EU Ferro-Silicon Prices Slide as Safeguard Quotas Remain Open

Ferro-Silicon

EU ferro-silicon prices have weakened since safeguard quotas renewed in May, as abundant low-priced inventory in European warehouses reduces the need for fresh imports. Prices have fallen by 3.6% since the third safeguard period began on 18 May.

EU ferro-silicon prices were last assessed at €1,240-1,280/t delivered northwest Europe, remaining rangebound for three weeks as spot trading stayed subdued.

EU ferro-silicon prices are being held down by material imported before safeguards were introduced in November 2025. Traders continue to hold significant volumes in storage while waiting for tighter quota availability to support higher prices.

The market could tighten later in the year, but weak steel demand and the seasonal July-August slowdown are expected to limit immediate upward momentum.

Warehouse Stocks Delay the Impact of EU Safeguards

The EU safeguard system has not yet generated the price response seen in some other ferro-alloys because major ferro-silicon import quotas remain available.

Smaller allocations for countries including Brazil and the broader "other countries" category have filled, but larger quotas for Norway and Iceland remain open.

This gives buyers access to imported ferro-silicon without immediately facing punitive out-of-quota costs.

At the same time, low-cost inventory imported before the safeguard regime remains available inside Europe. These stocks reduce urgency among steelmakers and traders to secure new material.

Some suppliers have responded by withdrawing offers rather than selling at current levels. They expect prices to strengthen once quotas fill and warehouse stocks decline.

The risk for buyers is that this adjustment could happen quickly. Once quotas are exhausted, the minimum import price for ferro-silicon is set at €2,408/t.

That level is almost twice current spot prices and significantly above the €1,392/t minimum import price applied to silico-manganese.

Importers therefore face substantial downside risk if they bring in material outside quota without a corresponding increase in European market prices.

This could encourage buyers to secure lower-cost ferro-silicon before quota utilisation increases further.

Silicon Metal Emerges as a Competitive Substitute

Silicon metal is becoming a more attractive alternative for some ferro-silicon consumers seeking to avoid potential safeguard-driven price increases.

Both products can provide elemental silicon in metallurgical applications, although substitution depends on process requirements and chemistry.

Lower-cost silicon metal imports from Angola and China have increased the economic incentive to consider alternative feedstock.

This creates an unintended competitive challenge for European ferro-silicon producers. Silicon metal was examined during the safeguard investigation but was ultimately excluded from the measures.

Historically, silicon metal traded at a substantial premium to ferro-silicon. That premium has narrowed since 2022, making substitution more economically realistic.

If ferro-silicon quotas eventually fill and import costs rise sharply, the relative attractiveness of silicon metal could increase further.

The safeguard mechanism could therefore support European ferro-silicon prices while simultaneously encouraging some consumers to reduce ferro-silicon usage.

Weak steel demand remains the larger constraint. Without stronger consumption, higher import protection may improve producer pricing power but cannot guarantee higher physical sales volumes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s ferro-silicon safeguards have not tightened the market yet because old inventory and unused quotas remain substantial. The bigger risk for producers is that a sharp safeguard-driven price increase could accelerate substitution toward silicon metal instead of simply lifting ferro-silicon margins.

China Strategic Minerals Framework Tightens State Control Over 36 Resources

Strategic Minerals

China strategic minerals policy has entered a more formal phase after Beijing placed 36 mineral resources under tighter central government control. The revised regulations strengthen state oversight of mining, exploration, production quotas and strategic reserves.

China strategic minerals covered by the framework include major industrial metals, battery materials, rare earths, semiconductor metals and energy resources. The rules also include non-metallic materials such as graphite, phosphate, fluorite and high-purity quartz.

China strategic minerals regulation is significant because many of the affected materials are essential to batteries, aerospace, defence, semiconductors, energy infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.

The immediate market impact has been limited because several controls already existed in practice. However, formalising them under a single legal framework could strengthen Beijing's ability to manage supply over the longer term.

Centralised Quotas and Reserves Strengthen Supply Management

The Ministry of Natural Resources, working with the National Development and Reform Commission, will set annual mining quotas for strategic minerals.

The objective is to prevent uncontrolled production while giving central authorities greater control over national resource development.

Approvals for new exploration and mining rights will also be consolidated at the central level. Authorities will restrict the number of mining licences granted for individual deposits.

This could slow uncontrolled capacity growth in some markets while giving Beijing more influence over production timing and regional development.

The new framework also establishes a three-tier reserve system covering physical product inventories, production capacity and undeveloped resource sites.

State and private companies will jointly participate in stockpiling, while resource-site reserves are expected to remain available for at least five years.

This creates a broader security mechanism than conventional commodity stockpiles. China will not only hold material inventories but also preserve future production capability and undeveloped resources.

For strategically sensitive metals, this could provide Beijing with greater flexibility to respond to supply disruptions, price volatility or geopolitical pressure.

Rare Earths and Semiconductor Metals Gain Greater Strategic Weight

The list covers 25 metallic commodities, including iron, copper, aluminium, titanium, vanadium, manganese and chromium.

Battery materials such as lithium, cobalt and nickel are included alongside all 17 rare earth elements.

China has also designated tungsten, antimony, tin and molybdenum as strategic resources, together with semiconductor and specialty metals including gallium, germanium, indium, rhenium, niobium, tantalum, beryllium, zirconium and hafnium.

This combination is important because China already holds dominant positions across many of these supply chains.

Rare earth separation, tungsten processing, antimony, gallium and germanium are particularly sensitive because alternative global processing capacity remains limited.

The inclusion of high-purity quartz also highlights the expanding definition of strategic materials. Quartz is an important input in semiconductor and solar manufacturing, linking mineral security directly with advanced technology industries.

The framework therefore goes beyond mining policy. It strengthens China's ability to manage the upstream materials required for manufacturing competitiveness and national security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is moving from individual export controls and quotas toward a comprehensive strategic resources system. The long-term implication is greater state influence over not only current supply, but also future capacity and undeveloped reserves across many of the world's most critical materials.

UCB Power BESS Production Gains Tax Support in Brazil

UCB Power

UCB Power BESS production will receive tax support as Brazil seeks to expand domestic manufacturing of battery energy storage systems. The Brazilian battery producer will benefit from reduced import tariffs on foreign components used in production.

UCB Power BESS production adds another industrial layer to Brazil’s growing energy storage market. The incentives will be administered through the Manaus Free Trade Zone framework, although specific tariff reductions have not been disclosed.

