EU Raw Materials Platform Targets Strategic Metals Supply Security

EU, Raw Materials Platform

EU raw materials platform development has advanced as the European Commission launched a new online mechanism to connect European offtakers with suppliers of strategic raw materials. The EU raw materials platform is designed to support demand aggregation, joint purchasing and better market information across critical supply chains.

The platform covers all 17 strategic raw materials listed under the Critical Raw Materials Act. These materials are central to batteries, rare earth magnets, defence systems, semiconductors, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing and industrial resilience.

EU raw materials platform activity will take place through structured rounds. The first diversification round will target operational projects where materials are already available or expected in the near term, with a focus on rare earths, defence-related materials and battery metals.

The mechanism will not provide financing or directly support negotiations. However, it can improve visibility across supply, demand, storage, investment opportunities and financing options, which are often fragmented in strategic raw material markets.

Demand Aggregation Could Strengthen Minor Metals Markets

Demand aggregation is the most important function of the platform. Many strategic materials are needed in small volumes by individual companies, but they carry high industrial and defence value.

This is especially true for minor metals such as gallium and germanium. These materials are used in semiconductors, optics, solar technologies, defence electronics and advanced communications systems, but individual buyers may not require large enough volumes to support new supply projects alone.

Pooling demand can change that equation. If several European buyers aggregate requirements, suppliers may see larger, more stable offtake volumes. This can improve confidence for upstream mining, refining, recycling and midstream processing projects.

The same logic applies to rare earths. Magnet makers, motor producers, defence manufacturers and clean-energy equipment suppliers often need secure access to neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Aggregated demand could make European purchasing more credible to non-EU suppliers.

Battery metals may also benefit. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and graphite supply chains are increasingly shaped by long-term offtake, regional qualification and industrial policy. A shared platform can help buyers identify supply options before shortages become acute.

The platform therefore addresses a structural weakness in Europe’s critical materials strategy. Europe has strong downstream industries, but many of those industries purchase strategic metals in fragmented, company-by-company channels.

By collecting and exchanging market data, the mechanism could help convert dispersed demand into more bankable offtake signals. That is important for suppliers seeking financing, customers and predictable long-term buyers.

Platform Supports EU Diversification but Does Not Replace Financing

The EU raw materials platform is part of a broader strategy to reduce external dependencies under the Critical Raw Materials Act. Europe wants to diversify supply, strengthen domestic processing and secure access to materials needed for the energy transition and defence.

However, the mechanism is not a full project-financing tool. Negotiations will take place outside the system, and the platform will not guarantee deals or provide direct financial backing.

This limits what the mechanism can achieve by itself. Strategic raw material projects still need permitting, capital, technology, customer qualification, logistics and long-term price visibility.

But the platform can still play a useful role. It can bring buyers and suppliers into the same market framework, improve demand transparency and identify where joint purchasing could support supply diversification.

The first diversification round will be important because it focuses on projects close to availability. This avoids the problem of relying only on long-dated mining projects that may take years to enter production.

The inclusion of storage options is also relevant. Strategic materials supply security is not only about production. It also depends on inventories, emergency access, buffer stocks and coordinated procurement during disruption.

The broader platform also includes gas and hydrogen mechanisms. This shows that the EU is applying a similar strategic procurement model across energy and raw materials, where fragmented buying can weaken market leverage.

For Europe’s industrial base, the key issue is execution. The platform must move beyond data sharing and create real commercial connections between offtakers and suppliers. Otherwise, it risks becoming another policy tool without enough market impact.

For suppliers, the opportunity is clearer. A credible pool of European demand could make projects more attractive, especially in rare earths, gallium, germanium and battery materials where supply diversification is politically urgent.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU raw materials platform is not a financing solution, but it could become an important demand-signalling tool. Its success will depend on whether Europe can turn fragmented buyer interest into real offtake volumes that support new strategic metals supply.

Spain Critical Raw Materials Plan Targets Mining Supply Chain Revival

Spain Mining

Spain critical raw materials policy is moving into a more active phase as the government prepares to invest €414 million to strengthen domestic mining and raw material supply. The funding will support recycling, mineral exploration, abandoned mine restoration, and workforce training across the Spanish mining sector.

The plan reflects Europe’s wider push to reduce dependence on imported critical minerals. Spain already holds an important position in the EU mining landscape. It ranks as the bloc’s second-largest copper producer and third-largest tungsten producer, giving the country a stronger base than many European peers.

Spain critical raw materials investment also comes as the EU accelerates project selection under the Critical Raw Materials Act. The European Commission has selected seven strategic mining and raw material projects in Spain, placing the country just behind Germany and France in the European project pipeline.

National Exploration Program Signals a Return to Resource Strategy

The most important part of the plan is Spain’s first National Mining Exploration Program in 50 years. The government plans to allocate €182 million to the program, marking a major shift from passive resource ownership to active resource development.

Exploration is critical because Europe’s raw material strategy cannot rely only on known deposits. Copper, tungsten, lithium, rare earths, and other strategic minerals require long development timelines. Without fresh exploration, permitting reform, and financing support, Europe’s supply ambitions will remain exposed to overseas sources.

Spain’s geological position gives the program clear industrial relevance. Copper supports power grids, electrification, renewable energy systems, and industrial manufacturing. Tungsten remains important for hard metals, defense applications, aerospace tooling, and high-performance manufacturing. As a result, the Spanish mining sector could become more strategically important to Europe’s energy transition and industrial security.

Financing Risk Remains the Main Barrier for Spanish Mining Projects

Spain critical raw materials funding addresses a long-standing complaint from mining companies. Industry players have asked for clearer financial and regulatory support because many emerging projects remain stalled despite strong policy interest.

The core problem is risk. Mining projects require large upfront capital, long permitting processes, and uncertain development timelines. Banks and investors often hesitate to provide credit lines, especially for early-stage projects that lack proven production economics.

