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Aclara Rare Earth Carbonate Reaches 99% Purity for Downstream Processing

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Aclara Rare Earth Carbonate Reaches 99% Purity for Downstream Processing
Aclara

Aclara rare earth carbonate development has reached a new milestone after the company produced a 99% rare earth content intermediate product at its pilot plant in Santiago, Chile. The material, called Super Pure Rare Earth Carbonate, is designed to improve downstream separation efficiency.

Aclara rare earth carbonate technology is expected to be deployed at the company’s Carina project in Brazil and Penco module in Chile once commercial operations begin.

Aclara rare earth carbonate production is strategically important because conventional mixed carbonate products can contain rare earth concentrations as low as 40%. Removing more impurities before separation can reduce processing complexity and improve product consistency.

The company says the additional capital and operating costs required to produce SPREC are not material when combined with its Circular Mineral Harvesting process.

Higher Purity Could Lower Separation and Logistics Costs

SPREC contains around 99% rare earth material, substantially increasing concentration compared with conventional mixed rare earth carbonate.

This higher purity removes impurities that can interfere with downstream separation into individual rare earth oxides.

The benefit could be particularly important for heavy rare earth elements, where separation chemistry is complex and product specifications are demanding.

Aclara expects the high heavy rare earth concentration in SPREC to provide more reliable separation performance.

Higher concentration also reduces the physical volume of material that must be transported between mining and processing locations.

That can lower logistics costs while increasing the value contained in each tonne of intermediate product.

For Aclara, this becomes important because its mining projects are in South America while downstream separation is planned in the US.

Reducing transported mass could improve the economics of that international supply chain.

SPREC Supports Aclara’s Integrated Rare Earth Strategy

Aclara plans to make SPREC the standard intermediate product for both the Carina project in Brazil and Penco project in Chile.

The material will then be shipped to Aclara’s planned US separation facility, where it will be processed into individual rare earth oxides.

Those oxides are expected to move further downstream into alloy production through a joint venture with Chilean steel producer CAP.

This creates a more integrated supply chain extending from ionic clay resources through purified carbonate, separated oxides and alloys.

The structure is strategically important because most rare earth projects outside China struggle not only with mining, but also with separation and downstream conversion.

Aclara’s approach attempts to reduce that bottleneck by improving feed quality before the material reaches the separation stage.

If commercial-scale performance matches pilot results, SPREC could improve both processing efficiency and the economics of transporting heavy rare earth material across the supply chain.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Aclara is targeting value creation before the separation stage by improving the quality of its intermediate product. If SPREC performs reliably at scale, it could reduce one of the major inefficiencies in ex-China heavy rare earth supply chains.

EGA Port Capacity Expansion Strengthens Abu Dhabi Aluminium Logistics

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EGA Port Capacity Expansion Strengthens Abu Dhabi Aluminium Logistics
Emirates Global Aluminium

EGA port capacity expansion at Khalifa Port will increase the scale and efficiency of bulk raw material handling for Emirates Global Aluminium’s operations in Abu Dhabi. EGA and AD Ports Group will jointly invest 84mn dirhams in a multi-phase berth enhancement programme.

EGA port capacity expansion will allow larger dry bulk vessels to use the company’s dedicated berth. These vessels can carry around 15-20% more cargo than those currently calling at the site.

EGA port capacity expansion will also improve unloading capacity, berth productivity and overall cargo-handling efficiency. The upgraded infrastructure is expected to support around 8mn t/yr of bulk cargo once completed.

The project is scheduled for completion by August 2028 and strengthens the logistics backbone supporting one of the Middle East’s largest aluminium production systems.

Larger Vessels Could Lower Raw Material Logistics Costs

Primary aluminium production depends on continuous access to large volumes of raw materials, making port efficiency an important part of smelter competitiveness.

Allowing larger dry bulk vessels to dock at EGA’s dedicated berth should improve shipping economics by increasing cargo volumes per voyage.

Higher vessel capacity can reduce freight costs per tonne, improve supply efficiency and decrease the number of shipments required to move the same amount of material.

The programme will also allow additional unloading equipment to be installed, improving the speed at which vessels can discharge cargo.

Faster unloading reduces berth occupancy and can improve inventory management across the wider aluminium production system.

For large-scale smelters, these logistics improvements can be significant because raw material flows must remain stable even during periods of shipping disruption or strong production demand.

Infrastructure Investment Supports EGA’s Wider Aluminium Growth

The Khalifa Port upgrade comes as EGA continues to expand across primary aluminium, recycling and downstream operations.

Reliable bulk logistics will remain critical as the company manages large material flows supporting its Abu Dhabi production base.

The ability to handle around 8mn t/yr of cargo also provides additional operational flexibility if production or raw material requirements increase.

The investment strengthens Abu Dhabi’s position as an integrated aluminium hub combining port infrastructure, smelting, recycling and downstream manufacturing.

It also highlights the growing importance of industrial logistics in metals competitiveness. Producers with efficient access to ports, energy and raw materials can maintain lower delivered costs than competitors operating through more fragmented supply chains.

For EGA, improving berth capacity therefore supports both existing operations and future expansion while reducing logistics constraints.

The Metalnomist Commentary

EGA’s port investment shows that aluminium competitiveness extends well beyond the smelter itself. Larger vessels and faster unloading can lower raw material costs and strengthen supply resilience across the entire production chain.

Brazil EV Import Tax Exemption Extended Despite Industry Pushback

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Brazil EV Import Tax Exemption Extended Despite Industry Pushback
CAMEX

Brazil EV import tax exemption has been renewed for semi-knocked-down and completely knocked-down electric vehicles, giving overseas manufacturers continued access to preferential import treatment while Brazil expands its domestic EV market.

Brazil EV import tax exemption covers up to $463mn of SKD and CKD imports over six months. Shipments above the quota will face tariffs of 35% for SKD vehicles and 14% for CKD imports, while fully assembled electric vehicles remain outside the quota system.

Brazil EV import tax exemption is intended to support fleet renewal and accelerate transport decarbonisation. However, domestic automakers argue that extending temporary benefits could weaken incentives to localise production.

The dispute highlights a broader industrial policy challenge: Brazil wants faster EV adoption while also trying to build a stronger domestic automotive and battery supply chain.

Import Incentives Support EV Adoption but Pressure Local Manufacturers

The renewed quota lowers the cost of bringing partially assembled electric vehicles into Brazil.

SKD and CKD structures allow automakers to import components and complete more assembly domestically than with fully built vehicles. This can provide a transition route toward local manufacturing without requiring immediate full-scale production.

However, Brazilian automakers argue that continued exemptions may delay deeper localisation.

The industry has already announced significant investments in domestic EV production, and manufacturers want policy to favour companies building factories and supply chains inside Brazil.

