China Rare Earth Export Curbs Tighten Pressure on Japan’s Critical Minerals Supply

China, Rare Earth

China rare earth export curbs targeting Japan have intensified after Beijing added another 20 Japanese companies to its export ban list and placed 20 more on a stricter watch list. The measures deepen restrictions across rare earths, tungsten, antimony, gallium, germanium, graphite and other strategic materials classified as dual-use products.

China rare earth export curbs now affect 40 Japanese companies on the outright ban list and another 40 under enhanced licensing scrutiny. Chinese exporters cannot supply dual-use materials to banned entities, while transactions involving watch-listed companies require individual licences, risk assessments and detailed end-use commitments.

China rare earth export curbs are already reshaping physical trade. Shipments of heavy rare earths and several critical metals to Japan have collapsed or stopped entirely since bilateral relations deteriorated in late 2025.

The restrictions expose Japan’s dependence on Chinese processing capacity across sectors including permanent magnets, semiconductors, aerospace, defence, nuclear technology and advanced manufacturing.

Heavy Rare Earth and Tungsten Flows Collapse

Heavy rare earth supply has experienced some of the sharpest disruption. China exported only 14t of yttrium oxide to Japan during January-May, down from 605t a year earlier.

Japan previously accounted for around 57-60% of China’s yttrium oxide exports, showing how rapidly geopolitical controls can dismantle established trade flows.

Exports of dysprosium oxide to Japan have been suspended since November 2025. Dysprosium metal and terbium metal shipments stopped in January, while terbium oxide exports have been halted since December.

These materials are strategically important for high-performance NdFeB permanent magnets. Dysprosium and terbium improve magnet performance at elevated temperatures, making them critical for electric motors, aerospace systems and defence applications.

Rare earth magnet shipments are also weakening. Chinese exports to Japan fell to 123t in May from 188t in April and a record 304t in November 2025.

Tungsten trade has deteriorated similarly. China has shipped no ammonium paratungstate to Japan since January, while tungsten trioxide exports were zero during January-May.

Tungsten carbide shipments fell to only 14t during the first five months of the year, compared with 628t during all of 2025. Tungsten powder exports dropped to 10t from 131t last year.

Antimony flows have effectively disappeared as well. China exported no antimony materials to Japan during January-May after supplying 100t of antimony metal and 80t of antimony oxides in 2025.

Japan Faces Accelerating Supply Chain Diversification Pressure

The new controls expand the challenge beyond individual commodities. Japanese manufacturers must now manage stricter licensing, end-user verification and greater uncertainty around whether strategic materials can be supplied at all.

Gallium shipments illustrate this uncertainty. China resumed exports of 6,000kg to Japan in May after sending nothing during January-April, but strict inspections and lengthy approvals remain in place.

Graphite exports have also weakened. Flake graphite shipments fell by 16% during January-May, while artificial graphite exports to Japan declined by 19% year on year in May.

The broader impact reaches batteries, semiconductors, permanent magnets, machine tools and defence manufacturing. Japan may need to accelerate stockpiling, recycling, substitution and investment in alternative processing capacity.

The restrictions also strengthen the strategic value of rare earth projects in Australia, the US and other allied markets. Japanese companies will increasingly need long-term access not only to mined resources but also to separation, refining, metal and alloy capacity outside China.

Japan already possesses significant manufacturing expertise in magnets and advanced materials, but its vulnerability lies further upstream where China maintains dominant processing capacity.

The current dispute therefore demonstrates how export controls can weaponise midstream processing rather than resource ownership alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is showing that control over processing can be more powerful than control over mines. Japan’s response will require accelerated investment in heavy rare earth separation, tungsten processing, recycling and strategic inventories rather than simple supplier diversification.

US Army Critical Minerals Leases Bring Processing Onto Military Bases

Titan Mining

US Army critical minerals leases will place commercial graphite, lithium, boron and rare earth processing facilities directly on military installations, marking a new stage in Washington’s effort to secure strategic materials for defense and industry.

US Army critical minerals leases were conditionally awarded to Empire State Mines, EnergyX, Ioneer USA and REalloys. The four companies will process graphite, lithium, boron and rare earth materials, respectively.

US Army critical minerals leases are strategically significant because this is the first time the Army and Department of Defense have moved to host commercial mineral processing facilities on military property.

Development is scheduled to begin in 2027, with initial operating capacity targeted by or before 2028.

Military Installations Become Critical Minerals Infrastructure

The projects will use the Army’s Enhanced Use Lease structure, allowing private companies to develop facilities on underutilized military land while retaining responsibility for financing, construction and operations.

The companies will pay market-based rent and cover the full cost of designing, building, operating, securing and eventually decommissioning their facilities.

This structure allows the government to support strategic industrial capacity without directly financing all plant construction costs.

For the Army, hosting processing facilities on military installations could also improve supply-chain security and strengthen links between critical mineral producers and defense customers.

The selected materials are central to multiple strategic industries. Graphite is critical for batteries, lithium supports energy storage, boron is used across specialty materials and nuclear applications, while rare earths are essential for permanent magnets and defense electronics.

The model could therefore help accelerate processing capacity in areas where the US remains dependent on imported material.

Public-Private Model Could Accelerate Domestic Processing

The awards are part of the Army’s Strategic Capital Initiatives, which use partnerships with private industry to speed modernization and strengthen domestic industrial capability.

The approach differs from traditional grants or loans. Instead of providing only capital, the government is using federal land and long-term lease certainty as industrial policy tools.

That can reduce some project development barriers while giving companies access to secure sites with existing infrastructure.

Formal lease agreements are still being negotiated, meaning the projects must move through final commercial and technical stages before construction starts.

If successful, the model could be replicated across other strategic materials and defense-related manufacturing sectors.

For US critical minerals policy, the significance lies in moving processing closer to the defense industrial base and treating refining capacity as strategic infrastructure rather than a purely commercial activity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is turning military property into part of its critical minerals strategy. By combining secure sites with private capital, the Army is creating a new pathway to build processing capacity without relying only on grants and subsidies.

Adani Nuclear Power Plan Targets 10GW Capacity by 2035

Adani Group

Adani nuclear power plans could add 10GW of generation capacity in India by 2035, marking one of the most ambitious private-sector entries into the country’s nuclear industry.

Adani nuclear power development will be led through newly established subsidiary Adani Atomic Energy. The move comes as India seeks greater private participation in nuclear generation to meet rising electricity demand and long-term decarbonisation targets.

Adani nuclear power would also become part of a much broader integrated energy platform spanning coal, renewables, hydropower, pumped storage, gas, transmission and distribution.

The strategy reflects India’s need for more firm power as industrial electrification, manufacturing and data centres increase around-the-clock electricity consumption.