The new funding can help reduce that gap, but it will not solve every obstacle. Spain must still convert policy support into bankable projects, faster approvals, skilled labor, and reliable infrastructure. If the government succeeds, the Spanish mining sector could become a stronger pillar of Europe’s critical raw materials strategy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Spain’s plan is strategically important because it links exploration, recycling, and mine restoration into one raw materials agenda. However, the decisive test will be whether public funding can unlock private capital for projects that banks still view as too risky.

Finland Sokli Phosphate Project Gains State Backing as Europe Seeks Raw Materials Security

Finnish Minerals Group

The Finland Sokli phosphate project has gained new momentum after the Finnish government approved a €65mn investment in Finnish Minerals Group. The funding will support the next development phase of the Sokli deposit in Savukoski. Phosphate is the main target, but rare earths also add strategic value. As a result, the Finland Sokli phosphate project is becoming more important to Europe raw materials security.

This matters because Sokli is not only a national mining project. The deposit could cover up to one fifth of EU phosphate demand if it moves into production. That gives Finland a stronger potential role in Europe’s fertilizer and strategic minerals base. Therefore, the Finland Sokli phosphate project now carries significance well beyond Finland.

The government will use the funding for a feasibility study running from 2026 to 2028. The work will include a pilot mine and a pilot concentrator. Meanwhile, the project will also assess the potential for vermiculite, niobium, and rare earth production. Consequently, the Sokli rare earth project is being framed as a multi-mineral industrial asset.

Sokli Rare Earth Project Expands the Strategic Case

The Sokli rare earth project strengthens the wider case for development because it adds strategic minerals to a phosphate-led deposit. Europe wants more secure access to raw materials that support industry, fertilizers, and advanced manufacturing. Rare earths help make Sokli more relevant to that agenda. As a result, the Sokli rare earth project could gain attention beyond traditional mining investors.

The development timeline is still early, but it is moving forward. The government said phosphate and iron concentrates production could begin between 2027 and 2029. That target will depend on study results, permitting, and pilot work. However, state support gives the project more credibility than before.

Finnish Minerals Group will also begin an environmental impact assessment in 2026. That step starts the environmental permitting process and gives the project a clearer regulatory path. Meanwhile, Sokli has already applied for a pilot operations permit, with a decision expected in summer 2026. Therefore, the Finland Sokli phosphate project is now entering a more serious execution stage.

Europe Raw Materials Security Gives Sokli Wider Relevance

Europe raw materials security is the bigger reason Sokli matters now. The EU is pushing to strengthen supply chains for critical and strategic minerals across the bloc. Finland wants Sokli to fit directly into that policy direction. As a result, the project is being positioned as both an industrial and geopolitical asset.

Sokli Oy applied in January 2026 for strategic status under the Critical Raw Materials Act. That application reflects the project’s phosphate and rare earth potential. The European Commission has not yet made a decision, but the move shows clear alignment with EU priorities. Therefore, the Finland Sokli phosphate project may become part of a broader European supply chain strategy.

The wider industrial logic is straightforward. Europe needs more domestic and regional sources of key raw materials. Projects like Sokli can reduce import dependence while creating new processing and mining capacity inside the bloc. Consequently, Finland is trying to move Sokli from geological potential to strategic industrial relevance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sokli matters because it combines phosphate scale with rare earth optionality at a time when Europe wants both supply security and industrial depth. The real test now is execution. If Finland can move the project through pilot work and permitting, Sokli could become one of the more important multi-mineral developments in northern Europe.

Australia EU Trade Deal Secures Critical Raw Materials Supply

Australia, EU trade

Australia EU trade deal negotiations have concluded after eight years, giving the EU a new framework to secure stable access to critical raw materials. The agreement targets minerals including lithium, bauxite, manganese, tantalum, nickel, cobalt, copper, and rare earth oxides.

The Australia EU trade deal will cut or remove bilateral tariffs on critical raw materials and value-added mineral products. This gives European manufacturers a more reliable supply route at a time when tariffs, export controls, and geopolitical pressure are reshaping global materials trade.

The agreement also strengthens Australia’s position as a preferred critical minerals partner for Europe. Australia produces around a third of global lithium and remains a major supplier of bauxite, iron ore, zirconium, and rare earth elements.

Critical Minerals Access Becomes Central to EU Trade Policy

The EU is using the Australia EU trade deal to reduce exposure to China-dominated supply chains and rising US tariff risks. The agreement reflects Brussels’ shift from traditional trade liberalisation toward strategic supply chain security.

Critical raw materials are now central to European industrial policy because they support batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy, defence systems, aerospace, electronics, and advanced manufacturing. Stable access to lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, and rare earths will determine how quickly Europe can scale clean-energy manufacturing.

The deal also includes deeper co-operation on critical raw materials, including possible co-financing of key projects. This matters because Europe needs not only raw mineral access, but also investment in processing, refining, and value-added material production.

Australia Gains Strategic Value as Europe Diversifies Supply

Australia stands to gain economically and strategically from the agreement. The deal is expected to add about $7 billion per year to the Australian economy, while European producers could save more than $1.1 billion in tariffs over the next decade.

The timing is important because Europe is rapidly diversifying its strategic trade partnerships. The EU recently moved forward with trade agreements involving Mercosur and India, showing that Brussels is building a wider network of reliable raw material and manufacturing partners.

The Australia agreement still requires approval by a majority of EU member states and consent from the European Parliament before ratification is complete. However, the strategic direction is already clear: Europe wants critical minerals supply from partners with stable governance, developed mining capacity, and lower geopolitical risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Australia EU trade deal shows that critical minerals have moved from procurement strategy to trade architecture. Europe is no longer simply buying raw materials; it is building alliances to secure the minerals, processing capacity, and industrial resilience needed for the energy transition.

