Nornickel Nickel Surplus Forecast Shrinks as Indonesia Supply Tightens

Nornickel

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast has been cut sharply for 2026 as Indonesian ore constraints, higher feedstock costs and sulphur shortages slow the supply growth that drove recent oversupply. The Russian producer now expects a marginal global surplus of around 20,000t, down from its previous forecast of 240,000t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast reflects a major shift in supply conditions. Global nickel production is expected to fall by 5% to 3.71mn t in 2026, marking the first annual decline in a decade, while demand is forecast to rise by 2% to 3.69mn t.

Nornickel nickel surplus forecast also places Indonesia at the centre of the market balance. Lower effective mining volumes, declining ore grades and sharply higher ore prices are tightening feedstock availability for NPI, HPAL and Class 1 nickel producers.

The adjustment follows a 2025 surplus of around 278,000t, when supply increased by 7% and demand rose by 6%. The market is therefore moving from structural oversupply toward a much tighter balance.

Indonesia Ore and Sulphur Constraints Reshape Supply

Indonesia mined around 320mn t of nickel ore in 2025 against an approved quota of 379mn t. For 2026, quotas are expected at around 300mn t, but actual mining could be closer to 270mn t if utilisation remains near 90%.

Lower ore grades further reduce contained nickel availability. Indonesian NPI production fell by 8% year on year in January-May, suggesting smelters are already feeling the impact.

Philippine ore imports could reach around 25mn t this year and offset part of the shortfall. However, Indonesia’s July quota review remains a critical market variable.

Ore economics are tightening as well. Indonesia’s revised pricing formula has doubled or tripled minimum ore prices for some grades.

Nornickel estimates the new system could add as much as $5,000/t to the cost of Class 1 nickel produced from Indonesian feedstock on a cathode-equivalent basis.

HPAL producers face another problem: sulphur.

Middle East disruption has pushed sulphur prices from around $300/t to above $1,000/t. HPAL operations require roughly 10-11t of sulphur for every tonne of nickel produced.

Indonesia sourced more than 75% of its sulphur imports from the Middle East in 2025, leaving battery nickel projects highly exposed to disrupted maritime supply.

Around one-third of HPAL capacity is currently idle, while HPAL production fell by 20% year on year in May.

Nornickel expects Indonesian NPI output to decline by 11% this year and mixed hydroxide precipitate production by 9%. Class 1 nickel supply is forecast to fall by 2%.

Demand Growth Stays Modest as Stainless Scrap Use Rises

Nickel demand is still growing, but not strongly enough to create a clear deficit.

Nornickel expects stainless steel nickel consumption to rise by only 1% this year. Chinese producers are using more scrap, reducing their need for primary nickel units.

China’s average stainless scrap share is expected to increase to 24% in 2026 from 19% in 2025. That change could keep Chinese primary nickel demand in stainless steel broadly flat at around 1.6mn t.

A higher share of 316 stainless partly offsets the scrap effect because 316 contains more nickel than 304. Chinese 300-series stainless output increased by 3% in the first five months of the year, while 200-series production rose by 11%.

Battery-related demand remains stronger.

China’s nickel sulphate output is forecast to rise by 15% to 421,000t of contained nickel in 2026 and reach 455,000t in 2027. Indonesian nickel sulphate production is expected to increase by 18% to 59,000t this year.

Matte output is another growth area. Indonesian nickel matte production is forecast to jump by 48% as conversion from NPI becomes more attractive.

The market could loosen again in 2027. Nornickel expects the surplus to widen modestly to around 55,000t if Indonesian ore quotas increase, sulphur availability improves and new processing capacity ramps up.

The near-term nickel story has therefore changed. Oversupply has not disappeared, but the margin between surplus and balance has narrowed sharply as Indonesian policy and feedstock economics begin to constrain output.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nickel’s biggest bullish driver is no longer demand acceleration but supply discipline in Indonesia. If ore quotas remain tight and sulphur costs stay elevated, the market could remain far more balanced than recent oversupply trends suggested.

China Critical Mineral Export Controls Tighten With New Enforcement Rules

China, Critical mineral

China critical mineral export controls are becoming more stringent as Beijing introduces new mechanisms to identify violations, prevent circumvention and strengthen oversight of strategic mineral shipments. The latest reporting framework takes effect on 1 July 2026 and specifically targets violations involving strategic mineral dual-use items.

China critical mineral export controls increasingly affect more than exporters themselves. Traders, processors, freight companies, overseas customers and intermediaries may need stronger documentation on product classification, end users, licensing and shipment routes as enforcement becomes more detailed.

China critical mineral export controls are also being reinforced by a separate supply-chain security investigation framework. The Ministry of Commerce can investigate foreign measures or commercial actions that it determines may damage China's industrial and supply-chain security.

The combined measures reinforce Beijing's use of regulatory oversight across critical mineral supply chains. For international buyers, compliance risk is becoming increasingly important alongside physical availability and price.

Circumvention and Third-Country Routing Face Greater Scrutiny

The new export-control reporting framework encourages organisations and individuals to report suspected violations. These include exports without licences, shipments outside approved licence conditions and exports of prohibited strategic mineral dual-use items.

The rules also explicitly address efforts to circumvent controls. They cover practices such as modifying or splitting controlled products into parts or components to avoid licensing requirements.

This is particularly important for complex industrial supply chains. Critical mineral products can move through multiple processors, traders and jurisdictions before reaching a final manufacturer.

China is therefore increasing pressure on companies to prove not only what they are exporting, but also where the material ultimately goes and how it will be used.

Authorities may provide rewards for verified reports of violations. Companies that identify potential non-compliance themselves are also encouraged to report voluntarily, with self-reporting potentially considered when penalties are determined.

The compliance burden will be especially significant for materials used in both civilian and defence applications. Rare earths, gallium, germanium, tungsten and antimony all have important roles in advanced electronics, aerospace, defence, semiconductors and industrial manufacturing.

