SiGe Capacity Expansion Accelerates as AI Data Centres Shift to Optical Networking

GlobalFoundries

SiGe capacity is becoming a critical bottleneck as artificial intelligence data centres move from copper interconnects toward optical networking. GlobalFoundries is expanding silicon germanium capacity to meet rising demand from customers building high-speed optical connectivity systems.

SiGe capacity at GlobalFoundries’ Vermont fabrication plant is already oversubscribed into 2027. The company said demand has reached an inflection point as AI workloads drive higher bandwidth, power efficiency and data transmission requirements.

SiGe capacity matters because silicon germanium technology supports key components in optical transceivers. These devices allow data centres to move information faster, cleaner and with less energy loss across large computing clusters.

The expansion reflects a wider shift in semiconductor materials. AI infrastructure is no longer only a story about graphics processors and advanced logic chips. It increasingly depends on photonics, optical transceivers and specialty semiconductor materials such as germanium.

Optical Networking Pushes SiGe Into a Strategic Role

AI data centres are increasing compute density and power consumption, forcing operators to rethink how data moves across networks. Copper interconnects face limits in reach, bandwidth density and energy efficiency.

Optical networking addresses those limits. It enables higher-speed data transfer across longer distances while improving system efficiency.

This shift is lifting demand for silicon photonics and SiGe technology. These materials are used in pluggable optical transceivers that convert high-speed electrical signals into optical signals and back again.

GlobalFoundries said SiGe is used in limiting amplifiers, transimpedance amplifiers and laser drivers. These components support signal amplification, conversion and cleaner data transmission inside data centre networks.

Transimpedance amplifiers and drivers are required in most data centre connections. As optical networking deployments grow, unit demand for these components is expected to increase sharply.

Satellite communications are also increasing SiGe usage. However, AI data centre optical networking is now the main growth signal attracting market attention.

Customer Prepayments and Government Support Shape Expansion

GlobalFoundries expects to double silicon photonics revenue in 2026. The company is targeting a silicon photonics revenue run rate above $1bn by the end of 2028 and $2bn in 2030.

GF already operates 300mm and 200mm silicon photonics and SiGe manufacturing facilities in New York and Singapore, with additional capacity in Germany. It also has a major US footprint in Vermont and New York.

The company increased annual wafer capacity to 2.7mn 300mm wafer equivalents in 2025 from 2.2mn in 2020. It also has an installed base of 1.6mn 200mm wafers per year.

GlobalFoundries has previously announced plans to invest more than $12bn in its New York and Vermont sites over the next decade. But future capacity growth will be tied closely to customer demand, prepayments and government financing.

That model is important. Semiconductor capacity expansion is capital-intensive, and customers increasingly need to help secure the supply chains they depend on.

Government grants and tax incentives are also becoming essential. AI, photonics, semiconductors and critical materials are now treated as strategic infrastructure, not only commercial technology.

For materials markets, the signal is clear. Germanium demand could gain support from AI-driven optical networking, especially as silicon photonics and SiGe devices become more important to data centre performance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GlobalFoundries’ SiGe expansion shows that AI supply chains are moving deeper into specialty semiconductor materials. The next bottleneck may not be compute chips alone, but the optical and germanium-linked technologies needed to connect them efficiently.

 

Corning Nvidia Optical Connectivity Partnership Expands US AI Infrastructure Supply Chain

Corning

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity plans will expand US manufacturing capacity for the optical systems needed to support artificial intelligence data centres. Corning will build three new manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and Texas as it targets a tenfold increase in optical connectivity output.

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity investment also includes a more than 50% expansion in Corning’s fibre production. The move reflects rising demand for high-speed data movement across AI infrastructure, where advanced optical links are becoming as important as chips themselves.

Corning Nvidia optical connectivity partnership strengthens the domestic supply chain around Nvidia’s AI computing ecosystem. Nvidia chips require high-performance optical fibre connectivity to move data quickly and at scale across large data centre networks.

The agreement also has a strategic materials angle. The fibre-optics industry is the largest US end-user of germanium, making AI data centre buildout increasingly relevant to minor metals demand.

AI Data Centres Drive Optical Connectivity Demand

AI workloads require massive data movement between chips, servers and storage systems. As computing clusters grow, copper-based connections face performance, distance and energy-efficiency limits in some high-speed applications.

Optical connectivity helps solve that problem. It allows data to move faster and across longer distances, supporting the scale required by advanced AI data centres.

Corning’s planned facilities in North Carolina and Texas will increase domestic capacity for these optical systems. That is important because AI infrastructure is becoming a national industrial priority, not only a technology market.

For Nvidia, the partnership supports the physical network behind its chips. AI accelerators create value only when data can move efficiently through the system.

For Corning, the deal gives stronger exposure to one of the fastest-growing infrastructure markets. Optical fibre, cable assemblies and connectivity products are becoming critical components in the AI supply chain.

Germanium Demand Links AI Growth to Critical Materials

The partnership also connects AI infrastructure to germanium demand. Germanium is used in optical fibre production, making fibre expansion relevant to critical minerals and specialty materials markets.

This matters because germanium supply is already strategically sensitive. It is used in fibre optics, infrared systems, semiconductors, defence electronics and solar applications.

If AI data centre construction accelerates, optical fibre demand could strengthen further. That would increase attention on germanium availability, recycling, refining and origin security.

The transaction also includes a financial component. Nvidia has the right to purchase up to 15mn shares of Corning stock at a fixed price of $180/share, as well as a pre-funded warrant to purchase up to 3mn shares for a total price of $500mn.

That structure shows how strategic customers are moving closer to upstream and midstream suppliers. Nvidia is not only buying components. It is helping secure the manufacturing base needed for future AI infrastructure.

For the US, the partnership supports domestic manufacturing around semiconductors, photonics and critical materials. It also reinforces the wider shift toward regionalised supply chains for high-value technology infrastructure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Corning-Nvidia partnership shows that AI supply chains are moving beyond chips into optical fibre, photonics and specialty materials. Germanium demand could become a hidden beneficiary as data centres require faster and more resilient optical connectivity.

Yunnan Germanium Recycling Project Targets Feedstock Security for Strategic Metal Supply

Germanium Scrap

Yunnan Germanium recycling project plans will strengthen China’s largest germanium producer’s control over feedstock as demand from downstream high-end manufacturing remains strategically important. The company plans to invest 200.66mn yuan in a fully automated facility to process germanium-bearing waste slag.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project will have capacity to process 150,000 t/yr of germanium-bearing waste slag. The company has not disclosed the construction timetable or launch date.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project is designed to improve germanium resource utilisation and support raw material supply for downstream deep-processing products. This matters because germanium is a strategic minor metal used in defence, infrared optics, fibre optics, semiconductors and high-performance electronics.

The project also reflects a broader industry shift. Producers of critical and minor metals are increasingly trying to secure secondary feedstock as primary supply becomes more politically controlled and price volatility rises.