Nuclear Expansion Adds Firm Power to Adani’s Energy Portfolio

Adani plans to invest more than Rs2tn over the next five years to expand its overall generation portfolio toward 45GW.

The company already operates 18.33GW and has another 23.72GW of locked-in capacity, targeting 42.05GW by the 2031-32 financial year.

Nuclear power would add a new source of low-carbon baseload generation to that portfolio.

This is important because India is simultaneously expanding variable renewable generation and energy-intensive digital infrastructure. Nuclear can provide stable output when solar and wind generation fluctuate.

Adani is also developing hydropower and pumped-storage assets, including projects in Bhutan. These technologies can complement nuclear and renewables by improving grid flexibility.

The group’s data centre business is targeting 3GW of capacity by 2030, creating another large internal source of electricity demand.

This combination of generation and consumption assets gives Adani a strong incentive to secure reliable long-term power supplies.

India’s Nuclear Target Could Reshape Strategic Materials Demand

India plans to increase installed nuclear capacity to 100GW by 2047 from around 8.8GW currently.

If Adani reaches its 10GW target, the company alone could represent roughly one-tenth of India’s long-term nuclear capacity ambition.

Such expansion would create demand across nuclear construction, fuel and specialist materials supply chains.

Nuclear reactors require large volumes of high-specification steels, nickel alloys, zirconium alloys and other corrosion-resistant materials. Uranium supply and fuel-cycle capacity would also become increasingly important as reactor numbers rise.

Grid infrastructure would need to expand alongside generation, supporting additional demand for copper, aluminium and electrical equipment.

The key challenge remains execution. Adani has not disclosed reactor types, project locations or grid integration plans, while nuclear projects typically involve long permitting, construction and qualification cycles.

Still, the entry of a major private industrial group signals that India’s nuclear expansion may increasingly rely on public-private investment rather than state development alone.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Adani’s nuclear push shows that India’s power strategy is shifting toward a mix of renewables and firm generation rather than relying on one technology. The materials opportunity extends well beyond uranium, into zirconium, nickel alloys, specialty steels and grid metals.

China Zirconium Oxychloride Prices Hit Three-Year High on Hafnium Demand

Zirconium Oxychloride

China zirconium oxychloride prices have climbed to their highest level in more than three years as higher zircon sand costs, stronger hafnium demand and tighter spot availability reshape the market. Prices for 36% grade material reached 17,500-18,000 yuan/t on 2 June.

China zirconium oxychloride prices have risen by about 35% at the midpoint since early March. Producers began lifting offers after falling prices compressed margins between July 2025 and March 2026.

China zirconium oxychloride prices are expected to remain supported as major international zircon sand suppliers increase third-quarter offers into China. Higher raw material costs are combining with expanding aerospace, nuclear and industrial gas turbine demand.

The market is also tightening structurally as some Chinese producers divert material away from the spot market and into higher-value zirconium and hafnium processing.

Zircon Sand Costs Push Oxychloride Production Higher

Zircon sand is the main feedstock for zirconium oxychloride production, making changes in concentrate pricing critical to downstream economics.

Major suppliers outside China have raised third-quarter export offers. South African producer Richards Bay Minerals increased new-business pricing significantly from first-quarter levels, with 66% zircon sand expected at $1,680-1,780/t cif China.

Tronox has also lifted third-quarter prices. Australian-origin 66% zircon sand is now offered at $1,950-1,975/t cif China, while South African-origin material is priced at $1,935-1,955/t.

The increases reflect tighter availability, higher operating costs and reduced production by some heavy mineral producers following weaker margins.

Chinese domestic zircon sand prices have moved in the same direction. Prices for 65% grade material reached 10,100-10,300 yuan/t in early June, up about 11% from mid-March.

These increases are squeezing zirconium chemical producers. Higher feedstock costs must increasingly be passed through into oxychloride pricing to protect margins.

Spot availability has tightened further because some producers have reduced commercial supply. Zibo Huantuo stopped supplying the open market after its acquisition by Shenzhen SinoHf, with production redirected into high-purity and nuclear-grade hafnium and zirconium feedstock.

Liaoning Huaxiang has also remained offline after suspending its 13,000 t/yr oxychloride operation in November 2025 because of losses.

Hafnium and Export Demand Tighten Zirconium Feedstock

Hafnium has become one of the strongest sources of incremental zirconium oxychloride demand. New projects have emerged to meet demand from industrial gas turbines, aerospace and nuclear applications.

China’s hafnium sector consumed around 43,000t of oxychloride in 2025, representing roughly 15% of domestic output of about 280,000t.

Demand has accelerated further this year. Hafnium producers purchased an estimated 15,975t of oxychloride in January-April, up 69% from a year earlier.

This growth is strategically important because hafnium and zirconium are chemically closely associated and require complex separation. Rising demand for high-purity hafnium can therefore pull more zirconium oxychloride into specialised downstream processing.

Export demand is also strengthening. China exported 19,709t of zirconium oxychloride in January-April, up 24% from a year earlier.

Japan was the largest growth market, with imports more than doubling to 10,510t. Shipments to India and the UK also increased significantly.

Unlike several other strategic metals, zirconium is not currently covered by China’s dual-use export control scheme. That has allowed international demand to continue flowing through normal commercial channels.

However, higher raw material prices and reduced spot availability are tightening the market regardless of export controls. Many regular buyers have already secured June-July contracts to reduce exposure to further price increases.

The combination of rising zircon sand costs, stronger hafnium consumption and shrinking spot supply suggests zirconium oxychloride prices could remain firm into the third quarter.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The zirconium market is being pulled upward by more than raw material inflation. Hafnium demand from aerospace, nuclear and gas turbines is converting zirconium oxychloride into a strategically tighter feedstock, increasing the value of integrated Zr-Hf processing capacity.

UK Seventh Carbon Budget Sets 87% Emissions Cut Target for 2038-42

Climate Change Committee

The UK seventh carbon budget sets a legally binding ceiling of 535mn t of CO₂ equivalent for 2038-42, equivalent to roughly an 87% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels. The target includes the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping emissions.

The UK seventh carbon budget gives energy-intensive industries a clearer long-term decarbonisation trajectory. Steel, aluminium, chemicals, transport and other industrial sectors will increasingly need to align capital spending with lower-carbon power, electrification and emissions reduction.

The UK seventh carbon budget follows the recommendation of the independent Climate Change Committee. The CCC identifies electrification and low-carbon electricity as the largest contributors to its pathway, accounting for around 60% of required emissions reductions by 2040.

The target strengthens the investment signal around renewable power, nuclear energy, grids and industrial electrification. It also reinforces the UK’s legally binding objective of reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

Industrial Decarbonisation Will Require More Clean Power and Metals

The new carbon budget has direct implications for UK manufacturing. Deep emissions reductions will require industry to replace fossil fuel consumption with electricity, low-carbon fuels and more efficient production processes.