Supply-Chain Security Rules Add Another Policy Layer

China's new supply-chain security investigation rules give the Ministry of Commerce authority to investigate certain foreign restrictions or discriminatory actions affecting Chinese industrial supply chains. The framework allows investigations into measures by foreign governments, organisations and individuals that may cause material harm or threats to China's supply-chain security.

The rules provide for investigations, information collection and other review procedures. Depending on findings, authorities may apply measures affecting trade or other economic activity.

This policy arrives alongside tighter entity-specific export controls. On 22 June, China added 10 US entities to its export control restricted list, including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, prohibiting exports of dual-use items to those companies except through approved exceptions.

The significance for global critical mineral markets is clear. Supply availability is increasingly determined not only by production capacity, but also by licences, end-use approvals, destination risk and geopolitical relations.

This raises the value of alternative processing and recycling capacity outside China. Companies that rely on Chinese-origin rare earths or other strategic minerals will need stronger compliance systems and more diversified supply strategies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China is turning critical mineral exports into a more closely monitored strategic supply chain rather than a conventional commodity trade. For buyers, the emerging risk is not simply whether material exists, but whether it can legally and reliably move through the entire chain.

Nickel Industries HPAL Expansion Targets Indonesian MHP Growth Through Acquisitions

Tsingshan

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion will move forward through acquisitions rather than new project development as Indonesia tightens control over additional high pressure acid leach capacity. The Australian producer will acquire stakes in two MHP projects next to its existing Excelsior Nickel Cobalt operation in Central Sulawesi.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion is strategically important because Indonesia has stopped issuing licences for new HPAL developments since late 2025, according to the company. That makes existing permitted projects increasingly valuable to producers seeking battery-grade nickel growth.

Nickel Industries HPAL expansion covers the planned Teluk Metal Industry and Chengsheng New Energy projects. Together, the stakes would give NI attributable MHP capacity of almost 17,000 t/yr.

Both projects are located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park and will use ore from NI’s Sampala mine. Their output will feed the electric vehicle battery supply chain.

TMI and CNE Add MHP Capacity Around Existing ENC Platform

NI will pay $169mn for a 17.5% stake in the Teluk Metal Industry HPAL project. TMI has planned nameplate MHP capacity of 38,640 t/yr, giving NI 6,775 t/yr of attributable output.

The transaction also carries construction protection from Tsingshan. The Chinese nickel and stainless steel producer has guaranteed that NI’s investment will be capped at $169mn and that TMI will reach nameplate production by September 2027.

This lowers construction risk for NI and reinforces its relationship with Tsingshan, which already owns an indirect 44% stake in the ENC project.

TMI’s remaining ownership includes Singapore-based Sumber International Investment and a South Korean-Japanese consortium involving LS MnM, Hanwa and another strategic investor. The structure shows how Asian industrial groups are positioning themselves around Indonesian battery nickel supply.

NI is also pursuing a 36% stake in the Chengsheng New Energy HPAL project together with a local partner. The acquisition will be funded by transferring 30% of their combined ownership in the Sampala nickel mine.

CNE has MHP capacity of 28,357 t/yr, with 10,208 t/yr attributable to NI. Commissioning is expected by mid-2027.

The CNE transaction still requires shareholder approval because an NI director is associated with the selling investment firm. That adds a governance step before completion.

Indonesia Licensing Limits Increase Value of Existing HPAL Assets

Indonesia’s decision to stop issuing new HPAL licences changes the economics of nickel expansion. Producers can no longer rely on greenfield development to add battery-grade processing capacity.

This gives existing permitted projects a scarcity premium. Companies seeking growth must acquire stakes, partner with current licence holders or expand existing operations.

For NI, TMI and CNE extend the company’s battery nickel platform around ENC. The 46%-owned ENC project is preparing to produce nickel cathode and nickel sulphate, giving NI exposure further downstream than MHP alone.

The strategy also integrates mining and processing. Ore from the Sampala project will supply both TMI and CNE, linking captive feedstock with HPAL conversion and battery-material output.

That integration matters because Indonesia’s nickel industry is increasingly constrained by ore availability, regulatory approvals and government efforts to manage oversupply.

The policy shift could support nickel prices by slowing future HPAL growth. But it also raises the value of projects already holding development rights.

For NI, acquisitions therefore become more than a growth option. They are now the main route to expanding Indonesian MHP production under a tighter licensing regime.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s HPAL licensing freeze is turning permitted projects into strategic assets. Nickel Industries is responding by buying access to existing capacity, showing how policy can shift competition from project development to asset acquisition.

Iluka Rare Earths Offtake Secures Automotive Demand for Eneabba Refinery

Iluka

Iluka rare earths offtake has moved into a binding agreement with an unnamed global automotive company, giving the Australian producer long-term demand visibility for magnet materials including neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium.

Iluka rare earths offtake will begin in 2028 and run for an initial four years under a take-or-pay structure. The agreement covers 1,200t of rare earth oxides, equal to about 10% of Iluka’s planned production over the period.

Iluka rare earths offtake is strategically important because it links future Australian rare earth output directly to the automotive magnet supply chain. The pricing structure also gives Iluka downside protection, with sales priced at the higher of minimum or market-linked values for each product.

The agreement strengthens the commercial case for Iluka’s Eneabba rare earths refinery in Western Australia, which is now more than 50% complete and scheduled for commissioning in mid-2027.

Take-or-Pay Structure Strengthens Project Bankability

The four-year take-or-pay structure gives Iluka greater revenue visibility ahead of Eneabba’s start-up. This is especially important in rare earth markets, where volatile prices and uncertain demand can complicate project financing.

The agreement covers both light and heavy rare earths. Neodymium and praseodymium are core inputs for NdFeB permanent magnets, while dysprosium and terbium improve magnet performance at elevated temperatures.

These materials are critical for electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, industrial motors, robotics and other high-performance applications. Automotive customers increasingly want long-term access to non-China rare earth supply.

