Updates Mining Rebate Rules: What You Need to Know

US Mining

The United States has introduced significant updates to its mining rebate rules, affecting companies in the mining and materials processing sectors. The U.S. Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released definitive rules on Thursday regarding the Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit, a part of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022. This credit was designed to foster investment in the U.S. manufacturing of components for wind, solar, and battery systems.

Key Changes to the Mining Rebate Rules

The new regulations bring forth an important adjustment for mining companies, particularly regarding "extraction costs." Previously, under the proposed guidance issued in December, extraction was not considered part of the production costs eligible for the 10% rebate. The rationale was that the extraction process was seen as too far removed from the ultimate production of an eligible component, such as those used in wind and solar energy systems.

However, after considerable feedback from stakeholders, the Treasury Department and IRS revised their stance. The updated rules now allow mining companies to claim the rebate for their extraction costs, provided the raw materials are processed into an eligible component. For example, lithium must be refined into lithium hydroxide, which can then be used directly in the production of batteries.

While the regulators acknowledged the importance of value-added processing activities, such as refining and purifying raw materials, they also clarified that "the action of extraction alone does not produce an eligible component." This decision effectively allows certain mining activities to qualify for the credit, but it is important to note that extraction alone, without subsequent processing, does not meet the eligibility requirements.

Industry Reactions and Future Implications

The updated guidance has generated mixed reactions within the industry. On one hand, groups representing mining companies welcomed the inclusion of extraction in some capacity, recognizing the importance of the sector in the overall supply chain for clean energy technologies. On the other hand, some stakeholders, including the National Mining Association (NMA), expressed disappointment over the narrow scope of the final rules.

Rich Nolan, CEO of the National Mining Association, argued that the decision to limit the rebate to producers who also refine materials would exclude many crucial projects from benefiting from the credit. He suggested that this limitation goes against the intentions of Congress in fostering a robust domestic supply chain for critical minerals.

The Bigger Picture: Supporting Clean Energy and Domestic Manufacturing

This policy shift reflects a broader push by the U.S. government to bolster clean energy production and reduce reliance on foreign sources of critical minerals. The Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit is an essential part of the Inflation Reduction Act, which aims to position the U.S. as a leader in the production of clean energy technologies. As the demand for minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt grows—critical materials for battery production—the role of domestic mining and refining becomes increasingly important.

Mining companies, however, will need to balance the rebate’s requirements with the investment needed for refining capabilities. Many smaller mining operations may struggle to meet the additional processing requirements, potentially leaving them at a disadvantage compared to larger, more established companies with the necessary infrastructure.

In conclusion, the update to the mining rebate rules marks a step forward in supporting domestic mining and clean energy initiatives but leaves room for further development. The debate over the scope of the credit is likely to continue as stakeholders assess its impact on the industry and its ability to meet the growing demand for clean energy components.

Burundi Mining Suspension Raises 3T Conflict Minerals Supply Risk

Burundi mining

Burundi mining suspension measures have halted nearly all mining operations in the country, leaving only Sotrevo Mining and Sonalek Mining allowed to continue operating. The move creates new uncertainty for tantalum, tungsten and tin supply from one of Africa’s smaller but strategically important 3T mineral producers.

Burundi mining suspension measures require mining companies and co-operatives to apply for new operating permits before restarting. The government said operating approvals and the state’s share of production will be decided case by case.

Burundi mining suspension rules also introduce the threat of severe sanctions for companies that ignore the new requirements. This signals a stronger state push to control mineral production, permitting and revenue sharing.

The decision matters because Burundi supplies 3T concentrates at a time when buyers are already sensitive to conflict minerals risk, origin documentation and supply disruption across central and eastern Africa.

Permit Reset Raises Supply Risk for 3T Minerals

The suspension affects all mining sites except those operated by Sotrevo Mining and Sonalek Mining. Sotrevo produces tantalum, tungsten and tin, while Sonalek Mining also remains exempt from the suspension.

The ministry’s decision effectively resets the operating framework for much of Burundi’s mining sector. Producers that previously operated under existing arrangements must now seek new approval before they can resume work.

This creates immediate supply-chain uncertainty. Buyers may face delays in shipments, reduced availability and additional documentation requirements while companies wait for permit decisions.

Burundi produced 421t of 3T concentrates in 2024, according to industry supply-chain data referenced in the source material. That volume is not large compared with global mined supply, but it matters for buyers seeking diversified and traceable African material.

Tantalum is critical for capacitors used in electronics, aerospace, defence systems and medical devices. Tungsten supports hard metals, cutting tools, defence applications and industrial machinery. Tin is essential for solder, electronics assembly and coatings.

The suspension therefore affects more than local mining companies. It reaches downstream electronics, tooling, defence and manufacturing supply chains that depend on stable 3T material flows.

Conflict Mineral Markets Face New Compliance Pressure

Burundi has gained importance because conflict and instability in other major 3T-producing countries have increased demand for its material. Buyers looking to diversify regional supply have turned to Burundian concentrates as an alternative source.

The new suspension complicates that trend. Even if the government aims to strengthen oversight, the immediate effect is to reduce clarity for exporters, traders and downstream consumers.

The case-by-case permit process could also reshape the country’s mining structure. Companies with stronger compliance systems, clearer production records and better state relationships may be better positioned to restart.

For responsible sourcing programmes, the policy shift adds another layer of due diligence. Buyers will need to confirm not only mine origin and chain of custody, but also whether suppliers hold valid new operating permits.

The state’s share of production will also be decided individually. This could change project economics and create different cost structures across operators.

Burundi’s decision reflects a wider trend in critical minerals. Resource-holding governments increasingly want more control over production, exports and domestic value capture.

For 3T markets, the timing is sensitive. Supply chains already face scrutiny under conflict minerals rules, while manufacturers need stable feedstock for electronics, aerospace, defence and industrial applications.

If the suspension is resolved quickly, the market impact may stay limited. If permitting delays continue, Burundi’s role as a flexible alternative source of 3T concentrates could weaken.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Burundi’s mining suspension shows how even smaller suppliers can affect strategic mineral confidence. In 3T markets, regulatory clarity and traceability are now as important as mined volume itself.

Codelco Rio Tinto Partnership Targets Faster Mining Development in Chile

Codelco Rio Tinto Partnership

Codelco Rio Tinto partnership plans could accelerate major mining development in Chile as the state-owned copper and lithium group seeks deeper cooperation with global miners. The preliminary agreement will focus on identifying joint investment opportunities in large-scale mining projects across the country.

Codelco and Rio Tinto will create an executive committee made up of senior officials from both companies. The committee will identify prospective pilot projects, assess major mining opportunities, and oversee implementation where cooperation advances.

