China Gallium Production Expands as Xinfa Starts Guangxi Trial Operations

China Gallium

China gallium production capacity has expanded again after Guangxi Xinfa began trial operations at a new 100 t/yr gallium plant in Guangxi province. The facility adds another source of supply to a market already dominated by Chinese producers.

China gallium production has accelerated in recent years as alumina refiners invest in recovering the metal as a by-product. Gallium is increasingly strategic because it is used in compound semiconductors for power electronics, communications, aerospace and defence applications.

China gallium production growth is also occurring under tighter export controls. Beijing introduced strict controls on gallium-related dual-use items in August 2023, increasing the strategic importance of domestic capacity and export licensing.

Xinfa’s early output remains limited and unstable while the new plant moves through trial operations. But at full capacity, the project would represent a meaningful addition to China’s gallium supply base.

Alumina Producers Accelerate By-Product Gallium Recovery

Gallium is recovered primarily as a by-product of alumina production, giving integrated aluminium companies a natural platform for adding capacity.

Xinfa already operates across China’s aluminium value chain, with assets in Shandong, Xinjiang and Guangxi. Adding gallium recovery allows the company to extract more value from existing refining streams rather than developing a standalone mine.

This model is becoming increasingly important across critical minerals. Small-volume metals such as gallium can often be recovered from large industrial processes if market demand and pricing justify the additional separation investment.

Chinese producers accelerated investment after gallium prices surged in 2022, supported by stronger demand from advanced technology sectors.

China’s gallium output reached an estimated 800-1,000 t/yr in 2025, while nameplate capacity expanded to around 1,200-1,300 t/yr. This was significantly above the 900-1,000 t/yr capacity estimated a year earlier.

Several projects have driven that expansion. New production lines came on stream in Guizhou, Chongqing and Shandong, while other producers continue to build additional capacity.

The Xinfa project therefore fits a wider industry trend rather than representing an isolated development.

Rising Capacity Collides With Strategic Export Controls

China’s rapid gallium capacity growth creates an unusual market structure. Domestic supply is expanding while international availability remains constrained by export controls and licensing requirements.

That divergence can create periods of domestic oversupply even while overseas buyers face tighter access.

Higher Chinese output contributed to weaker spot prices from late 2024. However, investment buying and strategic stockbuilding helped push prices higher again from the start of 2026.

This shows that gallium pricing is increasingly influenced by policy and inventory behaviour as well as conventional supply-demand fundamentals.

The metal’s importance is also growing because of its role in gallium nitride and gallium arsenide semiconductor systems. These materials are used in high-frequency electronics, power semiconductors, communications infrastructure, radar and aerospace applications.

For overseas buyers, additional Chinese production does not automatically translate into easier supply. Export licences, end-user controls and geopolitical restrictions can still limit physical availability.

The larger strategic question is whether producers outside China can build economically viable recovery capacity. Several western alumina producers technically have the capability to recover gallium, but demand visibility and financing remain major barriers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s gallium market shows why production capacity and supply security are not the same thing. Even as output expands, export controls can keep international users exposed, reinforcing the need for non-China recovery projects tied to existing alumina operations.

Cop 31 Electrification Target Could Reshape Global Power and Metals Demand

Cop 31

Cop 31 electrification target proposed by Turkey would lift electricity’s share of global final energy consumption to 35% by 2035, from around 20% today. The IEA is urging countries to support the goal at the November climate summit in Antalya.

Cop 31 electrification target would place power systems at the centre of the next phase of global decarbonisation. Reaching the target would require substantial investment in generation, grids, storage and end-use electrification across transport, buildings and industry.

Cop 31 electrification target also carries major implications for metals demand. More electricity infrastructure would support long-term consumption of copper, aluminium, electrical steel, battery materials and other inputs used in transmission, storage and renewable generation.

The political challenge is financing. Developing countries warned that higher borrowing costs, limited technology access and weak capital availability could prevent them from participating in the transition at the same pace as wealthier economies.

Grid Investment and Finance Will Determine Delivery

Turkey proposed the 35% electrification goal during climate talks in Bonn. The IEA said the target is achievable and could become a major legacy of Cop 31 if governments reach agreement.

However, expanding electricity use requires far more than adding renewable generation. Countries need transmission lines, distribution networks, transformers, substations, storage systems and digital grid infrastructure.

That creates a significant industrial demand signal. Copper will be central to cables, transformers and electrical equipment, while aluminium will remain critical for transmission conductors and lightweight electrical applications.

Battery storage will also become more important as renewable penetration rises. This supports demand for lithium, graphite, copper and other battery materials, while alternative storage technologies could create additional demand for vanadium, zinc and other metals.

Developing economies face the biggest financing challenge. High borrowing costs can make power projects significantly more expensive even when renewable resources are strong.

Turkey and Australia therefore want finance to sit alongside electrification in the Cop 31 agenda. Ministers from Ethiopia, Colombia and other developing countries also stressed that implementation will depend on better access to capital and technology.

Without that support, electrification could widen industrial inequality. Countries with cheaper financing would build grids and clean power faster, while higher-risk markets could remain dependent on older infrastructure and more expensive energy.

Clean Power Source Will Decide Climate Impact

Electrification alone does not guarantee lower emissions. The climate benefit depends on how the additional electricity is generated.

Civil society groups and governments have warned that rising electricity consumption can still be supplied by coal, gas or other fossil fuels. That means the electrification target must be linked with clean generation expansion and fossil fuel transition policies.

The Powering Past Coal Alliance has called for governments to integrate electrification, clean power build-out and coal transition scenarios. It warned that rapid power demand growth could otherwise lock countries into new coal capacity.

Colombia also argued that faster renewable deployment is not enough without addressing the phase-out of fossil fuels. This debate will remain central to negotiations around the broader transition away from fossil energy.

For industrial supply chains, the distinction matters. A clean electrification pathway creates sustained demand for renewable generation, grids, batteries and low-carbon materials. A fossil-heavy pathway may still increase metals demand, but with a much weaker emissions benefit.

The 35% target therefore represents more than an energy consumption metric. It would influence capital allocation, power infrastructure planning and material demand across multiple sectors for the next decade.

The Metalnomist Commentary

A global electrification target would be a major structural driver for copper, aluminium, electrical steel and storage materials. But without affordable finance and clean generation, electrification could expand electricity demand faster than it reduces emissions.

Derichebourg Recycling Results Rise on Non-Ferrous Strength and Scrap Policy Support

Chhattisgarh, Ferro‑alloy

Derichebourg recycling results improved in the first half of the company’s 2025-26 financial year as stronger non-ferrous demand, higher prices and increased metal volumes lifted earnings. The French recycling group reported Ebitda of €177.8mn for October-March, up almost 10% from a year earlier.

