Brazil ETS Calendar Sets Phased Path for Industrial Emissions Reporting

Brazil

Brazil ETS calendar proposals would bring heavy industry into the country’s emerging emissions trading system through phased reporting from 2027, 2029 and 2031. The finance ministry’s preliminary schedule is designed to give companies more visibility before mandatory emissions limits are applied.

Brazil ETS calendar plans would first cover paper and cellulose, ferrous metals and steel, cement, primary aluminum, oil and gas exploration and production, refining and air transport. These sectors sit at the centre of Brazil’s industrial emissions base.

Brazil ETS calendar development is strategically important for metals producers because steel, aluminum and mining will face rising scrutiny over carbon intensity. The system could gradually reshape investment decisions, energy sourcing and competitiveness.

Brazil’s emissions trading system, known as SBCE, is expected to be regulated by the end of this year. The government plans to launch a public consultation in July.

Steel and Primary Aluminum Enter the First Phase

The first phase places steel and primary aluminum among the earliest industrial sectors to report emissions. This is important because both industries are energy-intensive and increasingly exposed to carbon-related trade and customer requirements.

For steelmakers, emissions reporting will create a clearer baseline for future decarbonization planning. Companies will need to measure process emissions, energy use and operating practices before sector limits are introduced.

Primary aluminum producers will face similar pressure. Aluminum’s carbon footprint depends heavily on power source, smelting efficiency and upstream alumina supply.

The proposed structure gives companies time to prepare. Each phase would last four years, beginning with emissions monitoring before setting total emissions limits for each sector.

Reductions would remain non-mandatory during the initial phases. This lowers immediate compliance pressure, but still pushes companies to build emissions data systems and prepare for future regulation.

Mining and Recycled Aluminum Follow in Second Phase

The second phase would add mining, recycled aluminum, electricity, glass, food and beverages, chemicals, ceramics and waste. This expands the ETS from core heavy emitters into broader industrial supply chains.

Mining’s inclusion matters because Brazil is a major supplier of iron ore, bauxite, manganese, nickel, lithium and other critical minerals. Emissions reporting could become part of how mineral exports are assessed by customers and financiers.

Recycled aluminum entering the second phase also matters. Secondary aluminum usually carries a lower carbon profile than primary metal, but reporting requirements may still shape scrap processing, remelting efficiency and product certification.

Electricity’s inclusion is also critical. Power-sector emissions influence the carbon footprint of metals, chemicals and downstream manufacturing.

The third phase would cover road, waterways and rail transport. That could eventually affect logistics costs and emissions accounting across mineral exports, domestic freight and industrial supply chains.

The finance ministry said the proposal aims to create predictability for a gradual transition to decarbonization. That predictability will be essential if Brazil wants industry to invest before binding limits arrive.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil’s ETS proposal is not yet a hard cap on industry, but it is the start of carbon accounting discipline. For metals and mining companies, early preparation could become a competitive advantage once customers and regulators begin pricing emissions more directly.

Global Recycled Metals Output Rises as China and Emerging Regions Expand Capacity

Recycled Metals

Global recycled metals output increased further in 2025 as China maintained its leading position and emerging regions expanded recycling capacity. Production of recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc reached about 59.2mn t, up 5.6% from a year earlier.

Global recycled metals output is becoming more important to non-ferrous supply security as mining, processing and trade flows face rising geopolitical and cost pressures. Recycling now provides a larger secondary source of industrial metal units for manufacturers, smelters and battery supply chains.

Global recycled metals output accounted for around 34% of total non-ferrous metal production in 2025. The sector also delivered cumulative savings of about 1.2bn t of primary mineral resources, underlining its growing role in resource conservation.

The growth shows that recycled metals are no longer a secondary environmental story. They are becoming a core part of industrial raw material strategy across copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and battery metals.

China Leads as Regional Recycling Capacity Expands

China remained the world’s largest recycled base metals producer in 2025, with output of 20.57mn t. That represented 34.7% of global production.

The country’s scale gives it a major role in recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc supply. It also strengthens China’s position across non-ferrous metals at a time when primary raw material security is under pressure.

Europe produced more than 10mn t of recycled base metals, while the US produced more than 6mn t. India and southeast Asia reached around 6mn t and 4mn t, respectively.

These figures show that recycling capacity is becoming more geographically distributed. Emerging regions are no longer only consumers of recycled raw materials. They are becoming processing centres in their own right.

Battery-related recycling is also growing quickly. Nickel, cobalt and lithium recovery is supporting the new energy industry as electric vehicle and energy storage supply chains look for more secure material sources.

China aims to increase domestic recycled material recovery to 23mn t by 2030 under its next five-year plan. That target implies annual growth of around 7%.

The country is also expected to strengthen recycled product certification and explore the inclusion of recycled materials in carbon trading systems. This could make recycled metal more valuable for customers seeking traceable and lower-carbon supply.

Trade Flows and Technology Move Toward Asia

Global recycled raw material trade is becoming more regional, more Asia-focused and more diversified. Europe and North America remain major exporters of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock.

Europe exports around 2mn t/yr of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock, while North America exports about 4.2mn t/yr. China and India remain the largest importers, with imports exceeding 4mn t and 2mn t, respectively.

Southeast Asia is becoming a key transshipment hub. Regional recycled aluminium feedstock trade reached about 1.3mn t of imports and 900,000t of exports.

Black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries is also increasingly moving toward Asian processing centres. This reflects Asia’s stronger battery materials processing base and growing demand for recovered nickel, cobalt and lithium units.

Technology is improving the recycling value chain. Advances in laser sorting, intelligent dismantling, multi-metal battery recovery and digital process control are raising recovery rates and product quality.

Leading producers have achieved recycling rates above 94% for aluminium and 95% for lithium. These levels show how recycling is moving closer to industrial-grade resource recovery rather than simple scrap handling.

New products are also expanding. High-strength recycled aluminium alloys, high-purity recycled copper and recycled rare-earth permanent magnets are gaining traction.

This matters because recycled metal must meet customer specifications before it can displace primary material. Better sorting, cleaner chemistry and stronger certification will determine how much recycled metal can enter high-value applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Recycling is becoming a strategic metals supply pillar, not just a sustainability tool. The next competitive edge will come from producers that can turn complex scrap and battery waste into certified, high-purity and customer-ready materials.

China Rare Earth Mining Regulations Tighten as Beijing Targets Illegal Supply

China Rare Earth Mining

China rare earth mining regulations are set to become more detailed as Beijing moves to strengthen control over mining, smelting, recycling and trading activity. The industry and information technology ministry has released a draft plan that would impose administrative penalties of up to 5mn yuan for violations.

