Dark-Fleet Vessel Recycling Enters Regulated Channel With US License for GMS

GMS

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has entered a new regulatory phase after Dubai-based ship and offshore asset recycler GMS secured a US government license to buy and recycle sanctioned vessels. The approval creates a formal pathway for disposing of ships tied to sanctions risk.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has historically operated through opaque channels, especially as older tankers linked to Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil trades moved outside mainstream shipping markets. GMS said this is the first time a cash buyer has legally acquired and recycled sanctioned vessels under a fully authorised US licensing framework.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling now has a potential model for governments seeking to combine sanctions enforcement, environmental oversight and asset disposal. The license followed nearly seven months of review by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, with support from the US State Department.

The company has not disclosed the number or names of vessels acquired. But the approval itself is significant because aging sanctioned tonnage is becoming a larger safety, compliance and environmental challenge for global shipping.

OFAC License Creates a Compliance Route for Sanctioned Vessel Disposal

The OFAC license gives GMS legal approval to purchase and recycle several sanctioned vessels from the dark fleet. This matters because sanctioned ships are difficult to handle through normal commercial channels.

Banks, insurers, brokers, ports, shipyards and recyclers often avoid sanctioned assets because of legal and reputational risk. That leaves vessels exposed to informal transactions, weak oversight and poor end-of-life management.

A regulated license changes that structure. It allows disposal to take place under documented compliance checks, government review and controlled transaction procedures.

The dark fleet consists of sanctioned and unsanctioned older tankers used to move oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela while bypassing western sanctions. Many of these vessels operate outside mainstream shipping systems and may carry higher safety and environmental risks.

GMS said more than 30 sanctioned vessels have been recycled in India and elsewhere in recent years through opaque and largely unregulated channels. A licensed route could reduce that leakage into informal markets.

The development could also influence Europe. GMS views the approval as a possible model for other governments that need a lawful way to remove sanctioned vessels from global trade.

Ship Recycling Becomes a Sanctions and Materials Issue

The industrial significance extends beyond vessel disposal. Ship recycling produces ferrous and non-ferrous scrap that can re-enter steel and metals supply chains if handled under proper environmental and compliance standards.

Older tankers contain large volumes of recyclable steel, along with machinery, copper-bearing equipment, aluminium components and other recoverable materials. But sanctioned origin and weak documentation can complicate resale and downstream acceptance.

Regulated recycling pathways can improve traceability. They can also help ensure that scrap generated from sanctioned vessels does not move through hidden channels that undermine sanctions policy.

This creates a new intersection between shipbreaking, sanctions enforcement and circular metals. Recycling is no longer only about recovering material value. It is also about proving legal origin, environmental responsibility and financial accountability.

The timing is important. Aging dark-fleet tonnage is likely to keep rising as sanctions, insurance limits and safety concerns restrict normal fleet operations. Without formal disposal routes, more vessels could end up in poorly monitored recycling channels.

For cash buyers and recyclers, the GMS license may create a more legitimate business model. For governments, it provides a tool to remove risky vessels while controlling the financial and material flow around them.

The broader market should watch whether this becomes a repeatable framework. If more sanctioned vessels are recycled under licensed systems, ship recycling could become a meaningful part of sanctions implementation and circular metals governance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GMS has turned sanctioned vessel recycling into a compliance business rather than a grey-market disposal problem. The next challenge is whether regulators can scale this model before aging dark-fleet tankers create larger safety, environmental and financial risks.

USA Rare Earth Separation Project Gains DOE Support in Oklahoma

US Department of Energy

USA Rare Earth separation project plans in Stillwater, Oklahoma, have gained federal support as the company prepares to scale pilot rare earth processing technology. USA Rare Earth will receive up to $19.3mn from the US Department of Energy for a pilot-scale rare earth separation project.

USA Rare Earth separation project funding will come through the DOE’s Critical Materials Innovation, Efficiency and Alternatives programme. The total project value is $50.5mn, with $31.2mn expected from non-DOE sources.

USA Rare Earth separation project work will demonstrate a pilot-scale continuous ion exchange rare earth production operation. The facility aims to move the company’s bench-scale process toward a pre-commercial unit.

The project matters because rare earth separation remains one of the most difficult gaps in the US magnet supply chain. Mining rare earth material is not enough unless it can be separated, purified and converted into magnet-ready inputs.

Continuous Ion Exchange Targets Rare Earth Processing Bottleneck

The Stillwater facility will test continuous ion exchange technology as a potential alternative to incumbent solvent extraction. Solvent extraction is widely used in rare earth separation, but it can be complex, chemical-intensive and difficult to scale efficiently.

Continuous ion exchange could offer a different route if it proves technically reliable, cost-effective and suitable for commercial production. The DOE’s support signals that Washington is looking for processing technologies that can reduce dependence on existing separation models.

This is strategically important because separation is the midstream bottleneck in rare earth supply chains. Concentrates and mixed rare earth products must be separated into individual oxides before they can support magnets, defence systems, electronics and clean technology manufacturing.

The project timeline has not been disclosed. That leaves the pace of scale-up uncertain, but the funding gives USAR a stronger platform to move from laboratory development toward industrial demonstration.

For the US, the project aligns with a broader effort to create domestic rare earth processing capacity. Without separation, upstream resources cannot become secure industrial supply.

Magnet Ambition Depends on Separation Scale-Up

USAR is developing a fully integrated US rare earth and permanent magnet supply chain. The company plans to produce 10,000 t/yr of magnets by 2030.

That target depends on more than magnet assembly. USAR needs reliable rare earth feedstock, separation, metal-making, alloying and customer qualification before it can reach meaningful commercial output.

The Stillwater project could support that integration by strengthening the separation stage. If continuous ion exchange scales successfully, USAR may gain a more controlled route from rare earth feedstock to magnet materials.

Federal backing is also increasing. The US Department of Commerce issued USAR a letter of intent in January to provide $277mn of federal funding and a $1.3bn loan.

That level of support shows how rare earths have become part of US industrial policy. Washington is trying to build domestic capacity across the value chain, not only encourage private-sector exploration.

The key challenge remains execution. Pilot separation must prove stable, scalable and economical before it can support a 10,000 t/yr magnet target.

The Metalnomist Commentary

USAR’s DOE-backed project shows that rare earth security now depends on process technology as much as mining. If continuous ion exchange can scale, it could help close one of the most important gaps in the US permanent magnet supply chain.

