Lygend Nickel Capacity Reaches 400,000 t/yr at Obi Island

Lygend

Lygend nickel capacity in Indonesia has increased to around 400,000 t/yr in nickel metal equivalent following the commissioning of all phase 2 rotary kiln electric furnace lines at its Obi Island complex.

Lygend nickel capacity now spans nickel pig iron, mixed hydroxide precipitate and nickel sulphate, giving the Chinese producer exposure to both stainless steel and battery supply chains. The latest expansion highlights Lygend's ability to complete large projects despite weaker margins and tighter Indonesian nickel policies.

Lygend nickel capacity growth comes from 12 new RKEF lines commissioned in May. The phase 2 facilities add 185,000 t/yr of nameplate nickel metal equivalent capacity for NPI production in North Maluku.

The expansion strengthens Obi Island's position as one of Indonesia's major integrated nickel production centres and adds more supply to an already heavily concentrated global nickel market.

Obi Island Expansion Deepens Lygend's Integrated Nickel Position

The phase 2 project significantly expands Lygend's pyrometallurgical capacity. NPI produced through RKEF technology remains a major feedstock for stainless steel production, particularly across Asia.

Lygend also produces MHP and nickel sulphate, extending its position beyond stainless steel into battery materials. MHP can be refined into nickel sulphate for lithium-ion battery cathodes, giving the company exposure to multiple downstream markets.

This integrated structure can provide greater flexibility during weak nickel cycles. Producers focused entirely on one product face greater exposure to changes in stainless steel or battery demand.

Obi Island also gives Lygend scale advantages. Concentrating mining, smelting and downstream processing in one industrial location can reduce logistics costs and improve feedstock integration.

The company's ability to complete phase 2 is notable because other Indonesian nickel projects have faced delays, financing problems and weak economics. Higher operating costs and lower nickel prices have made new capacity increasingly difficult to justify.

Indonesian Policy Raises the Bar for New Nickel Projects

Lygend's expansion comes as Indonesia increases government control over nickel production, pricing and exports. Reduced RKAB mining quotas are tightening access to ore and increasing competition for feedstock.

Adjustments to the HPM pricing formula have also raised raw material costs for processors. At the same time, higher royalty rates are putting additional pressure on smelter margins.

These changes are affecting project development. Several NPI and HPAL projects have been delayed, slowed or cancelled as companies reassess returns under weaker market conditions.

The contrast with Lygend is important. Large integrated producers with existing infrastructure, financing and downstream capacity are better positioned to absorb policy changes than smaller standalone operators.

Indonesia's nickel industry may therefore enter a consolidation phase. Future growth could become increasingly concentrated among large producers capable of controlling ore supply, processing costs and multiple product routes.

For the global nickel market, Lygend's new capacity adds further supply pressure. But Indonesia's tighter policy framework could limit how quickly other projects follow.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lygend's Obi expansion shows that scale and integration are becoming decisive in Indonesia's nickel industry. As margins tighten and Jakarta strengthens control over ore and exports, smaller projects may struggle while established producers continue to consolidate supply.

GNI Debt Restructuring Exposes Pressure on Indonesia’s Nickel Smelting Model

Gunbuster Nickel Industry

GNI debt restructuring has placed one of Indonesia’s large nickel pig iron producers under court-supervised protection as ore shortages, rising costs and weak market conditions pressure the country’s smelting sector. Gunbuster Nickel Industry will continue operating while negotiating revised debt terms with creditors.

GNI debt restructuring follows a Central Jakarta Commercial Court decision placing the company under Indonesia’s suspension of debt payment obligations framework, known as PKPU. The process temporarily protects GNI from creditor enforcement while it prepares a restructuring proposal.

GNI debt restructuring is strategically important because the company operates 1.8mn t/yr of NPI capacity in North Morowali, Sulawesi. The plant represents a major part of the Chinese-backed RKEF expansion that transformed Indonesia into the world’s dominant nickel producer.

The case also follows financial distress at Huadi Nickel Alloy Indonesia, suggesting that pressure is spreading across parts of Indonesia’s NPI industry rather than remaining confined to a single producer.

Ore Shortages and Higher Costs Squeeze RKEF Producers

GNI operates 25 rotary kiln electric furnace production lines and began production in 2021 following investment of around Yn11bn. The scale of the complex makes its financial difficulties a significant signal for Indonesia’s nickel market.

The immediate problem is feedstock. Market participants have cited difficulty securing enough nickel ore as one factor behind recent production cuts at GNI.

Indonesia’s ore market has tightened as mining quotas, lower effective production and revised pricing rules increase costs for smelters. RKEF facilities depend on a continuous flow of suitable laterite ore, so shortages quickly reduce utilisation and raise unit costs.

Payment delays have added further pressure at GNI. Lower output can weaken cash flow while fixed costs, debt service and operating expenses remain high.

Huadi has faced similar problems. The company halted operations and entered its own debt suspension process after struggling with ore availability, higher feedstock costs and weak market conditions.

These cases show that Indonesia’s large nickel resource base does not automatically guarantee low-cost smelter economics. Ore access, pricing rules, power costs and financing are becoming more important differentiators between producers.

Indonesia’s Nickel Expansion Faces a Profitability Test

Indonesia’s nickel growth model was built on rapid investment in RKEF smelters producing NPI for stainless steel. That expansion created massive new supply, but it also compressed margins across the industry.

Oversupply remains an important problem. Weak nickel pricing makes it harder for higher-cost smelters to absorb rising ore and operating expenses.

Policy uncertainty adds another layer. Changes to mining quotas, ore pricing formulas and downstream regulations make long-term production planning more difficult.

Pressure is also visible beyond NPI. Nickel Industries’ ENC HPAL project and Hanrui’s nickel matte project have faced delays, showing that execution challenges are affecting both stainless-linked and battery-linked nickel routes.

This creates a more selective investment environment. Producers with captive mines, stronger balance sheets and integrated downstream assets are likely to be better positioned than standalone smelters dependent on external ore.

For the global nickel market, financial stress among Indonesian producers could eventually become supply discipline. If distressed plants cut output or remain underutilised, some of the oversupply that pressured nickel prices could begin to unwind.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GNI’s restructuring shows that Indonesia’s nickel dominance is entering a profitability test. The next phase will favour integrated producers with secure ore and strong balance sheets rather than smelters built only for rapid capacity growth.