China rare earth mining regulations already place rare earth production under a state quota system. The latest proposal would clarify penalty levels for companies that mine, smelt, process or trade rare earth materials outside approved channels.

China rare earth mining regulations are strategically important because China remains dominant across global rare earth mining, separation, metal production and magnet supply. Stronger enforcement could tighten unofficial supply and improve state oversight of material flows.

The draft plan released on 28 April sets clearer benchmarks for discretionary penalties. It is aimed at illegal mining, unauthorised smelting, quota breaches, unapproved feedstock use and failures in reporting or traceability.

Quota Enforcement Extends Across Mining, Smelting and Recycling

The draft plan targets enterprises that produce rare earth products beyond state-allocated mining quotas. Companies that conduct smelting without approved quotas would also face fines.

The rules would also cover comprehensive recycling firms that use rare earth ore as feedstock without authorisation. This is important because recycling and secondary processing can become loopholes if ore origin and flow reporting are weak.

Companies that buy, process or sell illegally produced rare earth ore or smelting products would also be penalised. This widens enforcement from producers to the broader trading and processing chain.

Firms that fail to comply with rare earth flow reporting and traceability requirements would face penalties. Companies that refuse or obstruct government supervision and inspection would also be targeted.

This shows that Beijing is not only regulating output volumes. It is building a more detailed control system around material origin, movement, processing rights and end-market access.

Rare earth traceability is becoming more important because these materials are strategic inputs for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace, electronics and high-end manufacturing.

The policy also strengthens China’s ability to monitor both primary and secondary supply. That matters as rare earth scrap recycling grows and as downstream magnet demand continues to increase.

State Control Reinforces China’s Strategic Rare Earth Position

China has tightened control over rare earth resources for more than a decade. The sector has been consolidated under several large state-owned groups to reduce illegal mining, improve environmental oversight and strengthen industrial coordination.

The State Council issued comprehensive rare earth regulations on 29 June 2024 covering mining, smelting, processing, recycling, trading and imports and exports. Those rules took effect on 1 October 2024, but did not define detailed penalty levels.

The latest draft fills that gap. It turns broad regulatory control into a more enforceable administrative system with clearer financial consequences.

China’s two major rare earth groups, Northern Rare Earth and China Rare Earth, now control domestic resources after China Rare Earth consolidated Xiamen Tungsten and Guangdong Rare Earth. Mining, smelting and separation quotas are allocated only to these groups and their affiliates.

Private firms and individuals are prohibited from processing rare earths. This gives Beijing a high level of control over domestic supply channels and industrial output.

From 2025, China also included imported rare earth ore in its quota system. This expanded oversight beyond domestic mining and gave the government more control over imported feedstock entering Chinese smelting and separation plants.

The move is strategically significant. China is treating rare earths as controlled industrial resources rather than ordinary commodities. Production discipline, traceability and export controls are now part of the same policy framework.

For global buyers, tighter regulation could reduce illegal or informal supply flows. It may also increase dependence on approved producers and make rare earth availability more closely tied to Chinese quota and export policy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s rare earth enforcement push shows that Beijing wants full visibility over every stage of the value chain. For western buyers, the risk is clear: rare earth supply is becoming more regulated, more traceable and more politically controlled at the source.

Hailiang Saudi Copper JV Targets Middle East Processing Growth

Rawas

Hailiang Saudi copper JV plans will give Chinese copper products producer Zhejiang Hailiang a new manufacturing platform in Saudi Arabia. The company plans to form a joint venture with Saudi investment firm Rawas to build a $566mn copper processing plant at the port of Dammam.

The Hailiang Saudi copper JV is planned with 150,000 t/yr of copper processing capacity. The plant will include copper pipes, copper bars, recycled copper and copper foil, giving the project a broad downstream product mix.

The agreement gives Hailiang a 51% stake in the venture, while Rawas will hold 49%. The project still requires approval from the Saudi government and Hailiang’s shareholders before the partners finalise the investment.

The Hailiang Saudi copper JV reflects a wider shift in the copper products industry. Chinese processors are increasingly looking overseas to secure market access, reduce trade exposure and position closer to growth regions in the Middle East, Europe and Africa.

Dammam Plant Adds Copper Foil and Recycling Capacity

The planned Dammam plant will include 30,000 t/yr of copper pipe capacity and 20,000 t/yr of copper bar capacity. These products support construction, cooling systems, power infrastructure, industrial equipment and manufacturing supply chains.

The project also includes 50,000 t/yr of recycled copper capacity. This is strategically important because copper scrap is becoming a more valuable feedstock as concentrate markets tighten and buyers seek lower-carbon copper units.

The planned 50,000 t/yr of copper foil capacity adds a higher-value growth angle. Copper foil is used in batteries, electronics, printed circuit boards and advanced electrical applications. That gives the project relevance beyond traditional copper tube and bar markets.

The product mix suggests Hailiang is not only targeting commodity copper processing. It is building a downstream platform that can serve infrastructure, energy, electronics and battery-related demand from one regional base.

Dammam also offers logistical value. A port location can support raw material imports, finished product exports and access to Gulf, African and European customers. This could help Hailiang build a wider regional distribution network.

Saudi Arabia Gains Value-Added Copper Manufacturing Role

Hailiang said it aims to capitalise on Saudi Arabia’s copper ore resources, energy cost advantages and policy environment. These factors align with Saudi Arabia’s wider ambition to expand industrial manufacturing and mineral value chains.

For Saudi Arabia, the project could support a shift from resource availability toward value-added processing. Copper products are increasingly important for grids, buildings, cooling systems, EV infrastructure, renewable energy and industrial electrification.

The inclusion of recycled copper also fits the growing importance of circular metal supply. If Saudi Arabia can combine scrap collection, energy advantages and downstream manufacturing, it could strengthen its role in regional copper supply chains.

However, the project faces uncertainty. Hailiang said it is closely monitoring Middle East developments and their potential impact on site selection, construction progress, personnel safety and future operations.

The construction timeline has not yet been fixed. The partners will determine the schedule according to market conditions after the joint-venture agreement receives the required approvals.

This cautious approach is important. Middle East industrial projects can offer strong energy and logistics advantages, but geopolitical risk, financing timing, permitting and supply-chain security can still affect execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hailiang’s Saudi venture shows how Chinese copper processors are internationalising downstream capacity, not only exporting products. The project’s real value lies in combining copper foil, recycling and regional market access inside Saudi Arabia’s industrial diversification strategy.