USAC Antimony Expansion Targets July Start for US Defense Stockpile Supply

USAC Antimony

USAC antimony expansion at Thompson Falls in Montana is expected to be fully online by mid-July, strengthening US domestic supply of a critical defense metal. The company has started commissioning the smelter expansion and plans to bring operations online in phases.

USAC antimony expansion will add capacity at a time when Washington is trying to secure antimony ingots for the national defense stockpile. Antimony is used in ammunition, flame retardants, alloys and other defense-related applications.

USAC antimony expansion depends on the arrival of furnace parts expected in the last week of May. The company plans to start one to two furnaces each week until all nine furnaces are operating around mid-July.

By the end of July, US Antimony expects the expansion to produce at nearly 80% of its 230 t/month capacity. The company then plans to temporarily shut its older 75 t/month plant for four to eight weeks for maintenance and emissions upgrades.

Montana Capacity Supports Fixed-Price DLA Contract

The Thompson Falls expansion is directly tied to US Antimony’s five-year fixed-price contract with the Defense Logistics Agency. The contract covers 6.7mn lb, or 3,039t, of antimony ingots for the national defense stockpile and is worth up to $245mn.

USAC has received $12mn in DLA sales orders to date. It has also received the first two delivery notices for finished antimony ingots to the Department of Defense.

The federal contract will become a major revenue driver. USAC expects $75mn-95mn of its estimated $125mn revenue in 2026 to come from shipments to the US government.

That structure makes the Montana expansion strategically important. The project is not only a capacity increase; it is part of a government-backed supply chain for a material with limited domestic production.

USAC’s antimony inventories also increased sharply. Inventories reached $21.7mn at the end of the first quarter, up from $12mn at the end of 2025.

However, execution has not been smooth. The expansion was initially expected to be completed in January but was delayed by supplier and third-party issues involving concrete pads, building construction and heat exchangers.

Federal Funding Pushes US Antimony Beyond Thompson Falls

The Department of Defense awarded USAC $27mn in Defense Production Act Title III funds in February to expand antimony production and refining capacity in Montana and Alaska. The company received $12.8mn of that grant in April.

This funding shows that US antimony supply is now a defense industrial priority. China’s dominant role in antimony processing has made domestic and allied capacity more strategically valuable.

USAC is also pursuing a larger hydrometallurgical processing project in Idaho with Canadian miner Americas Gold and Silver. The joint venture was established in February.

The partners expect to complete construction of the Idaho facility in 2028. The project is targeting capacity of up to 1,000 t/month of 99.9% pure antimony.

USAC has applied for more than $274mn in federal grants across several projects. These include the hydromet facility and tungsten exploration at the Fostung site in Canada.

The company’s financial results still show the strain of expansion. USAC reported an $11.3mn first-quarter loss, compared with a $0.5mn profit a year earlier, while revenue fell by 3% to $6.8mn.

The near-term challenge is therefore operational execution. USAC must bring the Montana furnaces online, meet emissions requirements, deliver to the DLA and convert federal support into reliable production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

USAC’s Montana expansion shows how the US is trying to rebuild antimony capacity through defense contracts, stockpiles and public funding. The strategic risk is execution: domestic supply security depends on furnaces actually running, not only grants and offtake contracts.

GTP Tungsten Oxide Stockpile Expansion Strengthens US Defense Supply

GTP Tungsten & Powders

GTP tungsten oxide stockpile plans will expand US access to one of the most strategically sensitive defense metals. Global Tungsten and Powders plans to raise tungsten oxide production capacity at its Towanda, Pennsylvania, plant to about 12,000 t/yr.

The GTP tungsten oxide stockpile will support US defense and critical industries, with initial deliveries expected later this year. The company did not disclose the exact volume dedicated to the reserve.

The GTP tungsten oxide stockpile is significant because tungsten is essential for armour-piercing ammunition, aircraft engine components, electronics, hard metals and other high-performance applications. Defence currently accounts for about 10% of global tungsten demand, but that share is rising as military budgets expand.

GTP, part of Austria’s Plansee group, already has around 10,000 t/yr of tungsten oxide capacity, although output can vary by about 15% depending on operating conditions. The planned expansion would give the US a stronger domestic platform for strategic tungsten oxide supply.

Recycling-Based Supply Supports Traceability and Security

The stockpile will use tungsten oxide sourced from recycled scrap and concentrates. This structure is important because US strategic materials procurement increasingly requires clear sourcing, traceability and supply-chain security.

Recycling is already central to GTP’s Towanda operation. Recycled material accounted for the majority of supply in 2025, when the plant recorded a recycling rate of 90%.

This gives the project a stronger compliance profile. Tungsten supply chains are exposed to geopolitical risk, concentrated processing and origin scrutiny, so recycled feedstock can help reduce dependence on higher-risk primary sources.

Tungsten recycling also supports industrial resilience. Scrap recovery can preserve valuable metal units inside the US system while reducing exposure to foreign concentrate availability.

For defense users, the key requirement is not only tonnage. They need reliable, traceable and qualified material that can be converted into powders, carbides, alloys and components without supply interruption.

The Towanda expansion therefore addresses a strategic gap. It does not only increase tungsten oxide capacity; it creates a more controlled domestic reserve tied to recycled and traceable inputs.

Stockpiling Moves From Emergency Buffer to Industrial Tool

Plansee US Holding has formed a joint venture with Manhattan Five to establish the stockpile. Manhattan Five will oversee warehousing, logistics and long-term asset management, while Plansee will lead production growth and supply.

The structure separates metal production from storage and asset management. That distinction matters because strategic stockpiles require more than buying material. They need inventory systems, logistics, inspection, rotation policies and long-term custody control.

The Defense Logistics Agency manages strategic and critical material procurement for the National Defense Stockpile. This system supports military and federal customers that need access to critical materials during supply disruptions.

The GTP project aligns with broader US priorities and could qualify for support from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy or the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

Washington is also preparing Project Vault, a proposed $12bn critical minerals stockpile for US manufacturers. The programme would be funded by $2bn in private capital and a loan.

The broader policy direction is clear. The US is moving from passive dependence on global tungsten markets toward active supply-chain positioning through stockpiles, domestic processing, recycling and public-private financing.

