US critical minerals list expands to 60 materials

US critical minerals

The US critical minerals list has expanded to 60 materials, reshaping policy for metals, energy and agriculture. The updated US critical minerals list now adds boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver and uranium. As a result, the US critical minerals list will guide US industrial strategy, investment priorities and supply chain risk management for years.

Why the US critical minerals list matters for industry

The new list reflects rising concern over supply chain vulnerability and geopolitical risk. US law requires the US Geological Survey to review critical minerals every three years, based on domestic manufacturing needs and import exposure. This process now captures more metals with defence, clean energy and advanced manufacturing applications.

Government agencies played a decisive role in shaping the final list. The Department of Defense pushed to keep arsenic and tellurium, citing key national security uses. The Department of Energy backed metallurgical coal and uranium because of their importance for steel, power generation and defence. These decisions show how critical mineral policy is converging with broader security and industrial goals.

Boron’s inclusion highlights growing dependence on specialised inputs for steelmaking and high-tech uses. The US relies heavily on ferro-boron imports from China, creating a strategic vulnerability. By classifying boron as critical, policymakers can prioritise domestic projects, alternative suppliers and recycling pathways.

Agriculture, fertilizers and the critical minerals agenda

Fertilizer inputs now sit squarely inside the critical minerals framework. Phosphate and potash both entered the list, reflecting their central role in food security. Industry group The Fertilizer Institute welcomed the move, expecting clearer policy support for investment and capacity growth.

Phosphate’s addition is especially significant for US farmers. Market participants and officials had campaigned for its inclusion after the draft list omitted it. The US Department of Agriculture ultimately backed phosphate as a critical mineral because crop yields and global food stability depend on reliable, affordable supply.

As a result, fertilizer supply chains may see more targeted incentives, permitting support and risk monitoring. Recognising phosphate and potash as critical could reduce price volatility and import shocks, while encouraging long-term domestic production and storage strategies.

 

The Metalnomist Commentary

Washington’s broader US critical minerals list strategy now clearly reaches beyond battery metals into steel, energy and fertilizers. By aligning national security, climate policy and food security inside one critical minerals framework, the US is quietly redrawing the map of “strategic materials.” For miners, processors and recyclers, this list will increasingly shape where capital flows and which projects move fastest through the policy pipeline.

US Antimony Bolivia Processing Facility Expands the Western Antimony Supply Chain

US Antimony, Bolivia plant

The US Antimony Bolivia processing facility could strengthen one of the West’s most constrained critical mineral chains. US Antimony said it helped develop a hydrometallurgical facility in Bolivia to refine antimony and other critical minerals at commercial scale. The company will be the sole recipient of processed antimony flake from the site. As a result, the US Antimony Bolivia processing facility may become an important upstream support point for western antimony supply.

This development matters because antimony remains strategically sensitive and commercially tight. US Antimony expects the higher-quality flake from Bolivia to raise throughput at its Thompson Falls smelter in Montana. The company plans to receive an initial 150-metric-tonne shipment in February or March. Therefore, the US Antimony Bolivia processing facility is not just a technology project. It is already linking directly to near-term metal and trioxide production.

The agreement also gives US Antimony more than supply access. The company secured the exclusive right to duplicate the Bolivian hydrometallurgical process in North America and Australia. That means the US Antimony Bolivia processing facility could serve as a template for wider regional expansion. Consequently, the project may help create a more scalable western antimony processing model.

Hydrometallurgical Antimony Processing Offers a Faster Route to Capacity Growth

Hydrometallurgical antimony processing is becoming the most important strategic feature of this deal. US Antimony said the Bolivian facility expanded output 15-fold since it began funding the site in mid-2025. That rise suggests the processing route can scale quickly when supported with capital and feedstock. As a result, hydrometallurgical antimony processing may offer a more flexible alternative to slower traditional capacity build-outs.

The feedstock base also supports the project’s commercial relevance. The facility uses stibnite concentrate or tetrahedrite concentrate to produce antimony. That flexibility matters because diversified feed options can improve plant utilisation and reduce procurement risk. Meanwhile, the company noted that similar methods and equipment could also refine other critical minerals. Therefore, the process may carry broader value beyond antimony alone.

This model fits the current strategic environment in critical minerals. Governments and processors increasingly want smaller, faster, and more adaptable refining assets. Large mining projects still matter, but midstream processing gaps often create the real bottlenecks. Consequently, hydrometallurgical antimony processing may attract stronger attention from both policymakers and investors.

Western Antimony Supply Chain Ambitions Are Moving Toward Domestic Replication

Western antimony supply chain strategy now appears to be shifting from dependence toward duplication. US Antimony said it expects to develop one or more hydrometallurgical facilities in the United States in the near future. Those sites would likely be located in the western continental US and or Alaska. Therefore, the company is clearly aiming to regionalise the process rather than rely on Bolivia alone.

Funding plans reinforce that ambition. US Antimony requested $44mn from the US Department of Energy for a US hydrometallurgical facility. It also plans to seek Department of Defense support for another location near Montana. That combination suggests the company sees antimony as both a commercial opportunity and a strategic materials priority. As a result, the western antimony supply chain could gain a stronger domestic processing base if funding is secured.

The broader implication is significant for critical minerals markets. Antimony has often been discussed as a supply risk, but less often as a processing challenge. This project changes that framing by focusing on conversion capacity and material quality. If US Antimony can replicate the Bolivian model successfully, it may move from being a niche processor to a more important builder of western antimony supply resilience.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This story matters because it is about process control as much as metal supply. US Antimony is trying to turn one successful hydrometallurgical model into a repeatable western platform. If that strategy works, antimony could become a rare example of a critical mineral chain that improves through midstream replication rather than waiting for major new mines.

U.S. Finalizes Massive Solar Tariffs, Reshaping Southeast Asia’s Export Landscape

US solar

Commerce Department sets duties as high as 3,400% on solar products from Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia

The U.S. Department of Commerce has concluded a landmark trade investigation by imposing some of the highest anti-dumping and countervailing duties ever recorded on imported solar panels. The decision targets silicon photovoltaic cells and modules from four Southeast Asian nations: Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia.

These duties follow a year-long investigation into allegations that Chinese solar companies, previously subject to tariffs, shifted operations to Southeast Asia in an attempt to bypass U.S. trade regulations. The move is widely regarded as a turning point for the global solar supply chain, with U.S. officials and industry leaders viewing it as a necessary step to restore fair competition.