Nornickel Nickel Surplus Forecast Shrinks as Indonesia Supply Tightens

Nornickel

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast has been cut sharply for 2026 as Indonesian ore constraints, higher feedstock costs and sulphur shortages slow the supply growth that drove recent oversupply. The Russian producer now expects a marginal global surplus of around 20,000t, down from its previous forecast of 240,000t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast reflects a major shift in supply conditions. Global nickel production is expected to fall by 5% to 3.71mn t in 2026, marking the first annual decline in a decade, while demand is forecast to rise by 2% to 3.69mn t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast also places Indonesia at the centre of the market balance. Lower effective mining volumes, declining ore grades and sharply higher ore prices are tightening feedstock availability for NPI, HPAL and Class 1 nickel producers.

The adjustment follows a 2025 surplus of around 278,000t, when supply increased by 7% and demand rose by 6%. The market is therefore moving from structural oversupply toward a much tighter balance.

Indonesia Ore and Sulphur Constraints Reshape Supply

Indonesia mined around 320mn t of nickel ore in 2025 against an approved quota of 379mn t. For 2026, quotas are expected at around 300mn t, but actual mining could be closer to 270mn t if utilisation remains near 90%.

Lower ore grades further reduce contained nickel availability. Indonesian NPI production fell by 8% year on year in January-May, suggesting smelters are already feeling the impact.

Philippine ore imports could reach around 25mn t this year and offset part of the shortfall. However, Indonesia’s July quota review remains a critical market variable.

Ore economics are tightening as well. Indonesia’s revised pricing formula has doubled or tripled minimum ore prices for some grades.

Nornickel estimates the new system could add as much as $5,000/t to the cost of Class 1 nickel produced from Indonesian feedstock on a cathode-equivalent basis.

HPAL producers face another problem: sulphur.

Middle East disruption has pushed sulphur prices from around $300/t to above $1,000/t. HPAL operations require roughly 10-11t of sulphur for every tonne of nickel produced.

Indonesia sourced more than 75% of its sulphur imports from the Middle East in 2025, leaving battery nickel projects highly exposed to disrupted maritime supply.

Around one-third of HPAL capacity is currently idle, while HPAL production fell by 20% year on year in May.

Nornickel expects Indonesian NPI output to decline by 11% this year and mixed hydroxide precipitate production by 9%. Class 1 nickel supply is forecast to fall by 2%.

Demand Growth Stays Modest as Stainless Scrap Use Rises

Nickel demand is still growing, but not strongly enough to create a clear deficit.

Nornickel expects stainless steel nickel consumption to rise by only 1% this year. Chinese producers are using more scrap, reducing their need for primary nickel units.

China’s average stainless scrap share is expected to increase to 24% in 2026 from 19% in 2025. That change could keep Chinese primary nickel demand in stainless steel broadly flat at around 1.6mn t.

A higher share of 316 stainless partly offsets the scrap effect because 316 contains more nickel than 304. Chinese 300-series stainless output increased by 3% in the first five months of the year, while 200-series production rose by 11%.

Battery-related demand remains stronger.

China’s nickel sulphate output is forecast to rise by 15% to 421,000t of contained nickel in 2026 and reach 455,000t in 2027. Indonesian nickel sulphate production is expected to increase by 18% to 59,000t this year.

Matte output is another growth area. Indonesian nickel matte production is forecast to jump by 48% as conversion from NPI becomes more attractive.

The market could loosen again in 2027. Nornickel expects the surplus to widen modestly to around 55,000t if Indonesian ore quotas increase, sulphur availability improves and new processing capacity ramps up.

The near-term nickel story has therefore changed. Oversupply has not disappeared, but the margin between surplus and balance has narrowed sharply as Indonesian policy and feedstock economics begin to constrain output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel’s biggest bullish driver is no longer demand acceleration but supply discipline in Indonesia. If ore quotas remain tight and sulphur costs stay elevated, the market could remain far more balanced than recent oversupply trends suggested.

Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets Indonesian MHP Growth Through Acquisitions

Tsingshan

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion will move forward through acquisitions rather than new project development as Indonesia tightens control over additional high pressure acid leach capacity. The Australian producer will acquire stakes in two MHP projects next to its existing Excelsior Nickel Cobalt operation in Central Sulawesi.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion is strategically important because Indonesia has stopped issuing licences for new HPAL developments since late 2025, according to the company. That makes existing permitted projects increasingly valuable to producers seeking battery-grade nickel growth.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion covers the planned Teluk Metal Industry and Chengsheng New Energy projects. Together, the stakes would give NI attributable MHP capacity of almost 17,000 t/yr.

Both projects are located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park and will use ore from NI’s Sampala mine. Their output will feed the electric vehicle battery supply chain.

TMI and CNE Add MHP Capacity Around Existing ENC Platform

NI will pay $169mn for a 17.5% stake in the Teluk Metal Industry HPAL project. TMI has planned nameplate MHP capacity of 38,640 t/yr, giving NI 6,775 t/yr of attributable output.

The transaction also carries construction protection from Tsingshan. The Chinese nickel and stainless steel producer has guaranteed that NI’s investment will be capped at $169mn and that TMI will reach nameplate production by September 2027.

This lowers construction risk for NI and reinforces its relationship with Tsingshan, which already owns an indirect 44% stake in the ENC project.

TMI’s remaining ownership includes Singapore-based Sumber International Investment and a South Korean-Japanese consortium involving LS MnM, Hanwa and another strategic investor. The structure shows how Asian industrial groups are positioning themselves around Indonesian battery nickel supply.

NI is also pursuing a 36% stake in the Chengsheng New Energy HPAL project together with a local partner. The acquisition will be funded by transferring 30% of their combined ownership in the Sampala nickel mine.

CNE has MHP capacity of 28,357 t/yr, with 10,208 t/yr attributable to NI. Commissioning is expected by mid-2027.

The CNE transaction still requires shareholder approval because an NI director is associated with the selling investment firm. That adds a governance step before completion.

Indonesia Licensing Limits Increase Value of Existing HPAL Assets

Indonesia’s decision to stop issuing new HPAL licences changes the economics of nickel expansion. Producers can no longer rely on greenfield development to add battery-grade processing capacity.

This gives existing permitted projects a scarcity premium. Companies seeking growth must acquire stakes, partner with current licence holders or expand existing operations.

For NI, TMI and CNE extend the company’s battery nickel platform around ENC. The 46%-owned ENC project is preparing to produce nickel cathode and nickel sulphate, giving NI exposure further downstream than MHP alone.

The strategy also integrates mining and processing. Ore from the Sampala project will supply both TMI and CNE, linking captive feedstock with HPAL conversion and battery-material output.

That integration matters because Indonesia’s nickel industry is increasingly constrained by ore availability, regulatory approvals and government efforts to manage oversupply.