For tungsten markets, this could tighten competition for clean feedstock, especially recycled scrap and compliant concentrates. It may also raise the strategic value of processors that can meet US sourcing and traceability rules.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GTP’s tungsten oxide expansion shows that US stockpiling is becoming more industrially sophisticated. The strategic advantage will come not from holding material alone, but from linking stockpiles to recycling, domestic processing and qualified defense supply chains.

MP Materials NdPr Production Rises as US Magnet Supply Chain Expands

MP Materials

MP Materials NdPr production rose sharply in the first quarter as the US rare earth producer increased output of the key magnet feedstock used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems and advanced manufacturing.

MP Materials NdPr production reached 917t of neodymium-praseodymium oxide in January-March, up 63% from a year earlier. The company also sold 1,006t of NdPr oxides during the quarter, including initial shipments to its newest US customer.

MP Materials NdPr production is strategically important because NdPr oxide remains the most important input for rare earth permanent magnet production. The company believes NdPr access will remain the main constraint on economically viable magnet production outside China for at least the next five years.

The company produced just under 13,000t of rare earth oxides in the first quarter. Its loss narrowed to $8mn on revenue of $91mn, compared with a loss of $23mn on revenue of $61mn a year earlier.

NdPr Price Floor Supports US Supply Chain Economics

MP expects its realised NdPr price in the second quarter to be in the low-to-mid $90/kg range. However, its public-private partnership with the US Department of Defense provides a $110/kg price floor.

That structure is commercially important. If MP sells below the floor, the partnership offsets the difference between the realised price and $110/kg.

The price floor gives MP stronger revenue visibility while it expands downstream rare earth capacity. It also shows how the US government is using market-support tools to build domestic supply chains for strategic materials.

This is critical because rare earth magnet supply outside China still faces weak economics, limited scale and high qualification barriers. A price floor can help bridge the gap between strategic supply security and market pricing.

MP is also advancing its magnet business. The company expects initial magnet revenue in the second half of 2026 as it develops new magnet grades and customer specifications.

The magnet strategy includes improved chemistry and materially lower heavy rare earth content. This matters because dysprosium and terbium are expensive, supply-constrained and heavily exposed to Chinese processing dominance.

If MP can reduce heavy rare earth intensity while maintaining magnet performance, it could improve cost competitiveness and reduce supply-chain risk.

Heavy Rare Earth Separation Adds Strategic Optionality

MP is commissioning its heavy rare earth separation circuit before July and expects to produce dysprosium and terbium later this year. It also plans to produce high-purity samarium oxide, with potential gadolinium oxide and other heavy rare earth products depending on market attractiveness.

The company’s position on heavy rare earths is selective. MP does not want upstream project ownership in heavy rare earths and is instead focused on diversifying its feedstock supply chain.

That strategy reflects a practical view of the rare earth market. Heavy rare earths are strategically important, but MP sees NdPr oxide as the binding constraint for non-China magnet production.

MP expects dysprosium and terbium prices to decline substantially because it believes they are secondary to the larger NdPr bottleneck. This view suggests that the company sees heavy rare earth scarcity as important, but not as decisive as securing sufficient NdPr oxide.

Midstream metalization remains another challenge. MP currently uses toll processors and is discussing options with domestic and international partners.

The company expects to continue using toll processing while exploring low-cost metalization routes globally. This shows that the US rare earth chain still has gaps between oxide production, metal conversion, alloying and final magnet manufacturing.

For the wider market, MP’s first-quarter performance is an important signal. The US is gradually moving from rare earth mining and oxide output toward a more integrated magnet supply chain, but every step requires qualification, processing capacity, customer acceptance and policy support.

The Metalnomist Commentary

MP’s stronger NdPr output shows that the US rare earth strategy is moving from resource ownership toward usable magnet feedstock. The price floor is the key industrial signal: Washington is now willing to support market economics where strategic supply chains cannot yet compete with China on price alone.

Heavy Rare Earth Supply Push Gains US Defense Backing Through REalloys

REalloys

Heavy rare earth supply has moved further into the US defense priority list after REalloys received a memorandum from the Department of Defense highlighting the need to secure domestic production of critical heavy rare earth elements. The document specifically identified dysprosium and terbium as the most critical and high-value materials.

The signal is important because heavy rare earth supply remains one of the weakest points in western permanent magnet value chains. Dysprosium and terbium are essential for high-performance magnets that must operate under heat, stress and demanding defense conditions.

REalloys said the Department of Defense is treating heavy rare earths as a national security priority. The company also said Washington is renewing support through financial investment, strategic policy and public-private partnerships.

The company is now expanding its North American metallisation platform to produce defense-grade dysprosium and terbium at commercial scale. That step targets one of the most important bottlenecks between rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing.

Dysprosium and Terbium Become Defense-Critical Materials

Dysprosium and terbium are not large-volume rare earths, but their industrial importance is high. They help improve the thermal stability and performance of neodymium-iron-boron magnets used in advanced motors, actuators, sensors and defense systems.

This makes them strategically different from ordinary raw materials. Even small shortages can affect high-value manufacturing programmes if qualified metal, alloy or magnet feedstock is unavailable.

The US defense focus reflects a wider shift in rare earth policy. Governments are no longer concerned only with mining rare earth ore. They are increasingly focused on separated oxides, metals, alloys and magnet-ready materials.

That is where heavy rare earth supply becomes difficult. China remains dominant across heavy rare earth processing and magnet material production, leaving western defense and industrial users exposed to export controls and licensing risk.

REalloys’ focus on defense-grade dysprosium and terbium is therefore strategically relevant. It addresses the material form that downstream manufacturers need, not only the upstream resource question.

Metallisation Capacity Is the Midstream Bottleneck

REalloys is expanding its North American metallisation platform with support from a long-term offtake agreement with the Saskatchewan Research Council facility in Canada. The agreement can provide feedstock sufficient to produce up to 530 t/yr of rare earth metals.

This feedstock link is important because rare earth metal production requires reliable separated material, technical process control and customer qualification. Without metallisation, separated rare earth oxides cannot fully support magnet and defense supply chains.

The North American rare earth supply chain still has several missing links. Mining and separation projects are advancing, but metal-making, alloy production and magnet manufacturing capacity remain limited.

REalloys’ platform could help close part of that gap. Producing dysprosium and terbium metal at commercial scale would give defense and magnet customers a more secure regional source of high-value heavy rare earth inputs.

