Adani Green BESS Expansion Makes Khavda a Major Grid Storage Platform

Adani Green Energy

Adani Green BESS capacity has reached 3.37GWh at the Khavda renewable energy park in Gujarat, marking a major step in India’s effort to make large-scale renewable power more reliable and dispatchable. Adani Green Energy added 2GWh to the 1.37GWh installed in March.

Adani Green BESS development at Khavda is significant because the project is now the largest single-location battery storage installation outside China, according to the company. The system is co-located with AGEL’s 30GW renewable energy project, of which 9.9GW is already operational.

Adani Green BESS expansion also signals how India’s clean energy transition is moving beyond generation capacity alone. Solar and wind projects need storage to manage intermittency, stabilise grids and supply power during peak demand periods.

The company plans to scale its storage footprint quickly. It is targeting more than 10GWh of new capacity by March 2027 and aims to reach 50GWh over the next five years.

Khavda Storage Strengthens Renewable Power Dispatchability

The Khavda BESS uses lithium-ion battery technology integrated with advanced energy management systems. This allows faster grid response, better stability and more reliable renewable power delivery.

This matters because India is adding renewable power at scale, but grid flexibility remains a major constraint. Battery storage helps convert variable solar and wind generation into usable power during high-demand periods.

AGEL said the 3.37GWh system can power about 1mn homes for a full day. It can also meet peak electricity demand in cities such as Indore or Chandigarh, or supply the entire state of Goa.

The Khavda project therefore shows how battery storage is becoming core electricity infrastructure. It is no longer only a backup tool or pilot technology.

For India, this type of storage capacity supports energy security, renewable integration and reduced dependence on fossil fuel peaking power. It also strengthens the case for more domestic battery materials, cell manufacturing and power electronics capacity.

Battery Storage Growth Lifts Materials and Supply-Chain Demand

Large BESS projects create demand across several material chains. Lithium-ion batteries require lithium, graphite, copper, aluminium, separators, electrolytes, battery management systems and thermal control technologies.

Copper demand is also supported by cabling, grid connections, transformers and power conversion systems. Aluminium can benefit through enclosures, busbars, structural systems and cooling components.

India’s rapid storage targets could therefore deepen demand for battery raw materials and downstream manufacturing. The country will need reliable supply chains for cells, modules, inverters and grid equipment if it wants to scale from gigawatt-hours to tens of gigawatt-hours.

The Khavda system also highlights the strategic link between renewable energy and industrial policy. Battery storage deployment can create demand signals for local manufacturing, recycling and critical minerals processing.

However, scaling to 50GWh will require capital, land, grid integration, battery procurement and long-term project economics. Storage must become not only technically viable, but also financially repeatable.

Adani Green’s commissioning shows that India is moving quickly. The next challenge is building a domestic ecosystem that can support storage deployment without relying too heavily on imported battery materials and equipment.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Khavda shows that the renewable energy race is becoming a storage race. India’s next clean-energy bottleneck will not be only solar or wind capacity, but the battery materials, grid equipment and financing needed to make renewable power dispatchable.

Energy Security Investment Rises as IEA Sees $3.4 Trillion Global Spend

IEA

Energy security investment is accelerating as the war in the Middle East and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz push governments and companies to diversify supply. The IEA expects global energy investment to reach $3.4 trillion in 2026.

Energy security investment is now shifting strongly toward electricity, grids, storage, renewables, nuclear, low-emissions fuels and efficiency. The IEA expects around $2.2 trillion to flow into these areas, compared with about $1.2 trillion for fossil fuels.

Energy security investment also carries direct metals implications. More spending on grids, storage, solar, wind, nuclear and electrification will support demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other critical materials.

The IEA described the current crisis as the largest energy security crisis the world has faced. It expects decision-makers to prioritise resilience, diversification and trusted energy partners.

Electricity Spending Becomes the Core Security Response

Electricity-related investment is becoming the dominant theme in global energy spending. The IEA expects investment in electricity supply and infrastructure to reach nearly $1.6 trillion in 2026.

That figure rises to about $2 trillion when end-use electrification is included. This shows that energy security is no longer only about oil and gas supply. It is increasingly about reliable power systems.

Power grids will be central to this shift. Grid expansion, storage deployment and electrification require large volumes of copper, aluminium and electrical equipment.

Renewables will also remain a major investment channel. The IEA expects renewables spending to reach around $665bn in 2026, including $365bn for solar, $200bn for wind and $75bn for hydropower.

Annual renewables spending growth has moderated because of lower technology costs and policy changes in China and the US. However, low-emissions sources still account for more than 70% of global power investment.

The metals signal is clear. Energy security policy is reinforcing the same material demand base already supported by decarbonisation. Grid metals, battery materials and renewable energy inputs remain structurally important.

Fuel Supply Shock Keeps Fossil Investment Alive

Fossil fuel investment is also rising in selected areas. Total fossil fuel supply investment is expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026, returning to 2024 levels.

Oil investment is expected to fall for a third consecutive year to below $500bn. Long project lead times, supply-chain limits, offshore rig tightness and uncertainty over the duration of the price spike are limiting near-term spending outside the Middle East.

Natural gas investment is moving in the opposite direction. The IEA expects gas investment to reach $330bn, the highest level in a decade, supported by LNG export projects and demand from data centres.

Coal investment is also expected to rise to $180bn, the highest level since 2012. Around 70% of that spending is expected in China, while some Asian countries may keep existing coal-fired power plants running longer to protect energy security.

The IEA said past investments in renewables, nuclear, efficiency and electrification have already improved energy security in major fuel-importing regions. It estimated that China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, southeast Asia and India avoided around $260bn in fossil fuel imports in 2025.

The conflict is also forcing a search for new energy export routes to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Repair costs for damaged energy infrastructure are expected to reach tens of billions of dollars.

For industrial markets, the result is a more complex energy outlook. Electricity investment is rising fast, but gas and coal remain part of short-term security planning. That mix will shape metals demand, energy costs and industrial competitiveness.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The IEA’s outlook shows that energy security and electrification are now the same investment story. The winners will be supply chains that can deliver grids, storage, renewables and critical minerals at scale while reducing exposure to fragile fuel routes.

India-US Critical Minerals Agreement Targets Mining, Processing and Recycling Security

India-US Critical Minerals

India-US critical minerals agreement marks a new step in efforts to secure mining, processing and recycling routes for strategic minerals and rare earth elements. The bilateral framework covers materials needed for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors, solar panels, defence systems and artificial intelligence hardware.

India-US critical minerals agreement was signed on the sidelines of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi. Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar and US secretary of state Marco Rubio attended the signing.

India-US critical minerals agreement reflects growing concern over concentrated supply chains. China dominates refining and processing for lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earths, leaving India and the US exposed to supply disruption, export controls and price leverage.

