Sherritt Refinery Shutdown Exposes Canada’s Dependence on Cuban Nickel Feed

Sherritt International

Sherritt refinery shutdown plans will halt nickel and cobalt production at the company’s Fort Saskatchewan facility in Alberta after feedstock from Cuba’s Moa joint venture ran out. The move highlights how upstream disruption can strand downstream refining capacity even in a politically secure jurisdiction.

Sherritt refinery shutdown operations will remain in place until mining and processing at Moa can resume and mixed sulfide precipitate shipments to Canada are restored. The company has not given a restart timeline.

Sherritt refinery shutdown is strategically important because Fort Saskatchewan converts Cuban mixed sulfide precipitate into finished nickel and cobalt. The refinery therefore depends on continuity across mining, processing, shipping and sanctions-sensitive trade routes.

Sherritt will use the shutdown period to complete maintenance work. Fertilizer and sulfuric acid production will continue, preserving part of the site’s industrial activity while nickel and cobalt refining is suspended.

Moa Feed Disruption Strands Canadian Refining Capacity

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery relies on the Moa joint venture in Cuba for its nickel and cobalt feed. Ore is mined and processed at Moa into mixed sulfide precipitate before being shipped to Alberta for refining.

That supply chain began to weaken in February when fuel shortages forced the joint venture to suspend mining operations. Feed inventories in Canada subsequently declined, with Sherritt previously expecting available material to last only until mid-June.

The problem then became more complex in May. Sherritt suspended direct participation in the Moa joint venture after the US expanded sanctions on Cuba under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

The company has maintained that suspension, leaving the future of Cuban production uncertain. Without fresh MSP shipments, Fort Saskatchewan cannot continue normal nickel and cobalt refining.

This illustrates a critical supply-chain weakness. Refining assets may sit inside Canada, but their security still depends on where upstream feed originates.

For North American critical minerals policy, that distinction matters. Domestic refining capacity does not create supply independence if raw materials remain tied to politically exposed jurisdictions.

Nickel and Cobalt Supply Security Shifts Toward Feedstock Control

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, superalloys, aerospace, industrial chemicals and defence-related manufacturing. Reliable refining capacity is therefore strategically valuable.

But Sherritt’s shutdown shows that feedstock security must be treated as part of refinery security. A plant without dependable concentrate or intermediate supply becomes an idle asset regardless of its technical capability.

The Fort Saskatchewan site still has value because its processing infrastructure and operating expertise remain in place. Maintenance during the shutdown may help preserve restart readiness if Moa supply resumes.

However, the absence of a clear restart timeline increases uncertainty. Sherritt must either restore the Cuban supply chain or eventually secure another viable feed route if the disruption becomes prolonged.

The situation also raises a broader question for western critical minerals strategies. Governments are investing heavily in domestic processing, but those projects need diversified and compliant raw material sources to remain resilient.

Sherritt’s experience shows why mining, intermediate processing and refining must be planned as one integrated supply chain rather than separate assets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Fort Saskatchewan is a reminder that secure refining capacity is only as strong as its feedstock chain. Canada can host the refinery, but without reliable upstream material, geopolitical risk still determines whether nickel and cobalt actually reach the market.

Vale Labor Deal Reduces Strike Risk at Ontario Copper and Nickel Operations

Vale

Vale labor deal discussions have produced a tentative collective agreement with United Steelworkers locals representing production and maintenance workers at Vale Base Metals operations in Ontario. The agreement could reduce strike risk at a key Canadian copper, nickel, cobalt and precious metals production base.

Vale labor deal terms still require union ratification. USW Local 6500 will hold information sessions on 27-28 May, followed by online voting from Thursday morning to Friday evening.

Vale labor deal approval would come just before the current five-year collective agreement expires on 31 May. The timing is important because union members had already voted strongly in favour of a strike mandate earlier this month.

The tentative agreement therefore matters for supply continuity. Vale’s Ontario operations remain an important source of finished nickel and copper for North American industrial and critical minerals supply chains.

Sudbury Operations Remain Strategically Important

Vale’s Sudbury operations include several mines, a mill, smelter and refinery. The complex produces copper, nickel, cobalt and precious metals, making it one of the most important integrated base metals operations in Canada.

The site’s role is especially important because nickel and cobalt remain critical to batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, defence applications and advanced manufacturing. Copper supports electrification, grids, data centres and industrial equipment.

Vale produced 59,400t of finished nickel at Sudbury in 2025. That accounted for about 34% of the company’s total finished nickel output that year.

Sudbury also produced 63,800t of finished copper in 2025, equal to about 17% of Vale’s total finished copper production. Any labour disruption would therefore carry company-level and regional supply-chain significance.

The Port Colborne refinery adds another downstream dimension. It produces electro-cobalt, processes precious metals and distributes finished nickel products.

Ratification Will Decide Supply Continuity

The tentative agreement is not yet final. Union members must approve the deal before it becomes the new labour contract.

That vote will be closely watched because Local 6500 members voted 97.64% in support of a strike mandate earlier this month. Such a strong mandate gave the union significant leverage during negotiations.

A ratified agreement would provide operational stability for Vale Base Metals in Ontario. It would also reduce uncertainty for customers that depend on Canadian nickel, copper, cobalt and refined products.

For North American critical minerals policy, labour stability matters. Governments and manufacturers are trying to build secure supply chains, but mine and refinery output still depends on workforce agreements, site reliability and downstream processing capacity.

The broader market impact depends on the vote. If workers approve the deal, Vale can avoid immediate disruption at a strategically important metals complex. If not, strike risk could quickly return as the current agreement expires.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Vale agreement shows that critical minerals security is not only about geology, capital or policy. Labour stability at integrated mining, smelting and refining assets is just as important to reliable nickel, copper and cobalt supply.

Sinomine Lithium and Copper Expansion Targets Zimbabwe and Zambia Growth

Sinomine Resources

Sinomine lithium and copper expansion is accelerating as the Chinese miner prepares to raise up to 5.2bn yuan to fund new battery metals, copper and specialty metals projects. The targeted share placement will support projects in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Jiangxi province.

Sinomine lithium and copper expansion reflects the company’s move from a lithium-focused growth story into a broader multi-metal platform. The company entered lithium through the Bikita mine in Zimbabwe in 2021 and added copper exposure through its 65% stake in Zambia’s Kitumba project in 2024.

Sinomine lithium and copper expansion also shows how Chinese mining companies are securing upstream resources while building processing capacity closer to mine sites. That strategy is becoming more important as resource-rich countries push for more domestic value addition.

The fundraising plan will support a 100,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant in Zimbabwe, the Kitumba copper project in Zambia, and a 2,000 t/yr caesium and rubidium products project in Jiangxi.

Kitumba Copper Project Strengthens Sinomine’s Diversification

The Kitumba copper project is central to Sinomine’s move into copper. Development is advancing through equipment procurement, civil works and installation, with trial concentrator production targeted by the third quarter of 2026.

Full concentrator commissioning is expected in the fourth quarter of 2026. Smelter trial production is also targeted for the fourth quarter, with full operations expected from the first quarter of 2027.