The larger implication is clear. Western rare earth resilience will depend on building each stage of the chain, from feedstock to separated oxides, metals, alloys and final magnets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The REalloys announcement shows that heavy rare earth strategy is moving beyond resource ownership into usable metal production. For defense supply chains, dysprosium and terbium security will depend on metallisation capacity, not only rare earth mining.

Indium Corp Gallium Recovery Grant Targets US Semiconductor Materials Security

Indium Corp

Indium Corp gallium recovery plans have gained US government support as Washington looks to build domestic supply chains for strategic semiconductor materials. The US-based metals refiner and manufacturer will receive a $3.2mn Department of Energy grant to recover gallium from industrial residues.

Indium Corp gallium recovery will focus on converting gallium-bearing residues into high-purity gallium for semiconductors and electronics. The project is part of the DOE’s Technology for Recovery and Advanced Critical-material Extraction-Gallium initiative.

Indium Corp gallium recovery matters because gallium is a critical input for compound semiconductors, radio-frequency devices, optoelectronics, defence systems and advanced electronics. The US remains heavily exposed to foreign supply because primary gallium production is concentrated in China.

The company will begin by developing a prototype to reclaim metallic gallium at its Rome, New York facility. In a second phase, it aims to scale the process to produce at least 1 t/yr of 99.99% pure gallium.

Gallium Residues Offer a Domestic Recovery Route

The project targets gallium-bearing residues rather than new primary mine output. This is strategically important because gallium is usually recovered as a by-product from alumina and zinc processing, making standalone primary supply difficult to build quickly.

Residue recovery can create a faster domestic supply route. If Indium Corp can economically recover high-purity gallium from waste streams, it could reduce dependence on imported material and strengthen US electronics supply chains.

The planned 99.99% purity level is important for semiconductor and electronics applications. High-purity gallium is used in materials such as gallium arsenide and gallium nitride, which support power electronics, LEDs, lasers, sensors, radar and communications equipment.

The Rome facility gives the project an existing industrial base. That can shorten the path from laboratory development to pilot production, although scale-up remains the key technical challenge.

A target of at least 1 t/yr is modest compared with global demand. However, the strategic value is larger than the tonnage suggests. The project could validate a recovery process that can later be expanded or replicated across other gallium-bearing waste streams.

TRACE-Ga Reflects US Push Into Critical Materials Recycling

Indium Corp was selected as one of five recipients under the DOE’s TRACE-Ga initiative. The programme will award a total of $5.4mn across companies working on gallium recovery and extraction technologies.

Other recipients include PHNX Materials, Atlantic Alumina, Found Energy and Kunin Technologies. Their inclusion shows that the US is exploring several recovery routes, from industrial waste refining to alumina-linked by-products and emerging mineral processing technologies.

The initiative reflects a broader policy shift. Washington is trying to secure critical materials not only through mining, but also through recycling, residue recovery, by-product extraction and domestic refining.

This approach is logical for gallium. China accounts for nearly all primary gallium production, making the market highly vulnerable to export controls, licensing delays and geopolitical disruption.

Gallium’s strategic value has increased because it supports both commercial and defence technologies. It is used in semiconductors, military systems, optics and high-frequency electronics.

For US manufacturers, secure gallium supply is becoming more urgent as demand grows from data centres, 5G systems, satellites, radar, power electronics and defence platforms.

The Indium Corp project will not solve the US gallium deficit by itself. But it is an important step toward creating a domestic recovery ecosystem for a metal that is difficult to source quickly during supply shocks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Indium Corp grant shows that gallium security will depend on by-product recovery and recycling as much as new mining. For the US, even small domestic gallium projects matter because the current supply chain is too concentrated for a material tied to semiconductors and defence.

Korea Zinc Tennessee Smelter Gains FAST-41 Support for Critical Minerals Refining

Korea Zinc

Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter plans have gained federal permitting support after the US Permitting Council added Project Crucible to FAST-41 coverage. The designation is intended to speed permitting for the proposed smelting and refining facility in Clarksville, Tennessee.

The Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter would produce 12 non-ferrous metals, including zinc, copper, lead, antimony, gallium and germanium. It would also produce semiconductor-grade sulfuric acid, making the project strategically relevant to metals, chemicals and semiconductor supply chains.

The Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter is significant because it would be the first large-scale domestic zinc refinery built in the US since the 1970s. It also reflects Washington’s effort to rebuild domestic refining capacity for critical minerals and reduce dependence on overseas processing.

Project Crucible is planned as a $7.4bn investment. Korea Zinc announced the project in December in a joint venture with the US commerce and defense departments after acquiring the adjacent East Tennessee and Mid Tennessee mining complexes and the Clarksville smelter from Trafigura-owned Nyrstar.

Project Crucible Targets a Multi-Metal Refining Gap

Project Crucible is designed to process 1.1mn t/yr of raw materials and produce 540,000 t/yr of finished products. Korea Zinc expects to source feedstock mainly from the US and other North American sources.

This feedstock strategy matters because the US has mine supply and scrap flows, but lacks enough large-scale refining and separation capacity for several strategic materials. Project Crucible could help close that midstream gap.

The product mix is especially important. Zinc, copper and lead provide scale, while antimony, gallium and germanium add critical minerals value.

Gallium and germanium are strategically sensitive because they are used in semiconductors, fibre optics, infrared systems, defence electronics and advanced manufacturing. Antimony is also important for flame retardants, ammunition, lead alloys and military applications.

The facility’s semiconductor-grade sulfuric acid output adds another layer of industrial importance. High-purity sulfuric acid is a key chemical input for semiconductor manufacturing and advanced electronics.

Korea Zinc plans to base the facility on its Onsan smelter in South Korea. That gives the project an established technical reference point and strengthens its credibility as a complex multi-metal refining platform.

FAST-41 Status Supports US Industrial Supply Security

FAST-41 coverage gives Project Crucible a more coordinated federal permitting path. The Permitting Council also signed a memorandum of understanding with Tennessee to align federal and state permitting efforts.

The US Department of Defense will primarily oversee permitting for the project. That role underlines the national security importance of domestic critical minerals refining.

Korea Zinc expects construction to begin in 2027. Phased operations are scheduled to start in 2029 with zinc, lead and copper production.

Finished products are expected to move to US customers by rail. This gives the project a domestic logistics route and supports the broader goal of building mine-to-market North American supply chains.

