processes. The DRC relies heavily on hydroelectricity for power, but diesel generators remain important in areas with limited grid access and for backup supply.

Zambia also plays a crucial logistics role between the copperbelt and key export ports, including Durban. Fuel shortages along these routes could slow truck movements, disrupt concentrate and cathode shipments, and add costs across copper and cobalt supply chains.

Australia Lithium and Indonesia Nickel Show Different Exposure Profiles

Australia appears acutely exposed because it imports most of its diesel from Asia, which in turn depends heavily on Middle East supply. The country has already lowered fuel standards in preparation for supply chain disruption, while cancelled fuel shipments have raised concerns about supply from the second half of April.

Hard-rock lithium mining in Australia could be one of the most fuel-sensitive parts of the battery metals chain. Major spodumene operations such as Greenbushes, Pilgangoora, and Mt Marion rely on diesel for haulage, drilling, and remote-site logistics, even though crushing, grinding, and concentration use more electricity.

Indonesia’s nickel sector is more insulated from immediate fuel disruption because many processing operations rely on captive coal-fired power. However, nickel mining still needs diesel for extraction and internal logistics, while the sector remains exposed to sulfur, sulfuric acid, shipping, and broader energy cost risks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Battery metals mining diesel disruption shows that energy security is now part of critical mineral security. The market often focuses on ore grades and processing capacity, but fuel logistics can decide whether copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel supply actually reaches the next stage of the value chain.

Sulfur Supply Disruptions Threaten Copper Cathode Production

Copper Cathode

Sulfur supply disruptions are emerging as a serious risk for copper cathode production as the US-Israeli-Iran war disrupts shipping and tightens global sulfur availability. Copper producers rely on sulfuric acid to leach, dissolve, and refine copper into high-purity cathode.

The Middle East supplies roughly one-quarter of global sulfur output, while nearly half of sulfur shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz. A de facto closure of the route has delayed deliveries and raised concern across copper supply chains.

Sulfur supply disruptions matter because sulfur is the key feedstock for sulfuric acid. Without stable acid supply, copper producers face higher costs, slower processing, lower cathode output, and possible bottlenecks between mining and refining.

African Copper Producers Face the Highest Sulfuric Acid Risk

African copper producers face the greatest exposure because the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia depend heavily on imported sulfuric acid. Much of that supply moves through Middle East-linked shipping routes, making both countries vulnerable to prolonged logistics disruption.

Sulfuric acid plays a central role in electrowinning, where producers leach copper from lower-grade ore to create copper sulfate solution. Electrolysis then deposits copper onto cathode plates.

Sulfuric acid also supports electrorefining, where impure copper anodes dissolve in a sulfuric acid and copper sulfate solution. The process leaves impurities behind and plates 99.9% pure copper onto cathode starter sheets.

If acid supply remains tight, DRC and Zambian producers could face lower cathode output and higher operating costs. Ore stockpiling may also rise if refining capacity cannot keep pace with mined material.

Regional Exposure Could Reshape Refined Copper Premiums

China faces a second tier of exposure because its large smelting and leaching base requires substantial sulfuric acid supply. Chinese smelters generate sulfuric acid as a byproduct, which offers some short-term protection, but lower sulfur imports could still raise domestic acid prices and pressure leaching operations.

Chile and Peru appear more insulated because their copper industries rely more heavily on sulfide ore smelting, which produces sulfuric acid internally. Chile still has exposure through leaching operations, but both countries carry less direct risk than African cathode producers.

Sulfur supply disruptions could therefore reshape regional copper premiums if shortages persist. Refined cathode supply may tighten, production costs may rise, and consumers could increase their use of higher-grade copper scrap where substitution is technically feasible.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sulfur is often treated as a secondary input, but this disruption shows its strategic role in copper refining. The copper market may focus on mine output, yet sulfuric acid availability can decide how much copper actually reaches cathode form.

Battery Metal Demand Faces Pressure From Rising Consumer Electronics Prices

Consumer Electronic

Battery metal demand could face new pressure if rising consumer electronics prices slow replacement cycles for smartphones and other portable devices. Higher handset prices are already emerging in China, where major smartphone brands have lifted prices by 200-1,000 yuan per unit.

Battery metal demand remains closely tied to consumer electronics, especially for cobalt. Mobile phones, laptops, tablets, and other portable devices are a major downstream market, accounting for around 35pc of global cobalt consumption and about 3pc of lithium demand.