The pact covers the full value chain, from extraction and processing to recycling, financing and long-term material management. That broader scope is important because raw mineral access alone does not create industrial supply security.

Processing Capacity Becomes the Strategic Priority

The agreement directly targets one of the biggest weaknesses in non-China critical mineral supply chains: processing. Mining resources matter, but value is captured when materials are refined, separated and qualified for industrial use.

China accounts for around 60-70% of global refining and processing capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt. It also controls about 90% of rare earth refining.

That dominance gives China strong influence over battery materials, magnet inputs, semiconductor minerals and advanced manufacturing supply chains. It also makes diversification difficult because new projects must compete with established Chinese scale and cost advantages.

India has significant long-term rare earth potential. Its monazite reserves contain an estimated 7.23mn t of rare earth oxides, but commercial output remains limited.

The new framework could help India convert resource potential into usable supply. That will require investment in mining, separation, refining, metallurgy, environmental management and customer qualification.

For the US, India offers a strategic partner with mineral resources, industrial ambition and a large domestic market. For India, the US can provide financing, technology partnerships, customer demand and policy support.

Rare Earth Corridors Fit India’s Industrial Strategy

India’s latest budget introduced a policy framework to develop rare earth corridors across Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. These regions could become the foundation for a more integrated rare earth supply chain.

The corridor model matters because rare earth development requires clustering. Mining, mineral sands processing, separation, waste management, logistics and downstream manufacturing need to be connected.

India is also widening its international partnerships. It signed a critical minerals cooperation agreement with Brazil in February 2026, showing that New Delhi wants a diversified supply network across multiple geographies.

The India-US framework adds a stronger strategic layer. It links India’s domestic minerals policy with Washington’s push to reduce dependence on China in defence, batteries, semiconductors and AI-related hardware.

Recycling is also part of the agreement. That inclusion is important because recovered battery metals, rare earth magnets and industrial scrap can reduce long-term import dependence.

However, execution will decide the real impact. India must move faster on permitting, processing technology, financing and downstream customer development if it wants to become a serious critical minerals hub.

The agreement gives both countries a framework. The next challenge is turning policy language into operating mines, refineries, recycling plants and qualified material flows.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The India-US deal shows that critical minerals security is now a full-chain industrial policy issue. The countries that win will not only secure ore; they will control processing, recycling, financing and qualified supply for strategic end markets.

Rising Aluminium Prices Seen Unlikely to Derail Demand Growth

Aluminium

Rising aluminium prices are unlikely to destroy demand, despite higher premiums caused by Middle East supply disruption and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Speakers at an aluminium industry event in London said the sector’s medium-term demand drivers remain strong.

Rising aluminium prices have raised concerns among analysts that buyers could reduce consumption or switch to alternative materials. Those fears have grown as supply disruption has lifted global delivery premiums and tightened availability.

Rising aluminium prices are still being weighed against structural demand from packaging, automotive lightweighting, power infrastructure, energy transition projects and artificial intelligence-related growth. Industry speakers argued that these end-use trends are not easily reversed by short-term price movements.

The debate matters because aluminium demand forecasts remain strong. Consensus expectations have pointed to demand growth of around 40% in 2022-30, while newer forecasts suggest growth of about 5% per year over the next decade.

Packaging and Automotive Demand Look More Resilient Than Expected

Packaging demand appears relatively insulated from short-term aluminium price moves. Alcoa said it is seeing more products move into aluminium cans and that price is not the main factor driving packaging substitution.

This is important because beverage cans and packaging remain high-volume aluminium markets. Their appeal is tied not only to cost, but also to recyclability, light weight, consumer preference and established filling infrastructure.

Automotive demand is more price-sensitive. However, major material choices in vehicle platforms are not usually changed because of short-term price movements.

Automakers make aluminium decisions around lightweighting, crash performance, emissions rules, platform design and long-term supply strategy. This gives aluminium some demand stability even when prices and premiums rise.

Still, demand destruction cannot be ruled out completely. High interest rates, weak consumer purchasing power and elevated living costs may continue to limit consumption in some traditional markets.

Copper Prices Strengthen Aluminium’s Role in Electrification

Energy transition and AI infrastructure demand give aluminium a stronger long-term floor. These sectors require large volumes of conductive, lightweight and scalable material.

Copper remains the main competing material in electrical and cable applications. But copper prices are now so high that some buyers are more likely to consider substituting copper with aluminium than the reverse.

This strengthens aluminium’s position in power cables, grids, renewable energy, data centres and related infrastructure. Aluminium offers good conductivity, lower weight and more transparent supply-chain options in some applications.

The energy transition also supports demand through decarbonisation. Solar, wind, transmission systems, electric vehicles, battery enclosures and industrial electrification all require more aluminium.

AI infrastructure adds another layer. Data centres need power distribution, cooling systems, structural materials and electrical infrastructure, all of which can support aluminium use.

Therefore, the demand question is not only about price. It is about whether the world can build enough power, transport and digital infrastructure. Aluminium remains one of the core materials for that buildout.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The aluminium market is showing that strategic demand can absorb higher prices better than traditional models suggest. The real risk is not immediate demand destruction, but whether supply disruption, premiums and energy costs create uneven pressure across weaker end-use sectors.

India Critical Minerals Supply Chain Faces Funding Gap Despite Policy Push

Indonesia nickel mining

India critical minerals supply chain ambitions face a major financing test as the country tries to reduce dependence on imported lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth materials. A new report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis warns that funding gaps, slow policy execution and raw material import dependence could delay India’s strategy.

India critical minerals supply chain development is becoming urgent because the country imports 100% of the lithium, cobalt and nickel used in clean energy manufacturing. Demand is expected to rise as India targets 30% electric vehicle penetration by 2030, along with 230GW of solar capacity and 140GW of wind capacity.

India critical minerals supply chain policy has moved quickly on paper. The government launched the National Critical Mineral Mission in January 2025 with a seven-year budget of 343bn rupees to support exploration and auctions.

However, the mission still lacks enough direct capital expenditure support for large-scale mining, refining and processing. That is the central weakness in India’s current critical minerals push.

Exploration Targets Need Processing Capital

The National Critical Mineral Mission targets 1,200 exploration projects and more than 100 critical mineral block auctions by 2030-31. This can improve domestic resource visibility, but exploration alone will not create battery, magnet or semiconductor supply chains.

Critical minerals projects require large upfront capital, long permitting timelines and technical processing capability. Mining projects can take 10-15 years to move from exploration to commercial production, creating long periods of uncertainty for investors.

India has identified major resource potential. The country reported 5.9mn t of inferred lithium resources in Jammu and Kashmir as of 2023. It also holds 13.15mn t of monazite deposits containing an estimated 7.23mn t of rare earth oxides.

The Geological Survey of India also identified 482.6mn t of rare earth ore resources through exploration projects in February. These figures suggest significant geological potential, but they do not solve the refining and separation challenge.