The project fits a wider US strategy. Washington is trying to accelerate permitting, use defence-linked financing and support domestic refining capacity for materials used in semiconductors, defence, energy infrastructure and manufacturing.

For Korea Zinc, the project offers a major entry into US critical minerals processing. For the US, it provides a rare chance to add large-scale refining capacity across both base metals and strategic minor metals.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Project Crucible shows that the US critical minerals challenge is increasingly about refining, not only mining. If Korea Zinc can execute the Tennessee smelter on schedule, it could become one of the most important non-Chinese multi-metal refining assets in North America.

US Solar Duties Target Asian Cell Imports as Washington Defends Domestic Manufacturing

US solar

US solar duties on cells and modules from India, Indonesia and Laos will raise the cost of imported photovoltaic products after the Commerce Department issued preliminary antidumping findings. The decision allows customs authorities to begin collecting cash deposits from importers.

US solar duties are part of a broader trade case brought by domestic manufacturers that accuse foreign producers of selling solar products at unfairly low prices. The case covers crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules imported into the US market.

US solar duties now combine antidumping margins with earlier countervailing duties. General preliminary duty rates stand at roughly 234% for India, 140% for Indonesia and 103% for Laos.

The decision comes at a critical point for the US solar supply chain. Washington is trying to expand domestic clean energy manufacturing while reducing dependence on lower-cost Asian imports.

Duties Raise Costs for India, Indonesia and Laos Solar Supply

The preliminary antidumping margins differ by country and company. Indian producers face the steepest margin, at about 123%.

Companies in Indonesia face a lower dumping margin of about 35%, while firms in Laos face around 22%. These rates come on top of countervailing duties announced earlier this year.

The combined duty levels could significantly affect solar module sourcing decisions. Importers may need to reassess contracts, landed costs and supply availability if final rates remain high.

The investigation was triggered by a petition from the Alliance for American Solar Manufacturing and Trade. The group includes US manufacturers such as First Solar and Mission Solar Energy, along with Qcells, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Hanwha.

The coalition argued that companies in the three countries benefited from subsidies and sold solar products into the US at unfairly low prices. It also alleged that Chinese-linked manufacturers operating in Southeast Asia were undercutting American-made products.
The decision strengthens the trade protection around US solar manufacturing. But it may also raise near-term procurement costs for developers that depend on imported cells and modules.

Domestic Manufacturing Push Collides With Deployment Costs

The case highlights the tension inside US clean energy policy. The government wants more domestic solar manufacturing, but the solar deployment market still relies heavily on imported equipment.

Antidumping tariffs are intended to counter imports sold below normal value. Countervailing duties target products that benefit from government subsidies.
Together, these duties can protect domestic producers from price competition that regulators view as unfair. They can also reshape trade flows by pushing buyers toward alternative origins or US-made products.

For manufacturers, the ruling supports investment in domestic capacity. Higher duties can improve the competitiveness of US-made solar products and encourage new factory spending.

For project developers, the impact is more complicated. Higher module costs can pressure project economics, especially where power purchase agreements, tax credits and construction budgets were based on cheaper imported supply.

Commerce is expected to issue final antidumping determinations in early September. Until then, the market will face uncertainty around final rates, supplier exposure and contract pricing.

The broader industrial message is clear. Solar policy is no longer only about renewable energy deployment. It is also about manufacturing location, trade enforcement and supply-chain control.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The new US solar duties show that clean energy deployment and industrial protection are increasingly inseparable. The key question is whether Washington can build domestic solar capacity fast enough to offset higher import costs without slowing project growth.

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

Lynas Rare Earth Revenue Nears Four-Year High as NdPr Output Rises

Lynas Rare Earth

Lynas rare earth revenue reached its highest quarterly level in nearly four years in January-March, supported by stronger rare earth oxide production, higher sales volumes and firmer year-on-year pricing. The Australian producer reported total sales revenue of A$265mn, more than double a year earlier and almost one-third higher than the previous quarter.

Lynas rare earth revenue was underpinned by continued ramp-up across the company’s facilities. The result marks its strongest quarterly sales performance since April-June 2022, showing that operational recovery and strategic offtake demand are beginning to translate into stronger commercial performance.

Lynas produced 3,233t of rare earth oxide during the quarter, up 69% from a year earlier and 36% from the previous quarter. Neodymium-praseodymium oxide output rose to 1,996t, up 32% on the year and 42% on the quarter.

The company also produced its first batch of samarium oxide in March, ahead of its original April target. This matters because samarium supports specialised magnet, defence and high-temperature applications, giving Lynas another product line beyond core NdPr supply.

NdPr Volumes and Price Floors Strengthen Revenue Visibility

Lynas’ sales volumes rose to 3,131t in January-March, up 29% from a year earlier and 33% from the previous quarter. Its average selling price was broadly steady quarter on quarter, but increased by 68% on the year to A$84.60/kg.

The stronger pricing environment supported Lynas rare earth revenue at a time when buyers are increasingly focused on non-China supply. NdPr remains the core feedstock for rare earth permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, industrial motors and defence systems.

The company also secured several major offtake agreements during the quarter. On 16 March, Lynas signed a binding letter of intent with the US Department of Defence covering a $96mn light and heavy rare earth oxide supply deal over more than four years.

That agreement includes a price floor of $110/kg for NdPr. Price floors are strategically important because they protect non-China suppliers from price downturns that could otherwise undermine project economics.

Lynas also expanded its rare earth supply agreement with Japan Australia Rare Earths on 10 March. Under the deal, Jare will buy at least 5,000 t/yr of NdPr oxide at a price floor of $110/kg and 50% of Lynas’ heavy rare earth output until 2038.

Lynas will supply Japanese producers with up to 7,200 t/yr of NdPr oxide and 75% of its heavy rare earth oxide output over the agreement period. This gives Japan a stronger long-term supply channel while giving Lynas more predictable demand.

Heavy Rare Earths and Metal Production Define the Next Growth Phase

Lynas’ stronger quarter comes as western governments and industrial buyers try to build rare earth supply chains outside China. The company already has a strategic position because it combines upstream mining with rare earth processing capability.

The next growth phase will depend on heavy rare earths and downstream metal production. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium, terbium and samarium are critical for high-performance magnets operating under heat, stress and demanding industrial conditions.

The expanded Japanese agreement gives Lynas a commercial route for future heavy rare earth output. This could strengthen supply security for automotive, electronics, robotics and clean-energy manufacturers seeking alternatives to China-dominated rare earth flows.