According to the final determination, some companies—particularly those that failed to comply with the Commerce Department’s requests—will now face duties exceeding 3,400%, an unprecedented figure. For example, four Cambodian firms, including Jintek and ISC, will be subject to this highest tier. In comparison, these same companies were only facing duties of 68% under the preliminary findings issued in October 2024.

On a broader scale, countrywide anti-dumping rates have also surged. Vietnam faces an average rate of 271%, Thailand 111%, and Cambodia 125%. Malaysia, while receiving the lowest general rate—just under 9%—still saw several of its companies slapped with individual duties over 80%, due to non-cooperation during the investigation.

The Commerce Department also imposed steep countervailing duties, which are used to offset the benefits companies receive from government subsidies. Cambodia again ranked highest, with a countrywide rate near 535%, while Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia saw rates of 125%, 264%, and 32%, respectively. The lowest countervailing duty—under 15%—was assigned to Hanwha Q Cells Malaysian subsidiary.

These tariffs are expected to take effect in June 2025, pending the final approval of the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). In certain cases, particularly in Thailand and Vietnam, duties may apply retroactively if the agencies determine that "critical circumstances" exist—such as import surges meant to beat the implementation timeline.

The ruling stems from a petition filed by the American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing Trade Committee, which includes prominent U.S. solar companies like FirstSolar, Mission Solar, and the U.S. arm of Hanwha Q Cells. The coalition argues that Chinese firms exploited a tariff moratorium enacted by President Biden in 2022 to reroute supply chains and avoid penalties, effectively distorting the market.

Tim Brightbill, legal counsel for the petitioner coalition, welcomed the decision. He emphasized that the tariffs represent a major victory for domestic manufacturers and are essential to encouraging long-term investment in the American solar industry. “These duties will go a long way toward protecting U.S. jobs and restoring a level playing field,” Brightbill said.

Industry analysts believe that the tariffs will have a ripple effect on solar deployment in the U.S., at least in the short term. Project developers who rely heavily on low-cost imported modules may face delays or cost increases. However, domestic producers see the ruling as a long overdue reset that prioritizes manufacturing resilience over low-cost imports.

As the global solar sector undergoes this structural shift, all eyes are on how China and Southeast Asian exporters will respond—and how U.S. clean energy goals will adapt to a more protected domestic market.

Vulcan US magnet plant signals new era for recycled rare earth magnets

Vulcan Elements

The Vulcan US magnet plant will anchor a new recycled rare earth magnet supply chain in North America. The project targets 10,000 metric tonnes per year of magnet production, focused on recycling magnets and electronic waste. As a result, the Vulcan US magnet plant directly supports US reshoring efforts in rare earth magnets for defence and clean energy.

Vulcan US magnet plant built on public–private financing

The Vulcan US magnet plant will rely on a blended finance structure combining US government and private capital. Vulcan secured a $620mn direct loan from the Department of Defense and $50mn in equity from the US Department of Commerce, alongside $550mn in private funding. This mix underlines Washington’s view of rare earth magnets as critical defence infrastructure rather than a pure commodity business.

Vulcan’s structure also gives federal agencies upside exposure. The Defense Department will receive warrants in both Vulcan and its processing partner ReElement Technologies, while Commerce takes a direct equity stake in Vulcan. Therefore the capital stack aligns national security objectives with commercial returns, a pattern increasingly common across US critical minerals projects.

Recycling and diversified feedstock at the heart of the model

Vulcan partners with ReElement Technologies to convert end-of-life magnets, electronic waste and mined concentrates into high-purity rare earth oxides. This model leans on urban mining and recycling to reduce dependence on imported primary rare earths. In parallel, supply agreements with Energy Fuels and ReElement provide neodymium-praseodymium and dysprosium oxides, plus broader light and heavy rare earth oxides.

The plant’s design aims squarely at high-performance permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence platforms. By combining recycled material with mined concentrates, the project improves resilience against export controls and price volatility. If the Vulcan US magnet plant ramps as planned, it could become a key node in a closed-loop rare earth ecosystem in the US.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Vulcan’s entry shows how the magnet segment is becoming the strategic front line of rare earth industrial policy. Government-backed recycling-centric capacity may set a benchmark for future US projects, especially as defence supply chain audits tighten. The real test will be scaling efficiently while meeting strict magnet performance specs for automotive and defence customers.

USA Rare Earth Separation Project Gains DOE Support in Oklahoma

US Department of Energy

USA Rare Earth separation project plans in Stillwater, Oklahoma, have gained federal support as the company prepares to scale pilot rare earth processing technology. USA Rare Earth will receive up to $19.3mn from the US Department of Energy for a pilot-scale rare earth separation project.

USA Rare Earth separation project funding will come through the DOE’s Critical Materials Innovation, Efficiency and Alternatives programme. The total project value is $50.5mn, with $31.2mn expected from non-DOE sources.

USA Rare Earth separation project work will demonstrate a pilot-scale continuous ion exchange rare earth production operation. The facility aims to move the company’s bench-scale process toward a pre-commercial unit.

The project matters because rare earth separation remains one of the most difficult gaps in the US magnet supply chain. Mining rare earth material is not enough unless it can be separated, purified and converted into magnet-ready inputs.

Continuous Ion Exchange Targets Rare Earth Processing Bottleneck

The Stillwater facility will test continuous ion exchange technology as a potential alternative to incumbent solvent extraction. Solvent extraction is widely used in rare earth separation, but it can be complex, chemical-intensive and difficult to scale efficiently.

Continuous ion exchange could offer a different route if it proves technically reliable, cost-effective and suitable for commercial production. The DOE’s support signals that Washington is looking for processing technologies that can reduce dependence on existing separation models.

This is strategically important because separation is the midstream bottleneck in rare earth supply chains. Concentrates and mixed rare earth products must be separated into individual oxides before they can support magnets, defence systems, electronics and clean technology manufacturing.

The project timeline has not been disclosed. That leaves the pace of scale-up uncertain, but the funding gives USAR a stronger platform to move from laboratory development toward industrial demonstration.

For the US, the project aligns with a broader effort to create domestic rare earth processing capacity. Without separation, upstream resources cannot become secure industrial supply.