Kitumba’s mining and processing design capacity remains 3.5mn t/yr of ore. However, smelting design capacity has been revised down to 35,000 t/yr of copper cathode from the previous 60,000 t/yr.

At full capacity, the project is expected to average 33,000 t/yr of copper cathode and 55,000 t/yr of copper concentrate. This gives Sinomine exposure to both refined copper and concentrate flows.

The project matters because copper demand is increasingly tied to grids, electric vehicles, data centres, renewable energy and industrial electrification. Chinese miners are therefore looking beyond lithium to secure copper assets that can support long-term energy transition demand.

Zambia also gives Sinomine a strategic position in the African copper belt. The region remains one of the most important sources of copper growth, but project execution will depend on infrastructure, power, permitting and smelting economics.

Zimbabwe Lithium Sulphate Plan Moves Processing Downstream

Sinomine’s Bikita lithium operations in Zimbabwe have already ramped up after commissioning 2mn t/yr and 1.2mn t/yr expansion projects in July 2023. The projects reached designed capacity and product specifications by November 2023.

Lithium concentrate shipments to China have continued, but Zimbabwe’s policy environment is pushing Chinese lithium firms to process more material locally. The country imposed a ban on concentrate exports in February, accelerating interest in lithium sulphate production.

Sinomine’s planned 100,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant fits that shift. Details on construction timing and commissioning have not yet been disclosed, but the strategic direction is clear.

Lithium sulphate gives producers a way to move further downstream before exporting material to China or other battery chemical markets. It also helps satisfy local value-addition requirements while preserving access to Zimbabwe’s lithium resource base.

Other Chinese battery materials companies are moving in the same direction. Huayou Cobalt shipped its first lithium sulphate cargo from Zimbabwe to China on 25 April, showing that the processing route is already becoming commercially active.

Sinomine’s specialty metals platform adds another layer. The company is a leading producer of caesium and rubidium salts, with integrated mining, processing and advanced materials capabilities.

The planned 2,000 t/yr caesium and rubidium products project in Jiangxi supports higher-value specialty materials growth. These metals serve specialised industrial, electronic and advanced technology applications.

Sinomine’s latest fundraising plan therefore points to a more integrated strategy. The company is securing lithium, adding copper, and expanding specialty metals processing while responding to changing export rules and downstream demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sinomine’s strategy shows how Chinese miners are adapting to a world where resource ownership alone is no longer enough. The next advantage will come from controlling mine supply, local processing and downstream product routes across lithium, copper and specialty metals.

Terrafame Scandium Recovery Study Could Create Europe’s First Domestic Supply

Terrafame

Terrafame scandium recovery plans could give Europe its only domestic scandium production source if a new project at the company’s Sotkamo operations in eastern Finland advances. The Finnish metals producer has launched a pre-feasibility study to assess scandium recovery from existing nickel and zinc production streams.

Terrafame scandium recovery would use the company’s current hydrometallurgical circuits, rather than requiring a standalone scandium mine. That gives the project a potentially lower-risk route because Terrafame already processes polymetallic ore and recovers multiple valuable metals.

Terrafame scandium recovery is strategically important because scandium supply remains extremely limited and heavily concentrated in China. Beijing controls around 85% of global supply and tightened export controls on the metal last year.

The study is expected to be completed by the end of 2026. If the project moves forward, Terrafame could target production in 2029.

Existing Circuits Could Lower Development Risk

Terrafame already produces battery-grade nickel, cobalt and copper. It also recovers uranium as a by-product from the same polymetallic ore system.

Adding scandium recovery to existing process streams could improve the value of Terrafame’s hydrometallurgical platform. It would also show how critical minerals can be extracted from established operations without developing entirely new mines.

This matters because scandium is usually produced in very small volumes as a by-product. Reliable recovery depends on chemistry, process control, impurity management and market qualification.

If successful, Terrafame could become a strategic supplier to European customers seeking non-China scandium. That would support supply-chain resilience for aerospace, aluminium alloys, solid oxide fuel cells and advanced materials.

The project also fits Europe’s wider critical raw materials agenda. The EU needs more domestic and allied sources of small-volume metals that support high-value industrial applications.

China Dominance Keeps Scandium Strategically Sensitive

Global scandium production remains limited at around 40-45 t/yr, while consumption reached about 60t in 2025. That small market size makes the supply chain highly sensitive to export controls and project delays.

China’s dominant position has increased interest in alternative sources. Export restrictions have made scandium more relevant to buyers that need secure material for advanced alloy and energy applications.

Several projects globally could increase supply over the next decade, including developments by NioCorp, Rio Tinto and Sunrise. Combined, these projects could lift global supply to 150-250 t/yr if they reach production.

That potential increase has raised some oversupply concerns. However, scandium demand may grow once buyers have more confidence in long-term availability.

This is a common problem for small critical materials markets. Customers hesitate to design around a material if supply is scarce, but producers struggle to invest before demand is proven.

Terrafame’s project could help break part of that cycle in Europe. A Finnish scandium source would not transform the market alone, but it could give manufacturers a more secure regional option.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Terrafame’s scandium study shows how Europe can extract more critical value from existing polymetallic operations. The opportunity is not only new mining, but smarter recovery of strategic by-products already moving through industrial circuits.

Nickel Ore Prices Fall as Philippine Supply Recovery Eases Feedstock Tightness

Philippine Nickel ore

Nickel ore prices have fallen as Philippine supply recovered after the monsoon season, while a correction in London Metal Exchange nickel weakened sentiment across the value chain. The decline shows how quickly seasonal ore flows can pressure feedstock markets when Indonesian buyers slow procurement.

Nickel ore prices for 1.3% grade material on a cif China basis dropped to 55-57 yuan/wmt on 14 May from 65-66 yuan/wmt on 26 March. The fall came even though LME nickel remained above late-March levels after briefly touching almost two-year highs earlier in May.

Nickel ore prices are important because ore often gives the earliest physical signal in the nickel chain. Unlike LME nickel, ore prices are less driven by financial flows and more directly tied to mine supply, port congestion, smelter demand and buyer inventories.

The current weakness reflects three forces moving together: Philippine mine supply is recovering, Indonesia is slowing purchases, and LME nickel has corrected after earlier policy-driven gains.

Philippine Supply Recovery Changes the Regional Ore Balance

The Philippines is entering its seasonal production recovery after monsoon-related disruptions. Mining activity in Surigao, the country’s main nickel ore hub, usually slows from November to March and rebounds from May.

Surigao accounts for around half of Philippine nickel ore output. As shipments recover, buyers have more nearby feedstock options, reducing the urgency that supported prices earlier in the year.

This seasonal pattern has become more important since Indonesia emerged as a major Philippine ore importer. Historically, Chinese buyers stocked up ahead of the rainy season and drew down inventories until supply returned. But Indonesia’s rising demand has added a second major pull on Philippine material.

The Philippines exported 55.22mn t of nickel ore in 2025. China took 72% of that volume, while Indonesia accounted for 18%.

Indonesia’s imports from the Philippines rose to 15.48mn t in 2025 from 9.55mn t in 2024. That growth was driven by tight domestic ore controls under Indonesia’s RKAB quota system.