UCB Power BESS production also has implications for critical mineral demand. Lithium-ion storage systems require materials including lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite, copper and aluminium across cells, electrical systems and enclosures.

The policy therefore supports more than battery assembly. It could help Brazil gradually build a domestic energy storage ecosystem around renewable power, grids and industrial electricity management.

Tax Incentives Strengthen Domestic Battery Manufacturing

Brazil’s Manaus Free Trade Zone provides tax incentives intended to encourage industrial production in the country’s northern region.

UCB Power will gain lower import costs for foreign components required in BESS manufacturing. This can improve the competitiveness of domestic production while Brazil develops more local supply capability.

The incentives remain subject to standard requirements within the Manaus framework, including environmental and research obligations.

Battery storage manufacturing remains dependent on imported cells, materials and electronic components in many emerging markets. Lower tariffs can therefore reduce the cost disadvantage faced by local manufacturers during the early stages of industry development.

UCB already operates battery factories in Manaus and Extrema, Minas Gerais. The company says its portfolio represents more than 7.8GWh of installed capacity.

That existing manufacturing base gives UCB a stronger position to expand into grid-scale and industrial energy storage as Brazilian electricity demand evolves.

BESS Growth Could Create New Critical Mineral Demand

Battery energy storage is becoming increasingly important as power systems integrate more intermittent renewable generation.

BESS installations can store electricity when supply is abundant and discharge it when demand rises, improving grid flexibility and helping industrial users manage electricity costs.

Lithium-ion technology currently dominates the market, creating demand across a broad range of battery materials.

For Brazil, this creates an opportunity to connect domestic battery manufacturing with its substantial mineral resource base. The country has resources across lithium, nickel, manganese and other materials relevant to energy storage.

However, mineral availability alone will not create an integrated battery industry. Brazil will need refining, active materials production, cell manufacturing and recycling capacity if it wants to capture more of the value chain.

Supporting BESS assembly is therefore an early step toward a broader industrial ecosystem rather than the endpoint.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil has the mineral resources and renewable power base to build a larger battery industry, but the missing link remains downstream processing and cell production. UCB’s expansion can help create domestic demand that makes those investments more commercially attractive.

India Manganese Ore Duty Removal Cuts Ferro-Alloy Costs

India Manganese Ore

India manganese ore duty removal will lower raw material costs for domestic ferro-alloy producers after the government scrapped the 2.5% basic customs duty on imported manganese ore and concentrates.

India manganese ore duty removal is expected to reduce producer costs by around 1.25-2.5%, improving margins for silico-manganese and ferro-manganese smelters. The change also makes imported ore more competitive against domestic material.

India manganese ore duty removal comes as alloy producers face pressure from high ore and power costs. Lower import costs could strengthen export competitiveness and encourage producers to increase utilisation where market demand allows.

India imports around 5.5mn-6.5mn t/yr of manganese ore, making overseas supply structurally important to the country's steel and ferro-alloy industry.

Lower Ore Costs Strengthen Ferro-Alloy Producers

South Africa dominates India's manganese ore imports because its high-grade and chemically consistent material performs well in submerged-arc furnaces.

India also imports significant volumes from Gabon, Australia and Ghana. Around 2.03mn t entered the country during the first quarter of 2026.

Removing the customs duty directly improves the economics of imported feedstock. Producers can lower blended ore costs or increase the proportion of higher-grade imported material.

Silico-manganese and ferro-manganese producers should benefit most. These alloys are essential deoxidising and alloying inputs for structural steel, automotive steel, rail products and special steels.

Steel production typically consumes around 6-9kg of manganese per tonne of crude steel, linking ferro-alloy demand closely to Indian steel output.

High input costs had already encouraged some producers to shift from 60-14 silico-manganese toward higher-value 65% grades and 70-75% ferro-manganese.

Lower ore costs could improve the competitiveness of standard grades again while giving producers greater flexibility across their product mix.

The measure could also narrow India's export cost disadvantage against Malaysia. Malaysian ferro-alloy producers benefit from lower electricity costs, but cheaper manganese ore and Indian labour costs could reduce the gap.

Domestic Ore Producers Face Greater Import Competition

The policy creates pressure for domestic manganese miners because cheaper imports will increase buyers' negotiating power.

Moil could face greater competition, particularly from high-grade imported ore used by coastal smelters with easy access to ports.

Domestic prices may increasingly move toward import parity as smelters compare local supply directly with landed overseas material.

This could create inventory pressure for domestic miners if buyers increase the proportion of imported ore in their furnace blends.

However, the impact will vary by location and ore quality. Moil remains competitive for inland customers because domestic freight from ports can offset part of the import advantage.

Its material also remains suitable for applications where very high-grade ore is not required.

The broader policy direction is clear. India is prioritising lower industrial input costs to strengthen steel and manufacturing competitiveness.

Manganese has also been identified alongside lithium, cobalt and nickel under India's National Critical Minerals Mission, increasing its importance in the country's wider supply-chain strategy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India is choosing downstream competitiveness over protection for domestic ore miners. The biggest beneficiaries will be ferro-alloy producers that can combine cheaper imported manganese with efficient power and higher furnace utilisation.

SMEL Ferro-Alloy Sales Fall as Export Costs and Ore Prices Rise

Shyam Metalics

SMEL ferro-alloy sales declined sharply in May as higher ore prices, Middle East-related logistics costs and weak overseas demand weighed on shipments. Shyam Metalics and Energy sold 16,201t of ferro-alloys during the month, down 18% from a year earlier.

SMEL ferro-alloy sales were also lower than April’s 18,391t, showing that export pressure is affecting near-term momentum. The company said higher raw material costs and more expensive manganese alloy exports contributed to the decline.

SMEL ferro-alloy sales weakness contrasts with more resilient stainless steel demand. This divergence highlights the growing importance of downstream and value-added products in protecting margins when bulk alloy markets weaken.

The company is responding by investing heavily in special bar quality steel, specialty wire rod and downstream stainless steel capacity through projects scheduled for completion by 2029.

Ferro-Alloy Exports Face Cost and Demand Pressure

SMEL’s May ferro-alloy sales fell from 19,869t a year earlier to 16,201t. The decline reflects pressure from both input costs and weaker export economics.