Rare earths are a clear example. Monazite and rare earth ore must be separated, purified, converted into metals or alloys, and qualified by downstream users before they can support magnets, defence systems, electronics or clean energy applications.

India’s midstream sector also faces pressure from Chinese overcapacity. China controls around 60-70% of global refining and processing capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt, and about 90% of rare earth refining.

That dominance suppresses margins and makes new Indian refining projects harder to finance. Without price support, offtake contracts or direct capital backing, investors may hesitate to fund projects that compete against established Chinese capacity.

Import Dependence Extends Beyond Battery Metals

India’s critical minerals strategy now reaches beyond battery materials. The government classified coking coal as a critical and strategic mineral in January to reduce import dependence and support steel expansion.

This widens the funding challenge. India aims to increase crude steel production capacity to 300mn t/yr by 2030 and 500mn t/yr by 2047. Its Mission Coking Coal targets domestic output of 140mn t/yr by 2030, up from 66.49mn t/yr in fiscal 2025-26.

These goals will require long-term investment in mining, washing, transport, processing and related infrastructure. That makes critical minerals policy a broader industrial financing issue, not only an energy transition issue.

India is also seeking overseas supply partnerships. It is working with Australia, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and Côte d’Ivoire to secure access to critical minerals.

State-backed Khanij Bidesh India is also pursuing overseas lithium and cobalt assets. These efforts can reduce raw material risk, but they still need downstream processing and domestic industrial integration.

The global funding requirement is enormous. The International Energy Agency estimates that mining and refining will need $915bn in new investment during 2026-35 under its Announced Pledges Scenario.

For India, the strategic question is how to convert policy ambition into bankable projects. Auctions and exploration can identify resources, but refining plants, processing hubs, offtake agreements and financing tools will decide whether domestic supply chains actually emerge.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India has recognised the critical minerals problem, but recognition is not the same as industrial capacity. The next stage must focus on project finance, refining economics and guaranteed demand, or India will remain dependent on imported materials despite its resource potential.

5N Plus Supply Security Becomes Top Priority as Semiconductor Materials Demand Rises

5N Plus

5N Plus supply security has become the company’s top priority as geopolitical volatility, trade uncertainty and rising customer demand reshape the semiconductor materials market. The Canadian producer said reliable supply is now essential to avoid disruptions for customers in renewable energy, space solar power and performance materials.

5N Plus supply security is becoming more important because the company operates in sensitive material chains serving semiconductors, solar cells and advanced industrial applications. These markets require consistent quality, qualified feedstock and stable delivery.

5N Plus supply security also reflects a wider shift in critical materials procurement. Customers are no longer focused only on price. They increasingly want trusted suppliers that can manage input volatility, origin risk and operating disruptions.

The company reported first-quarter revenue of $117.9mn, up 33% from a year earlier. Profit increased by 86% to $17.8mn, supported by growth across both business segments.

Specialty Semiconductor Revenue Rises on Solar and Space Demand

Revenue from the specialty semiconductor segment rose by 37% to $86.2mn in the first quarter. Higher volumes from the terrestrial renewable energy industry drove the increase.

Demand from the space solar power sector also supported growth. This is strategically important because space-grade solar cells require high-performance semiconductor materials and strict qualification standards.

5N Plus’ Germany-based solar cell producer Azur Space is expanding capacity again. The company expects to add another 25% of capacity by the second half of this year.

That follows capacity increases of 35% in 2024 and 30% in 2025. The expansion shows that demand for advanced solar cell technology remains strong across terrestrial and space applications.

The growth also highlights the strategic role of specialty materials in energy and aerospace supply chains. Solar power, satellites and advanced electronics depend on reliable access to high-purity inputs and qualified manufacturing capacity.

Cost Volatility Tests Performance Materials Margins

5N Plus’ performance materials segment also grew in the first quarter. Revenue rose by 21% on the year to $31.7mn.

Favourable pricing conditions supported the segment, but the company expects pricing to normalise in coming quarters. That could reduce some of the revenue uplift if volumes do not offset weaker prices.

Cost volatility remains a major risk. 5N Plus expects trade uncertainty, inflationary pressure and higher input costs to continue affecting margins through the year.

This matters because semiconductor and performance materials producers must manage both upstream feedstock risk and downstream customer commitments. Any mismatch between input costs and contract pricing can pressure profitability.

The company’s results show strong demand, but also a more complex operating environment. Supply security, inventory planning, sourcing diversification and cost control will remain central to performance.

For advanced manufacturing customers, 5N Plus’ message is clear. Secure materials supply is now a competitive advantage, especially in sectors linked to semiconductors, renewable energy, aerospace and space infrastructure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

5N Plus’ results show that specialty materials companies are becoming supply-chain security providers, not just product suppliers. In semiconductor and space solar markets, reliability, qualification and sourcing resilience may matter as much as capacity expansion.

Corning Nvidia Optical Connectivity Partnership Expands US AI Infrastructure Supply Chain

Corning

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity plans will expand US manufacturing capacity for the optical systems needed to support artificial intelligence data centres. Corning will build three new manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and Texas as it targets a tenfold increase in optical connectivity output.

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity investment also includes a more than 50% expansion in Corning’s fibre production. The move reflects rising demand for high-speed data movement across AI infrastructure, where advanced optical links are becoming as important as chips themselves.

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity partnership strengthens the domestic supply chain around Nvidia’s AI computing ecosystem. Nvidia chips require high-performance optical fibre connectivity to move data quickly and at scale across large data centre networks.

The agreement also has a strategic materials angle. The fibre-optics industry is the largest US end-user of germanium, making AI data centre buildout increasingly relevant to minor metals demand.

AI Data Centres Drive Optical Connectivity Demand

AI workloads require massive data movement between chips, servers and storage systems. As computing clusters grow, copper-based connections face performance, distance and energy-efficiency limits in some high-speed applications.

Optical connectivity helps solve that problem. It allows data to move faster and across longer distances, supporting the scale required by advanced AI data centres.

Corning’s planned facilities in North Carolina and Texas will increase domestic capacity for these optical systems. That is important because AI infrastructure is becoming a national industrial priority, not only a technology market.

For Nvidia, the partnership supports the physical network behind its chips. AI accelerators create value only when data can move efficiently through the system.

For Corning, the deal gives stronger exposure to one of the fastest-growing infrastructure markets. Optical fibre, cable assemblies and connectivity products are becoming critical components in the AI supply chain.

Germanium Demand Links AI Growth to Critical Materials

The partnership also connects AI infrastructure to germanium demand. Germanium is used in optical fibre production, making fibre expansion relevant to critical minerals and specialty materials markets.

This matters because germanium supply is already strategically sensitive. It is used in fibre optics, infrared systems, semiconductors, defence electronics and solar applications.