Recycling Capacity Reduces Dependence on External Raw Materials

Yunnan Germanium said partial reliance on externally sourced raw materials exposes it to germanium price volatility. Prices are influenced by global supply-demand conditions and demand from high-end manufacturing sectors.

The new recycling line should help reduce that exposure. By processing waste slag, the company can recover more germanium units from secondary material and support its downstream production chain.

This is strategically important because Yunnan Germanium already consumes significant germanium internally. In 2025, the company produced 29.7t of raw-material-grade germanium metal equivalent for external sales, excluding 68.95t used for internal consumption and third-party processing.

That internal use shows how the company is moving more material into higher-value products rather than selling all output into the merchant market. Recycling can strengthen that model by expanding available feedstock.

Yunnan Germanium also plans to diversify external suppliers of germanium-bearing waste slag. It will seek medium- to long-term supply agreements with quality provisions and emergency replenishment clauses.

The company also plans to build a raw material inventory reserve and a price-alert mechanism. It will adjust production and inventory strategies when germanium prices move by more than 10%.

These measures show a more disciplined approach to minor-metal procurement. In markets such as germanium, small disruptions can produce large price movements because supply is concentrated and liquidity is limited.

Export Controls Increase Strategic Value of Germanium Recovery

Germanium has become more strategically sensitive since China placed the metal under strict dual-use export controls in September 2023. China accounts for an estimated 60-70% of global germanium capacity.

This gives Chinese producers significant influence over global availability. It also makes domestic resource recovery more valuable, especially when export controls, defence demand and semiconductor-related applications increase policy attention.

Yunnan Germanium’s revenue rose to 1.07bn yuan in 2025 from 767mn yuan in 2024. Higher prices for key products, including raw-material-grade germanium, supported the increase despite lower external raw metal output.

The company’s recycling investment therefore supports both security and profitability. More stable feedstock access can improve operating flexibility when prices rise or external raw material supply tightens.

For downstream customers, the project may improve Yunnan Germanium’s ability to supply deeper-processed products. These include materials linked to optics, fibre communication, photovoltaics, infrared systems and compound semiconductors.

The broader market implication is clear. Germanium supply security will depend not only on mine output or primary production, but also on recycling, waste recovery, inventory control and long-term feedstock agreements.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Yunnan Germanium’s recycling plan shows that strategic minor metals are moving toward closed-loop resource control. In germanium, the advantage will belong to producers that can combine primary supply, secondary recovery and downstream processing under one feedstock strategy.

Korea Zinc Tennessee Smelter Gains FAST-41 Support for Critical Minerals Refining

Korea Zinc

Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter plans have gained federal permitting support after the US Permitting Council added Project Crucible to FAST-41 coverage. The designation is intended to speed permitting for the proposed smelting and refining facility in Clarksville, Tennessee.

The Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter would produce 12 non-ferrous metals, including zinc, copper, lead, antimony, gallium and germanium. It would also produce semiconductor-grade sulfuric acid, making the project strategically relevant to metals, chemicals and semiconductor supply chains.

The Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter is significant because it would be the first large-scale domestic zinc refinery built in the US since the 1970s. It also reflects Washington’s effort to rebuild domestic refining capacity for critical minerals and reduce dependence on overseas processing.

Project Crucible is planned as a $7.4bn investment. Korea Zinc announced the project in December in a joint venture with the US commerce and defense departments after acquiring the adjacent East Tennessee and Mid Tennessee mining complexes and the Clarksville smelter from Trafigura-owned Nyrstar.

Project Crucible Targets a Multi-Metal Refining Gap

Project Crucible is designed to process 1.1mn t/yr of raw materials and produce 540,000 t/yr of finished products. Korea Zinc expects to source feedstock mainly from the US and other North American sources.

This feedstock strategy matters because the US has mine supply and scrap flows, but lacks enough large-scale refining and separation capacity for several strategic materials. Project Crucible could help close that midstream gap.

The product mix is especially important. Zinc, copper and lead provide scale, while antimony, gallium and germanium add critical minerals value.

Gallium and germanium are strategically sensitive because they are used in semiconductors, fibre optics, infrared systems, defence electronics and advanced manufacturing. Antimony is also important for flame retardants, ammunition, lead alloys and military applications.

The facility’s semiconductor-grade sulfuric acid output adds another layer of industrial importance. High-purity sulfuric acid is a key chemical input for semiconductor manufacturing and advanced electronics.

Korea Zinc plans to base the facility on its Onsan smelter in South Korea. That gives the project an established technical reference point and strengthens its credibility as a complex multi-metal refining platform.

FAST-41 Status Supports US Industrial Supply Security

FAST-41 coverage gives Project Crucible a more coordinated federal permitting path. The Permitting Council also signed a memorandum of understanding with Tennessee to align federal and state permitting efforts.

The US Department of Defense will primarily oversee permitting for the project. That role underlines the national security importance of domestic critical minerals refining.

Korea Zinc expects construction to begin in 2027. Phased operations are scheduled to start in 2029 with zinc, lead and copper production.

Finished products are expected to move to US customers by rail. This gives the project a domestic logistics route and supports the broader goal of building mine-to-market North American supply chains.

The project fits a wider US strategy. Washington is trying to accelerate permitting, use defence-linked financing and support domestic refining capacity for materials used in semiconductors, defence, energy infrastructure and manufacturing.

For Korea Zinc, the project offers a major entry into US critical minerals processing. For the US, it provides a rare chance to add large-scale refining capacity across both base metals and strategic minor metals.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Project Crucible shows that the US critical minerals challenge is increasingly about refining, not only mining. If Korea Zinc can execute the Tennessee smelter on schedule, it could become one of the most important non-Chinese multi-metal refining assets in North America.

Gold Investor Base Shift Signals Broader Move Into Hard Assets

Gold

Gold investor base expansion is becoming a wider signal for how capital may move across physical assets, including industrial metals. Speakers at the FT Commodities Summit in Lausanne said central bank buying, tokenised products and tighter traceability standards are changing the structure of the gold market.

Gold investor base growth is no longer driven only by traditional bullion buyers. Central banks, institutional investors and digital channels are bringing new liquidity, broader access and stronger strategic demand into the market.

Gold investor base changes also matter beyond precious metals. They show that investors are increasingly looking for hard assets that can act as stores of value in a fragmented geopolitical and monetary environment.

The LBMA official gold price AM fell to $4,679.80/oz on 24 April from a record $5,501.70/oz on 29 January. But speakers said the pullback does not weaken the structural case for gold as a long-term diversifier.

Central Banks and Tokenised Products Broaden Demand

Central bank buying remains the clearest signal behind gold’s structural shift. Reserve managers are becoming more sensitive to concentration risk in US dollar assets as geopolitical alliances and monetary conditions change.

Gold offers central banks an asset without direct credit risk. It also supports reserve diversification at a time when inflation, debt debasement and currency risk are shaping long-term allocation decisions.

This trend is especially visible in emerging markets. Adding domestically sourced gold to reserves can support national balance sheets while reducing dependence on foreign reserve assets.

New financial channels are also expanding access. Tokenised gold and gold-backed digital products are attracting investors who may not have entered traditional bullion markets.