The policy shift could support nickel prices by slowing future HPAL growth. But it also raises the value of projects already holding development rights.

For NI, acquisitions therefore become more than a growth option. They are now the main route to expanding Indonesian MHP production under a tighter licensing regime.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s HPAL licensing freeze is turning permitted projects into strategic assets. Nickel Industries is responding by buying access to existing capacity, showing how policy can shift competition from project development to asset acquisition.

Indonesia NPI Export Exemption Eases Nickel Trade Fears but Leaves Policy Risk

Nickel pig iron

Indonesia NPI export exemption has eased immediate concerns in the nickel market after sources said nickel pig iron will not need to be exported through Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia. The clarification reduces near-term disruption risk for Indonesia’s dominant nickel alloy product.

Indonesia NPI export exemption matters because more than 90% of Indonesia’s nickel-alloy output is nickel pig iron. NPI is mainly used in stainless steel production and forms the backbone of Indonesia’s nickel downstreaming model.

Indonesia NPI export exemption does not remove all uncertainty. Ferro-nickel exports are still expected to be traded through DSI, while the industry lacks an official definition that clearly separates ferro-nickel from NPI.

That ambiguity is important because ferro-nickel and NPI share the same HS code under global and Indonesian trade frameworks. Market participants usually distinguish them by nickel content, with ferro-nickel typically above 20% nickel and NPI usually around 10-14%.

NPI Exclusion Protects Indonesia’s Core Nickel Flow

The exclusion of NPI from the DSI export requirement is commercially significant. NPI is Indonesia’s largest nickel product by volume and a critical feedstock for stainless steelmakers.

If NPI had been included, the rule could have disrupted contracts, pricing, payment flows and export execution across a major share of Indonesia’s nickel industry. That risk has now been reduced, at least for the near term.

The clarification also helps Chinese and regional stainless steel buyers. These customers rely heavily on Indonesian NPI because it offers a cost-effective alternative to pure nickel metal in stainless production.

However, the inclusion of ferro-nickel still matters. A small number of Indonesian smelters produce higher-nickel ferro-nickel, and those exports may now face a more centralised transaction structure through DSI.

The policy could therefore split Indonesia’s nickel alloy market into two regulatory paths. NPI would remain outside the new state export channel, while ferro-nickel would fall under tighter government control.

The risk is classification. Without a formal technical definition, exporters may face uncertainty over which products qualify as NPI and which are treated as ferro-nickel.

Policy Clarity Still Matters for Investment

Indonesia announced on 20 May that exports of key commodities, initially including palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, must be routed through DSI. The aim is to centralise control over strategic commodity exports.

The nickel industry welcomed the NPI clarification, but investors remain cautious. Indonesia’s mining and metals policy has changed frequently, creating uncertainty around timing, scope and implementation.

This matters because downstream nickel projects require large capital commitments. Smelters, matte converters, HPAL plants and battery-material facilities all need stable rules before investors can justify long payback periods.

The DSI rule follows other policy shifts, including changes to ore pricing, royalty plans, export levies and RKAB approval processes. Even when policies support state revenue and downstreaming, sudden changes can raise financing risk.

Indonesia still holds enormous leverage in global nickel. Its dominance in NPI and stainless-linked supply gives Jakarta significant influence over trade flows and pricing.

But policy predictability is now becoming just as important as resource control. If rules change too quickly or remain unclear, investors may delay decisions even when Indonesia remains the strongest nickel platform.

The NPI exemption is therefore a useful correction. But the market still needs formal definitions, clear transaction rules and stable implementation before confidence fully returns.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has reduced immediate nickel disruption by excluding NPI from the DSI export channel. But the ferro-nickel ambiguity shows that policy risk remains embedded in the country’s downstreaming model.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

Indonesia Nickel Export Rule Creates New Uncertainty for Global Supply

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia nickel export rule changes have created fresh uncertainty in the nickel market as Jakarta moves to centralise key commodity exports through state-owned enterprises. Market participants are now waiting for clearer details on scope, pricing and implementation.

Indonesia nickel export rule plans were announced by president Prabowo Subianto on 20 May. The policy will require exports of key commodities to be routed through a state-owned enterprise, or BUMN, which would act as the sole counterparty to overseas buyers.

Indonesia nickel export rule uncertainty matters because the country is the world’s dominant nickel producer, accounting for more than 60% of global supply. Most of that output is nickel pig iron, a ferroalloy used mainly in stainless steelmaking.

The policy will initially target palm oil, coal and ferrous alloys. Nickel pig iron is expected to fall under the rule because it is a ferroalloy, although other nickel products have not yet been explicitly included.

Nickel Pig Iron Trade Faces Centralisation Risk

Nickel pig iron is central to Indonesia’s nickel position. It is a lower-cost nickel-bearing feedstock for stainless steel production, but it cannot be used directly in batteries.

To enter the battery chain, NPI must first be converted into nickel matte and then processed further into nickel sulphate for cathode manufacturing. This means any disruption to NPI flows can affect stainless steel first, but may also influence battery-related nickel routes over time.

Indonesia has already used centralised systems for other commodities. Tin exports must be traded through official domestic exchanges, such as ICDX or JFX.

The new system would go further by placing a state-owned enterprise at the centre of export contracts, transactions and payment flows. From June to August, exporters are expected to gradually transfer these functions to BUMN. From September, all export transactions are expected to move fully through the state-owned structure.

Market participants are sceptical about the timeline. Many believe implementation from 1 June is too early because the policy still appears under preparation.

The lack of broad industry consultation has also increased concern. Traders say Jakarta consulted only a limited number of stakeholders before announcing the policy, contributing to confusion and weak market confidence.

Pricing and Product Scope Remain Unclear

The main uncertainty is scope. Ferroalloys are expected to be covered, but other nickel products have not been clearly defined. Many participants expect the policy to eventually expand across more nickel products.

Pricing is another major question. Buyers and sellers do not yet know whether export prices will be set by BUMN or negotiated commercially between counterparties.

A separate pricing framework may be introduced, but details are still missing. This matters because Indonesia’s nickel market already faces policy-driven cost changes, including ore pricing formula updates and royalty uncertainty.

The new export rule could tighten supply conditions if it slows contracting, complicates payments or reduces flexibility for private exporters. Even if physical output remains unchanged, transaction friction can affect availability.

The market reaction has so far been cautious rather than dramatic. Indonesia’s Jakarta Composite Index fell, while LME nickel showed only limited movement after the announcement.

However, the longer-term implication is more significant. Indonesia is moving toward stronger state control over strategic natural resource flows.