Magnet Ambition Depends on Separation Scale-Up

USAR is developing a fully integrated US rare earth and permanent magnet supply chain. The company plans to produce 10,000 t/yr of magnets by 2030.

That target depends on more than magnet assembly. USAR needs reliable rare earth feedstock, separation, metal-making, alloying and customer qualification before it can reach meaningful commercial output.

The Stillwater project could support that integration by strengthening the separation stage. If continuous ion exchange scales successfully, USAR may gain a more controlled route from rare earth feedstock to magnet materials.

Federal backing is also increasing. The US Department of Commerce issued USAR a letter of intent in January to provide $277mn of federal funding and a $1.3bn loan.

That level of support shows how rare earths have become part of US industrial policy. Washington is trying to build domestic capacity across the value chain, not only encourage private-sector exploration.

The key challenge remains execution. Pilot separation must prove stable, scalable and economical before it can support a 10,000 t/yr magnet target.

The Metalnomist Commentary

USAR’s DOE-backed project shows that rare earth security now depends on process technology as much as mining. If continuous ion exchange can scale, it could help close one of the most important gaps in the US permanent magnet supply chain.

US Gallium Recovery Projects Target Domestic Supply Chain for Defense and Semiconductors

DOE(The US Department of Energy)

US gallium recovery projects will receive $5.4mn in funding from the Department of Energy as Washington tries to rebuild domestic supply for a metal critical to defense systems, semiconductors and advanced electronics. The funding will support five US-based projects under the Technology for Recovery and Advanced Critical-material Extraction – Gallium initiative.

The TRACE-Ga initiative is designed to prototype technologies that can recover gallium from US metal-processing feedstocks. This is important because the US is fully import-reliant for gallium and has not produced the metal domestically since 1987.

US gallium recovery projects are gaining urgency because gallium is essential for compound semiconductor materials, including gallium nitride. These materials support power electronics, radio-frequency devices, radar systems, satellite communications, fast chargers, LEDs and other high-performance technologies.

The funding is modest in scale, but strategically important. It signals that the US is no longer focusing only on mining new critical minerals. It is also trying to recover strategic metals from industrial by-products, waste streams and existing processing networks.

TRACE-Ga Funding Targets Recovery From Existing Feedstocks

The DOE award will support five companies working on gallium recovery technologies. Participants include PHNX Materials, Atlantic Alumina Company, Found Energy, Kunin Technologies and Indium Corporation.

The selection of companies shows how broad the recovery opportunity could become. Gallium is not usually mined as a primary product. It is commonly recovered as a by-product from other industrial processes, especially alumina and zinc-related supply chains.

This makes gallium recovery different from conventional mining. The key challenge is not only finding deposits, but identifying feedstocks where gallium exists in recoverable concentrations and developing technologies that can extract it economically.

Industrial waste refiner PHNX Materials could support recovery from complex waste streams. Atlantic Alumina Company brings relevance to alumina-linked feedstock. Found Energy adds an aluminum-related industrial angle, while Kunin Technologies focuses on mineral by-product recovery. Indium Corporation brings downstream metals refining and manufacturing expertise.

The TRACE-Ga initiative therefore targets the middle of the supply chain. It seeks to bridge the gap between laboratory recovery methods and scalable domestic production.

That gap matters because gallium supply is highly concentrated. China dominates primary gallium production and has used export controls to increase pressure on global buyers. For US defense and semiconductor supply chains, reliance on foreign gallium has become a clear strategic risk.

Domestic recovery could help reduce that exposure. Even if early projects produce limited volumes, they can prove process routes, identify feedstock partners and create the technical base for larger recovery systems.

The use of US metal-processing feedstocks also fits a wider circular materials strategy. Instead of waiting for new mines, the US can extract critical materials from industrial streams already moving through domestic facilities.

This could make recovery faster than new primary production. However, it still requires technical success, feedstock security, refining capability and customer qualification.

Gallium Nitride Demand Raises Strategic Pressure

Gallium’s strategic value has increased because of its role in gallium nitride and other compound semiconductor materials. Gallium nitride is widely used where high power, high frequency, efficiency and heat performance matter.

These applications are highly relevant to defense and advanced electronics. Radar, communications systems, satellite technologies, power conversion equipment and semiconductor devices all rely on materials where gallium can be difficult to substitute.

The DOE’s TRACE-Ga funding also sits alongside a larger notice of funding opportunity of up to $69mn. That programme targets technologies and processes that advance domestic production and refining of critical materials, including gallium and gallium nitride for semiconductor applications.

This shows that Washington is building a layered funding strategy. TRACE-Ga supports recovery prototypes, while broader DOE programmes aim to scale refining, alloying and advanced material production.

For the semiconductor industry, domestic gallium supply is not only a raw material issue. It is connected to wafer production, epitaxy, device manufacturing, packaging and defense procurement. A shortage or export disruption at the gallium stage can move through the entire compound semiconductor chain.

This is why gallium recovery matters even if volumes are small at first. Strategic materials often have low tonnage but high consequence. A reliable domestic supply stream can reduce procurement risk for critical systems.

The challenge will be commercialisation. Recovery from waste and by-products can be technically complex because gallium concentrations may be low and feedstock chemistry can vary. Companies must prove that their processes can recover gallium consistently, meet purity requirements and operate at competitive cost.

The US also needs downstream refining capacity. Recovering gallium-bearing material is not enough if the material cannot be refined into forms suitable for semiconductor and defense applications.

The DOE funding is therefore best understood as an early-stage industrial rebuilding tool. It does not immediately solve US gallium dependence, but it helps create the technologies and partnerships needed to rebuild supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

US gallium recovery projects show that critical mineral security increasingly depends on recovering by-products from existing industrial systems. The strategic test will be whether TRACE-Ga can move beyond prototypes and create reliable domestic feedstock for gallium nitride, defense electronics and semiconductor manufacturing.

GTP Tungsten Oxide Stockpile Expansion Strengthens US Defense Supply

GTP Tungsten & Powders

GTP tungsten oxide stockpile plans will expand US access to one of the most strategically sensitive defense metals. Global Tungsten and Powders plans to raise tungsten oxide production capacity at its Towanda, Pennsylvania, plant to about 12,000 t/yr.