Ore prices have risen sharply, increasing production costs for manganese-based alloys. At the same time, the Middle East conflict has raised freight and export costs, making Indian material less competitive in some overseas markets.

Weak international demand has compounded the problem. Ferro-alloy producers depend heavily on steelmaking activity, so softer orders quickly translate into lower shipments and weaker utilisation.

This is particularly important for manganese alloys, where energy, ore and freight costs all account for a significant share of delivered pricing.

The market environment therefore favours producers with captive raw materials, lower-cost power and stronger domestic customer bases.

Value-Added Steel Becomes More Important to SMEL’s Strategy

SMEL’s stainless steel sales performed better than ferro-alloys, rising by 5.3% year on year to 7,367t in May. However, sales were around 7% lower than April.

Aluminium showed greater weakness, with sales falling by 25% year on year to 1,570t. Volumes were also 17% lower than the previous month.

The mixed performance reinforces SMEL’s decision to increase exposure to higher-margin products. The company is investing another Rs27bn to expand special bar quality and specialty wire rod capacity.

It is also expanding its downstream stainless steel complex, aiming to increase the share of higher-value products in its portfolio.

These projects should reduce dependence on lower-margin commodity sales and give SMEL greater exposure to automotive, engineering and industrial customers.

The strategy is important because bulk ferro-alloy markets can be highly cyclical. Producers with more downstream processing capacity can capture additional value and better manage weak export conditions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

SMEL’s May results show why Indian metals producers are moving downstream. Higher ore, freight and energy costs are compressing bulk alloy margins, making value-added steel products increasingly important for earnings stability.

EU Car Emissions Policy Divides States as 2035 and ETS 2 Battles Intensify

EU, ETS

EU car emissions policy is becoming a major fault line between member states as governments debate how much flexibility automakers should receive after 2035 and how quickly carbon pricing should expand into road transport and buildings.

France, Spain and Sweden defended continued electrification, while Poland called for greater flexibility in vehicle CO2 rules and further changes to ETS 2. The European Commission’s current proposal would replace the existing 100% tailpipe-emissions reduction requirement for new cars and vans from 2035 with a 90% reduction, with the remaining emissions compensated through low-carbon steel, e-fuels or biofuels. 

EU car emissions policy increasingly matters for metals markets because the regulatory outcome will influence the pace of EV adoption, internal-combustion vehicle production and material demand across batteries, copper, aluminium and automotive steels.

At the same time, disagreements over ETS 2 show that Europe is still negotiating how quickly consumers and transport markets should absorb the cost of decarbonisation.

2035 Flexibility Could Reshape Automotive Metals Demand

The Commission’s proposed flexibility would allow plug-in hybrids, range extenders, mild hybrids and some internal-combustion vehicles to remain in the market beyond 2035, provided manufacturers meet the wider emissions framework. 

That matters because the automotive material mix changes significantly depending on powertrain.

Battery electric vehicles typically require larger battery packs and more copper-intensive electrical systems. They directly support demand for lithium, graphite and selected nickel and manganese products depending on battery chemistry.

Hybrids require much smaller batteries, reducing battery mineral intensity per vehicle. However, they still consume more copper and electrical components than conventional combustion vehicles.

Continued ICE production would also sustain demand for metals and components linked to traditional powertrains, including speciality steels, aluminium castings and exhaust-system materials.

Low-carbon steel is becoming another strategic element. Under the Commission proposal, EU-made low-carbon steel could contribute to compensating the remaining emissions permitted after 2035. 

This could create a new commercial advantage for European steelmakers investing in lower-carbon production. Automotive decarbonisation would then depend not only on the vehicle powertrain but also on the embedded emissions of its materials.

The industrial argument is therefore becoming more complex than EV versus ICE. Europe is increasingly debating whether decarbonisation should be measured through tailpipe emissions alone or through a broader combination of powertrain, fuels and lower-carbon materials.

ETS 2 Debate Highlights Cost of Europe’s Transition

The political divide extends beyond cars to carbon pricing.

ETS 2 is designed to expand emissions trading to fuels used in buildings, road transport and additional sectors. Its full launch is currently scheduled for 2028, while EU institutions have also been strengthening its market stability reserve to reduce excessive price volatility. 

Poland is pushing for stronger mechanisms to control carbon prices and has argued for further flexibility around implementation.

The issue is important because ETS 2 could eventually increase the carbon cost associated with road fuels and heating. Governments are therefore balancing emissions objectives against household costs, inflation and industrial competitiveness.

For metals and manufacturing, carbon market design has indirect but significant consequences. Faster electrification supports grids, charging infrastructure and electrical metals demand. Slower implementation could extend fossil fuel consumption and delay part of that investment cycle.

Germany has meanwhile focused on the longer-term availability of allowances under the existing ETS, highlighting concern over how rapidly the emissions cap declines as Europe approaches its 2040 climate targets.

These debates show that Europe has broadly agreed on the direction of travel but not on the speed or industrial structure of the transition.

The eventual policy mix will influence where manufacturers invest, which automotive technologies survive and how quickly European material supply chains need to adapt.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s automotive debate is shifting from a simple ICE-versus-EV argument toward a contest over technology, carbon pricing and material origin. For metals markets, the final policy balance will determine how quickly demand moves toward batteries, copper and low-carbon steel.

Liberty Bell Bay Manganese Smelter Sale Aims to Preserve Australia’s Alloy Capacity

Liberty

Liberty Bell Bay manganese smelter assets in Tasmania are set to be sold to a consortium led by investment firm Adroit Capital, giving Australia’s only manganese alloy producer a potential path out of administration. The 290,000 t/yr smelter is a strategic asset for steelmaking, defence and construction supply chains.

Liberty Bell Bay manganese smelter operations have been under pressure since the site was shut in May 2025 by its former owner, GFG Alliance, because of feedstock shortages and maintenance requirements. The smelter produces ferro-manganese and silico-manganese, both essential alloying materials for steel production.

Liberty Bell Bay manganese smelter continuity is important because Australia has limited domestic ferro-alloy capacity. Losing the site permanently would increase dependence on imported manganese alloys for steelmakers and industrial users.

The Australian federal and Tasmanian state governments have now committed A$5mn to cover staff salaries until early August while administrator Ernst & Young finalises the sale with Adroit. That follows A$4.6mn in earlier support during April-May, bringing total recent government support to A$9.6mn.