For nickel buyers, this means procurement risk is no longer only about mine quotas, ore grades or processing costs. It now includes export governance, state counterparty risk and policy timing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is turning nickel from a commodity export into a managed strategic resource. The rule may support state control, but poor implementation could disrupt the very downstream supply chain Jakarta has worked so hard to build.

Weda Bay Power Shift Favors Aluminium as Nickel Pig Iron Margins Weaken

Weda Bay

Weda Bay power shift plans could redirect electricity from nickel pig iron smelters toward aluminium production in Indonesia’s Weda Bay Industrial Park. The move shows how power allocation is becoming a strategic production tool when aluminium margins exceed nickel margins.

Weda Bay power shift discussions involve scaling back output at 22 NPI smelting operations in June. Market sources said the power would be redirected to Juwan, the park’s sole operating aluminium facility.

Weda Bay power shift strategy reflects changing metal economics. NPI producers are under pressure from higher nickel ore costs and weaker margins, while aluminium smelters are benefiting from firmer prices and Middle East supply concerns.

Juwan is a joint venture between Tsingshan and Xinfa, with nameplate capacity of 250,000 t/yr. The timing and scale of any NPI production cuts remain unclear.

Aluminium Margins Pull Power Away From NPI

The planned power reallocation highlights the importance of electricity in Indonesian metals production. Both NPI and aluminium smelting are power-intensive, so the most profitable metal can influence where electricity is directed.

Aluminium prices have strengthened because of supply disruption linked to the Middle East. The region accounts for about 9% of global aluminium output, making any disruption significant for global balance.

The LME aluminium cash official price rose to a four-year high of $3,767.50/t on 14 May before closing at $3,636/t on 18 May. These higher prices have improved aluminium smelting margins.

NPI margins are moving in the opposite direction. Rising nickel ore costs and weaker profitability have reduced the incentive to maintain full output at some Indonesian smelters.

This creates a clear commercial logic. If electricity is constrained or strategically controlled, producers may prefer to allocate power toward aluminium rather than lower-margin NPI.

NPI Cuts Could Tighten High-Grade Nickel Units

Any sustained reduction in Weda Bay NPI output could support nickel pig iron prices, especially for higher-grade material. Higher-grade NPI remains important for stainless steel producers that need nickel-rich blending units.

Demand for higher-grade NPI has stayed relatively firm because stainless mills are using more scrap. Greater scrap use can increase the need for higher-nickel inputs to balance melt chemistry.

The situation also shows how Indonesia’s nickel and aluminium industries are becoming increasingly connected through infrastructure. Power, ports, industrial parks and Chinese-backed investment now shape multiple metal supply chains at once.

Tsingshan is also building a new aluminium project at Weda Bay with designed capacity of 800,000 t/yr. The first 400,000 t/yr phase is expected to start by the end of this year or in early 2027.

That expansion could make power allocation even more important. If aluminium capacity grows while NPI margins remain weak, Weda Bay may increasingly prioritise aluminium production over nickel pig iron during periods of electricity constraint.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Weda Bay shows that Indonesia’s industrial parks are becoming flexible metal platforms, not single-commodity hubs. When aluminium margins beat NPI margins, electricity itself becomes the deciding raw material.

Nickel Ore Prices Fall as Philippine Supply Recovery Eases Feedstock Tightness

Philippine Nickel ore

Nickel ore prices have fallen as Philippine supply recovered after the monsoon season, while a correction in London Metal Exchange nickel weakened sentiment across the value chain. The decline shows how quickly seasonal ore flows can pressure feedstock markets when Indonesian buyers slow procurement.

Nickel ore prices for 1.3% grade material on a cif China basis dropped to 55-57 yuan/wmt on 14 May from 65-66 yuan/wmt on 26 March. The fall came even though LME nickel remained above late-March levels after briefly touching almost two-year highs earlier in May.

Nickel ore prices are important because ore often gives the earliest physical signal in the nickel chain. Unlike LME nickel, ore prices are less driven by financial flows and more directly tied to mine supply, port congestion, smelter demand and buyer inventories.

The current weakness reflects three forces moving together: Philippine mine supply is recovering, Indonesia is slowing purchases, and LME nickel has corrected after earlier policy-driven gains.

Philippine Supply Recovery Changes the Regional Ore Balance

The Philippines is entering its seasonal production recovery after monsoon-related disruptions. Mining activity in Surigao, the country’s main nickel ore hub, usually slows from November to March and rebounds from May.

Surigao accounts for around half of Philippine nickel ore output. As shipments recover, buyers have more nearby feedstock options, reducing the urgency that supported prices earlier in the year.

This seasonal pattern has become more important since Indonesia emerged as a major Philippine ore importer. Historically, Chinese buyers stocked up ahead of the rainy season and drew down inventories until supply returned. But Indonesia’s rising demand has added a second major pull on Philippine material.

The Philippines exported 55.22mn t of nickel ore in 2025. China took 72% of that volume, while Indonesia accounted for 18%.

Indonesia’s imports from the Philippines rose to 15.48mn t in 2025 from 9.55mn t in 2024. That growth was driven by tight domestic ore controls under Indonesia’s RKAB quota system.

Indonesia imported 1.41mn t of Philippine nickel ore in March, up sharply from both a year earlier and the previous month. But that buying momentum has now slowed as port bottlenecks and price uncertainty weigh on procurement.

Indonesia Bottlenecks and NPI Margins Pressure Demand

Most Philippine ore shipped to Indonesia moves to the Weda Bay industrial park. The site produced around one third of Indonesia’s total nickel supply in 2025, making it a major feedstock demand centre.

But Weda Bay has limited unloading capacity. Only two major berths handle nickel ore discharge, creating recurring congestion.

Some vessels that would normally unload within two days are waiting up to two weeks. That congestion reduces buyers’ willingness to secure additional cargoes, especially when prices are falling.

Indonesia’s revised ore pricing formula has also changed buyer behaviour. The new formula includes cobalt, iron and chromium values, raising raw material costs and adding uncertainty to procurement decisions.

Meanwhile, LME nickel’s pullback has started to pressure nickel pig iron prices. NPI prices had been relatively steady, supported by stainless steel demand, but softer benchmark prices are now weakening producer margins.

Lower margins can reduce production incentives for Chinese NPI producers. That, in turn, may reduce demand for nickel ore and extend downward pressure on feedstock prices.

Nickel sulphate prices have remained stable because tight supply has offset weak demand from the nickel-cobalt-manganese battery sector. But the ore market is moving faster because supply is returning and buyers are stepping back.