Lynas is also exploring rare earth metal production outside China, including a potential project in Vietnam with South Korea’s LS Eco Energy. This step is strategically important because rare earth oxides alone do not complete the magnet supply chain.

Oxides must be converted into metals and alloys before magnet makers can produce finished permanent magnets. Building metal-making capability outside China would move Lynas further downstream and improve its role in the ex-China magnet ecosystem.

The company’s quarterly performance therefore reflects more than a revenue rebound. It shows a shift toward long-term offtake, price protection, heavy rare earth supply and downstream integration.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lynas rare earth revenue shows that non-China rare earth suppliers are gaining stronger commercial support from governments and strategic buyers. The key test now is whether Lynas can convert higher oxide output into deeper metal and magnet supply-chain capability outside China.

USA Rare Earth Serra Verde Acquisition Builds Ex-China Magnet Supply Chain

Serra Verde Group

USA Rare Earth Serra Verde acquisition will give the US rare earth producer direct access to one of the most important heavy rare earth projects outside China. The company has agreed to acquire Brazil’s Serra Verde Group for $2.8bn, accelerating its strategy to build a fully integrated mine-to-magnet supply chain.

The deal includes $300mn in cash and 126.85mn USA Rare Earth shares. After completion, USA Rare Earth shareholders will own 66% of the combined company, while Serra Verde shareholders will own 34%.

USA Rare Earth Serra Verde acquisition is strategically important because Serra Verde owns the Pela Ema ionic clay mine in Brazil. The project targets production of 6,400 t/yr of rare earth oxides by the end of 2027, with plans to double output later.

The acquisition gives USA Rare Earth exposure to four key magnet rare earth elements: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. These materials are essential for high-performance permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace, defence systems and advanced industrial motors.

The transaction also strengthens the company’s position in yttrium. Initial Serra Verde output is expected to include 1,534 t/yr of yttrium, a material whose price has risen sharply in the US market and which has strategic applications in ceramics, phosphors, electronics, alloys and defence-related materials.

Serra Verde Adds Heavy Rare Earth Feedstock and Price-Floor Protection

Serra Verde’s Pela Ema project gives USA Rare Earth a near-term rare earth oxide production base. Ionic clay deposits are strategically attractive because they can contain valuable heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium.

Initial planned output of 6,400 t/yr of rare earth oxides is expected to include 164 t/yr of dysprosium and 29 t/yr of terbium. These are small volumes compared with light rare earths, but they carry high strategic value because they improve magnet performance in high-temperature applications.

Dysprosium and terbium are especially important for permanent magnets used in EV traction motors, wind turbine generators, industrial robotics, guided systems and aerospace components. Without these elements, magnets can lose performance under heat and stress.

The deal also includes a 15-year offtake agreement previously signed by Serra Verde with a special-purpose vehicle funded by US government agencies, including the Department of Commerce and Department of Energy. This gives the project a policy-backed commercial structure rather than relying only on spot-market sales.

The offtake agreement includes price floors for neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Floors are set at $110/kg for neodymium and praseodymium, $575/kg for dysprosium and $2,050/kg for terbium.

This structure is important because rare earth projects outside China often struggle when prices fall. Price floors can improve project bankability by protecting revenues and reducing the risk that China-linked supply undercuts new producers during market downturns.

Serra Verde will also share 70% of non-China index prices above the floor, net of separation costs. This gives the project exposure to upside while maintaining downside protection.

The company can also monetise non-offtake elements, including yttrium. That flexibility matters because ionic clay resources can contain multiple valuable rare earths beyond the main magnet feedstocks.

The market timing is favourable for heavy rare earth producers. US yttrium oxide prices have risen sharply, while dysprosium and terbium remain high-value magnet materials. Supply chains outside China remain thin, and buyers are increasingly focused on traceable, geopolitically secure material.

However, the acquisition does not remove execution risk. Serra Verde must still deliver target output, manage ramp-up, maintain product quality and connect mine production with separation, metal and magnet capacity.

Mine-to-Magnet Roll-Up Tests Western Rare Earth Integration

USA Rare Earth Serra Verde acquisition is part of a broader roll-up strategy. The company is building its supply chain through acquisitions rather than waiting for long greenfield development timelines.

USA Rare Earth bought UK-based Less Common Metals for $125mn in November. Less Common Metals gives the company rare earth metal and alloy production capability, a critical midstream step between separated oxides and finished magnets.

The company also acquired Texas Mineral Resources for $73mn in March to secure the Round Top heavy rare earth project in Texas. Round Top adds a US-based heavy rare earth resource to the group’s upstream portfolio.

Together, Serra Verde and Round Top are expected to give the combined company 17,100 t/yr of rare earth oxide mining capacity. Separation capacity will total 13,000 t/yr, while expanded metal and magnet-making capacity is planned at 27,500 t/yr and 10,000 t/yr, respectively.

This integration is the key point. Rare earth supply security cannot be solved by mining alone. Ore or concentrate must be separated, refined, converted into metals, alloyed and manufactured into magnets before it can support industrial customers.

Many western rare earth projects fail to cover the full chain. Some have resources but no separation. Others have separation but no heavy rare earth feedstock. Some can produce oxides but lack metal conversion and magnet-making capacity.

USA Rare Earth argues that the merged company will be the only fully integrated magnet supplier outside China. The claim reflects the company’s attempt to combine upstream heavy rare earth resources, separation, metal production and magnet manufacturing in one platform.

That structure could be attractive to customers in defence, aerospace, automotive, robotics and clean energy. These buyers increasingly need non-China supply options that can meet origin, traceability, qualification and security requirements.

The US government-backed offtake component also shows how rare earth supply chains are changing. Western governments are no longer relying only on free-market procurement. They are using price floors, strategic vehicles, financing support and industrial policy to build alternative supply.

Still, integration brings complexity. USA Rare Earth must combine assets across Brazil, Texas, the UK and planned downstream facilities. It must align mining output, separation chemistry, metal production, magnet capacity, customer qualification and government-backed offtake obligations.

The valuation also raises expectations. A $2.8bn acquisition price gives Serra Verde a large strategic premium. The deal will need to deliver heavy rare earth output, stable separation economics and customer demand to justify that value.