Indium Phosphide Exports Become China’s New Chokepoint in AI Data Centre Supply Chain

AI data centre

Indium phosphide exports have become a strategic pressure point in the global AI data centre supply chain as China’s licensing controls delay shipments of a material essential for high-speed optical chips. The restrictions are exposing a new vulnerability in AI infrastructure: the physical materials behind silicon photonics and optical interconnects.

The issue has moved quickly from a specialist semiconductor concern to a high-level trade and industrial policy problem. Coherent, a key optical components supplier backed by Nvidia, warned in early May that indium phosphide shortages were already affecting the market. Its chief executive then joined a US business delegation to China as companies sought relief from export licence delays.

Indium phosphide exports matter because AI data centres are moving beyond copper-based interconnects. As AI workloads grow, hyperscalers need faster, lower-latency and more energy-efficient data transmission between processors, accelerators, switches and optical modules. Indium phosphide is one of the core materials enabling that shift.

The material is used in high-speed optical chips, lasers, detectors and photonic components. These devices support the optical links that move huge volumes of data across AI clusters. Without reliable indium phosphide substrates and wafers, the expansion of advanced AI data centre networks could slow.

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that critical materials policy is becoming more granular. Beijing no longer needs to restrict only rare earths or finished technology products. It can also influence upstream compounds, substrates and wafers that determine whether advanced semiconductor supply chains can scale.

Export Controls Expose a Hidden Bottleneck in Silicon Photonics

Silicon photonics has become a critical technology for AI infrastructure because it allows data to move through light rather than electrical signals. This reduces energy use per bit and supports the bandwidth required by large AI systems.

But silicon photonics is not only a silicon story. The most advanced optical systems often require compound semiconductor materials such as indium phosphide, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride and germanium-based compounds. Indium phosphide is especially important for lasers and high-speed optical devices.

This creates a difficult supply chain problem. AI companies, hyperscalers and chipmakers are racing to scale optical modules, but one of the key substrate materials remains highly concentrated. China is the world’s largest indium producer, accounting for about 70% of global output in 2024.

That concentration became more serious after China introduced export restrictions on indium phosphide in February 2025. Since then, licence delays have created backlogs for companies that manufacture or source InP substrates from China.

AXT, one of the world’s largest indium phosphide substrate producers and a major supplier to Coherent, said export permits were its most significant challenge. The company manufactures most of its InP substrates in China and only received its first permits last June. It still faces a large order backlog.

The effect has spread beyond individual suppliers. Coherent, Lumentum, VPEC and LandMark Optoelectronics all sit inside the optical components ecosystem that depends on reliable substrate supply. When permit delays hit upstream InP material, the impact moves through wafers, chips, optical modules and AI data centre equipment.

Prices show the severity of the shortage. Since China introduced export restrictions, the average price of a 6-inch indium phosphide wafer has surged by 250% to about $5,000. That price increase reflects both physical scarcity and the strategic premium attached to non-disrupted supply.

The supply squeeze also comes at a time of aggressive photonics investment. Nvidia announced $2bn investments each in Coherent and Lumentum in March. Marvell Technology also moved into photonics through its acquisition of Celestial AI, reflecting stronger demand for optical technology in AI computing.

These investments show where the industry is heading. AI infrastructure needs optical interconnects to manage power, latency and bandwidth. But China’s indium phosphide controls mean that materials availability could become a gating factor for deployment.

Companies are trying to respond. Coherent plans to double its InP wafer capacity at its Texas plant this year and more than double it again by the end of 2027. US photonics firms are also seeking supply from non-Chinese producers such as Sumitomo Electric Industries.

However, capacity additions are slow. New substrate plants can take two to three years to bring online. Qualification cycles are also long because optical chipmakers cannot easily switch substrate suppliers without testing performance, reliability and consistency.

This makes the shortage difficult to solve quickly. Even if new capacity is announced, it may not arrive fast enough to meet near-term AI data centre demand. Meanwhile, many non-China producers already consume part of their own output internally, reducing the amount available to the broader market.

China’s Materials Chokepoint Strategy Strengthens Domestic Producers

China’s indium phosphide export controls are creating both pressure and opportunity. They restrict global supply, but they also support domestic Chinese substrate producers that are expanding capacity.

Yunnan Germanium, Guangdong Xiandao and Zhuhai Dingtai Xinyuan are among China’s leading domestic InP substrate players. Their role is becoming more important as Beijing uses materials controls to strengthen strategic leverage across semiconductor and AI supply chains.

Yunnan Germanium has already moved to expand. The company announced a 189mn yuan investment in April to raise production capacity to 450,000 single InP wafers annually. Its shipments of InP wafers rose by 74% in 2025, showing fast domestic market growth.

Guangdong Xiandao is also expanding through its subsidiary Guangdong Xianrui. The project is expected to produce 40 t/yr of indium phosphide crystals, which are used as raw material for substrates.

These investments fit a broader pattern. China is not only defending control over upstream critical materials. It is also building downstream processing capacity in higher-value compound semiconductor materials.

However, Chinese producers may not immediately solve the global shortage. Some are still seeking export approvals, and any overseas shipments may be limited. Domestic demand remains a priority, especially as China builds its own AI, optical communications and semiconductor ecosystem.

AXT

Supplier qualification creates another barrier. Companies such as Coherent and Lumentum are unlikely to switch easily from established suppliers. Coherent relies heavily on AXT, while Lumentum sources mainly from Sumitomo and JX Advanced Metals. New suppliers must pass demanding qualification cycles before they can enter critical optical chip supply chains.

This gives China’s export controls a long-lasting effect. Even if alternative suppliers exist, the market cannot instantly redirect demand. The bottleneck is not only production volume. It is qualified, high-quality, customer-approved substrate supply.

The strategic lesson is clear. AI supply chains are not only exposed to advanced chips, GPUs and packaging capacity. They also depend on a deep materials stack that includes indium, phosphorous chemistry, InP crystals, substrates, wafers, lasers, detectors and optical modules.

This is why indium phosphide exports have become so important. AI data centre buildouts need more optical links as clusters grow larger. Copper interconnects face limits in speed, distance and energy consumption. Photonics offers a solution, but only if the materials chain can scale.

For the US and its allies, the response will likely require more than emergency licence negotiations. It will require investment in indium recovery, InP crystal growth, substrate manufacturing, wafer capacity and long-term offtake agreements. It may also require strategic stockpiles for high-purity indium and compound semiconductor substrates.

The issue also strengthens the case for recycling and secondary recovery. Indium is often produced as a by-product, making primary supply difficult to expand quickly. Recovering indium from industrial scrap, displays, semiconductors and related waste streams could become more important if export controls persist.