The GTP tungsten oxide stockpile will support US defense and critical industries, with initial deliveries expected later this year. The company did not disclose the exact volume dedicated to the reserve.

The GTP tungsten oxide stockpile is significant because tungsten is essential for armour-piercing ammunition, aircraft engine components, electronics, hard metals and other high-performance applications. Defence currently accounts for about 10% of global tungsten demand, but that share is rising as military budgets expand.

GTP, part of Austria’s Plansee group, already has around 10,000 t/yr of tungsten oxide capacity, although output can vary by about 15% depending on operating conditions. The planned expansion would give the US a stronger domestic platform for strategic tungsten oxide supply.

Recycling-Based Supply Supports Traceability and Security

The stockpile will use tungsten oxide sourced from recycled scrap and concentrates. This structure is important because US strategic materials procurement increasingly requires clear sourcing, traceability and supply-chain security.

Recycling is already central to GTP’s Towanda operation. Recycled material accounted for the majority of supply in 2025, when the plant recorded a recycling rate of 90%.

This gives the project a stronger compliance profile. Tungsten supply chains are exposed to geopolitical risk, concentrated processing and origin scrutiny, so recycled feedstock can help reduce dependence on higher-risk primary sources.

Tungsten recycling also supports industrial resilience. Scrap recovery can preserve valuable metal units inside the US system while reducing exposure to foreign concentrate availability.

For defense users, the key requirement is not only tonnage. They need reliable, traceable and qualified material that can be converted into powders, carbides, alloys and components without supply interruption.

The Towanda expansion therefore addresses a strategic gap. It does not only increase tungsten oxide capacity; it creates a more controlled domestic reserve tied to recycled and traceable inputs.

Stockpiling Moves From Emergency Buffer to Industrial Tool

Plansee US Holding has formed a joint venture with Manhattan Five to establish the stockpile. Manhattan Five will oversee warehousing, logistics and long-term asset management, while Plansee will lead production growth and supply.

The structure separates metal production from storage and asset management. That distinction matters because strategic stockpiles require more than buying material. They need inventory systems, logistics, inspection, rotation policies and long-term custody control.

The Defense Logistics Agency manages strategic and critical material procurement for the National Defense Stockpile. This system supports military and federal customers that need access to critical materials during supply disruptions.

The GTP project aligns with broader US priorities and could qualify for support from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy or the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

Washington is also preparing Project Vault, a proposed $12bn critical minerals stockpile for US manufacturers. The programme would be funded by $2bn in private capital and a loan.

The broader policy direction is clear. The US is moving from passive dependence on global tungsten markets toward active supply-chain positioning through stockpiles, domestic processing, recycling and public-private financing.

For tungsten markets, this could tighten competition for clean feedstock, especially recycled scrap and compliant concentrates. It may also raise the strategic value of processors that can meet US sourcing and traceability rules.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GTP’s tungsten oxide expansion shows that US stockpiling is becoming more industrially sophisticated. The strategic advantage will come not from holding material alone, but from linking stockpiles to recycling, domestic processing and qualified defense supply chains.

ReElement Rare Earth Processing Award Strengthens US Mine-to-Magnet Strategy

ReElement

ReElement rare earth processing has gained fresh support from the US Department of Defense through a $2mn award to expand separation capacity in Marion, Indiana. The funding reflects Washington’s continued push to reduce reliance on Chinese-dominated rare earth supply chains and build domestic processing capacity for defense and commercial applications.

The two-year award will support processing of ores, recycled magnets, and manufacturing waste. This is important because the US rare earth supply chain needs more than new mines. It also needs refining, separation, recycling, and oxide production capacity that can feed permanent magnet manufacturing.

ReElement rare earth processing uses chromatography-based refining technology to produce high-purity rare earth oxides. These oxides are used in permanent magnets for defense systems, electric motors, electronics, and other advanced industrial applications.

Rare Earth Separation Remains the Critical Bottleneck

Rare earth separation is one of the most important weaknesses in the Western critical minerals supply chain. Mining projects can produce concentrates, but those materials must still be separated and refined into usable oxides before they can support magnet production.

The Department of Defense award targets that gap. By supporting ReElement rare earth processing in Indiana, the US is trying to expand the domestic industrial base around materials that are essential for missiles, aircraft, radar systems, robotics, electric vehicles, wind power, and precision electronics.

The funding also covers recycled magnets and manufacturing waste, which could strengthen circular supply channels. Recycling cannot replace primary supply entirely, but it can reduce dependence on imported feedstock and improve resilience when geopolitical tensions disrupt traditional flows.

Defense Funding Supports the 2027 Mine-to-Magnet Initiative

The award is part of the Department of Defense’s 2027 mine-to-magnet initiative. That strategy aims to connect raw material sourcing, separation, oxide production, metal making, alloying, and magnet manufacturing inside a more secure domestic and allied supply chain.

The funding comes through the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program. Since 2014, the program has invested more than $2.6bn across 207 projects to expand US industrial base capacity. This shows that rare earths are now treated as a defense-industrial issue, not only a mining or technology issue.

The delayed announcement also highlights the importance of continuity in critical minerals policy. Government shutdowns and budget delays can slow execution, but the strategic direction remains clear. The US wants more domestic capacity for rare earth processing, especially for materials tied to permanent magnets and national security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The ReElement award is small in dollar terms but important in strategic direction. The US rare earth challenge will not be solved by mining alone; the real contest is in separation, refining, recycling, and magnet-ready material production.

US EV Charger Domestic Content Rule Could Reshape Charging Supply Chains

US, EV Charger

US EV charger domestic content rule could significantly reshape the charging equipment market. The US Department of Transportation has proposed raising domestic content requirements from 55pc to 100pc for federally funded EV chargers. The proposal would also end the Buy America public interest waiver introduced in 2023. As a result, the US EV charger domestic content rule could force a major reset in sourcing, assembly, and project execution.

This matters because federally funded EV chargers sit at the center of public charging expansion in the United States. If the proposal is adopted, projects in the acquisition or installation phase would need final assembly in the US and fully domestic components. That would sharply tighten compliance expectations. Therefore, the US EV charger domestic content rule would go well beyond a minor procurement change.

The proposal also arrives against a weak deployment backdrop. The Biden administration allocated $7.5bn in 2021 for EV charging stations. Yet only eight operational charging stations had been installed by June 2024. Consequently, the new rule raises a core policy question: will stricter domestic sourcing accelerate industrial buildout or slow charger deployment further?