The minimum-price mechanism is also important. It reduces exposure to severe price weakness and helps protect project economics against periods of market oversupply or aggressive Chinese pricing.

This model is becoming more common across strategic minerals. Buyers gain secure supply, while producers gain demand certainty and a clearer financing case.

Eneabba Builds Australia’s Downstream Rare Earth Position

Iluka’s 23,000 t/yr Eneabba refinery is central to Australia’s effort to move beyond mineral extraction and into rare earth separation and refining.

Export Finance Australia has confirmed access to a A$1.65bn non-recourse federal government loan for the project. The refinery’s total capital estimate remains at A$1.7bn-1.8bn.

The scale of government support shows how strategically important downstream rare earth processing has become. Australia has strong mineral resources, but long-term value depends on converting those resources into separated oxides that magnet and industrial customers can use.

Construction firm Civmec has been awarded work covering structural, mechanical, piping, electrical and instrumentation activities. With the project already more than halfway complete, execution risk is now shifting from financing toward construction, commissioning and product qualification.

If Eneabba starts on schedule, Iluka could become an important non-China supplier of both light and heavy rare earth oxides. The automotive offtake agreement gives the refinery an early anchor customer and strengthens its route to market.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Iluka’s agreement shows that rare earth diversification is becoming commercially real when long-term offtake, price protection and government finance align. Eneabba’s strategic value lies in supplying qualified NdPr, dysprosium and terbium outside the China-dominated refining chain.

China Heavy Rare Earth Exports Stall as Curbs Hit Japan and US

Ru

China heavy rare earth exports stalled in May as export restrictions continued to disrupt shipments of terbium, dysprosium and lutetium products to key buyers. The data show how Beijing’s licensing controls are reshaping trade flows for materials used in magnets, defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

China heavy rare earth exports were especially weak for products exposed to US and Japanese demand. China recorded no May exports of terbium oxide, dysprosium metal and several other key heavy rare earth products, while yttrium oxide shipments fell sharply from April.

China heavy rare earth exports are now being driven less by normal spot demand and more by policy clearance, end-use approval and bilateral tensions. This makes supply planning increasingly difficult for downstream users that need small but critical volumes.

Light rare earth exports moved in the opposite direction. Shipments of cerium oxide, lanthanum carbonate and neodymium metal increased in May as stronger downstream demand and firmer export prices encouraged buyers to purchase more material.

Heavy Rare Earth Controls Tighten Supply to Japan

Japan has been the clearest casualty of China’s heavy rare earth restrictions. It was previously a major consumer of Chinese yttrium oxide, accounting for 57-60% of total shipments.

That flow has changed sharply since January, when Beijing banned exports of dual-use items for Japanese military use or any end-use that could enhance Japan’s military capabilities. The measure followed deteriorating relations after comments on Taiwan by Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi.

China exported only 7t of yttrium oxide to Japan in May, while total May yttrium oxide exports fell to 90t from 161t in April. Germany received 55t, France 14t, Russia 6.9t and South Korea 6.2t.

For January-May, China exported 454t of yttrium oxide. South Korea received 111t, Austria 100t, the US 80t, Germany 69t, Vietnam 40t, Russia 20t and Japan only 14t.

Dysprosium flows were also tightly controlled. China exported 8.4t of dysprosium oxide in May, up slightly from April and March, but all shipments in April-May went to South Korea.

Dysprosium metal exports stopped in May after 3t moved to South Korea in April. Exports to Japan have been suspended since January, after 2t was shipped in December 2025.

Terbium exports were even more constrained. China exported no terbium oxide in May after shipping only 0.2t in April. Total January-May exports reached 5.7t, mostly to South Korea.

Terbium metal exports were almost absent in May, while shipments to Japan have been suspended since January. Lutetium oxide exports were also almost absent after 5t moved to the US in April.

Magnet and Aerospace Users Face Licensing Risk

The latest export pattern matters because heavy rare earths are small-volume materials with large strategic importance. Dysprosium and terbium are used to improve high-temperature performance in rare earth permanent magnets.

Those magnets are critical for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace systems, defence equipment and high-performance industrial motors. Yttrium is also important for ceramics, phosphors, alloys, coatings and aerospace-related applications.

Lutetium is a smaller market, but its supply risk is strategically relevant because many specialty rare earths have few alternative sources. Even small interruptions can affect qualified users because substitution is difficult.

The May data show that South Korea has remained a permitted destination for some heavy rare earth products, especially dysprosium oxide. This could reflect licensing approvals for civilian or qualified end uses.

But the broader message is that buyers cannot rely only on market availability. They must also track export licences, end-user reviews and political relations with Beijing.

The divergence between light and heavy rare earth exports is also important. Light rare earth demand can still rise when prices and downstream consumption support trade, while heavy rare earth flows remain vulnerable to strategic controls.

For non-China supply chains, this reinforces the need for separation, metallization, magnet recycling and heavy rare earth sourcing outside China. However, building that capacity will take time, capital and customer qualification.

Japan’s exposure is especially important because the country has deep magnet, electronics, automotive and precision manufacturing industries. Reduced access to yttrium, dysprosium, terbium and lutetium could force buyers to accelerate inventory strategies and non-China sourcing.

The market should therefore treat May’s export data as more than a trade statistic. It is another signal that heavy rare earth supply is becoming a managed geopolitical channel.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s May export data show that rare earth risk is now concentrated in licensing, not only price. For Japan, the US and other advanced manufacturing economies, heavy rare earth security will depend on building supply routes that can survive political friction.

Asian Aluminium Premiums Stay Subdued as QMJP Offers Test Buyer Resistance

Aluminum

Asian aluminium premiums remained subdued this week as buyers assessed sharply higher quarterly cif main Japan port offers for July-September delivery. Two major producers opened QMJP negotiations at $460/t and $480/t, far above the April-June settlement of $350-353/t.