The Codelco Rio Tinto partnership reflects a broader strategic shift inside Chile’s mining sector. Codelco wants to accelerate timelines, reduce costs, and improve ESG compliance by sharing technical knowledge with established international mining companies.

Chile Turns to Partnerships to Unlock Copper and Lithium Growth

Chile remains one of the world’s most important copper producers, but project development has become more difficult. Lower ore grades, permitting complexity, water constraints, community expectations, and capital intensity are increasing the pressure on producers.

Codelco’s partnership strategy aims to address those constraints. By working with companies such as Rio Tinto, the Chilean state miner can access technical expertise, operational experience, project discipline, and global capital networks. This could help move exploration and development projects faster.

The agreement also builds on Codelco’s recent cooperation with other major miners. The company partnered with BHP last year to enhance copper exploration in the Antofagasta region. This suggests Codelco may pursue more private-sector alliances as Chile works to protect its long-term copper output.

Rio Tinto Ties Strengthen Chile’s Critical Minerals Platform

Rio Tinto and Codelco have already been strengthening their relationship through work on the Maricunga lithium project and the Nuevo Cobre region. The new agreement broadens that cooperation and positions both companies to explore additional copper and lithium opportunities.

This matters because Chile is central to both traditional mining and the energy transition supply chain. Copper remains essential for power grids, electrification, EVs, renewables, and industrial infrastructure. Lithium remains strategically important for batteries and energy storage.

The Codelco Rio Tinto partnership therefore carries value beyond individual projects. It signals that Chile’s mining future may depend increasingly on structured cooperation between state-owned champions and global mining companies with advanced technical and ESG capabilities.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Codelco’s partnership model shows that Chile understands the limits of going alone in a more complex mining environment. The next competitive advantage will come from faster permitting, stronger technical execution, and alliances that can turn resource potential into reliable supply.

CATL Rio Tinto Partnership Targets Mining Electrification and Battery Circularity

CATL

CATL Rio Tinto partnership plans could accelerate electrification across Rio Tinto’s global mining operations as the metals sector looks for practical ways to cut emissions. The two companies have signed a non-binding agreement to explore cooperation in battery technologies, system integration, recycling, and new energy solutions.

The CATL Rio Tinto partnership connects one of the world’s largest battery producers with a major global supplier of iron ore, copper, aluminium, and lithium. This creates a direct link between upstream resource extraction and the battery systems needed to decarbonise mining fleets, rail, and industrial energy use.

Rio Tinto wants to develop a zero-carbon mining model with global demonstration value. CATL will support that goal through its battery technology, energy system expertise, and experience in large-scale electrification.

Battery Systems Move Deeper Into Mining Operations

Mining electrification is becoming a strategic priority because diesel-powered equipment remains a major source of operating emissions. Battery systems can support electric haul trucks, heavy equipment, rail locomotives, site power systems, and charging infrastructure.

The collaboration could help Rio Tinto improve operating efficiency while reducing carbon intensity. Electrified mining systems may also lower fuel exposure, improve maintenance economics, and support customers that increasingly demand lower-carbon raw materials.

The agreement also reflects a broader shift in mining procurement. Large miners are no longer only buying equipment; they are building partnerships around batteries, energy management, recycling, and circular material flows. This gives battery companies a larger role in mining’s industrial transition.

Critical Minerals Circularity Becomes a Strategic Link

The CATL Rio Tinto partnership will also explore business models for battery materials recycling and critical minerals circularity. This is important because mining electrification will create new demand for lithium, copper, nickel, graphite, rare earths, and other battery-linked materials.

Circularity can help reduce waste and strengthen supply security. If battery materials can be recovered and reused across mining operations, companies can reduce dependence on fresh raw material inputs and build more resilient supply chains.

CATL and BYD are increasingly targeting partnerships with major miners and energy companies. CATL and BYD have already signed agreements with BHP to develop battery solutions for mining equipment and railway locomotives, while BYD has also agreed to work with Aramco on electric and fuel cell vehicle technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mining electrification is becoming a new battleground for battery companies, miners, and equipment suppliers. The strategic winners will be those that can connect mineral supply, battery deployment, recycling, and low-carbon operations into one industrial ecosystem.

China Rare Earth Mining Regulations Tighten as Beijing Targets Illegal Supply

China Rare Earth Mining

China rare earth mining regulations are set to become more detailed as Beijing moves to strengthen control over mining, smelting, recycling and trading activity. The industry and information technology ministry has released a draft plan that would impose administrative penalties of up to 5mn yuan for violations.

China rare earth mining regulations already place rare earth production under a state quota system. The latest proposal would clarify penalty levels for companies that mine, smelt, process or trade rare earth materials outside approved channels.

China rare earth mining regulations are strategically important because China remains dominant across global rare earth mining, separation, metal production and magnet supply. Stronger enforcement could tighten unofficial supply and improve state oversight of material flows.

The draft plan released on 28 April sets clearer benchmarks for discretionary penalties. It is aimed at illegal mining, unauthorised smelting, quota breaches, unapproved feedstock use and failures in reporting or traceability.

Quota Enforcement Extends Across Mining, Smelting and Recycling

The draft plan targets enterprises that produce rare earth products beyond state-allocated mining quotas. Companies that conduct smelting without approved quotas would also face fines.

The rules would also cover comprehensive recycling firms that use rare earth ore as feedstock without authorisation. This is important because recycling and secondary processing can become loopholes if ore origin and flow reporting are weak.

Companies that buy, process or sell illegally produced rare earth ore or smelting products would also be penalised. This widens enforcement from producers to the broader trading and processing chain.

Firms that fail to comply with rare earth flow reporting and traceability requirements would face penalties. Companies that refuse or obstruct government supervision and inspection would also be targeted.

This shows that Beijing is not only regulating output volumes. It is building a more detailed control system around material origin, movement, processing rights and end-market access.

Rare earth traceability is becoming more important because these materials are strategic inputs for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace, electronics and high-end manufacturing.

The policy also strengthens China’s ability to monitor both primary and secondary supply. That matters as rare earth scrap recycling grows and as downstream magnet demand continues to increase.

State Control Reinforces China’s Strategic Rare Earth Position

China has tightened control over rare earth resources for more than a decade. The sector has been consolidated under several large state-owned groups to reduce illegal mining, improve environmental oversight and strengthen industrial coordination.

The State Council issued comprehensive rare earth regulations on 29 June 2024 covering mining, smelting, processing, recycling, trading and imports and exports. Those rules took effect on 1 October 2024, but did not define detailed penalty levels.

The latest draft fills that gap. It turns broad regulatory control into a more enforceable administrative system with clearer financial consequences.