Government Support Buys Time for a Strategic Smelter

The government funding gives the administrator more time to complete the transaction while preserving workforce continuity. This is critical because skilled labour, furnace knowledge and site readiness can be difficult to rebuild after a prolonged shutdown.

Tasmania’s government had already tried to support a restart under GFG. It provided a A$20mn bridging loan after the smelter was suspended in May 2025, helping operations resume in August.

However, GFG defaulted on that loan in January 2026, leading to the smelter entering administration. The sale process now shifts responsibility to a new investor group that must address the site’s core operating problems.

The key challenge remains feedstock security. Manganese alloy smelting depends on reliable ore supply, power costs, furnace availability and customer demand from steelmakers.

If Adroit can secure ore and stabilise operations, the smelter could again support domestic steel supply chains. If not, the asset risks remaining a strategic facility without a sustainable operating model.

Manganese Alloy Security Matters for Steelmaking

Manganese alloys are essential in steelmaking because they improve strength, toughness and deoxidation performance. Ferro-manganese and silico-manganese are widely used across construction steel, infrastructure, machinery and defence-related steel applications.

Australia’s reliance on a single domestic manganese alloy producer makes Liberty Bell Bay more important than its nameplate capacity alone suggests. The smelter represents industrial optionality in a market where supply security is becoming more politically relevant.

The sale also comes as global ferro-alloy markets face volatility from weak steel demand, feedstock constraints and trade measures. Domestic production can reduce exposure to import disruptions, but only if operating costs remain competitive.

For Tasmania, the site also carries regional employment and industrial policy importance. Keeping the workforce funded through the sale process reduces the risk of losing technical capability before a new owner takes control.

The Adroit-led consortium will need more than financial interest. It must prove that the smelter can operate with stable raw material supply, disciplined maintenance and a credible sales strategy.

The broader lesson is clear. Strategic metals capacity cannot survive on government support alone. It needs a bankable operating model that links feedstock, power, customers and long-term demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Liberty Bell Bay sale is a test of whether Australia can preserve critical ferro-alloy capacity before it disappears. Manganese alloy supply may not attract the same attention as lithium or rare earths, but steelmaking security depends on assets like this.

EU Silico-Manganese Prices Unlikely to Rally Despite Filled Quotas

Silico-Manganese

EU silico-manganese prices are unlikely to rise sharply despite the rapid exhaustion of tariff-free import quotas for Indian material and supply from other developing countries. Weak end-user demand, existing stock coverage and summer maintenance at steel mills are limiting the price impact.

EU silico-manganese prices did move higher after the third safeguard quota period opened on 18 May. Importers tried to pass duty costs through to consumers, lifting prices by €30/t on 21 May.

EU silico-manganese prices still face resistance from buyers. Many large steel consumers already secured annual contracts or imported material before the safeguards took effect, leaving limited spot demand in the market.

The result is a tighter import structure without a strong demand shock. Quota exhaustion is raising costs for importers, but it has not yet created the kind of physical shortage needed to force a major price rally.

Filled TRQs Raise Import Costs but Demand Remains Covered

Importers submitted 41,993t of Indian silico-manganese for clearance on the first day of the new quota period. That exceeded the available Indian quota of 31,959t by 10,034t.

Only 76% of the submitted Indian material was allocated inside the quota. The rest had to clear as out-of-quota material, exposing importers to higher costs under the EU safeguard mechanism.

The safeguard system combines country-specific tariff-rate quotas with a variable duty on excess imports. The duty is calculated against a price threshold, effectively creating a minimum import price.

For silico-manganese, that minimum import price is €1,392/t. This is well above the recent European delivered market assessment of €1,080-1,130/t.

That gap creates immediate pressure on traders holding out-of-quota material. One trader said the duty impact on part of his cargo would raise his average import cost by about €120/t across the full shipment.

Some suppliers have increased offers by around €50/t and are holding material while they assess market direction. But buyers are not accepting higher prices quickly because cheaper unsold units remain available in smaller volumes.

The timing also weakens the price case. European mills typically reduce activity during the summer maintenance period, lowering near-term consumption of manganese alloys.

Safeguards Shift Trade Flows While CBAM Alters Alloy Choices

The EU introduced safeguards on silico-manganese, ferro-manganese, ferro-silicon and silico-magnesium in November to protect European alloy producers from lower-cost third-country imports.

Silico-manganese has attracted more import activity than some other alloys. The quota for “other countries” was exhausted in both the second and third periods, while the current 18,956t quota was filled by 21 May.

Norway’s quota has also been closely watched. Its second-period quota was exhausted in April, but the third-period quota still had a large remaining balance as of 22 May.

Zambian material also remains available within quota. This gives importers some alternative supply routes, even as India and other-country quotas fill quickly.

Ferro-silicon and ferro-manganese quotas have not been filled. This shows that the safeguard impact is uneven across the ferro-alloy market.

CBAM is also changing trading behaviour. Silico-manganese is not subject to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, while high-carbon ferro-manganese carries additional administrative and compliance burdens.

That has made some traders more comfortable importing silico-manganese than ferro-manganese. Even when prices are close, lower bureaucracy can make silico-manganese more attractive from a trading perspective.

Ferro-manganese prices are receiving some support from CBAM-related caution, but liquidity and demand appear stronger in silico-manganese. This could keep trade flows focused on silico-manganese until buyers’ inventories fall.

The main market impact may therefore arrive in autumn. By then, end-user stocks could be lower, summer maintenance will have passed and importers may face tighter replacement costs under the safeguard regime.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU safeguard system is already raising import costs, but weak steel demand is preventing a sharp silico-manganese rally. The real test will come after summer, when mills return and buyers need to replace stocks under a more expensive import structure.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

Nickel Ore Prices Fall as Philippine Supply Recovery Eases Feedstock Tightness

Philippine Nickel ore

Nickel ore prices have fallen as Philippine supply recovered after the monsoon season, while a correction in London Metal Exchange nickel weakened sentiment across the value chain. The decline shows how quickly seasonal ore flows can pressure feedstock markets when Indonesian buyers slow procurement.

Nickel ore prices for 1.3% grade material on a cif China basis dropped to 55-57 yuan/wmt on 14 May from 65-66 yuan/wmt on 26 March. The fall came even though LME nickel remained above late-March levels after briefly touching almost two-year highs earlier in May.

Nickel ore prices are important because ore often gives the earliest physical signal in the nickel chain. Unlike LME nickel, ore prices are less driven by financial flows and more directly tied to mine supply, port congestion, smelter demand and buyer inventories.