If AI data centre construction accelerates, optical fibre demand could strengthen further. That would increase attention on germanium availability, recycling, refining and origin security.

The transaction also includes a financial component. Nvidia has the right to purchase up to 15mn shares of Corning stock at a fixed price of $180/share, as well as a pre-funded warrant to purchase up to 3mn shares for a total price of $500mn.

That structure shows how strategic customers are moving closer to upstream and midstream suppliers. Nvidia is not only buying components. It is helping secure the manufacturing base needed for future AI infrastructure.

For the US, the partnership supports domestic manufacturing around semiconductors, photonics and critical materials. It also reinforces the wider shift toward regionalised supply chains for high-value technology infrastructure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Corning-Nvidia partnership shows that AI supply chains are moving beyond chips into optical fibre, photonics and specialty materials. Germanium demand could become a hidden beneficiary as data centres require faster and more resilient optical connectivity.

Kamoa-Kakula Sulphuric Acid Output Turns Copperbelt Squeeze Into Margin Support

Ivanhoe

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid production has become a major earnings support for Ivanhoe Mines as tight acid availability across the African Copperbelt lifts by-product revenue. The company’s new direct-to-blister smelter in the Democratic Republic of Congo is turning a regional supply constraint into a margin advantage.

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid output reached 117,871t in the first quarter. Ivanhoe sold 107,700t to six offtakers at an average realised price of $467/t.

Kamoa-Kakula sulphuric acid pricing is now moving higher. Ivanhoe recently signed a June delivery contract at $725/t and plans to re-tender and reprice remaining contracts by the end of the quarter.

The shift is strategically important because many copper producers in the DRC and Zambia consume sulphuric acid for leaching. Kamoa-Kakula, by contrast, produces acid as a by-product, giving Ivanhoe a natural hedge against the same squeeze hurting regional competitors.

Acid Credits Change the Kamoa-Kakula Cost Structure

Sulphuric acid has become one of the hidden drivers of Copperbelt copper economics. The DRC and Zambia rely heavily on acid for solvent extraction and leaching operations, and supply has tightened because of Middle East sulphur disruption, Zambian acid export controls and smelter maintenance in the region.

Ivanhoe said around 80% of sulphur imported into Africa moves through the Strait of Hormuz. That makes the Copperbelt highly exposed to disruption in Middle Eastern sulphur flows.

The Kamoa-Kakula smelter changes Ivanhoe’s exposure. Instead of paying higher acid costs, the operation is selling acid into a tight regional market.

Smelter operating costs averaged $0.27/lb in the first quarter. Sulphuric acid by-product credits more than offset that cost at $0.32/lb.

This cost structure helped lower Kamoa-Kakula’s cash cost to $2.58/lb from $2.99/lb in the previous quarter. The result was slightly below the lower end of Ivanhoe’s 2026 guidance range of $2.60-3.00/lb.

The smelter also reduced logistics costs. Kamoa-Kakula exported 99.7% pure copper anodes instead of 35-40% copper concentrate, cutting logistics costs to $0.22/lb from $0.70/lb in the fourth quarter.

That shift matters because the smelter moves Ivanhoe further down the value chain. Higher-grade exported material reduces transport intensity, lowers logistics exposure and improves revenue capture.

Kamoa-Kakula generated revenue of $862mn, operating profit of $221mn and Ebitda of $397mn in the quarter. That represented an Ebitda margin of 46%.

However, Ivanhoe’s group results were still weaker. Adjusted Ebitda fell to $191mn from $226mn a year earlier, while the company reported a $2mn quarterly loss compared with a $122mn profit a year earlier.

The loss mainly reflected Ivanhoe’s $42mn share of loss from Kamoa Holding after Kamoa-Kakula booked a $183mn tax adjustment to settle DRC tax claims from previous years. This means the headline loss should be separated from the operational value of the smelter and acid credits.

Smelter Ramp-Up Links Copper Recovery to Regional Supply Strategy

Kamoa-Kakula’s copper output remains affected by disruption from last year’s seismic activity. The operation produced 61,906t of copper in concentrate in the first quarter, down from 133,120t a year earlier.

Contained copper in blister and anode totalled 71,417t. This included 63,671t from the on-site smelter and 7,746t from the Lualaba Copper Smelter in Kolwezi.

Ivanhoe maintained Kamoa-Kakula’s 2026 guidance at 290,000-330,000t of contained copper in anode or blister. Its 2027 guidance remains at 380,000-420,000t.

The company still expects production to return to more than 500,000 t/yr from 2028, with a target cash cost below $2/lb. Reaching that level will depend on mine recovery, smelter utilisation, power stability and logistics performance.

The smelter is currently operating at around 60% of design capacity. It is producing acid at about 1,350 t/d, but further ramp-up is constrained by concentrate availability.

Ivanhoe is assessing purchases and toll treatment of local third-party copper concentrates to raise smelter utilisation and improve margins. This could make Kamoa-Kakula more important to the regional concentrate market.

That point matters globally. Chinese smelters continue to face negative treatment charges, showing how tight copper concentrate supply has become. If Kamoa-Kakula becomes a larger third-party treatment option, it could offer an alternative regional route for selected Copperbelt concentrates.

Logistics are also changing. The first shipment of Kamoa-Kakula anodes moved through the Lobito railway corridor during the quarter and reached the Atlantic port of Lobito before shipment to Europe for refining.

Ivanhoe said the Lobito rail route takes around seven days from the DRC Copperbelt to the port. That compares with more than three weeks by truck to Durban or Dar es Salaam.

Flood damage in Angola temporarily halted Lobito shipments, but movements are expected to resume later this month. If reliable, the corridor could become a major strategic route for Central African copper exports.

Energy remains another critical variable. Ivanhoe has secured five months of diesel supply to protect operations from global supply-chain disruption.

The company is also developing a 60MW solar and battery storage project expected to deliver baseload power to Kamoa-Kakula from early in the third quarter. It plans to double on-site solar capacity to 120MW by the end of 2027.

These steps show that Kamoa-Kakula is no longer only a copper mine story. The asset now combines mining, smelting, acid supply, anode exports, rail logistics and on-site power strategy.

That integrated model gives Ivanhoe a stronger position in a region where other copper producers are exposed to acid shortages, sulphur disruption, diesel risk and long trucking routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s smelter has turned Kamoa-Kakula into a more strategic Copperbelt asset, not just a high-grade copper producer. In a market where acid, logistics and power can decide margins, the operation’s by-product and infrastructure advantages may become as important as its copper grade.

China Antimony Market Stabilises as Chenzhou Mining Output Halts Tighten Supply Risk

Antimony

China antimony market conditions have stabilised after prices fell from late March, as production suspensions by major producer Chenzhou Mining raised expectations of tighter domestic supply. The market is now balancing potential output losses against weak downstream demand.