Indonesia imported 1.41mn t of Philippine nickel ore in March, up sharply from both a year earlier and the previous month. But that buying momentum has now slowed as port bottlenecks and price uncertainty weigh on procurement.

Indonesia Bottlenecks and NPI Margins Pressure Demand

Most Philippine ore shipped to Indonesia moves to the Weda Bay industrial park. The site produced around one third of Indonesia’s total nickel supply in 2025, making it a major feedstock demand centre.

But Weda Bay has limited unloading capacity. Only two major berths handle nickel ore discharge, creating recurring congestion.

Some vessels that would normally unload within two days are waiting up to two weeks. That congestion reduces buyers’ willingness to secure additional cargoes, especially when prices are falling.

Indonesia’s revised ore pricing formula has also changed buyer behaviour. The new formula includes cobalt, iron and chromium values, raising raw material costs and adding uncertainty to procurement decisions.

Meanwhile, LME nickel’s pullback has started to pressure nickel pig iron prices. NPI prices had been relatively steady, supported by stainless steel demand, but softer benchmark prices are now weakening producer margins.

Lower margins can reduce production incentives for Chinese NPI producers. That, in turn, may reduce demand for nickel ore and extend downward pressure on feedstock prices.

Nickel sulphate prices have remained stable because tight supply has offset weak demand from the nickel-cobalt-manganese battery sector. But the ore market is moving faster because supply is returning and buyers are stepping back.

The short-term outlook remains soft. Rising Philippine availability, weaker LME sentiment and slower Indonesian buying are likely to keep nickel ore under pressure until the market finds a new floor.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel ore prices are showing that Indonesia’s downstream expansion has made Philippine supply more strategically important. But when port bottlenecks, weaker NPI margins and seasonal supply recovery hit together, even tight Indonesian ore controls cannot prevent a feedstock correction.

Sherritt Moa JV Dissolution Marks Break in Cuba Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution marks a major break in one of the more unusual cross-border nickel-cobalt supply chains linking Cuba and Canada. Sherritt International plans to deliver a dissolution notice to its joint venture partner, the General Nickel Company of Cuba, after expanded US sanctions made continued participation commercially and legally risky.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution will require the Canadian company to surrender its interests in the Cuban joint venture corporations. The company said immediate dissolution is the only way to preserve its ability to do business.

Sherritt Moa JV dissolution is strategically important because the Moa structure linked Cuban mining and intermediate processing with Canadian refining. Ore was mined and processed into mixed sulfide precipitate at Moa, then shipped to the Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta.

Sherritt expects GNC to owe an equalization payment because it believes the Moa mine is more valuable than the Canadian refinery. That valuation issue could become a key point in the separation process.

US Sanctions Force Structural Exit From Moa

The US directly sanctioned the Moa joint venture on 7 May. The designation followed a 1 May executive order allowing Washington to sanction entities or people supporting the Cuban government across metals, mining, energy, financial services, security and other sectors.

Sherritt had already suspended direct participation in Moa-related activities earlier this month after assessing the implications of the executive order. The direct sanctions accelerated the need for a structural exit.

The company said the dissolution is necessary so it can be considered the sole owner of Canada Refinery Corporation, which owns the Fort Saskatchewan nickel-cobalt refinery. That step is central to preserving the Canadian refining business outside the sanctioned Cuban structure.

The Moa joint venture had been a 50/50 partnership between Sherritt and GNC. Its value came from combining Cuban ore and MSP production with Canadian refining expertise.

The latest move shows how sanctions can fracture supply chains even when downstream refining sits in an allied jurisdiction. Feedstock origin, ownership structure and sanctioned counterparties now matter as much as the location of final refining.

Canadian Refinery Faces Feedstock Repositioning Challenge

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery remains strategically valuable because it produces finished nickel and cobalt. These metals are used in batteries, superalloys, stainless steel, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing.

However, the refinery’s historic feedstock route depended on Moa mixed sulfide precipitate. Losing the Cuban joint venture means Sherritt must protect the refinery’s operating future through ownership clarity, alternative feed planning or new commercial structures.

The company had already faced operating pressure before the sanctions escalated. Sherritt temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

That earlier disruption showed the physical fragility of the Moa supply chain. The sanctions now add a legal and geopolitical break to an already strained operating model.

For nickel and cobalt buyers, the key issue is whether Fort Saskatchewan can remain a reliable source of refined metal without direct participation in Moa. The answer will depend on feedstock access, legal separation, inventory management and customer confidence.

The dissolution also highlights a broader critical minerals lesson. Western supply chains can still carry high exposure when mines, intermediates or partners sit in sanctioned or politically sensitive jurisdictions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s exit from Moa shows that critical minerals security cannot rely on refining capacity alone. The real test is whether the entire chain, from mine ownership to intermediate feedstock and final metal, can survive sanctions, fuel disruption and geopolitical pressure.

Global Recycled Metals Output Rises as China and Emerging Regions Expand Capacity

Recycled Metals

Global recycled metals output increased further in 2025 as China maintained its leading position and emerging regions expanded recycling capacity. Production of recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc reached about 59.2mn t, up 5.6% from a year earlier.

Global recycled metals output is becoming more important to non-ferrous supply security as mining, processing and trade flows face rising geopolitical and cost pressures. Recycling now provides a larger secondary source of industrial metal units for manufacturers, smelters and battery supply chains.

Global recycled metals output accounted for around 34% of total non-ferrous metal production in 2025. The sector also delivered cumulative savings of about 1.2bn t of primary mineral resources, underlining its growing role in resource conservation.

The growth shows that recycled metals are no longer a secondary environmental story. They are becoming a core part of industrial raw material strategy across copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and battery metals.

China Leads as Regional Recycling Capacity Expands

China remained the world’s largest recycled base metals producer in 2025, with output of 20.57mn t. That represented 34.7% of global production.

The country’s scale gives it a major role in recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc supply. It also strengthens China’s position across non-ferrous metals at a time when primary raw material security is under pressure.

Europe produced more than 10mn t of recycled base metals, while the US produced more than 6mn t. India and southeast Asia reached around 6mn t and 4mn t, respectively.

These figures show that recycling capacity is becoming more geographically distributed. Emerging regions are no longer only consumers of recycled raw materials. They are becoming processing centres in their own right.

Battery-related recycling is also growing quickly. Nickel, cobalt and lithium recovery is supporting the new energy industry as electric vehicle and energy storage supply chains look for more secure material sources.

China aims to increase domestic recycled material recovery to 23mn t by 2030 under its next five-year plan. That target implies annual growth of around 7%.

The country is also expected to strengthen recycled product certification and explore the inclusion of recycled materials in carbon trading systems. This could make recycled metal more valuable for customers seeking traceable and lower-carbon supply.

Trade Flows and Technology Move Toward Asia

Global recycled raw material trade is becoming more regional, more Asia-focused and more diversified. Europe and North America remain major exporters of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock.

Europe exports around 2mn t/yr of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock, while North America exports about 4.2mn t/yr. China and India remain the largest importers, with imports exceeding 4mn t and 2mn t, respectively.