Asian aluminium premiums are now being pulled in two directions. Western-origin metal has tightened after the Iran war disrupted supply, giving producers a basis for higher offers. However, weak demand and greater availability of alternative units are limiting spot-market momentum.

Asian aluminium premiums also remain below the new QMJP offers. Current spot indications are around $320-380/t, while P1020 fca Korea indications for non-Russian material were heard at $320-350/t.

The gap between producer offers and spot levels suggests buyers may resist paying the full proposed premium. If QMJP settles above $400/t, non-western brands could continue trading below the benchmark.

Western-Origin Tightness Supports Higher Producer Offers

The higher QMJP offers reflect tighter availability of western-origin aluminium in Asia. Supply disruption linked to the Iran war has reduced confidence in some traditional flows, pushing producers to test stronger premium levels.

This is important because QMJP remains a key reference for aluminium trade across Asia. A high settlement can influence physical premiums, contract pricing and buyer behaviour beyond Japan.

However, the market is not uniformly tight. Some Asian smelters have received enquiries and are willing to sell into Europe or offer small volumes in Asia. Others prefer to wait for clearer direction from the QMJP negotiations.

This cautious behaviour shows how benchmark talks can freeze spot activity. Buyers do not want to commit at high levels before the benchmark is settled, while sellers do not want to underprice material if premiums rise.

The immediate market signal is therefore uncertainty, not shortage. Western-origin units command support, but broader aluminium availability remains mixed.

Stranded Wire and Russian Units Cap Spot Upside

Alternative supply is limiting the impact of higher QMJP offers. Stranded wire and Russian-origin aluminium units are weighing on sales of other brands, especially where buyers are more price-sensitive.

China’s exports of aluminium stranded wire rose sharply in April. Shipments under HS code 761490 increased by 166% year on year to 15,567t.

South Korea and Vietnam absorbed much larger volumes. Chinese shipments to South Korea surged to 2,911t, while shipments to Vietnam climbed to 2,288t. Exports to Thailand also rose to 619t.

These flows matter because stranded wire can create substitute supply pressure in regional aluminium markets. When alternative units are available, buyers have less urgency to accept premium increases for standard brands.

Russian-origin aluminium also remains a price-sensitive factor. Some buyers continue to avoid Russian material for policy or corporate reasons, but availability still affects regional market balance and non-western brand pricing.

Demand remains the bigger constraint. Buyers are likely to reduce volumes if both LME prices and QMJP premiums stay high. This limits the ability of producers to convert tight western-origin supply into broad spot-market price gains.

The next quarter may therefore produce a divided market. Western-origin material could secure stronger contract premiums, while non-western and alternative units trade at discounts.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Asia’s aluminium market is not rejecting higher premiums; it is questioning which metal deserves them. The real split is between tight western-origin supply and a softer regional market still supported by stranded wire, Russian units and weak demand.

Defu Copper Foil Facility Targets AI and New Energy Demand Growth

Defu Technology

Defu copper foil facility plans will add another major layer of Chinese capacity for high-end electronic circuit materials as artificial intelligence, communications and energy transition sectors lift demand for specialised copper products. Defu Technology will invest 3.1bn yuan to build the project in Jiujiang, Jiangxi province.

Defu copper foil facility development will be focused on high-end AI electronic circuit copper foil. The project will be built in two phases, each with 25,000 t/yr of production capacity.

Defu copper foil facility timing has not yet been disclosed. But the investment signals continued confidence in downstream copper demand linked to AI infrastructure, 5G and 6G communications, low-earth-orbit satellites and new energy applications.

The company already had 175,000 t/yr of copper foil capacity at the end of 2025. Its output rose by 50% to 139,600t last year, while sales increased by 52% to 140,900t.

AI Infrastructure Adds New Demand Layer for Copper Foil

Copper foil is becoming more strategically important as electronics, batteries and data infrastructure demand higher-performance materials. AI systems require dense electronic circuits, high-speed signal transmission and reliable thermal and electrical performance.

Defu’s new project targets that shift. High-end electronic circuit copper foil is used in printed circuit boards and advanced electronics, where quality, thickness control and surface performance can determine reliability.

AI-related demand is still emerging, but it is already becoming relevant to copper markets. Some market participants estimate global copper demand from AI-related applications could reach around 350,000t in 2026.

That demand does not come only from data-centre power cables. It also includes circuit materials, cooling systems, electrical equipment, grid connections, transformers and backup power infrastructure.

Defu is therefore positioning itself closer to higher-value copper demand. The company is not simply expanding commodity capacity; it is targeting sectors where copper foil quality and customer qualification matter.

New Energy and Electronics Support Capacity Expansion

Energy transition sectors remain a key driver for electrolytic copper foil demand. Copper foil is widely used in lithium-ion batteries, especially as current collector material for anodes.

China’s copper foil operating rates improved significantly in 2025. Average electrolytic copper foil operating rates rose to 77.1%, up by 18.8 percentage points from a year earlier.

That recovery reflects stronger downstream demand from battery, electronics and new energy markets. It also helps explain why producers such as Defu are still adding capacity despite competition across China’s materials sector.

The planned Jiujiang facility will lift Defu’s ability to serve multiple growth markets. These include AI hardware, communications equipment, satellites, batteries and other high-end electronics.

However, expansion also raises competitive pressure. As more Chinese copper foil capacity enters the market, producers will need to differentiate through product quality, customer qualification and exposure to higher-margin applications.

For copper demand, the project reinforces a broader structural point. Electrification is no longer limited to EVs and grids. AI, satellites, communications and advanced electronics are adding new copper-intensive demand channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Defu’s investment shows that copper demand is becoming more technology-driven and more specialised. The strongest copper foil producers will be those that can move beyond volume growth and qualify into AI, battery and high-end electronics supply chains.

India-US Critical Minerals Agreement Targets Mining, Processing and Recycling Security

India-US Critical Minerals

India-US critical minerals agreement marks a new step in efforts to secure mining, processing and recycling routes for strategic minerals and rare earth elements. The bilateral framework covers materials needed for electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors, solar panels, defence systems and artificial intelligence hardware.