The China antimony market had been under pressure from soft buying in flame retardants and solar glass. But safety-related production halts at Chenzhou Mining subsidiaries have limited further downside and encouraged sellers to watch market developments more closely.

The China antimony market remains fragile because the supply shock is occurring in a demand environment that is still weak. Prices may hold steady in the near term, but a strong rebound looks difficult unless downstream consumption improves.

Chenzhou Mining subsidiaries Xinlong Mining and Zhazixi Mining suspended production and began safety inspections after fatal accidents at two sites. Xinlong Mining has 5,000 t/yr of antimony concentrate capacity, while Zhazixi Mining has 6,000 t/yr of antimony metal capacity.

Output Suspensions Create Short-Term Supply Support

The restart timeline for the suspended operations remains unclear. Some market participants expect the stoppages to last at least one month, potentially cutting overall domestic supply by around 15%.

That scale is important for antimony because China remains a central producer and processor of the metal. Any disruption at a major domestic producer can quickly affect market sentiment, especially when inventories are not evenly distributed across producers and traders.

Antimony metal prices have stabilised at 158,000-162,000 yuan/t ex-works after falling by 9,000 yuan/t since 31 March. Sellers are now less willing to cut offers aggressively while they wait to see how long the production suspensions last.

The supply issue also matters beyond China. Antimony is used in flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, cables, batteries, solar glass and other industrial applications. It has become more strategically sensitive as governments reassess critical mineral supply chains.

However, production halts alone do not guarantee a price rally. The market needs stronger buying interest to convert supply risk into sustained upward price movement.

Weak Demand Limits Price Recovery

Demand from flame retardant and solar glass sectors remains soft. This continues to offset the impact of lower production and keeps buyers cautious.

A Hunan-based producer said domestic demand is weak and that some producers still hold hundreds of tonnes of metal stocks. This suggests that inventories are still available, even if fresh supply becomes tighter.

Most antimony metal and trioxide producers appear to be facing similar conditions. Buyers are not rushing to restock because downstream consumption has not improved enough to justify aggressive procurement.

This creates a holding pattern. Sellers have a reason to resist further price cuts because supply may tighten. Buyers have a reason to wait because demand remains weak and existing stocks are still available.

For the antimony value chain, the next price signal will come from the duration of Chenzhou Mining’s suspensions. A short halt may only stabilise the market. A longer shutdown could gradually reduce available supply and strengthen sellers’ position.

Still, demand recovery remains the decisive factor. Without stronger orders from flame retardants, solar glass or other industrial users, the China antimony market is likely to remain stable rather than sharply higher.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The antimony market is showing how supply shocks behave differently when demand is weak. Chenzhou Mining’s output halts have created a floor, but the market needs real downstream restocking before supply risk becomes a stronger price driver.

Hoshine Silicon Output Falls as China Photovoltaic Demand Slows

Hoshine

Hoshine silicon output fell sharply in 2025 as weaker photovoltaic demand weighed on China’s largest silicon metal producer. The company produced around 1.45mn t of silicon metal during the year, down 22.3% from 2024.

Hoshine silicon output declined as downstream polysilicon and photovoltaic markets lost momentum. Sales also fell by 10.1% on the year to 1.11mn t, reflecting softer consumption from key solar supply-chain customers.

Hoshine silicon output remains important because the company is a major force in China’s silicon metal market. Its production trends provide a clear signal for supply conditions across aluminium alloys, organosilicon, polysilicon and photovoltaic materials.

China’s wider silicon metal production also weakened. National output fell by 11% on the year to around 4.20mn t in 2025, showing that the slowdown was not limited to one producer.

Polysilicon Weakness Hits Silicon Metal Demand

Polysilicon production fell sharply in 2025, reducing one of the key demand channels for silicon metal. China produced around 1.33mn t of polysilicon during the year, down 27.8% from 2024.

This decline reflects pressure across the solar manufacturing chain. Photovoltaic growth continued, but the pace slowed compared with the previous year.

China’s newly installed photovoltaic capacity reached around 31.7GW in 2025, up 14% from a year earlier. However, this was well below the 28% growth recorded in 2024.

That slowdown matters for silicon producers. Silicon metal is a critical feedstock for polysilicon, which is then used in solar wafers, cells and modules.

When polysilicon output falls, demand for silicon metal weakens quickly. Producers then face lower sales, inventory pressure and weaker pricing power.

Hoshine’s 2025 results show how tightly silicon metal is linked to solar-sector cycles. Even large producers with scale advantages are exposed when downstream photovoltaic demand slows.

Capacity Remains Large Despite Softer Market Conditions

Hoshine still operated at high capacity utilisation despite lower output. The company has 1.22mn t/yr of designed silicon metal capacity, with utilisation reaching 119.2% in 2025.

This indicates that Hoshine continued producing above nameplate capacity, even as output fell from the previous year. The company remains a dominant supplier in China’s silicon metal market.

Hoshine also had 1.73mn t/yr of designed organosilicon capacity by the end of 2025. Organosilicon remains another major downstream channel for silicon metal, serving construction, electronics, automotive, industrial and consumer applications.

The company also had 50,000 t/yr of polysilicon capacity and a further 350,000 t/yr under construction. This shows that Hoshine is still investing in downstream integration despite short-term market weakness.

The expansion strategy carries both opportunity and risk. Integrated silicon-to-polysilicon capacity can improve value capture when solar demand recovers. However, it can also increase exposure to oversupply if polysilicon markets remain weak.

For China’s silicon industry, the key issue is balance. Producers must manage large capacity bases while downstream photovoltaic growth becomes less explosive than in previous years.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hoshine’s lower silicon output shows that solar-sector growth is no longer strong enough to absorb every upstream expansion. China’s silicon market now faces a more selective phase where cost control, downstream integration and demand timing will determine profitability.

US Solar Duties Target Asian Cell Imports as Washington Defends Domestic Manufacturing

US solar

US solar duties on cells and modules from India, Indonesia and Laos will raise the cost of imported photovoltaic products after the Commerce Department issued preliminary antidumping findings. The decision allows customs authorities to begin collecting cash deposits from importers.

US solar duties are part of a broader trade case brought by domestic manufacturers that accuse foreign producers of selling solar products at unfairly low prices. The case covers crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules imported into the US market.

US solar duties now combine antidumping margins with earlier countervailing duties. General preliminary duty rates stand at roughly 234% for India, 140% for Indonesia and 103% for Laos.

The decision comes at a critical point for the US solar supply chain. Washington is trying to expand domestic clean energy manufacturing while reducing dependence on lower-cost Asian imports.

Duties Raise Costs for India, Indonesia and Laos Solar Supply

The preliminary antidumping margins differ by country and company. Indian producers face the steepest margin, at about 123%.

Companies in Indonesia face a lower dumping margin of about 35%, while firms in Laos face around 22%. These rates come on top of countervailing duties announced earlier this year.