Defence funding in Europe risks squeezing battery materials investment at EU Raw Materials Week

EU Defence

Defence funding in Europe risks squeezing battery materials investment, participants warned in Brussels. The debate surfaced at EU Raw Materials Week during investor and industry discussions. Defence funding in Europe risks squeezing battery materials investment as capital shifts toward security priorities. Therefore, the energy transition may face a tighter financing environment.

The European Commission is pushing defence spending through the ReArm Europe Plan. The plan aims to mobilise up to €800bn for defence investment. Meanwhile, the United States is backing military metals through funding and policy tools. As a result, critical raw materials markets are linking defence and clean energy strategy.

Investors follow defence narratives while battery projects face funding gaps

Investors are showing stronger interest in defence-linked opportunities. Demeter partner Antoni Troeich said money is flowing into defence. However, he also framed batteries and the energy transition as sovereignty issues. Defence funding in Europe risks squeezing battery materials investment if capital ignores EV supply chain scale.

Some investors react when they hear materials overlap both sectors. Troeich said investors became more interested after learning raw materials matter for defence. Meanwhile, battery projects still need long-duration capital and stable offtake. Therefore, developers must sharpen investment cases around scale and resilience.

Lithium demand scale still depends on EVs, not defence volumes

Lithium producers see potential for cross-sector partnerships. However, they warn defence demand cannot justify new plants alone. One producer said the EV market drives demand at scale. As a result, defence funding in Europe risks squeezing battery materials investment without replacing EV-led volume growth.

Co-operation also faces structural limits. Defence procurement is often secretive and specification-driven. Meanwhile, defence may require high-purity lithium or lithium metal grades. These grades do not always match mainstream battery industry needs. Therefore, collaboration will likely focus on niche refining and qualification pathways.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe should avoid framing defence and batteries as competing priorities. Meanwhile, dual-use refining and secure sourcing can serve both markets. Therefore, policymakers should align finance tools to unlock EV-scale projects with defence-grade options.

EU Selects 47 Strategic Raw Materials Projects Under CRMA

EU

New Projects Aim to Boost European Raw Material Independence

The European Commission has announced 47 strategic raw materials projects across 13 EU countries under the Critical Raw Materials Act. These initiatives are part of the EU’s push to reduce foreign dependence and strengthen domestic supply chains by 2030.

The selected projects span extraction, processing, recycling, and substitution of key metals like lithium, nickel, and graphite. In total, they are expected to require €22.5 billion ($24.3 billion) in capital investment, with an accelerated permitting timeline.

Lithium and Nickel Dominate Strategic Focus

Among the 47 projects, 22 are focused on lithium, 12 on nickel, and 10 on cobalt—metals vital for green energy transitions. Projects also cover graphite, manganese, tungsten, and magnesium, all critical for battery, defense, and digital industries. The EU has set targets to meet 10% of its raw material extraction and 40% of processing needs internally by 2030. Savannah Resources’ Barroso lithium project in Portugal is among the featured initiatives with strategic classification status.

Stockpiling and Geopolitical Implications

The Commission is now gathering data on national stockpiles to assess safe storage levels for critical materials across the bloc. An EU raw materials center may coordinate stockpiling efforts starting next year, aligning with global practices in the US and China.

Given global geopolitical shifts, including US leadership changes, the EU is intensifying its focus on material security strategies. Officials stress that European clean tech independence should not lead to new forms of dependency—especially on China.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU's selection of 47 strategic raw materials projects signals a shift toward regional autonomy in critical mineral supply chains. If executed on time, the CRMA framework could reshape Europe's role in the global energy and defense materials landscape. However, execution speed and political cohesion across member states will ultimately determine the strategy’s success.

Trafigura Critical Minerals Loan Strengthens Germany’s Raw Materials Security

Trafigura

Trafigura critical minerals loan support from the German government marks another major step in Europe’s effort to secure strategic raw materials. The $2.1bn, five-year agreement is designed to support supplies for Germany’s industrial, energy, and technology sectors at a time when critical minerals are becoming central to economic security.

The loan is guaranteed through Germany’s export credit agency Euler Hermes and co-arranged by Commerzbank. A consortium of eight lenders financed the package. This structure shows how governments are increasingly using credit guarantees to support supply access, not only domestic production.

Trafigura critical minerals loan financing also reflects Germany’s growing reliance on public-private supply frameworks. The company previously secured an $800mn Germany-backed loan in 2022 to supply refined non-ferrous metals and a $3bn loan the same year to support gas supply. The latest agreement shifts the focus toward minerals needed for the green transition, defence, and advanced manufacturing.

Germany Deepens State-Backed Support for Critical Minerals Supply

Germany is treating critical minerals supply as an industrial resilience issue. The new loan does not identify specific minerals or projects, but the EU’s critical raw materials list includes rare earths, gallium, germanium, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper. These materials are essential for batteries, semiconductors, power systems, defence applications, and high-performance manufacturing.

The financing also shows how Europe is responding to supply concentration risk. Many critical minerals are mined, refined, or processed in limited jurisdictions. As a result, industrial buyers are exposed not only to price volatility, but also to export controls, geopolitical disruption, and refining bottlenecks.

Trafigura critical minerals loan support gives Germany a mechanism to strengthen access through one of the world’s largest commodity trading networks. For German manufacturers, this matters because access to raw materials can determine competitiveness in electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, electronics, aerospace, and industrial technology.

Processing Capacity Becomes the Strategic Battleground

Trafigura has repeatedly argued that governments must support smelting and refining capacity if they want resilient critical minerals supply chains. This is a key point because supply security does not end at mining. Many strategic materials become usable only after complex refining, by-product recovery, and metallurgical processing.

Nyrstar, Trafigura’s metals subsidiary, is becoming an important part of that strategy. The company is expanding processing capacity for by-products such as antimony, germanium, indium, and bismuth. These materials often come from existing metallurgical circuits, making legacy smelters strategically valuable in the critical minerals economy.