India-US critical minerals agreement was signed on the sidelines of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi. Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar and US secretary of state Marco Rubio attended the signing.

India-US critical minerals agreement reflects growing concern over concentrated supply chains. China dominates refining and processing for lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earths, leaving India and the US exposed to supply disruption, export controls and price leverage.

The pact covers the full value chain, from extraction and processing to recycling, financing and long-term material management. That broader scope is important because raw mineral access alone does not create industrial supply security.

Processing Capacity Becomes the Strategic Priority

The agreement directly targets one of the biggest weaknesses in non-China critical mineral supply chains: processing. Mining resources matter, but value is captured when materials are refined, separated and qualified for industrial use.

China accounts for around 60-70% of global refining and processing capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt. It also controls about 90% of rare earth refining.

That dominance gives China strong influence over battery materials, magnet inputs, semiconductor minerals and advanced manufacturing supply chains. It also makes diversification difficult because new projects must compete with established Chinese scale and cost advantages.

India has significant long-term rare earth potential. Its monazite reserves contain an estimated 7.23mn t of rare earth oxides, but commercial output remains limited.

The new framework could help India convert resource potential into usable supply. That will require investment in mining, separation, refining, metallurgy, environmental management and customer qualification.

For the US, India offers a strategic partner with mineral resources, industrial ambition and a large domestic market. For India, the US can provide financing, technology partnerships, customer demand and policy support.

Rare Earth Corridors Fit India’s Industrial Strategy

India’s latest budget introduced a policy framework to develop rare earth corridors across Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. These regions could become the foundation for a more integrated rare earth supply chain.

The corridor model matters because rare earth development requires clustering. Mining, mineral sands processing, separation, waste management, logistics and downstream manufacturing need to be connected.

India is also widening its international partnerships. It signed a critical minerals cooperation agreement with Brazil in February 2026, showing that New Delhi wants a diversified supply network across multiple geographies.

The India-US framework adds a stronger strategic layer. It links India’s domestic minerals policy with Washington’s push to reduce dependence on China in defence, batteries, semiconductors and AI-related hardware.

Recycling is also part of the agreement. That inclusion is important because recovered battery metals, rare earth magnets and industrial scrap can reduce long-term import dependence.

However, execution will decide the real impact. India must move faster on permitting, processing technology, financing and downstream customer development if it wants to become a serious critical minerals hub.

The agreement gives both countries a framework. The next challenge is turning policy language into operating mines, refineries, recycling plants and qualified material flows.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The India-US deal shows that critical minerals security is now a full-chain industrial policy issue. The countries that win will not only secure ore; they will control processing, recycling, financing and qualified supply for strategic end markets.

Mt Marion Lithium Expansion Advances as MinRes and Ganfeng Lift Spodumene Supply

Mineral Resources

Mt Marion lithium expansion is moving ahead after Mineral Resources and Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium reached a final investment decision on a A$490mn upgrade at the Western Australian mine. The project will raise 6% spodumene concentrate output from 500,000 t/yr to 600,000 t/yr.

Mt Marion lithium expansion reflects renewed confidence in spodumene markets after a period of stronger pricing, Chinese demand and supply disruption from Zimbabwean export controls. The decision also reinforces Australia’s role as a core lithium feedstock supplier to global battery material chains.

Mt Marion lithium expansion includes A$220mn for underground mine development, A$240mn for a flotation plant and A$30mn for non-processing infrastructure. Construction is scheduled to begin in July-September.

The partners expect to commission the mine within 12 months of construction starting, with production ramp-up over the following six months. That timeline makes Mt Marion an important near-term growth project in the Australian hard-rock lithium sector.

Underground Mining Extends Mine Life and Feed Flexibility

The underground mine will supplement ore from the existing open pit and contribute up to 40% of processing feed. This will extend Mt Marion’s remaining mine life by six years beyond the previous estimate of 10 years.

That is strategically important because mine life extension improves supply visibility for customers and investors. Battery chemical producers need stable spodumene feedstock to support long-term lithium hydroxide and lithium carbonate production.

The underground development also gives MinRes and Ganfeng more operational flexibility. Combining open-pit and underground ore can support feed blending, grade control and continuity as the mine matures.

The project will cause minimal disruption to existing operations, according to the company. That matters because the mine is already a major producing asset and any downtime could affect near-term shipments.

Mt Marion is also backed by a strong downstream partner. Ganfeng is one of China’s leading lithium companies, giving the project a direct link to one of the world’s largest battery materials markets.

Flotation Plant Targets Higher-Grade Product Mix

The new flotation plant will remove SC3.5 product from MinRes’ mix and deliver a minimum SC5 grade product. This is a key upgrade because higher-grade concentrate can improve processing efficiency for downstream converters.

SC6 remains the benchmark product for hard-rock lithium supply. Increasing SC6 output to 600,000 t/yr gives Mt Marion stronger exposure to higher-value concentrate markets.

The investment economics are highly sensitive to price. At an assumed SC6 price of $2,700/t, MinRes expects the expansion payback period to be less than one year.

Spodumene prices have risen in recent months, supported by Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export controls and strong Chinese demand. The latest Australian SC6 assessment was $2,661/t on 19 May, down from $2,811/t a week earlier but still elevated enough to support renewed investment.

MinRes also cited higher lithium prices as a reason for restarting operations at its Bald Hill mine in Western Australia. Together, these moves suggest producers are again positioning for stronger lithium feedstock demand.

The broader lithium market remains volatile, but the Mt Marion decision shows that high-quality Australian assets can still attract capital when pricing, partners and mine-life extension align.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mt Marion’s expansion shows that lithium investment is returning first to established, scalable assets with strong downstream links. The key lesson is that the next lithium cycle will reward producers that can improve grade, extend mine life and secure reliable routes into China’s battery supply chain.