The combined duty levels could significantly affect solar module sourcing decisions. Importers may need to reassess contracts, landed costs and supply availability if final rates remain high.

The investigation was triggered by a petition from the Alliance for American Solar Manufacturing and Trade. The group includes US manufacturers such as First Solar and Mission Solar Energy, along with Qcells, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Hanwha.

The coalition argued that companies in the three countries benefited from subsidies and sold solar products into the US at unfairly low prices. It also alleged that Chinese-linked manufacturers operating in Southeast Asia were undercutting American-made products.
The decision strengthens the trade protection around US solar manufacturing. But it may also raise near-term procurement costs for developers that depend on imported cells and modules.

Domestic Manufacturing Push Collides With Deployment Costs

The case highlights the tension inside US clean energy policy. The government wants more domestic solar manufacturing, but the solar deployment market still relies heavily on imported equipment.

Antidumping tariffs are intended to counter imports sold below normal value. Countervailing duties target products that benefit from government subsidies.
Together, these duties can protect domestic producers from price competition that regulators view as unfair. They can also reshape trade flows by pushing buyers toward alternative origins or US-made products.

For manufacturers, the ruling supports investment in domestic capacity. Higher duties can improve the competitiveness of US-made solar products and encourage new factory spending.

For project developers, the impact is more complicated. Higher module costs can pressure project economics, especially where power purchase agreements, tax credits and construction budgets were based on cheaper imported supply.

Commerce is expected to issue final antidumping determinations in early September. Until then, the market will face uncertainty around final rates, supplier exposure and contract pricing.

The broader industrial message is clear. Solar policy is no longer only about renewable energy deployment. It is also about manufacturing location, trade enforcement and supply-chain control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The new US solar duties show that clean energy deployment and industrial protection are increasingly inseparable. The key question is whether Washington can build domestic solar capacity fast enough to offset higher import costs without slowing project growth.

Hindustan Zinc Refined Metal Capacity Target Signals Major Indian Zinc Expansion

Hindustan Zinc

Hindustan Zinc refined metal capacity could nearly double by FY2030 as the Indian producer advances a major expansion programme. The company aims to lift refined metal capacity from 1.12mn t/yr today to 2mn t/yr by the April 2029-March 2030 fiscal year.

Hindustan Zinc refined metal capacity growth will begin with an approved 250,000 t/yr integrated zinc smelter expansion at Debari. The project will raise total refined metal capacity to 1.38mn t/yr, with completion targeted in the second quarter of FY2028-29.

Hindustan Zinc refined metal capacity could then rise further through two additional proposed integrated smelter projects, one for zinc and one for lead. These projects remain subject to board approval but would take total capacity to the company’s 2mn t/yr target.

The expansion is strategically important for India’s metals supply chain. Zinc and lead are essential for galvanised steel, infrastructure, batteries, automotive components, construction and industrial manufacturing.

Debari Expansion Anchors HZL’s Smelting Growth

The Debari zinc smelter expansion is the first major approved step in HZL’s capacity roadmap. The 250,000 t/yr project will strengthen the company’s downstream processing base and increase its ability to convert mined metal into refined output.

This matters because mined metal growth alone does not create refined supply. Smelting and refining capacity must expand in parallel if India wants more domestic zinc availability for steel galvanising and industrial use.

HZL delivered record mined metal output of 315,000t in January-March. This was up 14% from the previous quarter and 2% from a year earlier.

Full-year mined metal production reached a record 1.11mn t in FY2025-26, up from 1.09mn t a year earlier. Higher ore output and improved grades at the company’s underground mines in Rajasthan supported the increase.

However, refined metal sales slipped slightly to 1.04mn t from 1.05mn t a year earlier. Debottlenecking work at the Chanderiya and Dariba smelters weighed on output.

That contrast shows why smelter investment is central to the company’s growth plan. HZL has strong upstream production, but refined metal capacity and operating stability will determine how much value it captures.

Silver Capacity Adds Energy Transition Exposure

HZL is also targeting major growth in silver production. The company aims to lift silver capacity to 1,500 t/yr by FY2029-30.

Saleable silver production rose by 11% from the previous quarter to 176t in January-March. Full-year silver output reached 627t.

The silver target adds another strategic layer to HZL’s expansion. Silver demand is supported by solar panels, electric vehicles, electronics and electrical applications.

This gives HZL exposure beyond traditional zinc and lead markets. As India expands solar power, electrification and electronics manufacturing, domestic silver availability could become more valuable.

The company’s integrated position is important. HZL can link mining, smelting, refining and by-product recovery, giving it a stronger platform than producers focused only on one stage of the value chain.

For India, the expansion supports domestic metals security. Higher zinc, lead and silver capacity can reduce import exposure and strengthen supply for infrastructure, renewable energy and manufacturing.

The key challenge will be execution. HZL must complete the Debari expansion, secure approvals for the next smelter projects and maintain mined metal growth from Rajasthan.

The Metalnomist Commentary

HZL’s growth plan shows that India is building deeper domestic capacity in core industrial metals, not only critical minerals. The combination of zinc, lead and silver expansion gives the company a stronger role in infrastructure, galvanised steel and energy transition supply chains.

Renewables Energy Security Message Shapes Cop 31 Climate Agenda

Renewables energy

Renewables energy security is becoming a central policy message ahead of the Cop 31 climate summit, as Turkey and Australia argue that fossil fuels no longer guarantee stable energy supply. The two countries said stronger decarbonisation, electrification and alternative energy sources are now essential to national resilience.

Turkey will host Cop 31 in Antalya, while Australia will lead climate negotiations. Both countries are preparing the summit against the backdrop of energy market disruption caused by the war in the Mideast Gulf and shipping interruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.

Renewables energy security is now being framed not only as a climate issue, but also as a sovereignty issue. Turkey’s environment minister Murat Kurum said countries should invest in clean energy sources, including renewables, hydrogen and ammonia, to support stable and independent development.

The message reflects a wider shift in energy policy. Fossil fuels once dominated energy security thinking because they offered high-density supply and established infrastructure. But recent geopolitical shocks have shown that oil, gas and coal supply chains can be exposed to sanctions, shipping blockages and regional conflict.

Fossil Fuel Risk Pushes Electrification Up the Policy Agenda

The Mideast Gulf energy crisis has strengthened the argument that fossil fuel dependence creates vulnerability. Supply routes can be disrupted, prices can spike and importing countries can quickly face inflation, industrial cost pressure and energy security concerns.

Australia’s climate and energy minister Chris Bowen said the crisis creates an opportunity to show that energy reliability, sovereignty and security can move together with strong decarbonisation. His message was clear: doubling down on fossil fuels is not the answer.

That argument gives renewables energy security a sharper industrial meaning. Wind and solar resources cannot be sanctioned in the same way as seaborne fossil fuels. They also reduce exposure to imported fuel prices once infrastructure is built.