Domestically produced EV sales rose by 57% year on year during January-May, showing that local output is beginning to gain momentum.

Domestic vehicles represented around 26% of EV sales in 2025. That share could rise further if new manufacturing capacity comes online.

The policy question is therefore whether import incentives accelerate the market enough to justify the competitive pressure they place on local plants.

EV Policy Will Shape Brazil’s Battery and Metals Demand

Brazil's EV market has implications beyond vehicle assembly.

Higher electric vehicle production supports demand for batteries, power electronics, copper wiring, aluminium structures and electrical steel.

Localising more of the supply chain could therefore create industrial opportunities in metals processing and battery materials.

Brazil also holds significant resources of lithium, nickel and other critical minerals, giving the country potential to connect upstream mining with domestic vehicle and battery manufacturing.

However, this value chain will only deepen if policy encourages investment in refining, cathode materials, cells and components rather than relying primarily on imported vehicles and kits.

The renewed import quota may support near-term EV penetration, but the long-term industrial outcome will depend on whether automakers transition from SKD and CKD assembly toward more local content.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil is balancing two competing goals: faster EV adoption and deeper industrial localisation. Import incentives can grow the market quickly, but without a clear path toward local batteries, components and materials, they risk supporting consumption more than manufacturing.

EU 2035 Car Emissions Target Faces Growing Political Divide

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EU 2035 Car Emissions Target Faces Growing Political Divide
EU, ETS

EU 2035 car emissions target remains firmly backed by France, Spain and Sweden, while Poland is pushing for greater flexibility on vehicle rules and a slower rollout of the bloc’s emissions trading system for road transport and buildings.

EU 2035 car emissions target requires new passenger cars to reach 0g/km of CO2 from 2035. France says it has assembled enough support to block attempts to extend conventional internal combustion engine sales beyond that date.

EU 2035 car emissions target is becoming increasingly linked with industrial competitiveness. Policymakers are debating whether biofuels, e-fuels and low-carbon steel should help manufacturers meet emissions obligations without weakening overall climate targets.

The discussion also exposes widening divisions over ETS 2, electricity costs and how quickly Europe can electrify transport while preserving automotive manufacturing.

Car Rules Bring Steel, Fuels and Manufacturing Into the Debate

France, Sweden and Spain argue that weakening the 2035 target would undermine investment certainty for electric vehicles and associated supply chains.

Sweden has warned that slowing electrification could make European automakers more vulnerable against global EV competitors. Spain has also expressed concern that excessive flexibility would dilute the original target.

The European Commission has proposed allowing carbon-neutral biofuels and e-fuels to count toward up to 3% of vehicle CO2 targets.

More importantly for the metals sector, low-carbon steel credits could contribute up to 7% of manufacturers’ CO2 reduction requirements for cars and vans.

This creates a direct connection between automotive regulation and green steel demand. Carmakers using lower-emissions steel could gain additional compliance value beyond conventional material performance.

For European steel producers investing in electric arc furnaces, hydrogen-based ironmaking and lower-carbon power, such credits could create a stronger demand signal from automotive customers.

However, broader flexibility also creates policy risk. If compliance pathways become too generous, demand for battery electric vehicles could grow more slowly than expected.

That would affect not only automakers but also lithium, nickel, graphite, copper and battery manufacturing investment across Europe.

ETS 2 Reform Highlights Europe’s Cost and Competitiveness Problem

Poland is separately calling for another delay to ETS 2, which is already scheduled to begin in 2028 after being postponed from 2027.

The system will extend carbon pricing to road transport and heating fuels, potentially increasing costs for households and businesses using fossil fuels.

Warsaw is also seeking to transform the existing emissions trading system market stability reserve into a stronger price control mechanism.

The reserve currently absorbs excess allowances from the market, but Poland wants greater ability to prevent sharp carbon price increases.

Germany is taking a different approach, arguing that changes to the annual reduction rate for existing ETS allowances should only begin from 2036.

These positions show that Europe increasingly faces two competing priorities: maintaining credible decarbonisation targets while preventing carbon costs from damaging industrial competitiveness and consumer affordability.

The debate also extends beyond Europe. Turkey has proposed a global target for electricity to reach 35% of final energy consumption by 2035, reflecting the growing role of electrification in international climate policy.

For metals markets, faster electrification would support long-term demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel and battery materials. But the pace will depend increasingly on whether Europe can manage power, carbon and manufacturing costs simultaneously.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s climate debate is shifting from whether to decarbonise toward how to distribute the industrial cost. The inclusion of low-carbon steel credits shows that automotive policy is increasingly becoming metals policy as well.

Aubert & Duval Acquisition Tightens Airbus and Safran Control of Aerospace Metals

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Aubert & Duval Acquisition Tightens Airbus and Safran Control of Aerospace Metals
Aubert & Duval

Aubert & Duval acquisition plans will give Airbus and Safran greater control over one of Europe’s most strategically important specialty metals producers after the two aerospace groups agreed to acquire Tikehau Capital’s stake.

Aubert & Duval acquisition will see Tikehau’s holding divided equally between Airbus and Safran, subject to regulatory approval. The three companies originally acquired the French producer from Eramet in April 2023.

Aubert & Duval acquisition is strategically significant because the company supplies specialty steels, nickel-based superalloys, titanium and forged products used across demanding aerospace and industrial applications.

The transaction deepens vertical integration between major aircraft and engine manufacturers and a critical upstream materials supplier at a time when aerospace supply chains remain constrained.

Titanium and Superalloy Supply Become More Strategic

Aubert & Duval manufactures bars, ingots, forgings and other high-value products from titanium, specialty steels and superalloys.

These materials are essential in aircraft engines, landing systems, structural components and other parts exposed to high temperatures and mechanical loads.

For Airbus and Safran, greater ownership can provide more visibility over capacity allocation, investment priorities and long-term material availability.

This is particularly important for forgings and nickel-based superalloys, where qualification requirements and long lead times can make supply difficult to replace quickly.

Titanium supply carries similar strategic importance because aerospace-grade material requires highly controlled melting, forging and machining routes.

The deal therefore goes beyond financial ownership. It gives two major aerospace manufacturers stronger influence over a critical point between primary metal production and finished aircraft components.

European Aerospace Supply Chain Moves Toward Vertical Integration

The transaction reflects a broader shift toward tighter control of strategic manufacturing capacity.

Aerospace manufacturers have faced persistent constraints across forgings, castings, engines and precision components. Owning or closely aligning with key suppliers can reduce exposure to shortages and improve production planning.

The French government’s special share in Aubert & Duval adds another layer of strategic protection, reflecting the importance of the company to national aerospace and defence supply chains.

For Europe, maintaining domestic titanium and superalloy processing capability is increasingly important as geopolitical risks and defence demand rise.

