Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs in Brazil

Comexport

Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs marks a major shift in Brazil’s role within global EV supply chains. The Brazilian foreign trade firm will assemble GM’s new Spark EUV, a Chinese electric vehicle sold under the Chevrolet brand, at the former Ford-owned PACE industrial hub. As a result, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs deal turns a decommissioned plant into a regional platform for imported Chinese SKD units.

The project uses a flexible contract-assembly model rather than an equity partnership or joint venture. Comexport will import semi-knocked-down Spark units from China, already welded, painted and partially manufactured, and then complete final assembly at PACE. Meanwhile, GM will supervise production quality and pay Comexport per unit, ensuring OEM control over standards while limiting capital exposure. Therefore, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs contract gives GM fast market access with lower fixed costs.

PACE becomes Brazil’s first multi-brand EV assembly hub

PACE will emerge as Brazil’s first and only multi-brand vehicle assembly line once all client negotiations close. The plant, acquired by Comexport in 2024 from the state of Ceara, will serve at least three carmakers, with GM confirmed as the first anchor client. Initially, the facility will operate below its 80,000 vehicle per year capacity and gradually ramp up as the local supply chain matures.

GM plans for all Spark units sold in Brazil to be assembled as SKD imports over time. However, the company will first bring in fully built consumer-ready vehicles while Comexport stabilises processes and tooling. As the supply chain “nationalises”, more Brazilian auto-parts suppliers will enter the platform, supporting localisation targets and potentially unlocking tax and industrial policy incentives. This phased approach reduces ramp-up risk while anchoring long term EV manufacturing in northeastern Brazil.

Chinese EV platforms deepen their footprint in Latin America

The project highlights how Chinese EV platforms penetrate Latin America via global OEM brands and contract assemblers. The Spark is a Chinese-developed model from the joint venture between GM, SAIC and Wuling, sold domestically as the Baojun Yep Plus. Therefore, Brazilian consumers will buy a Chevrolet-badged vehicle that originates from a Chinese EV architecture. PACE will exclusively assemble hybrids and EVs, increasing the likelihood that future clients will also be Chinese or China-linked automakers.

For GM, this structure supports a broader strategy of leveraging Chinese small-EV know-how while maintaining brand control in key emerging markets. For Brazil, the Comexport to assemble GM Chinese EVs model could accelerate EV adoption, technology transfer and supplier upgrading, especially in battery, electronics and lightweight components. However, policymakers and local OEMs will also scrutinise the impact on domestic manufacturers and industrial competitiveness as Chinese-origin platforms gain share.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal illustrates how decommissioned legacy plants can be repurposed into EV assembly hubs bound into China-centric technology networks. By combining SKD imports, contract assembly and gradual localisation, Comexport and GM create a flexible template that other brands may copy across Latin America. Market participants should watch how quickly local suppliers move into higher value EV components and how Brazil balances openness to Chinese platforms with support for domestic champions.

Southeast Asia Aluminium Premiums Could Decouple From Japan on Chinese Semi Flows

Aluminium

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums could begin to decouple from Japan as Vietnamese buyers increasingly accept Chinese-origin semi-finished products for remelting. The shift suggests regional aluminium pricing may become more dependent on origin acceptance than on traditional Asian premium benchmarks.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums are still supported for Western-origin and free-trade-agreement cargoes, with some deals above $300/t on a cif Thailand and Vietnam basis. However, cheaper Chinese semi-finished products are creating a parallel supply route.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums may therefore face a different pricing path from Japan, where origin requirements and customer preferences can be more restrictive. Vietnam’s willingness to buy and remelt Chinese-origin material is changing the regional supply equation.

The key issue is whether low-priced Chinese semi exports remain available. If they do, southeast Asian buyers may have less reason to pay Japan-linked premiums for standard P1020 supply.

Chinese Semi-Finished Products Create a Remelting Alternative

Chinese semi-finished aluminium products are attracting stronger interest from Vietnamese and Korean buyers. Traders pointed to low-priced offers for products such as aluminium wires under HS code 76149000.

Offers for high-purity aluminium stranded wires were reported at between an $80/t discount and a $100/t premium to London Metal Exchange prices. That is below the more typical $50-100/t premium range seen in recent months.

The economics become competitive after remelting. With remelting costs estimated at $150-200/t, buyers can effectively convert wire into P1020-equivalent ingot at a total premium of about $200-300/t.

That is competitive against direct P1020 purchases, especially when standard ingot premiums remain elevated. For price-sensitive buyers, remelting offers a practical way to secure metal units while avoiding higher conventional premiums.

This does not mean all customers will accept the route. Some buyers still require Western-origin or free-trade-agreement cargoes because of compliance, quality, customer specification or trade-policy considerations.

But the presence of a cheaper remelting route can weaken the connection between southeast Asia and Japan premiums. If Vietnam accepts material that Japan will not, the two markets may price differently.

Export Rebates Could Decide Sustainability

China’s 13% export tax rebate for certain aluminium products is central to the pricing gap. Some Chinese suppliers can offer semi-finished products at very low premiums, or even discounts to LME, because the rebate supports export economics.

This creates a policy-driven arbitrage. Instead of exporting primary aluminium directly, suppliers can export semi-finished products that receive more favourable tax treatment.

The sustainability of the trend depends on Beijing’s response. If Chinese authorities decide export volumes are excessive or distortive, they could remove or adjust the rebate.

That would quickly change the economics. Without the rebate, low-priced Chinese semis may become less competitive as a remelting feedstock for southeast Asian buyers.

For now, the trade flow matters because western aluminium supply remains tight and regional premiums are elevated. Buyers are looking for workable alternatives, and Chinese semis provide one.

The broader market implication is clear. Aluminium premiums are becoming more segmented by origin, trade rules and customer acceptance. Regional benchmarks may no longer move together if buyers have different views on acceptable supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The possible split between southeast Asia and Japan premiums shows how trade policy can reshape aluminium pricing as much as physical supply. If Chinese semi exports remain cheap, Vietnam could become a more flexible remelting market while Japan stays tied to stricter origin premiums.

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge exports are expected to rise over the next five years as western aerospace supply chains look for additional qualified raw material sources. Chinese producer Chaoyang Jinda Titanium expects international shipments of qualified aerospace-grade sponge to increase from around 1,000t this year to 10,000t by 2030.

The shift reflects a deeper change in the aerospace titanium supply chain. Western aircraft manufacturers and ingot melters are trying to reduce exposure to Russian supply, while aircraft build rates are expected to rise from 2027.

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge is therefore moving from a limited export niche into a potential supply-chain balancing tool. However, tariffs, qualification risk and geopolitical uncertainty will limit how quickly US and European buyers adopt Chinese material.

The opportunity is strongest in standard-quality structural titanium grades. Premium-quality sponge for engine, landing-gear and other critical applications is likely to remain controlled by established suppliers with long qualification histories.