The current weakness reflects three forces moving together: Philippine mine supply is recovering, Indonesia is slowing purchases, and LME nickel has corrected after earlier policy-driven gains.

Philippine Supply Recovery Changes the Regional Ore Balance

The Philippines is entering its seasonal production recovery after monsoon-related disruptions. Mining activity in Surigao, the country’s main nickel ore hub, usually slows from November to March and rebounds from May.

Surigao accounts for around half of Philippine nickel ore output. As shipments recover, buyers have more nearby feedstock options, reducing the urgency that supported prices earlier in the year.

This seasonal pattern has become more important since Indonesia emerged as a major Philippine ore importer. Historically, Chinese buyers stocked up ahead of the rainy season and drew down inventories until supply returned. But Indonesia’s rising demand has added a second major pull on Philippine material.

The Philippines exported 55.22mn t of nickel ore in 2025. China took 72% of that volume, while Indonesia accounted for 18%.

Indonesia’s imports from the Philippines rose to 15.48mn t in 2025 from 9.55mn t in 2024. That growth was driven by tight domestic ore controls under Indonesia’s RKAB quota system.

Indonesia imported 1.41mn t of Philippine nickel ore in March, up sharply from both a year earlier and the previous month. But that buying momentum has now slowed as port bottlenecks and price uncertainty weigh on procurement.

Indonesia Bottlenecks and NPI Margins Pressure Demand

Most Philippine ore shipped to Indonesia moves to the Weda Bay industrial park. The site produced around one third of Indonesia’s total nickel supply in 2025, making it a major feedstock demand centre.

But Weda Bay has limited unloading capacity. Only two major berths handle nickel ore discharge, creating recurring congestion.

Some vessels that would normally unload within two days are waiting up to two weeks. That congestion reduces buyers’ willingness to secure additional cargoes, especially when prices are falling.

Indonesia’s revised ore pricing formula has also changed buyer behaviour. The new formula includes cobalt, iron and chromium values, raising raw material costs and adding uncertainty to procurement decisions.

Meanwhile, LME nickel’s pullback has started to pressure nickel pig iron prices. NPI prices had been relatively steady, supported by stainless steel demand, but softer benchmark prices are now weakening producer margins.

Lower margins can reduce production incentives for Chinese NPI producers. That, in turn, may reduce demand for nickel ore and extend downward pressure on feedstock prices.

Nickel sulphate prices have remained stable because tight supply has offset weak demand from the nickel-cobalt-manganese battery sector. But the ore market is moving faster because supply is returning and buyers are stepping back.

The short-term outlook remains soft. Rising Philippine availability, weaker LME sentiment and slower Indonesian buying are likely to keep nickel ore under pressure until the market finds a new floor.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel ore prices are showing that Indonesia’s downstream expansion has made Philippine supply more strategically important. But when port bottlenecks, weaker NPI margins and seasonal supply recovery hit together, even tight Indonesian ore controls cannot prevent a feedstock correction.

EU CRMA Strategic Projects Delay Raises Questions Over Critical Minerals Execution

the Critical Raw Materials Act

EU CRMA strategic projects are facing a likely delay as Brussels postpones the next batch of designations under the Critical Raw Materials Act. The announcement was initially expected between mid-May and June, but market sources now expect the process to run into autumn.

EU CRMA strategic projects are intended to accelerate domestic and allied supply chains for critical minerals. The strategic label can give projects faster permitting and better access to EU financing.

EU CRMA strategic projects matter because Europe has set ambitious 2030 targets for extraction, processing and recycling. Any delay risks slowing investment decisions at a time when the bloc is trying to reduce dependence on concentrated foreign supply chains.

The European Commission selected 60 projects in the first round across the EU and partner countries. The second round drew 161 applications, showing strong industry interest but also increasing administrative complexity.

Battery and Rare Earth Projects Dominate Applications

The second round of applications shows where Europe’s supply-chain priorities are concentrated. Of the 161 applications, 95 came from inside the EU and 66 from outside.

Battery-related projects dominated the list with 75 applications. This reflects Europe’s continued effort to build supply chains for lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite and other battery materials.

Rare earths were another major focus, with 21 applications. These projects are strategically important because Europe remains highly dependent on China for rare earth separation, metals, alloys and permanent magnets.

The strategic label is expected to help selected projects access financing under the Resource Action Plan and benefit from accelerated permitting. That support is important because critical minerals projects face high capital costs, long timelines and uncertain market economics.

However, the delay shows that project selection is not simple. The EU must assess technical readiness, strategic value, permitting status, financing needs, environmental standards and supply-chain contribution.

For developers, uncertainty over designation timing can affect financing discussions, offtake negotiations and investment decisions. A project may be commercially promising, but delays in policy support can slow its path to construction.

Europe’s Raw Materials Targets Face Execution Risk

The CRMA sets clear 2030 goals. The EU wants domestic extraction to cover at least 10% of annual consumption, processing to cover at least 40%, and recycling to cover at least 25%.

These targets are ambitious because Europe has limited mining capacity in several critical minerals and remains weak in key midstream stages. Processing and refining remain the hardest gaps to close.

The first round of strategic projects gave the market a positive signal. But industry participants are now questioning whether the mechanism is delivering meaningful progress quickly enough.

The European Court of Auditors warned in February that the EU risks missing its raw materials targets. It pointed to unclear selection criteria and weak data as major concerns.

Transparency has also become a pressure point. Non-governmental organisations and legal groups have challenged the process, arguing that citizens have not received enough disclosure.

This creates a difficult balance for Brussels. The EU wants to accelerate strategic projects, but it must also maintain public trust, environmental credibility and clear selection standards.

The delay is therefore more than an administrative issue. It tests whether Europe can turn critical minerals policy into bankable industrial capacity before global competition locks up capital, feedstock and customers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The CRMA’s strategic project label is valuable only if it accelerates real investment. Europe has identified the right bottlenecks, but delays in selection and financing risk turning industrial strategy into another slow policy process.

EU EV Transition Faces Energy Cost and Trade Policy Pressure

EU energy

EU EV transition plans are facing growing pressure from high energy costs, tougher global competition and a regulatory model that industry leaders say may be weakening Europe’s automotive position. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car Summit warned that Europe must rethink how it competes with China and other industrial economies.