China’s two major rare earth groups, Northern Rare Earth and China Rare Earth, now control domestic resources after China Rare Earth consolidated Xiamen Tungsten and Guangdong Rare Earth. Mining, smelting and separation quotas are allocated only to these groups and their affiliates.

Private firms and individuals are prohibited from processing rare earths. This gives Beijing a high level of control over domestic supply channels and industrial output.

From 2025, China also included imported rare earth ore in its quota system. This expanded oversight beyond domestic mining and gave the government more control over imported feedstock entering Chinese smelting and separation plants.

The move is strategically significant. China is treating rare earths as controlled industrial resources rather than ordinary commodities. Production discipline, traceability and export controls are now part of the same policy framework.

For global buyers, tighter regulation could reduce illegal or informal supply flows. It may also increase dependence on approved producers and make rare earth availability more closely tied to Chinese quota and export policy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s rare earth enforcement push shows that Beijing wants full visibility over every stage of the value chain. For western buyers, the risk is clear: rare earth supply is becoming more regulated, more traceable and more politically controlled at the source.

Severe Weather Disrupts Australian Copper and Fertilizer Logistics

Queensland Rail (QR)

Torrential rains have forced the closure of Australia's Mount Isa rail line, disrupting the transport of critical commodities like copper and phosphate. This rail line, which connects key mining sites to the Port of Townsville in Queensland, is essential for the export of goods, and the lack of a clear timeline for its reopening is creating significant logistical challenges.

Mount Isa Rail Line Severely Damaged by Torrential Rain

Queensland Rail (QR) reported on February 10 that the North Coast and Mount Isa rail lines had sustained significant damage, with 177 defects identified. The rail line is a crucial route for transporting products from mining operations, including Glencore's Mount Isa copper mine and Incitec Pivot's Phosphate Hill fertilizer plant. Without it, these mining companies face major delays in moving their products from production sites to the Port of Townsville for export and distribution across Australia.

Challenges for Incitec Pivot and Other Mining Companies

In addition to weather-related challenges, Incitec Pivot is facing other operational issues. The company recently lowered its production forecast for Phosphate Hill by 7%, expecting to produce between 740,000 and 800,000 tons for the 2025 financial year due to ongoing gas supply problems. This is further complicated by the logistical difficulties caused by the Mount Isa rail line closure. Other companies, including Centrex, also rely on the line to ship phosphate rock, amplifying the broader impact on Australia's mining sector.

Port of Townsville and Abbot Point Impacted by Weather

The Port of Abbot Point, located south of Townsville, also experienced disruptions due to wet weather, closing from January 31 to February 5. Despite large parts of Townsville being flooded, the Port of Townsville remained operational, which helped mitigate some logistical challenges during this period. However, the combined effects of rail and port disruptions continue to strain the local economy and hinder mining and fertilizer exports.

Outlook for Australia’s Mining Industry Amid Infrastructure Setbacks

As the Mount Isa rail line remains closed indefinitely, Australian mining companies, particularly in copper and fertilizer sectors, are facing continued uncertainty. With production forecasts adjusted and logistical bottlenecks in place, it is unclear when normal operations will resume, further impacting Australia's export capacity.

Chinalco Guinea Alumina Plant Plan Deepens China’s Bauxite Processing Footprint

Chinalco

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant plans mark another major step in shifting part of the aluminium value chain closer to Guinea’s bauxite resources. Chinese state-owned aluminium producer Chinalco has signed an agreement with the Guinean government to build a 1.2mn t/yr alumina facility in the country.

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant investment is expected to total $1bn. The company has not released a construction timeline, but said the production line will use local bauxite resources, which should support cost competitiveness.

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant development is strategically important because Guinea is China’s largest bauxite supplier. China imported 149mn t of Guinean bauxite in 2025, up 35% from a year earlier and equal to 74% of its total bauxite imports.

The project shows how Guinea’s resource policy is starting to reshape aluminium supply chains. The country is pushing mining companies to invest in local alumina production instead of exporting only raw bauxite.

Guinea Pushes Bauxite Miners Toward Local Value Addition

Guinea has strengthened mining supervision in recent years as it seeks more economic value from its bauxite reserves. Authorities are requiring large mining companies to build alumina plants in the country.

This policy shift matters because bauxite is only the first stage of the aluminium chain. Alumina refining captures more value, creates industrial jobs and gives the host country a stronger role in downstream processing.

For China, local alumina production in Guinea could reduce pressure on long-distance bauxite logistics. It may also help Chinese aluminium companies secure a more stable feedstock chain in a country that has become essential to their raw material supply.

Guinea’s leverage has increased because Chinese refiners depend heavily on its ore. With nearly three-quarters of China’s bauxite imports coming from Guinea, policy changes in Conakry can directly affect Chinese alumina and aluminium economics.

The $1bn Chinalco project therefore reflects both opportunity and pressure. Chinese firms can keep access to Guinean bauxite, but they increasingly need to commit capital to local processing.

Chinese Alumina Investment Faces Policy and Execution Risk

Chinalco’s agreement follows the start of construction by Inner Mongolia Dian Tou Energy on an alumina plant in Guinea’s Tougnifilidy area in March 2025. That project was described as the first Chinese-owned alumina project in Guinea.

Market participants expect Guinea’s alumina output to rise over the next five years. If these projects advance, Guinea could move from being mainly a bauxite exporter toward becoming a more meaningful alumina producer.

The shift could alter aluminium raw material trade flows. More alumina produced in Guinea may eventually reduce the need to ship some bauxite to China for refining, depending on costs, logistics and power availability.

However, execution risk remains high. Alumina refining requires capital, power, water, infrastructure, environmental management and stable policy terms. Project economics will depend on more than bauxite availability.

Guinea’s military government also moved in May 2025 to rescind mining licences granted over the previous two decades across bauxite, iron ore, gold, diamonds and graphite. That action has increased pressure on mining companies and reinforced the importance of compliance with local value-addition requirements.

For Chinese aluminium producers, the direction is clear. Guinea remains indispensable, but access to bauxite is increasingly tied to local investment, refining commitments and government expectations.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Guinea is using its bauxite dominance to force a deeper industrial bargain with foreign miners. Chinalco’s alumina project shows that China’s aluminium supply chain is no longer only about importing ore; it is becoming tied to processing investment inside resource countries.

Guinea Mining Licences Revocation Affects 50+ Operations Amid Resource Nationalism

Guinea Mining

Guinea mining licences revocation encompasses more than 50 permits granted over the past two decades, targeting bauxite, iron ore, gold, diamond, and graphite operations. The Guinea mining licences cancellation decree signed by interim president Mamady Doumbouya focuses on non-operational projects and underutilized permits, reflecting broader resource nationalism trends across West Africa's military-controlled governments.