Western Aerospace Buyers Face a Supply-Diversification Challenge

Aerospace-grade sponge demand is expected to recover from 2027 after a weaker 2026 caused by inventory normalisation. Mills have been reducing stocks of semi-finished titanium parts and raw materials, but aircraft production plans point to higher requirements later in the decade.

The timing is important. Airbus and Boeing both carry long aircraft backlogs, creating a decade of production visibility. This forces mills and original equipment manufacturers to look beyond short-term demand swings and secure raw material sources for future build-rate increases.

Western OEMs also continue to reassess Russian titanium exposure. If procurement from Russia declines, the market will need alternative aerospace-qualified sponge to fill the gap. Japan’s Toho Titanium and Osaka Titanium are expanding, while China is preparing to supply more qualified material.

Global approved aerospace-grade sponge supply excluding Russian products is expected to rise from about 74,000t this year to around 91,000t by 2030. Demand is expected to grow at a similar pace, leaving the market sensitive to which suppliers are included in purchasing programmes.

The supply-demand picture changes significantly depending on China and Russia. Excluding both suppliers creates a tighter market. Including them creates more apparent supply availability. This makes qualification and geopolitical acceptability just as important as physical capacity.

Some US ingot producers began qualifying Chinese titanium sponge in 2024. US imports from China rose to a 10-year high of 1,069t that year, showing that buyers were willing to test Chinese material when diversification pressure increased.

However, imports fell to 155t last year and no Chinese sponge imports were reported in January-February 2026. Tariff volatility, high mill inventories and policy uncertainty discouraged further purchasing.

This shows the main barrier for China aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Aerospace qualification requires multi-year commitments, stable documentation, repeatable quality and customer confidence. Buyers will not qualify a new source quickly if they fear trade rules could change again.

Titanium is exempt from the latest 10% US tariff, and overall duties have fallen back to 40% from 60%. But the rate itself is not the only issue. For aerospace buyers, volatility can be more damaging than the actual tariff level.

A mill can absorb or price a known tariff. It cannot easily build a long-term qualification strategy around unpredictable policy. This is why US buyers may limit Chinese sponge procurement to 15-20% of requirements, even if the material is technically acceptable.

Europe and Asia-Pacific may offer more immediate export channels. China already supplies aerospace-grade sponge to buyers in those regions, supporting shipments even when US demand is limited.

Capacity Expansion Could Change the Titanium Sponge Balance

China is preparing a large wave of aerospace-grade sponge capacity additions. Several major projects are scheduled to come on line soon, with combined new capacity of around 110,000 t/yr.

The scale is unprecedented. The planned additions exceed the combined existing capacity of Japan’s Toho and Osaka Titanium, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, and Saudi Arabia’s ATTM.

China’s expansion is driven by two demand streams. Domestic aerospace demand is rising from the Comac C919 programme and military aircraft production. At the same time, producers expect higher export demand as western OEMs diversify away from Russia.

China’s titanium mill product demand already has a meaningful aerospace base. Aerospace applications accounted for about 20% of China’s titanium mill product demand in 2025, or roughly 31,280t. The chemicals industry remained the largest segment at 48%.

The domestic base gives Chinese sponge producers a stronger platform for quality improvement. Aerospace production experience matters because sponge qualification depends on consistency over time, not only nameplate capacity.

Still, some market participants question whether all new capacity can secure international aerospace qualification. New lines may need years of operating history before western melters and OEMs accept material for aircraft applications.

This is a critical distinction. China may have large physical capacity, but aerospace supply depends on approved, audited and repeatable production. Capacity alone does not guarantee market access.

Price competitiveness may support adoption. Domestic China aerospace-grade sponge prices have recently held firm at 55,000-57,000 yuan/t ex-works because of cost pressure. That remains competitive against some western supply routes, especially if buyers need alternative non-Russian material.

However, qualification is likely to split the market by application. Standard structural titanium grades are more likely to accept Chinese sponge over time. These grades support airframes and less critical structural components where qualification remains strict but less restrictive than engine-grade applications.

Premium-quality sponge will be harder to penetrate. Engine, landing-gear and other demanding aerospace uses require deeper qualification, tighter chemistry control and stronger confidence from prime contractors and tier suppliers.

Airbus’ titanium demand outlook adds another layer. The A350 is a high titanium-bearing platform, with titanium representing around 15% of aircraft weight. As A350 production rises toward 2027 and 2028, titanium demand visibility should improve across the supply chain.

That demand pull could make Chinese material more attractive if western supply tightens. But buyers will still balance cost, qualification, geopolitics and supply security.

For Chinese producers, the path is clear but difficult. They must prove consistent aerospace-grade quality, build long-term customer trust, manage export documentation and navigate trade policy risk.

For western OEMs, the decision is strategic. China aerospace-grade titanium sponge could reduce Russia exposure and improve supply flexibility. But it also introduces another geopolitical dependency at a time when aerospace and defence supply chains are under closer scrutiny.

The most likely outcome is partial adoption. Chinese sponge may become a growing supplement for standard-quality structural grades, while established Japanese, Kazakh, Saudi and other qualified suppliers remain central to premium aerospace applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge will become harder for western aerospace supply chains to ignore as aircraft build rates rise and Russian exposure narrows. The decisive issue is not capacity, but whether Chinese producers can convert new output into trusted, qualified and politically acceptable supply.

China Tungsten Exports Resume in Europe with Limited Volumes

China Tungsten

China tungsten exports restarted in European markets for the first time since February stoppages, though shipment volumes remain constrained at maximum 1 tonne per delivery. The resumption of China tungsten exports follows months of supply disruption caused by Chinese export controls announced February 4th, creating acute shortages for US and European buyers dependent on tungsten ingots for defense and industrial applications.

Small-Scale Shipments Signal Cautious Market Re-entry

China tungsten exports currently originate primarily from smaller state-owned manufacturers rather than major producers. Market sources report receiving new shipments in Rotterdam while additional material remains in transit to European destinations. However, volumes stay extremely limited compared to pre-control periods, reflecting continued regulatory uncertainty and cautious export policies from Chinese suppliers.

Meanwhile, delivery timelines extend significantly with current orders potentially shipping in July for immediate purchases. Traders quote current prices at $56 per kilogram on a cost-insurance-freight basis, representing substantial increases from historical levels. The extended lead times demonstrate supply chain disruptions that persist despite the resumption of limited export activities.

Export Controls Create Ongoing Market Uncertainty

However, tungsten metal products face complex regulatory environments despite not appearing on initial dual-use licensing lists. While other tungsten products required explicit export licenses from February 4th, tungsten ingots experienced de facto export halts through administrative restrictions. This regulatory ambiguity creates persistent uncertainty for international buyers seeking reliable supply sources.

Therefore, US and European buyers continue struggling to secure sufficient alternative tungsten sources outside Chinese production. The global tungsten market's dependence on Chinese suppliers becomes evident through months of supply shortages following export control implementation. Alternative sourcing efforts prove inadequate for meeting industrial demand requirements across defense and manufacturing sectors.