EU EV transition policy has relied heavily on regulation, including the planned 2035 phase-out of new internal combustion engine car sales. But carmakers and suppliers argue that regulation alone cannot deliver a competitive electric vehicle industry if energy prices, subsidies and supply-chain costs remain unfavourable.

EU EV transition challenges are becoming more visible as Chinese automakers gain share in Europe, southeast Asia and Latin America. Chinese producers have built cost-competitive EV platforms through subsidies, domestic competition, supply-chain control and fast industrial scaling.

The debate matters for metals because slower or more expensive electrification can reshape demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, aluminium and rare earth magnets. Automotive materials demand will still grow, but the path may become less direct and more exposed to policy choices.

China’s EV Scale Forces Europe to Rethink Trade Strategy

European automotive suppliers are calling for a more realistic approach to global competition. The industry is facing rivals that operate under different labour, subsidy and industrial policy conditions.

China has become one of the world’s strongest EV exporters. It accounted for around 40% of global EV exports in 2024, while leading Chinese brands have expanded aggressively with lower-cost, technology-rich vehicles.

This creates a competitive problem for European carmakers. Europe has focused on setting strict emissions targets, while China has focused on making EVs cheaper, scalable and export-ready.

Several industry executives now argue that collaboration may become unavoidable. Western manufacturers may need to partner with Chinese or other international competitors that already have a technological lead in EV platforms, batteries, software and power electronics.

This could change European supply chains. Rather than developing every technology internally, carmakers may increasingly combine European assembly and branding with externally sourced EV systems.

That strategy could support faster electrification, but it also creates dependence on imported components, battery materials and processed inputs. It may help automakers compete on cost, but it does not solve Europe’s strategic materials vulnerability.

Energy Costs Could Slow Consumer Adoption and Metals Demand

High charging and energy costs are another major barrier to Europe’s EV push. If consumers face much higher charging costs than drivers in China or other regions, the economic case for EV adoption weakens.

This is critical because EV demand is highly sensitive to total ownership cost. Batteries may become cheaper, but charging costs, highway tariffs and energy price volatility can still shape consumer decisions.

For battery metals, this matters directly. Slower EV adoption would reduce the speed of demand growth for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, especially in full battery electric vehicles with large battery packs.

Copper and aluminium remain better positioned across multiple automotive pathways. EVs require copper for wiring, motors, charging systems and power electronics, while aluminium supports lightweighting, battery enclosures and structural components.

However, Europe’s automotive metals demand will increasingly depend on which technology mix wins. Full BEVs support larger battery metals demand, while hybrids and lower-cost EV platforms could shift consumption toward smaller batteries, more electronics and continued use of conventional automotive materials.

The policy challenge is therefore industrial as much as environmental. Europe must reduce emissions while keeping manufacturing competitive, securing raw materials and lowering energy costs for consumers.

If Europe cannot align regulation, energy prices and trade strategy, its EV transition could become a market for imported vehicles rather than a platform for domestic industrial growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s EV problem is not only about regulation or consumer demand. It is about whether the region can build a cost-competitive industrial system around energy, materials, technology and trade before Chinese EV platforms define the market.

Ferroglobe Silicon Shipments Fall as European Plants Face Import Pressure

Ferroglobe

Ferroglobe silicon shipments fell in the first quarter after the company suspended production across its European silicon metal plants in October. The decline shows how weak demand and low-priced imports are reshaping Europe’s silicon metal market.

Ferroglobe silicon shipments dropped by 15.9% year on year to 30,533t in January-March. The company later restarted one of two furnaces at its Anglefort plant in France to maintain an EU operating presence.

Ferroglobe silicon shipments remain under pressure because European production costs are still struggling to compete against lower-cost third-country imports. The company warned that the current market structure is no longer viable during a prolonged period of depressed demand.

The issue is strategically important because silicon metal supports aluminium alloys, silicones, solar materials, semiconductors and industrial chemicals. If European smelting capacity continues to close, the region’s downstream industries will become more dependent on imported feedstock.

European Silicon Metal Faces Low-Cost Import Pressure

Ferroglobe said the European silicon metal market remains under pressure from China and Angola. Angola has emerged as a faster-growing supplier into the EU, increasing its market share during the first two months of 2026.

Angola supplied 993t of silicon metal to the EU in February, up by around two-thirds from a year earlier. Its EU market share more than doubled to 3.3% in January-February from 1.5% a year earlier.

This matters because even modest import share gains can influence pricing when demand is weak. European producers with higher energy and operating costs have limited room to absorb lower selling prices.

Ferroglobe has called for the EU to introduce anti-dumping duties on certain third-country suppliers selling at low prices into the bloc. The company made the request after the European Commission excluded silicon metal from last year’s safeguard investigation.

The policy question is now becoming more urgent. Europe wants strategic materials security, but it also needs trade tools that keep domestic production viable when imports undercut regional cost structures.

Without stronger protection or demand recovery, European silicon metal output could remain constrained. That would weaken the region’s ability to support aluminium, chemicals, solar and advanced manufacturing supply chains from local feedstock.

Ferro-Alloy Sales Offset Silicon Weakness

Ferroglobe’s broader first-quarter performance was supported by stronger silicon-based and manganese-based alloy shipments. This helped offset weaker silicon metal volumes.

Shipments of silicon-based alloys rose by 41.6% year on year to 60,674t. The increase was driven by stronger US demand for ferro-silicon.

However, average selling prices for silicon-based alloys fell by 4.9% to $2,016/t. Competitive conditions in the US and South Africa limited pricing power despite stronger volumes.

Manganese-based alloy sales also improved sharply. Shipments rose by 27.5% to 85,743t, supported by recently implemented safeguard measures.

The average selling price for manganese-based alloys increased by 12.8% to $1,250/t because of higher European prices. This shows how trade measures can directly support pricing when regional supply protection is in place.

Ferroglobe’s total sales rose by 13.2% year on year to $347.7mn. The increase came from higher silicon-based and manganese-based alloy volumes, along with stronger manganese alloy pricing.

Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation increased by 112.5% to $3.3mn. The improvement was meaningful, but margins remain thin for a company operating in volatile alloy and silicon markets.

The company is also considering reopening operations in Venezuela. Those assets are close to the US market and could benefit from low-cost energy, raw materials and favourable logistics.