Military Government Targets Underperforming Mining Assets

Guinea mining licences repossession primarily affects operations that failed to launch or demonstrate inadequate utilization of granted permits. Information Minister Fana Soumah announced the comprehensive review during a television address, emphasizing the government's commitment to maximizing resource development outcomes. The decree represents the most significant mining sector intervention since Doumbouya's military takeover in September 2021.

Meanwhile, industry analysts indicate the revocations predominantly target non-operating assets rather than active mining operations. This selective approach suggests the military government seeks to optimize resource allocation without disrupting established production and export revenues. The strategy aligns with similar resource nationalism policies implemented across West African nations following recent military coups.

EGA Bauxite Operations Face Specific Scrutiny

However, the announcement follows earlier reports that Guinea initiated proceedings to revoke Emirates Global Aluminium's (EGA) bauxite mining licence. EGA's Guinea Alumina subsidiary ranks as the world's second-largest bauxite supplier to third parties, making this potential revocation particularly significant for global aluminum supply chains. The government cited delays in EGA's planned alumina refinery construction as justification for the licence review.

Therefore, the EGA case exemplifies the military government's emphasis on value-added processing rather than raw material exports. Guinea's leadership demands concrete progress on downstream development commitments made during original licence negotiations. This policy shift reflects broader African resource governance trends prioritizing local beneficiation over traditional commodity export models.

Regional Context Shapes Mining Sector Uncertainty

Furthermore, Guinea's actions mirror resource nationalism patterns across West Africa following military takeovers in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali over the past five years. These governments consistently challenge existing mining agreements while demanding greater local content and processing requirements. The coordinated approach suggests regional alignment on extractive industry governance despite distinct national circumstances.

As a result, Guinea faces pressure to restore democratic governance by year-end when the transition period established by the military junta and regional bloc ECOWAS expires. Scheduled elections create additional uncertainty for mining sector investors navigating both political transitions and evolving resource policies. The timing of licence revocations before democratic restoration raises questions about continuity of mining sector reforms.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Guinea's comprehensive mining licence revocation demonstrates how resource nationalism increasingly shapes African mining governance, particularly following military interventions that prioritize sovereignty over foreign investment partnerships. The selective targeting of underperforming assets while maintaining active operations suggests a pragmatic approach to resource optimization, though the EGA case highlights risks for major international mining companies operating in politically unstable environments.

Brazil ETS Calendar Sets Phased Path for Industrial Emissions Reporting

Brazil

Brazil ETS calendar proposals would bring heavy industry into the country’s emerging emissions trading system through phased reporting from 2027, 2029 and 2031. The finance ministry’s preliminary schedule is designed to give companies more visibility before mandatory emissions limits are applied.

Brazil ETS calendar plans would first cover paper and cellulose, ferrous metals and steel, cement, primary aluminum, oil and gas exploration and production, refining and air transport. These sectors sit at the centre of Brazil’s industrial emissions base.

Brazil ETS calendar development is strategically important for metals producers because steel, aluminum and mining will face rising scrutiny over carbon intensity. The system could gradually reshape investment decisions, energy sourcing and competitiveness.

Brazil’s emissions trading system, known as SBCE, is expected to be regulated by the end of this year. The government plans to launch a public consultation in July.

Steel and Primary Aluminum Enter the First Phase

The first phase places steel and primary aluminum among the earliest industrial sectors to report emissions. This is important because both industries are energy-intensive and increasingly exposed to carbon-related trade and customer requirements.

For steelmakers, emissions reporting will create a clearer baseline for future decarbonization planning. Companies will need to measure process emissions, energy use and operating practices before sector limits are introduced.

Primary aluminum producers will face similar pressure. Aluminum’s carbon footprint depends heavily on power source, smelting efficiency and upstream alumina supply.

The proposed structure gives companies time to prepare. Each phase would last four years, beginning with emissions monitoring before setting total emissions limits for each sector.

Reductions would remain non-mandatory during the initial phases. This lowers immediate compliance pressure, but still pushes companies to build emissions data systems and prepare for future regulation.

Mining and Recycled Aluminum Follow in Second Phase

The second phase would add mining, recycled aluminum, electricity, glass, food and beverages, chemicals, ceramics and waste. This expands the ETS from core heavy emitters into broader industrial supply chains.

Mining’s inclusion matters because Brazil is a major supplier of iron ore, bauxite, manganese, nickel, lithium and other critical minerals. Emissions reporting could become part of how mineral exports are assessed by customers and financiers.

Recycled aluminum entering the second phase also matters. Secondary aluminum usually carries a lower carbon profile than primary metal, but reporting requirements may still shape scrap processing, remelting efficiency and product certification.

Electricity’s inclusion is also critical. Power-sector emissions influence the carbon footprint of metals, chemicals and downstream manufacturing.

The third phase would cover road, waterways and rail transport. That could eventually affect logistics costs and emissions accounting across mineral exports, domestic freight and industrial supply chains.

The finance ministry said the proposal aims to create predictability for a gradual transition to decarbonization. That predictability will be essential if Brazil wants industry to invest before binding limits arrive.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil’s ETS proposal is not yet a hard cap on industry, but it is the start of carbon accounting discipline. For metals and mining companies, early preparation could become a competitive advantage once customers and regulators begin pricing emissions more directly.

Tantalite Prices Surge Amid DRC Conflict and Global Supply Chain Strain

Tantalite

The global tantalum market has seen a significant price surge in recent weeks, largely due to escalating violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This comes at a time when the supply of tantalite, a key metal used in electronics manufacturing, is already under significant strain.

Rising Prices Fueled by Political Unrest in DRC

The price of tantalite has spiked over the past two weeks, a result of renewed violence in the DRC, where the M23 militant group has captured key mining areas. This instability in the DRC's North and South Kivu provinces is compounded by the end of the Lunar New Year public holiday in China, which has historically influenced demand for the metal. The M23 group's capture of Goma and recent advances toward Bukavu have disrupted the extraction and transport of tantalite, tungsten, and tin, collectively known as the 3Ts. This disruption has caused many local mining companies to flee, further tightening supply.

Increased Supply Chain Challenges and International Repercussions

The M23 group's activities in the DRC have led to the withdrawal of international organizations like ITSCI, which monitors the trade of conflict minerals. Most smelters and downstream Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are adhering to OECD guidelines, which prevent the use of minerals sourced from areas controlled by non-state armed groups. As a result, many companies are hesitant to accept tantalum mined in these conflict zones, exacerbating the global shortage.