Nyrstar’s first shipments of Australian-produced antimony metal from its Port Pirie plant highlight this approach. Instead of waiting for entirely new mines and refineries, Trafigura is using existing infrastructure to scale output of materials with high strategic value. That model could become increasingly important as Europe and allied economies race to reduce exposure to concentrated supply chains.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This loan shows that critical minerals security is moving from policy language into balance-sheet-backed industrial action. The winners will be companies that control logistics, refining knowledge, and by-product recovery capacity, not only mine ownership.

Nth Cycle Trafigura Battery Materials Deal Signals Scale-Up in Black Mass Refining

Nth Cycle

Nth Cycle Trafigura battery materials deal marks a significant step for recycled battery metals supply as the US critical metals refiner prepares to expand its refining footprint. Nth Cycle has signed a 10-year binding offtake agreement to supply Trafigura with battery materials valued at $1.1bn.

The agreement covers 2,000 metric tonnes of contained nickel in mixed hydroxide precipitate and 1,500 tonnes of lithium carbonate. These materials will be refined from 12,000 tonnes of black mass, reinforcing the growing commercial role of recycled feedstock in the battery supply chain.

The Nth Cycle Trafigura battery materials deal also gives Trafigura long-term exposure to recycled nickel and lithium units. That matters as battery manufacturers, automakers, and trading houses seek lower-carbon and more traceable alternatives to mined raw materials.

Modular Refining Model Targets Faster Battery Materials Capacity

Nth Cycle plans to establish new operations in South Carolina and the Netherlands, with production scheduled to begin in 2028. The dual-location strategy gives the company access to both North American and European battery supply chains.

The company’s modular refinery system is designed to reduce build time and capital intensity. This model could become important because conventional refining projects often face long development timelines, high upfront costs, and permitting delays.

Black mass refining is becoming a strategic bridge between battery recycling and primary raw material supply. By converting battery waste into mixed hydroxide precipitate and lithium carbonate, refiners can return critical metals into the battery value chain with less dependence on new mining projects.

Trafigura Offtake Strengthens Commercial Validation

The Nth Cycle Trafigura battery materials deal provides commercial validation for Nth Cycle’s refining technology and expansion plan. A 10-year offtake agreement with a major global trading house can support financing, customer confidence, and project execution.

Nth Cycle has also received a €7.5mn grant from the Netherlands’ National Growth Fund under the Critical Raw Materials Lion initiative. This support highlights Europe’s policy focus on domestic and regional critical raw materials capacity.

The agreement reflects a broader shift in battery materials markets. Recycled nickel and lithium are moving from pilot-scale sustainability claims toward bankable supply contracts. As a result, black mass is increasingly becoming an industrial feedstock rather than a waste stream.

The Metalnomist Commentary

This deal shows that battery recycling is entering a more serious commercial phase. The key challenge for Nth Cycle will be execution, because long-term offtake value only matters if modular refining can deliver consistent volume, quality, and cost performance.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.

Germany Launches €1 Billion Raw Materials Fund to Strengthen Supply Chains

Germany has approved a €1 billion ($1.1 billion) raw materials fund aimed at boosting domestic and international raw material projects. The initiative, managed by state-owned development bank KfW, is designed to strengthen value chains and reduce reliance on foreign imports. The fund will focus on critical areas such as mining, processing, and recycling, and the German government will contribute through equity capital.

Eligible projects must have a binding offtake agreement and a completed feasibility study, as outlined by KfW in May. A government-led raw materials committee will oversee project negotiations and approvals. This strategic move aligns with Europe's growing emphasis on securing critical minerals, a priority under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act.

Germany’s initiative mirrors similar efforts in France and Italy, which have also launched raw materials funds. Italy's fund, valued at €1 billion, is expected to attract an additional €1 billion from private investors, while France has committed €500 million to its fund. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, along with the EU, launched a joint initiative in July to provide up to €100 million in equity investments for critical materials projects.

Key minerals such as lithium, copper, battery metals, and rare earth elements—essential for industries like aerospace and defense—are primary targets for these European initiatives.

EU RESourceEU action plan accelerates EU critical raw materials supply security

EU, Critical Raw Materials

The EU RESourceEU action plan aims to harden Europe’s critical minerals resilience. European Commission will mobilise close to €3bn within the next 12 months. Therefore, the EU RESourceEU action plan turns the 2024 framework into faster financing.

Funding targets fast-deliverable molybdenum and lithium projects

The plan prioritises projects that can cut strategic dependencies quickly. The European Investment Bank and member states will support two flagship developments. Meanwhile, officials frame these as near-term supply wins.

The first backed project is Greenland Resources’ Malmbjerg molybdenum project in Greenland. The plan links molybdenum supply to defence-sector demand and security priorities. The second supported project is Vulcan Energy Resources lithium extraction project in Germany. As a result, the EU RESourceEU action plan tightens the link between finance and battery raw materials.

Scrap export controls and joint purchasing reshape circular supply

The EU RESourceEU action plan strengthens circular supply through targeted scrap controls. The plan restricts exports of scrap and waste from permanent magnets. It also introduces targeted measures for aluminium scrap to expand EU recycling capacity. However, the plan leaves the door open to copper scrap measures if needed.

The plan also creates a new governance layer for long-term execution. A European Critical Raw Materials Centre will launch from early next year to oversee supply chains. It will provide market intelligence, enable joint purchasing, support stockpiling, and catalyse investment. Therefore, the EU RESourceEU action plan shifts from ad-hoc response to structured procurement power.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU RESourceEU action plan signals a decisive pivot from policy intent to industrial action. Meanwhile, scrap controls will matter as much as new mining in tight markets. Therefore, Europe’s next advantage will come from coordinated purchasing and faster permitting discipline.

US Critical Mineral Processing Funding Targets Domestic Battery Supply Chain

Critical Mineral

US critical mineral processing funding is moving into another major round as the Department of Energy prepares to allocate up to $500mn for processing, recycling, and derivative battery manufacturing projects. The funding opportunity is designed to support US-based projects that can strengthen domestic supply of critical minerals and battery materials.