Stablecoin issuer Tether has emerged as a significant physical buyer over the past 18 months, adding a new category of demand alongside central banks and institutional investors.

This matters because easier access can change market behaviour. When physical gold becomes more liquid through digital channels, its investor base can expand faster than traditional vault, bullion and exchange-traded routes would allow.

For industrial metals, the signal is important. Copper, aluminium, rare earths, gallium, germanium and other strategic materials are also becoming policy-linked assets as governments and investors focus on supply security.

Gold may therefore offer an early example of how geopolitical risk, capital flows and physical asset ownership can reinforce one another.

Traceability Becomes Essential as Physical Demand Rises

Broader gold market participation also raises the importance of standards. Higher prices can make illicit flows more attractive and increase the risk of laundering through recycled or poorly documented material.

This creates pressure for stronger traceability, refining standards and chain-of-custody systems. Buyers and regulators increasingly want to know where metal comes from, how it was produced and whether it meets responsible sourcing requirements.

The market is moving from gold of unknown origin toward gold of known origin. That transition will require transparency, technology and stricter documentation across refining and recycling routes.

The issue is especially important for artisanal and small-scale mining supply. These flows can be difficult to document, but they remain important in many producing regions.

The same traceability logic is moving into industrial metals. Strategic stockpiling, defence procurement, battery regulations and critical minerals policies are making origin and documentation more important across supply chains.

For metals markets, this means physical assets are becoming more valuable, but also more scrutinised. Capital wants exposure to hard assets, while buyers and regulators want cleaner provenance.

That combination could reshape commodity markets. The winners will be suppliers that can provide not only material, but also verified origin, reliable custody and trusted compliance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Gold’s changing investor base shows that hard assets are becoming strategic financial instruments again. For industrial metals, the lesson is clear: capital will flow toward physical scarcity, but only trusted and traceable supply will command the strongest premium.

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan Targets Supply Chain Security

US EU

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan marks a deeper transatlantic effort to secure strategic raw materials as China export controls and global protectionism reshape industrial supply chains. The US and EU have signed the plan to diversify sourcing, strengthen resilience and coordinate responses to mineral supply disruptions.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan is significant because it moves beyond general diplomatic language. It allows both sides to use trade and market tools, including border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies to close price gaps and offtake agreements.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan also includes stockpile cooperation, technical coordination, regulatory alignment and standards for mining, processing and recycling. This shows that Washington and Brussels are now treating critical minerals as industrial security assets, not only commodity inputs.

Price Floors and Offtake Tools Signal Stronger Market Intervention

The plan highlights a major shift in western raw materials policy. The US and EU are preparing to coordinate tools that can make non-China supply more commercially viable.

Border-adjusted price floors could help protect strategic mineral projects from low-cost competition. This matters because many western projects struggle to compete against established Chinese processing chains when prices fall.

Subsidies to address price gaps serve the same purpose. They can help bridge the cost difference between secure, traceable supply and cheaper material from dominant incumbent producers.

Offtake agreements are also central. Long-term purchase commitments can give miners, refiners and recyclers the revenue visibility needed to finance new capacity.

This is especially important for rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and other strategic materials. Many of these markets are small, volatile or heavily concentrated in processing.

The plan also points to standards-based markets. This could support supply chains where environmental, labour, traceability and security standards become part of pricing.

For suppliers, the message is clear. Western buyers may increasingly pay for origin, compliance and resilience, not only the lowest spot price.

Transatlantic Coordination Raises Pressure on China-Linked Supply Chains

The plan will be implemented by the office of the US trade representative and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for trade and economic security. That structure places critical minerals directly inside trade and economic security policy.

The US has already moved aggressively in critical minerals. It has used the Defense Production Act, supported price floors and offtake agreements, and invested in overseas mineral assets to reduce reliance on China.

The EU has historically been more cautious about direct market intervention. However, its position is changing as supply risks increase and European manufacturers face tighter access to strategic raw materials.

Earlier this month, the European Commission launched a critical raw materials platform to match EU buyers with suppliers and aggregate demand. The new US-EU action plan builds on that direction and gives Europe a broader external coordination channel.

Rapid response mechanisms are also important. Export controls, shipping disruption, sanctions or sudden shortages can quickly affect defence, semiconductors, batteries, magnets, aerospace and clean energy manufacturing.

Stockpile cooperation could provide a temporary buffer. But the larger strategic goal is to build durable supply, processing and recycling capacity across allied economies.

The plan therefore strengthens the policy architecture for western mineral security. It also raises the likelihood that future raw material trade will be shaped by origin rules, price support, industrial standards and government-backed purchasing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-US plan shows that critical minerals policy is moving from risk awareness to market design. The decisive question is whether price floors, offtakes and subsidies can create real processing capacity before the next supply shock hits.

China EU Dual-Use Export Controls Raise Rare Earth Supply Risk for Europe

China EU

China EU dual-use export controls have escalated after Beijing added seven military-related European entities to its export control list. The move signals a sharper trade dispute between China and the EU and could increase uncertainty around rare earths and critical metals supply to Europe.

China EU dual-use export controls prohibit domestic exporters from supplying listed entities with controlled dual-use goods, technologies and services. Overseas organisations and individuals are also barred from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to those entities.

China EU dual-use export controls are significant because rare earths, tungsten, antimony, germanium and gallium have all gained stronger military and strategic relevance. Many of these materials are already covered by China’s dual-use export control framework.

The targeted entities include defence, aerospace and military-linked companies in Europe. Beijing said the companies had engaged in arms sales to Taiwan or had links with Taiwan-related activity.

Rare Earths and Critical Metals Become Trade Policy Tools

China’s decision marks the first time Beijing has imposed dual-use export restrictions specifically targeting EU entities. It shows that critical materials policy is increasingly being used as a geopolitical instrument.

The move follows growing friction between China and the EU, including disputes around cybersecurity rules and alleged discriminatory treatment of Chinese companies. Beijing has warned that it could take broader countermeasures if Chinese firms continue to face restrictions.

This matters for Europe because the region remains a major buyer of Chinese rare earths and critical minerals. The Netherlands, Italy, France and Spain all received rare earth shipments from China in the first quarter.

Rare earths are essential for permanent magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace components and precision electronics. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are especially important for high-performance magnets used in demanding operating environments.

Other controlled critical metals also carry strategic weight. Tungsten is used in hard metals, defence systems and high-temperature applications. Antimony supports flame retardants, ammunition and alloys. Germanium and gallium are critical for semiconductors, optics, satellites and power electronics.

China’s use of export controls has become more systematic. Beijing has already tightened critical minerals exports to Japan this year, which disrupted shipments of dysprosium and terbium and forced buyers to seek alternative supply.

Europe Faces Higher Security Premiums for Heavy Rare Earths

Europe’s immediate risk is not a full loss of Chinese supply. The more likely impact is higher compliance risk, licensing uncertainty and greater pressure on buyers that need controlled materials for defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

This could widen the security premium for non-China rare earths and minor metals. Buyers without reliable export licences may need to pay more for material available in the Atlantic market.