Derichebourg recycling results show how metal recyclers are benefiting from two linked forces. Non-ferrous scrap demand remains firm, while European steel policy is encouraging mills to source more feedstock from within the region.

Derichebourg recycling results also point to continued momentum in the second half. The company expects April-September performance to be comparable to the first half and forecasts full-year Ebitda of €350mn-370mn.

The market responded positively to the filing, with Derichebourg’s share price rising above €10 from €9.50 after the results were released.

Non-Ferrous Metals Drive Earnings Growth

Non-ferrous metals were the main earnings driver. Derichebourg sold 357,100t of non-ferrous metals in the first half, up 4.4% from a year earlier.

Revenue from the non-ferrous segment rose by nearly 20% to €1bn. The average non-ferrous price was almost 15% higher than in the same period last year.

Copper sales were especially strong, rising by 17%. Aluminium sales, excluding ingots, increased by 10%, supported by firm industrial demand.

However, the picture was not uniformly positive. Aluminium ingot sales fell by 15%, while lead sales dropped by 4%, mainly because of weaker demand from the automotive industry.

This split matters for recyclers. Copper and aluminium scrap remain exposed to electrification, infrastructure and industrial manufacturing, while automotive weakness can still pressure selected downstream products.

Derichebourg’s non-ferrous performance shows that scrap is becoming a strategic raw material, not only a waste recovery business. Buyers increasingly need reliable recycled metal flows for cost control, carbon reduction and supply security.

CBAM and Steel Quotas Support Ferrous Scrap Outlook

Ferrous scrap revenue fell by 5% to €649.9mn because lower average prices offset higher volumes. Derichebourg sold 2.13mn t of ferrous scrap, up 2.2% from a year earlier.

European mills increased scrap purchases ahead of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism coming into force in January. CBAM has added complexity to imported steel and raw material calculations, pushing some steelmakers toward European suppliers.

The company also expects ferrous scrap demand to strengthen after the EU introduces new steel quotas and customs duties in July. These measures could support regional scrap flows by making local feedstock more attractive.

Turkey also contributed to stronger scrap demand as steel production increased. That remains important because Turkish mills are major seaborne scrap buyers and can influence European collection and export markets.

Derichebourg is also expanding geographically. The company agreed to acquire Germany’s Scholz Recycling, which operates 180 sites including joint ventures across Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Austria and Romania.

The deal is expected to close in the second half of 2026. It will strengthen Derichebourg’s recycling network in eastern Europe, where its presence has been smaller.

The acquisition fits the wider market direction. European recyclers are scaling up as policy, carbon rules and industrial demand make scrap supply more valuable.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Derichebourg’s results show that recycling is becoming a policy-supported industrial supply chain. CBAM, steel trade measures and non-ferrous demand are turning scrap networks into strategic assets for European metals security.

Record Temperatures 2026-30 Forecast Raises Climate Risk for Industry

WMO

Record temperatures 2026-30 are likely to keep global heat at or near historic highs, according to a report produced by the UK’s Met Office for the World Meteorological Organization. The forecast points to average annual global near-surface temperatures of 1.3°C-1.9°C above pre-industrial levels.

Record temperatures 2026-30 would extend a period of exceptional heat after 2023-25 became the three hottest years on record. The report also gives an 86% chance that at least one year in 2026-30 will surpass 2024 as the hottest year ever recorded.

Record temperatures 2026-30 carry direct implications for energy, mining, agriculture, logistics and industrial manufacturing. Higher heat levels can increase power demand, strain grids, disrupt water availability and raise operating risk for resource industries.

The outlook also reinforces the gap between climate targets and current warming trends. The Paris Agreement seeks to keep temperature rises well below 2°C and pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.

Temporary Threshold Breaches Increase Policy Pressure

The report found a 91% chance that global average near-surface temperatures will exceed 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for at least one year between 2026 and 2030. It also found a 75% likelihood that the five-year mean will breach the same threshold.

That does not mean the Paris Agreement’s long-term goal has formally failed. The agreement’s thresholds refer to sustained warming over an extended period, typically measured over about 20 years.

However, temporary breaches still matter. They increase pressure on governments to accelerate emissions cuts, expand renewable power, improve energy efficiency and strengthen climate adaptation policies.

For metals and mining, this creates a two-sided market effect. Stronger climate action supports demand for copper, aluminium, lithium, nickel, rare earths and electrical steel used in grids, batteries, electric vehicles and renewable energy.

At the same time, higher temperatures increase operational risk. Mines, smelters, refineries and transport corridors can face more heat stress, water constraints, power reliability problems and weather-related disruption.

El Nino Risk Adds Volatility to Industrial Planning

The past 11 years have been the warmest on record, mainly because of rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. The report said anomalous warmth was widespread in 2021-25, even though La Nina conditions prevailed in four of those five years.

The forecast now points to a tendency toward El Nino conditions, especially in 2027 and 2028. El Nino typically raises global temperatures, while La Nina usually has a cooling effect.

This matters because El Nino can intensify weather volatility. Heat, drought, floods and shifting rainfall patterns can affect hydropower, crop output, transport, mine operations and energy markets.

Industrial companies will need to treat climate risk as an operating variable, not only a sustainability issue. Power security, water management, site resilience and supply-chain redundancy will become more important in capital planning.

The report’s use of predictions from 13 institutes adds weight to the outlook. The central message is that high-temperature years are becoming more frequent as underlying global warming approaches key climate thresholds.

For resource markets, that means climate policy and physical climate risk will increasingly shape demand, costs and investment decisions at the same time.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The WMO outlook shows that climate risk is moving from long-term scenario planning into near-term industrial reality. Metals demand will benefit from decarbonisation, but producers must also prepare for hotter, more volatile operating conditions.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

ICJ Climate Ruling Gains UN Backing as Oil Powers Push Back

International Court of Justice

ICJ climate ruling support has gained global political weight after the UN general assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the court’s advisory opinion on states’ obligations to protect the climate system. The vote shows that climate policy is increasingly moving into legal and trade-risk territory.

The ICJ climate ruling is not legally binding, but it carries legal and moral authority that could influence future climate litigation. That makes it important for energy, mining, metals and industrial companies exposed to emissions, fossil fuels and transition-linked regulation.

The ICJ climate ruling was backed by 141 countries, including China. Only eight countries opposed the resolution, including the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia, the world’s three largest oil producers.

The divide highlights a growing strategic split. Most countries are accepting stronger legal language around climate responsibility, while major fossil fuel producers are resisting efforts that could accelerate pressure on oil, gas and coal.