Southeast Asia is becoming a key transshipment hub. Regional recycled aluminium feedstock trade reached about 1.3mn t of imports and 900,000t of exports.

Black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries is also increasingly moving toward Asian processing centres. This reflects Asia’s stronger battery materials processing base and growing demand for recovered nickel, cobalt and lithium units.

Technology is improving the recycling value chain. Advances in laser sorting, intelligent dismantling, multi-metal battery recovery and digital process control are raising recovery rates and product quality.

Leading producers have achieved recycling rates above 94% for aluminium and 95% for lithium. These levels show how recycling is moving closer to industrial-grade resource recovery rather than simple scrap handling.

New products are also expanding. High-strength recycled aluminium alloys, high-purity recycled copper and recycled rare-earth permanent magnets are gaining traction.

This matters because recycled metal must meet customer specifications before it can displace primary material. Better sorting, cleaner chemistry and stronger certification will determine how much recycled metal can enter high-value applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Recycling is becoming a strategic metals supply pillar, not just a sustainability tool. The next competitive edge will come from producers that can turn complex scrap and battery waste into certified, high-purity and customer-ready materials.

Automotive Raw Material Supply Chains Hit Localisation Limits

Automotive

Automotive raw material supply chains are becoming the main constraint on electric vehicle localisation as carmakers seek more control over strategic components. Automakers want regional supply chains, but battery metals, rare earths and processed inputs still depend on global mining and refining networks.

Automotive raw material supply chains have shifted from pure efficiency toward resilience, security and geopolitical risk management. The industry is no longer trying only to minimise cost. It is trying to protect production from export controls, licensing delays, trade restrictions and raw material shortages.

Automotive raw material supply chains therefore cannot be fully localised by assembling batteries, motors or electronics closer to vehicle plants. The deeper constraint sits upstream, where lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and rare earth materials remain tied to global extraction and processing capacity.

The result is a more selective supply-chain model. Automakers will regionalise the components they can control, while still relying on global raw materials for the minerals and refined products they cannot replace quickly.

EV Localisation Still Depends on Global Critical Minerals

Jaguar Land Rover has decided to control three critical parts of electric propulsion: battery assembly, electric drive units and energy management systems. This gives the company more control over the final systems that define EV performance.

However, vertical integration has limits. Even if an automaker controls battery assembly or electric drive units, it may not control the lithium chemicals, nickel sulphate, cobalt, manganese, graphite or rare earth magnets inside those systems.

Permanent magnet motors remain one of the clearest pressure points. Electric drive units depend on rare earth materials that are still heavily exposed to Chinese processing, magnet production and export licensing.

Obtaining magnet raw materials from China has become more difficult from a licensing perspective. This shows how export controls can affect vehicle production even when the final assembly line is located in Europe or the US.

Battery supply chains face the same structural problem. Automakers can localise pack assembly, module production and software integration, but raw material exposure remains global.

Lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese supply depends on mine locations, refining capacity, chemical conversion and government policy. These inputs cannot be made local simply by building a battery plant near an auto factory.

This changes the meaning of automotive localisation. The next phase will be less about full independence and more about reducing exposure to single-country bottlenecks.

Recycling and Traceability Become Strategic Tools

Critical minerals recycling is becoming a strategic issue for automakers, not only an environmental goal. Black mass recovery can eventually return lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper and other materials into the supply chain.

Recycling can reduce raw material exposure over time. But it depends on enough end-of-life batteries, reliable collection systems, safe transport, processing capacity and customer acceptance of recovered materials.

The UK’s critical minerals strategy reflects this reality. Domestic production, partner-country supply agreements and recycling can improve resilience, but full self-sufficiency is not realistic.

That point matters for manufacturers. Supply security will depend on diversified sourcing, trusted partners, recycling loops and traceable material flows rather than a complete break from global markets.

The shift will also affect pricing. Materials may increasingly carry value based on origin, regulatory acceptability, sustainability documentation and licensing risk.

A battery metal or rare earth input from a secure and traceable source may command a premium over lower-cost material with higher geopolitical or compliance risk.

For automakers, the strategic challenge is clear. They must control more of the EV system while accepting that critical mineral supply will remain globally contested.

For metals suppliers, the opportunity is also clear. Producers that can offer traceable, compliant and secure supply will become more valuable to automotive customers than suppliers competing only on price.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Automakers are learning that EV localisation stops where raw material dependence begins. The winners in automotive supply security will be those that connect local manufacturing with diversified minerals, recycling capacity and credible traceability.

Battery Metals Demand Faces Slower Path as Hybrid Vehicle Growth Extends

Battery Metals

Battery metals demand could face a slower growth path as carmakers and suppliers expect hybrids and range extenders to remain important for longer than earlier electric-only transition models assumed. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car summit said vehicle decarbonisation should be measured by emissions reduction, not only battery electric vehicle share.

Battery metals demand remains structurally supported by electrification. However, a longer hybrid phase could reduce near-term demand intensity for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese because hybrid vehicles use smaller battery packs than full battery electric vehicles.

Battery metals demand assumptions are therefore becoming more complex. Automotive electrification is still progressing, but the industry is moving toward a mixed powertrain future rather than a simple shift from combustion engines to full BEVs.

Horse Powertrain chief executive Matias Giannini said half of passenger vehicles could still be produced with some form of combustion or hybrid powertrain by 2040. That outlook would keep investment flowing into efficient hybrid systems alongside EV platforms.

Hybrid Growth Changes the Battery Raw Materials Curve

Hybrid vehicle growth could temper the pace of battery raw material demand without reversing electrification. Hybrids and range extenders still require electric motors, inverters, wiring and batteries, but their battery packs are much smaller than those used in BEVs.

This matters most for nickel. High-nickel NCM and NCA batteries are closely tied to longer-range BEVs, where larger packs are needed to deliver performance and driving range.

A slower BEV ramp-up could delay some of the nickel sulphate demand growth that has supported investment cases for new battery-grade nickel projects. It could also affect cobalt and manganese demand in cathode chemistries exposed to full EV penetration rates.

Lithium remains supported across almost every electrification pathway. Still, a longer hybrid transition could slow the rate at which large-format BEV batteries absorb lithium units.

The shift does not mean automotive metals demand will weaken across the board. Hybrids use more copper than conventional combustion vehicles because they require electric motors, power electronics and more complex wiring systems.

Continued hybrid and combustion production also supports aluminium castings, stainless steel, exhaust components and engine-related materials. Meanwhile, BEV growth still supports aluminium lightweighting, copper wiring, charging infrastructure and battery materials.

The result is a less linear automotive metals outlook. Battery metals may grow more slowly than aggressive BEV scenarios suggest, while broader automotive metals consumption remains supported by platform complexity and mixed powertrain production.

Policy Flexibility Could Reshape European Metal Demand

European suppliers are pushing for more flexibility in the EU regulatory framework. Current policy remains heavily weighted toward full electrification through tailpipe emissions targets.

The EU targets a 100% reduction in tailpipe emissions from new cars and vans from 2035. That effectively ends new combustion engine sales unless future exemptions are created.