Tight European Market Maintains Price Pressure

Furthermore, European tungsten markets remain extremely tight with minimal warehouse inventory available for immediate delivery. Limited stock levels mean small resumptions in Chinese exports cannot immediately relieve price pressures or supply constraints. Market participants describe conditions as "total lottery" scenarios where securing tungsten ingots depends largely on timing and supplier relationships.

As a result, prompt tungsten prices maintain elevated levels despite the resumption of small-scale Chinese shipments. The constrained supply environment supports premium pricing while buyers compete for limited available material. Industrial consumers face continued procurement challenges that affect production planning and cost structures across tungsten-dependent manufacturing sectors.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China's limited tungsten export resumption highlights the persistent vulnerability of global supply chains dependent on single-source suppliers for critical materials, particularly when geopolitical tensions influence trade policies. The constrained volumes and regulatory uncertainty demonstrate how export controls can fundamentally reshape commodity markets, forcing Western buyers to reassess supply security strategies for defense-critical materials like tungsten.

South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens

South32 Manganese Ore

South32 manganese ore export prices to China have fallen for June shipments as weak alloy demand, ample port inventories and cautious buying pressure the import market. The Australian diversified metals producer lowered offers for both Australian and South African manganese ore, according to Chinese importers.

South32 manganese ore export prices for Australian 42% lumpy ore fell to $5.40/mtu cif China for June delivery. This was down by $0.50/mtu from May.

South32 also reduced its offer for South African 37% manganese ore to $5/mtu cif China. This was down by $0.40/mtu from the previous month.

South32 manganese ore export prices are an important signal for the wider manganese chain because China remains the largest global buyer of seaborne ore. When Chinese alloy plants slow purchases, overseas miners often need to adjust export offers to maintain sales momentum.

Chinese Alloy Weakness Cuts Restocking Appetite

Chinese importers have shown limited interest in restocking manganese ore because inventories remain sufficient and alloy prices are weakening. This has reduced spot buying urgency before the Labour Day holiday on 1-5 May.

Many alloy plants postponed ore feedstock purchases while waiting for clearer market direction after the holiday. This cautious behaviour has weakened the negotiating position of overseas ore suppliers.

The pressure is also visible in Chinese port prices. Australian 44-46% lumpy manganese ore fell to 43-47 yuan/mtu delivery ex quay on 28 April, down from 47-50 yuan/mtu on 31 March.

The decline shows that domestic buyers are not only resisting new import offers. They are also repricing available port material lower as downstream demand fails to improve.

Manganese ore demand is closely linked to ferro-manganese and silico-manganese production. These alloys are used in steelmaking, where manganese improves strength, deoxidation and performance.

When steel consumption slows, alloy plants reduce purchasing activity. This immediately affects ore demand because manganese alloy producers are the main consumers of imported ore.

Steel Demand Remains the Main Constraint

The deeper issue is weak steel demand in China. Slower economic growth and subdued construction activity have limited recovery in steel consumption, leaving alloy producers cautious about raw material buying.

Without a stronger steel recovery, manganese alloy prices are likely to remain under pressure. This limits the ability of alloy plants to pay higher ore prices, even when miners try to defend margins.

South32’s price cut also reflects wider seaborne competition. Mining firms outside China need to respond when Chinese buyers have enough stock and are unwilling to chase cargoes.

Australian high-grade lumpy ore usually commands stronger interest because of its quality and processing value. However, even higher-grade material can weaken when alloy margins are poor and port inventories are sufficient.

South African ore also remains exposed to Chinese demand swings. Lower-grade material can face sharper price pressure when buyers reduce procurement and focus only on immediate needs.

For the manganese market, the June price cut suggests that miners are prioritising volume discipline and customer access over holding elevated offers. The next price direction will depend on whether Chinese alloy plants return after the holiday with real restocking demand.

If steel demand remains weak, manganese ore prices could face further downside pressure. If alloy prices stabilise and inventories fall, importers may resume buying, but recovery is likely to be gradual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

South32’s price cut shows that the manganese market is being driven by demand absorption, not supply shortage. Until Chinese steel and alloy demand improves, seaborne manganese ore suppliers will remain exposed to cautious restocking and lower port prices.

Minor Metals Security Premium Becomes Cost of Supply Chain Resilience

Minor Metals

Minor metals security premium is becoming a structural cost for western buyers as China’s dominance in processing leaves supply chains exposed to disruption. Speakers at the FT Commodities Global Summit in Lausanne said consumers must pay more for non-Chinese minor metals if they want resilient supply.

The argument is no longer theoretical. Chinese export controls have reduced available supply in western markets and widened the price gap between China and Europe. Materials that once traded closely across regions now reflect very different fundamentals.

Minor metals security premium is most visible in dual-use products subject to Chinese export controls. European gallium prices are more than double Chinese export levels, while Rotterdam germanium prices are also close to twice Chinese fob values.

This premium is not only a temporary reaction to trade disruption. Speakers argued that higher western prices must persist even if export controls are eased, because alternative processing capacity outside China needs long-term economic support.

China Export Controls Break Traditional Price Links

China’s concentration in minor metals processing has created a major vulnerability for western manufacturers. Many critical materials are produced as by-products, refined in small volumes and traded through narrow supply chains.

That structure makes the market highly sensitive to policy changes. When China restricts exports, buyers in Europe and the US cannot easily replace supply because there are few alternative processors with qualified material.

The result is a geographic price split. European warehouse prices once tracked Chinese markets closely, but that relationship no longer reflects real availability outside China. Chinese prices now represent domestic conditions, while western prices reflect scarcity, logistics risk and origin security.

Gallium and germanium show this most clearly. Both metals are essential for semiconductors, optics, power electronics, defence systems, satellite communications and advanced manufacturing. Both are also heavily exposed to Chinese processing and export licensing.

For western buyers, the question is no longer whether Chinese prices look cheaper. The real question is whether material can be accessed, shipped, qualified and used without exposing factories to sudden supply interruptions.

That changes procurement behaviour. Buyers are increasingly willing to pay a security premium for material with reliable origin, clearer documentation and lower exposure to export restrictions.

The same logic is spreading to other by-product metals. Indium, bismuth and antimony are gaining strategic attention because they support electronics, flame retardants, solders, alloys, photovoltaics, semiconductors and defence-related applications.

These metals are often small in volume but large in industrial consequence. A missing input can stop production even if the dollar value of the metal is tiny compared with the final product.

This is why western buyers are treating minor metals differently from ordinary commodities. They are paying for continuity, not only material.

Supply Security Needs Processing Capacity and Long-Term Demand

Minor metals security premium must support investment, not only emergency buying. If higher prices disappear as soon as immediate disruption fades, new processing projects outside China will struggle to survive.

This is the key industrial challenge. Building non-Chinese supply requires refining capacity, technical know-how, environmental permitting, qualified output and customer commitments. These cannot be created quickly during a crisis.

A short-term price spike can help existing suppliers, but it does not guarantee new capacity. Investors need confidence that buyers will continue paying for secure supply after the market stabilises.