Electrification will therefore become more important in the Cop 31 discussion. Germany has already pushed for a stronger debate on how countries can advance electrification before the summit.

This matters for metals and manufacturing. Electrification requires more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, rare earth magnets, batteries, power electronics, transformers, grid equipment and storage systems. The shift away from fossil fuels therefore increases demand for industrial materials that support clean power systems.

Hydrogen and ammonia also remain part of Turkey’s energy transition vision. These fuels could support hard-to-abate sectors, industrial heat, shipping, fertilisers and long-duration energy storage, but they require large amounts of renewable electricity and new infrastructure.

The policy direction is not only about replacing fuels. It is about rebuilding energy systems around grids, storage, clean molecules and domestic generation capacity.

Cop 31 Could Turn Energy Security Into a Decarbonisation Driver

Cop 31 is expected to revisit the global transition away from fossil fuels. Nearly 200 countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels at Cop 28 in 2023, while developed countries agreed at Cop 29 to provide $300bn/yr to developing countries by 2035.

Turkey is now urging countries to fulfil earlier commitments on finance and energy. Kurum also called on countries that have not submitted updated nationally determined contributions to do so.

This creates pressure before Cop 31. Around 43 countries still need to submit climate plans, according to Kurum. Without credible national plans, the global transition risks remaining a statement rather than an implementation programme.

Australia pointed to three processes already under way before Cop 31. These include the Belem roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels, the global implementation accelerator and the Belem Mission to 1.5°C.

The challenge will be coordination. Countries have already agreed on high-level climate direction, but implementation remains uneven. Clean energy investment, grid expansion, permitting, financing and critical mineral supply all need to move faster.

For resource markets, the message is clear. Renewables energy security will not reduce dependence on supply chains. It will shift dependence from fossil fuel flows toward metals, minerals, equipment and industrial manufacturing capacity.

That creates a new form of energy security risk. Countries that build renewable power but lack access to copper, rare earths, battery metals, transformers, power electronics or grid equipment may still face strategic exposure.

Cop 31 could therefore strengthen demand for policies that connect climate action with supply-chain resilience. Energy transition goals will require not only emissions targets, but also mineral security, manufacturing investment and infrastructure deployment.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The renewables energy security argument marks a turning point in climate politics. The next energy security race will be fought through grids, storage, critical minerals and clean manufacturing capacity, not only through control of fossil fuel routes.

Cleveland-Cliffs Rare Earths Plan Stalls on US Refining Bottleneck

Cleveland-Cliffs

Cleveland-Cliffs rare earths ambitions have been put on hold as limited US refining capacity weakens the economics of upstream exploration. The integrated steelmaker said it has halted plans to shift part of its mining strategy toward rare earths because domestic processing infrastructure remains too limited.

The decision highlights a central weakness in the US critical minerals strategy. Finding rare earth mineralisation is only the first step. Without refining, separation and downstream conversion capacity, upstream resources cannot easily become commercial supply.

Cleveland-Cliffs rare earths plans had gained attention because the company owns mining assets and tailings basins in traditional US iron ore regions. Geological surveys last year identified signs of rare earth mineralisation at two company-owned sites, one in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and another in Minnesota.

However, chief executive Lourenco Goncalves said the economics depend on domestic refining capability. He said that infrastructure remains extremely limited in the US, making rare earth development difficult without external processing support.

US Refining Gap Limits Critical Minerals Development

Cleveland-Cliffs is not planning to build rare earth refining capacity on its own. The company said the process is capital-intensive, and the investment case remains weak without a broader domestic refining ecosystem.

This is strategically important because rare earth supply chains are highly segmented. Mining, beneficiation, separation, refining, metal conversion, alloying and magnet manufacturing all require different capabilities.

The US has focused heavily on rare earth resource development, but refining and separation remain among the most difficult parts of the value chain. These stages require chemical processing expertise, environmental controls, long permitting timelines and large capital commitments.

Cleveland-Cliffs rare earths development therefore depends on infrastructure beyond its own mining footprint. The company said it remains positioned to enter the market when viable domestic refining capacity becomes available, whether through government-backed projects or third-party investments.

This approach is cautious but realistic. A steelmaker with mineral resources may identify rare earth potential in ore bodies or tailings, but it cannot easily monetise those materials without a customer-ready processing route.

The decision also shows why tailings-based critical minerals projects are harder than they appear. Tailings may contain valuable elements, but recovery depends on grade, mineralogy, processing cost, environmental permitting and access to refining capacity.

For the US government, the message is clear. Critical mineral independence cannot rely only on resource mapping. It needs industrial processing capacity that gives miners and materials companies a practical route to market.

Rare Earth Opportunity Remains Conditional on Policy and Processing

Cleveland-Cliffs had explored rare earths as part of a broader response to rising US-China trade tensions and Washington’s push for critical material independence. The company’s historic identity as an ore producer made the idea strategically plausible.

Cliffs originally operated as an iron ore producer before becoming a major US steelmaker. It expanded downstream in 2020 by acquiring AK Steel and most of ArcelorMittal’s US operations.

That history gives the company mining expertise, industrial assets and a domestic manufacturing base. But rare earths are not the same as iron ore or steel. They require a much more specialised chemical and metallurgical value chain.

Rare earth elements are key feedstocks for electric vehicle motors, semiconductors, wind power, solar technologies, defence systems and advanced electronics. This makes them strategically valuable, but also politically sensitive.

The US wants to reduce dependence on China, which dominates many rare earth processing and magnet supply chains. But companies still need bankable refining options before upstream projects can move forward.

Cleveland-Cliffs rare earths strategy may therefore return if domestic refining capacity expands. Government-backed projects, third-party processors or integrated separation facilities could change the economics.

Until then, the company appears unwilling to commit capital to a market where upstream potential is disconnected from downstream processing. That reflects discipline, but also exposes a national supply-chain gap.

The broader implication is that critical minerals policy must connect every stage of the chain. Exploration without refining creates stranded potential. Refining without feedstock creates underused capacity. Magnet and electronics supply chains need both.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Cleveland-Cliffs’ decision shows that the US rare earth challenge is not only geological. The real bottleneck is processing infrastructure, and without it, even strategically located resources can remain commercially stranded.

DMEGC Magnet Output Falls as Competition and Export Controls Pressure Sales

DMEGC

DMEGC magnet output fell in 2025 as tougher competition and China’s export restrictions on some rare earth permanent magnets weighed on sales. Hengdian Group DMEGC Magnetics produced 221,690t of magnetic materials during the year, down 2.5% from 2024.

DMEGC magnet output declined even as the broader Chinese magnet market benefited from stronger demand in new energy vehicles, smart appliances, data centres and consumer electronics. The company’s magnetic material sales fell by 5.9% to 218,282t, while inventories rose by 22% to 19,074t.