Buy America EV Chargers Policy Now Favors Full Domestic Sourcing

Buy America EV chargers policy is clearly moving toward a far stricter interpretation. The earlier waiver allowed federally backed projects to move forward under more flexible sourcing rules. Removing that waiver would end that transition path. As a result, manufacturers and project developers would face a much narrower compliance window.

This shift could support domestic manufacturing if suppliers can scale quickly enough. US-based charger assembly, components, and sub-systems could all benefit from stronger policy protection. However, the transition may be difficult for companies still relying on mixed international supply chains. Therefore, Buy America EV chargers policy may reward a small group of prepared suppliers first.

The biggest challenge may be component depth. Final assembly in the US is one requirement. Full US-made EV charger components is a much harder threshold. That means the rule could expose weak points in power electronics, connectors, enclosures, and other charging hardware inputs. Meanwhile, compliance verification may become more complex for project owners.

Federally Funded EV Chargers Could Face a New Trade-Off

Federally funded EV chargers may now face a sharper trade-off between industrial policy and rollout speed. A 100pc domestic content rule can strengthen US manufacturing intent. But it can also reduce supplier flexibility and raise procurement friction. As a result, charger deployment timelines may face new pressure during the transition.

That trade-off matters because the current buildout has already moved slowly. Public charging expansion depends not only on funding, but also on permitting, grid connection, equipment supply, and contractor readiness. A stricter sourcing rule adds one more layer to that process. Therefore, federally funded EV chargers may become a test case for how far domestic content policy can go without harming project delivery.

The broader industrial signal is still important. Washington appears to be treating EV charging infrastructure as a strategic manufacturing category, not only a transport category. That places chargers closer to the wider US reshoring agenda. Consequently, the US EV charger domestic content rule could influence how future clean infrastructure policies are designed.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This proposal matters because it turns EV chargers into a more explicit industrial policy tool. The US is no longer only trying to fund charging growth. It is trying to localize the entire equipment chain behind that growth. If domestic suppliers cannot scale fast enough, deployment may slow before it strengthens.

US titanium scrap-sponge ratio set to shift as melters chase margins

Titanium Scrap

The US titanium scrap-sponge ratio is poised to shift as melters chase cheaper inputs in 2026. Premium titanium sponge prices and weak downstream demand are squeezing margins and forcing producers to reconsider melt mixes. As a result, the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio could move decisively toward higher scrap utilization across many grades.

Furnace expansions support higher scrap utilization

Capacity expansions at ATI, Perryman and Timet will give melters more room to adjust the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio. Their projects are expected to add nearly 30,000 t/yr of ingot production capacity once fully ramped, according to Metalnomist estimates. Consequently, scrap utilization capacity could rise by 22pc to 111,215t in 2026 compared with 2024, ELG Utica Alloys’ Nick Corby told the International Titanium Association conference.

However, not every alloy can fully pivot away from sponge, because certain grades still require premium sponge for purity. Grade 5 (6Al-4V) ingot can be melted from 100pc scrap, which encourages a higher US titanium scrap-sponge ratio when prices favor recycled inputs. Importantly, melters can alter the scrap and sponge ratio without major downtime, allowing them to track raw material prices and supply conditions in real time.

Meanwhile, destocking in commercial aerospace could cap the practical impact of these technical options. Boeing and Airbus are signalling another year of subdued orders for ingot and milled products as they normalise inventory. This means melters already grappling with weaker demand may push deliveries out or no-quote dealers on certain grades, even as the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio tilts structurally toward scrap.

Global scrap flows deepen market distortions

Scrap sourcing dynamics will play a critical role in how far the US titanium scrap-sponge ratio can shift. The US accounts for around 95pc of global consumption of aerospace-grade titanium scrap, making it the natural sink for high-grade revert. Imports are crucial, covering more than half of US raw material needs and bridging gaps in domestic generation.

Historically, Europe supplied much of this scrap, reflecting its strong base of forging and machining operations. Long-standing supply agreements and buy-back schemes cemented a circular flow of titanium between the two regions. However, shifts in downstream processing toward Asia are eroding Europe’s share, even as titanium activity in countries like China accelerates.

China is on track to increase global titanium scrap exports by 64pc in 2025 to 5,874t, with most of that likely moving into the US. Officially, the US has only imported 434t of titanium scrap from China this year, US Commerce Department data show. Yet market participants say Chinese-origin scrap often reaches the US via other Asian countries to circumvent 25pc tariffs, complicating visibility.

As a result, the supply chain looks “inconsistent”, with scrap availability not matching lower generation rates caused by delayed aircraft build schedules and OEM stockpiles. Corby noted that imports are expected to exceed exports by 19,460t this year, the widest gap since records began. At the same time, European ferro-titanium consumers face weak steel demand and index-driven price pressure, cutting their appetite for scrap and pushing more material toward US buyers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The evolving US titanium scrap-sponge ratio highlights how price signals, furnace investments and trade flows interact across the titanium ecosystem. For melters, flexibility in melt mixes is becoming a strategic hedge against stubborn sponge prices and volatile aerospace demand. For scrap generators and intermediaries, rising US dependence and opaque routing via Asia could keep differentials wide — and margins attractive — well into the next aerospace upcycle.

US Releases Initial Antidumping Duty Rates on Ferro-Silicon Imports from Brazil, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan

FerroGlobe, Ferro-Silicon

The US Department of Commerce has announced the preliminary antidumping duty (AD) rates for ferro-silicon (FeSi) imports from Brazil, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan. The initial duty rates vary by country and producer, with most foreign entities falling below 10%, signaling a moderate level of protectionism against what is perceived as unfair pricing practices in the sector. These decisions come amid an ongoing investigation and could have significant implications for the US ferro-silicon industry.