For metals markets, that transition creates additional demand for copper, aluminium and electrical steel. Grid expansion, renewable power, electric transport and industrial electrification all require substantial quantities of conductive and structural materials.

The target can also increase pressure on high-emission materials producers. Steel and aluminium customers are increasingly tracking embedded carbon, while future investment decisions will depend more heavily on access to competitive low-carbon electricity.

Energy security is another part of the policy case. The UK government argues that greater reliance on domestic clean power can reduce exposure to volatile imported fossil fuel markets, while the CCC has similarly linked its recommended pathway with lower dependence on imported fuels.

This creates both risk and opportunity for industry. Companies with access to renewable power, recycling, efficient processing and lower-carbon technologies may gain an advantage as the emissions ceiling tightens.

Long-Term Target Gives Investors a Clearer Policy Signal

Carbon budgets cap total UK greenhouse gas emissions over five-year periods, giving companies a longer planning horizon than annual targets. The seventh budget extends that framework through 2042.

That certainty matters for infrastructure with long investment cycles. Power networks, nuclear projects, smelters, industrial plants and transport systems often require capital decisions many years before new capacity begins operating.

The government has said a specific delivery plan for the seventh carbon budget will follow, setting out how the target will be achieved. The existing Carbon Budget and Growth Delivery Plan covers earlier budgets through 2037.

The industrial challenge will therefore shift from setting the target to allocating the cost of delivery. Power availability, grid expansion, industrial support and technology investment will determine whether UK manufacturers can cut emissions without losing competitiveness.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The seventh carbon budget gives UK industry a clear direction, but the real test is whether clean electricity and grid capacity expand fast enough to support it. For metals producers, lower-carbon power could become as important to competitiveness as raw material cost.

Adani Nuclear Power Capacity Plan Targets 10GW by 2035

Adani

Adani nuclear power capacity could reach 10GW by 2035 as the Indian conglomerate expands into atomic energy alongside thermal, renewable, hydroelectric and gas-based generation. The plan would make Adani one of the most ambitious private entrants into India’s nuclear power sector.

Adani nuclear power capacity development comes as India seeks to widen private participation in nuclear generation. The country needs significantly more reliable baseload power to support industrialisation, electrification and rising digital infrastructure demand.

Adani nuclear power capacity will be developed through Adani Atomic Energy, a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated by Adani Power in February. The business is authorised to generate, transmit and distribute electricity from nuclear and atomic energy.

The group has not disclosed potential sites, reactor configurations or grid integration plans. However, the 10GW target would represent around one-tenth of India’s planned 100GW nuclear fleet by 2047.

Nuclear Adds Baseload Power to Adani’s Integrated Energy Strategy

Adani plans to invest more than Rs2 trillion over the next five years to expand its overall power generation portfolio to 45GW. The programme covers thermal power, renewables, hydroelectricity, pumped storage and supporting transmission infrastructure.

Nuclear adds a different capability to that portfolio. It can provide large-scale, low-carbon baseload electricity while renewable generation expands.

India currently has around 8.8GW of installed nuclear capacity, with nuclear supplying about 3% of national electricity generation in the 2024-25 financial year. Reaching 100GW by 2047 would therefore require a major acceleration in construction.

Private-sector participation could help provide capital, engineering capacity and project execution. However, nuclear projects require long development periods, strict regulation, specialised supply chains and large upfront investment.

For Adani, nuclear could complement its existing thermal and renewable assets. A diversified generation mix gives the group more flexibility as India’s power demand rises.

The company also remains heavily invested in coal generation. Adani Power operates 18.33GW and has 23.72GW of locked-in capacity, giving it a target of 42.05GW by the 2031-32 financial year.

Data Centres and Grid Growth Strengthen Power Demand Outlook

Adani’s nuclear target also fits rising electricity demand from digital infrastructure. The group’s data centre business aims to reach 3GW of capacity by 2030, supported by growth in artificial intelligence and cloud computing.

Data centres require continuous, high-quality power. This increases the value of generation sources that can provide round-the-clock electricity alongside renewable power and storage.

Adani is also expanding hydroelectric and pumped-storage capacity. Through its partnership with Bhutan’s Druk Green Power, the group plans to jointly develop up to 5GW of hydropower and pumped storage.

The portfolio increasingly resembles a full energy system rather than a collection of individual generation assets. Thermal power provides dispatchability, renewables lower emissions, storage balances variability and nuclear could add low-carbon baseload.

This strategy also carries metals implications. Nuclear, grids, data centres and transmission infrastructure require large volumes of copper, aluminium, specialty steels, zirconium alloys and other engineered materials.

If Adani executes even part of the 10GW nuclear target, India’s nuclear supply chain will need more qualified equipment, materials, engineering and fuel-cycle capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Adani’s nuclear plan shows that India’s power strategy is moving toward a broader mix rather than a renewables-only model. The industrial opportunity will extend beyond generation into grids, specialty metals, nuclear-grade materials and long-term power infrastructure.

Energy Security Investment Rises as IEA Sees $3.4 Trillion Global Spend

IEA

Energy security investment is accelerating as the war in the Middle East and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz push governments and companies to diversify supply. The IEA expects global energy investment to reach $3.4 trillion in 2026.

Energy security investment is now shifting strongly toward electricity, grids, storage, renewables, nuclear, low-emissions fuels and efficiency. The IEA expects around $2.2 trillion to flow into these areas, compared with about $1.2 trillion for fossil fuels.

Energy security investment also carries direct metals implications. More spending on grids, storage, solar, wind, nuclear and electrification will support demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other critical materials.

The IEA described the current crisis as the largest energy security crisis the world has faced. It expects decision-makers to prioritise resilience, diversification and trusted energy partners.

Electricity Spending Becomes the Core Security Response

Electricity-related investment is becoming the dominant theme in global energy spending. The IEA expects investment in electricity supply and infrastructure to reach nearly $1.6 trillion in 2026.

That figure rises to about $2 trillion when end-use electrification is included. This shows that energy security is no longer only about oil and gas supply. It is increasingly about reliable power systems.

Power grids will be central to this shift. Grid expansion, storage deployment and electrification require large volumes of copper, aluminium and electrical equipment.

Renewables will also remain a major investment channel. The IEA expects renewables spending to reach around $665bn in 2026, including $365bn for solar, $200bn for wind and $75bn for hydropower.

Annual renewables spending growth has moderated because of lower technology costs and policy changes in China and the US. However, low-emissions sources still account for more than 70% of global power investment.

The metals signal is clear. Energy security policy is reinforcing the same material demand base already supported by decarbonisation. Grid metals, battery materials and renewable energy inputs remain structurally important.