The deal also signals that downstream processing assets may become more valuable than raw material ownership alone. Melting, forging and qualification capability determine whether metal can actually enter certified aerospace programmes.

Airbus and Safran are therefore strengthening control over one of the most technically demanding parts of the European materials chain.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Airbus and Safran are moving closer to the metals that determine aircraft production capacity. Aubert & Duval’s titanium, superalloy and forging capabilities make it a strategic industrial asset, not simply another supplier.

US Rare Earths Investment Builds Ex-China Supply Chain Dominance

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US Rare Earths Investment Builds Ex-China Supply Chain Dominance
US rare earths

US rare earths investment has accelerated dramatically over the past year, giving American-backed companies growing control over major mining, refining, metal, alloy and magnet assets outside China. Government loans, grants, offtake agreements and direct investments are providing the capital needed to acquire strategic companies across the global supply chain.

US rare earths investment is no longer focused only on developing domestic mines. US-backed companies are buying established processing and manufacturing assets in Europe, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and other markets, creating an international network centred increasingly on American capital.

US rare earths investment gained further momentum after Energy Fuels agreed to acquire German permanent magnet producer Vacuumschmelze for $1.9bn. The transaction follows a conditional $725mn US Department of Defense loan supporting Energy Fuels' rare earth processing expansion.

Energy Fuels had already agreed to acquire Australian Strategic Materials for $299mn. ASM owns the Korean Metals Plant, one of the relatively few commercial rare earth metal and alloy facilities operating outside China.

US Capital Is Consolidating the Mine-to-Magnet Chain

Washington's support accelerated after China tightened export controls on critical rare earth products, exposing the vulnerability of western magnet and defence supply chains.

One of the largest interventions came through the US government's support package for MP Materials, which combined a price floor, guaranteed offtake and direct Department of Defense investment.

Federal financing has since spread across the downstream chain. Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies received support for magnet manufacturing and refining, while USA Rare Earth secured a $1.6bn assistance package for its integrated mine-to-magnet strategy.

Phoenix Tailings has also received a $500mn defense-backed loan for rare earth refining and metallization.

Government support gives these companies more than operating capital. It improves financing certainty and strengthens their ability to bid aggressively for overseas strategic assets.

USA Rare Earth's $2.8bn acquisition of Brazilian producer Serra Verde is a clear example. Serra Verde is developing one of the more advanced heavy rare earth supply sources outside China and targets 6,400 t/yr of rare earth oxide production by 2027.

USAR had previously acquired UK-based Less Common Metals for $125mn, adding rare earth metal and alloy production to its portfolio.

The strategy therefore extends beyond securing ore. American-backed companies are assembling the intermediate and downstream capabilities required to convert rare earth resources into metals, alloys and finished permanent magnets.

Europe and Other Western Markets Risk Losing Strategic Control

The acquisition wave is reshaping the balance of power across the non-China rare earth industry.

Europe still retains important capabilities, including Solvay's rare earth oxide production in France. But several strategically important downstream assets are now controlled by North American companies.

Vacuumschmelze would become another major example if the Energy Fuels transaction closes, while Neo Performance Materials' Estonian magnet operations are already North American-owned.

US-backed investment is also influencing project development decisions outside the country. Companies seeking financing increasingly see access to US government funding and customers as more attractive than relying solely on European or national support schemes.

This creates a strategic challenge for Europe, the UK and other allied economies. They may successfully diversify supply away from China while simultaneously allowing ownership and commercial control to become concentrated in US-backed groups.

The result is an emerging ex-China rare earth system that is geographically diversified but financially and strategically centred increasingly on Washington.

The US may therefore achieve supply-chain influence without directly controlling every mine or refinery on American soil. Government-backed capital can secure long-term offtake, ownership stakes and processing capacity across allied countries.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is building rare earth influence through capital rather than geography. The emerging risk for Europe and other allies is that reducing dependence on China could create a new dependence on US-controlled processing, financing and magnet capacity.

China Critical Mineral Export Controls Tighten With New Compliance Rules

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China Critical Mineral Export Controls Tighten With New Compliance Rules
China, critical mineral

China critical mineral export controls will become more tightly enforced from 1 July as Beijing introduces new reporting, whistleblower and anti-circumvention mechanisms for strategic mineral shipments.

China critical mineral export controls cover dual-use materials including rare earths, gallium, germanium, tungsten and antimony. China holds dominant positions across several of these markets, giving enforcement changes direct implications for global manufacturing and defence supply chains.

China critical mineral export controls will now target not only unlicensed shipments, but also attempts to disguise restricted materials as components or reroute them through third countries. Exporters will face greater responsibility for demonstrating that transactions comply with licence conditions.

The measures suggest Beijing is moving from simply establishing export restrictions toward building a more comprehensive enforcement system capable of tracing materials through international supply chains.

Anti-Circumvention Rules Raise Compliance Risk Across Global Supply Chains

China is encouraging companies and individuals to report suspected violations involving unlicensed exports, shipments outside permit conditions and other restricted transactions.

Verified whistleblowers may receive rewards, increasing the likelihood that suspicious trading activity will attract regulatory attention.

Exporters can also voluntarily disclose potential violations. Authorities may consider self-reporting when determining penalties, creating an incentive for companies to strengthen internal compliance systems.

The most significant change may be the focus on circumvention.

Authorities will scrutinise attempts to relabel strategic minerals as components, parts or other products. They will also target shipments routed through third countries to avoid export restrictions.

This could affect traders, processors and manufacturers well beyond China. Companies purchasing China-origin materials may need stronger documentation proving product classification, end use and final destination.

The compliance burden could become particularly significant for aerospace, defence, semiconductor, magnet and advanced manufacturing companies using rare earths or specialty metals.

Supply Chain Investigations Expand Beijing’s Trade Policy Toolkit

China has separately introduced rules allowing the commerce ministry to investigate foreign actions that threaten domestic supply chain security.

The ministry can examine discriminatory trade restrictions, supply disruptions and other measures affecting Chinese industrial interests.

Potential countermeasures include import and export restrictions, investment bans and the addition of foreign entities to restrictive lists.

This gives Beijing a broader mechanism for responding to overseas trade and technology controls.

The rules arrive shortly after China banned dual-use exports to 10 US companies, including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth. That action demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to target specific companies involved in strategic industries.

For global critical mineral markets, tighter enforcement increases the importance of alternative supply.

Projects producing rare earths, gallium, germanium, tungsten and antimony outside China may gain strategic value even when their production costs remain higher.

The key risk is no longer simply whether China introduces new controls. More rigorous enforcement of existing rules could itself reduce trade flows, extend permitting timelines and encourage buyers to hold larger inventories.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is turning critical mineral export controls into a permanent compliance architecture rather than a temporary trade weapon. The result will accelerate investment in non-China processing and make origin, end-use and traceability increasingly important commercial factors.