Industry participants increasingly want a more technology-neutral route. They argue that hybrids, range extenders, renewable fuels and lower-carbon manufacturing should contribute to emissions reduction alongside BEVs.

This policy debate matters for metals. Battery material demand depends heavily on BEV penetration, average pack size and chemistry choice.

If Europe allows a longer role for hybrids and range extenders, lithium-ion battery capacity demand per vehicle could grow more slowly. That would affect demand forecasts for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese.

Chinese EV and hybrid technology is also improving quickly. This puts pressure on European and US automakers to share development costs across BEV, hybrid and range-extender platforms.

For suppliers, the strategic issue is flexibility. Companies tied only to high-growth BEV battery assumptions may face demand timing risk, while suppliers serving copper, aluminium, stainless steel, electronics and hybrid systems may benefit from a broader platform mix.

The automotive transition is still real, but the material demand path is becoming more diversified. Metals markets must now track powertrain mix, not only EV sales headlines.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hybrid growth does not weaken the energy transition, but it changes the metals timing. Battery metals demand will still rise, yet copper, aluminium and hybrid-related materials may capture more value if automakers choose a longer mixed-powertrain route.

India Critical Minerals Supply Chain Faces Funding Gap Despite Policy Push

Indonesia nickel mining

India critical minerals supply chain ambitions face a major financing test as the country tries to reduce dependence on imported lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth materials. A new report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis warns that funding gaps, slow policy execution and raw material import dependence could delay India’s strategy.

India critical minerals supply chain development is becoming urgent because the country imports 100% of the lithium, cobalt and nickel used in clean energy manufacturing. Demand is expected to rise as India targets 30% electric vehicle penetration by 2030, along with 230GW of solar capacity and 140GW of wind capacity.

India critical minerals supply chain policy has moved quickly on paper. The government launched the National Critical Mineral Mission in January 2025 with a seven-year budget of 343bn rupees to support exploration and auctions.

However, the mission still lacks enough direct capital expenditure support for large-scale mining, refining and processing. That is the central weakness in India’s current critical minerals push.

Exploration Targets Need Processing Capital

The National Critical Mineral Mission targets 1,200 exploration projects and more than 100 critical mineral block auctions by 2030-31. This can improve domestic resource visibility, but exploration alone will not create battery, magnet or semiconductor supply chains.

Critical minerals projects require large upfront capital, long permitting timelines and technical processing capability. Mining projects can take 10-15 years to move from exploration to commercial production, creating long periods of uncertainty for investors.

India has identified major resource potential. The country reported 5.9mn t of inferred lithium resources in Jammu and Kashmir as of 2023. It also holds 13.15mn t of monazite deposits containing an estimated 7.23mn t of rare earth oxides.

The Geological Survey of India also identified 482.6mn t of rare earth ore resources through exploration projects in February. These figures suggest significant geological potential, but they do not solve the refining and separation challenge.

Rare earths are a clear example. Monazite and rare earth ore must be separated, purified, converted into metals or alloys, and qualified by downstream users before they can support magnets, defence systems, electronics or clean energy applications.

India’s midstream sector also faces pressure from Chinese overcapacity. China controls around 60-70% of global refining and processing capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt, and about 90% of rare earth refining.

That dominance suppresses margins and makes new Indian refining projects harder to finance. Without price support, offtake contracts or direct capital backing, investors may hesitate to fund projects that compete against established Chinese capacity.

Import Dependence Extends Beyond Battery Metals

India’s critical minerals strategy now reaches beyond battery materials. The government classified coking coal as a critical and strategic mineral in January to reduce import dependence and support steel expansion.

This widens the funding challenge. India aims to increase crude steel production capacity to 300mn t/yr by 2030 and 500mn t/yr by 2047. Its Mission Coking Coal targets domestic output of 140mn t/yr by 2030, up from 66.49mn t/yr in fiscal 2025-26.

These goals will require long-term investment in mining, washing, transport, processing and related infrastructure. That makes critical minerals policy a broader industrial financing issue, not only an energy transition issue.

India is also seeking overseas supply partnerships. It is working with Australia, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and Côte d’Ivoire to secure access to critical minerals.

State-backed Khanij Bidesh India is also pursuing overseas lithium and cobalt assets. These efforts can reduce raw material risk, but they still need downstream processing and domestic industrial integration.

The global funding requirement is enormous. The International Energy Agency estimates that mining and refining will need $915bn in new investment during 2026-35 under its Announced Pledges Scenario.

For India, the strategic question is how to convert policy ambition into bankable projects. Auctions and exploration can identify resources, but refining plants, processing hubs, offtake agreements and financing tools will decide whether domestic supply chains actually emerge.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India has recognised the critical minerals problem, but recognition is not the same as industrial capacity. The next stage must focus on project finance, refining economics and guaranteed demand, or India will remain dependent on imported materials despite its resource potential.

SoftBank Osaka Battery Production Targets AI Data Centre Energy Demand

SoftBank

SoftBank Osaka battery production plans will add a new Japanese platform for next-generation battery cells and battery energy storage systems. The company aims to start production at its GX Factory in Osaka by March 2028.

SoftBank Osaka battery production will focus partly on zinc-halogen battery technology developed with South Korea’s COSMOS Lab. The partners aim to begin mass production during the April 2027-March 2028 fiscal year.

SoftBank Osaka battery production is strategically linked to rising electricity demand from artificial intelligence infrastructure. As AI data centres expand, operators need safer, scalable and more resilient energy storage systems to support grid stability and power management.

The GX Factory is part of SoftBank’s planned AI data centre development at Sakai in Osaka prefecture, on a site formerly owned by Sharp. The wider project also includes the AX Factory, which will focus on AI data centre operations and infrastructure hardware manufacturing.

Zinc-Halogen Technology Targets Safety and Local Supply

SoftBank is positioning zinc-halogen batteries as a safer alternative to lithium-ion systems. The company said the technology removes lithium-ion fire risk by using a halogen-based cathode material, zinc anode and water-based electrolyte.

This chemistry also supports supply-chain resilience. Zinc and halides are available in Japan, reducing exposure to imported lithium, nickel, cobalt or graphite supply chains.

That matters because energy storage is becoming more strategically important as AI data centres, renewable power and grid balancing needs grow together. Battery systems must be safe, affordable and scalable.

Zinc-halogen batteries may be especially relevant for stationary storage, where safety, durability and material availability can matter more than maximum energy density.

SoftBank’s plan shows that AI infrastructure is beginning to shape battery demand beyond electric vehicles. Data centres require large and reliable power systems, and that could create a new demand channel for non-lithium battery chemistries.

BESS Manufacturing Adds Industrial Scale Ambition

SoftBank will also partner with South Korea’s DeltaX to develop and manufacture high-energy-density battery energy storage systems. The partnership will use DeltaX’s cell-connecting system design and cell-to-pack technology.

SoftBank aims to reach 1 GWh/yr of BESS mass production by the 2028-29 fiscal year. That would give the company a meaningful platform for grid, industrial and data-centre storage customers.

The company plans to expand sales into grid-storage, industrial and residential applications. It is also considering overseas markets in the medium term.