Fuel Supply Shock Keeps Fossil Investment Alive

Fossil fuel investment is also rising in selected areas. Total fossil fuel supply investment is expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026, returning to 2024 levels.

Oil investment is expected to fall for a third consecutive year to below $500bn. Long project lead times, supply-chain limits, offshore rig tightness and uncertainty over the duration of the price spike are limiting near-term spending outside the Middle East.

Natural gas investment is moving in the opposite direction. The IEA expects gas investment to reach $330bn, the highest level in a decade, supported by LNG export projects and demand from data centres.

Coal investment is also expected to rise to $180bn, the highest level since 2012. Around 70% of that spending is expected in China, while some Asian countries may keep existing coal-fired power plants running longer to protect energy security.

The IEA said past investments in renewables, nuclear, efficiency and electrification have already improved energy security in major fuel-importing regions. It estimated that China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, southeast Asia and India avoided around $260bn in fossil fuel imports in 2025.

The conflict is also forcing a search for new energy export routes to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Repair costs for damaged energy infrastructure are expected to reach tens of billions of dollars.

For industrial markets, the result is a more complex energy outlook. Electricity investment is rising fast, but gas and coal remain part of short-term security planning. That mix will shape metals demand, energy costs and industrial competitiveness.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The IEA’s outlook shows that energy security and electrification are now the same investment story. The winners will be supply chains that can deliver grids, storage, renewables and critical minerals at scale while reducing exposure to fragile fuel routes.

Viridis Rare Earth Output Marks First Step Toward Brazil Magnet Materials Supply

mixed rare earth carbonate

Viridis rare earth output from its Poços de Caldas demonstration plant marks an important milestone for Brazil’s emerging role in non-China rare earth supply. Australia-based Viridis Mining and Minerals has produced its first batch of high-grade mixed rare earth carbonate in Minas Gerais.

Viridis rare earth output comes from a newly commissioned demonstration plant that processes 100 kg/hr of ionic clay feedstock. The product includes magnet-related rare earths such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium.

Viridis rare earth output is strategically important because mixed rare earth carbonate is an intermediate product that can feed separation, oxide refining and eventually permanent magnet supply chains. The achievement moves the Colossus project from resource potential into early process validation.

The company has sent samples to the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation for qualification. It is still in discussions with potential offtake partners for its mixed rare earth carbonate.

Colossus Ionic Clay Project Gains Processing Momentum

The demonstration plant draws feedstock from the northern concession pits of Viridis’ nearby Colossus ionic clay project. Colossus contains a 200mn t reserve grading 2,640ppm total rare earth oxides.

That resource base gives the project strategic relevance. Ionic clay rare earth deposits can be important because they may contain valuable heavy rare earths used in high-performance magnets.

The presence of dysprosium and terbium matters especially. These heavy rare earths improve magnet performance under heat and stress, making them important for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace and defence systems.

Viridis plans to build a commercial-scale plant at Colossus and is targeting first production in 2028. But the company has not yet confirmed a construction timeline.

Financing support is building around the project. Colossus has received A$50mn in loans from Export Finance Australia, along with funding commitments from Brazilian public finance institutions.

The project has also received a $100mn letter of interest from Export Development Canada and support from French export credit agency Bpifrance Assurance Export. This shows that allied governments are willing to support rare earth projects outside China.

Brazil Builds a Broader Rare Earth Processing Platform

Viridis is not only developing Colossus as a mining project. It is also planning rare earth oxide refining and magnet recycling capacity at the same Poços de Caldas location through a joint venture with Ionic Rare Earths.

That integrated approach matters. Rare earth supply chains need more than mining and carbonate production. They require refining, separation, recycling, metal-making, alloying and magnet qualification.

Brazil could become more important if it can connect resource development with processing and downstream material production. The country already has mineral potential, but the value will depend on building customer-ready products.

The Poços de Caldas site could therefore become a rare earth materials hub if the demonstration work, qualification process and future commercial plant progress as planned.

For magnet users, Brazil offers a potential alternative source of rare earth intermediates at a time when China still dominates processing and permanent magnet supply.

The next challenge is commercialisation. Viridis must qualify its product, secure offtake partners, complete project financing and prove that Colossus can scale from demonstration output to reliable industrial supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Viridis’ first rare earth output is small in volume but important in direction. Brazil’s rare earth opportunity will depend on whether projects like Colossus can move beyond resource statements into qualified carbonate, refined oxides and magnet-ready supply.

China-Russia Energy Cooperation Deepens as Beijing and Moscow Broaden Industrial Ties

China-Russia

China-Russia energy cooperation is set to deepen after both countries agreed to expand collaboration across energy, chemicals, metallurgy, agriculture and manufacturing. The pledge followed Russian president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing on 19-20 May.

China-Russia energy cooperation remains the core of the bilateral relationship. Oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables all featured in the joint statement, showing that energy security remains central to both countries’ strategic alignment.

China-Russia energy cooperation also has wider industrial meaning. Stable Russian energy flows support China’s manufacturing base, while Russian suppliers gain a critical long-term market as western sanctions continue to reshape trade.

The two countries also agreed to extend their treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation. That move reinforces a long-term political framework for resource trade, industrial projects and supply-chain coordination.

Energy and Nuclear Ties Anchor Strategic Partnership

Energy remains the strongest pillar of China-Russia trade. Russia is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas, delivering through a 38bn m³/yr pipeline and accounting for about 45% of China’s pipeline gas imports.

However, the joint statement did not confirm progress on a second major gas pipeline. That omission suggests that both sides still have commercial or political issues to resolve before expanding pipeline capacity further.

Russian crude also remains important to China. China imported an average of 2.53mn b/d of Russian crude in January-April, up from 2.01mn b/d a year earlier.

The buyer structure is shifting. State-owned Chinese refiners have reduced some purchases since tighter US sanctions began last October, while independent refiners remain more focused on margins and cargo economics.

Nuclear energy is another strategic link. China and Russia will continue work on the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear projects, which are expected to come online around 2026-28.

The two countries also plan to cooperate on advanced nuclear technologies, including fast reactors, fusion power and closed fuel cycle systems. This gives the relationship a long-term technology dimension beyond fossil fuel trade.

Renewable energy also appeared in the statement, including green power certificates. That language shows both sides want energy cooperation to cover low-carbon systems, even while oil, gas and coal remain central.

Agriculture, Metallurgy and Manufacturing Deepen Trade Flows

Agriculture is becoming a larger part of the partnership. China and Russia agreed to expand bilateral trade in meat, seafood, grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils and feed protein meals.