Adani Nuclear Power Plan Targets 10GW Capacity by 2035

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Adani Nuclear Power Plan Targets 10GW Capacity by 2035
Adani Group


Adani nuclear power plans could add 10GW of generation capacity in India by 2035, marking one of the most ambitious private-sector entries into the country’s nuclear industry.

Adani nuclear power development will be led through newly established subsidiary Adani Atomic Energy. The move comes as India seeks greater private participation in nuclear generation to meet rising electricity demand and long-term decarbonisation targets.

Adani nuclear power would also become part of a much broader integrated energy platform spanning coal, renewables, hydropower, pumped storage, gas, transmission and distribution.

The strategy reflects India’s need for more firm power as industrial electrification, manufacturing and data centres increase around-the-clock electricity consumption.

Nuclear Expansion Adds Firm Power to Adani’s Energy Portfolio

Adani plans to invest more than Rs2tn over the next five years to expand its overall generation portfolio toward 45GW.

The company already operates 18.33GW and has another 23.72GW of locked-in capacity, targeting 42.05GW by the 2031-32 financial year.

Nuclear power would add a new source of low-carbon baseload generation to that portfolio.

This is important because India is simultaneously expanding variable renewable generation and energy-intensive digital infrastructure. Nuclear can provide stable output when solar and wind generation fluctuate.

Adani is also developing hydropower and pumped-storage assets, including projects in Bhutan. These technologies can complement nuclear and renewables by improving grid flexibility.

The group’s data centre business is targeting 3GW of capacity by 2030, creating another large internal source of electricity demand.

This combination of generation and consumption assets gives Adani a strong incentive to secure reliable long-term power supplies.

India’s Nuclear Target Could Reshape Strategic Materials Demand

India plans to increase installed nuclear capacity to 100GW by 2047 from around 8.8GW currently.

If Adani reaches its 10GW target, the company alone could represent roughly one-tenth of India’s long-term nuclear capacity ambition.

Such expansion would create demand across nuclear construction, fuel and specialist materials supply chains.

Nuclear reactors require large volumes of high-specification steels, nickel alloys, zirconium alloys and other corrosion-resistant materials. Uranium supply and fuel-cycle capacity would also become increasingly important as reactor numbers rise.

Grid infrastructure would need to expand alongside generation, supporting additional demand for copper, aluminium and electrical equipment.

The key challenge remains execution. Adani has not disclosed reactor types, project locations or grid integration plans, while nuclear projects typically involve long permitting, construction and qualification cycles.

Still, the entry of a major private industrial group signals that India’s nuclear expansion may increasingly rely on public-private investment rather than state development alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Adani’s nuclear push shows that India’s power strategy is shifting toward a mix of renewables and firm generation rather than relying on one technology. The materials opportunity extends well beyond uranium, into zirconium, nickel alloys, specialty steels and grid metals.

Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets More Indonesian MHP Supply

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Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets More Indonesian MHP Supply
Nickel Ore

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion will add stakes in two Indonesian high-pressure acid leach projects next to its existing Excelsior Nickel Cobalt operation in Central Sulawesi. The acquisitions give the company access to additional mixed hydroxide precipitate capacity for the electric vehicle battery market.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion comes as Indonesia restricts new HPAL project development. The government stopped issuing new licences in late 2025, making acquisitions of existing permitted projects increasingly important for producers seeking growth.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion covers the Teluk Metal Industry and Chengsheng New Energy projects, both located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park. Together, the transactions could add nearly 17,000 t/yr of attributable MHP capacity to Nickel Industries.

The strategy deepens the company’s downstream exposure beyond nickel ore and conventional smelting into battery-grade nickel intermediates, nickel sulphate and cathode production.

HPAL Licence Restrictions Increase the Value of Existing Projects

Nickel Industries will pay $169mn for a 17.5% stake in the planned Teluk Metal Industry HPAL project.

TMI has nameplate MHP capacity of 38,640 t/yr. Nickel Industries’ equity share will provide around 6,775 t/yr of attributable production.

Tsingshan has provided a construction guarantee covering the project, capping Nickel Industries’ investment at $169mn and targeting nameplate production by September 2027.

The company will also gain exposure to the Chengsheng New Energy project through a separate transaction involving equity in its Sampala nickel mine.

CNE has MHP capacity of 28,357 t/yr, with around 10,208 t/yr attributable to Nickel Industries. Commissioning is expected by mid-2027.

The two acquisitions are especially valuable because Indonesia is no longer approving new HPAL developments. This effectively raises the strategic value of existing permits and projects already in development.

For producers seeking to expand battery-nickel capacity, buying into permitted facilities may now be more realistic than pursuing greenfield HPAL projects.

MHP Growth Strengthens Battery-Nickel Integration

Both TMI and CNE will operate alongside Nickel Industries’ 46%-owned Excelsior Nickel Cobalt project in the Morowali industrial complex.

ENC is expected to produce nickel cathode and nickel sulphate, extending the company further downstream into products used in battery supply chains.

TMI and CNE will produce MHP using ore from the Sampala project, strengthening the link between mine supply and downstream processing.

This integration can improve control over ore quality, operating costs and feedstock availability.

Indonesia’s policy shift also suggests that future nickel growth may become more concentrated among producers that already control mines, processing infrastructure and approved HPAL projects.

That could slow the pace of new supply while strengthening larger integrated groups with existing licences and partnerships.

For the global battery market, the acquisitions reinforce Indonesia’s central role in nickel intermediates even as Jakarta tries to limit oversupply and support prices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s HPAL restrictions are turning existing licences into strategic assets. Nickel Industries is responding by buying into permitted projects, allowing it to expand battery-grade nickel supply without relying on new greenfield approvals.

Virginia Offshore Critical Minerals Lease Review Opens New US Seabed Mining Front

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Virginia Offshore Critical Minerals Lease Review Opens New US Seabed Mining Front
BOEM

Virginia offshore critical minerals development has moved onto the US federal agenda after the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management opened a request for information on a proposed mineral lease off the Delmarva peninsula.

Virginia offshore critical minerals interest follows an unsolicited request from Odyssey Marine Exploration covering about 1.8mn acres, or 7,160 km², of federal waters. The company is targeting heavy mineral sands, rare earth elements and phosphates.

Virginia offshore critical minerals development remains at an early stage. BOEM stressed that the request for information does not mean the government will ultimately offer the area for commercial leasing.

The review nevertheless reflects growing US interest in unconventional domestic sources of strategic minerals as Washington seeks to reduce dependence on concentrated foreign supply chains.

Heavy Mineral Sands Could Add New Strategic Feedstock

Odyssey's proposed exploration area could contain heavy mineral sands carrying multiple economically valuable minerals.