The Department of Energy will target projects that process raw feedstocks, recycle critical materials, or manufacture battery materials and components. The agency specifically identified battery-related materials such as lithium, graphite, nickel, copper, and aluminum among its areas of focus.

US critical mineral processing funding is becoming a central tool in Washington’s effort to reduce dependence on offshore refining and battery material supply chains. The latest funding round also shows that the US is not only focused on mining, but on the midstream capacity needed to convert raw materials into usable industrial inputs.

DOE Funding Pushes Midstream Capacity Beyond Mining

Critical mineral processing remains one of the most difficult gaps in the US battery supply chain. Mining projects can expand raw material availability, but domestic industrial resilience depends on refining, chemical conversion, recycling, and component manufacturing.

The new funding opportunity will support projects that can process critical minerals from raw feedstocks and recycle valuable materials back into the supply chain. This approach reflects the growing importance of black mass, scrap, and secondary materials as strategic inputs for battery production.

DOE battery materials funding also gives policy support to companies working across lithium chemicals, graphite processing, nickel products, copper materials, aluminum inputs, and battery component manufacturing. These segments are essential for electric vehicles, grid storage, defense electrification, and industrial energy systems.

Battery Manufacturing Policy Enters Third Funding Round

The latest funding notice marks the third round in recent years under the DOE’s battery materials processing and battery manufacturing and recycling programs. In September 2024, the agency selected 25 projects to receive more than $3bn to expand domestic battery, component, and critical material supply.

The new $500mn opportunity extends that policy direction. It gives the US another mechanism to move from strategic mineral rhetoric toward physical processing capacity, especially in areas where China still dominates global refining and battery material production.

Applicants must submit non-binding letters of intent by 27 March, with full applications due by 24 April. The timeline signals that the DOE wants near-term project visibility and a faster pipeline of investable domestic capacity.

US critical mineral processing funding will be especially important for companies that can prove commercial readiness, feedstock security, and scalable production. The strongest projects will likely be those that connect raw material access with downstream battery customers and recycling loops.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is now treating processing capacity as the real bottleneck in critical minerals security. Funding can accelerate projects, but the strategic test will be whether supported companies can deliver cost-competitive, qualified material at industrial scale.

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan Targets Supply Chain Security

US EU

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan marks a deeper transatlantic effort to secure strategic raw materials as China export controls and global protectionism reshape industrial supply chains. The US and EU have signed the plan to diversify sourcing, strengthen resilience and coordinate responses to mineral supply disruptions.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan is significant because it moves beyond general diplomatic language. It allows both sides to use trade and market tools, including border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies to close price gaps and offtake agreements.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan also includes stockpile cooperation, technical coordination, regulatory alignment and standards for mining, processing and recycling. This shows that Washington and Brussels are now treating critical minerals as industrial security assets, not only commodity inputs.

Price Floors and Offtake Tools Signal Stronger Market Intervention

The plan highlights a major shift in western raw materials policy. The US and EU are preparing to coordinate tools that can make non-China supply more commercially viable.

Border-adjusted price floors could help protect strategic mineral projects from low-cost competition. This matters because many western projects struggle to compete against established Chinese processing chains when prices fall.

Subsidies to address price gaps serve the same purpose. They can help bridge the cost difference between secure, traceable supply and cheaper material from dominant incumbent producers.

Offtake agreements are also central. Long-term purchase commitments can give miners, refiners and recyclers the revenue visibility needed to finance new capacity.

This is especially important for rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and other strategic materials. Many of these markets are small, volatile or heavily concentrated in processing.

The plan also points to standards-based markets. This could support supply chains where environmental, labour, traceability and security standards become part of pricing.

For suppliers, the message is clear. Western buyers may increasingly pay for origin, compliance and resilience, not only the lowest spot price.

Transatlantic Coordination Raises Pressure on China-Linked Supply Chains

The plan will be implemented by the office of the US trade representative and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for trade and economic security. That structure places critical minerals directly inside trade and economic security policy.

The US has already moved aggressively in critical minerals. It has used the Defense Production Act, supported price floors and offtake agreements, and invested in overseas mineral assets to reduce reliance on China.

The EU has historically been more cautious about direct market intervention. However, its position is changing as supply risks increase and European manufacturers face tighter access to strategic raw materials.

Earlier this month, the European Commission launched a critical raw materials platform to match EU buyers with suppliers and aggregate demand. The new US-EU action plan builds on that direction and gives Europe a broader external coordination channel.

Rapid response mechanisms are also important. Export controls, shipping disruption, sanctions or sudden shortages can quickly affect defence, semiconductors, batteries, magnets, aerospace and clean energy manufacturing.

Stockpile cooperation could provide a temporary buffer. But the larger strategic goal is to build durable supply, processing and recycling capacity across allied economies.

The plan therefore strengthens the policy architecture for western mineral security. It also raises the likelihood that future raw material trade will be shaped by origin rules, price support, industrial standards and government-backed purchasing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-US plan shows that critical minerals policy is moving from risk awareness to market design. The decisive question is whether price floors, offtakes and subsidies can create real processing capacity before the next supply shock hits.

Yunnan Germanium Output Falls as Downstream Wafer Demand Absorbs Metal

Germanium

Yunnan Germanium output of raw material-grade germanium available for external sales fell in 2025 as the company redirected more metal into internal downstream production. The shift reflects stronger demand from photovoltaic wafers, optical fibre materials and compound semiconductor products.

Yunnan Germanium output for external raw material-grade germanium sales fell by 13% to 29.7t metal equivalent. The figure excludes 68.95t used for internal consumption and third-party processing.

Yunnan Germanium output therefore signals a change in material allocation rather than simple production weakness. More germanium units are being retained inside the company’s higher-value product chain instead of being sold as raw material.

Revenue rose by 38% to 1.07bn yuan, supported by higher prices for raw germanium, optical fibre materials, PV germanium products, infrared products and semiconductor products.