The short-term outlook remains soft. Rising Philippine availability, weaker LME sentiment and slower Indonesian buying are likely to keep nickel ore under pressure until the market finds a new floor.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel ore prices are showing that Indonesia’s downstream expansion has made Philippine supply more strategically important. But when port bottlenecks, weaker NPI margins and seasonal supply recovery hit together, even tight Indonesian ore controls cannot prevent a feedstock correction.

Danantara Weda Bay Nickel Stake Plan Signals Stronger Indonesian Control

Weda Bay Nickel

Danantara Weda Bay Nickel stake interest signals Indonesia’s push to increase domestic participation in strategic nickel assets. The sovereign investment agency is considering acquiring Eramet’s stake in Weda Bay Nickel after discussions with president Prabowo Subianto.

Danantara Weda Bay Nickel stake talks remain at an early stage, with no final decision made. But the move shows that Jakarta wants stronger local ownership in assets central to its electric vehicle battery supply chain strategy.

Danantara Weda Bay Nickel stake interest comes as Indonesia continues to use policy, quotas and state-backed entities to shape the nickel value chain. The country wants to capture more value from mining, processing and downstream battery materials.

Weda Bay Nickel is located in North Maluku and has operated under a special mining permit since 2019. It is one of Indonesia’s most important nickel ore assets.

Domestic Participation Becomes a Strategic Priority

Danantara could position itself as a strong local partner in Weda Bay Nickel. That role would support Indonesia’s broader effort to increase national participation in critical mineral assets.

Eramet currently holds around 37.8% of the project. China’s Tsingshan owns about 51.2%, while state-controlled Aneka Tambang holds roughly 10%.

This ownership structure already reflects Indonesia’s nickel strategy. Foreign capital and Chinese processing expertise have helped build the sector, but Jakarta is now seeking greater domestic influence over key assets.

A Danantara investment would not only change ownership. It could also strengthen state-linked oversight of production, ore allocation and downstream integration.

For Eramet, the talks come at a sensitive time. The company has already faced pressure after Weda Bay Nickel’s 2026 RKAB production quota was cut sharply.

RKAB Quota Cut Raises Nickel Supply Uncertainty

Eramet confirmed in February that Weda Bay Nickel’s 2026 RKAB quota was reduced by 70% to 12mn wet metric tonnes. That cut has made the asset’s production outlook more uncertain.

The quota reduction matters because Indonesia’s downstream nickel capacity depends on stable ore supply. Smelters, high-pressure acid leach plants and battery-material producers need consistent feedstock to maintain output.

Weda Bay Nickel is a key part of that supply chain. Any change in ownership, production quota or operating strategy can affect ore availability and regional nickel pricing.

Indonesia is trying to balance several goals at once. It wants more state participation, higher domestic value capture, stronger downstream processing and continued investor confidence.

Danantara’s potential entry could help align Weda Bay Nickel more closely with national policy. But it may also raise questions for foreign partners about operating certainty and long-term control.

The nickel market should watch whether the talks progress from early-stage discussions into a formal transaction. If Danantara moves ahead, it would mark another step in Indonesia’s shift from attracting foreign nickel investment to actively reshaping ownership of strategic assets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Danantara’s interest in Weda Bay Nickel shows that Indonesia’s nickel strategy is entering a more state-directed phase. The key risk is whether greater domestic control can improve supply-chain resilience without unsettling the foreign capital and technical partners that built the sector.

Indonesia Nickel Royalty Changes Delayed as Jakarta Balances State Revenue and Producer Costs

Indonesia Nickel

Indonesia nickel royalty changes have been delayed as the government reviews planned royalty increases and export taxes for nickel products. Jakarta is trying to balance higher state revenue with the cost pressure already facing miners, smelters and battery-material producers.

Indonesia nickel royalty changes were initially expected to take effect in June. But the energy and mineral resources ministry will now reassess the policy after industry consultations.

Indonesia nickel royalty changes are part of a wider policy reset covering nickel, copper, tin, gold, silver and other minerals. The government wants a formula that captures more value for the state without damaging investment in downstream processing.

The delay also applies to planned export duties on nickel products. Indonesia will continue finalising the pricing mechanism for the duty, but implementation has been pushed back.

Downstreaming Policy Meets Rising Cost Pressure

Indonesia’s nickel export duty plan is tied to its downstreaming strategy. The policy aims to push mining and metals companies to build more domestic value-added capacity instead of exporting lower-value materials.

The country has already become the world’s most important nickel processing hub. However, officials say the sector has developed only about 40% of its potential, leaving room for more investment in battery materials, stainless steel and other downstream products.

The royalty delay shows that Indonesia understands the risk of overloading producers with too many cost increases at once. Miners and processors are already dealing with tighter RKAB quotas, higher ore costs and rising input risks.

Indonesia updated its nickel ore pricing formula on 15 April. The new mechanism includes cobalt, iron and chromium in ore valuation, increasing raw material costs for downstream users.

This change is especially important for high-pressure acid leach projects, which consume limonite ore and produce mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery supply chains. Higher ore prices can raise costs for nickel intermediates and reduce margins.

Sulphur supply risk is another pressure point. Middle East disruption has raised concerns over sulphur availability, a key input for nickel processing. This has supported nickel prices but also increased uncertainty for producers.

Nickel Prices Supported by Policy and Supply Risk

Indonesia’s recent policy shifts have generally supported nickel prices. LME nickel rose to around $19,450/t on 6 May from $18,075/t on 15 April, supported by the revised ore pricing formula, sulphur supply concerns and lower 2026 RKAB quota expectations.

The delayed royalty and export tax changes may ease immediate producer pressure. But they do not reverse the broader direction of Indonesian policy.

Jakarta still wants to capture more value from its mineral resources. It also wants companies to keep investing in domestic processing and a more complete nickel supply chain.

For the nickel market, this creates a more policy-sensitive pricing environment. Ore quotas, benchmark formulas, export taxes, royalties and downstream investment rules can all influence costs and trade flows.

The delay gives producers time, but not certainty. Companies will still need to plan for higher government take, stricter ore valuation and stronger pressure to invest in domestic value-added products.

Indonesia’s nickel strategy is therefore entering a more complex phase. The country wants to remain the dominant global nickel hub, but it must avoid weakening the economics that attracted downstream investment in the first place.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s delay is not a retreat from resource nationalism; it is a recalibration. Jakarta wants more value from nickel, but it also knows that excessive cost pressure could slow the downstreaming model that made Indonesia central to global battery and stainless steel supply.