For AI data centre developers, the risk is timing. Demand for optical modules is accelerating now, while new ex-China capacity may not fully arrive until 2027 or later. That mismatch could raise costs, delay deployments and intensify competition for qualified photonics suppliers.

The market may therefore see a split. Companies with secured InP supply will be better positioned to support hyperscaler demand. Companies exposed to licence delays, qualification bottlenecks or spot-market wafers may face higher costs and delivery risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that the AI race is becoming a materials race. The next bottleneck may not be only GPUs or power supply, but the compound semiconductor substrates needed to move data fast enough inside AI clusters.

High-Purity Iron Plant Targets US Rare Earth Magnet Supply Gap

Hertha Metals

High-purity iron is emerging as a hidden bottleneck in the US rare earth magnet supply chain as new defense sourcing rules approach. Houston-based Hertha Metals plans to build a 10,000 t/yr plant in Texas to produce high-purity iron used in neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets.

The project targets a less visible vulnerability in magnet manufacturing. US policy has focused heavily on rare earth elements such as neodymium and praseodymium, but NdFeB magnets also require high-purity iron. Hertha Metals says about 90% of this material is currently produced in China.

The timing is strategically important. Updated Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations are set to take effect on 1 January 2027, restricting Chinese-origin rare earth magnets and constituent materials in covered US defense systems. That rule could force defense contractors, magnet makers and upstream material suppliers to rebuild supply chains around non-China sources.

Hertha Metals plans to break ground later this summer. The company says its Texas plant will become the first domestic producer of high-purity iron for this application, positioning the project at the intersection of magnet security, steelmaking technology and US industrial policy.

DFARS Rules Put Magnet Inputs Under Supply Chain Pressure

The 2027 DFARS deadline changes the strategic value of upstream magnet materials. Compliance will not depend only on where final magnets are assembled. It will also depend on the origin of constituent materials used in defense-related systems.

This creates a direct opportunity for domestic high-purity iron. NdFeB magnets require neodymium, praseodymium and often dysprosium or terbium for performance, but iron remains the major base component. If high-purity iron remains China-dependent, US magnet supply chains could still face compliance risk even if rare earth oxides or metals are sourced elsewhere.

Hertha Metals is trying to address that gap with its FLEXHERS process, short for flexible fuel hydrogen electric reduction smelting. The process combines electric arc furnace technology with natural gas or hydrogen to produce iron and steel.

The company says the technology can use lower-grade ores and iron ore fines that are difficult to process economically through conventional blast furnace routes. This could widen the domestic feedstock base and reduce dependence on imported high-purity iron.

Hertha currently operates a one-tonne-per-day demonstration plant in Conroe, Texas. It describes the site as the largest demonstration-scale single-step steelmaking facility in the US. Ore is sourced domestically from Minnesota, and the pilot facility is already producing material that meets customer specifications.

The planned high-purity iron facility will also produce trial steel products. Hertha sees the project as a stepping stone toward broader iron and steelmaking capacity, with a target of reaching roughly 500,000 t/yr of production within four to five years.

Cost competitiveness will be critical. Hertha says it does not plan to rely on a domestic supply premium. Instead, it aims to compete economically by replacing metallurgical coal with natural gas and electricity while using lower-cost ore feedstocks.

This claim matters because strategic materials projects often struggle when policy support is stronger than market economics. If Hertha can produce competitively without relying on premium pricing, the company could build a more durable position in both defense and commercial supply chains.

Hertha Metals CEO Laureen Meroueh

Domestic Iron Production Links Magnets, Electrical Steel and Clean Manufacturing

High-purity iron has strategic importance beyond NdFeB magnets. The material can also support electrical steel used in transformers, electric vehicle motors and other electromagnetic applications. These sectors are becoming more important as grid investment, electrification and domestic manufacturing policy expand.

The project also fits a wider shift in iron and steel markets. Traditional blast furnace production depends heavily on metallurgical coal and higher-emission processing routes. Meanwhile, demand for higher-grade iron inputs suitable for lower-carbon steelmaking is expected to rise as producers shift toward cleaner technologies.

Hertha’s process aims to sit inside that transition. By using electricity, natural gas or hydrogen, the company is positioning FLEXHERS as a lower-carbon alternative to legacy ironmaking. The ability to process lower-grade ore and fines could also help revive domestic iron production without requiring only premium feedstocks.

The US steel industry has increasingly focused on scrap-fed electric arc furnaces. That model supports recycling and lower emissions, but it does not fully solve domestic iron supply for high-purity applications. Magnets, electrical steel and advanced components often need controlled chemistry that scrap alone cannot easily provide.

This is where Hertha’s strategy becomes industrially relevant. The company is not only proposing another steel plant. It is targeting a specific materials gap between critical minerals policy, rare earth magnet manufacturing and advanced steelmaking.

Competition from subsidized overseas producers remains a risk. Hertha says it can compete on cost, but Chinese industrial support and below-cost exports could still challenge domestic producers. This is why policy, procurement rules and long-term customer commitments may become important even if the production technology works.

The company has not disclosed financing details, future fundraising plans or offtake agreements. That leaves open questions about capital structure, customer readiness and the pace of commercial scale-up. However, the 2027 DFARS deadline gives the project a clear market catalyst.

The broader implication is that rare earth magnet supply security cannot be solved by rare earth mining alone. The full chain includes ore, separation, metal conversion, alloying, magnet manufacturing and supporting inputs such as high-purity iron. Any weak link can create dependence.

Hertha Metals is betting that the next phase of US critical materials policy will recognise that reality. If the company can scale production, secure customers and maintain cost discipline, high-purity iron could become a small but essential piece of the domestic magnet supply chain.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hertha Metals highlights a critical point often missed in rare earth policy: magnet security depends on more than rare earths. High-purity iron, electrical steel and alloy inputs will become strategic materials if US defense and electrification supply chains must move away from China.

Sofia Med Copper Fabricator Secures EBRD Loan to Raise Recycled Metal Use

Sofia Med

Sofia Med copper fabricator has secured a €20 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to increase recycled metal use and reduce water waste at its Bulgarian operations. The financing supports Europe’s wider effort to strengthen domestic copper processing and improve resource efficiency.

The loan is also notable because it is the first EBRD financing in Bulgaria that allows the borrower to pay a lower interest rate if it meets green targets. These targets are linked to recycling and water efficiency, making the facility’s environmental performance part of its financing cost.

Sofia Med copper fabricator is owned by Greek metals group Viohalco and operates downstream rolling and extrusion lines. The company processes refined copper into tubes, sheets and profiles for industrial users.