The broader market implication is clear. Heavy rare earth supply is becoming the strategic centre of the magnet market. Neodymium and praseodymium remain essential, but dysprosium and terbium determine performance in the most demanding applications.

China still dominates much of the rare earth separation, metal and magnet chain. The USA Rare Earth-Serra Verde deal is an attempt to create an alternative industrial route at scale.

If successful, the combined company could become a rare western platform with upstream resources, heavy rare earth exposure, midstream conversion and downstream magnet capability. If execution slips, it will show again how difficult it is to recreate China’s integrated rare earth ecosystem outside China.

The Metalnomist Commentary

USA Rare Earth Serra Verde acquisition shows that the rare earth race is shifting from single-asset mining stories to integrated supply-chain control. The deal’s real test will be whether USA Rare Earth can turn Brazilian ionic clay output, US heavy rare earth resources, separation capacity and magnet production into a bankable ex-China magnet platform.

US Gallium Recovery Projects Target Domestic Supply Chain for Defense and Semiconductors

DOE(The US Department of Energy)

US gallium recovery projects will receive $5.4mn in funding from the Department of Energy as Washington tries to rebuild domestic supply for a metal critical to defense systems, semiconductors and advanced electronics. The funding will support five US-based projects under the Technology for Recovery and Advanced Critical-material Extraction – Gallium initiative.

The TRACE-Ga initiative is designed to prototype technologies that can recover gallium from US metal-processing feedstocks. This is important because the US is fully import-reliant for gallium and has not produced the metal domestically since 1987.

US gallium recovery projects are gaining urgency because gallium is essential for compound semiconductor materials, including gallium nitride. These materials support power electronics, radio-frequency devices, radar systems, satellite communications, fast chargers, LEDs and other high-performance technologies.

The funding is modest in scale, but strategically important. It signals that the US is no longer focusing only on mining new critical minerals. It is also trying to recover strategic metals from industrial by-products, waste streams and existing processing networks.

TRACE-Ga Funding Targets Recovery From Existing Feedstocks

The DOE award will support five companies working on gallium recovery technologies. Participants include PHNX Materials, Atlantic Alumina Company, Found Energy, Kunin Technologies and Indium Corporation.

The selection of companies shows how broad the recovery opportunity could become. Gallium is not usually mined as a primary product. It is commonly recovered as a by-product from other industrial processes, especially alumina and zinc-related supply chains.

This makes gallium recovery different from conventional mining. The key challenge is not only finding deposits, but identifying feedstocks where gallium exists in recoverable concentrations and developing technologies that can extract it economically.

Industrial waste refiner PHNX Materials could support recovery from complex waste streams. Atlantic Alumina Company brings relevance to alumina-linked feedstock. Found Energy adds an aluminum-related industrial angle, while Kunin Technologies focuses on mineral by-product recovery. Indium Corporation brings downstream metals refining and manufacturing expertise.

The TRACE-Ga initiative therefore targets the middle of the supply chain. It seeks to bridge the gap between laboratory recovery methods and scalable domestic production.

That gap matters because gallium supply is highly concentrated. China dominates primary gallium production and has used export controls to increase pressure on global buyers. For US defense and semiconductor supply chains, reliance on foreign gallium has become a clear strategic risk.

Domestic recovery could help reduce that exposure. Even if early projects produce limited volumes, they can prove process routes, identify feedstock partners and create the technical base for larger recovery systems.

The use of US metal-processing feedstocks also fits a wider circular materials strategy. Instead of waiting for new mines, the US can extract critical materials from industrial streams already moving through domestic facilities.

This could make recovery faster than new primary production. However, it still requires technical success, feedstock security, refining capability and customer qualification.

Gallium Nitride Demand Raises Strategic Pressure

Gallium’s strategic value has increased because of its role in gallium nitride and other compound semiconductor materials. Gallium nitride is widely used where high power, high frequency, efficiency and heat performance matter.

These applications are highly relevant to defense and advanced electronics. Radar, communications systems, satellite technologies, power conversion equipment and semiconductor devices all rely on materials where gallium can be difficult to substitute.

The DOE’s TRACE-Ga funding also sits alongside a larger notice of funding opportunity of up to $69mn. That programme targets technologies and processes that advance domestic production and refining of critical materials, including gallium and gallium nitride for semiconductor applications.

This shows that Washington is building a layered funding strategy. TRACE-Ga supports recovery prototypes, while broader DOE programmes aim to scale refining, alloying and advanced material production.

For the semiconductor industry, domestic gallium supply is not only a raw material issue. It is connected to wafer production, epitaxy, device manufacturing, packaging and defense procurement. A shortage or export disruption at the gallium stage can move through the entire compound semiconductor chain.

This is why gallium recovery matters even if volumes are small at first. Strategic materials often have low tonnage but high consequence. A reliable domestic supply stream can reduce procurement risk for critical systems.

The challenge will be commercialisation. Recovery from waste and by-products can be technically complex because gallium concentrations may be low and feedstock chemistry can vary. Companies must prove that their processes can recover gallium consistently, meet purity requirements and operate at competitive cost.

The US also needs downstream refining capacity. Recovering gallium-bearing material is not enough if the material cannot be refined into forms suitable for semiconductor and defense applications.

The DOE funding is therefore best understood as an early-stage industrial rebuilding tool. It does not immediately solve US gallium dependence, but it helps create the technologies and partnerships needed to rebuild supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

US gallium recovery projects show that critical mineral security increasingly depends on recovering by-products from existing industrial systems. The strategic test will be whether TRACE-Ga can move beyond prototypes and create reliable domestic feedstock for gallium nitride, defense electronics and semiconductor manufacturing.

Aluminum Dynamics Arizona Cast House Faces New Permit Challenge

Aluminum Dynamic

Aluminum Dynamics Arizona cast house development faces another potential delay after the Center for Biological Diversity petitioned the US Environmental Protection Agency to overturn the final state air permit for the planned facility in Benson, Arizona. The challenge adds fresh uncertainty to a project designed to feed Aluminum Dynamics’ rolling mill in Columbus, Mississippi.

The environmental group argues that the permit issued by the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality violates the federal Clean Air Act. It claims the permit does not adequately monitor air pollution and does not ensure compliance with toxic air pollution limits.

Aluminum Dynamics Arizona cast house construction can continue while the EPA reviews the petition because the permit remains enforceable during the deliberation period. However, the challenge could complicate the project’s timeline if the EPA accepts the petition and requires revisions.