This is where security premiums differ from green premiums. Green premiums have often been debated because buyers could delay paying more for lower-carbon materials. But critical materials supply disruption leaves fewer choices.

If rare earths, gallium, germanium or antimony are unavailable, manufacturers may face production stoppages. In that situation, the premium becomes part of operating cost rather than a voluntary sustainability expense.

Governments can help bridge this gap through stockpiles, offtake support, price floors, procurement rules and financing tools. But industry also needs to accept that resilient supply chains cost more than the lowest-price global model.

For miners, by-product metals can improve project economics. Recovering indium, bismuth, antimony, gallium or germanium can add revenue streams to larger operations and strengthen the business case for complex ore bodies.

For refiners, sustained premiums can justify investment in separation and purification capacity. For manufacturers, long-term contracts can reduce the risk of sudden shortages and forced spot-market buying.

The larger strategic point is clear. Western supply chains cannot become more secure while continuing to benchmark only against Chinese domestic prices. Security, traceability and supply reliability require a different pricing model.

Minor metals security premium therefore represents a shift in how critical materials are valued. Buyers are beginning to price the risk of disruption, not just the cost of production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The security premium for minor metals is the market’s way of pricing geopolitical risk into industrial supply. Western buyers cannot build resilient supply chains while demanding Chinese-cost material from non-Chinese sources.

Defense & Security 2025 turns Bangkok into Asia’s defense crossroads

Defense & Security 2025

Defense & Security 2025 opens in Bangkok with record scale and deep strategic signaling. Defense & Security 2025 hosts 580 companies, 28 national pavilions, and 26,000 visitors. Defense & Security 2025 runs 10–13 November at IMPACT under Thailand’s defense ministry.

China’s strategic push shapes the exhibition’s competitive landscape. Thailand has fielded Chinese VT-4 tanks, VN-1 IFVs, drones, and QBZ-195T rifles. Thailand has in recent years purchased more Chinese arms by value than US systems. Therefore, the halls highlight Chinese offerings across air, land, and maritime domains. Meanwhile, invited delegations exceed 350 senior officials from 35 countries.

Scale and content reinforce the show’s Asia-Pacific weight. Exhibits span missiles, tanks, UAVs, ships, satellites, and secure comms. Exhibitors also show electronic warfare, cyber, and counter-terror systems. As a result, the event functions as a tri-service marketplace with policy dialogue. Twenty seminars and conferences convene industry and government experts.

Defense & Security 2025, China Sector

China’s export expansion meets Thailand’s modernization

China’s export pattern concentrates on Asia and Oceania buyers. Asia-Oceania take 77% of Chinese arms exports, with Africa at 14%. Pakistan accounts for 63% of Chinese exports, followed by Bangladesh and Thailand. Consequently, regional procurement pipelines increasingly feature Chinese platforms and components.

Thailand’s modernization plan advances across multiple suppliers. The cabinet approved a phased purchase of 12 Gripen E/F jets over a decade. The estimated cost is 60 billion baht for the Gripen program. Thailand’s 2024 defense budget totals 198.3 billion baht, up 2% year on year. Therefore, procurement mixes US Strykers, Chinese VN-1s, and Israeli UAVs.

ASEAN’s rearmament cycle accelerates in parallel. Indonesia’s defense budget reached $13.2 billion in 2023. Singapore’s spending reached $13.4 billion in 2023 after a 10% rise. Singapore is acquiring eight F-35B fighters to expand airpower. Vietnam is upgrading naval capabilities to protect maritime claims.

Defense & Security 2025

Global spending pledges and exporter dynamics reframe supply chains

NATO members set a higher ambition at the June 2025 summit. Members committed to invest 5% of GDP in defense. This marks a major uplift from the earlier 2% benchmark. As a result, delivery slots, components, and workforce will tighten globally.

Exporter shares define competitive pressures through 2020–24. The United States held 43% of global arms exports. France and Russia followed in second and third positions. China accounted for 5.9% and ranked fourth. Therefore, Chinese vendors face strong US and European competition in premium segments.

Defense & Security 2025 serves more than a sales floor. Organizers prioritize invited government buyers and curated agendas. Discussions focus on autonomy, AI ISR, resilient logistics, and cyber. Exhibitors pitch lifecycle packages with training and local sustainment. Co-production, MRO, and data rights feature in many deal rooms.

The Metalnomist Commentary 

Bangkok’s show captures a decisive shift toward diversified sourcing and localization. Expect tougher offset terms, co-development, and data-centric sustainment as ASEAN hedges suppliers. Financing creativity will separate winners from followers in the next procurement wave.

Samarium Oxide Export Prices Fall as Lynas Output Pressures Chinese Offers

Lynas

Samarium oxide export prices fell as Chinese suppliers lowered offers in response to Lynas’ first samarium oxide production at its Malaysian refinery. The 99.5% samarium oxide export range dropped to $6-8/kg fob China after reaching a record $11-14.50/kg in late February.

The price decline reflected a shift in market sentiment rather than a full easing of supply constraints. Chinese export permits remain difficult to obtain, especially for shipments to Japan, but Lynas start-up introduced a credible non-China supply route for downstream users.

Samarium oxide export prices had surged earlier because of China’s tighter export control framework for medium and heavy rare earths. The emergence of Lynas output has now weakened the pricing leverage of some Chinese sellers, even though China still dominates global samarium supply.

Lynas Start-Up Adds Non-China Supply for SmCo Magnet Producers

Lynas produced first samarium oxide at its Malaysian refinery on 19 March, adding another separated heavy rare earth product to its portfolio. The company is the only commercial producer of separated samarium, terbium and dysprosium outside China.

The Australian producer is expected by market participants to raise samarium output to about 1,100 t/yr. That volume could be enough to cover a meaningful share of downstream demand in Japan, where samarium-cobalt magnet manufacturing is concentrated outside China.

Samarium-cobalt magnets are used in high-temperature and high-reliability applications across aerospace, defense, automotive, electronics and advanced industrial systems. The material’s strategic value is higher than its market size suggests because SmCo magnets are difficult to replace in demanding environments.

Lynas also plans to expand its product line to include gadolinium, yttrium and lutetium over the next two years. This would further strengthen non-China supply options for selected medium and heavy rare earth oxides.

China Export Controls Still Shape Samarium Market Risk

China continues to control more than 90% of global samarium oxide supply, with global production estimated at about 4,900t in 2025. Output is expected to rise to around 5,000t in 2026 as Lynas adds volume and Chinese production remains steady.

Beijing’s export restrictions remain the main structural risk. China has placed samarium, gadolinium, dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, lutetium and scandium under tighter export controls from 4 April, adding uncertainty for buyers outside China.

Japan is particularly exposed because it is China’s largest buyer of samarium products, accounting for more than 85% of Chinese shipments. Japanese buyers have reported difficulties securing export permits for samarium products since late October, following a sharp deterioration in China-Japan relations.