Heavy rare earth prices outside China have already surged because of tight availability and stronger Japanese buying. Yttrium oxide prices in Europe have climbed sharply this year, reflecting the scarcity of prompt non-China supply.

If EU-China tensions continue, European buyers may accelerate efforts to diversify supply. That could benefit projects in Australia, Brazil, Estonia, the US and other jurisdictions trying to build rare earth separation, metal-making and magnet capacity outside China.

However, diversification will not be quick. Rare earth supply chains require mining, separation, refining, metal conversion, alloying and magnet manufacturing. Each stage needs qualification, capital and technical expertise.

For European manufacturers, the policy signal is clear. Critical metals procurement can no longer rely only on price and delivery time. Buyers must now evaluate origin risk, licensing exposure, dual-use classification and strategic inventory needs.

The broader market implication is that China’s critical minerals controls are becoming a routine part of trade policy. Europe must now treat rare earths and minor metals as supply-chain security issues, not just raw material inputs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s latest export control move shows that rare earths and minor metals are becoming geopolitical leverage points. Europe’s challenge is no longer just finding alternative supply, but building a complete industrial chain that can survive licensing shocks.

Teck Copper Production Rises as All Four Mines Lift First-Quarter Output

Teck

Teck copper production rose sharply in the first quarter as all four of the Canadian miner’s copper operations delivered higher output. The company produced 140,000t of copper in January-March, up 32% from a year earlier.

Teck copper production growth was broad-based, with gains from Quebrada Blanca, Highland Valley, Antamina and Carmen de Andacollo. The result strengthens Teck’s position in a market increasingly focused on copper supply security for grids, electrification and industrial infrastructure.

Teck copper production remains on track with the company’s 2026 guidance of 455,000-530,000t. The first-quarter performance gives Teck a strong start to the year, despite planned maintenance at Quebrada Blanca and mixed recovery performance at some assets.

The stronger copper result also supported earnings. Teck reported first-quarter profit of C$809mn, up from C$313mn a year earlier.

Quebrada Blanca and Highland Valley Drive Copper Growth

Quebrada Blanca produced 55,500t of copper in the first quarter, up 31% from a year earlier. The increase came despite a planned maintenance shutdown early in the period.

Teck is implementing an action plan at Quebrada Blanca this year to improve production. The mine remains central to the company’s copper growth profile in Chile.

Highland Valley in Canada also delivered a strong quarter. Copper output rose by 36% to 40,200t, mainly because of higher grades and stronger mill throughput.

Lower recovery rates partly offset the improvement at Highland Valley. Still, the mine’s performance shows how grade and throughput improvements can quickly lift output when processing capacity is available.

Antamina in Peru also contributed to the copper increase. The mine, jointly owned by Teck, BHP, Glencore and Mitsubishi, produced 135,000t of copper, up 42%.

Carmen de Andacollo in Chile produced 13,900t, up 7% from a year earlier. Higher copper grades and stronger recovery rates supported the increase.

The result highlights the value of portfolio diversification. Teck’s copper growth did not depend on one asset alone, reducing the operational risk of isolated maintenance or recovery issues.

Zinc Weakness Offsets Some Base Metals Strength

Teck’s zinc performance was weaker than copper. Total zinc-in-concentrate production fell by 12% to 120,300t, reflecting planned activity at Red Dog and Antamina.

Zinc sales fell more sharply, dropping by 35% to 69,700t. This reduced the contribution from Teck’s zinc concentrate business during the quarter.

However, refined zinc output at Trail in British Columbia rose by 27% to 73,800t. The Trail operation remains important because it connects Teck’s mining output with downstream refined metal and by-product production.

By-product output at Trail, including silver and germanium, was steady on the year. Germanium remains strategically important because of its use in fibre optics, infrared systems, semiconductors and defence-related applications.

Teck is working with the Canadian government to explore options to increase germanium production. This could strengthen Canada’s role in critical minerals supply, especially as western buyers seek more non-Chinese sources of minor metals.

The Middle East conflict is not expected to significantly disrupt Teck’s fuel supply. However, the company warned that higher diesel costs could affect its Chilean operations, where fuel must be imported.

This cost risk matters for copper miners. Even when production is strong, fuel, reagents, logistics and power costs can influence margins and project economics.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Teck’s first-quarter copper growth shows the strategic value of diversified mine exposure across Canada, Chile and Peru. The next focus will be whether Quebrada Blanca’s action plan can convert early momentum into sustained copper growth while zinc and diesel cost pressures remain manageable.

Yunnan Germanium Output Falls as Downstream Wafer Demand Absorbs Metal

Germanium

Yunnan Germanium output of raw material-grade germanium available for external sales fell in 2025 as the company redirected more metal into internal downstream production. The shift reflects stronger demand from photovoltaic wafers, optical fibre materials and compound semiconductor products.

Yunnan Germanium output for external raw material-grade germanium sales fell by 13% to 29.7t metal equivalent. The figure excludes 68.95t used for internal consumption and third-party processing.

Yunnan Germanium output therefore signals a change in material allocation rather than simple production weakness. More germanium units are being retained inside the company’s higher-value product chain instead of being sold as raw material.

Revenue rose by 38% to 1.07bn yuan, supported by higher prices for raw germanium, optical fibre materials, PV germanium products, infrared products and semiconductor products.

PV and Optical Fibre Demand Pull Germanium Into Internal Processing

Yunnan Germanium nearly doubled production of 4-6 inch PV-grade germanium wafers in 2025. Output rose to 909,000 pieces from 491,400 pieces a year earlier.

This growth is strategically important because germanium wafers serve high-efficiency photovoltaic applications. Stronger wafer output means more raw germanium is being converted into higher-value products rather than sold into the merchant market.

Optical fibre materials also expanded. Output of optical fibre-grade germanium tetrachloride rose to 39.8t from 27t, showing stronger demand from communications infrastructure and optical transmission markets.

Infrared-grade germanium raw material output fell by 28% to 4.77t metal equivalent. However, production of infrared lenses and optical systems rose sharply to 4,717 sets from 1,828 sets.

That mix shows deeper downstream processing. The company reduced some raw infrared material output but increased finished optical systems, capturing more value further along the chain.

For germanium buyers, the key issue is external availability. When China’s largest germanium producer consumes more material internally, less raw metal is available for third-party customers.

Indium Phosphide Expansion Strengthens Compound Semiconductor Push

Yunnan Germanium also increased indium phosphide wafer output in 2025. Production of 2-4 inch InP wafers rose by 55% to 100,100 pieces.

In contrast, gallium arsenide wafer production declined by 13% to 76,300 pieces. This shows a shift in compound semiconductor emphasis toward InP, where demand is rising from advanced optical and semiconductor applications.

The company plans to keep increasing PV-grade germanium wafer and indium phosphide wafer output in 2026. It also plans to reduce infrared product output.

Yunnan Germanium targets 73t metal equivalent of raw material-grade germanium products in 2026, including internal use and third-party processing. It also plans to produce 1.45mn pieces of 4-6 inch equivalent PV-grade wafers and 180,000 pieces of 2-6 inch InP wafers.