DMEGC magnet output weakness shows that rising end-market demand does not guarantee growth for every producer. Fiercer competition in China and overseas, combined with tighter controls on medium and heavy rare earth magnet exports, created pressure across the company’s magnet business.

China imposed export restrictions in April 2025 on permanent magnets containing seven medium and heavy rare earth elements. These included dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, lutetium, gadolinium, scandium and samarium.

The restrictions affected a sensitive part of the magnet supply chain. Dysprosium and terbium are especially important for high-performance magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace systems and defence-related applications.

Magnetic Materials Lag as DMEGC Revenue Rises Elsewhere

DMEGC’s overall business still expanded in 2025 despite weaker magnet volumes. Revenue rose by 22% on the year to 22.6bn yuan, while profit increased by 1.3% to 1.85bn yuan.

The strongest revenue growth came from photovoltaic products. Sales from that segment rose by 29% to 14.3bn yuan, making solar products a major earnings driver for the group.

Revenue from magnetic materials increased by 5% to 4bn yuan, even though output and sales volumes declined. This suggests that pricing, product mix or higher-value material sales partly offset weaker physical shipments.

Lithium battery revenue also increased. Sales rose by 12% to 2.72bn yuan, while component sales climbed by 30% to 995mn yuan.

The result shows DMEGC’s advantage as a diversified materials and energy technology supplier. Weakness in one product line did not prevent group revenue growth, because photovoltaics, batteries and components supported the wider business.

Still, the magnet segment remains strategically important. DMEGC had designed magnetic materials capacity of 300,000 t/yr by the end of 2025, placing it among China’s leading magnetic material producers by sales scale.

The company’s battery and component capacity also reached 23GW and 21GW, respectively, while lithium battery output capacity stood at 8GWh. This gives DMEGC exposure to several electrification markets, including solar, batteries, motors and electronic components.

The inventory increase in magnetic materials deserves attention. Rising inventories during a year of falling sales can signal slower customer offtake, tougher competition or weaker export channels.

Export restrictions may have added to that pressure. When overseas buyers face licensing uncertainty, shipment delays or compliance risk, purchasing patterns can change even if underlying demand remains strong.

This is particularly important for rare earth permanent magnets. Buyers in automotive, robotics, wind power and electronics supply chains require stable delivery, traceability and qualification. Policy disruption can therefore affect procurement decisions quickly.

NEVs, Appliances and Data Centres Support Long-Term Magnet Demand

China’s magnet demand outlook remains positive despite DMEGC’s weaker 2025 volume performance. China produced 1.62mn t of magnetic materials in 2025, accounting for about 80% of global output.

This total included 750,000t of permanent magnetic ferrite, 600,000t of soft magnets and 270,000t of rare earth permanent magnets. The scale confirms China’s dominant role across both low-cost and high-performance magnet supply chains.

New energy vehicles remain one of the strongest demand drivers. China’s automobile output rose by 10% to 34.5mn units in 2025, while NEV production increased by 29% to 16.6mn units.

NEVs consume more magnetic materials because electric drivetrains, sensors, power steering, braking systems, pumps and comfort systems all require motors and magnetic components. As vehicles become more automated, intelligent and comfort-oriented, magnet intensity per vehicle is likely to increase.

Smart home appliances are another major demand source. China’s output of air conditioners, refrigerators and washing machines reached 266.97mn, 109.24mn and 125.17mn units, respectively, in 2025.

These appliances support demand for soft magnets and ferrite materials used in motors, compressors, power electronics and control systems. Energy efficiency standards and inverter technologies can further raise the need for higher-performance magnetic components.

Data centres are becoming a newer growth channel. Global server shipments rose by 1.9% to 16.3mn units in 2025, while AI server shipments increased by 25% to 2.04mn units.

Cooling systems in data centres require fans, motors and magnetic components. As AI infrastructure expands, heat management becomes more important, adding another source of demand for rare earth permanent magnets and soft magnetic materials.

Consumer electronics also supported the market. Global smartphone shipments rose by 2% to 1.25bn units, while personal computer shipments increased by 9.2% to 280mn units.

This broad demand base gives Chinese magnet producers a strong long-term market. However, it also attracts capacity expansion and intensifies competition. Producers must now compete not only on volume, but also on product quality, export compliance, heavy rare earth efficiency and downstream qualification.

The market is therefore entering a more selective phase. Producers with strong customer relationships, stable rare earth supply, advanced magnet technologies and diversified end-market exposure will be better positioned.

DMEGC’s 2025 results reflect that transition. Demand for magnets is rising, but policy controls, competition and inventory pressure can still weaken individual company performance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

DMEGC’s results show that China’s magnet market is growing, but not evenly. The next competitive divide will come from export-control management, high-performance magnet capability and access to reliable rare earth feedstock.

US Critical Materials Funding Targets Recycling, Refining and DLE Technologies

DOE (the Department of Energy)

US critical materials funding is moving deeper into domestic production and refining after the Department of Energy announced up to $69 million for new technologies and processes. The notice of funding opportunity, announced on 7 April, targets critical materials including rare earth elements.

The funding is designed to help move technologies from bench-scale innovation toward commercial deployment. That focus is important because the US critical materials funding gap is often not resource identification, but the ability to scale processing, refining and recovery technologies into reliable industrial supply.

The programme covers three main areas: recycling from manufacturing and end-of-life scrap, refining of gallium, germanium and silicon, and direct lithium extraction alongside critical material recovery from volcanic-hosted geothermal systems.

Recycling and Refining Move Higher on the US Supply Chain Agenda

The first funding area targets recycling from manufacturing scrap and end-of-life scrap. This could support recovery routes for valuable metals already present in electronics, magnets, batteries, industrial components and advanced manufacturing waste streams.

The second area focuses on refining gallium, germanium and silicon. These materials are strategically important for semiconductors, optics, solar technologies, defense systems, data infrastructure and advanced electronics.

US critical materials funding for these metals reflects growing concern over concentrated supply chains. China dominates several critical material processing routes, making domestic refining capability a central issue for industrial resilience and national security.

DLE and Geothermal Systems Add New Resource Pathways

The third topic area covers direct lithium extraction and exploration of critical materials and rare earth elements from volcanic-hosted geothermal systems. This could open new pathways for lithium and mineral recovery beyond conventional mining.

Direct lithium extraction remains strategically important because it may improve recovery efficiency, reduce land use and shorten production timelines compared with traditional brine evaporation. However, commercial scalability remains the decisive test.

The DOE said the $69 million opportunity is part of several programmes totalling nearly $1 billion. These initiatives aim to advance mining, processing and manufacturing technologies across the critical materials supply chain.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US critical materials funding programme shows that Washington is now targeting the weakest links between laboratory success and industrial supply. The key test will be whether these grants create commercial refining and recovery capacity, not only promising pilot projects.