SoftBank wants the battery business to generate more than ¥100bn in annual revenue by the 2030-31 fiscal year. That target shows the company sees batteries as an infrastructure business, not only a technology experiment.

For Japan, the project strengthens domestic battery manufacturing around AI infrastructure and energy security. It also diversifies battery chemistry development beyond the lithium-ion supply chain.

The industrial implication is clear. As AI power demand accelerates, battery storage will become a strategic layer between data centres, grids and renewable energy supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

SoftBank’s Osaka plan shows that AI infrastructure is now pulling battery innovation in a new direction. Zinc-halogen technology may not replace lithium-ion in vehicles, but it could become strategically important for safer, locally sourced stationary storage.

Sherritt Moa Nickel-Cobalt Suspension Deepens Cuba Supply Chain Risk

Sherritt

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension has moved from sanctions review to direct operational action after the Canadian miner and refiner halted its participation in activities tied to the Moa joint venture in Cuba. The decision follows new US sanctions authority that could target entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension is significant because the Moa joint venture links Cuban mine and intermediate processing operations with Sherritt’s refining capacity in Alberta. Ore is mined and processed in Cuba into mixed sulfide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt, then shipped to Canada for refining.

Sherritt Moa nickel-cobalt suspension adds another layer of disruption to an already fragile supply route. The company had temporarily suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba.

Although Sherritt was not directly named in the new US sanctions, the company said the executive order is expected to create conditions that make operating in Cuba more difficult. That risk was enough for Sherritt to suspend direct participation in Moa-related activities.

Sanctions Risk Hits a Cross-Border Nickel and Cobalt Chain

The new US executive order expands sanctions authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It allows Washington to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, along with several other industries.

That broad language creates uncertainty for companies with Cuban exposure. Even without direct designation, counterparties may become more cautious around shipping, banking, insurance, payments, logistics and commercial contracts.

For Sherritt, the issue is not only legal exposure. It is the practical ability to keep a cross-border supply chain functioning when sanctions risk rises around the Cuban mining sector.

The Moa joint venture is co-owned by Sherritt and the General Nickel Company of Cuba. Its structure depends on Cuban ore mining, local MSP production and shipment to Canada for refining.

Mixed sulfide precipitate is a critical intermediate product because it carries both nickel and cobalt units into downstream refining. Any interruption in MSP flows can affect feed availability at the refinery level.

Nickel and cobalt remain important to batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and advanced manufacturing. That makes Moa strategically relevant despite its political and logistical complexity.

Alberta Refinery Continues but Feedstock Window Narrows

Sherritt said its Fort Saskatchewan refinery in Alberta has not been affected by the suspension and will continue producing finished nickel and cobalt. Existing feed at the site is expected to last until mid-June.

That timeline is now critical. If Cuban MSP flows do not resume or alternative feedstock is not secured, refinery operations could face greater pressure once inventories are depleted.

The situation shows how refining capacity can still be vulnerable when upstream feedstock depends on a politically exposed jurisdiction. A refinery may remain operational, but its production outlook depends on the continuity of intermediate material supply.

The February fuel-related suspension at Moa already showed that physical operating conditions in Cuba were difficult. The latest sanctions-driven action compounds that problem by adding policy risk to fuel and logistics constraints.

For customers, the key question is whether Sherritt can maintain finished nickel and cobalt output after mid-June. Buyers will also watch for any change in shipment schedules, inventory levels and alternative feed strategies.

For the wider market, Sherritt’s case highlights a broader critical minerals reality. Western supply security cannot be measured only by refining location. It must include mine jurisdiction, intermediate processing, sanctions exposure, energy availability and shipping routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s Moa suspension shows that critical minerals supply chains can be disrupted by policy risk even before a company is directly sanctioned. The lesson for nickel and cobalt buyers is clear: feedstock origin and political exposure now matter as much as refining capacity.

Sherritt Cuba Sanctions Risk Clouds Moa Nickel-Cobalt Supply Chain

Sherritt

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has become a new uncertainty for Canadian metals miner and refiner Sherritt International after the US expanded its sanctions framework targeting Cuba. The company is consulting advisers and stakeholders to assess possible implications for its Cuban mining and refining exposure.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk centres on the company’s Moa joint venture with the General Nickel Company of Cuba. The operation mines and processes nickel and cobalt ore in Cuba before shipping mixed sulphide precipitate to Sherritt’s refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta.

Sherritt Cuba sanctions risk has increased after US president Donald Trump issued an executive order on 1 May broadening existing Cuba-related restrictions. The order allows the US to sanction entities operating in Cuba’s metals and mining sector, as well as energy, defence, financial services, security and other parts of the Cuban economy.

The development matters because Moa is not only a Cuban mining asset. It is part of a cross-border nickel and cobalt processing chain that links Cuban ore production with Canadian refining capacity.

Moa Joint Venture Faces Sanctions and Fuel Supply Pressure

The Moa joint venture produces mixed sulphide precipitate containing nickel and cobalt. Ore is mined and processed at the Moa site in Cuba, then shipped to Alberta for refining.

This structure gives Sherritt exposure to two different risks. The first is sanctions policy. The second is physical supply continuity from Cuba.

The company had already suspended mining operations at Moa in February because of fuel supply problems in Cuba. That disruption reduced upstream feed availability and raised concerns over refinery inventory in Canada.

Sherritt said in February that its Fort Saskatchewan refinery feed inventory was expected to last until mid-April. The new sanctions uncertainty adds another layer of pressure to an already fragile supply chain.

Nickel and cobalt remain important materials for batteries, stainless steel, superalloys, industrial chemicals and defence-related supply chains. Any disruption to feedstock or refining routes can affect customers that rely on qualified supply.

The Moa operation is therefore strategically important despite its geopolitical complexity. It supplies intermediate material that can be refined into products serving North American industrial demand.

US Policy Adds Complexity to Critical Minerals Trade

The executive order broadens the list of possible sanctions targets linked to Cuba. Metals and mining are now explicitly included, raising compliance risk for companies with Cuban operations or Cuban-linked material flows.

For Sherritt, the immediate issue is clarity. The company must determine whether its ownership structure, product flows, financing relationships, logistics providers or customers could be affected by the expanded sanctions framework.

This matters because sanctions risk can affect more than direct operations. It can influence shipping, banking, insurance, payment processing, customer contracts and counterparty willingness to handle material.

The case also highlights a difficult reality in critical minerals policy. Western governments want secure nickel and cobalt supply, but some existing supply chains run through politically sensitive jurisdictions.

Canada’s refining capacity at Fort Saskatchewan is valuable, but its feedstock connection to Cuba creates exposure to US policy decisions. That makes Sherritt’s position more complicated than a conventional mining or refining business.

The outcome will depend on how broadly Washington applies the new order and whether Sherritt’s activities become directly targeted. Until then, customers and investors are likely to watch for guidance on operational continuity, legal exposure and feedstock availability.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sherritt’s situation shows that critical minerals security is not only about mine reserves or refining capacity. Political jurisdiction, sanctions exposure and feedstock logistics can determine whether a nickel-cobalt supply chain remains bankable.