Heavy mineral sand deposits can host titanium minerals, zircon-bearing materials, monazite and other mineral phases containing rare earth elements.

This makes them potentially attractive because a single resource can provide several strategic materials rather than one commodity alone.

Rare earths are especially important for permanent magnets used in defence, electric motors, robotics, aerospace and energy technologies.

Phosphate resources could add another strategic dimension because phosphorus is important to agriculture and can also occur alongside recoverable critical mineral content.

However, offshore development creates technical and environmental challenges that differ significantly from conventional land-based mining.

Resource definition, seabed conditions, extraction technology, environmental impact and processing economics will all need to be demonstrated before commercial development becomes realistic.

US Policy Pushes Seabed Minerals Toward Faster Review

The federal review follows a 2025 executive order aimed at accelerating seabed mineral exploration and commercial recovery permitting.

This policy direction reflects Washington's growing concern over critical mineral security and the limited speed at which conventional mines can enter production.

Offshore resources could provide another domestic supply option, but faster permitting does not remove the need for extensive technical and environmental evaluation.

BOEM is now seeking information and expressions of interest before deciding whether the proposed area should advance further in the leasing process.

Responses are due by 23 July.

The project could become an important test of whether US seabed mining policy can move from strategic ambition into commercially viable mineral development.

Even if Virginia does not proceed to production, the review could establish a framework for future offshore critical mineral projects elsewhere in US waters.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Offshore mining could expand the US critical minerals resource base, but permitting speed alone will not make these projects economic. The real test will be whether seabed resources can be extracted and processed competitively without creating unacceptable environmental risk.

Energy Fuels VAC Acquisition Creates Mine-to-Magnet Rare Earth Platform

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Energy Fuels VAC Acquisition Creates Mine-to-Magnet Rare Earth Platform
Energy Fuels

Energy Fuels VAC acquisition will give the US critical minerals producer downstream permanent magnet manufacturing capacity through a $1.9bn cash-and-stock deal for Germany-based Vacuumschmelze.

Energy Fuels VAC acquisition is strategically significant because it links rare earth mining and separation with metals, alloys and finished magnet production. The company is attempting to build one of the most vertically integrated non-China rare earth supply chains.

Energy Fuels VAC acquisition also adds existing manufacturing operations across North America, Europe and Asia. VAC produces sintered neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets alongside cobalt-iron and nickel-iron soft magnetic materials.

The transaction moves Energy Fuels well beyond its historical uranium business and positions rare earth magnets as a major future growth platform.

VAC Adds Immediate Magnet Manufacturing Capacity

VAC operates 2,000 t/yr of permanent magnet capacity at its Sumter, South Carolina, facility. The site could eventually expand to as much as 12,000 t/yr.

This capacity gives Energy Fuels a downstream outlet for rare earth materials produced from its growing mining and refining portfolio.

VAC’s NdFeB magnets are used across electrification, industrial motors and other high-performance applications. These products require neodymium and praseodymium, while selected grades also depend on heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium.

Energy Fuels has already demonstrated production of high-purity dysprosium and terbium oxides at its White Mesa Mill in Utah.

The combination therefore creates a potential route from separated oxides into metal, alloy and finished magnet production inside a western-controlled supply chain.

Government support strengthens the platform. VAC has secured $41mn to develop US metal-making capability, while Energy Fuels has received a conditional commitment for up to $725mn in long-term financing to expand White Mesa and support a planned US metals facility.

Vertical Integration Targets the West’s Main Rare Earth Bottleneck

Energy Fuels is also pursuing the acquisition of Australian Strategic Minerals, which would add commercial-scale rare earth metal and alloy capacity in South Korea and a planned US operation.

If both transactions proceed, the company could control multiple stages from mineral extraction through separation, metallization, alloying and magnet manufacturing.

This is important because the western rare earth challenge is not primarily a shortage of deposits. The larger weakness remains midstream and downstream processing capacity.

China continues to dominate separation, rare earth metal production and permanent magnet manufacturing, making these stages strategically more important than mining alone.

Energy Fuels is attempting to close that gap through acquisitions rather than developing every capability internally.

VAC will remain headquartered in Germany as a wholly owned subsidiary, preserving its existing technical base and customer relationships while gaining access to Energy Fuels’ upstream materials.

The industrial logic is therefore straightforward: secure feedstock, process it into separated rare earths, convert it into metals and alloys, and manufacture finished magnets within one integrated platform.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Energy Fuels is trying to solve the western rare earth problem at the stage where it matters most: downstream conversion into magnets. If integration succeeds, the company could emerge as one of the few western platforms controlling the chain from mineral feed to finished NdFeB products.

Sherritt Nickel-Cobalt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Cuba Feedstock Risk

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Sherritt Nickel-Cobalt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Cuba Feedstock Risk
Sherritt

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery operations at Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta will enter a shutdown state after feedstock from the company’s Moa joint venture in Cuba became unavailable.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery production depends on mixed sulfide precipitate shipped from the Moa mine, where nickel and cobalt ore is mined and processed before final refining in Canada.

Sherritt nickel cobalt refinery shutdown highlights the vulnerability of processing facilities that rely on a single international feed source. The company has not provided a timeline for restarting nickel and cobalt refining.

The shutdown follows fuel-related disruptions at Moa and increased US sanctions on Cuba, which led Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture.

Cuba Disruption Breaks the Mine-to-Refinery Supply Chain

The Moa joint venture is owned equally by Sherritt and Cuba’s General Nickel Company. Its operating model links Cuban mining and intermediate processing directly with Canadian refining.

Ore from Moa is processed into mixed sulfide precipitate before shipment to Fort Saskatchewan for conversion into finished nickel and cobalt products.

That structure becomes vulnerable when upstream operations stop. Sherritt had already warned that existing refinery feed inventories would last only until around mid-June.

Fuel shortages initially forced the Moa operation to suspend mining activity in February. Additional uncertainty followed after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba, prompting Sherritt to suspend its direct participation in the joint venture in May.

The refinery will remain shut until Moa mining and processing resume and enough intermediate material is available to rebuild feed supply.

This shows that refining capacity alone does not guarantee critical mineral security. A plant can remain technically capable of producing metal while geopolitical or logistical problems interrupt the upstream feed required to operate it.

Nickel and Cobalt Output Stops While Byproduct Production Continues

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to carry out maintenance at Fort Saskatchewan.

The company will continue producing fertilizer and sulfuric acid, showing that some parts of the industrial complex can remain operational even while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

However, the loss of finished nickel and cobalt output reduces North American availability of two important materials used across stainless steel, superalloys, batteries and other industrial applications.

Cobalt is particularly relevant to aerospace, defence and battery supply chains, while refined nickel remains important for both conventional metallurgy and selected battery chemistries.