That strategy reflects the changing economics of ferro-alloy and silicon production. Energy cost, trade access, import protection and proximity to customers are becoming more important than legacy European capacity alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ferroglobe’s results show that Europe’s silicon metal problem is not only weak demand; it is structural cost exposure against lower-priced imports. If the EU wants domestic critical industrial material capacity, silicon metal may need the same policy seriousness now being applied to batteries, magnets and semiconductors.

Moil Manganese Ore Prices Fall as Indian Steel Demand Weakens

Moil, Manganese Ore

Moil manganese ore prices have been cut by 4% for May as weak downstream steel demand and sluggish export bookings pressure India’s manganese market. The state-owned producer reduced prices across ferro-grade ore, silico-grade ore and fines.

Moil manganese ore prices for ferro-grade material with manganese content of 44% and above, as well as below-44% material, were lowered by 4% from April levels. The cut follows a sharp 17.5% increase in April for ore below 44% manganese content.

Moil manganese ore prices for 25% and 30% silico-grade ore and fines were also reduced by 4% for May. The move reflects a softer market environment in which domestic buyers are cautious and export opportunities remain limited.

The price cut highlights a wider imbalance in India’s manganese ore chain. Lower export demand has pushed more material into the domestic market, creating surplus supply across major trading hubs.

Weak Steel Demand Pressures Ferro-Grade Ore

Ferro-grade manganese ore demand remains tied closely to steel and ferro-alloy production. When steel demand weakens, alloy producers reduce feedstock buying and ore prices come under pressure.

India’s downstream steel market has been sluggish, limiting demand for manganese alloys and the ore used to produce them. This has made buyers more cautious about restocking, especially after the April price increase.

The 4% reduction is therefore a market-clearing move. Moil is adjusting prices to reflect weaker consumer appetite and rising domestic availability.

Export weakness has added further pressure. Reduced overseas bookings mean more ore is staying inside India, increasing competition among suppliers and traders.

This domestic oversupply is especially important for ferro-grade ore. Alloy producers can delay purchases when they expect further weakness, which slows market activity and reinforces downward pressure.

Higher Output Adds to Domestic Supply Overhang

Moil’s production has continued to rise despite weaker demand. The company produced around 164,000t of manganese ore in March 2026, up from 159,000t a year earlier.

Full-year output for April 2025-March 2026 reached 1.9mn t, compared with 1.8mn t in the previous fiscal year. This higher supply has entered a market already facing softer domestic and export demand.

The result is a supply overhang across key trading hubs. Even if production growth is modest, weaker buying can quickly create surplus conditions in the manganese ore market.

For alloy producers, lower ore prices may ease cost pressure. But the benefit depends on whether ferro-manganese and silico-manganese demand recovers enough to support production margins.

For Moil, the challenge is balancing output growth with market absorption. Higher production supports volume targets, but weak demand forces price adjustments when inventories rise.

The May price cut therefore sends a clear signal. India’s manganese ore market needs stronger steel and alloy demand before pricing power can return.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Moil’s price cut shows that India’s manganese market is being driven by demand weakness, not raw material scarcity. Until steel and export bookings improve, higher mine output will continue to weigh on ore pricing.

Anglo American Copper Output Rises as Chile Offsets Quellaveco Grade Decline

Anglo American, Copper

Anglo American copper output rose slightly in the first quarter as stronger Chilean mine performance offset lower grades at Quellaveco in Peru. The global mining group produced 170,400t of copper during the quarter, up 1% from a year earlier.

Anglo American copper output was supported by higher throughput at Los Bronces and Collahuasi, along with improved recoveries at Collahuasi. Chilean copper production increased by 9% to 97,000t, while Peruvian output fell by 8% to 73,400t.

Anglo American copper output remains on track with unchanged 2026 guidance of 700,000-760,000t. The company had already lowered that target in February because of expected lower grades at Collahuasi.

The result confirms that copper remains Anglo’s strategic centre as the group continues reshaping its portfolio. Nickel is moving toward disposal, manganese is recovering from weather disruption, and copper is becoming the company’s clear lead business.

Los Bronces and Collahuasi Support Chilean Copper Performance

Los Bronces output rose by 12% to 48,500t after the restart of its second plant. The restart improved throughput and gave Anglo a stronger base in Chile during the quarter.

Collahuasi also delivered a stronger result. Anglo’s attributable share of production rose by 10% to 38,800t, supported by higher throughput and improved recoveries.

These gains helped offset weaker output from Quellaveco. The Peruvian mine faced expected lower grades, reducing copper production despite its importance as one of Anglo’s major growth assets.

The first-quarter result shows how copper production increasingly depends on ore grade, plant availability and recovery performance. Higher throughput can support output, but grade decline remains a major constraint across the industry.

Anglo’s growth is still weighted toward the second half of the year. Market attention will focus on Collahuasi’s return to higher-grade ore, the ramp-up of desalination capacity and the continued benefit from Los Bronces’ second plant restart.

The proposed merger with Teck Resources also remains important. Anglo said the deal is still on track for completion between September 2026 and March 2027. South Korean approval has been secured, leaving Chinese anti-monopoly clearance as the final major regulatory hurdle.

If completed, the merger would deepen Anglo’s copper exposure and reinforce the industry trend toward scale in high-quality copper assets.

Nickel Falls as Manganese Rebounds From Weather-Hit Base

Anglo’s nickel production fell by 7% year on year to 9,100t because of maintenance at Barro Alto and Codemin in Brazil. Barro Alto output declined by 7% to 7,500t, while Codemin fell by 6% to 1,600t.

The company expects nickel production to improve gradually from the second quarter. However, nickel is no longer central to Anglo’s long-term portfolio strategy.

Anglo is still working through the European Commission’s anti-monopoly review of the agreed sale of its nickel assets to MMG Singapore Resources. The deal is worth up to $500mn.

Manganese ore output rose sharply from a weak base. Anglo’s 40% attributable production jumped by 118% to just over 759,000t after operations recovered from the disruption caused by tropical cyclone Megan in early 2025.

Sales volumes rose even more strongly, increasing by 217% to 946,000t. However, weather still affected the business, with second-quarter output down 16% from the fourth quarter of 2025 because of adverse weather and cyclone Narelle.

The portfolio direction is now clearer. Anglo is prioritising copper and iron ore while continuing sale processes for steelmaking coal and De Beers. Nickel is becoming a disposal asset, and manganese remains a recovery story after weather-related disruption.