Climate Duties Move From Politics Toward Legal Risk

The UN resolution calls on member states to take all possible steps to avoid significant damage to the climate and environment. It also urges countries to follow through on their Paris Agreement commitments.

Vanuatu, which led the resolution, framed the issue as a matter of legal obligation rather than political discretion. That language is important because it gives climate policy a stronger legal foundation.

For industry, the risk is clear. Even if the advisory opinion is not binding, it may support future lawsuits, regulatory challenges and pressure on governments to tighten climate rules.

The resolution also reinforces earlier climate summit outcomes. It points to keeping the global temperature rise to 1.5°C, tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling energy efficiency improvement rates by 2030, transitioning away from fossil fuels and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

That matters for metals demand. Stronger climate implementation supports long-term demand for copper, aluminium, electrical steel, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other materials tied to grids, renewables, batteries and electrification.

However, it also raises pressure on high-emission industrial sectors. Steel, aluminium, cement, chemicals, mining and refining will face closer scrutiny over emissions, power sources and supply-chain transparency.

Oil Producers Resist While Finance Divide Remains

The opposition from the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia shows that fossil fuel producers remain wary of climate language that could constrain future energy policy. The US objected to the resolution, arguing that it included inappropriate political demands related to fossil fuels.

Russia also opposed the measure, saying the resolution risked making the ICJ opinion mandatory in nature and selectively used the advisory opinion and climate summit outcomes.

Several developing and fossil fuel-producing countries focused on another issue: finance. India, Iraq and Algeria abstained, arguing that the resolution placed too much emphasis on emissions cuts while not adequately addressing climate finance and adaptation support.

This dispute will remain central to future climate negotiations. Developing economies want funding to support decarbonisation, adaptation and industrial transition, while developed countries and climate-vulnerable states want faster action on emissions.

Brazil, the Cop 30 president, supported the resolution. Turkey, which will host Cop 31 in Antalya, abstained, while Australia supported the text but said that support should not be read as agreement with every part of the advisory opinion.

For industrial markets, the vote confirms that climate policy is not retreating. It is becoming more legal, more geopolitical and more connected to trade, finance and supply-chain decisions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The UN vote turns climate responsibility into a stronger legal signal for governments and industry. For metals and mining, the opportunity is rising demand from electrification, but the risk is higher scrutiny over emissions, origin and financing.

EU 2026 Growth Forecast Cut as Energy Shock Hits Industrial Outlook

EU energy

EU 2026 growth forecast has been cut to 1.1% as the European Commission warned that the US-Iran war has created a new energy shock, lifted inflation risk and weakened economic sentiment across the bloc.

EU 2026 growth forecast was lowered by 0.3 percentage points from the previous projection of 1.4%. The downgrade reflects the sharp rise in energy costs since late February and the renewed pressure on households, manufacturers and public finances.

EU 2026 growth forecast matters for metals and industrial supply chains because higher gas and oil prices directly affect production costs, margins and demand visibility. Energy-intensive sectors such as aluminium, steel, chemicals, fertilizers and glass remain especially exposed.

The Commission expects EU growth to recover to 1.4% in 2027, while eurozone growth is forecast at 1.2%. But the near-term outlook remains fragile as the energy shock continues to reshape inflation and investment decisions.

Higher Gas and Oil Prices Weigh on European Competitiveness

Energy prices have risen sharply since the outbreak of the conflict. The Commission said gas prices increased by 50% and crude oil prices by 65% between 27 February and the 29 April cut-off date.

The outlook assumes average TTF gas futures prices will be 47% higher in 2026 and 32% higher in 2027 than in the previous forecast. That creates a heavier cost base for European industry.

For manufacturers, the impact is immediate. Higher gas, power and fuel costs reduce competitiveness against producers in regions with cheaper energy.

This is especially important for metals. European smelters, refiners and rolling mills already face pressure from imports, carbon costs and weak demand. Another energy shock could delay restocking and weaken investment appetite.

Inflation is also expected to rise. EU headline inflation is forecast to increase to 3.1% in 2026 from 2.5% in 2025, before easing to 2.4% in 2027.

That inflation path limits policy flexibility. Governments may need to support vulnerable consumers and industries, but public finances are already under pressure.

The EU general government deficit is expected to widen to 3.6% of GDP by 2027, up from 3.1% in 2025. This reduces the room for broad stimulus and increases the importance of targeted support.

Growth Gap Widens Across the EU

The energy shock is affecting member states unevenly. Ireland is forecast to contract by 1.2%, while major economies such as Italy, Germany and France are expected to grow only modestly.

Germany’s growth is forecast at 0.6%, France at 0.8%, Italy at 0.5% and the Netherlands at 1%. These figures point to weak momentum across several core industrial economies.

Southern and eastern Europe show stronger projections. Spain is forecast to grow by 2.4%, Lithuania by 3%, Poland by 3.5% and Malta by 3.7%.

The gap matters because Europe’s industrial recovery will not be uniform. Regions with stronger growth may support construction, infrastructure and manufacturing demand, while slower economies could weigh on metals consumption.

The Commission also warned of a downside scenario in which EU-wide growth falls to just 0.7% this year. That risk depends partly on how quickly oil and gas supply from the Mideast Gulf can normalise.

EU economy commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said Europe should respond by further reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels and keeping fiscal support temporary and targeted.

That message reinforces the strategic link between energy security and industrial competitiveness. Europe has reduced the energy intensity of economic output by about 44% since 1995, but the latest shock shows that import dependence still carries major economic risk.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s growth downgrade is an industrial warning, not just a macroeconomic revision. The bloc cannot protect metals, manufacturing and clean-energy supply chains without faster domestic energy deployment and lower exposure to imported fossil fuels.

Global Recycled Metals Output Rises as China and Emerging Regions Expand Capacity

Recycled Metals

Global recycled metals output increased further in 2025 as China maintained its leading position and emerging regions expanded recycling capacity. Production of recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc reached about 59.2mn t, up 5.6% from a year earlier.

Global recycled metals output is becoming more important to non-ferrous supply security as mining, processing and trade flows face rising geopolitical and cost pressures. Recycling now provides a larger secondary source of industrial metal units for manufacturers, smelters and battery supply chains.

Global recycled metals output accounted for around 34% of total non-ferrous metal production in 2025. The sector also delivered cumulative savings of about 1.2bn t of primary mineral resources, underlining its growing role in resource conservation.

The growth shows that recycled metals are no longer a secondary environmental story. They are becoming a core part of industrial raw material strategy across copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and battery metals.