EU Mexico Trade Agreement Opens Clean Tech and Critical Materials Opportunities

EU, Mexico

EU Mexico trade agreement signing marks a major update to a commercial relationship already worth around €100bn/yr in goods and services. The revised deal aims to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers while creating new opportunities in clean technology, critical raw materials and agri-food trade.

EU Mexico trade agreement provisions will eliminate almost all high Mexican tariffs on EU imports. The affected sectors include machinery, mineral fuels, cars, car parts and a wide range of agri-food products.

EU Mexico trade agreement rules also include legally binding commitments on environmental protection and climate change. This gives the deal a strategic industrial angle beyond conventional tariff reduction.

The interim trade agreement is expected to move faster than the wider modernised global agreement. It needs European Parliament approval and qualified-majority approval from EU member states, rather than ratification by all 27 countries.

Clean Technology and Raw Materials Gain Strategic Relevance

The agreement could strengthen EU-Mexico cooperation in clean technology and critical raw materials. This matters as Europe seeks more diversified supply chains for energy transition equipment, electric vehicles, industrial machinery and advanced manufacturing.

Mexico is already a major manufacturing base linked to North American automotive and industrial supply chains. Better EU access could support machinery, components and clean technology exports into a market positioned between Europe and the US.

The deal also includes strict rules of origin, including for electric vehicles. EU officials said these rules are designed to prevent circumvention and avoid the agreement becoming a backdoor for Chinese production.

That detail is important. As tariffs, subsidies and local-content rules reshape global EV trade, rules of origin are becoming a core tool of industrial policy.

For European manufacturers, clearer access to Mexico may support exports of vehicles, parts, machinery and clean technology systems. For Mexican producers, greater access to the EU could strengthen trade in food, consumer products and selected industrial goods.

Tariff Cuts Combine With Climate and Circular Economy Commitments

Mexico will remove tariffs on key European exports including pork, dairy, cereals, fruit and pasta. Sensitive products will receive limited access through tariff-rate quotas.

The agreement also gives EU exporters broader quota access for dairy, beef, poultry and pork products. In return, Mexican producers will gain more liberalised access to the EU for products including coffee, fruit, chocolate and agave syrup.

Alongside the trade deal, both sides signed a circular economy declaration covering climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, including plastics. This adds sustainability language to the commercial framework.

The agreement requires both parties to uphold international climate treaties, including the Paris Agreement. It also includes a dedicated dispute settlement procedure.

For metals and industrial supply chains, the wider message is clear. Trade agreements are increasingly combining market access, climate obligations, origin rules and supply-chain security.

The EU is using trade policy to support clean technology, critical raw materials cooperation and industrial competitiveness. Mexico gains deeper access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets while strengthening its role in global manufacturing networks.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-Mexico deal shows how trade policy is becoming a supply-chain security instrument. The rules of origin for electric vehicles may prove as important as the tariff cuts, especially as Europe tries to protect clean technology markets from indirect Chinese competition.

Indonesia NPI Export Exemption Eases Nickel Trade Fears but Leaves Policy Risk

Nickel pig iron

Indonesia NPI export exemption has eased immediate concerns in the nickel market after sources said nickel pig iron will not need to be exported through Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia. The clarification reduces near-term disruption risk for Indonesia’s dominant nickel alloy product.

Indonesia NPI export exemption matters because more than 90% of Indonesia’s nickel-alloy output is nickel pig iron. NPI is mainly used in stainless steel production and forms the backbone of Indonesia’s nickel downstreaming model.

Indonesia NPI export exemption does not remove all uncertainty. Ferro-nickel exports are still expected to be traded through DSI, while the industry lacks an official definition that clearly separates ferro-nickel from NPI.

That ambiguity is important because ferro-nickel and NPI share the same HS code under global and Indonesian trade frameworks. Market participants usually distinguish them by nickel content, with ferro-nickel typically above 20% nickel and NPI usually around 10-14%.

NPI Exclusion Protects Indonesia’s Core Nickel Flow

The exclusion of NPI from the DSI export requirement is commercially significant. NPI is Indonesia’s largest nickel product by volume and a critical feedstock for stainless steelmakers.

If NPI had been included, the rule could have disrupted contracts, pricing, payment flows and export execution across a major share of Indonesia’s nickel industry. That risk has now been reduced, at least for the near term.

The clarification also helps Chinese and regional stainless steel buyers. These customers rely heavily on Indonesian NPI because it offers a cost-effective alternative to pure nickel metal in stainless production.

However, the inclusion of ferro-nickel still matters. A small number of Indonesian smelters produce higher-nickel ferro-nickel, and those exports may now face a more centralised transaction structure through DSI.

The policy could therefore split Indonesia’s nickel alloy market into two regulatory paths. NPI would remain outside the new state export channel, while ferro-nickel would fall under tighter government control.

The risk is classification. Without a formal technical definition, exporters may face uncertainty over which products qualify as NPI and which are treated as ferro-nickel.

Policy Clarity Still Matters for Investment

Indonesia announced on 20 May that exports of key commodities, initially including palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, must be routed through DSI. The aim is to centralise control over strategic commodity exports.

The nickel industry welcomed the NPI clarification, but investors remain cautious. Indonesia’s mining and metals policy has changed frequently, creating uncertainty around timing, scope and implementation.

This matters because downstream nickel projects require large capital commitments. Smelters, matte converters, HPAL plants and battery-material facilities all need stable rules before investors can justify long payback periods.

The DSI rule follows other policy shifts, including changes to ore pricing, royalty plans, export levies and RKAB approval processes. Even when policies support state revenue and downstreaming, sudden changes can raise financing risk.

Indonesia still holds enormous leverage in global nickel. Its dominance in NPI and stainless-linked supply gives Jakarta significant influence over trade flows and pricing.

But policy predictability is now becoming just as important as resource control. If rules change too quickly or remain unclear, investors may delay decisions even when Indonesia remains the strongest nickel platform.