Recycled Copper Becomes Strategic for European Fabricators

European copper fabricators are increasingly important because they sit close to final industrial demand. They convert refined copper and scrap into semi-finished products used in construction, power equipment, manufacturing, heating systems and infrastructure.

Sofia Med can raise the share of secondary metal in its feedstock if suitable scrap is available. This matters because recycled copper can reduce emissions, lower dependence on primary metal and support Europe’s circular economy goals.

However, Europe still exports large volumes of copper scrap. This limits local availability for refiners and fabricators, creating a policy challenge as Brussels tries to retain more strategic raw materials inside the region.

Brussels Pushes to Keep Copper Scrap in Europe

The loan comes as Brussels considers tighter export rules under its RESourceEU plan. The aim is to protect local supply of recyclable materials and support European processing capacity.

The EBRD and European Investment Bank are also backing projects across the copper value chain. Aurubis secured a €200 million EIB loan last September to expand its Pirdop tankhouse, showing that European institutions are targeting both refining and downstream fabrication.

The €20 million loan for Sofia Med is still only a limited part of the upgrades the site may need. Its impact will depend on how much copper scrap the company can secure and how quickly it can reduce water waste.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sofia Med’s loan shows that recycled copper is becoming part of Europe’s industrial security agenda. The next challenge is not only financing upgrades, but keeping enough copper scrap inside Europe to feed refiners and fabricators.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Fell to 2009 Low After Russian Ban

Ferro-Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports fell to their lowest level since 2009 in 2025 after sanctions blocked Russian material from entering the bloc directly or through Baltic transit routes. EU countries imported 30,171t of ferro-titanium last year, down 36% from 47,296t in 2024.

The sharp decline showed how deeply the European ferro-titanium market had depended on Russian supply and Baltic logistics. Estonia, Poland, and Latvia together accounted for 12,830t of EU supply, but the structure of that supply changed significantly once Russian-origin ferro-titanium was barred.

EU ferro-titanium imports from Estonia halved on the year to 6,384t. The decline suggests that Estonian flows now more closely reflect local production rather than Russian material transiting through the country.

Sanctions Shifted Supply Toward Estonia, Poland and India

Estonia remained the EU’s largest ferro-titanium supplier in 2025, while Poland became the second-largest intra-EU source. Polish shipments rose by a quarter to 3,834t, showing that European buyers were turning more heavily to regional producers after the Russian ban.

Imports from the UK fell 27% to 3,468t after the closure of TiVac last summer. Most of TiVac’s former volumes are expected to shift to Estonia, where FE Mottram is scaling up operations in Ahtme, while Transition Metals continues to operate in the UK.

India became a larger alternative supplier as exports to the EU rose 171% to 2,310t. Turkey’s shipments also surged to 1,000t, although these flows remain unclear because Turkey is not a known ferro-titanium producer.

Russian ferro-titanium imports fell to just 463t in 2025 after full implementation of EU sanctions on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. Russian exports largely moved to Asia, with Chinese imports from Russia reaching a record 6,381t last year.

Russian Scrap Flows Rose Before Late-Year Slowdown

Titanium scrap became a temporary workaround because Russian titanium scrap was not covered by EU sanctions. EU imports of Russian scrap doubled to 2,517t in 2025, with 2,406t entering Estonia.

Estonia then re-exported 2,277t of titanium scrap last year, showing how scrap flows supported the regional ferro-titanium supply chain after the ban on Russian ferro-alloys. However, this trade also weakened sharply toward year-end, with EU imports falling to 36t in December and 37t in January 2026.

European ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.98-5.33/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in 2025, down 28% from 2024. Weak steel mill consumption kept prices under pressure for most of the year.

The market later rebounded from multi-year lows in December. Supply concerns linked to Latvian producer LLR-Ecotech first supported the recovery, before higher scrap costs allowed other producers to raise offers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU ferro-titanium market is now being rebuilt around sanctions compliance, regional production, and scrap availability. The Russian ban reduced headline imports, but it also exposed Europe’s dependence on flexible titanium scrap flows and a small group of regional producers.

India Aluminium BIS Certification Raises Quality Bar for Domestic Supply

BIS

India aluminium BIS certification is becoming a formal market requirement as the government enforces the aluminium and aluminium alloy products Quality Control Order 2026. The order mandates Bureau of Indian Standards certification for a wide range of aluminium products sold in the domestic market.

The regulation took effect on 11 March 2026 and replaces the earlier 2025 order. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry introduced the measure to improve product quality, strengthen consumer safety, and standardise aluminium products across India’s industrial supply chain.

India aluminium BIS certification will apply to products such as rods, bars, sheets, and composite panels. These materials are used across infrastructure, engineering, electrical equipment, packaging, aerospace, and household applications, making the order significant for both producers and downstream manufacturers.

Aluminium Producers Face New Compliance Timelines

Manufacturers must now secure a valid BIS licence before selling covered aluminium products in India. Certification will follow Scheme-I of Schedule II under the BIS regulations, 2018, which requires compliance with relevant Indian Standards and testing procedures.

The government has introduced phased deadlines to reduce disruption across different enterprise sizes. Critical aluminium products face immediate compliance, while general engineering aluminium products will follow a staggered schedule.

Large enterprises must comply by 1 December 2026. Small enterprises will have until 1 March 2027, while micro enterprises must comply by 1 June 2027. This phased structure gives smaller manufacturers more time to adapt their testing, documentation, and quality control systems.

Quality Control Order Reshapes India’s Aluminium Market

India aluminium BIS certification will likely raise the entry barrier for low-quality or inconsistent aluminium products. This could support more disciplined domestic production and reduce the circulation of non-standard material in key industrial sectors.

The order also has trade and procurement implications. Importers and domestic suppliers will need to align product specifications with Indian Standards before selling into the local market. However, exemptions remain for exports and research activities.

The R&D exemption allows up to 200kg of annual imports without BIS certification, provided the material is not sold and is later disposed of as scrap. This gives laboratories, universities, and product development teams limited flexibility while keeping commercial sales under the certification framework.

For India’s aluminium industry, the order signals a stronger policy focus on quality, traceability, and industrial standardisation. As demand grows from infrastructure, power equipment, packaging, aerospace, and manufacturing, certified aluminium supply will become more important for competitiveness and reliability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India’s aluminium Quality Control Order is not just a standards update. It is a market-filtering mechanism that could reward compliant producers and pressure weaker suppliers out of higher-value industrial channels.

Global Refined Copper Surplus Expands as Smelter Output Outpaces Demand

Copper

Global refined copper surplus widened sharply in 2025 as refined production grew faster than consumption despite persistent mine disruptions. The International Copper Study Group reported a preliminary surplus of 380,000t, up from 69,000t in 2024, signaling a looser refined market balance than many copper buyers expected.