Preliminary AD Rates for Brazilian, Malaysian, and Kazakh Ferro-Silicon Producers

The following initial AD rates have been determined:

1. Brazil:

• Minasligas: 1.18%
• Companhia de Ferro Ligas da Bahia (Ferbasa): 13.13%
• Ligas de Alumino: 21.78%
• "All others": 13.13%

2. Malaysia:

• OM Sarawak: 6.91%
• Pertama Ferralloys: 9.01%
• "All others": 7.84%

3. Kazakhstan:

• YDD, Asia Ferroalloys, and KazSilicon Metallurgical Combine: 4.22%
• TNC Kazchrome: 6.2%
• "All others": 4.67%

In addition to these AD rates, importers must pay cash deposit rates to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). For example, Brazilian importers will be required to pay rates ranging from 1.06% to 13.03% depending on the exporter. Notably, there are no cash deposit requirements for imports from Kazakhstan, further highlighting the complexity of the trade case.

Ongoing Investigation and Potential Impact on US Ferro-Silicon Industry

The Commerce Department’s final ruling is expected by May 17, with an injury determination scheduled from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) by April 29. This investigation is running concurrently with a countervailing duty (CVD) probe into the imports from these countries. The case initially arose from petitions filed by FerroGlobe's US subsidiary and CC Metals and Alloys, two key players in the US ferro-silicon industry, in response to perceived market distortions.

In 2023, shipments from Brazil, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan accounted for 77% (152,073 metric tonnes) of the total US ferro-silicon imports, making this investigation crucial for the local industry.

The outcome of this case will likely affect future imports and pricing dynamics in the US market, as well as the competitiveness of domestic ferro-silicon producers.

US Expands Semiconductor Investments with India Partnership

India Chip

The US government continues to ramp up investments in semiconductor manufacturing both domestically and internationally, with a significant focus on partnerships with allied nations. This week, a major agreement was reached between the US and Indian governments to establish a new semiconductor plant in Kolkata, India. The facility will focus on producing advanced semiconductors, including infrared, gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC), to support sectors such as national security, next-gen telecommunications, and clean energy.

Strengthening Tech Ties: US-India Collaborations

This venture is a part of a broader collaboration supported by the US Space Force, Bharat Semi, 3rdiTech, and the India Semiconductor Mission. The mission, initiated by India's electronics and IT ministry (MIIT), aims to build a robust semiconductor supply chain, supported by the US Department of Commerce’s International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund. The fund itself is a key initiative under the CHIPS and Science Act, designed to bolster US semiconductor production.

In addition to the plant in Kolkata, US-based Analog Devices has also signed a partnership with India's Tata Electronics. Their collaboration focuses on chip production at Tata's planned $11bn manufacturing plant in Gujarat, with a potential $3bn facility for chip assembly and testing in Assam. Furthermore, US manufacturer GlobalFoundries, after acquiring Tagore Technology’s power GaN IP, announced plans to develop a Kolkata Power Centre for GaN technology.

On the domestic front, the US Commerce Department recently awarded Polar Semiconductor up to $123mn to expand its silicon wafer manufacturing in Bloomington, Minnesota. This marks the first allocation under the CHIPS Act for commercial chip production, which has sparked over $400bn in private semiconductor investments and more than $35bn across 16 states.

Perpetua antimony mine development wins US approval and financing support

Perpetua antimony mining

Perpetua antimony mine development at the Stibnite Gold project has cleared a major US regulatory hurdle. The US Forest Service has granted conditional approval to begin mine construction after eight years of permitting review. As a result, Perpetua Resources can now advance early works, subject to securing full project financing.

US backs Perpetua antimony mine development with blended public and private finance

Perpetua antimony mine development is now underpinned by a substantial mix of equity, grants and planned debt. The company raised $425mn in June through a $325mn public share offering and a $100mn private placement. Meanwhile, Perpetua expects to secure up to $2bn in debt financing from the US Export-Import Bank, significantly derisking the project’s capital stack.

In parallel, the US Department of Defense has already provided more than $80mn, including $6.9mn from the US Army in May. This direct support confirms antimony’s status as a strategic material for defense and national security. Therefore the Stibnite Gold development sits squarely within Washington’s broader push to localise critical mineral supply chains.

Perpetua antimony mine development targets China-dependent supply gap

The Perpetua antimony mine development comes as the US confronts a complete lack of commercial-scale domestic antimony production. According to the US Geological Survey, the country currently produces no primary antimony at scale. However, demand remains robust for military uses, flame retardants and antimony–lead alloys in batteries and cables.

China’s December ban on antimony exports to the US has sharpened urgency around diversification. As a result, US policymakers view Stibnite Gold as a flagship project for rebuilding secure supply outside Chinese control. If executed on time and budget, the mine could reduce exposure to geopolitical shocks in a tight global antimony market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Perpetua’s progress illustrates how quickly critical mineral projects can move once policy, capital and security interests align. The decisive test will be execution: any delays or cost overruns could reopen the US antimony gap and reinforce China’s leverage in this niche but vital market.

US Solar Duties Target Asian Cell Imports as Washington Defends Domestic Manufacturing

US solar

US solar duties on cells and modules from India, Indonesia and Laos will raise the cost of imported photovoltaic products after the Commerce Department issued preliminary antidumping findings. The decision allows customs authorities to begin collecting cash deposits from importers.

US solar duties are part of a broader trade case brought by domestic manufacturers that accuse foreign producers of selling solar products at unfairly low prices. The case covers crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules imported into the US market.

US solar duties now combine antidumping margins with earlier countervailing duties. General preliminary duty rates stand at roughly 234% for India, 140% for Indonesia and 103% for Laos.

The decision comes at a critical point for the US solar supply chain. Washington is trying to expand domestic clean energy manufacturing while reducing dependence on lower-cost Asian imports.

Duties Raise Costs for India, Indonesia and Laos Solar Supply

The preliminary antidumping margins differ by country and company. Indian producers face the steepest margin, at about 123%.

Companies in Indonesia face a lower dumping margin of about 35%, while firms in Laos face around 22%. These rates come on top of countervailing duties announced earlier this year.

The combined duty levels could significantly affect solar module sourcing decisions. Importers may need to reassess contracts, landed costs and supply availability if final rates remain high.

The investigation was triggered by a petition from the Alliance for American Solar Manufacturing and Trade. The group includes US manufacturers such as First Solar and Mission Solar Energy, along with Qcells, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Hanwha.

The coalition argued that companies in the three countries benefited from subsidies and sold solar products into the US at unfairly low prices. It also alleged that Chinese-linked manufacturers operating in Southeast Asia were undercutting American-made products.
The decision strengthens the trade protection around US solar manufacturing. But it may also raise near-term procurement costs for developers that depend on imported cells and modules.