For copper markets, Anglo’s modest first-quarter increase is less important than its second-half execution. The company needs stronger grades, stable plant performance and project discipline to support its full-year copper target.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Anglo American’s first quarter shows that copper growth is increasingly a quality-of-ore and processing-efficiency story. The strategic focus now shifts to whether Collahuasi, Los Bronces and the Teck merger can turn Anglo into a more copper-led mining company.

South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens

South32 Manganese Ore

South32 manganese ore export prices to China have fallen for June shipments as weak alloy demand, ample port inventories and cautious buying pressure the import market. The Australian diversified metals producer lowered offers for both Australian and South African manganese ore, according to Chinese importers.

South32 manganese ore export prices for Australian 42% lumpy ore fell to $5.40/mtu cif China for June delivery. This was down by $0.50/mtu from May.

South32 also reduced its offer for South African 37% manganese ore to $5/mtu cif China. This was down by $0.40/mtu from the previous month.

South32 manganese ore export prices are an important signal for the wider manganese chain because China remains the largest global buyer of seaborne ore. When Chinese alloy plants slow purchases, overseas miners often need to adjust export offers to maintain sales momentum.

Chinese Alloy Weakness Cuts Restocking Appetite

Chinese importers have shown limited interest in restocking manganese ore because inventories remain sufficient and alloy prices are weakening. This has reduced spot buying urgency before the Labour Day holiday on 1-5 May.

Many alloy plants postponed ore feedstock purchases while waiting for clearer market direction after the holiday. This cautious behaviour has weakened the negotiating position of overseas ore suppliers.

The pressure is also visible in Chinese port prices. Australian 44-46% lumpy manganese ore fell to 43-47 yuan/mtu delivery ex quay on 28 April, down from 47-50 yuan/mtu on 31 March.

The decline shows that domestic buyers are not only resisting new import offers. They are also repricing available port material lower as downstream demand fails to improve.

Manganese ore demand is closely linked to ferro-manganese and silico-manganese production. These alloys are used in steelmaking, where manganese improves strength, deoxidation and performance.

When steel consumption slows, alloy plants reduce purchasing activity. This immediately affects ore demand because manganese alloy producers are the main consumers of imported ore.

Steel Demand Remains the Main Constraint

The deeper issue is weak steel demand in China. Slower economic growth and subdued construction activity have limited recovery in steel consumption, leaving alloy producers cautious about raw material buying.

Without a stronger steel recovery, manganese alloy prices are likely to remain under pressure. This limits the ability of alloy plants to pay higher ore prices, even when miners try to defend margins.

South32’s price cut also reflects wider seaborne competition. Mining firms outside China need to respond when Chinese buyers have enough stock and are unwilling to chase cargoes.

Australian high-grade lumpy ore usually commands stronger interest because of its quality and processing value. However, even higher-grade material can weaken when alloy margins are poor and port inventories are sufficient.

South African ore also remains exposed to Chinese demand swings. Lower-grade material can face sharper price pressure when buyers reduce procurement and focus only on immediate needs.

For the manganese market, the June price cut suggests that miners are prioritising volume discipline and customer access over holding elevated offers. The next price direction will depend on whether Chinese alloy plants return after the holiday with real restocking demand.

If steel demand remains weak, manganese ore prices could face further downside pressure. If alloy prices stabilise and inventories fall, importers may resume buying, but recovery is likely to be gradual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

South32’s price cut shows that the manganese market is being driven by demand absorption, not supply shortage. Until Chinese steel and alloy demand improves, seaborne manganese ore suppliers will remain exposed to cautious restocking and lower port prices.

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan Targets Supply Chain Security

US EU

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan marks a deeper transatlantic effort to secure strategic raw materials as China export controls and global protectionism reshape industrial supply chains. The US and EU have signed the plan to diversify sourcing, strengthen resilience and coordinate responses to mineral supply disruptions.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan is significant because it moves beyond general diplomatic language. It allows both sides to use trade and market tools, including border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies to close price gaps and offtake agreements.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan also includes stockpile cooperation, technical coordination, regulatory alignment and standards for mining, processing and recycling. This shows that Washington and Brussels are now treating critical minerals as industrial security assets, not only commodity inputs.

Price Floors and Offtake Tools Signal Stronger Market Intervention

The plan highlights a major shift in western raw materials policy. The US and EU are preparing to coordinate tools that can make non-China supply more commercially viable.

Border-adjusted price floors could help protect strategic mineral projects from low-cost competition. This matters because many western projects struggle to compete against established Chinese processing chains when prices fall.

Subsidies to address price gaps serve the same purpose. They can help bridge the cost difference between secure, traceable supply and cheaper material from dominant incumbent producers.

Offtake agreements are also central. Long-term purchase commitments can give miners, refiners and recyclers the revenue visibility needed to finance new capacity.

This is especially important for rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and other strategic materials. Many of these markets are small, volatile or heavily concentrated in processing.

The plan also points to standards-based markets. This could support supply chains where environmental, labour, traceability and security standards become part of pricing.

For suppliers, the message is clear. Western buyers may increasingly pay for origin, compliance and resilience, not only the lowest spot price.

Transatlantic Coordination Raises Pressure on China-Linked Supply Chains

The plan will be implemented by the office of the US trade representative and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for trade and economic security. That structure places critical minerals directly inside trade and economic security policy.

The US has already moved aggressively in critical minerals. It has used the Defense Production Act, supported price floors and offtake agreements, and invested in overseas mineral assets to reduce reliance on China.

The EU has historically been more cautious about direct market intervention. However, its position is changing as supply risks increase and European manufacturers face tighter access to strategic raw materials.

Earlier this month, the European Commission launched a critical raw materials platform to match EU buyers with suppliers and aggregate demand. The new US-EU action plan builds on that direction and gives Europe a broader external coordination channel.

Rapid response mechanisms are also important. Export controls, shipping disruption, sanctions or sudden shortages can quickly affect defence, semiconductors, batteries, magnets, aerospace and clean energy manufacturing.

Stockpile cooperation could provide a temporary buffer. But the larger strategic goal is to build durable supply, processing and recycling capacity across allied economies.

The plan therefore strengthens the policy architecture for western mineral security. It also raises the likelihood that future raw material trade will be shaped by origin rules, price support, industrial standards and government-backed purchasing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-US plan shows that critical minerals policy is moving from risk awareness to market design. The decisive question is whether price floors, offtakes and subsidies can create real processing capacity before the next supply shock hits.