With supply chains already strained, mining firms are scrambling to export material from the region to avoid the risk of looting. Meanwhile, the banking system in South Kivu is in turmoil, which has prompted artisanal mining companies to sell their stock quickly, further fueling market volatility.

A Struggling Industry Facing Limited Tantalite Supply

Tantalite supply was already under pressure before the current political unrest. The 2023 takeover of Rubaya by the M23 group and a series of disruptions caused by political disputes and tariffs on Chinese tantalum products had already left smelters with minimal inventory to begin the year. Many consumers and manufacturers are now finding it difficult to secure enough material to meet their production needs. Although some OEMs are diversifying their sources to countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, political instability in these regions has also limited availability.

The overall situation presents a challenging year for the tantalum industry, with limited supply, rising prices, and increasing pressure from major companies like Apple to cut sourcing from high-risk areas like Rwanda and the DRC. Industry experts suggest that 2024 will be marked by ongoing challenges for both suppliers and consumers of tantalite.

Chengtun DRC Copper-Cobalt Project Stake Expands China’s Overseas Resource Push

Chengtun Mining

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project investment will give the Chinese mining company an indirect 30% interest in a designated mining asset in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The deal strengthens China’s overseas copper resource strategy as domestic smelting demand continues to rise.

Chengtun Mining’s wholly owned subsidiaries Hongsheng International Resources and Preeminence Holdings signed the agreement with Abu Dhabi-based Novel Mining and Services and its subsidiary Nkoyi Leopard Mining and Investment. Under the deal, Preeminence will acquire 50% of Nkoyi for $300mn.

Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project exposure is strategically important because the DRC remains one of the world’s key copper and cobalt supply regions. The project’s technical assessment indicates an average copper grade of 1.66% and an associated cobalt grade of 0.67%.

DRC Asset Adds Copper and Cobalt Feedstock Optionality

The acquisition gives Chengtun access to a copper-cobalt asset at a time when Chinese firms are increasing control over upstream mineral resources. This reflects a wider push to secure feedstock for China’s expanding smelting, refining and battery materials sectors.

The companies plan to negotiate binding agreements covering mineral processing and product sales after the initial transaction documents are completed. These future agreements will determine how project output moves into downstream supply chains.

Chengtun expects mine and processing construction to take around 18 months, followed by a 24-month ramp-up period to full capacity. The company has not disclosed expected annual copper output, leaving the project’s full market impact unclear.

China’s Smelting Demand Drives Overseas Copper Ownership

China copper resource ownership is becoming more important as domestic refined copper output continues to grow. China’s refined copper production rose by 9% on the year in January-February, increasing pressure on companies to secure stable concentrate and mine supply.

The DRC has become a central region for Chinese copper and cobalt investment. Its high-grade copper resources and cobalt by-product value make it strategically attractive for companies exposed to both electrification and battery material demand.

The Chengtun DRC copper-cobalt project deal shows that Chinese companies are still willing to deploy capital into African mining assets despite infrastructure, political and execution risks. For China, the priority remains long-term feedstock security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Chengtun’s DRC investment shows that China’s copper strategy is moving further upstream. As smelting capacity expands, control over mine supply will become just as important as processing scale.

Chinese Firms Intensify Investments in Cu-Co Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In a strategic maneuver to secure a steady supply of crucial resources, Chinese enterprises are significantly amplifying their investments in the copper-cobalt reserves of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This initiative addresses China's limited cobalt resources and the enduringly strong copper market.

Leading the charge are prominent entities such as diversified metals producer CMOC, China Railways Resources, China Nonferrous Metal Mining, Norin Mining, Excellent Mining, and Huayou Cobalt. According to data compiled by Metalnomist, the DRC produced approximately 167,000 metric tons of cobalt feedstock in 2023, with Chinese mining companies contributing around 59% of this total output. Presently, Chinese investments account for over 62% of the DRC’s total cobalt reserves, a remarkable increase from roughly 25% in 2016. This proportion is anticipated to expand further following Norin Mining's acquisition of Dubai-based Chemaf Resources (CRL).

China’s dependency on imported cobalt, which constitutes nearly 99% of its primary feedstock, has propelled these extensive investments. The DRC remains the foremost supplier of cobalt feedstock to China, accounting for 84% of China's total imports in 2023, trailed by Indonesia (10%), Papua New Guinea (1.6%), and New Caledonia (1.5%).

This domestic resource shortfall has driven Chinese mining firms to intensify their investments in the DRC’s copper and cobalt assets over recent years. CMOC, a global titan in mining cobalt, copper, tungsten, molybdenum, and niobium with operations spanning China, the DRC, Australia, and Brazil, acquired a 56% stake in the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine (TFM) from US-based Freeport-McMoRan in 2016, later increasing its stake to 80% in 2017. Additionally, CMOC finalized its acquisition of the Kisanfu copper-cobalt mine (KFM) in December 2020.

With copper prices maintaining an upward trajectory since early this year, achieving new heights on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) and London Metals Exchange (LME) in mid-May, mining firms have been further incentivized to augment their investments in the DRC’s copper-cobalt mines.

Norin Mining's acquisition of CRL, which controls two copper-cobalt mines in the DRC, underscores this trend. Norin Mining Kingco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norin Mining, has entered into a share purchase agreement with CRL’s parent company Chemaf to acquire all of Chemaf's shares in CRL. The financial details of the transaction remain undisclosed, yet CRL anticipates completing the deal in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Nevertheless, the state mining company Gecamines has expressed opposition to the sale of Chemaf Resources, potentially delaying the acquisition process. A source familiar with the matter noted, "The acquisition is expected to be delayed for a while because of Gecamines' opposition, but it will probably be resolved later without significantly impacting the acquisition."

Chemaf SA is progressing with the expansion of the Etoile mine (Etoile phase 2) to process mixed and sulphide ore, alongside developing a new Mutoshi mine. Both projects, in advanced stages of development, have the potential to collectively produce over 75,000 metric tons of copper and 20,000 metric tons of cobalt hydroxide annually. These new ventures are expected to commence production in 2025, post-acquisition.

Spain Critical Raw Materials Plan Targets Mining Supply Chain Revival

Spain Mining

Spain critical raw materials policy is moving into a more active phase as the government prepares to invest €414 million to strengthen domestic mining and raw material supply. The funding will support recycling, mineral exploration, abandoned mine restoration, and workforce training across the Spanish mining sector.

The plan reflects Europe’s wider push to reduce dependence on imported critical minerals. Spain already holds an important position in the EU mining landscape. It ranks as the bloc’s second-largest copper producer and third-largest tungsten producer, giving the country a stronger base than many European peers.