China already allows Russian beef and by-products that meet registration and disease-free zone requirements. It also lifted restrictions on Russian pork exports after a long ban linked to African swine fever.

Russia has become a key supplier of sunflower and rapeseed oils to China. It is also China’s largest source of non-GM soybean imports, making food security another strategic layer in the relationship.

Metallurgy and chemicals also remain important. China’s non-ferrous sector imports selected Russian raw materials, including antimony concentrate.

This matters because antimony is a critical material for flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, batteries and defence-related applications. Russian supply can help China manage raw material availability in niche but strategic metals.

The two countries also plan to deepen cooperation in automotive manufacturing, shipbuilding and civil aviation. Chinese automakers have already invested in Russian production, while Russia remains an important market for Chinese vehicles, including electric vehicles.

The wider industrial direction is clear. China and Russia are not only increasing commodity trade. They are building a broader economic partnership that connects energy, raw materials, food, manufacturing and strategic technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China and Russia are building a resource-and-industry bloc designed to withstand western pressure. The metals market should watch the metallurgy and critical minerals angle closely, because raw material flows such as antimony can become strategically important even when volumes are small.

VSMPO-Avisma Titanium Pipes to Support Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Plant

VSMPO-Avisma

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes will be supplied to Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant, strengthening Russia’s role in critical materials supply for nuclear infrastructure. The Russian titanium producer will deliver 150t of titanium pipes for integrated equipment in unit 4 of the project.

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes are commercially pure welded products made at the company’s Verkhnyaya Salda facility. The company launched serial production of CP welded titanium pipes in March.

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes are relevant because CP titanium is widely used in heat exchangers and cooling systems. Its corrosion resistance makes it suitable for nuclear power plants that rely on seawater cooling or other aggressive operating environments.

The supply deal also reinforces the strategic link between titanium manufacturing and nuclear energy construction. As countries build new reactors, demand rises for corrosion-resistant, qualified and reliable metal components.

CP Titanium Supports Nuclear Cooling Reliability

Commercially pure titanium is valued in heat exchangers because it resists corrosion in chloride-rich environments. That makes it especially useful in power plants located near seawater sources.

El Dabaa’s equipment will require materials that can operate reliably over long periods. Titanium pipes can reduce corrosion risk, extend service life and improve the reliability of cooling-related systems.

The 150t order also shows that nuclear projects create specialised demand for titanium beyond aerospace and defence. Energy infrastructure can absorb high-value titanium products where performance and durability are essential.

VSMPO-Avisma has already supplied welded titanium tubes for unit 4 of Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant. That project was also built using a Russian design.

This track record gives the company a stronger position in Rosatom-linked international nuclear projects. It also shows how Russia can bundle reactor construction with domestic metal and component supply.

El Dabaa Extends Russia’s Nuclear Industrial Reach

Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom is building the 4.8GW El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt. Phase one is expected to come online in 2028, while all four units are planned to be operational by 2030.

Construction of unit 4 began in January 2024. The titanium pipes supplied by VSMPO-Avisma will support that unit’s equipment package.

The project is important for Egypt’s long-term energy strategy. Nuclear power can provide baseload electricity, reduce fuel import exposure and diversify the country’s energy mix.

For Russia, El Dabaa extends its industrial influence through nuclear technology, engineering services and material supply. Titanium pipes are only one component, but they show how nuclear export projects can support wider Russian industrial chains.

For titanium markets, the order confirms that corrosion-resistant CP titanium remains a strategic material for energy infrastructure. Demand from nuclear, desalination, chemical processing and marine systems can provide industrial support outside cyclical aerospace markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The El Dabaa order shows that titanium’s strategic value extends well beyond aircraft structures. Nuclear projects need materials that can survive corrosive environments for decades, and CP titanium remains one of the key metals for that role.

Argentina Lithium Growth Could Challenge Chile’s Regional Lead

Argentina Lithium

Argentina lithium growth could reshape Latin America’s lithium map over the next decade as new projects advance under more investor-friendly rules. Argentina is expected to match Chile’s lithium output by 2035, with some industry participants arguing it could overtake Chile even earlier.

Argentina lithium growth is being supported by faster permitting, large brine resources and stronger investment incentives. By contrast, Chile’s lithium expansion remains constrained by restrictive legislation, lengthy approval processes and uncertainty around new project development.

Argentina lithium growth is strategically important because lithium remains central to electric vehicles, energy storage and battery supply chains. Global buyers want large-scale, politically stable and western hemisphere supply outside more exposed jurisdictions.

Chile remains the region’s largest producer today. However, its future output growth depends heavily on existing producers and slow-moving new projects, while Argentina has a deeper pipeline of advanced developments.

Chile’s Lithium Policy Slows New Supply

Chile has long been Latin America’s dominant lithium producer, but its regulatory system is limiting new investment. Lithium remains non-concessionable and is still treated under legislation linked to nuclear materials.

Companies seeking to extract lithium in Chile must apply for special mining contracts. These contracts are granted through public bidding processes that can be lengthy, bureaucratic and uncertain.

This creates a major exploration problem. Companies may be reluctant to explore land if they cannot be confident of later securing extraction rights.

Chile’s national lithium strategy also requires all new projects to use direct lithium extraction. DLE is viewed as more environmentally friendly than traditional evaporation ponds, but it creates technical and cost challenges.

Each DLE process must be designed around the specific chemistry of each brine resource. That means technology used at one salar cannot simply be copied at another.

This raises development costs and lengthens project timelines. Industry participants estimate that DLE projects may require investment of up to $44,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate equivalent, compared with about $26,000/t for evaporation projects.

Chile’s new supply pipeline is therefore moving slowly. The first major new project, Rio Tinto’s Maricunga, is expected only by the end of 2030, with another new project expected in 2032.

Until then, Chile may rely mainly on capacity increases from existing producers. That could limit its ability to respond to rising lithium demand if Argentina’s project pipeline accelerates.

Argentina’s Rigi Regime Attracts Lithium Capital

Argentina is moving in the opposite direction. Its government has streamlined licensing and introduced the Rigi incentive regime for large investments.

Rigi provides tax exemptions, import-export benefits and legal protections for approved projects. It also allows companies to settle certain disputes in courts outside Argentina, improving investor confidence.

Ten lithium projects have already applied to Rigi, with three approved. The programme has become a major signal to international investors seeking policy stability and faster project execution.

Argentina now has more than 60 active lithium projects and seven producing assets, the most in Latin America. Two new developments are expected to come on line this year, lifting projected output to 159,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

That remains below Chile’s 305,000t in 2024. However, Argentina has more than 20 projects in advanced stages, including eight close to production.

Argentina’s mining ministry expects output to reach 583,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent by 2035. That would put the country in position to match or overtake Chile if Chile’s permitting regime does not change.