Indonesia-Philippines Nickel Corridor Gains Momentum as Ore Supply Gap Widens

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia-Philippines nickel corridor plans are gaining strategic importance as the region’s two largest nickel-producing countries deepen cooperation across the nickel value chain. The Indonesian Nickel Miners Association and the Philippine Nickel Industry Association signed a second memorandum of understanding in Cebu on 7 May.

The Indonesia-Philippines nickel corridor is designed to improve coordination between upstream ore supply, processing demand and downstream battery-related investment. The agreement builds on an earlier MoU signed in Manila in February 2026.

The Indonesia-Philippines nickel corridor also reflects a practical market need. Indonesia’s domestic nickel ore supply is tightening, while its smelting and battery-material capacity continues to expand.

The latest agreement was signed alongside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit, giving the partnership a stronger regional policy dimension. It signals that nickel is becoming a strategic industrial platform for Southeast Asia, not only a mined commodity.

Ore Supply Coordination Becomes Critical for Indonesia

Indonesia’s nickel processing industry is facing a widening feedstock challenge. APNI estimates the country’s approved nickel ore production quota for 2026 at 260mn-270mn wet metric tonnes.

That level still leaves a projected supply gap of around 80mn wet metric tonnes. This shortfall highlights the growing role of Philippine ore as supplementary feedstock for Indonesian smelters.

Indonesia imported 15.3mn t of nickel ore in 2025. That trade flow could increase if domestic mining quotas remain tight and processing demand continues to grow.

Philippine ore is not a simple replacement for Indonesian ore. The two countries’ ores differ in chemical composition, which can affect processing performance, recovery rates and smelter efficiency.

However, blending Philippine and Indonesian ore can help optimise smelter feed. This gives the partnership a direct operational purpose, especially for nickel pig iron, stainless steel and battery-linked processing routes.

The agreement therefore formalises a market trend already developing through trade. Indonesian processors need reliable ore, while Philippine miners can benefit from stronger regional demand and closer customer integration.

Nickel Corridor Supports Southeast Asia’s Battery Ambition

The partnership also supports Southeast Asia’s emerging electric vehicle battery ecosystem. Nickel remains a key input for high-nickel cathode materials, mixed hydroxide precipitate, stainless steel and specialty alloy production.

Indonesia has already become the centre of regional nickel processing. But its growth depends on stable ore access, clear mining quotas, sulphur and acid availability, power supply and downstream investment.

The Philippines brings complementary upstream strength. Its ore exports can help fill Indonesia’s feedstock gap while giving Manila a more active role in the regional battery materials chain.

The MoU framework covers supply-chain integration, policy dialogue and industry development. This is important because nickel markets are increasingly shaped by regulation, quotas, export policies and downstream industrial strategy.

The corridor could also influence Asian nickel ore pricing. If Indonesian demand for Philippine ore increases, regional benchmark dynamics may shift as buyers compete for suitable feedstock.

For smelters, the biggest value may come from consistency. Better coordination between miners, processors and policymakers can reduce uncertainty around ore availability and improve long-term planning.

For battery supply chains, the agreement shows that Southeast Asia is trying to build a more integrated regional nickel platform. Indonesia and the Philippines together can influence ore flows, processing economics and downstream investment decisions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Indonesia-Philippines nickel corridor is a response to Indonesia’s processing success creating its own ore shortage. The next phase of Southeast Asian nickel competition will depend less on who has ore alone, and more on who can coordinate feedstock, processing and battery-market access.

Indonesia Nickel Pricing Sets Floor and Ceiling as HPAL Costs Rise

Huafei Nickel Cobalt

Indonesia nickel pricing is increasingly defining the global nickel market as ore quotas, benchmark pricing rules and sulphuric acid availability reshape supply economics. UK broker Sucden Financial said Indonesia is now setting both the floor and ceiling for nickel prices.

Indonesia nickel pricing has moved the market away from a simple oversupply story. The key question is no longer only how much nickel Indonesia can produce, but how tightly Jakarta chooses to manage supply.

Indonesia nickel pricing is also becoming more important because HPAL producers face rising costs for ore, sulphur and sulphuric acid. These inputs directly affect mixed hydroxide precipitate production, which feeds battery-grade nickel supply chains.

The London Metal Exchange nickel price settled at $19,500/t on Wednesday, while Sucden said Indonesia’s current policy stance is creating a firmer floor around $18,000/t. But upside may also be capped if higher prices encourage new quota approvals.

Indonesia Turns Ore Policy Into Market Control

Indonesia remains the central force in nickel because it controls the largest source of new supply. In recent years, Indonesian output growth, large exchange stocks and Chinese-linked processing capacity defined the market.

That structure is now changing. Sucden said Indonesia appears focused on supporting prices and discouraging weaker producers, rather than allowing unrestricted supply growth.

The country has reduced 2026 ore quotas by around 30% year on year. It has also revised its domestic benchmark ore pricing system, strengthening the link between ore valuation, contained metals and producer costs.

This policy approach gives Indonesia unusual pricing power. If supply is restricted, the market finds a firmer floor. If prices rise too far, Indonesia can relax quotas and allow more material through the system.

That means nickel’s upside is managed. Sucden warned that the market should become more cautious near $20,000/t, where additional supply approvals and producer hedging could begin to limit further gains.

This is why Indonesia now acts as both support and restraint. It can tighten ore availability to stabilise prices, but it can also prevent a strong rally from damaging downstream competitiveness.

The result is a more policy-driven nickel market. Traditional inventory and demand indicators still matter, but Jakarta’s quota and ore pricing decisions are now central to global price formation.

HPAL Costs Expose Battery Nickel Supply Risk

HPAL production is becoming the second major driver of nickel pricing. Unlike nickel pig iron and ferro-nickel, HPAL is highly dependent on sulphur and sulphuric acid.

This makes battery-grade nickel supply more vulnerable to chemical input availability. HPAL plants need stable acid supply to process limonite ore into MHP, and Indonesia’s inventory buffers are relatively tight.

Huayou’s decision to place half of its Huafei Nickel Cobalt MHP capacity into temporary care and maintenance from 1 May shows how quickly reagent costs can affect production. The company cited elevated sulphur costs and prolonged high operating rates.

The HPAL sector now faces a double squeeze. Ore prices are rising because of Indonesia’s revised pricing framework, while sulphur and sulphuric acid costs are increasing because of tighter chemical supply.

This changes the nickel cost curve. Producers with secure ore, sulphur access and integrated infrastructure can operate more defensively. Those relying on external feedstock or exposed to high reagent prices face greater margin pressure.