China Leads as Regional Recycling Capacity Expands

China remained the world’s largest recycled base metals producer in 2025, with output of 20.57mn t. That represented 34.7% of global production.

The country’s scale gives it a major role in recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc supply. It also strengthens China’s position across non-ferrous metals at a time when primary raw material security is under pressure.

Europe produced more than 10mn t of recycled base metals, while the US produced more than 6mn t. India and southeast Asia reached around 6mn t and 4mn t, respectively.

These figures show that recycling capacity is becoming more geographically distributed. Emerging regions are no longer only consumers of recycled raw materials. They are becoming processing centres in their own right.

Battery-related recycling is also growing quickly. Nickel, cobalt and lithium recovery is supporting the new energy industry as electric vehicle and energy storage supply chains look for more secure material sources.

China aims to increase domestic recycled material recovery to 23mn t by 2030 under its next five-year plan. That target implies annual growth of around 7%.

The country is also expected to strengthen recycled product certification and explore the inclusion of recycled materials in carbon trading systems. This could make recycled metal more valuable for customers seeking traceable and lower-carbon supply.

Trade Flows and Technology Move Toward Asia

Global recycled raw material trade is becoming more regional, more Asia-focused and more diversified. Europe and North America remain major exporters of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock.

Europe exports around 2mn t/yr of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock, while North America exports about 4.2mn t/yr. China and India remain the largest importers, with imports exceeding 4mn t and 2mn t, respectively.

Southeast Asia is becoming a key transshipment hub. Regional recycled aluminium feedstock trade reached about 1.3mn t of imports and 900,000t of exports.

Black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries is also increasingly moving toward Asian processing centres. This reflects Asia’s stronger battery materials processing base and growing demand for recovered nickel, cobalt and lithium units.

Technology is improving the recycling value chain. Advances in laser sorting, intelligent dismantling, multi-metal battery recovery and digital process control are raising recovery rates and product quality.

Leading producers have achieved recycling rates above 94% for aluminium and 95% for lithium. These levels show how recycling is moving closer to industrial-grade resource recovery rather than simple scrap handling.

New products are also expanding. High-strength recycled aluminium alloys, high-purity recycled copper and recycled rare-earth permanent magnets are gaining traction.

This matters because recycled metal must meet customer specifications before it can displace primary material. Better sorting, cleaner chemistry and stronger certification will determine how much recycled metal can enter high-value applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Recycling is becoming a strategic metals supply pillar, not just a sustainability tool. The next competitive edge will come from producers that can turn complex scrap and battery waste into certified, high-purity and customer-ready materials.

Rising Aluminium Prices Seen Unlikely to Derail Demand Growth

Aluminium

Rising aluminium prices are unlikely to destroy demand, despite higher premiums caused by Middle East supply disruption and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Speakers at an aluminium industry event in London said the sector’s medium-term demand drivers remain strong.

Rising aluminium prices have raised concerns among analysts that buyers could reduce consumption or switch to alternative materials. Those fears have grown as supply disruption has lifted global delivery premiums and tightened availability.

Rising aluminium prices are still being weighed against structural demand from packaging, automotive lightweighting, power infrastructure, energy transition projects and artificial intelligence-related growth. Industry speakers argued that these end-use trends are not easily reversed by short-term price movements.

The debate matters because aluminium demand forecasts remain strong. Consensus expectations have pointed to demand growth of around 40% in 2022-30, while newer forecasts suggest growth of about 5% per year over the next decade.

Packaging and Automotive Demand Look More Resilient Than Expected

Packaging demand appears relatively insulated from short-term aluminium price moves. Alcoa said it is seeing more products move into aluminium cans and that price is not the main factor driving packaging substitution.

This is important because beverage cans and packaging remain high-volume aluminium markets. Their appeal is tied not only to cost, but also to recyclability, light weight, consumer preference and established filling infrastructure.

Automotive demand is more price-sensitive. However, major material choices in vehicle platforms are not usually changed because of short-term price movements.

Automakers make aluminium decisions around lightweighting, crash performance, emissions rules, platform design and long-term supply strategy. This gives aluminium some demand stability even when prices and premiums rise.

Still, demand destruction cannot be ruled out completely. High interest rates, weak consumer purchasing power and elevated living costs may continue to limit consumption in some traditional markets.

Copper Prices Strengthen Aluminium’s Role in Electrification

Energy transition and AI infrastructure demand give aluminium a stronger long-term floor. These sectors require large volumes of conductive, lightweight and scalable material.

Copper remains the main competing material in electrical and cable applications. But copper prices are now so high that some buyers are more likely to consider substituting copper with aluminium than the reverse.

This strengthens aluminium’s position in power cables, grids, renewable energy, data centres and related infrastructure. Aluminium offers good conductivity, lower weight and more transparent supply-chain options in some applications.

The energy transition also supports demand through decarbonisation. Solar, wind, transmission systems, electric vehicles, battery enclosures and industrial electrification all require more aluminium.

AI infrastructure adds another layer. Data centres need power distribution, cooling systems, structural materials and electrical infrastructure, all of which can support aluminium use.

Therefore, the demand question is not only about price. It is about whether the world can build enough power, transport and digital infrastructure. Aluminium remains one of the core materials for that buildout.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The aluminium market is showing that strategic demand can absorb higher prices better than traditional models suggest. The real risk is not immediate demand destruction, but whether supply disruption, premiums and energy costs create uneven pressure across weaker end-use sectors.

EU EV Transition Faces Energy Cost and Trade Policy Pressure

EU energy

EU EV transition plans are facing growing pressure from high energy costs, tougher global competition and a regulatory model that industry leaders say may be weakening Europe’s automotive position. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car Summit warned that Europe must rethink how it competes with China and other industrial economies.

EU EV transition policy has relied heavily on regulation, including the planned 2035 phase-out of new internal combustion engine car sales. But carmakers and suppliers argue that regulation alone cannot deliver a competitive electric vehicle industry if energy prices, subsidies and supply-chain costs remain unfavourable.

EU EV transition challenges are becoming more visible as Chinese automakers gain share in Europe, southeast Asia and Latin America. Chinese producers have built cost-competitive EV platforms through subsidies, domestic competition, supply-chain control and fast industrial scaling.

The debate matters for metals because slower or more expensive electrification can reshape demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, aluminium and rare earth magnets. Automotive materials demand will still grow, but the path may become less direct and more exposed to policy choices.

China’s EV Scale Forces Europe to Rethink Trade Strategy

European automotive suppliers are calling for a more realistic approach to global competition. The industry is facing rivals that operate under different labour, subsidy and industrial policy conditions.