The investment logic is clear. Argentina offers large brine resources, a more open policy framework and exposure to western hemisphere supply chains. That combination is increasingly attractive to battery makers, automakers and mining companies.

Chile still has enormous lithium potential. But potential alone does not create supply. Without faster approvals and clearer rules, Chile risks losing regional leadership to Argentina.

For the lithium market, this shift matters. Argentina’s rise could increase competition, diversify supply and give buyers more options in South America. It could also make Latin America’s lithium growth less dependent on Chile’s policy choices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina’s lithium advantage is not only geological; it is regulatory. Chile still has world-class resources, but Argentina is turning policy speed into supply-chain momentum.

Argentina Lithium Growth Could Challenge Chile’s Regional Lead

Argentina Lithium

Argentina lithium growth could reshape Latin America’s lithium map over the next decade as new projects advance under more investor-friendly rules. Argentina is expected to match Chile’s lithium output by 2035, with some industry participants arguing it could overtake Chile even earlier.

Argentina lithium growth is being supported by faster permitting, large brine resources and stronger investment incentives. By contrast, Chile’s lithium expansion remains constrained by restrictive legislation, lengthy approval processes and uncertainty around new project development.

Argentina lithium growth is strategically important because lithium remains central to electric vehicles, energy storage and battery supply chains. Global buyers want large-scale, politically stable and western hemisphere supply outside more exposed jurisdictions.

Chile remains the region’s largest producer today. However, its future output growth depends heavily on existing producers and slow-moving new projects, while Argentina has a deeper pipeline of advanced developments.

Chile’s Lithium Policy Slows New Supply

Chile has long been Latin America’s dominant lithium producer, but its regulatory system is limiting new investment. Lithium remains non-concessionable and is still treated under legislation linked to nuclear materials.

Companies seeking to extract lithium in Chile must apply for special mining contracts. These contracts are granted through public bidding processes that can be lengthy, bureaucratic and uncertain.

This creates a major exploration problem. Companies may be reluctant to explore land if they cannot be confident of later securing extraction rights.

Chile’s national lithium strategy also requires all new projects to use direct lithium extraction. DLE is viewed as more environmentally friendly than traditional evaporation ponds, but it creates technical and cost challenges.

Each DLE process must be designed around the specific chemistry of each brine resource. That means technology used at one salar cannot simply be copied at another.

This raises development costs and lengthens project timelines. Industry participants estimate that DLE projects may require investment of up to $44,000 per tonne of lithium carbonate equivalent, compared with about $26,000/t for evaporation projects.

Chile’s new supply pipeline is therefore moving slowly. The first major new project, Rio Tinto’s Maricunga, is expected only by the end of 2030, with another new project expected in 2032.

Until then, Chile may rely mainly on capacity increases from existing producers. That could limit its ability to respond to rising lithium demand if Argentina’s project pipeline accelerates.

Argentina’s Rigi Regime Attracts Lithium Capital

Argentina is moving in the opposite direction. Its government has streamlined licensing and introduced the Rigi incentive regime for large investments.

Rigi provides tax exemptions, import-export benefits and legal protections for approved projects. It also allows companies to settle certain disputes in courts outside Argentina, improving investor confidence.

Ten lithium projects have already applied to Rigi, with three approved. The programme has become a major signal to international investors seeking policy stability and faster project execution.

Argentina now has more than 60 active lithium projects and seven producing assets, the most in Latin America. Two new developments are expected to come on line this year, lifting projected output to 159,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent.

That remains below Chile’s 305,000t in 2024. However, Argentina has more than 20 projects in advanced stages, including eight close to production.

Argentina’s mining ministry expects output to reach 583,000 t/yr of lithium carbonate equivalent by 2035. That would put the country in position to match or overtake Chile if Chile’s permitting regime does not change.

The investment logic is clear. Argentina offers large brine resources, a more open policy framework and exposure to western hemisphere supply chains. That combination is increasingly attractive to battery makers, automakers and mining companies.

Chile still has enormous lithium potential. But potential alone does not create supply. Without faster approvals and clearer rules, Chile risks losing regional leadership to Argentina.

For the lithium market, this shift matters. Argentina’s rise could increase competition, diversify supply and give buyers more options in South America. It could also make Latin America’s lithium growth less dependent on Chile’s policy choices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Argentina’s lithium advantage is not only geological; it is regulatory. Chile still has world-class resources, but Argentina is turning policy speed into supply-chain momentum.

China Nuclear Capacity Expansion Strengthens Demand for Hafnium and Zirconium

the China Nuclear Energy

China nuclear capacity continues to expand as the country retains the global lead in nuclear power construction. China currently operates 60 commercial nuclear power units and has another 36 units under construction, according to the China Nuclear Energy Industry Association.

The scale of China nuclear capacity growth is significant for energy security and industrial materials demand. Projects under construction in China account for more than half of global nuclear capacity currently being built.

China nuclear capacity is also set to grow further because 16 additional units have already received approvals and are awaiting construction. The country has started construction on two nuclear power units so far this year and plans to complete seven units within the year.

The country’s installed nuclear power capacity has reached 125GW, ranking first globally, according to the association. This keeps China at the centre of global nuclear construction and strengthens downstream demand for strategic metals used in reactor systems.

Nuclear Buildout Raises Demand for Hafnium and Zirconium

China’s nuclear expansion is important for several minor metals, especially hafnium and zirconium. These materials sit deep inside the nuclear supply chain, but they are critical to reactor performance and safety.

Hafnium is mainly used in control rods for nuclear power plants. It has strong neutron absorption properties, making it valuable for regulating fission reactions inside reactors.

Nuclear-grade zirconium sponge is used as a core structural material for fuel assemblies. Zirconium is valued in nuclear systems because it has low neutron absorption and strong corrosion resistance under reactor operating conditions.

The growth in nuclear construction therefore creates direct demand for high-purity and nuclear-qualified materials. These materials require strict processing, quality control and certification, which makes supply more specialized than ordinary industrial metals.

China’s large buildout also creates a strategic demand signal for upstream zirconium minerals, zirconium sponge, hafnium separation and downstream nuclear components. As more units move from approval to construction and commissioning, material procurement will become more important.

Export Controls Tighten Strategic Minor Metals Supply

The nuclear sector is not the only source of demand for hafnium. Industrial gas turbines also use hafnium in high-performance alloy systems, creating additional competition for supply.

Prices have risen because of stronger demand from nuclear power and industrial gas turbine sectors, while supply has tightened because of reduced exports from China. This makes hafnium a more visible strategic material in global industrial supply chains.

China has included hafnium in its strict dual-use item export control scheme. This constrains global availability and increases supply risk for users outside China.