Spain critical raw materials investment also comes as the EU accelerates project selection under the Critical Raw Materials Act. The European Commission has selected seven strategic mining and raw material projects in Spain, placing the country just behind Germany and France in the European project pipeline.

National Exploration Program Signals a Return to Resource Strategy

The most important part of the plan is Spain’s first National Mining Exploration Program in 50 years. The government plans to allocate €182 million to the program, marking a major shift from passive resource ownership to active resource development.

Exploration is critical because Europe’s raw material strategy cannot rely only on known deposits. Copper, tungsten, lithium, rare earths, and other strategic minerals require long development timelines. Without fresh exploration, permitting reform, and financing support, Europe’s supply ambitions will remain exposed to overseas sources.

Spain’s geological position gives the program clear industrial relevance. Copper supports power grids, electrification, renewable energy systems, and industrial manufacturing. Tungsten remains important for hard metals, defense applications, aerospace tooling, and high-performance manufacturing. As a result, the Spanish mining sector could become more strategically important to Europe’s energy transition and industrial security.

Financing Risk Remains the Main Barrier for Spanish Mining Projects

Spain critical raw materials funding addresses a long-standing complaint from mining companies. Industry players have asked for clearer financial and regulatory support because many emerging projects remain stalled despite strong policy interest.

The core problem is risk. Mining projects require large upfront capital, long permitting processes, and uncertain development timelines. Banks and investors often hesitate to provide credit lines, especially for early-stage projects that lack proven production economics.

The new funding can help reduce that gap, but it will not solve every obstacle. Spain must still convert policy support into bankable projects, faster approvals, skilled labor, and reliable infrastructure. If the government succeeds, the Spanish mining sector could become a stronger pillar of Europe’s critical raw materials strategy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Spain’s plan is strategically important because it links exploration, recycling, and mine restoration into one raw materials agenda. However, the decisive test will be whether public funding can unlock private capital for projects that banks still view as too risky.

Indonesia Nickel Mining Quota Approval Raises Ore Supply Uncertainty

ESDM

Indonesia nickel mining quota approvals for 2026 have reached only 190mn-200mn t so far, leaving the market below the government’s earlier signalled target of 260mn-270mn t. The slower approval process has increased uncertainty over nickel ore availability and future smelter operating rates.

The approved volume remains far below the 379mn t quota granted for 2025. Indonesia had already been expected to cut this year’s RKAB quota by about one-third, but the current approved level is still tighter than many market participants expected.

Indonesia nickel mining quota uncertainty matters because the country remains the world’s dominant nickel supply hub. Any shortage of approved mining volumes could raise ore prices, reduce feedstock availability and pressure nickel pig iron, ferronickel and HPAL operations.

RKAB Delays Could Tighten Nickel Ore Availability

The RKAB approval process is moving more slowly than expected, creating operational uncertainty for miners and smelters. Companies without confirmed 2026 RKAB approvals must halt mining after the 31 March cut-off, unless new approvals are granted.

The ESDM previously allowed nickel firms to continue mining using up to 25% of their 2026 production plan until 31 March. That temporary mechanism helped avoid an immediate supply shock, but the expiration of the allowance now increases pressure on companies still waiting for approval.

Several mining firms plan to submit fresh applications for higher quotas, with reviews expected in July. This means Indonesia nickel mining quota volumes could still rise later in the year, but near-term ore availability remains exposed to administrative timing.

Sulphur and Fuel Risks Add Pressure to HPAL Operations

Indonesia’s nickel industry also faces external supply risks from fuel oil and sulphur disruptions linked to Middle East instability. The issue is especially important for HPAL plants, which rely heavily on sulphuric acid production and energy-intensive processing.

The Middle East supplies about 75% of Indonesia’s sulphur imports. If sulphur or fuel oil availability tightens, HPAL producers may face higher operating costs or even output curtailments.

Imports may offset part of the nickel ore quota shortfall, but market participants do not expect overseas material to fully meet smelter demand. Some producers may therefore face reduced operating rates if domestic quota approvals remain limited.

Indonesia is also considering tighter compliance rules. Tax compliance may become a requirement for RKAB submissions from 2027, although it remains unclear whether this will affect the 2026 process.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia nickel mining quota delays show that policy administration can become a direct supply risk in the nickel market. The bigger issue is whether Indonesia can balance resource control, smelter demand and HPAL feedstock security without creating avoidable price volatility.

US Rare Earths Spending Spree Builds Mine-to-Magnet Power Outside China

Energy Fuels

US rare earths spending spree has rapidly reshaped the non-China industry as American companies acquire mining, refining, metal-making and permanent magnet assets around the world. Large government loans, grants and offtake guarantees have given US-backed groups the financial capacity to consolidate strategic assets across the full value chain.

US rare earths spending spree accelerated with Energy Fuels’ planned $1.9bn acquisition of German permanent magnet maker Vacuumschmelze. The deal follows its $299mn purchase of Australian Strategic Materials, which owns one of the few commercial rare earth metal and alloy plants outside China.

US rare earths spending spree is therefore moving beyond domestic production. Washington-backed capital is allowing US companies to build control or commercial influence over rare earth assets in Europe, South America, Australia, Greenland and Asia.

The result is an emerging US-centred supply network covering mines, separated oxides, metals, alloys and finished NdFeB magnets. That structure could become more important than ownership of any single mineral deposit.

Government Capital Accelerates Global Rare Earth Consolidation

US industrial policy has shifted decisively toward financing complete rare earth supply chains rather than isolated mining projects.

Energy Fuels received a conditional $725mn loan commitment for rare earth processing before announcing the VAC acquisition. Buying the German magnet producer gives Energy Fuels downstream manufacturing capability to complement its growing separation and metal-making assets.

The company had already acquired Australian Strategic Materials in January. ASM’s Korean Metals Plant adds commercial rare earth metal and alloy production, a critical midstream step between separated oxides and permanent magnets.

Other US companies are following the same integration strategy.

USA Rare Earth acquired Brazilian producer Serra Verde for $2.8bn in April. Serra Verde is targeting 6,400 t/yr of rare earth oxide production by 2027, giving USAR direct exposure to one of the more advanced rare earth mining operations outside China.

USAR had previously bought UK-based Less Common Metals for $125mn, adding metal and alloy production capability. That combination links upstream Brazilian resources with downstream metallisation expertise.

Critical Minerals also agreed to acquire European Lithium for $835mn to consolidate ownership around Greenland’s Tanbreez rare earth project.

The pattern is consistent. US-backed companies are using access to capital to purchase scarce assets that would otherwise require years to build and qualify independently.

Government support has made this possible. MP Materials received a multi-billion-dollar package including a price floor, guaranteed offtake and direct government investment. Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies received conditional financing support, while USA Rare Earth secured a major federal funding package for its mine-to-magnet development.