The disruption also underlines the strategic importance of diversified feedstock. Refiners that can process material from multiple mines or jurisdictions have greater resilience when one supply route fails.

For Sherritt, the key issue is therefore not refinery maintenance but restoration of a stable Cuban feed stream.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan shows that midstream capacity is only as secure as its upstream feed. North American critical minerals policy must address concentrate and intermediate supply alongside domestic refining capacity.

COP31 Electrification Target Could Reshape Global Power and Metals Demand

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COP31 Electrification Target Could Reshape Global Power and Metals Demand
Iea

COP31 electrification target discussions are gaining momentum as the International Energy Agency backs Turkey’s proposal for electricity to reach 35% of global final energy consumption by 2035. Electricity currently accounts for around 20%.

COP31 electrification target adoption would imply a major acceleration in power generation, transmission, storage and end-use electrification. That would have direct consequences for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, battery materials and other industrial metals.

COP31 electrification target support is not universal, however. Developing countries argue that faster electrification will require better access to financing, technology and infrastructure if the transition is to remain economically viable.

The debate therefore moves beyond climate policy. It increasingly concerns who will finance the grids, power systems and material supply chains required to deliver a much more electrified global economy.

Higher Electrification Would Drive Grid and Metals Investment

Raising electricity’s share of final energy consumption from around 20% to 35% would require substantial expansion of generation and network infrastructure.

Grid investment would become particularly important because additional renewable generation has limited value without transmission capacity, storage and distribution networks capable of delivering power to consumers.

Copper would be one of the clearest beneficiaries because of its extensive use in cables, transformers, motors and electrical equipment.

Aluminium demand could also increase through overhead conductors, renewable energy structures and lightweight electrical applications.

Electrical steel, lithium, graphite, nickel and other materials would gain from additional transformers, motors, batteries and stationary storage systems.

However, stronger metals demand could also create supply constraints. New mines, refineries and processing plants often require long development periods, while electrification targets can increase demand much faster.

This makes materials security an increasingly important part of energy policy.

Finance Gap Could Decide Whether the Target Is Achievable

Developing countries have warned that electrification cannot advance at the same pace everywhere because financing costs differ significantly between markets.

Countries perceived as higher risk often face much higher borrowing costs for renewable generation, grids and storage.

This makes capital availability as important as technology. Lower-cost financing could determine whether emerging economies can build clean power systems quickly enough to meet the proposed target.

Another concern is how electricity is generated. Higher electricity consumption does not automatically reduce emissions if new demand is supplied by coal or other high-carbon fuels.

Governments therefore need to link electrification targets with renewable generation, grid expansion and the gradual retirement of fossil-based capacity.

For metals producers, the outcome matters significantly. A successful global electrification push would create strong structural demand, while delays caused by financing constraints could produce a more uneven regional market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

A 35% electrification target would effectively become a global infrastructure and metals target as much as a climate goal. The biggest constraint may not be technology, but whether grids, financing and critical material supply can expand fast enough to support it.

UK Critical Minerals Funding Targets Magnets, Processing and Recycling

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UK Critical Minerals Funding Targets Magnets, Processing and Recycling
UK, critical minerals

UK critical minerals funding will provide £50mn for domestic projects spanning rare earth magnet manufacturing, mineral processing, recycling and supply chain development. The package forms part of the government’s broader strategy to reduce dependence on overseas critical material supply.

UK critical minerals funding will allocate £20mn to a new rare earth magnet manufacturing hub, £25mn to a critical minerals accelerator and £5mn to a platform designed to aggregate demand across British industries.

UK critical minerals funding follows around £200mn already committed through other public programmes. The new package signals that the UK is increasingly focusing on downstream processing and manufacturing rather than resource extraction alone.

However, the scale of the funding remains modest compared with the capital required to bring most commercial critical minerals projects into production.

Magnet Manufacturing and Recycling Move Up the Policy Agenda

The £20mn magnet hub will focus on developing, testing and scaling rare earth magnet manufacturing technology.

This is strategically important because permanent magnet production remains one of the most technically demanding stages of the rare earth supply chain.

The hub is also expected to support workforce development and training, addressing the shortage of technical skills needed for magnet production.

Another £25mn will be directed toward a critical minerals accelerator supporting extraction, processing and recycling projects.

Recycling could become particularly important for the UK because domestic mine resources are limited compared with major producing countries. Recovering rare earths and other critical minerals from industrial waste, scrap and end-of-life products can therefore provide an alternative feedstock source.

Companies such as Seloxium are already developing technologies to recover rare earth elements from industrial waste, showing how secondary materials could contribute to future domestic supply.

The strategy also strengthens the case for processing infrastructure capable of converting recovered materials into usable oxides, metals and alloys.

Funding Scale Remains the Key Commercial Challenge

The remaining £5mn will support a platform that aggregates critical mineral demand from multiple industries.

Pooling demand could improve project financing by giving producers and processors clearer visibility over future customers and volumes.

This approach could be useful for sectors such as aerospace, automotive, defence, electronics and energy, where individual companies may struggle to support new supply projects alone.

However, £50mn is unlikely to fund large-scale commercial projects by itself. Even relatively small mining, refining or magnet manufacturing developments can require investment well above £100mn.

The government package is therefore more likely to function as project de-risking capital rather than full financing.

Its success will depend on whether public funding can attract larger private investment and convert pilot technologies into commercially competitive operations.

The UK’s longer-term challenge is to build enough processing and manufacturing scale to justify domestic supply chains while remaining competitive against established Asian producers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The UK is targeting the right parts of the value chain, particularly magnets, processing and recycling. But £50mn will matter only if it unlocks substantially larger private capital for commercial-scale projects.

China Dual-Use Export Ban Targets MP Materials and USA Rare Earth

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China Dual-Use Export Ban Targets MP Materials and USA Rare Earth
China rare earth

China dual-use export ban has been imposed on 10 US companies, including rare earth producers MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, adding fresh uncertainty to critical mineral supply chains and US-China trade relations.

China dual-use export ban takes immediate effect and prevents exporters from supplying covered materials to the designated companies. The restrictions also prohibit third parties in other countries from transferring China-origin dual-use items to the targeted entities.

China dual-use export ban is strategically significant because the controlled list includes rare earths, gallium, germanium, tungsten and antimony. These materials are critical to defence, aerospace, semiconductors, robotics and advanced manufacturing.

The move directly affects two companies central to Washington’s effort to build a rare earth supply chain outside China, while also targeting major defence, aerospace, drone and robotics manufacturers.

Rare Earth Producers Face New Supply Chain Pressure

MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are among the most important US companies attempting to expand non-China rare earth mining, refining and magnet manufacturing.

China’s restrictions could complicate access to materials, equipment or intermediate products where their supply chains still contain Chinese-origin inputs.