The shift also matters for battery supply chains. MHP is a key intermediate for nickel sulphate and other battery chemicals. If HPAL margins weaken, battery-grade nickel output can become less responsive than headline capacity numbers suggest.

Sucden said tighter nearby spreads and higher trading volumes may indicate increased hedging and another shift in market balance. That suggests producers and traders are adjusting to a market where costs and policy now matter more than simple surplus.

Nickel is still not structurally tight like copper. But it is no longer a market where oversupply alone explains price direction. Indonesia’s supply discipline and HPAL cost inflation are giving nickel a stronger base, even if the rally remains capped.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has turned nickel into a managed market where policy controls supply and chemistry controls cost. The winners will be producers with secure ore, acid access and enough balance-sheet strength to survive Jakarta’s tighter discipline.

Nickel Industries Indonesian Output Shows Ore Pressure Despite HPAL Growth

Nickel Industries, Indonesian

Nickel Industries Indonesian output was mixed in the first quarter as lower mining volumes and declining nickel grades contrasted with higher nickel pig iron and mixed hydroxide precipitate production. The Australia-based producer reported weaker ore output but stronger downstream processing across its Indonesian RKEF and HPAL assets.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output reflects the increasingly complex operating environment for nickel producers in Indonesia. Mining permits, ore grades, sulphur availability and downstream ramp-up timing are all shaping production performance.

Nickel Industries Indonesian output also shows why Indonesia’s nickel market can no longer be viewed only through capacity additions. Feedstock access and ore quality are becoming just as important as new processing plants.

Total nickel ore production fell by 30% from a year earlier to 3.96mn wet metric tonnes in January-March. However, output almost tripled from the previous quarter after mining activity recovered from RKAB quota delays late last year.

RKAB Quota Recovery Supports Ore Flow but Grades Weaken

Nickel Industries received 14.3mn wmt of 2026 RKAB nickel ore quota this year. This was 36% higher than its total approved quota of 10.5mn wmt in 2025.

The higher quota helped production recover from the December quarter, when mining was disrupted by RKAB delays. The company also plans to apply for additional RKAB quotas later this year.

The Hengjaya mine supplies ore to Nickel Industries’ RKEF and HPAL plants. These facilities produce nickel pig iron for stainless steel markets and mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material supply chains.

Total NPI output from the Hengjaya, Ranger, Oracle and Angel RKEF operations rose by 4.4% year on year and 1.7% quarter on quarter to 274,086t.

However, nickel-contained production fell to 30,264t because the average nickel content of NPI dropped to 11% from 12.1% a year earlier. This is a critical signal for margins because lower grades reduce metal output even when furnace volumes rise.

The result shows how Indonesian nickel producers face a tightening relationship between ore availability and processing efficiency. Higher RKEF output does not automatically mean stronger nickel production if feedstock grades weaken.

HPAL Growth Continues as ENC Start-Up Moves to Second Quarter

Nickel Industries’ Huayue Nickel Cobalt HPAL project produced 21,526t of nickel and 2,370t of cobalt in MHP form during the first quarter. Nickel output rose by 1.7% from a year earlier, while cobalt output increased by 23%.

This growth strengthens Nickel Industries’ exposure to battery materials. MHP remains a key intermediate product for nickel sulphate and other battery chemical supply chains.

The company’s next major step is the Excelsior Nickel Cobalt HPAL project. Commissioning has been delayed to the second quarter, with full ramp-up targeted by the end of October.

ENC had previously been expected to start commissioning in the first quarter. The delay matters because HPAL projects are technically complex and depend on stable feedstock, acid supply, utilities and commissioning discipline.

Nickel Industries said it has enough sulphur inventory to support ENC’s ramp-up until the third quarter. The company previously bought sulphur at an average price of $450/t.

Sulphur availability is now a strategic issue for HPAL producers. Any disruption in sulphur or sulphuric acid supply can raise costs and slow production growth across Indonesia’s battery nickel chain.

The company also plans to list nickel cathode produced at ENC on both the London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange. Exchange approval would support market acceptance and improve the project’s commercial flexibility.

Nickel Industries increased its stake in ENC by 2% for $46mn on 1 April, lifting its interest to 46% and making it the project’s largest shareholder. This gives the company greater exposure to Indonesia’s move from NPI and MHP toward Class I nickel products.

The broader implication is clear. Nickel Industries is moving across the Indonesian nickel value chain, from ore mining and RKEF production into HPAL, MHP and exchange-deliverable cathode.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel Industries’ quarter shows that Indonesia’s nickel growth is becoming more constrained by ore quality, RKAB permits and sulphur logistics. Capacity still matters, but the winners will be producers that control feedstock, manage HPAL complexity and secure recognised Class I nickel routes.

Nickel Deficit Forecast Emerges as Indonesia Tightens Ore Supply

Nickel manufacturing

Nickel deficit conditions are expected to return in 2026 as Indonesia tightens ore supply controls and stainless steel demand continues to grow. The International Nickel Study Group forecasts global primary nickel production of 3.715mn t against usage of 3.747mn t, implying a deficit of 32,000t.

The nickel deficit would mark a sharp change after three consecutive years of surplus. The market recorded surpluses of 175,000t in 2023, 116,000t in 2024 and 283,000t in 2025.

The nickel deficit forecast remains modest, but it carries strategic significance because it depends heavily on Indonesian policy. Indonesia has been the main driver of global nickel supply growth, and tighter controls on ore mining could slow the expansion that previously pushed the market into surplus.

The Middle East conflict is adding another layer of uncertainty. Higher energy prices, inflation pressure and disrupted sulphur flows could affect nickel production costs, especially for high-pressure acid leach operations in Indonesia.

Indonesia Ore Controls Reshape Nickel Supply Growth

Indonesia’s approved nickel ore mining quota for 2026 has been set significantly lower than in 2025. The quota can still be revised, but the initial reduction has already changed market expectations.

The country’s revised mineral benchmark pricing mechanism also took effect on 15 April. The new HPM formula raises base prices for all nickel ore grades and includes cobalt, iron and chromium in the valuation for the first time.

This matters because Indonesian nickel supply is no longer expanding under the same low-cost conditions that drove rapid output growth. Ore access, ore pricing, royalties and contained metal values are all becoming more tightly managed.

The policy impact is not evenly distributed. Eramet’s PT Weda Bay Nickel mine is preparing to enter care and maintenance in May after receiving an initial ore quota of just 12mn wet metric tonnes. This is far below last year’s final permit of up to 42mn wmt.

In contrast, Nickel Industries received quota approvals of 14.3mn wmt, up from 10.5mn wmt in 2025. This shows that Indonesia’s controls are not simply cutting all supply. They are also reshaping which operators receive ore access.