The company also plans to produce 35t of optical fibre-grade germanium tetrachloride, 80,000 pieces of 3-6 inch GaAs wafers, 3t of infrared-grade germanium raw materials and 8,000 sets of infrared lenses and optical systems.

The planned 188.56mn yuan investment to expand high-quality InP single-crystal wafer capacity reinforces this strategy. Yunnan Germanium is moving from raw germanium supply toward integrated semiconductor and photonics material production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Yunnan Germanium’s lower external metal output should not be read as weak demand. It shows that strategic germanium producers are capturing more value internally, tightening merchant supply while expanding into PV, optical fibre and InP wafer markets.

Mercuria Metals Project Financing Push Deepens Critical Minerals Strategy

Mercuria Metals

Mercuria metals project financing is set to increase sharply this year as the Swiss energy trader expands its role in copper, cobalt and other critical minerals. Chief executive Marco Dunand said the company will substantially increase pre-financing for mining projects, working more closely with producers and governments.

Mercuria metals project financing has become a major growth pillar since the company created its metals division in 2023. The unit began with copper in Zambia before expanding into cobalt and other strategic materials.

Mercuria metals project financing now supports a business that accounts for nearly 20% of group turnover. The company has already deployed almost $2bn, mainly in copper deals, and sees further growth in its project pipeline.

The strategy reflects a wider shift in commodity trading. Traders are no longer only moving material between buyers and sellers. They are increasingly financing production, securing offtake and shaping strategic mineral flows before material reaches the market.

Copper and Critical Minerals Move Trading Closer to Mining

Mercuria’s metals expansion started with copper because the market faces structural supply pressure. Copper demand is rising from grids, electrification, data centres, renewable energy and industrial policy, while new mine supply remains difficult to develop.

Pre-financing gives Mercuria earlier access to material. By front-loading capital, the company can support producers while securing commercial positions in future supply.

This model is becoming more important as mining projects require larger capital commitments. Producers need liquidity for development, operations and expansion. Traders that can provide capital can gain offtake, marketing rights and long-term supply relationships.

Mercuria is also moving into cobalt and other critical minerals. These markets are smaller than copper but strategically important for batteries, superalloys, semiconductors, defence systems and advanced manufacturing.

The company’s partnership with Gecamines in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows this direction. Mercuria is working with the state miner to market critical minerals such as gallium and germanium from the Kipushi mine.

Gallium and germanium are high-value minor metals with concentrated supply chains and growing strategic importance. Their inclusion shows that Mercuria is targeting not only bulk base metals, but also thinly traded materials where supply security commands a premium.

Government Partnerships Become Strategic Supply Tools

Mercuria is expanding joint ventures with governments, including partnerships in Zambia and the DRC. This matters because critical minerals supply is increasingly shaped by state policy, not only commercial contracting.

Resource-rich governments want more value from minerals. Buyers want secure supply. Traders can sit between them by providing financing, logistics, marketing and access to global customers.

The model also fits a period of rising geopolitical competition. Western governments and manufacturers are looking for alternatives to China-linked supply chains, especially in copper, cobalt, gallium, germanium and other strategic materials.

Mercuria plans to raise at least $200mn in new financing in Asia to support liquidity. The company said sovereign firms, private equity and banks have strong appetite to finance metals projects.

The financing requirement highlights one important trade-off. Metals project financing can create stronger strategic positions, but it is more cash-intensive than traditional trading. It requires balance-sheet capacity, risk management and long-term confidence in mineral demand.

Mercuria said it does not expect regulatory constraints to limit expansion. That confidence suggests the company sees strong institutional demand for capital-backed critical minerals strategies.

For metals markets, the implications are significant. Trading houses with capital can influence which projects advance, which producers receive liquidity and where future metal flows are directed.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mercuria’s strategy shows that critical minerals trading is becoming a financing business. The winners will be firms that can combine capital, offtake, government relationships and supply-chain control before the market tightens further.

Minor Metals Security Premium Becomes Cost of Supply Chain Resilience

Minor Metals

Minor metals security premium is becoming a structural cost for western buyers as China’s dominance in processing leaves supply chains exposed to disruption. Speakers at the FT Commodities Global Summit in Lausanne said consumers must pay more for non-Chinese minor metals if they want resilient supply.

The argument is no longer theoretical. Chinese export controls have reduced available supply in western markets and widened the price gap between China and Europe. Materials that once traded closely across regions now reflect very different fundamentals.

Minor metals security premium is most visible in dual-use products subject to Chinese export controls. European gallium prices are more than double Chinese export levels, while Rotterdam germanium prices are also close to twice Chinese fob values.

This premium is not only a temporary reaction to trade disruption. Speakers argued that higher western prices must persist even if export controls are eased, because alternative processing capacity outside China needs long-term economic support.

China Export Controls Break Traditional Price Links

China’s concentration in minor metals processing has created a major vulnerability for western manufacturers. Many critical materials are produced as by-products, refined in small volumes and traded through narrow supply chains.

That structure makes the market highly sensitive to policy changes. When China restricts exports, buyers in Europe and the US cannot easily replace supply because there are few alternative processors with qualified material.

The result is a geographic price split. European warehouse prices once tracked Chinese markets closely, but that relationship no longer reflects real availability outside China. Chinese prices now represent domestic conditions, while western prices reflect scarcity, logistics risk and origin security.

Gallium and germanium show this most clearly. Both metals are essential for semiconductors, optics, power electronics, defence systems, satellite communications and advanced manufacturing. Both are also heavily exposed to Chinese processing and export licensing.

For western buyers, the question is no longer whether Chinese prices look cheaper. The real question is whether material can be accessed, shipped, qualified and used without exposing factories to sudden supply interruptions.

That changes procurement behaviour. Buyers are increasingly willing to pay a security premium for material with reliable origin, clearer documentation and lower exposure to export restrictions.

The same logic is spreading to other by-product metals. Indium, bismuth and antimony are gaining strategic attention because they support electronics, flame retardants, solders, alloys, photovoltaics, semiconductors and defence-related applications.

These metals are often small in volume but large in industrial consequence. A missing input can stop production even if the dollar value of the metal is tiny compared with the final product.

This is why western buyers are treating minor metals differently from ordinary commodities. They are paying for continuity, not only material.

Supply Security Needs Processing Capacity and Long-Term Demand

Minor metals security premium must support investment, not only emergency buying. If higher prices disappear as soon as immediate disruption fades, new processing projects outside China will struggle to survive.

This is the key industrial challenge. Building non-Chinese supply requires refining capacity, technical know-how, environmental permitting, qualified output and customer commitments. These cannot be created quickly during a crisis.

A short-term price spike can help existing suppliers, but it does not guarantee new capacity. Investors need confidence that buyers will continue paying for secure supply after the market stabilises.

This is where security premiums differ from green premiums. Green premiums have often been debated because buyers could delay paying more for lower-carbon materials. But critical materials supply disruption leaves fewer choices.