Sumitomo Ambatovy Nickel-Cobalt Exit Marks Costly Retreat From Madagascar Laterite Project

Sumitomo

Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit marks a major strategic retreat from one of the world’s largest laterite nickel operations. The Japanese trading and mining group will divest its 54.17% stake in Madagascar’s Ambatovy project to Ambatovy Mineral Resources Investment.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit is unusually costly. The transaction value is negative $418mn, meaning Sumitomo will pay to leave the asset after more than two decades of involvement.

The Sumitomo Ambatovy nickel-cobalt exit reflects years of operational instability, high costs and weak profitability. Sumitomo joined Ambatovy in 2005 and invested around $3bn, but the project generated cumulative losses of about ¥400bn.

The sale is expected to close in the first half of Sumitomo’s financial year ending 31 March 2027. Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources will retain its 45.82% stake.

Operational Instability Undermines a Strategic Nickel Asset

Ambatovy remains strategically important because it produces refined nickel and cobalt. These materials serve stainless steel, battery raw materials, superalloys and industrial supply chains.

However, the project has struggled to operate consistently. Ambatovy combines laterite mining, slurry transport and refining, making it a complex integrated operation with high technical and maintenance demands.

The project was suspended in February before Cyclone Gezani struck eastern Madagascar. It has not yet fully restarted, although market participants expect operations to resume during the current quarter.

Recovery efforts are still continuing. The project has also faced slurry pipeline damage and other processing issues in previous years, which affected output and reliability.

Ambatovy produced about 30,000t of refined nickel in 2025. Cobalt output was estimated at roughly 10% of nickel production.

That production profile gives the asset continuing supply-chain relevance. But strategic metal exposure alone cannot offset weak operating economics if reliability, costs and weather-related risks remain unresolved.

New Ownership Faces Production Reliability Test

AMRI, the buyer, is a UK-based consortium led by mining investment firm Essenwood and South African private equity firm Zungu Investments. The transaction gives the new group control of Sumitomo’s stake in a difficult but potentially valuable nickel-cobalt platform.

For Sumitomo, the divestment removes a long-running drag on earnings. The company expects to record a loss of about ¥70bn in its consolidated April-June results and a non-consolidated loss of about ¥85bn for the full financial year.

Sumitomo said tax effects should limit the net consolidated impact, and the transfer has already been included in its full-year earnings forecast.

For the nickel market, the key issue is not ownership alone. The immediate question is whether the new structure can stabilise output, repair operating weaknesses and restore confidence in Ambatovy’s supply.

Madagascar nickel-cobalt supply remains strategically relevant as buyers look beyond Indonesia-dominated nickel growth. But Ambatovy must prove that it can deliver refined nickel and cobalt reliably before it can regain stronger market importance.

The sale also highlights a broader industry lesson. Large laterite nickel projects can offer scale and battery-metal exposure, but they often carry high capital intensity, technical risk and sensitivity to market cycles.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sumitomo’s exit shows that nickel-cobalt scale is not enough when operating reliability and cost control fail. Ambatovy’s next phase will depend on whether new owners can turn a strategically valuable asset into a commercially stable supplier.

Glencore Copper Production Rises as DRC Cobalt Quota Reshapes Output Priorities

Glencore

Glencore copper production rose sharply in the first quarter as higher grades at its African copper mines and stronger throughput at Antamina lifted output. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group produced 199,600t of copper, up 19% from a year earlier.

Glencore copper production growth contrasts with a steep fall in cobalt output. Own-sourced cobalt production dropped by 39% to 5,800t, mainly because the Democratic Republic of Congo’s export quota system has changed how producers manage shipments and mine planning.

Glencore copper production is now becoming more important inside its DRC asset base because cobalt export limits have made copper the clearer operating priority. This shift shows how state policy can directly reshape output behaviour in multi-metal mining systems.

The company maintained full-year production guidance for copper, nickel and zinc, despite weaker output in several other metals. Copper guidance remains at 810,000-870,000t for the year.

DRC Quota System Pushes Cobalt Lower

The sharp fall in cobalt output reflects the DRC’s quota system, introduced after the country moved away from its earlier export ban framework. The system capped shipments and set annual limits for 2026-27, with an additional strategic pool.

For Glencore, the practical effect is clear. Its DRC assets are now prioritising copper production because copper can move through the market with fewer quota-related constraints.

This matters for battery and superalloy supply chains. The DRC remains the world’s dominant source of mined cobalt, so export policy can quickly affect availability, pricing and producer behaviour.

Cobalt is not produced in isolation at many Congolese operations. It is often linked to copper mining, which means policy limits on cobalt can influence mine sequencing, processing priorities and inventory decisions.

The first-quarter numbers therefore point to a more managed cobalt market. Supply is not only a function of ore grades and plant capacity. It is increasingly controlled by export approvals, quotas and state strategy.

Copper benefited from stronger grades at African operations and higher throughput at Antamina in Peru. That performance reinforces copper’s stronger strategic position at a time when demand from grids, electrification, industrial policy and data centres continues to attract market attention.

Nickel, Zinc and Ferro-Chrome Show Operational Pressure

Glencore’s nickel output fell by 9% to 17,200t. The decline was caused by a furnace disruption at the Sudbury complex in Canada, which affected matte shipment timing to Norway.

Nickel guidance remained unchanged at 70,000-80,000t. This suggests Glencore sees the first-quarter weakness as manageable rather than a full-year supply reset.

Zinc output fell by 17% to 176,900t. The decline was mainly linked to the closure of the Lady Loretta mine in Australia and lower output from Kazzinc in Kazakhstan.

Zinc guidance also remained unchanged at 700,000-740,000t. However, the first-quarter result shows how mine closures and regional production issues can still weigh on quarterly availability.

Ferro-chrome output collapsed by 95% to 13,000t because of continued care and maintenance at Glencore’s chrome smelting operations and the phased restart of the Lion Smelter in South Africa.

South African ferro-chrome remains under pressure from high energy prices and competition from lower-cost Chinese material. This has forced output cuts at major producers and weakened South Africa’s position in global ferro-alloy supply.

Glencore’s vanadium pentoxide production rose by 5% to 2,300t, offering a small positive signal in another strategic alloy material.

Overall, the quarter shows a company benefiting from copper strength while managing policy and cost pressures across cobalt, nickel, zinc and ferro-chrome. The most important signal is that copper and cobalt are now being shaped by very different forces: copper by grade and throughput, cobalt by DRC export control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Glencore’s results show how government policy can be as powerful as geology in multi-metal supply chains. The DRC cobalt quota is not only reducing cobalt output; it is pushing producers to prioritise copper in one of the world’s most strategic mining regions.

Indonesia Nickel Pricing Sets Floor and Ceiling as HPAL Costs Rise

Huafei Nickel Cobalt

Indonesia nickel pricing is increasingly defining the global nickel market as ore quotas, benchmark pricing rules and sulphuric acid availability reshape supply economics. UK broker Sucden Financial said Indonesia is now setting both the floor and ceiling for nickel prices.

Indonesia nickel pricing has moved the market away from a simple oversupply story. The key question is no longer only how much nickel Indonesia can produce, but how tightly Jakarta chooses to manage supply.