China has become one of the world’s strongest EV exporters. It accounted for around 40% of global EV exports in 2024, while leading Chinese brands have expanded aggressively with lower-cost, technology-rich vehicles.

This creates a competitive problem for European carmakers. Europe has focused on setting strict emissions targets, while China has focused on making EVs cheaper, scalable and export-ready.

Several industry executives now argue that collaboration may become unavoidable. Western manufacturers may need to partner with Chinese or other international competitors that already have a technological lead in EV platforms, batteries, software and power electronics.

This could change European supply chains. Rather than developing every technology internally, carmakers may increasingly combine European assembly and branding with externally sourced EV systems.

That strategy could support faster electrification, but it also creates dependence on imported components, battery materials and processed inputs. It may help automakers compete on cost, but it does not solve Europe’s strategic materials vulnerability.

Energy Costs Could Slow Consumer Adoption and Metals Demand

High charging and energy costs are another major barrier to Europe’s EV push. If consumers face much higher charging costs than drivers in China or other regions, the economic case for EV adoption weakens.

This is critical because EV demand is highly sensitive to total ownership cost. Batteries may become cheaper, but charging costs, highway tariffs and energy price volatility can still shape consumer decisions.

For battery metals, this matters directly. Slower EV adoption would reduce the speed of demand growth for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, especially in full battery electric vehicles with large battery packs.

Copper and aluminium remain better positioned across multiple automotive pathways. EVs require copper for wiring, motors, charging systems and power electronics, while aluminium supports lightweighting, battery enclosures and structural components.

However, Europe’s automotive metals demand will increasingly depend on which technology mix wins. Full BEVs support larger battery metals demand, while hybrids and lower-cost EV platforms could shift consumption toward smaller batteries, more electronics and continued use of conventional automotive materials.

The policy challenge is therefore industrial as much as environmental. Europe must reduce emissions while keeping manufacturing competitive, securing raw materials and lowering energy costs for consumers.

If Europe cannot align regulation, energy prices and trade strategy, its EV transition could become a market for imported vehicles rather than a platform for domestic industrial growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s EV problem is not only about regulation or consumer demand. It is about whether the region can build a cost-competitive industrial system around energy, materials, technology and trade before Chinese EV platforms define the market.

Battery Metals Demand Faces Slower Path as Hybrid Vehicle Growth Extends

Battery Metals

Battery metals demand could face a slower growth path as carmakers and suppliers expect hybrids and range extenders to remain important for longer than earlier electric-only transition models assumed. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car summit said vehicle decarbonisation should be measured by emissions reduction, not only battery electric vehicle share.

Battery metals demand remains structurally supported by electrification. However, a longer hybrid phase could reduce near-term demand intensity for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese because hybrid vehicles use smaller battery packs than full battery electric vehicles.

Battery metals demand assumptions are therefore becoming more complex. Automotive electrification is still progressing, but the industry is moving toward a mixed powertrain future rather than a simple shift from combustion engines to full BEVs.

Horse Powertrain chief executive Matias Giannini said half of passenger vehicles could still be produced with some form of combustion or hybrid powertrain by 2040. That outlook would keep investment flowing into efficient hybrid systems alongside EV platforms.

Hybrid Growth Changes the Battery Raw Materials Curve

Hybrid vehicle growth could temper the pace of battery raw material demand without reversing electrification. Hybrids and range extenders still require electric motors, inverters, wiring and batteries, but their battery packs are much smaller than those used in BEVs.

This matters most for nickel. High-nickel NCM and NCA batteries are closely tied to longer-range BEVs, where larger packs are needed to deliver performance and driving range.

A slower BEV ramp-up could delay some of the nickel sulphate demand growth that has supported investment cases for new battery-grade nickel projects. It could also affect cobalt and manganese demand in cathode chemistries exposed to full EV penetration rates.

Lithium remains supported across almost every electrification pathway. Still, a longer hybrid transition could slow the rate at which large-format BEV batteries absorb lithium units.

The shift does not mean automotive metals demand will weaken across the board. Hybrids use more copper than conventional combustion vehicles because they require electric motors, power electronics and more complex wiring systems.

Continued hybrid and combustion production also supports aluminium castings, stainless steel, exhaust components and engine-related materials. Meanwhile, BEV growth still supports aluminium lightweighting, copper wiring, charging infrastructure and battery materials.

The result is a less linear automotive metals outlook. Battery metals may grow more slowly than aggressive BEV scenarios suggest, while broader automotive metals consumption remains supported by platform complexity and mixed powertrain production.

Policy Flexibility Could Reshape European Metal Demand

European suppliers are pushing for more flexibility in the EU regulatory framework. Current policy remains heavily weighted toward full electrification through tailpipe emissions targets.

The EU targets a 100% reduction in tailpipe emissions from new cars and vans from 2035. That effectively ends new combustion engine sales unless future exemptions are created.

Industry participants increasingly want a more technology-neutral route. They argue that hybrids, range extenders, renewable fuels and lower-carbon manufacturing should contribute to emissions reduction alongside BEVs.

This policy debate matters for metals. Battery material demand depends heavily on BEV penetration, average pack size and chemistry choice.

If Europe allows a longer role for hybrids and range extenders, lithium-ion battery capacity demand per vehicle could grow more slowly. That would affect demand forecasts for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese.

Chinese EV and hybrid technology is also improving quickly. This puts pressure on European and US automakers to share development costs across BEV, hybrid and range-extender platforms.

For suppliers, the strategic issue is flexibility. Companies tied only to high-growth BEV battery assumptions may face demand timing risk, while suppliers serving copper, aluminium, stainless steel, electronics and hybrid systems may benefit from a broader platform mix.

The automotive transition is still real, but the material demand path is becoming more diversified. Metals markets must now track powertrain mix, not only EV sales headlines.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hybrid growth does not weaken the energy transition, but it changes the metals timing. Battery metals demand will still rise, yet copper, aluminium and hybrid-related materials may capture more value if automakers choose a longer mixed-powertrain route.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV Production Plan Signals Localised Chinese EV Strategy

Stellantis

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production plans could mark a new phase in Europe’s electric vehicle supply chain, as western automakers look to combine local assembly with lower-cost Chinese components. Stellantis and Leapmotor are considering new battery electric vehicle lines at Zaragoza and Villaverde in Spain through their Leapmotor International joint venture.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production would move the partnership beyond vehicle imports and toward European manufacturing. That shift matters because local content rules, tariff risk and regional supply security are becoming more important in the EV market.

Stellantis Leapmotor Spain BEV production could also help the companies respond to weaker European affordability conditions. Chinese component sourcing can lower cost, while Spanish assembly may improve regulatory and commercial positioning inside Europe.