The price correction therefore does not mean the market has fully normalised. Samarium oxide export prices are now being pulled in two directions: Lynas is weakening China’s supply monopoly, while Chinese licensing controls continue to restrict trade flows into key magnet markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lynas’ samarium start-up shows how even modest non-China output can change rare earth pricing psychology. However, China’s export licensing power remains decisive, especially for Japan’s SmCo magnet industry.

Lynas Heavy Rare Earths Production Breaks China's Market Monopoly

Lynas Rare Earths

Lynas heavy rare earths production achieved a historic milestone by becoming the first non-Chinese producer of separated dysprosium. The Australian mineral company's Lynas heavy rare earths facility in Malaysia successfully produced separated dysprosium, marking a significant breakthrough in global supply chain diversification for critical minerals essential to advanced manufacturing and defense applications.

Malaysian Plant Establishes Alternative Supply Chain

Lynas heavy rare earths processing capabilities expanded significantly during the first quarter of 2025. The company constructed dysprosium and terbium processing circuits at its Malaysian facility, with capacity to separate up to 1,500 tonnes per year of heavy rare earths. These new circuits position Lynas to challenge China's dominance in the separated heavy rare earths market.

Meanwhile, Lynas plans to commence separated terbium production next month at the same facility. The processing circuits will eventually enable production of separated dysprosium, terbium, and holmium concentrate. Additionally, the facility will produce unseparated samarium/europium/gadolinium and unseparated mixed heavy rare earths, creating a comprehensive product portfolio.

Strategic Timing Amid Chinese Export Restrictions

However, the breakthrough comes at a critical juncture for global rare earths markets. Chinese suppliers recently limited offers for rare earth minerals, including dysprosium and terbium, following government export control tightening. This timing underscores the strategic importance of establishing alternative supply sources outside China's control.

Therefore, Lynas' production achievement addresses growing concerns about supply chain vulnerability in critical minerals. The company's Q1 2025 total rare earth oxide production reached 1,911 tonnes, including 1,509 tonnes of NdPr oxide. Production declined 46% year-on-year due to improvement and maintenance works across Malaysian and Western Australian operations.

US Partnership Strengthens Supply Chain Resilience

Furthermore, Lynas continues developing another rare earths processing plant in Texas with US government support. The American facility will produce both separated heavy and light rare earths, further reducing Western dependence on Chinese supplies. This dual-facility strategy creates redundancy and geographic diversification for critical mineral processing.

As a result, Lynas positions itself as a cornerstone of Western rare earths supply chain security. The company's expansion into heavy rare earths processing represents a strategic shift from its traditional focus on light rare earths production, addressing military and high-tech manufacturing requirements.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lynas' achievement in producing separated heavy rare earths outside China represents a watershed moment for global supply chain resilience in critical minerals. The timing coincides perfectly with Chinese export restrictions, demonstrating the urgent need for alternative suppliers in materials essential to clean energy, defense, and advanced technology sectors.

China Titanium Sponge Exports Rise in March as Asian Buyers Support Demand

China Titanium Sponge

China titanium sponge exports rose year on year in March, supported by stronger buying interest from South Korea, India, Vietnam and Slovenia. Chinese customs data showed exports reached 453t during the month, up 8.6% from 417t a year earlier.

China titanium sponge exports still declined by 7.4% from February’s 489t, showing that overseas buying remained selective. Some buyers were not under immediate pressure to purchase Chinese material because spot supply was sufficient.

China titanium sponge exports totalled 1,535t in January-March, down 5.7% from a year earlier. The decline reflected weaker buying from major consumers including Japan, South Korea and the US.

The data show a titanium sponge export market that is recovering unevenly. Asian demand helped March shipments, but inventory drawdowns, delayed purchasing and weaker aerospace-linked orders continued to limit broader export momentum.

Japan, South Korea and US Demand Weaken in First Quarter

Japan remained the largest destination for Chinese titanium sponge in January-March, receiving 347t. However, shipments fell by 37% from 548t a year earlier.

The decline was mainly caused by delayed purchasing from a major Japanese consumer. Purchases are expected to resume in May, which could support later-quarter export flows.

South Korean imports from China also fell. Shipments dropped by 33% to 172t as some buyers slowed procurement after failing to secure downstream aerospace original equipment manufacturer orders.

This matters because aerospace demand remains one of the most important drivers of higher-grade titanium sponge consumption. When downstream aerospace orders are delayed, sponge buyers often reduce spot intake and work through inventories.

US demand was almost absent in the first quarter. China exported only 0.2t of titanium sponge to the US, down 99.8% from a year earlier, as US consumers continued drawing down inventories.

The US result highlights the effect of inventory cycles and trade uncertainty. Even when Chinese material remains available, buyers may delay purchases if they have sufficient stock or face qualification, tariff and policy risk.

Export Prices Track Higher Domestic Sponge Market

Chinese 99.7% grade titanium sponge export prices averaged $6.70/kg fob China in January-March. This was up 1.5% from $6.60/kg a year earlier.

The increase tracked higher domestic titanium sponge prices. Export pricing therefore reflected cost support in China rather than a broad surge in overseas demand.

The modest price rise also shows that the market remains balanced. Chinese suppliers have support from domestic costs, but overseas buyers are still cautious and selective.

For global titanium supply chains, the key issue is not only volume. The quality, qualification status and end-use requirements of sponge matter, especially for aerospace and high-performance industrial applications.

China’s titanium sponge exports remain important for regional buyers in Asia and Europe. However, demand from aerospace-linked customers will depend on downstream order visibility, inventory levels and qualification confidence.

If Japanese buying resumes in May and South Korean aerospace-related demand improves, Chinese exports could recover further. But weak US flows suggest that trade and inventory factors will continue to limit upside in some markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China titanium sponge exports show a market supported by regional buying but still constrained by aerospace order timing and inventory drawdowns. The next signal will come from whether Japanese and South Korean buyers return with stronger qualified-material demand in the second quarter.

U.S. Tariff Hike Puts Pressure on China’s Tantalum Feedstock Market

Tantalum

The recent U.S. decision to impose a 25% tariff on Chinese unwrought tantalum is set to create significant challenges for the tantalum feedstock market. This move, part of the Section 301 tariffs, will come into effect on September 27, having been delayed from August. The new tariffs will impact the demand for tantalum feedstock materials, including ores, pentoxide, and potassium fluotantalate, creating uncertainty within the market.

Impact of U.S. Tariff on Chinese Exports

China has long been a leading supplier of unwrought tantalum to the U.S., responsible for around 40% of total U.S. imports of this critical material between 2020 and mid-September 2024. In the first seven months of 2024 alone, the U.S. imported 177 tons of unwrought tantalum, a figure that already surpasses the total imports for all of 2023.

However, the volume of Chinese tantalum exported to the U.S. has been steadily declining. The U.S. imported 321 tons in 2023, a 56% drop from the 730 tons imported in 2022. Of this, only 131 tons came from China, marking the lowest level in years. This downward trend is likely to accelerate further as the tariffs come into effect, prompting U.S. buyers to reconsider their reliance on Chinese tantalum.