The quota system could therefore become a major competitive factor. Producers with larger approved volumes may gain stronger operating flexibility, while others face lower utilisation, higher costs or temporary shutdowns.

HPAL producers are especially exposed. These plants require steady limonite ore supply and large volumes of sulphuric acid or sulphur-linked feedstock. Tighter ore availability and higher reagent costs can quickly pressure margins.

Disrupted sulphur flows from the Middle East conflict have raised concern over HPAL feedstock availability. This is important because Indonesian HPAL projects have become key suppliers of mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material production.

If sulphur costs remain elevated and ore prices rise under the new HPM formula, HPAL production costs could increase materially. That would weaken the low-cost supply advantage that helped Indonesia dominate battery-linked nickel intermediates.

Stainless Steel Supports Demand as Batteries Disappoint

Stainless steel remains the main support for nickel demand. INSG said the stainless steel sector grew in 2025 and is expected to expand further in 2026.

This is important because stainless steel still consumes far more nickel than the battery sector. Demand from stainless steel, alloys and industrial uses continues to anchor the primary nickel market.

Battery demand has grown more slowly than earlier expectations. Lithium iron phosphate chemistries have gained market share, reducing nickel intensity in parts of the electric vehicle market.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle demand has also outpaced fully battery-electric vehicle demand in some markets. This has limited the speed at which nickel-rich battery chemistries absorb new supply.

The result is a market caught between two forces. Supply growth is slowing because of Indonesian ore controls and higher input costs. However, battery demand is not rising fast enough to create a large structural shortage.

This makes the 2026 nickel deficit highly sensitive to policy and disruption. If Indonesia raises quotas, supply could recover. If sulphur, energy or ore costs worsen, the deficit could deepen.

The forecast also changes the market narrative. Nickel has spent recent years under pressure from surplus supply and rising inventories. A move into deficit, even a small one, could stabilise sentiment and support prices.

Still, the deficit is not yet a sign of broad scarcity. It is a warning that Indonesia’s supply discipline, not battery demand alone, is now determining the market balance.

For producers, cost control and ore access will become more important. For buyers, the focus will shift toward supplier reliability, feedstock route and exposure to Indonesian policy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The nickel market is not tightening because batteries suddenly absorbed the surplus. It is tightening because Indonesia is putting discipline into ore supply while HPAL costs rise. That makes the nickel deficit more policy-driven than demand-driven.

Eramet Weda Bay Nickel Faces Care and Maintenance Risk as RKAB Quota Tightens

Eramet - Nickel

Eramet Weda Bay nickel operations face a potential care and maintenance move in May after Indonesia approved a sharply reduced 2026 nickel ore quota. The French mining group said PT Weda Bay Nickel received an initial RKAB permit covering only 12mn wet metric tonnes of nickel ore production and sales.

The Eramet Weda Bay nickel quota is more than 70% below last year’s authorised level. PT WBN initially received 32mn wmt in 2025, later revised up to 42mn wmt.

Eramet has requested an upward revision to the 2026 permit. The company said the current quota will be exhausted by the middle of next month, making the permit decision the most important near-term issue for its nickel business.

The initial 12mn wmt permit includes 3mn wmt for internal use. This leaves Eramet’s external sales target at only 9mn wmt for 2026, well below the level implied by the mine’s operating capacity.

Indonesia’s RKAB Limits Threaten Ore Supply and NPI Continuity

PT Weda Bay Nickel is preparing to enter care and maintenance if the quota is not increased. Eramet said its nickel pig iron plant will continue operating using ore stocks, but the mining restriction creates clear supply risk.

The permit issue matters because Weda Bay is a key ore supplier inside Indonesia’s nickel ecosystem. Its saprolite ore supports nickel pig iron and stainless steel production, while limonite ore feeds high-pressure acid leach plants producing battery intermediates.

PT WBN delivered strong first-quarter output before the quota risk escalated. Marketable nickel ore production rose by 10% on the year to 10mn wmt.

External ore sales climbed by 54% to 8.3mn wmt. Saprolite sales increased by 27% to 4.8mn wmt, while limonite sales jumped by 118% to 3.6mn wmt.

The limonite increase was driven by stronger demand from HPAL plants at the Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park. Internal ore consumption for Eramet’s NPI plant was 1mn wmt during the quarter.

Strong sales partly reflected a weak comparison with early 2025, when IWIP plants were destocking after ending 2024 with high inventories. Still, the result shows that downstream demand remains firm.

PT WBN also continued to benefit from premiums of more than 100% above Indonesia’s benchmark floor price for high-grade saprolite. This reflected tight domestic ore supply and stronger competition for available material.

Nickel Market Rebalancing Depends on Permits, Sulphur and Ore Costs

Eramet’s nickel ferro-alloy production was broadly stable in the first quarter. Output reached 9,000t of nickel, down only 1% from a year earlier.

Adjusted nickel turnover, excluding New Caledonia’s Societe Le Nickel, rose by 43% to €163mn. Eramet’s share of PT WBN turnover, excluding its offtake contract, increased by 59% to €116mn.

The company said first-quarter market conditions were supportive. The average London Metal Exchange nickel price rose by 12% on the year to $17,362/t, driven partly by uncertainty over Indonesian ore supply.

Global primary nickel demand rose by 3% to 900,000t in the first quarter. Stainless steel, batteries and aerospace supported consumption.

Global primary nickel production fell by 3%, although the market remained in a modest surplus. Eramet said the nickel market could gradually rebalance over the rest of the year.

Restricted Indonesian mine permits are one reason. Sulphur supply problems are another, because they are raising costs for HPAL producers that depend on sulphuric acid or sulphur feedstock.

PT WBN’s production costs are expected to rise from 2025 levels. Eramet cited authorised volume limits, mining plan adjustments and higher fuel prices.

Indonesia’s revised mineral benchmark formula could also reshape ore economics. The formula, effective from mid-April, now includes cobalt and other contained metals in ore valuation.

This change could increase costs for HPAL feedstock and alter the economics of limonite supply. It also strengthens the government’s ability to capture more value from contained metals in nickel ore.

For Eramet Weda Bay nickel operations, the quota decision will determine whether strong first-quarter performance can continue. Without a higher RKAB, the mine faces a sudden operating constraint despite firm downstream demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Eramet Weda Bay nickel is becoming a test case for Indonesia’s tighter control over ore supply. If the RKAB quota is not revised, the impact will reach beyond one mine and reinforce cost pressure across NPI, HPAL and battery-linked nickel supply chains.