The NPI exemption is therefore a useful correction. But the market still needs formal definitions, clear transaction rules and stable implementation before confidence fully returns.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia has reduced immediate nickel disruption by excluding NPI from the DSI export channel. But the ferro-nickel ambiguity shows that policy risk remains embedded in the country’s downstreaming model.

Chinalco Guinea Alumina Plant Plan Deepens China’s Bauxite Processing Footprint

Chinalco

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant plans mark another major step in shifting part of the aluminium value chain closer to Guinea’s bauxite resources. Chinese state-owned aluminium producer Chinalco has signed an agreement with the Guinean government to build a 1.2mn t/yr alumina facility in the country.

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant investment is expected to total $1bn. The company has not released a construction timeline, but said the production line will use local bauxite resources, which should support cost competitiveness.

Chinalco Guinea alumina plant development is strategically important because Guinea is China’s largest bauxite supplier. China imported 149mn t of Guinean bauxite in 2025, up 35% from a year earlier and equal to 74% of its total bauxite imports.

The project shows how Guinea’s resource policy is starting to reshape aluminium supply chains. The country is pushing mining companies to invest in local alumina production instead of exporting only raw bauxite.

Guinea Pushes Bauxite Miners Toward Local Value Addition

Guinea has strengthened mining supervision in recent years as it seeks more economic value from its bauxite reserves. Authorities are requiring large mining companies to build alumina plants in the country.

This policy shift matters because bauxite is only the first stage of the aluminium chain. Alumina refining captures more value, creates industrial jobs and gives the host country a stronger role in downstream processing.

For China, local alumina production in Guinea could reduce pressure on long-distance bauxite logistics. It may also help Chinese aluminium companies secure a more stable feedstock chain in a country that has become essential to their raw material supply.

Guinea’s leverage has increased because Chinese refiners depend heavily on its ore. With nearly three-quarters of China’s bauxite imports coming from Guinea, policy changes in Conakry can directly affect Chinese alumina and aluminium economics.

The $1bn Chinalco project therefore reflects both opportunity and pressure. Chinese firms can keep access to Guinean bauxite, but they increasingly need to commit capital to local processing.

Chinese Alumina Investment Faces Policy and Execution Risk

Chinalco’s agreement follows the start of construction by Inner Mongolia Dian Tou Energy on an alumina plant in Guinea’s Tougnifilidy area in March 2025. That project was described as the first Chinese-owned alumina project in Guinea.

Market participants expect Guinea’s alumina output to rise over the next five years. If these projects advance, Guinea could move from being mainly a bauxite exporter toward becoming a more meaningful alumina producer.

The shift could alter aluminium raw material trade flows. More alumina produced in Guinea may eventually reduce the need to ship some bauxite to China for refining, depending on costs, logistics and power availability.

However, execution risk remains high. Alumina refining requires capital, power, water, infrastructure, environmental management and stable policy terms. Project economics will depend on more than bauxite availability.

Guinea’s military government also moved in May 2025 to rescind mining licences granted over the previous two decades across bauxite, iron ore, gold, diamonds and graphite. That action has increased pressure on mining companies and reinforced the importance of compliance with local value-addition requirements.

For Chinese aluminium producers, the direction is clear. Guinea remains indispensable, but access to bauxite is increasingly tied to local investment, refining commitments and government expectations.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Guinea is using its bauxite dominance to force a deeper industrial bargain with foreign miners. Chinalco’s alumina project shows that China’s aluminium supply chain is no longer only about importing ore; it is becoming tied to processing investment inside resource countries.

Indonesia Metals Investment Risk Rises as Policy Shifts Cloud Downstreaming

Indonesia Nickel mining

Indonesia metals investment faces growing uncertainty as frequent policy changes test foreign investor confidence in the country’s mining and processing sector. Jakarta’s latest move to route key commodity exports through a new state-owned enterprise adds another layer of complexity to an already policy-heavy operating environment.

Indonesia metals investment has been supported for years by the country’s downstreaming strategy, especially in nickel. However, investors are now watching whether sudden changes in royalties, export levies, price floors, export proceeds rules and RKAB approvals could weaken the economics of new projects.

Indonesia metals investment remains strategically important because the country dominates global nickel supply and is attracting major aluminium, battery, ferro-alloy and electric vehicle-related projects. But policy direction and policy predictability are not the same thing.

The government’s natural resource strategy is clear. It wants tighter export control, higher state revenue, more domestic value addition and greater retention of foreign exchange. The main concern is how quickly and broadly those rules are implemented.

DSI Export Rule Adds New Uncertainty to Nickel Downstreaming

The planned use of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia as a state export channel is the clearest sign of Jakarta’s tightening control over commodity flows. The policy initially targets palm oil, coal and ferro-alloys, but nickel market participants expect broader implications.

Nickel pig iron is likely to be affected because it is a ferro-alloy. That matters because Indonesia’s nickel growth has been built around NPI, stainless steel, nickel matte and battery-material processing.

A centralised export model could reshape how contracts, pricing and payments are handled. If DSI becomes the sole counterparty for overseas buyers, private producers and traders may lose commercial flexibility.

The policy follows several other changes. Indonesia has revised government-mandated price floors, required export proceeds to remain in domestic banks for at least 12 months, adjusted royalty rates, introduced export levy plans and modified the RKAB application process.

These measures all fit Jakarta’s broader resource nationalism agenda. But rapid revisions make it harder for companies to model long-term returns.

Nickel producers have already faced uncertainty over royalty and export duty proposals. The government announced planned changes in April, then postponed them in May before the intended June start date.

This pattern may show that officials are willing to listen to industry feedback. But it also suggests that policy design and communication remain incomplete before major measures are announced.

The risk is that investors begin pricing Indonesia as a less predictable jurisdiction. That could slow downstreaming projects, especially those requiring large capital commitments, long payback periods and imported technology.