Lower Demand for Tantalum Feedstock

As a result of the anticipated reduction in downstream demand, producers of tantalum feedstock in China are already feeling the pressure. For instance, Chinese potassium fluotantalate producers have reported receiving lower bids from tantalum smelters in recent days. Bid prices have dropped to approximately ¥830-840/kg, down from ¥850/kg before the mid-autumn holiday in mid-September.

The electronics industry, a major consumer of tantalum, is also likely to be affected. Some companies are now required to avoid sourcing tantalite from Africa due to a dispute between the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) and the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI). This dispute, combined with the U.S. tariff hike, is leading to further hesitation among tantalum smelters to source feedstock from Africa.

Chinese Smelters' Response and Outlook

Despite the current challenges, some Chinese smelters are optimistic about domestic supply. “We are not short of feedstock because there is ample tantalum scrap feedstock supply, which is sufficient to feed China’s domestic tantalum production,” commented a source from a South China-based smelter. However, many smelters and traders remain cautious, focusing on fulfilling domestic orders while closely monitoring global market developments.

With the U.S. tariff hike set to take effect, the outlook for China's tantalum feedstock market remains uncertain. Tantalum suppliers are attempting to raise their prices, but market participants believe the increased tariffs will make it difficult to conclude new deals at elevated prices.

As the U.S. prepares to implement its new tariffs on Chinese tantalum, the ripple effects are being felt throughout the supply chain. From lower demand in the electronics sector to falling bid prices for feedstock, the market faces a challenging road ahead. While Chinese producers remain resilient with alternative feedstock sources, the long-term impact of the tariffs could reshape global supply chains and market dynamics.

US New Tariffs Could Disrupt China's Non-Exempt Metals Exports

China Tariffs

New tariffs on lithium, rare earth magnets, and more could affect China's metal exports to the US.

The United States has announced significant new tariffs on Chinese imports, with a notable focus on metals. While many non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys have been exempted, some crucial exports from China, like lithium, rare earth magnets, and lithium-ion batteries, will face substantial increases in tariff rates. These changes are set to have a lasting impact on the trade between the US and China, especially in the energy storage and electric vehicle (EV) sectors.

High Tariffs on Lithium-Ion Batteries and Energy Storage

As of April 9, the US will implement an 82.4% tariff on electric vehicle (EV) power batteries and a 57.4% tariff on non-EV lithium-ion batteries from China. This substantial hike in tariffs will make Chinese-made batteries far more expensive and may eliminate the possibility of Chinese EV power batteries entering the US market. US consumers will likely absorb these costs, potentially leading to inflation in the US battery industry, especially in the energy storage sector.

China’s lithium-ion battery exports to the US had already been on the rise, with a 59% increase in exports during the first two months of the year. However, these new tariffs are expected to curb the growth of China's battery exports to the US and negatively affect lithium feedstock prices, which are currently at a four-year low.

Impact on Rare Earth Magnets

Rare earth magnets are another key area of concern, as these products were not exempted from the new tariffs. Despite some uncertainty about the exact tariff implementation, producers in China are anxious about the potential 54% tariff on rare earth magnets. China remains the dominant supplier of rare earth magnets globally, and while the US does have some alternatives, they are mostly focused on military applications with significantly higher prices. This makes it unlikely that the US can fully escape its dependence on China, especially for civilian applications.

China’s exports of rare earth magnets to the US in 2022 accounted for 12% of its total exports, and while tariffs could reduce this figure, China’s competitive pricing in the civil sector ensures its continued dominance in the global market.

Copper, Aluminium, and Hafnium: Other Affected Metals

While copper and aluminium are exempt from this latest round of tariffs, the copper industry remains on edge. US authorities are investigating the potential security implications of copper imports, and there’s speculation that a tariff may be imposed in the future. As for aluminium, Chinese exports are already subject to a steep 70% tariff, which is expected to discourage further aluminium exports to the US, pushing Chinese suppliers to seek alternative markets.

Hafnium, a critical metal used in aerospace applications, will also face a significant tariff hike, moving from 34% to 79%. This change could prompt US buyers to source hafnium from other regions, like Rotterdam, where the tariff is considerably lower.

Conclusion

The new US tariffs on Chinese metals exports are set to reshape the global metals market, particularly for lithium-ion batteries, rare earth magnets, and hafnium. While some sectors, like copper and aluminium, may have avoided immediate tariff hikes, long-term implications for the industry remain uncertain. The tariff increase on key metal exports from China to the US is expected to alter supply chains and increase costs for US consumers, especially in the EV and energy storage markets.

Tronox Zircon Sand Prices Rise as China Faces Higher Third-Quarter Import Costs

Tronox

Tronox zircon sand prices have increased for third-quarter deliveries to China as higher mining input costs and delivery expenses push exporters to raise offers. The US-based titanium dioxide and zircon producer lifted prices for both Australian-origin and South African-origin zircon sand.

Tronox zircon sand prices for 66% grade Australian-origin material rose by $225/t from the April-June quarter to $1,950-1,975/t cif China. South African-origin material also increased by $225/t to $1,935-1,955/t cif China.

Tronox zircon sand prices are important because China remains a major importer and processor of zircon sand and concentrates. Higher import costs can quickly feed into domestic zirconium chemicals, ceramics, refractories and zirconium-titanium beneficiation markets.

The move also raises expectations that Iluka Resources may increase third-quarter export offers to China. Iluka’s heavy minerals output fell sharply in the first quarter, tightening expectations around premium supply.

Higher Export Offers Reflect Cost and Supply Pressure

Tronox cited continued inflation in key inputs across its global mining operations, along with rising delivery costs. These pressures are now being passed into third-quarter zircon sand offers.

The increase comes as supply from major producers remains under scrutiny. Iluka produced 47,600t of heavy minerals in the first quarter, down sharply from 130,700t a year earlier.

Lower output from major suppliers can strengthen sellers’ pricing power, especially when buyers need consistent quality from established origins such as Australia and South Africa.

China’s import data also show a tighter year-on-year supply picture. Imports of zircon sand and concentrates fell by 18% in January-March to 498,703t.

March imports reached 156,526t, down 23% from a year earlier but up 30% from February. Australia, South Africa and Nigeria were the top suppliers during the month.

This mixed import pattern shows that Chinese buyers are still active, but overall availability has weakened compared with last year. That gives overseas miners more room to lift offers.

Chinese Domestic Prices Move Higher Ahead of New Contracts

Domestic Chinese zircon sand prices have also been rising since mid-March. Prices for 65% grade zircon sand reached 9,800-10,000 yuan/t ex-works with value-added tax unpaid.

This domestic increase reflects anticipation of higher third-quarter export offers from overseas mining companies. Zirconium-titanium beneficiation producers have already lifted offers in response.

The price movement matters for downstream users. Zircon sand is a key feedstock for ceramics, foundry applications, refractories, zirconium chemicals and specialty materials.