The global refined copper surplus reached 437,000t after adjusting for estimated changes in Chinese bonded stocks. This reflected strong refined production growth, particularly in China and the Democratic Republic of Congo, even as mine supply growth remained constrained by operational incidents, lower grades, and major disruptions at key assets.

World refined copper production rose by 4.2pc to 28.54mn t in 2025. Primary output increased by 3.9pc, while secondary production from scrap rose by 5.8pc. The expansion shows that smelting, refining, and recycling capacity can continue lifting refined supply even when mine growth remains limited.

China and the DRC Drive Refined Copper Output Growth

China and the DRC were the main drivers of refined copper production growth in 2025. Together, they account for around 57pc of global refined output and recorded combined growth of about 9pc. Excluding these two countries, world refined production fell by around 1.8pc, showing how concentrated refined copper growth has become.

Asia outside China faced weaker production. Output fell by 3.7pc as maintenance shutdowns in Japan reduced the country’s production by 8.2pc and the Pasar refinery in the Philippines closed. Indonesia added new capacity through the Amman and Manyar smelters, but operational issues and disruptions linked to Grasberg limited the impact.

Chile also weighed on refined supply outside the main growth centres. Refined copper production fell by 10pc, with electrolytic output from concentrates down 16pc amid maintenance shutdowns. SX-EW production also declined by 6.8pc, reinforcing the pressure on one of the world’s most important copper-producing countries.

Mine Disruptions Keep Supply Risk Alive Despite Higher Inventories

Mine production increased by only around 1pc to 23.13mn t in 2025. Concentrate output was broadly flat, while SX-EW output rose by 3pc. New projects supported growth, but lower grades and operational disruptions prevented a stronger mine-side recovery.

Major incidents at Kamoa and Grasberg were especially important. Kamoa’s output fell after a seismic incident, while Indonesian mine production dropped by around 43pc because of lower Batu Hijau output, Grasberg maintenance, and the mud rush incident at Grasberg. These events show why copper supply risk remains high even when refined inventories are rising.

Consumption also grew, but not fast enough to absorb new refined supply. World apparent refined copper usage rose by about 3pc to 28.16mn t. Chinese apparent demand increased by around 4pc, but net refined imports fell by 15pc as imports declined and exports jumped. Outside China, growth in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and north Africa offset weakness in the EU and Japan.

The global refined copper surplus became more visible late in the year. December refined production reached 2.43mn t, while usage was 2.26mn t, creating a monthly surplus of 173,000t. Global refined stocks rose to 1.776mn t at year-end, while exchange stocks at the LME, Comex, and SHFE reached 933,641t at the end of January 2026, the highest level since September 2003.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The global refined copper surplus does not remove copper’s long-term supply challenge, but it changes the near-term market psychology. Copper now faces a split reality: refined metal looks looser, while mine disruptions still threaten the concentrate pipeline behind future supply.

Acute Tungsten Shortage Drives Record Prices Across Global Supply Chains

Tungsten

The acute tungsten shortage is pushing global tungsten prices to record highs in 2026. Supply remains extremely tight across concentrate, APT, and downstream products. Low inventories and restricted Chinese export licences are worsening the squeeze. As a result, the acute tungsten shortage is becoming one of the most severe specialty metals disruptions in the market.

The current problem starts at the raw material level. Global production of tungsten concentrates has declined, while available western supply remains far below demand. Market participants now describe an estimated shortfall of around 13,000t of contained tungsten in the western market. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is no longer a regional issue. It is a structural supply crisis.

Pricing shows how quickly the market has tightened. Tungsten concentrate prices in Rotterdam surged to record levels in late January. European APT prices also climbed sharply as concentrate costs and export restrictions combined. Consequently, global tungsten prices are rising across the entire value chain.

Chinese Supply Constraints Are Tightening the Tungsten Concentrate Shortage

Chinese supply constraints remain the core driver of the tungsten concentrate shortage. China produces about 80pc of global tungsten supply and still dominates export availability. However, domestic ore shortages have intensified after mine shutdowns and weak new project development. Meanwhile, China’s 2025 mining quota fell from the previous year.

Trade data reinforces that tightening pattern. Chinese exports of tungsten concentrate declined sharply in 2025, while Chinese imports rose strongly. That means even China is pulling in more raw material to support its own processing base. As a result, less material is reaching overseas buyers.

APT export licences have added another bottleneck. Western customers may secure limited licences, but actual shipment still depends on concentrate availability. That creates a second layer of uncertainty on top of already weak feedstock supply. Therefore, the tungsten concentrate shortage is now feeding directly into delayed APT deliveries and higher prices.

Consumers are also paying much more for feedstock. Payables for concentrate have risen sharply as buyers compete for scarce supply. That shift reflects a market where sellers hold stronger leverage and buyers have fewer alternatives. Consequently, procurement conditions are becoming more difficult even for experienced consumers.

Japan and Europe Face Growing Pressure as Recycling Lags Demand

Japan and Europe are now feeling the full pressure of the acute tungsten shortage. Europe faces critically tight APT availability because it depends heavily on Chinese supply and licensing. Japan faces similar pressure after new Chinese restrictions on dual-use exports added more uncertainty. Therefore, both regions are competing harder for a smaller pool of material.

Japan’s position is especially sensitive. The country has no domestic tungsten mining base and depends heavily on imported tungsten products. Buyers are now seeking tungsten-containing scrap, but that market is also tight. As a result, recycling cannot yet solve the immediate supply problem.

Recycling capacity may grow, but it will take time. Japan is expanding tungsten recycling capability in response to lower Chinese exports. However, significant new output will not arrive quickly. Meanwhile, downstream consumers still need metal today, not years from now.

This means the market will likely remain strained for some time. Concentrate shortages, limited export licences, and weak scrap availability are all reinforcing one another. Therefore, the acute tungsten shortage is likely to keep global tungsten prices elevated unless primary supply improves materially.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tungsten is now showing how vulnerable specialty metal supply chains become when one country dominates both mining and exports. This market is not just tight. It is structurally exposed. Unless new western supply or faster recycling emerges, tungsten buyers may face prolonged price pressure and continued allocation risk.

EU aluminium scrap export restriction consultation targets rising exports

EU, Aluminium scrap

EU aluminium scrap export restriction policy moved closer on 19 December. The European Commission opened a public consultation on limiting aluminium scrap exports. EU aluminium scrap export restriction aims to address tighter scrap availability in Europe. Therefore, recyclers and traders now face a clear policy timeline.