The issue highlights a broader trend in critical materials. Small-volume metals can become major chokepoints when they support high-value sectors such as nuclear power, aerospace, defence, turbines and advanced manufacturing.

For global nuclear developers, the supply chain challenge extends beyond uranium. Reactor construction also depends on certified zirconium, hafnium, specialty alloys, forgings, control rod materials and precision components.

China’s nuclear construction lead therefore has two effects. It supports domestic energy security while also increasing China’s influence over the strategic materials used in nuclear and high-temperature industrial applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s nuclear buildout shows how energy security is becoming a materials security issue. Hafnium and nuclear-grade zirconium may be small-volume markets, but they are critical bottlenecks for reactors, turbines and strategic industrial systems.

Clean Power Growth Will Reshape Global Electricity Markets by 2030

Renewables and nuclear

Clean power growth is set to reshape global electricity markets by 2030. The IEA expects renewables and nuclear to provide half of the world’s electricity by then. This shift will happen even as global electricity demand rises strongly. As a result, clean power growth is becoming the dominant force in future power systems.

The scale of demand growth makes this transition more significant. Global electricity demand is expected to rise from 28,199 TWh in 2025 to 33,594 TWh in 2030. The IEA sees demand growing at an average annual rate of 3.6pc through 2030. Therefore, global electricity markets are not just decarbonising. They are also expanding rapidly.

This demand surge is being driven by structural changes in the economy. Industry is using more electricity, electric vehicle adoption is rising, and air conditioning demand is growing. Data centres and artificial intelligence are also adding a new layer of power consumption. Consequently, power demand growth is becoming one of the biggest industrial themes of the decade.

Renewable Power Generation Is Overtaking Coal in a Bigger Market

Renewable power generation is now moving ahead even as total electricity use climbs. The IEA said renewables are in the process of overtaking coal-fired generation after nearly matching it in 2025. Solar was especially important last year, offsetting weaker wind speeds and softer hydropower output. As a result, renewable power generation is now carrying more of the global power system.

The forecast growth is substantial. Renewable generation is expected to increase by around 1,050 TWh each year through 2030. Solar alone will account for more than 600 TWh of that annual increase. Therefore, solar remains the clearest growth engine inside the broader clean power expansion.

Coal will still remain the single largest source of electricity through 2030, but its position is weakening. The IEA expects coal-fired generation to contract by 0.9pc per year from 2026 to 2030. A plateau in Chinese coal generation is one of the main drivers behind this trend. Meanwhile, renewables and nuclear together are expected to rise from 43pc of global generation in 2025 to 50pc by 2030.

Power Demand Growth Will Test Grids, Flexibility, and Investment

Power demand growth will also expose weaknesses in grid infrastructure. The IEA warned that power systems need far more investment in grids and flexibility. More than 2.5TW of projects are currently stuck in connection queues worldwide. Therefore, grid expansion may become as important as generation investment itself.

Gas-fired generation will still play a support role in this transition. The IEA expects gas-fired power output to grow by 2.6pc per year through 2030. Stronger demand in the US and the Middle East will support that growth. As a result, global electricity markets are moving toward a more mixed system, not a simple fossil-to-renewable swap.

Emissions trends show why this shift matters. The IEA expects the rise of renewables to keep power-sector CO2 emissions roughly flat through 2030 despite higher demand. That would mark a significant change after years of steady emissions pressure. Consequently, clean power growth is becoming the main reason power-sector emissions are no longer rising with electricity use.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This forecast matters because it confirms that the power transition is no longer a niche policy story. Electricity is becoming the central growth engine of the global energy system, and clean power is taking a larger share of that expansion. The next real bottleneck will not be ambition. It will be whether grids, storage, and system flexibility can keep pace.

EGA aluminium decarbonisation agreements reshape Abu Dhabi’s power model for low-carbon metal

EGA Aluminium

EGA aluminium decarbonisation agreements will rewire how Emirates Global Aluminium sources power and markets greener metal. The deal package links asset sales, long-term power purchasing, and grid upgrades into one decarbonisation roadmap. However, the strategy also locks in multi-decade electricity arrangements to protect smelter stability. Therefore, customers seeking certified low-carbon premium aluminium may see more supply and clearer contracting signals.

The headline move shifts power and water assets at Al Taweelah into new hands for $1.9bn. Abu Dhabi National Energy Company and Dubal Holding will acquire the assets, while Emirates Water and Electricity Company signs a power purchase agreement for the gas-fired plant through 2049. Meanwhile, TAQA Transmission will acquire EGA’s electricity transmission assets. As a result, EGA can focus capital on production and decarbonisation execution, rather than owning and operating utility infrastructure.

Abu Dhabi clean power deal locks long-term electricity while raising renewables share

Abu Dhabi clean power deal terms extend across the next 24 years. TAQA Distribution and Emirates Water and Electricity Company will supply power under new agreements that gradually lift renewable and clean energy share. Meanwhile, solar generation projects coming online under EWEC will drive that shift over time. Therefore, EGA can reduce its carbon intensity without destabilising baseload operations.

This structure also signals a maturing industrial power model in the UAE. The deal uses long-term contracting to de-risk both grid investment and smelter continuity. However, the pace of decarbonisation will still depend on project delivery and grid integration. As a result, procurement teams may track renewables ramp milestones as closely as aluminium premiums.

Low-carbon premium aluminium expands via CelestiAL and MinimAL output targets

Low-carbon premium aluminium will become a bigger share of EGA’s sales mix if the plan holds. EGA aims to raise production of its CelestiAL solar aluminium and MinimAL nuclear-powered aluminium to almost half of total primary output by end-2028, subject to market demand. Meanwhile, that scale-up could tighten differentiation between commodity metal and verified low-carbon units. Therefore, buyers in automotive, packaging, and construction can build greener supply chains with fewer sourcing compromises.

EGA aluminium decarbonisation agreements also influence regional competition. The move may pressure other producers to secure cleaner power, improve disclosures, and justify carbon premiums. However, premium markets will still test whether customers pay consistently for lower emissions. As a result, contract structures and traceability claims will matter as much as headline capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

EGA aluminium decarbonisation agreements look designed to industrialise decarbonisation, not just pilot it. However, long-dated power structures can create rigidity if policy or technology shifts quickly. Therefore, the winners will be buyers who lock in low-carbon premium aluminium with credible attributes and flexible delivery terms.

Age of electricity has arrived as IEA flags surging power demand to 2035

IEA

The International Energy Agency says the Age of electricity has arrived, and global power use is accelerating. Fatih Birol says the shift has already arrived and markets must respond now. The latest World Energy Outlook shows electricity demand rising faster than overall energy use.

The report links electricity demand growth to households, mobility, cooling, and digital services. Meanwhile, it expects demand to rise about 40% by 2035 in two scenarios. In its Net Zero pathway, it expects demand to rise more than 50%.