If rare earths, gallium, germanium or antimony are unavailable, manufacturers may face production stoppages. In that situation, the premium becomes part of operating cost rather than a voluntary sustainability expense.

Governments can help bridge this gap through stockpiles, offtake support, price floors, procurement rules and financing tools. But industry also needs to accept that resilient supply chains cost more than the lowest-price global model.

For miners, by-product metals can improve project economics. Recovering indium, bismuth, antimony, gallium or germanium can add revenue streams to larger operations and strengthen the business case for complex ore bodies.

For refiners, sustained premiums can justify investment in separation and purification capacity. For manufacturers, long-term contracts can reduce the risk of sudden shortages and forced spot-market buying.

The larger strategic point is clear. Western supply chains cannot become more secure while continuing to benchmark only against Chinese domestic prices. Security, traceability and supply reliability require a different pricing model.

Minor metals security premium therefore represents a shift in how critical materials are valued. Buyers are beginning to price the risk of disruption, not just the cost of production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The security premium for minor metals is the market’s way of pricing geopolitical risk into industrial supply. Western buyers cannot build resilient supply chains while demanding Chinese-cost material from non-Chinese sources.

DRC Cobalt Stockpile Plan Adds New Uncertainty to Export Quota System

DRC Cobalt

DRC cobalt stockpile plans could add another layer of uncertainty to a market already adjusting to the country’s export quota system. The Democratic Republic of Congo plans to create a state-controlled strategic reserve for cobalt, coltan and germanium, with cobalt expected to be the main focus because of its scale and strategic role.

The DRC cobalt stockpile will be managed by state-controlled mining company Gecamines and regulator Arecoms. The government said the reserve is intended to stabilise markets and strengthen national control over key minerals.

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan comes as the country tries to raise cobalt hydroxide exports toward a 7,500 t/month quota. That quota was introduced in October after an eight-month export ban, but exports have so far recovered only gradually.

This creates a more complicated operating environment for producers, traders and battery materials buyers. Cobalt units may now face two competing channels: export clearance under the quota system or diversion into state-controlled storage.

Export Quota Ramp-Up Remains Slow and Unclear

The DRC is trying to increase cobalt exports after months of disruption, but the quota system is still moving slowly. Around 7,000t of cobalt-contained material was reportedly cleared for export last month, although it remains unclear whether those volumes have crossed the border.

January exports were much lower. Around 1,000t of cobalt contained in hydroxide was exported during the month, far below the 7,500 t/month quota level.

An estimated 3,000t of cobalt-contained material also remains held inside the country awaiting decisions on allocation. This shows that administrative approval, quota allocation and physical logistics remain key constraints.

The new stockpile could add friction to this system. Producers may need to determine which material should be submitted for export clearance and which material may be directed into reserve storage.

This matters because cobalt hydroxide supply from the DRC is critical for global battery and superalloy supply chains. The country remains the dominant source of cobalt units for refiners, precursor makers, cathode producers and high-performance alloy manufacturers.

Any delay in DRC cobalt exports can affect feedstock availability outside the country. It can also influence cobalt hydroxide payables, refined cobalt prices and procurement strategies for downstream users.

The DRC government’s objective is clear. It wants more control over strategic minerals and greater influence over market flows. But the transition from export ban to quota system and now strategic stockpile introduces uncertainty for commercial counterparties.

For producers, the main issue is predictability. Mine operators and processors need to know how much material can be exported, how quickly clearances will be issued and whether stockpile obligations will reduce available sales volumes.

For traders, the uncertainty affects logistics and financing. Material held inside the country can create delays in shipping, documentation, payment cycles and customer delivery schedules.

For buyers, the risk is supply disruption. Cobalt consumers may need to hold larger inventories or diversify supply where possible, although alternative large-scale sources remain limited.

Stockpile Mechanics Could Decide Market Impact

The DRC government has not yet clarified how the strategic reserve will operate. The decree does not explain how stockpiled cobalt will be purchased, paid for or released back into the market.

This lack of detail is the most important issue for market participants. A strategic reserve can stabilise supply if it is transparent and predictable. It can also disrupt trade if it removes material from the market without clear pricing, payment and release rules.

Producers do not yet know whether cobalt earmarked for the reserve will remain on their balance sheets or be effectively requisitioned by the state. This distinction matters for accounting, working capital and sales planning.

There is also no clear communication on pricing. If material is diverted into the stockpile, producers need to know whether payment will be based on market prices, official formulas or negotiated values.

Payment timing is equally important. Delayed payment for stockpiled cobalt could strain cash flow, especially for producers already managing export restrictions and logistics delays.

The planned reserve also includes coltan and germanium. These materials have strategic value in electronics, defence, semiconductors and critical minerals supply chains. However, cobalt will dominate attention because of its larger volumes and direct link to battery supply.

The policy reflects a wider trend among resource-rich countries. Governments are seeking more control over minerals that have strategic value in energy transition, defence and advanced manufacturing supply chains.

For the DRC, cobalt stockpiling could provide market leverage. It could allow the government to manage supply release, support prices or protect domestic interests during periods of oversupply.

However, too much uncertainty could have the opposite effect. If producers and buyers cannot understand how the reserve works, they may price in additional risk or delay transactions.

The stockpile may also complicate the DRC’s attempt to normalise exports after the ban. Export quotas already require allocation decisions. Adding reserve obligations could slow the recovery unless the government clearly separates stockpile volumes from commercial export flows.

For the global cobalt market, the key question is whether the reserve removes significant material from export availability. If it does, cobalt supply outside the DRC could tighten even while official quota volumes suggest exports should rise.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The DRC cobalt stockpile plan shows that cobalt policy is shifting from export control to active state management. The strategy may increase national leverage, but without clear rules on pricing, ownership and release timing, it risks adding more uncertainty to an already fragile cobalt supply chain.

EU Raw Materials Platform Targets Strategic Metals Supply Security

EU, Raw Materials Platform

EU raw materials platform development has advanced as the European Commission launched a new online mechanism to connect European offtakers with suppliers of strategic raw materials. The EU raw materials platform is designed to support demand aggregation, joint purchasing and better market information across critical supply chains.

The platform covers all 17 strategic raw materials listed under the Critical Raw Materials Act. These materials are central to batteries, rare earth magnets, defence systems, semiconductors, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing and industrial resilience.

EU raw materials platform activity will take place through structured rounds. The first diversification round will target operational projects where materials are already available or expected in the near term, with a focus on rare earths, defence-related materials and battery metals.

The mechanism will not provide financing or directly support negotiations. However, it can improve visibility across supply, demand, storage, investment opportunities and financing options, which are often fragmented in strategic raw material markets.

Demand Aggregation Could Strengthen Minor Metals Markets

Demand aggregation is the most important function of the platform. Many strategic materials are needed in small volumes by individual companies, but they carry high industrial and defence value.

This is especially true for minor metals such as gallium and germanium. These materials are used in semiconductors, optics, solar technologies, defence electronics and advanced communications systems, but individual buyers may not require large enough volumes to support new supply projects alone.