PV and Optical Fibre Demand Pull Germanium Into Internal Processing

Yunnan Germanium nearly doubled production of 4-6 inch PV-grade germanium wafers in 2025. Output rose to 909,000 pieces from 491,400 pieces a year earlier.

This growth is strategically important because germanium wafers serve high-efficiency photovoltaic applications. Stronger wafer output means more raw germanium is being converted into higher-value products rather than sold into the merchant market.

Optical fibre materials also expanded. Output of optical fibre-grade germanium tetrachloride rose to 39.8t from 27t, showing stronger demand from communications infrastructure and optical transmission markets.

Infrared-grade germanium raw material output fell by 28% to 4.77t metal equivalent. However, production of infrared lenses and optical systems rose sharply to 4,717 sets from 1,828 sets.

That mix shows deeper downstream processing. The company reduced some raw infrared material output but increased finished optical systems, capturing more value further along the chain.

For germanium buyers, the key issue is external availability. When China’s largest germanium producer consumes more material internally, less raw metal is available for third-party customers.

Indium Phosphide Expansion Strengthens Compound Semiconductor Push

Yunnan Germanium also increased indium phosphide wafer output in 2025. Production of 2-4 inch InP wafers rose by 55% to 100,100 pieces.

In contrast, gallium arsenide wafer production declined by 13% to 76,300 pieces. This shows a shift in compound semiconductor emphasis toward InP, where demand is rising from advanced optical and semiconductor applications.

The company plans to keep increasing PV-grade germanium wafer and indium phosphide wafer output in 2026. It also plans to reduce infrared product output.

Yunnan Germanium targets 73t metal equivalent of raw material-grade germanium products in 2026, including internal use and third-party processing. It also plans to produce 1.45mn pieces of 4-6 inch equivalent PV-grade wafers and 180,000 pieces of 2-6 inch InP wafers.

The company also plans to produce 35t of optical fibre-grade germanium tetrachloride, 80,000 pieces of 3-6 inch GaAs wafers, 3t of infrared-grade germanium raw materials and 8,000 sets of infrared lenses and optical systems.

The planned 188.56mn yuan investment to expand high-quality InP single-crystal wafer capacity reinforces this strategy. Yunnan Germanium is moving from raw germanium supply toward integrated semiconductor and photonics material production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Yunnan Germanium’s lower external metal output should not be read as weak demand. It shows that strategic germanium producers are capturing more value internally, tightening merchant supply while expanding into PV, optical fibre and InP wafer markets.

China Strategic Minerals Competitiveness Becomes Core Priority in New Five-Year Plan

China newly released 15th Five-Year Plan

China strategic minerals competitiveness will become a central industrial priority under the country’s 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026-30. Beijing has pledged to strengthen its advantages in rare earths, critical minor metals, and super-hard materials while improving the comprehensive use of key strategic mineral resources.

The plan calls for greater efforts to explore, develop, and stockpile strategic mineral resources. It also supports a new round of mineral exploration breakthroughs, showing that China wants to defend its upstream security while moving further into high-value downstream technologies.

China strategic minerals competitiveness is not only about producing more raw materials. It is increasingly about controlling refining, processing, advanced materials, and high-end manufacturing capacity across industries tied to semiconductors, aerospace, defense, batteries, and clean energy.

Rare Earths and Critical Metals Remain China’s Industrial Leverage

China already holds a dominant position across several critical mineral supply chains. The country controls most global refining capacity for rare earths and has major shares in tungsten, antimony, cobalt, and lithium processing.

This dominance gives China strong leverage in global industrial supply chains. Rare earths support permanent magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, defense systems, and precision electronics, while critical minor metals such as tungsten and antimony are essential for hard materials, flame retardants, munitions, and advanced manufacturing.

However, China still depends on imports for some high-end materials used in strategic sectors. This gap explains why the Five-Year Plan emphasizes autonomous and controllable industrial chains, rather than simple resource extraction.

Beijing Pushes From Raw Materials Toward High-End Manufacturing

China strategic minerals competitiveness now appears focused on higher value-added products. The plan does not disclose detailed measures, but its direction suggests stronger support for advanced processing, materials innovation, and domestic substitution.

This shift reflects China’s response to rising geopolitical pressure. As the US, EU, Japan, and other economies tighten critical mineral policies, Beijing is also using export licensing and industrial planning to protect its strategic position.

The broader message is clear. China wants to remain the central force in critical mineral refining while reducing its exposure to foreign restrictions on advanced materials and technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s new plan shows that critical minerals are no longer treated as commodity inputs. They are now strategic instruments for industrial control, technology security, and geopolitical leverage. This will push rival economies to accelerate non-China refining, recycling, and advanced materials capacity.

Canada adds iron ore to the list of critical raw materials

Iron raw materials

High-quality iron ore is required for the production of environmentally friendly steel and is an integral part of the decarbonization process 

Natural Resources Canada has added high-quality iron ore to the list of critical minerals. This was reported by Mining.com with reference to the Ministry’s data.

The list of critical minerals, which has already reached 34 types of raw materials, also includes phosphorus and silicon.

"These raw materials are integral to a wide range of products that are critical to the energy transition, often in short supply, and critical to Canada’s future economic prosperity," the government said in a statement.

Silicon is used to make chips and semiconductors used in most electronic devices. High-quality iron ore is needed to make environmentally friendly steel and is an integral part of the decarbonization process. Phosphorus is in demand for fertilizers and batteries.

The list of critical minerals was first released in March 2021 as part of Canada’s emissions reduction plan, which aims to reduce Co2 emissions by 40-45% below 2005 levels by 2030 and achieve zero emissions by 2050.

Champion Iron, which owns and operates the Bloom Lake mining complex in Quebec, welcomed the addition of iron ore to the List of Critical Minerals. The company’s mine, on the southern edge of the Labrador Trough, has one of the world’s highest iron ore reserves and can produce iron ore concentrate with an iron content of 67.5%. Champion Iron is working on several modernization projects to increase the iron content of iron ore concentrate to 69%.