EPA Review Could Affect Start-Up Timing

The EPA has 60 days to accept or reject the petition. If the agency grants the request, ADEQ would have 90 days from the ruling to revise the permit or permit record to meet EPA requirements.

The petition does not immediately stop construction. But the project remains in an early physical stage, with no structures built yet. Benson officials said the company has been carrying out ground-clearing work at the site.

The timing remains uncertain. Aluminum Dynamics, a subsidiary of Steel Dynamics, had previously indicated that it expected the facility to be ready by September or October after ADEQ proposed the final permit in mid-December. But when the company first came to Benson, it told local officials that construction would take at least 18 months.

The planned plant would have 150,000 t/yr of production capacity. It is intended to produce aluminum slab for the company’s downstream rolling operations, supporting beverage-can sheet production at the Columbus, Mississippi, mill.

Local Opposition Highlights Industrial Permitting Risk

Aluminum Dynamics Arizona cast house plans have already faced community resistance. The company moved the project to Benson after earlier opposition in Gila Bend, where residents raised concerns over water use, air pollution and odor.

Similar concerns have emerged in Benson. A local nonprofit, Health Over Wealth Benson, sued the city and Aluminum Dynamics after accusing the planning and zoning commission of exceeding its authority when it approved a conditional-use permit allowing the company to exceed the city’s 30ft building height limit.

That lawsuit was dismissed on 25 March after a Cochise County Superior Court judge found that the complainants lacked standing. However, the group has indicated it plans to appeal and also supported the Center for Biological Diversity’s EPA petition.

The dispute shows that aluminum recycling and cast house projects face more than commercial and technical hurdles. Even facilities tied to circular aluminum supply chains must manage local concerns over emissions, water, odor, traffic and land use.

For the US aluminum market, the project remains strategically relevant. The Benson site is located to draw used beverage can supply from the US west coast and Mexico, giving Aluminum Dynamics a potential feedstock advantage for recycled-content can sheet.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The ADI permit challenge shows that secondary aluminum growth still depends on local environmental acceptance. Recycled aluminum capacity may support lower-carbon supply chains, but permitting risk can still slow projects if communities question emissions, water use or industrial impacts.

Ascend Elements Bankruptcy Exposes Pressure in Battery Recycling Market

Ascend Elements

Ascend Elements bankruptcy filing shows how difficult the battery recycling business has become as electric vehicle adoption slows in the US and Europe. The US battery recycler has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and will use the court-supervised process to restructure liabilities while continuing normal operations.

Ascend Elements bankruptcy comes despite major commercial and government-backed support. The company said it had secured more than $2bn in commercial agreements and a $320mn grant from Poland, but these were not enough to overcome longstanding financial issues and outstanding liabilities.

The filing highlights a broader weakness in the battery recycling sector. Recyclers need steady end-of-life battery and production scrap feedstock, but slower EV growth has limited available material and made it harder to sell recovered products into battery supply chains.

Funding and Offtake Deals Failed to Offset Financial Pressure

Ascend had previously planned to develop cathode active material production in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. However, the company and the US Department of Energy agreed in March 2025 to cancel a $164mn grant for that project.

The company later received a $320mn grant from Poland in May 2025 to build a precursor cathode active material plant. That support showed continued policy interest in battery materials localization, especially in Europe.

Ascend also signed a five-year offtake agreement to supply Trafigura with 15,000t of lithium carbonate from 2027 to 2031. The agreement gave the company a future sales channel, but it did not solve its immediate balance-sheet pressure.

Slower EV Growth Weakens Recycling Economics

Ascend Elements bankruptcy reflects the timing problem facing battery recyclers. Many business models were built around rapid EV growth, rising battery scrap availability and strong demand for recycled lithium, nickel, cobalt and cathode materials.

But slower EV adoption has delayed feedstock growth and reduced market confidence. Without sufficient input material and reliable downstream demand, recyclers can struggle to operate at the scale needed to justify large processing and materials investments.

The pressure is not limited to Ascend. Texas-based recycler Ecobat is selling assets in the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Austria to focus on North America, showing that consolidation and retrenchment are spreading across the sector.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ascend Elements bankruptcy shows that battery recycling is strategically important but commercially unforgiving. The winners will be companies with secured feedstock, disciplined capital spending and customers ready to buy recycled battery materials at scale.

US Critical Materials Funding Targets Recycling, Refining and DLE Technologies

DOE (the Department of Energy)

US critical materials funding is moving deeper into domestic production and refining after the Department of Energy announced up to $69 million for new technologies and processes. The notice of funding opportunity, announced on 7 April, targets critical materials including rare earth elements.

The funding is designed to help move technologies from bench-scale innovation toward commercial deployment. That focus is important because the US critical materials funding gap is often not resource identification, but the ability to scale processing, refining and recovery technologies into reliable industrial supply.

The programme covers three main areas: recycling from manufacturing and end-of-life scrap, refining of gallium, germanium and silicon, and direct lithium extraction alongside critical material recovery from volcanic-hosted geothermal systems.

Recycling and Refining Move Higher on the US Supply Chain Agenda

The first funding area targets recycling from manufacturing scrap and end-of-life scrap. This could support recovery routes for valuable metals already present in electronics, magnets, batteries, industrial components and advanced manufacturing waste streams.

The second area focuses on refining gallium, germanium and silicon. These materials are strategically important for semiconductors, optics, solar technologies, defense systems, data infrastructure and advanced electronics.

US critical materials funding for these metals reflects growing concern over concentrated supply chains. China dominates several critical material processing routes, making domestic refining capability a central issue for industrial resilience and national security.

DLE and Geothermal Systems Add New Resource Pathways

The third topic area covers direct lithium extraction and exploration of critical materials and rare earth elements from volcanic-hosted geothermal systems. This could open new pathways for lithium and mineral recovery beyond conventional mining.

Direct lithium extraction remains strategically important because it may improve recovery efficiency, reduce land use and shorten production timelines compared with traditional brine evaporation. However, commercial scalability remains the decisive test.

The DOE said the $69 million opportunity is part of several programmes totalling nearly $1 billion. These initiatives aim to advance mining, processing and manufacturing technologies across the critical materials supply chain.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US critical materials funding programme shows that Washington is now targeting the weakest links between laboratory success and industrial supply. The key test will be whether these grants create commercial refining and recovery capacity, not only promising pilot projects.