Higher zircon sand costs can squeeze processors if downstream demand does not fully absorb the increase. But if supply remains tight, buyers may have limited ability to resist higher offers.

For China, the market is increasingly dependent on imported material from Australia, South Africa and other producing countries. That import reliance makes domestic pricing sensitive to overseas mining costs, freight and output discipline.

The third-quarter pricing round will therefore be a key test. If Iluka follows Tronox with higher offers, Chinese processors may face a broader reset in zircon feedstock costs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tronox’s price increase shows that zircon sand is moving with the same logic affecting many industrial minerals: higher costs, tighter supply and stronger producer discipline. China’s processors may accept higher prices if major suppliers align, but downstream demand will decide how much of the increase can be passed through.

China Aluminium Flat-Rolled Products Review Tests EU Trade Defence Balance

Aluminium Ingots

China aluminium flat-rolled products are back under EU scrutiny after the European Commission opened a partial interim review of anti-dumping measures on selected imports. The review follows a request from PalNet, an air cargo products manufacturer that says specific aluminium sheets used in aviation cargo equipment cannot be sourced adequately outside China.

The case focuses on aluminium sheets made from 7000-series alloys. These materials are used to manufacture unit load devices, or ULDs, for the civil aviation and air cargo sectors. PalNet argues that these products must meet strict sector-specific requirements and are not currently produced in sufficient volumes within the EU or by alternative non-Chinese suppliers.

The review highlights a sensitive industrial policy issue for Europe. Anti-dumping duties are designed to protect domestic producers from unfairly priced imports. However, when specialised downstream manufacturers depend on materials that are not readily available inside the bloc, trade defence measures can create unintended supply-chain pressure.

Aviation Supply Chains Depend on Narrow Aluminium Specifications

The aluminium 7000-series sheets at the centre of the case serve a specialised market. ULD manufacturing requires lightweight, high-strength materials that can meet aviation and air cargo performance rules. These requirements narrow the list of qualified suppliers and make substitution difficult.

PalNet claims the existing EU anti-dumping duties on China aluminium flat-rolled products could threaten the survival of the only Union-based ULD manufacturer. That claim places the Commission in a difficult position. It must weigh upstream trade protection against downstream industrial continuity.

The issue is not simply about import prices. It is about whether Europe can maintain manufacturing capability in a niche aviation supply chain while also enforcing trade measures against Chinese aluminium products. If local supply is unavailable or insufficient, duties may raise costs without creating meaningful European replacement capacity.

EU Review Could Signal a More Targeted Approach to Aluminium Duties

The partial interim review could lead to a narrower interpretation of existing measures if the Commission accepts PalNet’s arguments. The investigation is expected to conclude within 12 months, giving EU authorities time to assess supply availability, technical requirements, and the economic impact on downstream users.

The case may also become a reference point for other sectors that rely on highly specific aluminium products. Europe imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese aluminium flat-rolled products in 2021, but industrial demand has become more complex as aviation, transport, defence, and energy-transition supply chains require specialised alloys.

For China aluminium flat-rolled products, the review does not signal a broad reversal of EU trade defence policy. Instead, it suggests Brussels may need more precise tools when a protected upstream category overlaps with materials that European manufacturers cannot source competitively or reliably elsewhere.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This review shows the limits of broad trade measures in specialised metal supply chains. Europe can protect aluminium producers, but it also needs enough flexibility to keep strategic downstream manufacturers alive.

EU EV Transition Faces Energy Cost and Trade Policy Pressure

EU energy

EU EV transition plans are facing growing pressure from high energy costs, tougher global competition and a regulatory model that industry leaders say may be weakening Europe’s automotive position. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car Summit warned that Europe must rethink how it competes with China and other industrial economies.

EU EV transition policy has relied heavily on regulation, including the planned 2035 phase-out of new internal combustion engine car sales. But carmakers and suppliers argue that regulation alone cannot deliver a competitive electric vehicle industry if energy prices, subsidies and supply-chain costs remain unfavourable.

EU EV transition challenges are becoming more visible as Chinese automakers gain share in Europe, southeast Asia and Latin America. Chinese producers have built cost-competitive EV platforms through subsidies, domestic competition, supply-chain control and fast industrial scaling.

The debate matters for metals because slower or more expensive electrification can reshape demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, aluminium and rare earth magnets. Automotive materials demand will still grow, but the path may become less direct and more exposed to policy choices.

China’s EV Scale Forces Europe to Rethink Trade Strategy

European automotive suppliers are calling for a more realistic approach to global competition. The industry is facing rivals that operate under different labour, subsidy and industrial policy conditions.

China has become one of the world’s strongest EV exporters. It accounted for around 40% of global EV exports in 2024, while leading Chinese brands have expanded aggressively with lower-cost, technology-rich vehicles.

This creates a competitive problem for European carmakers. Europe has focused on setting strict emissions targets, while China has focused on making EVs cheaper, scalable and export-ready.

Several industry executives now argue that collaboration may become unavoidable. Western manufacturers may need to partner with Chinese or other international competitors that already have a technological lead in EV platforms, batteries, software and power electronics.

This could change European supply chains. Rather than developing every technology internally, carmakers may increasingly combine European assembly and branding with externally sourced EV systems.

That strategy could support faster electrification, but it also creates dependence on imported components, battery materials and processed inputs. It may help automakers compete on cost, but it does not solve Europe’s strategic materials vulnerability.

Energy Costs Could Slow Consumer Adoption and Metals Demand

High charging and energy costs are another major barrier to Europe’s EV push. If consumers face much higher charging costs than drivers in China or other regions, the economic case for EV adoption weakens.

This is critical because EV demand is highly sensitive to total ownership cost. Batteries may become cheaper, but charging costs, highway tariffs and energy price volatility can still shape consumer decisions.

For battery metals, this matters directly. Slower EV adoption would reduce the speed of demand growth for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, especially in full battery electric vehicles with large battery packs.

Copper and aluminium remain better positioned across multiple automotive pathways. EVs require copper for wiring, motors, charging systems and power electronics, while aluminium supports lightweighting, battery enclosures and structural components.

However, Europe’s automotive metals demand will increasingly depend on which technology mix wins. Full BEVs support larger battery metals demand, while hybrids and lower-cost EV platforms could shift consumption toward smaller batteries, more electronics and continued use of conventional automotive materials.

The policy challenge is therefore industrial as much as environmental. Europe must reduce emissions while keeping manufacturing competitive, securing raw materials and lowering energy costs for consumers.

If Europe cannot align regulation, energy prices and trade strategy, its EV transition could become a market for imported vehicles rather than a platform for domestic industrial growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s EV problem is not only about regulation or consumer demand. It is about whether the region can build a cost-competitive industrial system around energy, materials, technology and trade before Chinese EV platforms define the market.

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

Indium Phosphide Exports Become China’s New Chokepoint in AI Data Centre Supply Chain

AI data centre

Indium phosphide exports have become a strategic pressure point in the global AI data centre supply chain as China’s licensing controls delay shipments of a material essential for high-speed optical chips. The restrictions are exposing a new vulnerability in AI infrastructure: the physical materials behind silicon photonics and optical interconnects.