Pooling demand can change that equation. If several European buyers aggregate requirements, suppliers may see larger, more stable offtake volumes. This can improve confidence for upstream mining, refining, recycling and midstream processing projects.

The same logic applies to rare earths. Magnet makers, motor producers, defence manufacturers and clean-energy equipment suppliers often need secure access to neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Aggregated demand could make European purchasing more credible to non-EU suppliers.

Battery metals may also benefit. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and graphite supply chains are increasingly shaped by long-term offtake, regional qualification and industrial policy. A shared platform can help buyers identify supply options before shortages become acute.

The platform therefore addresses a structural weakness in Europe’s critical materials strategy. Europe has strong downstream industries, but many of those industries purchase strategic metals in fragmented, company-by-company channels.

By collecting and exchanging market data, the mechanism could help convert dispersed demand into more bankable offtake signals. That is important for suppliers seeking financing, customers and predictable long-term buyers.

Platform Supports EU Diversification but Does Not Replace Financing

The EU raw materials platform is part of a broader strategy to reduce external dependencies under the Critical Raw Materials Act. Europe wants to diversify supply, strengthen domestic processing and secure access to materials needed for the energy transition and defence.

However, the mechanism is not a full project-financing tool. Negotiations will take place outside the system, and the platform will not guarantee deals or provide direct financial backing.

This limits what the mechanism can achieve by itself. Strategic raw material projects still need permitting, capital, technology, customer qualification, logistics and long-term price visibility.

But the platform can still play a useful role. It can bring buyers and suppliers into the same market framework, improve demand transparency and identify where joint purchasing could support supply diversification.

The first diversification round will be important because it focuses on projects close to availability. This avoids the problem of relying only on long-dated mining projects that may take years to enter production.

The inclusion of storage options is also relevant. Strategic materials supply security is not only about production. It also depends on inventories, emergency access, buffer stocks and coordinated procurement during disruption.

The broader platform also includes gas and hydrogen mechanisms. This shows that the EU is applying a similar strategic procurement model across energy and raw materials, where fragmented buying can weaken market leverage.

For Europe’s industrial base, the key issue is execution. The platform must move beyond data sharing and create real commercial connections between offtakers and suppliers. Otherwise, it risks becoming another policy tool without enough market impact.

For suppliers, the opportunity is clearer. A credible pool of European demand could make projects more attractive, especially in rare earths, gallium, germanium and battery materials where supply diversification is politically urgent.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU raw materials platform is not a financing solution, but it could become an important demand-signalling tool. Its success will depend on whether Europe can turn fragmented buyer interest into real offtake volumes that support new strategic metals supply.

Kamoa-Kakula Copper Output Falls as Ivanhoe Shifts Toward Smelter Recovery

Ivanhoe

Kamoa-Kakula copper output fell sharply in the first quarter as Ivanhoe Mines continued to recover from seismic damage at the Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The complex produced 61,906t of copper in concentrate, down 54% from 133,120t a year earlier.

The decline reflects the continuing effect of the May 2025 seismic shocks that forced Ivanhoe to shut, drain and rebuild the Kakula mine. The asset remains in a staged recovery process and has not yet returned to full production.

Kamoa-Kakula copper output now sits below earlier expectations, forcing Ivanhoe to lower its 2026 guidance to 290,000-330,000t from 380,000-420,000t. The company also cut its 2027 target to 380,000-420,000t from 500,000-540,000t, although it still expects output to exceed 500,000 t/yr from 2028.

The weaker concentrate output is important for the global copper market because Kamoa-Kakula is one of the most important growth assets in the DRC copper belt. Any delay in its recovery reduces near-term copper supply from a region that has become central to global mine growth.

Smelter Output and Acid Production Cushion the Disruption

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results also showed a shift in the site’s operating profile. While copper concentrate output fell sharply, the Kamoa-Kakula smelter produced 63,671t of anode during the quarter.

The company also produced 7,746t of copper in blister from the LCS smelter in Kolwezi. This shows that Ivanhoe is building more downstream processing capability even as underground mine recovery continues.

The smelter gives Kamoa-Kakula a strategic advantage in the DRC. Most producers in the African Copperbelt rely on sulphuric acid for leaching operations, while Kamoa-Kakula produces sulphuric acid as a byproduct.

The on-site copper smelter produced 117,871t of high-strength sulphuric acid in the first quarter. This has become more important because the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised concern over sulphur supply into African hydrometallurgical operations.

Sulphur and sulphuric acid availability can directly affect DRC copper production costs. Producers that rely on imported sulphur or purchased acid may face higher costs or operating constraints if Middle East disruptions persist.

Ivanhoe’s position is different. The company does not need sulphuric acid for its own main copper production route and can instead produce acid for regional demand. This could turn a regional input shortage into a commercial advantage.

The main external risk for Ivanhoe is diesel availability. Diesel remains important for on-site energy generation and logistics in the DRC. Ivanhoe has made advanced diesel purchases and implemented contingency measures to sustain operations.

The company also has a lower diesel exposure than many regional operators because it has access to 250MW of hydroelectric capacity. A further 60MW of solar power with battery storage is expected to come online soon, strengthening the site’s energy resilience.

Kipushi Zinc Growth Adds Diversification Despite Grid Instability

Ivanhoe’s Kipushi zinc-copper-lead-germanium mine delivered a stronger first-quarter result. The DRC mine produced a quarterly record of 65,044t of zinc in concentrate, up 52.2% from a year earlier and 5.9% from the previous quarter.

The result gives Ivanhoe an important diversification benefit while Kamoa-Kakula works through its recovery. Zinc concentrate output from Kipushi adds exposure to galvanizing, infrastructure, alloying and specialty metal supply chains.

Kipushi also carries strategic by-product relevance because the mine includes copper, lead and germanium. Germanium has become more important for semiconductors, fibre optics, infrared systems and defence applications.

However, Kipushi still faces infrastructure constraints. Ivanhoe said concentrator availability was affected by electrical grid instability, even as zinc output increased.

This highlights a wider challenge across the DRC mining sector. The country has high-grade resources and major growth potential, but reliable power, transport, reagents and logistics remain critical constraints.

For Kamoa-Kakula, the longer-term recovery depends on mine rebuilding, underground transport, smelter integration, acid market dynamics and energy reliability. The 2028 target of more than 500,000 t/yr remains achievable only if these systems stabilise together.

For the copper market, Ivanhoe’s first-quarter performance sends a mixed signal. Concentrate output remains sharply lower, but smelting and acid production are becoming more strategically valuable as regional supply chains face sulphur and fuel risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Ivanhoe’s first-quarter results show that Kamoa-Kakula is no longer just a copper volume story. Its smelter, sulphuric acid output and power mix could become strategic advantages in a DRC market exposed to reagent, fuel and logistics shocks.

Indium Phosphide Exports Become China’s New Chokepoint in AI Data Centre Supply Chain

AI data centre

Indium phosphide exports have become a strategic pressure point in the global AI data centre supply chain as China’s licensing controls delay shipments of a material essential for high-speed optical chips. The restrictions are exposing a new vulnerability in AI infrastructure: the physical materials behind silicon photonics and optical interconnects.