The measure is especially relevant because rare earth independence requires more than domestic mining. Separation, refining, metallization, alloying and permanent magnet production remain highly concentrated in China.

China accounts for around 70% of global rare earth mine production and more than 90% of refining capacity.

That concentration gives Beijing significant leverage over downstream manufacturing even as US companies add new domestic capacity.

The other targeted companies operate across aerospace, defence, drones, robotics and maritime systems. These sectors consume rare earth magnets and other controlled materials in motors, sensors, guidance systems, communications and high-performance electronics.

The restrictions could therefore pressure both raw material procurement and specialised component supply chains.

November Expiry Raises Risk of Wider Export Controls

The latest action comes ahead of the scheduled expiry of earlier temporary suspensions on Chinese export restrictions.

China expanded controls last November to cover additional heavy rare earths and equipment used in rare earth production. Those measures were subsequently suspended for one year following improved bilateral relations.

Beijing also temporarily paused export bans affecting dozens of US companies.

The latest restrictions suggest that trade tensions are rising again before those suspensions expire. This is already encouraging some international buyers to rebuild inventories ahead of November.

The risk is that temporary controls could become broader again, affecting not only designated companies but the wider Atlantic rare earth market.

That would increase the strategic value of non-China separation, refining and magnet manufacturing projects now under development in the US, Europe, Australia and other allied markets.

For manufacturers, the immediate response is likely to involve greater inventory buffers, supplier diversification and more aggressive qualification of alternative materials and processing routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is showing that critical minerals remain a direct instrument of geopolitical leverage. The biggest risk for the US is not access to ore, but continued dependence on Chinese processing, metals and magnet supply while domestic alternatives are still scaling.

Oyu Tolgoi Copper Shipments Restart After Mongolia Protest Disruption

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Oyu Tolgoi Copper Shipments Restart After Mongolia Protest Disruption
Oyu Tolgoi

Oyu Tolgoi copper shipments have restarted after protesters blocked a key haulage road on 17 June, temporarily interrupting concentrate exports from Mongolia’s largest copper mine.

Oyu Tolgoi copper shipments are strategically important because the Rio Tinto-controlled operation is becoming one of the largest sources of new global copper supply. Mine production is rising rapidly as expanded underground operations ramp up.

Oyu Tolgoi copper shipments remain heavily dependent on road transport to China, however. The recent blockade highlights how logistics can become a critical bottleneck even when mine output itself is increasing strongly.

The disruption also carried significant economic consequences for Mongolia. Oyu Tolgoi contributes around 9% of the national budget and injects an estimated 23bn togrogs into the economy each day.

Copper Output Growth Increases Mongolia’s Supply Importance

Mongolia has emerged as an increasingly important source of incremental copper supply as Oyu Tolgoi expands production.

National mine output increased by around 35% in January, largely because of the operation’s ramp-up. Rio Tinto also reported a 56% increase in first-quarter concentrate output from Oyu Tolgoi.

The mine is targeting around 500,000 t/yr of copper in concentrate during 2028-36, which would place it among the world’s most significant copper operations.

That growth comes at an important time for the copper market. Grid expansion, renewable energy, electric vehicles, data centres and industrial electrification are increasing long-term demand while large new mines remain difficult to develop.

Oyu Tolgoi therefore represents one of the major projects capable of adding meaningful copper tonnes without waiting for an entirely new greenfield development.

The mine’s growing production also strengthens Mongolia’s fiscal dependence on copper exports. The operator estimated that prolonged shipment disruption could reduce government tax receipts by around 35bn togrogs per week.

Road Dependence Remains a Critical Export Bottleneck

Despite strong production growth, copper concentrate still needs to move by truck across the border into China.

This leaves shipments vulnerable to local protests, road disruptions and border logistics even when underground mining and processing facilities operate normally.

The recent blockade demonstrated how quickly physical exports can be interrupted. Delayed shipments can affect contract deliveries, working capital and customer inventory even without reducing mine production.

Mongolia has been working to improve transport infrastructure and increase shared haulage capacity across commodity supply chains.

Those investments will become increasingly important as Oyu Tolgoi approaches higher production rates. A mine producing around 500,000 t/yr of copper requires logistics infrastructure capable of handling consistently larger concentrate volumes.

For Chinese smelters, Oyu Tolgoi also represents an increasingly important nearby source of concentrate. Reliable transport between Mongolia and China therefore carries strategic significance for both countries.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Oyu Tolgoi’s geology and production ramp-up are delivering the copper, but logistics remain the weak link. As output approaches 500,000 t/yr, Mongolia will need export infrastructure as reliable as the mine itself to fully capture the project’s value.

Energy Fuels Rare Earth Processing Could Receive $725mn US Defense Loan

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Energy Fuels Rare Earth Processing Could Receive $725mn US Defense Loan
Energy Fuels

Energy Fuels rare earth processing plans could receive up to $725mn in conditional financing from the US Department of Defense, supporting a major expansion of domestic separation, refining and rare earth metal production.

Energy Fuels rare earth processing strategy centres on its White Mesa mill in Utah, where the company plans to process monazite concentrates into light and heavy rare earth products alongside uranium and vanadium.

Energy Fuels rare earth processing expansion is strategically important because it targets several stages where the US remains heavily dependent on overseas capacity. The company ultimately plans to connect oxide production with domestic rare earth metal and alloy manufacturing.

The proposed loan remains subject to due diligence, final agreements and closing conditions, but it could substantially accelerate Energy Fuels' transition from mineral developer into an integrated critical materials producer.

White Mesa Expansion Targets NdPr and Heavy Rare Earths

The first phase at White Mesa is designed to process up to 10,000 t/yr of monazite concentrate and produce around 1,000 t/yr of neodymium-praseodymium oxide.

The operation will also generate concentrate containing samarium and other heavy rare earth elements.

Energy Fuels is installing additional equipment to process mixed rare earth carbonates and produce separated light and heavy rare earth oxides. Commercial production from this expansion is scheduled for mid-2027.

Phase 2 would significantly increase output. Planned additional capacity includes 5,513 t/yr of NdPr, 48 t/yr of terbium and 165 t/yr of dysprosium.

The expansion would also produce 748 t/yr of concentrate containing samarium and other heavy rare earths.

These materials are strategically important for high-performance permanent magnets used in defence, aerospace, electric vehicles, robotics and other advanced technologies.

The Phase 2 project carries an estimated capital cost of $419mn. Energy Fuels estimates NdPr operating costs of $29.39/kg using feedstock from its Vara Mada project in Madagascar.

Global Feedstock and US Alloy Capacity Build an Integrated Chain

Energy Fuels is developing several heavy mineral sands projects that could provide monazite and other rare earth-bearing feedstocks.