Domestic Manufacturing Push Collides With Deployment Costs

The case highlights the tension inside US clean energy policy. The government wants more domestic solar manufacturing, but the solar deployment market still relies heavily on imported equipment.

Antidumping tariffs are intended to counter imports sold below normal value. Countervailing duties target products that benefit from government subsidies.
Together, these duties can protect domestic producers from price competition that regulators view as unfair. They can also reshape trade flows by pushing buyers toward alternative origins or US-made products.

For manufacturers, the ruling supports investment in domestic capacity. Higher duties can improve the competitiveness of US-made solar products and encourage new factory spending.

For project developers, the impact is more complicated. Higher module costs can pressure project economics, especially where power purchase agreements, tax credits and construction budgets were based on cheaper imported supply.

Commerce is expected to issue final antidumping determinations in early September. Until then, the market will face uncertainty around final rates, supplier exposure and contract pricing.

The broader industrial message is clear. Solar policy is no longer only about renewable energy deployment. It is also about manufacturing location, trade enforcement and supply-chain control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The new US solar duties show that clean energy deployment and industrial protection are increasingly inseparable. The key question is whether Washington can build domestic solar capacity fast enough to offset higher import costs without slowing project growth.

US Germanium Refining Expansion Gains Strategic Momentum with 5N Plus Award

5N Plus

US germanium refining expansion gained new momentum after the Department of Defense awarded $18.1mn to 5N Plus. The funding will support capacity growth at the company’s St George facility in Utah. This US germanium refining expansion targets higher recovery of metal from industrial waste. As a result, the project could strengthen domestic germanium supply for strategic applications.

The award matters because germanium remains a critical bottleneck material in the United States. The metal is essential for infrared optics, fibre-optic communication, satellite solar cells, and semiconductor uses. Meanwhile, the Pentagon sees domestic germanium production as a high-priority industrial base issue. Therefore, US germanium refining expansion now carries both commercial and defense significance.

5N Plus plans to scale output gradually through 2030. The company aims to produce 20 t/yr of high-purity germanium from recycling and recovery streams. That volume could satisfy a significant share of US demand. Consequently, 5N Plus germanium refining may become an important pillar of domestic supply resilience.

Domestic Germanium Supply Still Faces a Clear Strategic Gap

Domestic germanium supply remains limited compared with US consumption needs. In 2024, the United States imported both germanium metal and germanium dioxide. That import dependence exposes critical industries to external supply shocks. Therefore, expanding local refining capacity has become a strategic necessity.

China’s dominance explains why this matters so much. China controls most global germanium supply and introduced export controls in 2023. Those restrictions tightened non-Chinese availability and pushed prices to record highs. As a result, US germanium refining expansion is now part of a broader effort to reduce supply concentration risk.

The St George project also focuses on a practical route to growth. Recycling and industrial waste recovery can add supply faster than waiting for new mines. That makes the project more realistic in the near term. Meanwhile, it supports a more circular domestic materials chain.

Germanium Recycling Is Becoming a Defense Supply Chain Priority

Germanium recycling is no longer a niche topic in specialty materials. It is becoming a priority for industrial resilience and weapons platform support. The Department of Defense said refining capacity is a key bottleneck affecting critical military systems. Therefore, this award targets a weak point in the US defense materials base.

The project also carries policy importance beyond its size. It is the first investment made by the Defense Production Act Purchases Office in fiscal 2026. That suggests germanium now sits near the front of current critical minerals action. Consequently, 5N Plus germanium refining may become a reference case for future specialty metal support.

The wider message is clear. Supply security now depends on refining and recovery as much as on raw material access. A stronger domestic germanium chain can support semiconductors, communications, and defense applications at the same time. Therefore, US germanium refining expansion matters far beyond one facility in Utah.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This is a small-tonnage project with outsized strategic value. Germanium is one of those specialty metals where refining capacity matters more than headline volume. If 5N Plus executes well, this award could mark an important shift in how the US rebuilds critical material security.

US DoD Invests in Domestic Niobium Production to Secure Supply

The US Department of Defense (DoD)

The US Department of Defense (DoD) is taking significant steps to secure the domestic supply of niobium, a metal essential for defense and aerospace applications. In a strategic move to reduce reliance on imports, the DoD has awarded a $26.4 million grant to Global Advanced Metals (GAM) under the Defense Production Act Investments (DPAI) program. This funding will enable GAM to enhance production of high-purity niobium oxide at its Pennsylvania facility. The investment aligns with the National Defense Industrial Strategy, prioritizing the expansion of domestic production to mitigate supply chain risks.

Niobium's Role in Defense and Aerospace

Niobium, known for its high strength-to-weight ratio and refractory properties, plays a crucial role in aerospace components. Its lower density compared to other refractory metals makes it ideal for reducing mass in systems like jet engines, solid rocket motor skirts, and turbine nozzles. As China accelerates its development of hypersonic weapons, the US government has expressed concern about securing a reliable supply of niobium for applications in these advanced defense platforms.

The grant to GAM will also enable the company to refine its production processes, integrating new workflows that are expected to increase efficiency. As niobium oxide is currently predominantly sourced from Brazil, this move marks a critical step toward reducing US dependence on foreign sources.

America's Response to Global Competition

In addition to GAM's efforts, the DoD is also supporting projects aimed at enhancing the cost-efficiency of niobium-based materials. The Powder Alloy Development of Additive Manufacturing (PADAM) project, led by America Makes and financed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), is focused on improving niobium alloy production, particularly Nb C-103. This project seeks to expand the supply base while making niobium powder feedstocks more affordable and versatile for defense applications.

The increased focus on niobium highlights its importance in the defense sector, particularly as the US faces growing competition from nations like China, which is developing hypersonic missiles that rely heavily on niobium components. The success of these initiatives will not only secure the US niobium supply but also support the nation's defense systems for years to come.

US Targets 1 Million Tons of Lithium Production by 2035, Says DoE

Department of Energy (DOE)

The US Department of Energy (DoE) projects that the country could produce 1 million metric tons (t) of battery-grade lithium by 2035. This output would be sufficient to meet domestic demand while allowing for exports to trading partners.