The companies have not disclosed production targets, utilisation rates or investment figures. This leaves the scale of the plan uncertain, but the strategic direction is clear.

Spain Could Become a European Platform for Leapmotor Models

Zaragoza could gain a new all-electric SUV line as early as this year. The plant has long been associated with Opel production and could become a base for new BEV output under the joint venture.

Villaverde in Madrid may also become more important to Leapmotor International. The plant faces a production gap after Citroen C4 output ends and may shift entirely to Leapmotor models by 2029.

That potential transition would give Stellantis a way to protect industrial activity at existing Spanish plants while adding lower-cost BEV models to its European portfolio.

The plan reflects a broader industry pattern. European automakers are trying to defend market share against Chinese EV competition while also using Chinese platforms, components and cost structures to improve competitiveness.

Stellantis bought a 21% stake in Leapmotor in 2023 and created a 51-49 joint venture to sell and manufacture Leapmotor vehicles outside China. Spain could now become one of the key production bases for that strategy.

For Spain, the opportunity is industrial. More BEV assembly could support jobs, supplier activity and demand for local logistics, batteries, wiring, aluminium components and electronics integration.

Local Assembly Meets Cost Pressure and Supply-Chain Rules

The move from imports to local production is strategically important. European BEV manufacturing is increasingly shaped by tariffs, local content rules, battery sourcing requirements and political pressure to keep vehicle production inside the region.

Leapmotor brings cost-competitive EV engineering and components. Stellantis brings European plants, distribution, regulatory experience and manufacturing scale.

This combination could help address one of Europe’s biggest EV problems: producing affordable electric vehicles while maintaining regional industrial capacity.

However, the lack of disclosed volumes makes the market impact difficult to judge. Without production targets, it is unclear whether the Spain plans will materially change Stellantis’ European BEV output.

Stellantis needs stronger BEV momentum. Its BEV sales accounted for around 13% of output in the first half of last year, behind Volkswagen and BMW, and the company later reported a major write-down after cutting prices.

Leapmotor is growing much faster. Its EV sales, including plug-in hybrids, more than doubled last year to 596,000 units. That growth gives Stellantis access to a Chinese partner with clear scale momentum.

The industrial implication extends into materials. More European BEV production increases demand for aluminium body and structural parts, copper wiring, electrical steel, battery materials, power electronics and lightweight components.

If the model works, Stellantis and Leapmotor could create a template for Chinese-designed, Europe-built EVs. That would reshape competition not only in vehicles, but also in the upstream materials and component chains that support regional BEV manufacturing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Stellantis and Leapmotor are not only discussing new Spanish EV lines; they are testing a hybrid supply-chain model for Europe. Local assembly with Chinese components may become a practical route for automakers caught between cost pressure, tariff risk and the need to keep European factories active.

CFC Recycling Tennessee Expansion Adds Gallatin Scrapyard and Nonferrous Feedstock

CFC Recycling

CFC Recycling Tennessee expansion has advanced with the acquisition of Goolsby & Sons Recycling, giving the company a third scrapyard in the state. The deal strengthens CFC’s regional collection network and adds a new feedstock source for its nonferrous shredder.

CFC Recycling Tennessee expansion now links the company’s existing scrapyards in Tullahoma and McMinnville with a new site in Gallatin. The acquired location will be temporarily closed for upgrades before reopening in June.

CFC Recycling Tennessee expansion is significant because scrap processors are increasingly competing for reliable regional feedstock. Control over collection points, yard infrastructure and processing routes can determine margins in both ferrous and nonferrous recycling.

Financial details of the acquisition were not disclosed. CFC plans a soft opening on 18 May before fully reopening the Gallatin location in June.

Gallatin Yard Strengthens Regional Scrap Collection

The Goolsby & Sons site gives CFC another physical intake point for scrap in Tennessee. That matters because scrapyard density improves access to local industrial, demolition, commercial and consumer scrap flows.

CFC plans to renovate buildings and equipment at the Gallatin site. It also plans to concrete surfaces, improving yard handling, environmental control and operating efficiency.

These upgrades are practical but important. Better surfaces can reduce contamination, improve traffic flow, support cleaner material handling and help meet customer and regulatory expectations.

The acquisition also gives CFC a stronger footprint in a state with active manufacturing, construction and industrial activity. Regional scrap generation can support steady flows of steel, stainless steel, aluminium and other nonferrous materials.

For smaller recycling networks, yard expansion can create scale advantages. More sites improve sourcing reach, while centralised processing can lift equipment utilisation.

Nonferrous Shredder Feedstock Becomes Strategic

The deal adds a new feedstock source for CFC’s nonferrous shredder. The company operates a 3Tek Bravo 6280 hammer mill shredder used to process stainless steel and aluminium specialty items.

That detail is commercially important. Nonferrous scrap processing can carry higher value than ordinary ferrous scrap when material is sorted, upgraded and delivered into qualified downstream channels.

Aluminium specialty scrap is especially relevant because secondary aluminium demand is growing across automotive, packaging, construction and industrial markets. Processors with better collection and shredding capacity can capture more value from complex scrap streams.

Stainless steel scrap also remains valuable because of its nickel, chromium and molybdenum content. Efficient shredding and separation can improve recoveries and support alloy producers seeking recycled feedstock.

CFC’s acquisition therefore fits a wider industry trend. Scrap companies are not only buying yards for volume. They are building feedstock networks around specific processing equipment and higher-value material streams.

The Gallatin site should help CFC improve sourcing flexibility. Once renovated, it can support local intake while feeding the company’s broader processing platform.

The Metalnomist Commentary

CFC’s acquisition shows that regional scrap control is becoming more strategic as recyclers chase cleaner and higher-value feedstock. The real value of the Gallatin yard will depend on how effectively CFC channels material into its stainless and aluminium specialty shredding operations.

Pax Silica Initiative Gains Norway as Western Supply Chains Tighten Around AI and Semiconductors

Pax silica

Pax Silica initiative membership has expanded with Norway joining the US-led framework for artificial intelligence, semiconductors and critical raw materials security. The move adds a European partner with low-carbon power, industrial metals capacity and growing critical minerals relevance.

The Pax Silica initiative has become part of Washington’s effort to reduce dependence on China in critical minerals, semiconductor supply chains and AI infrastructure. Norway’s accession strengthens the coalition’s European minerals, energy and capital base.

The Pax Silica initiative now includes countries with complementary strengths in mining, processing, technology, energy, finance and advanced manufacturing. That mix is important because strategic supply chains increasingly require more than mineral deposits alone.