Phoenix Tailings also received substantial government-backed financing for rare earth refining.

This capital does more than reduce project risk. It gives US companies the balance-sheet strength to bid for strategic assets elsewhere.

Europe Risks Losing Strategic Control of Its Rare Earth Assets

The US acquisition wave exposes a major weakness in European and other western critical minerals strategies: policy ambition has not always been matched by comparable financing.

Europe still retains important rare earth capabilities. Solvay operates rare earth processing capacity in France, while Neo Performance Materials produces magnets in Estonia.

But ownership is increasingly shifting toward North American groups. VAC will become US-owned if the Energy Fuels transaction closes, while Neo Performance Materials is already controlled from North America.

The same dynamic is emerging in project development. Companies seeking large-scale financing increasingly look to US government programmes rather than domestic European sources.

UK-based Pensana abandoned plans for a UK rare earth refinery and shifted its downstream strategy toward the US, illustrating how capital availability can redirect industrial investment.

This creates an important policy distinction. A rare earth asset can remain physically located in Europe, Brazil, Greenland or Australia while its financing, offtake and strategic direction become increasingly tied to US interests.

That makes Washington’s influence broader than domestic production statistics suggest.

The US does not need every mine or refinery to sit inside its borders. If US-backed companies own assets, control offtake, provide financing or anchor downstream demand, they can still direct material into allied supply chains.

This approach may prove faster than attempting to develop every stage domestically from scratch.

China still dominates global rare earth processing and permanent magnet manufacturing. But outside China, the competitive landscape is increasingly being shaped by access to government-backed capital and the ability to integrate fragmented assets.

The next phase of the rare earth competition will therefore be about ownership and industrial coordination as much as geology. Companies that connect mines, separation, metallisation, alloys and finished magnets will hold the strongest strategic position.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is building rare earth influence by financing companies that can buy and integrate scarce ex-China assets. Europe and other allies may retain the mines and factories geographically, but without comparable capital they risk losing strategic control of the value chain.

Argentina Lithium Growth Could Challenge Chile’s Regional Lead

Argentina Lithium

Argentina lithium growth could reshape Latin America’s lithium map over the next decade as new projects advance under more investor-friendly rules. Argentina is expected to match Chile’s lithium output by 2035, with some industry participants arguing it could overtake Chile even earlier.

Argentina lithium growth is being supported by faster permitting, large brine resources and stronger investment incentives. By contrast, Chile’s lithium expansion remains constrained by restrictive legislation, lengthy approval processes and uncertainty around new project development.

Argentina lithium growth is strategically important because lithium remains central to electric vehicles, energy storage and battery supply chains. Global buyers want large-scale, politically stable and western hemisphere supply outside more exposed jurisdictions.

Chile remains the region’s largest producer today. However, its future output growth depends heavily on existing producers and slow-moving new projects, while Argentina has a deeper pipeline of advanced developments.

Chile’s Lithium Policy Slows New Supply

Chile has long been Latin America’s dominant lithium producer, but its regulatory system is limiting new investment. Lithium remains non-concessionable and is still treated under legislation linked to nuclear materials.

Companies seeking to extract lithium in Chile must apply for special mining contracts. These contracts are granted through public bidding processes that can be lengthy, bureaucratic and uncertain.

This creates a major exploration problem. Companies may be reluctant to explore land if they cannot be confident of later securing extraction rights.

Chile’s national lithium strategy also requires all new projects to use direct lithium extraction. DLE is viewed as more environmentally friendly than traditional evaporation ponds, but it creates technical and cost challenges.

Each DLE process must be designed around the specific chemistry of each brine resource. That means technology used at one salar cannot simply be copied at another.

This raises development costs and lengthens project timelines. Industry participants estimate that DLE projects may require investment of up to $44,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate equivalent, compared with about $26,000/t for evaporation projects.

Chile’s new supply pipeline is therefore moving slowly. The first major new project, Rio Tinto’s Maricunga, is expected only by the end of 2030, with another new project expected in 2032.

Until then, Chile may rely mainly on capacity increases from existing producers. That could limit its ability to respond to rising lithium demand if Argentina’s project pipeline accelerates.

Argentina’s Rigi Regime Attracts Lithium Capital

Argentina is moving in the opposite direction. Its government has streamlined licensing and introduced the Rigi incentive regime for large investments.

Rigi provides tax exemptions, import-export benefits and legal protections for approved projects. It also allows companies to settle certain disputes in courts outside Argentina, improving investor confidence.

Ten lithium projects have already applied to Rigi, with three approved. The programme has become a major signal to international investors seeking policy stability and faster project execution.

Argentina now has more than 60 active lithium projects and seven producing assets, the most in Latin America. Two new developments are expected to come on line this year, lifting projected output to 159,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

That remains below Chile’s 305,000t in 2024. However, Argentina has more than 20 projects in advanced stages, including eight close to production.

Argentina’s mining ministry expects output to reach 583,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent by 2035. That would put the country in position to match or overtake Chile if Chile’s permitting regime does not change.

The investment logic is clear. Argentina offers large brine resources, a more open policy framework and exposure to western hemisphere supply chains. That combination is increasingly attractive to battery makers, automakers and mining companies.

Chile still has enormous lithium potential. But potential alone does not create supply. Without faster approvals and clearer rules, Chile risks losing regional leadership to Argentina.

For the lithium market, this shift matters. Argentina’s rise could increase competition, diversify supply and give buyers more options in South America. It could also make Latin America’s lithium growth less dependent on Chile’s policy choices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina’s lithium advantage is not only geological; it is regulatory. Chile still has world-class resources, but Argentina is turning policy speed into supply-chain momentum.

Argentina Lithium Growth Could Challenge Chile’s Regional Lead

Argentina Lithium

Argentina lithium growth could reshape Latin America’s lithium map over the next decade as new projects advance under more investor-friendly rules. Argentina is expected to match Chile’s lithium output by 2035, with some industry participants arguing it could overtake Chile even earlier.

Argentina lithium growth is being supported by faster permitting, large brine resources and stronger investment incentives. By contrast, Chile’s lithium expansion remains constrained by restrictive legislation, lengthy approval processes and uncertainty around new project development.

Argentina lithium growth is strategically important because lithium remains central to electric vehicles, energy storage and battery supply chains. Global buyers want large-scale, politically stable and western hemisphere supply outside more exposed jurisdictions.

Chile remains the region’s largest producer today. However, its future output growth depends heavily on existing producers and slow-moving new projects, while Argentina has a deeper pipeline of advanced developments.