The company fully owns Vara Mada in Madagascar and Bahia in Brazil, while holding a 49% interest in the Donald project in Australia.

This geographic diversification could give White Mesa access to multiple sources of feedstock rather than relying solely on US mine production.

The company also plans to move further downstream through the proposed acquisition of Australian Strategic Materials.

That transaction would support development of the American Metal Plant in the US, with initial rare earth alloy capacity of 2,000 t/yr and potential expansion to 4,000 t/yr.

Permitting is expected to continue through 2026, followed by a two-year construction period.

If these projects proceed as planned, Energy Fuels could control a supply chain extending from mineral sands and monazite through separated oxides to rare earth metals and alloys.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Energy Fuels is building one of the more complete non-China rare earth chains in the US. The key strategic value lies in linking diversified monazite feedstock with heavy rare earth separation and domestic alloy production.

Port of Los Angeles Container Traffic Forecast to Fall 7% in 2026-27

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Port of Los Angeles Container Traffic Forecast to Fall 7% in 2026-27
Los Angeles Port

Port of Los Angeles container traffic is expected to fall by 7% in the 2026-27 fiscal year as uncertainty around global trade, geopolitics and US trade policy weighs on cargo flows. The port forecasts throughput of about 9.3mn twenty-foot equivalent units during the year beginning in July.

Port of Los Angeles container traffic has already softened in the current fiscal year. Through the end of May, the port handled 9.4mn TEUs, down 2.4% from the same period a year earlier.

Port of Los Angeles container traffic remains an important indicator for US industrial demand because the facility handles large volumes of manufactured goods, machinery, components and raw-material-linked products moving through west coast supply chains.

The weaker outlook suggests importers are remaining cautious as tariffs and geopolitical risks complicate purchasing decisions and inventory planning.

Trade Policy Uncertainty Weighs on Import Flows

The projected decline reflects more than a simple slowdown in consumer demand. US trade policy has created uncertainty over the timing and cost of imports, encouraging companies to delay purchases, reroute shipments or adjust sourcing strategies.

May throughput rose by 17% year on year to 840,165 TEUs, but the comparison was distorted by unusually weak volumes in May 2025. Importers had postponed or cancelled cargoes following the introduction of broad US tariffs.

This creates volatility rather than a clear growth trend. Companies may accelerate shipments ahead of potential tariffs and then reduce orders once inventories are replenished.

For manufacturers, this complicates procurement of imported machinery, components and semi-finished materials. It also raises the value of domestic and regional sourcing when tariff exposure becomes difficult to predict.

The west coast is particularly sensitive to shifts in Asian trade. Any reduction in China-linked imports or diversion toward Mexico, Canada or other regions can materially change container flows through Los Angeles.

Lower Cargo Volumes Signal Broader Supply Chain Caution

Loaded exports also weakened, falling by 10.5% year on year in May to 107,657 TEUs. That indicates softer outbound trade alongside uncertainty in imports.

For metals markets, weaker port activity can signal slower movement of fabricated products, machinery and downstream manufactured goods even when underlying raw material demand remains stable.

The impact will vary by sector. Automotive, electronics, construction materials and industrial equipment remain particularly exposed to changes in containerised trade.

Lower throughput may also reduce congestion and logistics costs, but that benefit would come at the expense of weaker trade volumes.

The larger issue is predictability. Companies can manage high freight costs more easily than sudden tariff changes or shifting trade rules because long-term supply contracts depend on stable landed costs.

The Port of Los Angeles outlook therefore points to another year in which trade policy may shape cargo flows as much as underlying demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The expected decline at Los Angeles reflects uncertainty rather than a simple collapse in trade. For industrial supply chains, unpredictable tariffs and sourcing rules are increasingly becoming as important as freight rates in determining where material moves.

Volkswagen Osnabruck Plant Could Shift to Defence Use as EV Transition Slows

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Volkswagen Osnabruck Plant Could Shift to Defence Use as EV Transition Slows
Volkswagen

Volkswagen Osnabruck plant may be repurposed for defence manufacturing after vehicle production ends in 2027, highlighting how weaker-than-expected electric vehicle demand is reshaping Germany’s automotive industrial base.

Volkswagen Osnabruck plant is already scheduled to stop car production under the company’s wider restructuring plan. Volkswagen is now discussing possible future use of the site with defence companies as it seeks to retain jobs and utilise existing industrial capacity.

Volkswagen Osnabruck plant currently produces the T-Roc Cabrio, a niche combustion-engine model. Its limited role in Volkswagen’s future EV portfolio has made the facility more vulnerable as the group reduces domestic manufacturing capacity.

The potential shift toward defence also reflects a broader change in European industry. Automotive companies are increasingly examining alternative uses for factories that no longer fit slower and less predictable electrification plans.

EV Weakness Forces Volkswagen to Rationalise German Capacity

Volkswagen is reducing roughly 40% of its domestic production capacity by 2028 as it restructures its German operations.

The company has already closed or repurposed other facilities and is moving models between plants to reduce costs and improve utilisation.

Weak utilisation has become a central problem across Europe’s automotive sector. EV manufacturing capacity expanded rapidly based on expectations of stronger demand, but sales growth has proved uneven across markets.

That has created a mismatch between factory capacity and actual vehicle demand. Carmakers are responding through production pauses, model transfers, workforce reductions and plant closures.

Volkswagen’s decision to halt ID.4 production in the US also illustrates the uncertainty surrounding EV demand outside Europe.

For suppliers, lower vehicle production can affect demand for aluminium, copper, electrical steel, battery materials and automotive-grade specialty metals.

The restructuring therefore reaches beyond vehicle assembly. Capacity changes at major automakers can ripple through entire regional manufacturing and materials supply chains.

Defence Manufacturing Offers Alternative Use for Industrial Assets

Repurposing Osnabruck for defence could allow Volkswagen to preserve skilled labour, manufacturing infrastructure and regional industrial activity after passenger vehicle production ends.

Automotive plants already possess many capabilities relevant to defence manufacturing, including metal fabrication, machining, welding, coating, assembly and quality control.

However, defence production requires different certifications, security requirements and product qualifications, meaning conversion would not be immediate.

The strategic logic is still strong. European governments are increasing defence spending while automotive manufacturers face underused capacity.

This creates an opportunity to redirect factories toward sectors with stronger demand and government-backed procurement.

For Germany, the shift could also help preserve industrial employment while supporting domestic defence manufacturing capacity.

The broader implication is that Europe’s industrial transition may become more diversified than originally expected. Instead of moving directly from combustion vehicles to EVs, some manufacturing assets may migrate into defence, aerospace and other strategic sectors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Volkswagen’s Osnabruck review shows that Europe’s industrial transition is no longer only about electrification. As EV demand disappoints, defence and other strategic industries may become alternative destinations for underused automotive manufacturing capacity.