The issue has moved quickly from a specialist semiconductor concern to a high-level trade and industrial policy problem. Coherent, a key optical components supplier backed by Nvidia, warned in early May that indium phosphide shortages were already affecting the market. Its chief executive then joined a US business delegation to China as companies sought relief from export licence delays.

Indium phosphide exports matter because AI data centres are moving beyond copper-based interconnects. As AI workloads grow, hyperscalers need faster, lower-latency and more energy-efficient data transmission between processors, accelerators, switches and optical modules. Indium phosphide is one of the core materials enabling that shift.

The material is used in high-speed optical chips, lasers, detectors and photonic components. These devices support the optical links that move huge volumes of data across AI clusters. Without reliable indium phosphide substrates and wafers, the expansion of advanced AI data centre networks could slow.

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that critical materials policy is becoming more granular. Beijing no longer needs to restrict only rare earths or finished technology products. It can also influence upstream compounds, substrates and wafers that determine whether advanced semiconductor supply chains can scale.

Export Controls Expose a Hidden Bottleneck in Silicon Photonics

Silicon photonics has become a critical technology for AI infrastructure because it allows data to move through light rather than electrical signals. This reduces energy use per bit and supports the bandwidth required by large AI systems.

But silicon photonics is not only a silicon story. The most advanced optical systems often require compound semiconductor materials such as indium phosphide, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride and germanium-based compounds. Indium phosphide is especially important for lasers and high-speed optical devices.

This creates a difficult supply chain problem. AI companies, hyperscalers and chipmakers are racing to scale optical modules, but one of the key substrate materials remains highly concentrated. China is the world’s largest indium producer, accounting for about 70% of global output in 2024.

That concentration became more serious after China introduced export restrictions on indium phosphide in February 2025. Since then, licence delays have created backlogs for companies that manufacture or source InP substrates from China.

AXT, one of the world’s largest indium phosphide substrate producers and a major supplier to Coherent, said export permits were its most significant challenge. The company manufactures most of its InP substrates in China and only received its first permits last June. It still faces a large order backlog.

The effect has spread beyond individual suppliers. Coherent, Lumentum, VPEC and LandMark Optoelectronics all sit inside the optical components ecosystem that depends on reliable substrate supply. When permit delays hit upstream InP material, the impact moves through wafers, chips, optical modules and AI data centre equipment.

Prices show the severity of the shortage. Since China introduced export restrictions, the average price of a 6-inch indium phosphide wafer has surged by 250% to about $5,000. That price increase reflects both physical scarcity and the strategic premium attached to non-disrupted supply.

The supply squeeze also comes at a time of aggressive photonics investment. Nvidia announced $2bn investments each in Coherent and Lumentum in March. Marvell Technology also moved into photonics through its acquisition of Celestial AI, reflecting stronger demand for optical technology in AI computing.

These investments show where the industry is heading. AI infrastructure needs optical interconnects to manage power, latency and bandwidth. But China’s indium phosphide controls mean that materials availability could become a gating factor for deployment.

Companies are trying to respond. Coherent plans to double its InP wafer capacity at its Texas plant this year and more than double it again by the end of 2027. US photonics firms are also seeking supply from non-Chinese producers such as Sumitomo Electric Industries.

However, capacity additions are slow. New substrate plants can take two to three years to bring online. Qualification cycles are also long because optical chipmakers cannot easily switch substrate suppliers without testing performance, reliability and consistency.

This makes the shortage difficult to solve quickly. Even if new capacity is announced, it may not arrive fast enough to meet near-term AI data centre demand. Meanwhile, many non-China producers already consume part of their own output internally, reducing the amount available to the broader market.

China’s Materials Chokepoint Strategy Strengthens Domestic Producers

China’s indium phosphide export controls are creating both pressure and opportunity. They restrict global supply, but they also support domestic Chinese substrate producers that are expanding capacity.

Yunnan Germanium, Guangdong Xiandao and Zhuhai Dingtai Xinyuan are among China’s leading domestic InP substrate players. Their role is becoming more important as Beijing uses materials controls to strengthen strategic leverage across semiconductor and AI supply chains.

Yunnan Germanium has already moved to expand. The company announced a 189mn yuan investment in April to raise production capacity to 450,000 single InP wafers annually. Its shipments of InP wafers rose by 74% in 2025, showing fast domestic market growth.

Guangdong Xiandao is also expanding through its subsidiary Guangdong Xianrui. The project is expected to produce 40 t/yr of indium phosphide crystals, which are used as raw material for substrates.

These investments fit a broader pattern. China is not only defending control over upstream critical materials. It is also building downstream processing capacity in higher-value compound semiconductor materials.

However, Chinese producers may not immediately solve the global shortage. Some are still seeking export approvals, and any overseas shipments may be limited. Domestic demand remains a priority, especially as China builds its own AI, optical communications and semiconductor ecosystem.

AXT

Supplier qualification creates another barrier. Companies such as Coherent and Lumentum are unlikely to switch easily from established suppliers. Coherent relies heavily on AXT, while Lumentum sources mainly from Sumitomo and JX Advanced Metals. New suppliers must pass demanding qualification cycles before they can enter critical optical chip supply chains.

This gives China’s export controls a long-lasting effect. Even if alternative suppliers exist, the market cannot instantly redirect demand. The bottleneck is not only production volume. It is qualified, high-quality, customer-approved substrate supply.

The strategic lesson is clear. AI supply chains are not only exposed to advanced chips, GPUs and packaging capacity. They also depend on a deep materials stack that includes indium, phosphorous chemistry, InP crystals, substrates, wafers, lasers, detectors and optical modules.

This is why indium phosphide exports have become so important. AI data centre buildouts need more optical links as clusters grow larger. Copper interconnects face limits in speed, distance and energy consumption. Photonics offers a solution, but only if the materials chain can scale.

For the US and its allies, the response will likely require more than emergency licence negotiations. It will require investment in indium recovery, InP crystal growth, substrate manufacturing, wafer capacity and long-term offtake agreements. It may also require strategic stockpiles for high-purity indium and compound semiconductor substrates.

The issue also strengthens the case for recycling and secondary recovery. Indium is often produced as a by-product, making primary supply difficult to expand quickly. Recovering indium from industrial scrap, displays, semiconductors and related waste streams could become more important if export controls persist.

For AI data centre developers, the risk is timing. Demand for optical modules is accelerating now, while new ex-China capacity may not fully arrive until 2027 or later. That mismatch could raise costs, delay deployments and intensify competition for qualified photonics suppliers.

The market may therefore see a split. Companies with secured InP supply will be better positioned to support hyperscaler demand. Companies exposed to licence delays, qualification bottlenecks or spot-market wafers may face higher costs and delivery risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s control over indium phosphide exports shows that the AI race is becoming a materials race. The next bottleneck may not be only GPUs or power supply, but the compound semiconductor substrates needed to move data fast enough inside AI clusters.