Electricity demand growth accelerates with AI, cooling, and mobility

Electricity demand growth now surges in advanced economies because data centres and AI add new load. The agency estimates global data-centre investment could hit $580bn in 2025. That figure exceeds the $540bn it links to global oil supply spending.

This demand shift changes capital flows across the energy transition. However, utilities must match new load with firm capacity and flexible generation. As a result, corporate buyers will push harder for clean power procurement.

Renewables lead, but grid constraints and heat risks threaten reliability

Renewable energy deployment expands fastest across scenarios, and solar leads new capacity. Meanwhile, nuclear regains momentum for large plants and small modular reactors. Therefore, system planners will rely on more diverse generation mixes.

Grid investment now lags generation spending, and the bottleneck is getting worse. The agency says electricity generation investment jumped nearly 70% since 2015. However, annual grid spending rose at less than half that pace, and slow permitting delays projects.

Heat risk and security risk now threaten power reliability and supply chains. The agency says temperatures exceed 1.5°C regularly around 2030 in all scenarios. Meanwhile, energy-related CO2 hit a record 38bn tonnes in 2024, and it stays near that level in the current-policy case.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Grid investment will decide whether the Age of electricity has arrived stays affordable or turns inflationary. Meanwhile, metals supply chains must scale copper, aluminum, and transformer components. Therefore, policymakers should speed permits and reduce equipment bottlenecks.

Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects to reshape its resource strategy

Canada fast-tracks

Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects as Ottawa launches a new tier of “National Interest Projects.” The first list includes LNG, nuclear, mining and port infrastructure that will receive accelerated permitting and financing support. As a result, Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects to revive growth, enhance energy security and pivot trade away from US dependence.

Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects with LNG Canada Phase 2 at the centre of the plan. The proposed second phase in British Columbia would double existing 14mn t/yr capacity if sanctioned. Therefore, Phase 2 would create one of the world’s largest LNG export facilities and strengthen Canada’s Pacific energy footprint. Prime minister Mark Carney frames these assets as “nation building” projects that can transform Canada into an energy superpower.

LNG, nuclear and port projects gain streamlined federal backing

The fast-track list extends beyond gas export capacity into nuclear and logistics infrastructure. The Darlington New Nuclear Project in Ontario, centred on small modular reactors, aims to provide firm low carbon power. Meanwhile, an expansion of the Port of Montreal container terminal will support higher trade volumes with “reliable” partners beyond the US. These projects anchor a broader strategy that links energy, trade and industrial policy.

Canada will use a new Major Projects Office to shepherd these investments through remaining approvals. The office will coordinate regulatory and permitting processes and help secure necessary financing. Therefore, projects on the “National Interest Projects” list can bypass some red tape that previously discouraged investors. Streamlined reviews must conclude within two years, a major change in a country known for slow project timelines.

Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects to support critical minerals and oil sands

Canada fast-tracks LNG and mining projects partly to strengthen critical minerals supply. Two western mining projects made the first list: an expansion at the Red Chris copper gold mine in British Columbia and the McIlvenna Bay Foran Copper Mine in Saskatchewan. These assets support copper demand from electrification, grids and data centres, while reinforcing Canada’s role in allied critical mineral supply chains.

Carbon capture plans also feature prominently in the next wave of projects. Carney highlighted the Pathways Alliance 22mn t/yr carbon capture and storage project for referral to the Major Projects Office. Pathways could link to a new pipeline serving multiple markets and underpin “enormous” emissions reductions. However, it would also facilitate new oil sands growth, tying climate strategy directly to hydrocarbon expansion.

Political dynamics around these decisions remain complex yet pragmatic. Alberta premier Danielle Smith described her recent meeting with Carney as “exceptionally productive” and urged Albertans to be patient. She claims “Albertans are finally being heard,” signalling provincial support if projects deliver tangible economic benefits. Meanwhile, Carney plans a second tranche of major projects by mid November, which could include additional energy and infrastructure schemes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Canada’s move to fast-track LNG and mining projects shows how permitting reform, not only subsidies, now drives resource strategy. If the Major Projects Office delivers credible two year timelines, global capital may revisit Canadian LNG, nuclear and mining assets. Market participants should watch which projects enter the second tranche, since that list will reveal how aggressively Ottawa intends to balance hydrocarbons, critical minerals and climate goals.

China tungsten prices surge on solar, superalloy and defense demand

Tungsten

China tungsten prices surge on unexpectedly strong prompt buying. China tungsten prices surge as APT and concentrate jump in late August. As a result, China tungsten prices surge while spot trades clear well above term bids.

Spot tightness and term contracts diverge

Prices for 65% wolframite hit Yn252,000–262,000/t on 28 August. They rose from Yn234,000–236,000/t on 26 August. That is up 32% in August and 86% year-to-date. APT 88.5% rose to Yn360,000–380,000/t ex-works. It climbed from Yn340,000–350,000/t over the same period. Producers in Jiangxi and Hunan ran at low rates to honor term contracts. Suppliers reported thin inventories and began withholding sales. Spot deals cleared at Yn380,000–400,000/t for APT this week. Doped tungsten powder traded near Yn600/kg for superalloys.[Price Link: https://supermetalprice.com/]

Demand spikes across solar, tools, and defense

Solar glass, cutting tools, and superalloy buyers drove the rally. Market participants urged quick purchases to avoid higher costs tomorrow. Key state-linked groups floated August APT bids at Yn305,000–340,000/t. These levels sat far below active spot prints. Term volumes still covered roughly 80% of liquidity. However, immediate needs and investor buying set marginal prices. China’s defense procurement lifted cemented tools and AP core plans by 42%. That signaled firm tungsten pull from military channels.

Meanwhile, Li-ion and solar supply chains expanded tungsten use. Tungsten wire for silicon slicing may consume 4,500t in 2025. That rises from 2,000–3,000t in 2023–2024. Battery applications added about 1,500t over the past year. That total rose 22% year on year. These shifts increased sensitivity to short-term tightness. Therefore, small inventory gaps triggered rapid price jumps.

Supply constraints and medium-term outlook

Resource depletion and mining limits constrained feed. New large mines remain years away. The Dahutang project holds 1.21mn t of WO₃ reserves. It is unlikely to start before three years from now. Prices may stabilize or soften after restocking. That depends on whether prompt demand cools. Yet long-term fundamentals still look firm. China plans major infrastructure, nuclear, and grid projects. The Xinjiang–Tibet railway also supports metal intensity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The spread between spot APT and state-linked term bids underscores scarcity at the margin. If defense and solar orders persist, pullbacks may prove shallow. Watch Dahutang timelines and export policies; absent new supply, volatility should remain elevated.