The issue has moved quickly from a specialist semiconductor concern to a high-level trade and industrial policy problem. Coherent, a key optical components supplier backed by Nvidia, warned in early May that indium phosphide shortages were already affecting the market. Its chief executive then joined a US business delegation to China as companies sought relief from export licence delays.

Indium phosphide exports matter because AI data centres are moving beyond copper-based interconnects. As AI workloads grow, hyperscalers need faster, lower-latency and more energy-efficient data transmission between processors, accelerators, switches and optical modules. Indium phosphide is one of the core materials enabling that shift.

The material is used in high-speed optical chips, lasers, detectors and photonic components. These devices support the optical links that move huge volumes of data across AI clusters. Without reliable indium phosphide substrates and wafers, the expansion of advanced AI data centre networks could slow.

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that critical materials policy is becoming more granular. Beijing no longer needs to restrict only rare earths or finished technology products. It can also influence upstream compounds, substrates and wafers that determine whether advanced semiconductor supply chains can scale.

Export Controls Expose a Hidden Bottleneck in Silicon Photonics

Silicon photonics has become a critical technology for AI infrastructure because it allows data to move through light rather than electrical signals. This reduces energy use per bit and supports the bandwidth required by large AI systems.

But silicon photonics is not only a silicon story. The most advanced optical systems often require compound semiconductor materials such as indium phosphide, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride and germanium-based compounds. Indium phosphide is especially important for lasers and high-speed optical devices.

This creates a difficult supply chain problem. AI companies, hyperscalers and chipmakers are racing to scale optical modules, but one of the key substrate materials remains highly concentrated. China is the world’s largest indium producer, accounting for about 70% of global output in 2024.

That concentration became more serious after China introduced export restrictions on indium phosphide in February 2025. Since then, licence delays have created backlogs for companies that manufacture or source InP substrates from China.

AXT, one of the world’s largest indium phosphide substrate producers and a major supplier to Coherent, said export permits were its most significant challenge. The company manufactures most of its InP substrates in China and only received its first permits last June. It still faces a large order backlog.

The effect has spread beyond individual suppliers. Coherent, Lumentum, VPEC and LandMark Optoelectronics all sit inside the optical components ecosystem that depends on reliable substrate supply. When permit delays hit upstream InP material, the impact moves through wafers, chips, optical modules and AI data centre equipment.

Prices show the severity of the shortage. Since China introduced export restrictions, the average price of a 6-inch indium phosphide wafer has surged by 250% to about $5,000. That price increase reflects both physical scarcity and the strategic premium attached to non-disrupted supply.

The supply squeeze also comes at a time of aggressive photonics investment. Nvidia announced $2bn investments each in Coherent and Lumentum in March. Marvell Technology also moved into photonics through its acquisition of Celestial AI, reflecting stronger demand for optical technology in AI computing.

These investments show where the industry is heading. AI infrastructure needs optical interconnects to manage power, latency and bandwidth. But China’s indium phosphide controls mean that materials availability could become a gating factor for deployment.

Companies are trying to respond. Coherent plans to double its InP wafer capacity at its Texas plant this year and more than double it again by the end of 2027. US photonics firms are also seeking supply from non-Chinese producers such as Sumitomo Electric Industries.

However, capacity additions are slow. New substrate plants can take two to three years to bring online. Qualification cycles are also long because optical chipmakers cannot easily switch substrate suppliers without testing performance, reliability and consistency.

This makes the shortage difficult to solve quickly. Even if new capacity is announced, it may not arrive fast enough to meet near-term AI data centre demand. Meanwhile, many non-China producers already consume part of their own output internally, reducing the amount available to the broader market.

China’s Materials Chokepoint Strategy Strengthens Domestic Producers

China’s indium phosphide export controls are creating both pressure and opportunity. They restrict global supply, but they also support domestic Chinese substrate producers that are expanding capacity.

Yunnan Germanium, Guangdong Xiandao and Zhuhai Dingtai Xinyuan are among China’s leading domestic InP substrate players. Their role is becoming more important as Beijing uses materials controls to strengthen strategic leverage across semiconductor and AI supply chains.

Yunnan Germanium has already moved to expand. The company announced a 189mn yuan investment in April to raise production capacity to 450,000 single InP wafers annually. Its shipments of InP wafers rose by 74% in 2025, showing fast domestic market growth.

Guangdong Xiandao is also expanding through its subsidiary Guangdong Xianrui. The project is expected to produce 40 t/yr of indium phosphide crystals, which are used as raw material for substrates.

These investments fit a broader pattern. China is not only defending control over upstream critical materials. It is also building downstream processing capacity in higher-value compound semiconductor materials.

However, Chinese producers may not immediately solve the global shortage. Some are still seeking export approvals, and any overseas shipments may be limited. Domestic demand remains a priority, especially as China builds its own AI, optical communications and semiconductor ecosystem.

AXT

Supplier qualification creates another barrier. Companies such as Coherent and Lumentum are unlikely to switch easily from established suppliers. Coherent relies heavily on AXT, while Lumentum sources mainly from Sumitomo and JX Advanced Metals. New suppliers must pass demanding qualification cycles before they can enter critical optical chip supply chains.

This gives China’s export controls a long-lasting effect. Even if alternative suppliers exist, the market cannot instantly redirect demand. The bottleneck is not only production volume. It is qualified, high-quality, customer-approved substrate supply.

The strategic lesson is clear. AI supply chains are not only exposed to advanced chips, GPUs and packaging capacity. They also depend on a deep materials stack that includes indium, phosphorous chemistry, InP crystals, substrates, wafers, lasers, detectors and optical modules.

This is why indium phosphide exports have become so important. AI data centre buildouts need more optical links as clusters grow larger. Copper interconnects face limits in speed, distance and energy consumption. Photonics offers a solution, but only if the materials chain can scale.

For the US and its allies, the response will likely require more than emergency licence negotiations. It will require investment in indium recovery, InP crystal growth, substrate manufacturing, wafer capacity and long-term offtake agreements. It may also require strategic stockpiles for high-purity indium and compound semiconductor substrates.

The issue also strengthens the case for recycling and secondary recovery. Indium is often produced as a by-product, making primary supply difficult to expand quickly. Recovering indium from industrial scrap, displays, semiconductors and related waste streams could become more important if export controls persist.

For AI data centre developers, the risk is timing. Demand for optical modules is accelerating now, while new ex-China capacity may not fully arrive until 2027 or later. That mismatch could raise costs, delay deployments and intensify competition for qualified photonics suppliers.

The market may therefore see a split. Companies with secured InP supply will be better positioned to support hyperscaler demand. Companies exposed to licence delays, qualification bottlenecks or spot-market wafers may face higher costs and delivery risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that the AI race is becoming a materials race. The next bottleneck may not be only GPUs or power supply, but the compound semiconductor substrates needed to move data fast enough inside AI clusters.