Norway’s ambassador to the US, Anniken Huitfeldt, is expected to sign the initiative, giving Norway a formal role in a US-backed economic security framework.

Norway Adds Low-Carbon Metals, Capital and Rare Earth Potential

Norway brings several advantages to the coalition. The country has a long-established aluminium and ferro-alloys industry, access to low-carbon power and a growing policy focus on critical raw materials.

Its role has also become more relevant because of work on the Fen rare earth deposit in southern Norway. Rare earths are central to permanent magnets, defence systems, electric motors, wind turbines and advanced electronics.

Norway’s sovereign wealth fund also gives the country strategic capital relevance. In critical minerals, financing capacity can be as important as geology because new projects require long development timelines, technical qualification and patient capital.

Norway said Pax Silica could give domestic companies stronger access to advanced technology value chains. This matters for suppliers that want to connect local raw materials, clean power and industrial capabilities with AI, semiconductor and defence-linked markets.

The country is also aligning its wider policy with key partners through the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and European Chips Act. That creates a bridge between European industrial policy and the US-led supply-chain framework.

Supply-Chain Blocs Reshape Mineral Investment Logic

The industrial significance of Pax Silica lies less in immediate metal flows and more in policy direction. Western governments are building supply-chain blocs that link raw materials, processing, capital and end-use manufacturing across allied jurisdictions.

This could affect future investment decisions in rare earths, aluminium, silicon-related materials, battery metals and other inputs tied to semiconductors and AI infrastructure.

The framework also reflects a shift in how critical minerals projects are evaluated. Access to technology partners, downstream customers, public financing and geopolitical alignment may increasingly determine which projects advance.

For Norway, membership strengthens its position in the emerging western critical minerals architecture. For the wider market, it reinforces the idea that supply security is becoming a structured policy goal rather than a simple procurement choice.

This trend will matter for metals producers, refiners, traders and manufacturers. Companies that can operate inside trusted supply-chain blocs may gain better access to capital, offtake support and advanced technology customers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Norway’s entry into Pax Silica shows that critical minerals strategy is now merging with AI, semiconductor and economic security policy. The next phase of mineral competition will be defined by blocs that combine geology, capital, clean energy and downstream demand.

Mercuria Venezuela Offtake Agreements Signal Push to Reopen Mineral Exports

Mercuria

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements mark a significant attempt to reconnect Venezuelan mineral supply with international markets. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group has signed strategic offtake agreements with investment firm Heeney Capital covering Venezuelan bulk commodities and gold projects.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements are expected to support initial mineral exports worth about $2.2bn/yr. The partners are also advancing possible transactions in aluminium, nickel and ferrous products that could represent another $3bn/yr in export value, subject to regulatory approvals.

The agreements come as US government officials and industry participants visited Caracas to support new investment frameworks and supply agreements in oil and mining. The timing shows how raw materials trade is becoming more closely tied to diplomacy, sanctions policy and western supply-chain security.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements also fit the trader’s broader expansion into metals and minerals. The company is using offtake structures to secure future supply while positioning itself in markets where conventional financing remains difficult.

Venezuela’s Aluminium and Nickel Revival Will Require Capital

Venezuela has historically been an important producer and exporter of aluminium, iron ore and other bulk commodities. However, its industrial base has weakened after years of underinvestment, power shortages, sanctions constraints and operational deterioration.

The aluminium sector is a clear example. Restarting or expanding output will require reliable electricity, working capital, plant rehabilitation, spare parts, logistics and customer confidence.

Nickel and ferrous products offer additional potential, but they face similar execution challenges. Resource availability alone will not be enough. Venezuela must rebuild industrial reliability and prove that export flows can operate consistently.

This makes Mercuria’s role important. A trading group can provide offtake, financing support, logistics expertise and market access without taking the same full risk as a mine owner or plant operator.

For Venezuela, the agreements could help generate export revenues and attract additional foreign capital. For western buyers, they could create another source of raw materials outside more concentrated supply chains.

Still, regulatory approval remains critical. Sanctions, compliance requirements and political risk will determine how quickly these agreements can move from announcement to physical trade.

Offtake Deals Reflect a New Metals Geopolitics

The structure of the agreements shows how metals trading is changing. Offtake deals are no longer just commercial purchase contracts. They are becoming tools for supply security, project restart and geopolitical alignment.

Commodity traders can secure future material while helping producers revive exports. This model is especially useful in jurisdictions where banks may hesitate, governments want fast results and buyers need alternative supply.

Mercuria’s Venezuela strategy also reflects the wider shift in western raw materials policy. The US and its allies are looking for new sources of industrial materials as supply chains become more fragmented and politically exposed.

This does not mean Venezuela can quickly return to full historical production levels. The country’s mining and metals infrastructure needs investment, operational discipline and credible long-term governance.

However, the strategic logic is clear. If Venezuela can reopen parts of its extractive industry under workable investment frameworks, it could become a useful supplementary source for aluminium, nickel, ferrous products and gold.

For Mercuria, the opportunity is to move early. By securing offtake and building relationships before assets fully recover, the trader can gain access to material flows that may become more valuable as western supply chains diversify.

The broader metals market should watch whether these agreements lead to actual export volumes. The first test will be regulatory clearance, followed by financing, rehabilitation and shipment execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mercuria’s Venezuela agreements show that metals offtake is becoming a geopolitical instrument. The opportunity is large, but the real test will be whether Venezuela can rebuild reliable production and export systems after years of industrial decline.

 

France Fossil Fuel Roadmap Sets Clear Timetable for Energy Transition

Fossil fuel roadmap

France fossil fuel roadmap marks an important step in turning climate targets into a structured energy transition plan. The roadmap does not introduce new targets, but it brings France’s energy policies, electrification strategy and climate goals into one document.

France fossil fuel roadmap is significant because it gives a clear schedule for reducing fossil fuel dependence. France aims to cut fossil fuels from around 60% of final energy consumption in 2023 to 40% in 2030 and 30% in 2035.

France fossil fuel roadmap also sets long-term phase-out dates for coal, oil and natural gas. The government plans to phase out coal by 2030, oil by 2045 and natural gas by 2050, while targeting net zero emissions by mid-century.

The roadmap matters beyond France. It gives other governments a practical example of how fossil fuel transition planning can connect emissions targets, energy security, electrification and industrial strategy.

Electrification Becomes the Core of Fossil Fuel Reduction

France’s roadmap links fossil fuel reduction directly to electrification. The country’s new electrification plan, released in April, now sits alongside its national low-carbon strategy and wider climate targets.