The consultation asks market participants to comment on trade defence options. Respondents must complete a questionnaire by 31 January. Meanwhile, the Commission will review responses before drafting final measures. The Commission plans to adopt the package in spring 2026.

The consultation tests export duties and tariff rate quotas

The consultation covers export duties and tariff rate quotas for aluminium scrap. These tools can slow outbound flows without banning trade outright. However, the Commission must calibrate measures to avoid unintended disruptions. Therefore, stakeholder feedback will shape the final design.

The Commission framed the process as an economic security and industrial resilience step. Officials want more scrap to stay within EU recycling loops. Meanwhile, downstream buyers want stable pricing and reliable secondary supply. As a result, the policy will influence contracting and inventory strategies.

Aluminium scrap exports squeeze recyclers and reshape pricing power

Aluminium scrap exports rose sharply over recent years. The Commission cited a 50% export increase from 2019 to 1.2mn tonnes in 2024. Higher external bids lifted European scrap prices. As a result, secondary aluminium producers saw margins tighten.

Secondary aluminium supports low-carbon aluminium goals and circular economy targets. However, scrap scarcity can push producers back toward primary metal. Therefore, the EU aluminium scrap export restriction debate links directly to decarbonisation policy. Companies will likely accelerate sorting, upgrading, and closed-loop scrap programs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This consultation signals a shift from monitoring to intervention in EU scrap flows. However, the final impact depends on quota levels and enforcement quality. The winners will secure domestic scrap streams before spring 2026 rules arrive.

EU end-of-life vehicles regulation sets recycled content targets for cars

Recycled content for cars

The EU end-of-life vehicles regulation will set recycled content targets for cars across the bloc. The deal phases in recycled plastics content in new vehicles over the next decade. Therefore, the EU end-of-life vehicles regulation reshapes how automakers source plastics, steel, and aluminium.

The European Parliament and EU states reached a provisional agreement on the rules. The plan sets 15% recycled plastics in six years. It then rises to 25% in ten years. Meanwhile, 20% of those plastics must come from end-of-life vehicles or reused components.

Recycled steel and aluminium targets move to a feasibility phase

Targets for recycled steel and aluminium will follow later. The European Commission will run feasibility studies first. As a result, the EU end-of-life vehicles regulation creates a staged pathway for metal recycling mandates.

This approach gives industry time to validate scrap availability and quality. However, it still signals future demand for low-carbon secondary aluminium and recycled steel. Therefore, suppliers should prepare for tighter traceability and mass-balance scrutiny.

Producer responsibility and export rules tighten material retention

The agreement expands collection and depollution rules to more vehicle categories. It will cover heavy-duty vehicles, motorcycles, and special purpose vehicles. Meanwhile, the regulation will introduce a cross-border extended producer responsibility scheme three years after entry.

Manufacturers will carry financial and organisational responsibility across the vehicle lifecycle. The rules also aim to distinguish used vehicles from end-of-life vehicles more clearly. Five years after entry, the EU will ban exports of non-roadworthy used vehicles.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This policy pushes the auto supply chain toward circular materials at scale. However, recycled aluminium and steel targets will hinge on scrap sorting and clean-stream capacity. Therefore, early movers in certified recycling and traceable alloys gain leverage.

EU RESourceEU action plan accelerates EU critical raw materials supply security

EU, Critical Raw Materials

The EU RESourceEU action plan aims to harden Europe’s critical minerals resilience. European Commission will mobilise close to €3bn within the next 12 months. Therefore, the EU RESourceEU action plan turns the 2024 framework into faster financing.

Funding targets fast-deliverable molybdenum and lithium projects

The plan prioritises projects that can cut strategic dependencies quickly. The European Investment Bank and member states will support two flagship developments. Meanwhile, officials frame these as near-term supply wins.

The first backed project is Greenland Resources’ Malmbjerg molybdenum project in Greenland. The plan links molybdenum supply to defence-sector demand and security priorities. The second supported project is Vulcan Energy Resources lithium extraction project in Germany. As a result, the EU RESourceEU action plan tightens the link between finance and battery raw materials.

Scrap export controls and joint purchasing reshape circular supply

The EU RESourceEU action plan strengthens circular supply through targeted scrap controls. The plan restricts exports of scrap and waste from permanent magnets. It also introduces targeted measures for aluminium scrap to expand EU recycling capacity. However, the plan leaves the door open to copper scrap measures if needed.

The plan also creates a new governance layer for long-term execution. A European Critical Raw Materials Centre will launch from early next year to oversee supply chains. It will provide market intelligence, enable joint purchasing, support stockpiling, and catalyse investment. Therefore, the EU RESourceEU action plan shifts from ad-hoc response to structured procurement power.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU RESourceEU action plan signals a decisive pivot from policy intent to industrial action. Meanwhile, scrap controls will matter as much as new mining in tight markets. Therefore, Europe’s next advantage will come from coordinated purchasing and faster permitting discipline.

US titanium scrap-sponge ratio set to shift as melters chase margins

Titanium Scrap

The US titanium scrap-sponge ratio is poised to shift as melters chase cheaper inputs in 2026. Premium titanium sponge prices and weak downstream demand are squeezing margins and forcing producers to reconsider melt mixes. As a result, the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio could move decisively toward higher scrap utilization across many grades.

Furnace expansions support higher scrap utilization

Capacity expansions at ATI, Perryman and Timet will give melters more room to adjust the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio. Their projects are expected to add nearly 30,000 t/yr of ingot production capacity once fully ramped, according to Metalnomist estimates. Consequently, scrap utilization capacity could rise by 22pc to 111,215t in 2026 compared with 2024, ELG Utica Alloys’ Nick Corby told the International Titanium Association conference.

However, not every alloy can fully pivot away from sponge, because certain grades still require premium sponge for purity. Grade 5 (6Al-4V) ingot can be melted from 100pc scrap, which encourages a higher US titanium scrap-sponge ratio when prices favor recycled inputs. Importantly, melters can alter the scrap and sponge ratio without major downtime, allowing them to track raw material prices and supply conditions in real time.

Meanwhile, destocking in commercial aerospace could cap the practical impact of these technical options. Boeing and Airbus are signalling another year of subdued orders for ingot and milled products as they normalise inventory. This means melters already grappling with weaker demand may push deliveries out or no-quote dealers on certain grades, even as the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio tilts structurally toward scrap.

Global scrap flows deepen market distortions

Scrap sourcing dynamics will play a critical role in how far the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio can shift. The US accounts for around 95pc of global consumption of aerospace-grade titanium scrap, making it the natural sink for high-grade revert. Imports are crucial, covering more than half of US raw material needs and bridging gaps in domestic generation.