As Metalnomist reported earlier, global iron ore exports in January-March 2024 increased by 6% compared to the same period in 2023 – to 376 million tons. In the short term, global iron ore exports will remain high as major global companies maintain their production forecasts.

Green Premiums: More Myth Than Reality in Metals Industry, Experts at Resourcing Tomorrow Warn

Vale

During the Resourcing Tomorrow conference in London, leading voices in the metals industry, including Vale's Jeff Gaulin, emphasized that metals producers should not rely on green premiums to offset a lack of innovation or competitiveness. The consensus among experts is that the idea of green premiums for critical raw materials will likely remain just that—an idea.

Reassessing the Value of Green Premiums

Jeff Gaulin, head of corporate affairs at Vale, expressed skepticism about the practicality of green premiums during economically volatile times. He highlighted that no original equipment manufacturer (OEM) has shown a willingness to pay significant premiums for minerals, even if they are produced under environmentally and socially responsible conditions. "It's not a consumer-facing product, and people are not going to make that economic decision when no-one else is looking," Gaulin remarked, suggesting that the focus should instead be on driving down costs to spur innovation.

The Realities of Funding and Development in the Metals Sector

Other panelists, including Antoine Troesch from Demeter Investment Managers, echoed Gaulin’s sentiments. They pointed out that OEMs are reluctant to pay any premium on raw materials. Troesch advised seeking upfront capital for projects that meet environmental, social, and governance targets, rather than expecting higher prices for raw materials themselves.

The Path Forward: Innovation and Competitiveness

The panelists discussed the importance of competitiveness, particularly given the intense demand for critical raw materials amid high political interest yet low commercial viability due to slim profit margins. Former UK Deputy Prime Minister Dominic Raab and Euromines Director-General Rolf Kuby highlighted the challenges in Europe, such as long lead times for opening mines and high operational costs, which hinder resource development.

Gaulin concluded with a call for a triple-focused strategy in Western jurisdictions: revitalizing industry with local extraction and refining, fostering collaborations due to geological limitations, and pursuing an innovation agenda to discover alternative sources and technologies.

Yunnan Germanium Recycling Project Targets Feedstock Security for Strategic Metal Supply

Germanium Scrap

Yunnan Germanium recycling project plans will strengthen China’s largest germanium producer’s control over feedstock as demand from downstream high-end manufacturing remains strategically important. The company plans to invest 200.66mn yuan in a fully automated facility to process germanium-bearing waste slag.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project will have capacity to process 150,000 t/yr of germanium-bearing waste slag. The company has not disclosed the construction timetable or launch date.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project is designed to improve germanium resource utilisation and support raw material supply for downstream deep-processing products. This matters because germanium is a strategic minor metal used in defence, infrared optics, fibre optics, semiconductors and high-performance electronics.

The project also reflects a broader industry shift. Producers of critical and minor metals are increasingly trying to secure secondary feedstock as primary supply becomes more politically controlled and price volatility rises.

Recycling Capacity Reduces Dependence on External Raw Materials

Yunnan Germanium said partial reliance on externally sourced raw materials exposes it to germanium price volatility. Prices are influenced by global supply-demand conditions and demand from high-end manufacturing sectors.

The new recycling line should help reduce that exposure. By processing waste slag, the company can recover more germanium units from secondary material and support its downstream production chain.

This is strategically important because Yunnan Germanium already consumes significant germanium internally. In 2025, the company produced 29.7t of raw-material-grade germanium metal equivalent for external sales, excluding 68.95t used for internal consumption and third-party processing.

That internal use shows how the company is moving more material into higher-value products rather than selling all output into the merchant market. Recycling can strengthen that model by expanding available feedstock.

Yunnan Germanium also plans to diversify external suppliers of germanium-bearing waste slag. It will seek medium- to long-term supply agreements with quality provisions and emergency replenishment clauses.

The company also plans to build a raw material inventory reserve and a price-alert mechanism. It will adjust production and inventory strategies when germanium prices move by more than 10%.

These measures show a more disciplined approach to minor-metal procurement. In markets such as germanium, small disruptions can produce large price movements because supply is concentrated and liquidity is limited.

Export Controls Increase Strategic Value of Germanium Recovery

Germanium has become more strategically sensitive since China placed the metal under strict dual-use export controls in September 2023. China accounts for an estimated 60-70% of global germanium capacity.

This gives Chinese producers significant influence over global availability. It also makes domestic resource recovery more valuable, especially when export controls, defence demand and semiconductor-related applications increase policy attention.

Yunnan Germanium’s revenue rose to 1.07bn yuan in 2025 from 767mn yuan in 2024. Higher prices for key products, including raw-material-grade germanium, supported the increase despite lower external raw metal output.

The company’s recycling investment therefore supports both security and profitability. More stable feedstock access can improve operating flexibility when prices rise or external raw material supply tightens.

For downstream customers, the project may improve Yunnan Germanium’s ability to supply deeper-processed products. These include materials linked to optics, fibre communication, photovoltaics, infrared systems and compound semiconductors.

The broader market implication is clear. Germanium supply security will depend not only on mine output or primary production, but also on recycling, waste recovery, inventory control and long-term feedstock agreements.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Yunnan Germanium’s recycling plan shows that strategic minor metals are moving toward closed-loop resource control. In germanium, the advantage will belong to producers that can combine primary supply, secondary recovery and downstream processing under one feedstock strategy.

Mercuria Venezuela Offtake Agreements Signal Push to Reopen Mineral Exports

Mercuria

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements mark a significant attempt to reconnect Venezuelan mineral supply with international markets. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group has signed strategic offtake agreements with investment firm Heeney Capital covering Venezuelan bulk commodities and gold projects.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements are expected to support initial mineral exports worth about $2.2bn/yr. The partners are also advancing possible transactions in aluminium, nickel and ferrous products that could represent another $3bn/yr in export value, subject to regulatory approvals.