Chile’s Lithium Policy Slows New Supply

Chile has long been Latin America’s dominant lithium producer, but its regulatory system is limiting new investment. Lithium remains non-concessionable and is still treated under legislation linked to nuclear materials.

Companies seeking to extract lithium in Chile must apply for special mining contracts. These contracts are granted through public bidding processes that can be lengthy, bureaucratic and uncertain.

This creates a major exploration problem. Companies may be reluctant to explore land if they cannot be confident of later securing extraction rights.

Chile’s national lithium strategy also requires all new projects to use direct lithium extraction. DLE is viewed as more environmentally friendly than traditional evaporation ponds, but it creates technical and cost challenges.

Each DLE process must be designed around the specific chemistry of each brine resource. That means technology used at one salar cannot simply be copied at another.

This raises development costs and lengthens project timelines. Industry participants estimate that DLE projects may require investment of up to $44,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate equivalent, compared with about $26,000/t for evaporation projects.

Chile’s new supply pipeline is therefore moving slowly. The first major new project, Rio Tinto’s Maricunga, is expected only by the end of 2030, with another new project expected in 2032.

Until then, Chile may rely mainly on capacity increases from existing producers. That could limit its ability to respond to rising lithium demand if Argentina’s project pipeline accelerates.

Argentina’s Rigi Regime Attracts Lithium Capital

Argentina is moving in the opposite direction. Its government has streamlined licensing and introduced the Rigi incentive regime for large investments.

Rigi provides tax exemptions, import-export benefits and legal protections for approved projects. It also allows companies to settle certain disputes in courts outside Argentina, improving investor confidence.

Ten lithium projects have already applied to Rigi, with three approved. The programme has become a major signal to international investors seeking policy stability and faster project execution.

Argentina now has more than 60 active lithium projects and seven producing assets, the most in Latin America. Two new developments are expected to come on line this year, lifting projected output to 159,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

That remains below Chile’s 305,000t in 2024. However, Argentina has more than 20 projects in advanced stages, including eight close to production.

Argentina’s mining ministry expects output to reach 583,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent by 2035. That would put the country in position to match or overtake Chile if Chile’s permitting regime does not change.

The investment logic is clear. Argentina offers large brine resources, a more open policy framework and exposure to western hemisphere supply chains. That combination is increasingly attractive to battery makers, automakers and mining companies.

Chile still has enormous lithium potential. But potential alone does not create supply. Without faster approvals and clearer rules, Chile risks losing regional leadership to Argentina.

For the lithium market, this shift matters. Argentina’s rise could increase competition, diversify supply and give buyers more options in South America. It could also make Latin America’s lithium growth less dependent on Chile’s policy choices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina’s lithium advantage is not only geological; it is regulatory. Chile still has world-class resources, but Argentina is turning policy speed into supply-chain momentum.

South Kivu Governor Suspends All Mining Operations

The governor of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) South Kivu province, Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, has halted all mining activities in the region, significantly impacting the production of tantalite, tin, and gold. This directive, issued on July 18 and shared via social media platform X, demands all mining companies, businesses, and cooperatives cease operations and vacate mining sites within 72 hours.

Governor Sadiki emphasized that the suspension aims to restore order, ensure the traceability of minerals, and protect human lives. A meeting with mining stakeholders is scheduled for July 30 to discuss the state of mining operations in the province.

South Kivu is a crucial producer of tantalite, essential for the electronics and aerospace sectors, as well as gold and cassiterite (tin ore). These minerals are classified as conflict minerals, often linked to funding armed conflicts in the DRC.

Multiple tantalite mining operations in South Kivu have ceased production following the governor's order, as confirmed by Metalnomist. Market participants are closely monitoring the situation. "The announcement was really bad… but these situations seem to work themselves out," noted one market participant.

The halt in mining operations is expected to exacerbate the already strained tantalite supply chain, worsened by ongoing conflicts in neighboring North Kivu province. In April, the M23 militia group seized Rubaya, a key mining town, disrupting essential transport routes. "Production in Congo is falling like a stone," remarked another market participant to Metalnomist.

Despite the supply constraints, tantalite prices have been declining. As of July 23, Metalnomist assessed prices at $74-78/lb cif main port, down 5% from earlier this month. This decrease is attributed to weaker demand from Chinese smelters and the electronics sector, as well as sourcing concerns from the DRC and Rwanda.

US Venezuelan Critical Mineral Licences Open Sanctions Path for Mining Investment

US, Venezuelan

US Venezuelan critical mineral licences have created a new legal route for mineral investment and operations in Venezuela under strict sanctions guidelines. The US Treasury Department issued new and amended general licences on 27 March, allowing limited mineral-related activities and contingent investment agreements.

The licences permit the supply of certain items and services for minerals operations. They also allow negotiations and contingent contracts for investment in Venezuela’s minerals sector, including certain contracts with state-owned miner Minerven if governed under US law.

US Venezuelan critical mineral licences reflect Washington’s attempt to reconnect parts of Venezuela’s resource sector with US-linked investment. However, the opportunity remains complicated by illegal mining, weak infrastructure, political risk and security concerns in key mineral regions.

Venezuela’s Mineral Potential Comes With High Execution Risk

Venezuela is believed to hold strategic resources including copper, nickel, columbite-tantalite and uranium, although available public data do not provide clear reserve volumes. The Orinoco Mining Arc in southern Bolívar state is one of the country’s richest mining regions, with deposits of coltan, bauxite, gold and other metals.

The Orinoco Mining Arc has been designated as a strategic development zone, but the region remains difficult for formal investors. Illegal mining, mineral smuggling, money laundering and the presence of non-government armed groups create serious operational and compliance risks.

Some public-private partnerships already operate in coltan-rich areas, while Venezuela’s armed forces also maintain mining activity through Camimpeg. These structures add further complexity for any foreign company evaluating due diligence, security and legal exposure.

Sanctions Relief Could Support Critical Mineral Strategy

US Venezuelan critical mineral licences come as the US seeks more diversified sources of technology and defense-related minerals. Venezuela’s potential resource base could attract interest if companies can manage sanctions compliance, contract structure, security and infrastructure constraints.

The new licences also follow Venezuela’s effort to open its mining sector to more investment. The national assembly passed a new mining law in an initial vote on 9 March, signalling a policy push to revive resource development.

Still, economic instability remains a major obstacle. Venezuela continues to face currency weakness, very high inflation and years of underinvestment across industrial infrastructure. These conditions mean sanctions relief alone will not quickly convert mineral potential into reliable supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US Venezuelan critical mineral licences are strategically important, but they do not remove the hard risks on the ground. Venezuela may hold valuable minerals, yet the real test will be whether legal access, security, infrastructure and transparent sourcing can be aligned.