This connection is important because fossil fuel phase-out cannot happen only through policy declarations. It requires more electricity, cleaner generation, stronger grids, electric heating, electric transport, industrial efficiency and lower-carbon manufacturing.

France also has an energy security reason to move faster. More than 95% of fossil fuels burned in the country are imported, exposing households and industry to external price shocks, shipping risks and geopolitical disruption.

Reducing imported fossil fuel use therefore serves two goals. It lowers emissions and reduces exposure to volatile global energy markets.

The roadmap reiterates France’s target to cut gross greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. It also supports the longer-term objective of net zero emissions in 2050.

France’s remaining two coal-fired power plants are scheduled to close or be converted by next year. This makes coal the easiest part of the transition, while oil and natural gas will require deeper changes across transport, buildings and industry.

For metals and materials markets, the roadmap points to rising demand for the physical infrastructure behind electrification. Copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, rare earth magnets, grid equipment and power electronics will all become more important as France cuts fossil fuel use.

The policy also strengthens the case for clean energy investment. A clearer timetable can help utilities, manufacturers, grid operators and industrial users plan capital spending around future energy demand.

Fossil Fuel Transition Planning Gains Global Momentum

Think tanks welcomed the French roadmap because few countries address coal, oil and gas together under one transition framework. They noted that France did not raise ambition, but still provided a useful model by setting timelines and aligning policies.

This matters because global climate diplomacy is moving from broad pledges toward implementation. The first global stocktake agreed at Cop 28 called for a transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, but many countries still lack detailed national plans.

France’s roadmap gives that commitment a national structure. It shows how governments can translate climate summit language into domestic policy sequencing.

The document also creates pressure on fossil fuel-producing countries. If demand for fossil fuels declines over the coming decades, producer economies will need diversification plans, new industries and alternative sources of public revenue.

Colombia’s draft fossil fuel transition roadmap shows that this discussion is widening. The country aims to cut primary fossil fuel demand by 90% over 2026-50 while expanding energy access and managing dependence on oil and coal exports.

The EU is also moving in the same direction, even if its language focuses more on emissions reduction than explicit fossil fuel phase-out. The bloc targets net zero emissions by 2050, a 55% emissions reduction by 2030 and a 90% reduction by 2040 compared with 1990 levels.

The practical effect is similar. Deep emissions cuts cannot happen without a major reduction in fossil fuel use.

For industry, this creates a long-term signal. Companies should expect more electrification, stronger carbon rules, higher clean-energy investment and greater pressure to reduce fossil fuel exposure in operations and supply chains.

The strategic issue is execution. Roadmaps help, but governments still need permitting reform, grid investment, clean power capacity, financing, industrial incentives and raw material supply security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

France’s roadmap shows that fossil fuel transition is becoming an infrastructure plan, not just a climate slogan. The industrial winners will be countries that connect phase-out timelines with grids, clean power, critical minerals and manufacturing capacity.

Constellium Record Earnings Highlight North American Aluminium Tightness

Constellium

Constellium record earnings in the first quarter show how favourable North American aluminium market conditions are lifting margins even when shipment volumes remain flat. The France-based downstream aluminium producer reported segment-adjusted Ebitda of $359mn, up 93% from a year earlier.

The company’s revenue rose by 24% to $2.5bn in January-March, while total shipments slipped by 1% to 370,000t. This split matters because Constellium’s performance was driven less by volume growth and more by pricing, product mix, recycling economics and supply shortages in key end markets.

Constellium record earnings were strongest in packaging and automotive rolled products, where North American supply tightness created better commercial conditions. Aerospace and transport also improved, supported by stronger customer activity and rising shipments.

The result reinforces a broader aluminium market theme. Downstream producers with qualified capacity, scrap access and exposure to higher-value products can benefit even in a volatile macroeconomic environment.

Automotive Rolled Products and Recycling Margins Lift North America

Constellium’s packaging and automotive rolled products division delivered the largest earnings improvement. Ebitda rose by 152% on the year to $151mn, while revenue increased by 24% to $1.48bn.

Shipments in the division fell by 3% to 261,000t. The earnings gain despite lower volumes shows that market conditions, not only tonnage, shaped the quarter.

North America was the key driver. Constellium benefited from a supply shortage in automotive rolled products, which improved pricing power and margins for qualified suppliers.

Automotive aluminium supply remains highly sensitive to qualification, product consistency and availability. Automakers cannot easily switch suppliers for body sheet, structural materials or specialised rolled products without approvals and technical validation.

This gives established producers an advantage when supply tightens. Customers need reliable metal, not simply the lowest-cost material.

Constellium also benefited from better US recycling margins. Trade tariffs affected aluminium products but not scrap, improving the relative economics of recycled inputs.

That detail is important. Scrap access can become a margin advantage when tariffs, regional premiums and product shortages reshape the aluminium value chain.

Recycling also supports lower-carbon aluminium supply. Customers in automotive, packaging and industrial markets increasingly need recycled content, traceability and regional supply resilience.

The first-quarter result therefore shows how recycling and trade policy can reinforce each other. Tariffs changed product economics, while scrap availability gave Constellium a stronger cost position.

Aerospace and Transport Demand Strengthens Product Mix

Constellium’s aerospace and transport division also performed strongly. Ebitda rose by 24% to $102mn, while revenue increased by 30% to $609mn.

Shipments in the segment rose by 18% to 60,000t. This was the clearest volume-growth signal across the company’s business units.

The aerospace recovery matters because aircraft programmes need qualified aluminium plate, sheet and extrusions. These materials support structural components, fuselage sections, wings, transport systems and lightweight design.

Aerospace aluminium demand is also tied to long customer approval cycles. Once a supplier is qualified, stable production and delivery reliability become strategically valuable.

The automotive structures and industry division posted Ebitda of $24mn, up 50% from a year earlier. Revenue rose by 9% to $415mn, while shipments fell by 3% to 51,000t.

This again shows the importance of mix and margin. Constellium improved earnings even where volumes declined, suggesting stronger commercial discipline and better end-market positioning.

The company raised its 2026 adjusted Ebitda guidance to $900mn-940mn. Chief executive Ingrid Joerg said macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty remains, but the company is optimistic about its end-market positioning.

Constellium record earnings therefore point to a market where quality of exposure matters more than headline volume. Packaging, automotive rolled products, aerospace and recycling-linked margins are driving performance.

For the aluminium sector, the message is clear. Supply shortages, tariffs, scrap economics and aerospace recovery are reshaping profitability across downstream producers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Constellium’s quarter shows that aluminium value is moving toward qualified products, regional supply and recycling economics. The strongest performers will be producers that can combine technical approvals, scrap access and exposure to tight North American end markets.