The agreements come as US government officials and industry participants visited Caracas to support new investment frameworks and supply agreements in oil and mining. The timing shows how raw materials trade is becoming more closely tied to diplomacy, sanctions policy and western supply-chain security.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements also fit the trader’s broader expansion into metals and minerals. The company is using offtake structures to secure future supply while positioning itself in markets where conventional financing remains difficult.

Venezuela’s Aluminium and Nickel Revival Will Require Capital

Venezuela has historically been an important producer and exporter of aluminium, iron ore and other bulk commodities. However, its industrial base has weakened after years of underinvestment, power shortages, sanctions constraints and operational deterioration.

The aluminium sector is a clear example. Restarting or expanding output will require reliable electricity, working capital, plant rehabilitation, spare parts, logistics and customer confidence.

Nickel and ferrous products offer additional potential, but they face similar execution challenges. Resource availability alone will not be enough. Venezuela must rebuild industrial reliability and prove that export flows can operate consistently.

This makes Mercuria’s role important. A trading group can provide offtake, financing support, logistics expertise and market access without taking the same full risk as a mine owner or plant operator.

For Venezuela, the agreements could help generate export revenues and attract additional foreign capital. For western buyers, they could create another source of raw materials outside more concentrated supply chains.

Still, regulatory approval remains critical. Sanctions, compliance requirements and political risk will determine how quickly these agreements can move from announcement to physical trade.

Offtake Deals Reflect a New Metals Geopolitics

The structure of the agreements shows how metals trading is changing. Offtake deals are no longer just commercial purchase contracts. They are becoming tools for supply security, project restart and geopolitical alignment.

Commodity traders can secure future material while helping producers revive exports. This model is especially useful in jurisdictions where banks may hesitate, governments want fast results and buyers need alternative supply.

Mercuria’s Venezuela strategy also reflects the wider shift in western raw materials policy. The US and its allies are looking for new sources of industrial materials as supply chains become more fragmented and politically exposed.

This does not mean Venezuela can quickly return to full historical production levels. The country’s mining and metals infrastructure needs investment, operational discipline and credible long-term governance.

However, the strategic logic is clear. If Venezuela can reopen parts of its extractive industry under workable investment frameworks, it could become a useful supplementary source for aluminium, nickel, ferrous products and gold.

For Mercuria, the opportunity is to move early. By securing offtake and building relationships before assets fully recover, the trader can gain access to material flows that may become more valuable as western supply chains diversify.

The broader metals market should watch whether these agreements lead to actual export volumes. The first test will be regulatory clearance, followed by financing, rehabilitation and shipment execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mercuria’s Venezuela agreements show that metals offtake is becoming a geopolitical instrument. The opportunity is large, but the real test will be whether Venezuela can rebuild reliable production and export systems after years of industrial decline.

 

HyProMag Rare Earth Magnet Recycling Plant Opens in Germany

HyProMag

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling has moved into commercial-scale production in Germany after the company opened a new recycling and manufacturing plant in Pforzheim. The facility strengthens Europe’s effort to build a circular rare earth magnet supply chain outside China.

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling will focus on neodymium-iron-boron magnets and alloys. The plant will start with 100 t/yr of production capacity, with plans to increase output to 350 t/yr.

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling is strategically important because NdFeB magnets are critical for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, electronics, defence systems and industrial motors. Europe needs more local magnet capacity as China continues to dominate rare earth processing and magnet production.

The plant is permitted for production of up to 750 t/yr. HyProMag and parent company Mkango Resources are evaluating a scale-up to that level over the next three years.

HPMS Technology Targets Magnet Scrap Recovery

The Pforzheim plant will use Hydrogen Processing of Magnet Scrap technology, known as HPMS. The process was developed at the University of Birmingham and is designed to recover rare earth magnets from scrap streams more efficiently.

This technology matters because magnet recycling can reduce dependence on mined rare earth feedstock and conventional separation routes. It can also shorten supply chains by recovering material already embedded in end-of-life products and industrial scrap.

Recycled NdFeB magnets can support European manufacturers that need secure and traceable supply. Automotive, wind power, electronics and defence customers increasingly want material with clearer origin and lower supply-chain risk.

The initial 100 t/yr capacity is modest compared with China’s magnet industry. However, the strategic value lies in proving that commercial-scale recycling and magnet manufacturing can operate inside Europe.

The planned expansion to 350 t/yr, and potentially 750 t/yr, would make the site more meaningful for regional supply. It would also help Europe develop technical expertise in magnet scrap collection, processing, alloying and remanufacturing.

EU Critical Raw Materials Strategy Gains Recycling Base

HyProMag’s German plant fits directly into Europe’s critical raw materials strategy. The EU wants to reduce dependence on imported rare earth materials by supporting domestic mining, separation, recycling and manufacturing capacity.

Mkango Resources adds another layer to this strategy. The Canadian company owns a rare earths project in Malawi and a proposed rare earths separation plant in Poland.

Both projects have been selected as strategic projects under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act. This gives Mkango a broader position across upstream rare earth resources, midstream separation and downstream magnet recycling.

The German plant therefore is not just a standalone recycling facility. It could become part of a wider European rare earth value chain connecting African feedstock, European separation and recycled magnet production.

For Europe, this model is important. Mining alone will not solve rare earth dependence if separation, metal making, alloying and magnet manufacturing remain concentrated elsewhere.

HyProMag’s Pforzheim facility helps address one of the most difficult parts of the chain: turning rare earth scrap into usable magnet products. If the company scales successfully, it could support a more resilient European magnet ecosystem.

The Metalnomist Commentary

HyProMag’s plant shows that Europe’s rare earth strategy is moving from policy ambition into industrial execution. The key test will be whether recycling capacity can scale fast enough to supply real magnet demand in EVs, wind power and defence.