Scaling Up Domestic Lithium Production

The DoE's Loan Programs Office Director, Jigar Shah, emphasized the need to expand lithium extraction, processing, and recycling to support the growing lithium-ion battery industry. He noted that diverse lithium resources across multiple US regions could be unlocked using advanced technology and infrastructure investments.

The US plans to increase lithium supply through three key sources:

• Spodumene deposits in Charlotte, North Carolina, expected to produce 100,000-150,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE).
• Albemarle’s Kings Mountain mine is one of the most advanced spodumene projects, projected to yield 50,000 t/yr of LCE.

• Brine and clay resources in Nevada, California's Imperial Valley, and the Arkansas Smackover Formation, estimated to contribute 500,000-1 million t/yr of LCE.
• These resources have lower lithium concentrations than South American reserves, but direct lithium extraction (DLE) technology can help process them efficiently.
• Recycling of end-of-life EV batteries, which could reduce the need for new lithium extraction, supplying 50,000-100,000 t/yr of LCE by 2035.

Government Investment in Lithium Infrastructure

The Biden administration has significantly increased investments in US lithium production to accelerate the clean energy transition.

In September 2024, the DoE selected 25 projects across 14 states, committing over $3 billion to expand domestic lithium supply. Additionally, the Thacker Pass lithium project in Nevada, operated by Lithium Americas, received a $2.3 billion loan to build a 40,000 t/yr lithium carbonate facility.

In December 2024, the DoE also allocated $17 million to 14 critical mineral technology projects, reinforcing efforts to scale up lithium production.

Lithium’s Role in the US Energy Transition

According to the US Geological Survey, the US has 1.1 million tons of lithium reserves, compared to a global total of 28 million tons.

Shah highlighted that advancements in direct lithium extraction (DLE) could rapidly unlock large lithium resources, much like hydraulic fracturing transformed the oil and gas industry.

With global lithium demand rising, the US is positioning itself as a key player in the lithium supply chain, reducing dependence on foreign imports and strengthening the clean energy sector.

MP Materials rare earth refinery JV targets Saudi processing and allied supply chains

MP Materials

MP Materials rare earth refinery JV plans to establish a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia with support from the US Department of Defense. MP Materials rare earth refinery JV also brings in Saudi Arabian Mining Company Maaden to process regional and global feedstock. As a result, MP Materials rare earth refinery JV aims to supply separated light and heavy rare earth oxides for industrial and defense demand across allied markets.

Rare earth processing move links US security goals with Saudi industrial policy

The partnership aligns with a broader US-Saudi push on strategic industries and critical minerals. Meanwhile, the planned refinery would convert rare earth feedstock into separated oxides, which sit upstream of permanent magnets and advanced electronics. Therefore, the project targets a bottleneck that has constrained non-China rare earth supply chains for years.

The ownership structure also signals Saudi control with US-aligned participation. Maaden will own at least 51% of the joint venture, while MP Materials and the US Department of Defense will jointly hold up to 49%. The US side will use non-recourse financing for its stake, while MP Materials will provide technical capability, sourcing reach, and marketing access.

Magnet supply chains and allied markets move closer to diversification

The announcement reinforces earlier commitments between the companies. MP Materials and Maaden signed an agreement in May to build a fully integrated rare earth supply chain, and the new refinery represents a concrete processing step. However, the real strategic leverage will come from consistent feedstock access and predictable qualification of light and heavy oxides for defense-grade requirements.

Saudi Arabia also frames mining as a pillar of its economic diversification strategy. The country is using Vision 2030 to reduce oil dependence, and it wants mining to become a major GDP contributor. As a result, a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia could anchor downstream investment in permanent magnets, alloys, and advanced manufacturing over time.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This joint venture targets the highest-value chokepoint in rare earths: separation capacity for light and heavy oxides. Meanwhile, the structure blends Saudi scale with US security financing, which can accelerate execution. Therefore, buyers should watch qualification timelines and offtake structures for magnet-grade supply.

 

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

Gunnison Copper first cathode production boosts US copper supply ambitions

Gunnison Copper

Gunnison Copper first cathode production marks a key milestone for US domestic copper supply. The company produced its first copper cathode at the Johnson Camp Mine in Arizona in late August, ahead of schedule. As a result, the Gunnison Copper first cathode production strengthens US efforts to secure critical minerals for energy transition.

Early ramp-up at Johnson Camp Mine underpins new US copper source

Gunnison Copper first cathode production follows the successful start of solvent extraction and electrowinning operations. The company began running its SX plant and EW circuit in August, using run-of-mine ore from the Arizona site. Therefore, the project now moves from development into early ramp-up, which often proves pivotal for leaching projects.

The company expects to produce 25mn lbs per year of copper cathode, equal to about 11,300 tonnes. This scale does not rival major Chilean or Peruvian mines, yet it still matters for US niche supply. Meanwhile, the focus on finished cathode production rather than concentrates aligns with growing demand from North American smelters and fabricators.

Funding support highlights the broader strategic value of this new copper stream. The Johnson Camp Mine received backing from Nuton, a Rio Tinto venture focused on innovative copper technologies. In addition, the project secured $13.9mn in US Department of Energy tax credits in January to support domestic copper production.

Strategic context for US energy transition and critical minerals policy

The Gunnison Copper first cathode production arrives as policymakers push for more resilient US copper supply chains. Copper demand continues to rise across electric vehicles, renewable power and grid upgrades. Therefore, new SX–EW operations like Johnson Camp help reduce dependence on imported copper units.

Federal tax credits signal Washington’s willingness to support qualifying critical mineral projects. As a result, projects such as Johnson Camp can de-risk early capital phases and accelerate commissioning schedules. However, Gunnison Copper must still deliver consistent production performance, maintain environmental compliance and manage operating costs in Arizona’s competitive mining landscape.

For investors and copper buyers, the project offers modest but meaningful additional US cathode volumes. It may also showcase Nuton and Rio Tinto’s broader technology and partnership model for brownfield and mid-scale assets. Over time, similar projects could play a larger role in regional copper balance and contract pricing dynamics.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Gunnison Copper’s first cathode production at Johnson Camp illustrates how smaller US projects can still punch above their weight in policy terms. While volumes remain limited, the combination of Nuton funding and DOE tax support shows how technology and incentives now shape copper growth. Market participants should watch ramp-up performance closely, since SX–EW reliability will determine whether this asset becomes a durable pillar of US cathode supply.