Battery metal demand has not yet shown an immediate spot-market reaction. However, the risk is becoming more visible as semiconductor supply chains face energy, helium, and logistics pressure linked to the Middle East conflict.

Smartphone Price Increases Threaten Replacement Demand

Consumer electronics demand is highly sensitive to price and upgrade cycles. If smartphone prices rise further, consumers may delay replacing older devices, reducing near-term battery demand from the electronics sector.

Major Chinese smartphone manufacturers including OPPO, vivo, and Honor have already raised prices. Some flagship models are now about 10pc more expensive, reflecting pressure from tighter memory-chip supply and higher input costs.

The main risk comes from the semiconductor supply chain. South Korea and Taiwan host some of the world’s most advanced chipmaking capacity, and both rely heavily on Middle East crude imports that transit the Strait of Hormuz. Any prolonged disruption could increase chip production costs and further lift electronics prices.

Cobalt and Lithium Markets Still Face Strong Supply-Side Offsets

Battery metal demand weakness from electronics may be partly offset by supply-side disruptions. The cobalt market remains under pressure after the Democratic Republic of Congo effectively paused exports following concerns over mismatched assay results for cobalt hydroxide.

This matters because the DRC is the world’s largest cobalt feedstock producer. Any delay in hydroxide exports can tighten supply to refiners and support prices, even if electronics demand softens.

Lithium markets are also watching Zimbabwe’s export ban. Market participants are assessing whether the restriction will offset slower buying and whether concentrate exports could resume soon.

The helium shortage adds another layer of risk. Qatar supplies about a third of global helium output, and disruption has pushed inventories at some memory-chip producers toward warning levels. Since helium is essential for semiconductor manufacturing, continued tightness could keep pressure on chip prices and consumer electronics costs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Battery metal demand is now exposed to a new kind of risk: not only EV sales or energy storage growth, but also semiconductor-linked consumer inflation. If electronics demand weakens while cobalt and lithium supply disruptions persist, price direction will depend on which force moves faster.

India Stainless Steel Fuel Crunch Forces Jindal Stainless to Reduce Operations

Jindal Stainless

India stainless steel fuel crunch is now directly cutting production at Jindal Stainless, the country’s largest stainless steel producer. The company has begun operating its plants at reduced capacity as Middle East tensions disrupt fuel availability and global shipping routes.

The pressure is centered on critical industrial fuels and gases used across stainless steelmaking. Propane, LPG, and natural gas supplies have tightened after disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, creating a direct operational risk for Indian mills.

Jindal Stainless said limited fuel availability has affected several manufacturing processes and forced the company to rationalise operations. The India stainless steel fuel crunch is also raising the risk of shipment delays for customers.

Stainless Steel Mills Face Higher Fuel Exposure Than Carbon Steel Producers

Stainless steel producers face a different energy risk profile from conventional carbon steel plants. Blast furnace-based steelmakers can use internally generated gases from coke ovens and blast furnaces, while scrap-based stainless steel routes depend more heavily on external fuel supply.

This structural difference is now becoming a competitive and operational weakness. When LPG, propane, or piped natural gas supplies tighten, stainless steel mills have fewer internal alternatives to maintain stable production.

Jindal Stainless has around 3 million tonnes per year of production capacity and plans to expand to 4.2 million tonnes per year in April 2026-March 2027. However, the current fuel disruption shows that capacity growth depends not only on demand and investment, but also on reliable energy logistics.

Fuel Allocation Becomes a Strategic Issue for Indian Industry

India’s fuel allocation policy is adding another layer of pressure. The government has diverted part of natural gas supply away from industry to prioritise household consumption, leaving manufacturers exposed to tighter industrial supply.

Jindal Stainless said clear guidance on propane, LPG, and natural gas allocation will be essential for stainless steel producers. Stable fuel supply is now necessary for mills to plan production, manage customer commitments, and avoid deeper disruptions.

The broader Indian stainless steel sector is also feeling the strain. Small and mid-sized mills, particularly in regions such as Gujarat, are cutting output as LNG shortages deepen. Mills reliant on LPG or piped natural gas face the most severe constraints.

The India stainless steel fuel crunch could therefore become more than a temporary supply issue. If fuel availability does not stabilise, temporary shutdowns may follow across parts of the sector, tightening stainless supply and delaying deliveries to downstream manufacturers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India’s stainless steel sector is showing how energy security can become an industrial competitiveness issue. Scrap-based steelmaking supports decarbonisation, but it still needs stable external fuel systems to remain reliable at scale.