Historically, Europe supplied much of this scrap, reflecting its strong base of forging and machining operations. Long-standing supply agreements and buy-back schemes cemented a circular flow of titanium between the two regions. However, shifts in downstream processing toward Asia are eroding Europe’s share, even as titanium activity in countries like China accelerates.

China is on track to increase global titanium scrap exports by 64pc in 2025 to 5,874t, with most of that likely moving into the US. Officially, the US has only imported 434t of titanium scrap from China this year, US Commerce Department data show. Yet market participants say Chinese-origin scrap often reaches the US via other Asian countries to circumvent 25pc tariffs, complicating visibility.

As a result, the supply chain looks “inconsistent”, with scrap availability not matching lower generation rates caused by delayed aircraft build schedules and OEM stockpiles. Corby noted that imports are expected to exceed exports by 19,460t this year, the widest gap since records began. At the same time, European ferro-titanium consumers face weak steel demand and index-driven price pressure, cutting their appetite for scrap and pushing more material toward US buyers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The evolving US titanium scrap-sponge ratio highlights how price signals, furnace investments and trade flows interact across the titanium ecosystem. For melters, flexibility in melt mixes is becoming a strategic hedge against stubborn sponge prices and volatile aerospace demand. For scrap generators and intermediaries, rising US dependence and opaque routing via Asia could keep differentials wide — and margins attractive — well into the next aerospace upcycle.

Japan tungsten recycling expansion accelerates after China export controls

the International Tungsten Industry Association(ITIA)

Japan tungsten recycling expansion is now central to the country’s response to China’s new export controls. Japan has no domestic tungsten mines and historically relied on Chinese APT and cemented carbide imports. As a result, Japan tungsten recycling expansion is becoming the primary lever to secure supply and stabilise its hard-metal value chain. Japan tungsten recycling expansion also reflects a broader shift toward circularity and strategic raw material resilience.

Scrap flows highlight the scale of Japan tungsten recycling expansion

Japan is ramping tungsten scrap utilisation to compensate for lower Chinese export volumes. The country generates 3,500–4,000t of tungsten scrap annually, with about half recycled domestically and half exported. However, Japan also imports 500–1,000t of scrap each year, underscoring its dependence on global recycling networks.

China’s export controls on APT and cemented carbide have sharply reduced shipments into Japan. No other producing country has fully offset this loss, creating a structural shortfall in virgin tungsten materials. Therefore, Japanese industry is pushing harder to capture and process scrap from cutting tools and hard-metal components.

Scrap exports to overseas processors have also surged as part of this adjustment. From April to June, Japan exported 865t of tungsten scrap, double the previous quarter. Much of this material goes to the US, Germany and Taiwan for conversion into tungsten carbide powder. Meanwhile, limited domestic processing capacity means Japan must then reimport refined powders or finished tools.

Japan lacks tungsten recycling capacity comparable to leading manufacturing countries such as Germany. Market participants agree that higher prices and strong scrap demand create a window to invest in domestic plants. Companies like Mitsubishi Materials and Sumitomo Group are intensifying recycling efforts, but significant capacity additions will take time to materialise.

Strategic impact of Japan tungsten recycling expansion on supply security

Japan tungsten recycling expansion carries important strategic implications beyond near-term supply balancing. By strengthening domestic scrap processing, Japan can reduce exposure to Chinese export policies over the medium term. At the same time, enhanced recycling supports national goals on circular economy and lower carbon metal supply.

Industry leaders emphasise that Japan still needs a framework for constructive cooperation with China. However, they also stress that recycling will play a growing role in any long-term procurement strategy. As a result, Japan tungsten recycling expansion is viewed as both a defensive and forward-looking move. It protects critical industries today while aligning with future ESG requirements.

Higher tungsten prices and constrained primary supply should continue to incentivise investment in collection, sorting and processing infrastructure. Tool manufacturers and end-users will likely see tighter take-back schemes and more advanced recycling logistics. In five to ten years, today’s disruption may be remembered as the catalyst that forced Japan to build a more robust, diversified tungsten procurement system.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Japan’s response to China’s tungsten export controls shows how quickly advanced manufacturing economies can pivot toward recycling when supply shocks hit. If current investment momentum holds, Japan could evolve from a largely import-dependent buyer into a more balanced scrap-and-powder hub. Market participants should watch where new recycling plants are sited and how quickly domestic processing capacity closes the gap with Germany and other leaders.

US copper scrap exports rise in July

Copper Scrap

US copper scrap exports rise in July as buyers shift from China to other Asian markets. Total copper scrap exports rose 16pc year on year to 29,005t, extending a three-month uptrend amid changing trade flows. However, weakness in China’s economy and property sector curbed its intake every month since December, forcing US suppliers to diversify destinations. Meanwhile, US copper scrap exports rise in July also reflects pre-emptive buying before proposed US tariffs intended to promote domestic sourcing. Therefore, exporters leaned into stronger demand from Japan and India, while China-bound volumes collapsed.

Trade flows pivot to Japan and India

US copper scrap exports rise in July with Japan showing the largest gain, adding 4,973t of receipts. As a result, shipments to China fell by 95pc, a drop of 11,081t, underscoring a decisive market pivot. Moreover, bare bright volumes surged 120pc to 13,200t on increased exports to India, offsetting declines in #1 and #2 grades. However, #1 copper scrap slipped 3pc to 8,916t as China took just 135t versus 5,288t a year earlier. Exports of #2 scrap fell 30pc to 6,888t, marking an eighth straight monthly decline led by a 98pc collapse to China.

Price arbitrage widens discounts and drives opportunistic sales

US copper scrap exports rise in July amid record CME pricing and wider arbitrage. The CME next-active copper contract averaged $5.48/lb, up $1.12/lb from July 2024, and set a $5.82/lb daily high. Consequently, Asian #1 scrap discounts widened to an average 83¢/lb under CME versus 25¢/lb a year earlier. Consumers still paid $4.65/lb for #1 scrap, 54¢/lb more year on year, reflecting exchange-linked uplift. Meanwhile, an average $1.08/lb arbitrage, up from 45¢/lb in June, encouraged July buying as market participants positioned around proposed US trade measures. The announced 50pc duty on copper cathodes slated for 1 August was not implemented, but the signaling effect supported mid-summer export activity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The shift away from China and toward Japan and India confirms a structural re-routing of US copper scrap. Watch discounts versus CME and policy headlines as leading indicators for Q4 flows, while grade-mix dynamics may continue to favor bare bright over #1 and #2.