Indonesia nickel pricing is also becoming more important because HPAL producers face rising costs for ore, sulphur and sulphuric acid. These inputs directly affect mixed hydroxide precipitate production, which feeds battery-grade nickel supply chains.

The London Metal Exchange nickel price settled at $19,500/t on Wednesday, while Sucden said Indonesia’s current policy stance is creating a firmer floor around $18,000/t. But upside may also be capped if higher prices encourage new quota approvals.

Indonesia Turns Ore Policy Into Market Control

Indonesia remains the central force in nickel because it controls the largest source of new supply. In recent years, Indonesian output growth, large exchange stocks and Chinese-linked processing capacity defined the market.

That structure is now changing. Sucden said Indonesia appears focused on supporting prices and discouraging weaker producers, rather than allowing unrestricted supply growth.

The country has reduced 2026 ore quotas by around 30% year on year. It has also revised its domestic benchmark ore pricing system, strengthening the link between ore valuation, contained metals and producer costs.

This policy approach gives Indonesia unusual pricing power. If supply is restricted, the market finds a firmer floor. If prices rise too far, Indonesia can relax quotas and allow more material through the system.

That means nickel’s upside is managed. Sucden warned that the market should become more cautious near $20,000/t, where additional supply approvals and producer hedging could begin to limit further gains.

This is why Indonesia now acts as both support and restraint. It can tighten ore availability to stabilise prices, but it can also prevent a strong rally from damaging downstream competitiveness.

The result is a more policy-driven nickel market. Traditional inventory and demand indicators still matter, but Jakarta’s quota and ore pricing decisions are now central to global price formation.

HPAL Costs Expose Battery Nickel Supply Risk

HPAL production is becoming the second major driver of nickel pricing. Unlike nickel pig iron and ferro-nickel, HPAL is highly dependent on sulphur and sulphuric acid.

This makes battery-grade nickel supply more vulnerable to chemical input availability. HPAL plants need stable acid supply to process limonite ore into MHP, and Indonesia’s inventory buffers are relatively tight.

Huayou’s decision to place half of its Huafei Nickel Cobalt MHP capacity into temporary care and maintenance from 1 May shows how quickly reagent costs can affect production. The company cited elevated sulphur costs and prolonged high operating rates.

The HPAL sector now faces a double squeeze. Ore prices are rising because of Indonesia’s revised pricing framework, while sulphur and sulphuric acid costs are increasing because of tighter chemical supply.

This changes the nickel cost curve. Producers with secure ore, sulphur access and integrated infrastructure can operate more defensively. Those relying on external feedstock or exposed to high reagent prices face greater margin pressure.

The shift also matters for battery supply chains. MHP is a key intermediate for nickel sulphate and other battery chemicals. If HPAL margins weaken, battery-grade nickel output can become less responsive than headline capacity numbers suggest.

Sucden said tighter nearby spreads and higher trading volumes may indicate increased hedging and another shift in market balance. That suggests producers and traders are adjusting to a market where costs and policy now matter more than simple surplus.

Nickel is still not structurally tight like copper. But it is no longer a market where oversupply alone explains price direction. Indonesia’s supply discipline and HPAL cost inflation are giving nickel a stronger base, even if the rally remains capped.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has turned nickel into a managed market where policy controls supply and chemistry controls cost. The winners will be producers with secure ore, acid access and enough balance-sheet strength to survive Jakarta’s tighter discipline.

Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth

Nickel Industries, Indonesian

Nickel Industries Indonesian output was mixed in the first quarter as lower mining volumes and declining nickel grades contrasted with higher nickel pig iron and mixed hydroxide precipitate production. The Australia-based producer reported weaker ore output but stronger downstream processing across its Indonesian RKEF and HPAL assets.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output reflects the increasingly complex operating environment for nickel producers in Indonesia. Mining permits, ore grades, sulphur availability and downstream ramp-up timing are all shaping production performance.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output also shows why Indonesia’s nickel market can no longer be viewed only through capacity additions. Feedstock access and ore quality are becoming just as important as new processing plants.

Total nickel ore production fell by 30% from a year earlier to 3.96mn wet metric tonnes in January-March. However, output almost tripled from the previous quarter after mining activity recovered from RKAB quota delays late last year.

RKAB Quota Recovery Supports Ore Flow but Grades Weaken

Nickel Industries received 14.3mn wmt of 2026 RKAB nickel ore quota this year. This was 36% higher than its total approved quota of 10.5mn wmt in 2025.

The higher quota helped production recover from the December quarter, when mining was disrupted by RKAB delays. The company also plans to apply for additional RKAB quotas later this year.

The Hengjaya mine supplies ore to Nickel Industries’ RKEF and HPAL plants. These facilities produce nickel pig iron for stainless steel markets and mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material supply chains.

Total NPI output from the Hengjaya, Ranger, Oracle and Angel RKEF operations rose by 4.4% year on year and 1.7% quarter on quarter to 274,086t.

However, nickel-contained production fell to 30,264t because the average nickel content of NPI dropped to 11% from 12.1% a year earlier. This is a critical signal for margins because lower grades reduce metal output even when furnace volumes rise.

The result shows how Indonesian nickel producers face a tightening relationship between ore availability and processing efficiency. Higher RKEF output does not automatically mean stronger nickel production if feedstock grades weaken.

HPAL Growth Continues as ENC Start-Up Moves to Second Quarter

Nickel Industries’ Huayue Nickel Cobalt HPAL project produced 21,526t of nickel and 2,370t of cobalt in MHP form during the first quarter. Nickel output rose by 1.7% from a year earlier, while cobalt output increased by 23%.

This growth strengthens Nickel Industries’ exposure to battery materials. MHP remains a key intermediate product for nickel sulphate and other battery chemical supply chains.

The company’s next major step is the Excelsior Nickel Cobalt HPAL project. Commissioning has been delayed to the second quarter, with full ramp-up targeted by the end of October.

ENC had previously been expected to start commissioning in the first quarter. The delay matters because HPAL projects are technically complex and depend on stable feedstock, acid supply, utilities and commissioning discipline.

Nickel Industries said it has enough sulphur inventory to support ENC’s ramp-up until the third quarter. The company previously bought sulphur at an average price of $450/t.

Sulphur availability is now a strategic issue for HPAL producers. Any disruption in sulphur or sulphuric acid supply can raise costs and slow production growth across Indonesia’s battery nickel chain.

The company also plans to list nickel cathode produced at ENC on both the London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange. Exchange approval would support market acceptance and improve the project’s commercial flexibility.

Nickel Industries increased its stake in ENC by 2% for $46mn on 1 April, lifting its interest to 46% and making it the project’s largest shareholder. This gives the company greater exposure to Indonesia’s move from NPI and MHP toward Class I nickel products.

The broader implication is clear. Nickel Industries is moving across the Indonesian nickel value chain, from ore mining and RKEF production into HPAL, MHP and exchange-deliverable cathode.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel Industries’ quarter shows that Indonesia’s nickel growth is becoming more constrained by ore quality, RKAB permits and sulphur logistics. Capacity still matters, but the winners will be producers that control feedstock, manage HPAL complexity and secure recognised Class I nickel routes.