Several battery and nickel projects have already faced delays from feedstock constraints, regulatory approvals or weaker market conditions. These include projects linked to Chengtun, Hanrui and LG Energy Solution.

Some operations have also cut or halted production because of delayed or insufficient RKAB approvals. This shows how permitting and quota decisions can directly affect physical output.

Aluminium and Manganese Projects Face Spillover Risk

The market’s immediate focus is nickel, but the risk is wider. If the DSI model expands across more strategic commodities, aluminium and manganese investors could also face new pricing and export constraints.

Chinese aluminium producers have been increasing overseas investment in Indonesia since China imposed a 45mn t/yr cap on domestic primary aluminium capacity. Indonesia offers power access, industrial park infrastructure and proximity to Asian growth markets.

Tsingshan is building an 800,000 t/yr aluminium smelter in Indonesia. Nanshan Aluminium plans to expand its Bintan Industrial Park facility to 500,000 t/yr, while Hua Chin Aluminum Indonesia commissioned a 500,000 t/yr smelter in 2025.

Some Chinese companies are also considering downstream aluminium processing projects in Indonesia. These investments would move the country beyond smelting and into fabricated products.

But discounted sales from Chinese-invested Indonesian smelters could become harder if aluminium exports are eventually routed through DSI. A state-controlled export platform may not allow the same commercial discounting that buyers currently use.

That would raise costs for Chinese buyers and could change the economics of Indonesia-based aluminium supply chains. It could also affect trade flows if producers lose flexibility in pricing and contract structures.

Manganese may also be exposed. Tsingshan has invested in Indonesian manganese production, with six lines and combined capacity of 100,000 t/yr.

The broader lesson is that Indonesia’s downstreaming success depends on credibility as well as control. Investors can adapt to higher royalties, stricter export rules or local processing requirements if implementation is clear and stable.

Uncertainty is more damaging than regulation itself. If companies cannot predict which products will be covered, how prices will be set or when rules will take effect, they may delay capital spending.

Indonesia still has enormous strategic leverage in nickel and growing relevance in aluminium, manganese and battery materials. But maintaining that position will require policy discipline, transparent consultation and practical implementation.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia is not retreating from downstreaming; it is tightening state control over the value chain. The danger is that too many rapid policy shifts could weaken the investment confidence needed to build the very processing base Jakarta wants to protect.

China-Russia Energy Cooperation Deepens as Beijing and Moscow Broaden Industrial Ties

China-Russia

China-Russia energy cooperation is set to deepen after both countries agreed to expand collaboration across energy, chemicals, metallurgy, agriculture and manufacturing. The pledge followed Russian president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing on 19-20 May.

China-Russia energy cooperation remains the core of the bilateral relationship. Oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables all featured in the joint statement, showing that energy security remains central to both countries’ strategic alignment.

China-Russia energy cooperation also has wider industrial meaning. Stable Russian energy flows support China’s manufacturing base, while Russian suppliers gain a critical long-term market as western sanctions continue to reshape trade.

The two countries also agreed to extend their treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation. That move reinforces a long-term political framework for resource trade, industrial projects and supply-chain coordination.

Energy and Nuclear Ties Anchor Strategic Partnership

Energy remains the strongest pillar of China-Russia trade. Russia is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas, delivering through a 38bn m³/yr pipeline and accounting for about 45% of China’s pipeline gas imports.

However, the joint statement did not confirm progress on a second major gas pipeline. That omission suggests that both sides still have commercial or political issues to resolve before expanding pipeline capacity further.

Russian crude also remains important to China. China imported an average of 2.53mn b/d of Russian crude in January-April, up from 2.01mn b/d a year earlier.

The buyer structure is shifting. State-owned Chinese refiners have reduced some purchases since tighter US sanctions began last October, while independent refiners remain more focused on margins and cargo economics.

Nuclear energy is another strategic link. China and Russia will continue work on the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear projects, which are expected to come online around 2026-28.

The two countries also plan to cooperate on advanced nuclear technologies, including fast reactors, fusion power and closed fuel cycle systems. This gives the relationship a long-term technology dimension beyond fossil fuel trade.

Renewable energy also appeared in the statement, including green power certificates. That language shows both sides want energy cooperation to cover low-carbon systems, even while oil, gas and coal remain central.

Agriculture, Metallurgy and Manufacturing Deepen Trade Flows

Agriculture is becoming a larger part of the partnership. China and Russia agreed to expand bilateral trade in meat, seafood, grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils and feed protein meals.

China already allows Russian beef and by-products that meet registration and disease-free zone requirements. It also lifted restrictions on Russian pork exports after a long ban linked to African swine fever.

Russia has become a key supplier of sunflower and rapeseed oils to China. It is also China’s largest source of non-GM soybean imports, making food security another strategic layer in the relationship.

Metallurgy and chemicals also remain important. China’s non-ferrous sector imports selected Russian raw materials, including antimony concentrate.

This matters because antimony is a critical material for flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, batteries and defence-related applications. Russian supply can help China manage raw material availability in niche but strategic metals.

The two countries also plan to deepen cooperation in automotive manufacturing, shipbuilding and civil aviation. Chinese automakers have already invested in Russian production, while Russia remains an important market for Chinese vehicles, including electric vehicles.

The wider industrial direction is clear. China and Russia are not only increasing commodity trade. They are building a broader economic partnership that connects energy, raw materials, food, manufacturing and strategic technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China and Russia are building a resource-and-industry bloc designed to withstand western pressure. The metals market should watch the metallurgy and critical minerals angle closely, because raw material flows such as antimony can become strategically important even when volumes are small.

Arafura Nolans Rare Earths Project Reaches FID as NdPr Offtake Clears Threshold

Arafura

Arafura Nolans rare earths project has reached final investment decision, giving Australia a major new source of neodymium-praseodymium oxide for permanent magnet supply chains. Construction is scheduled to begin in September and production is expected to start in early to mid-2029.

Arafura Nolans rare earths project will produce 4,440 t/yr of NdPr oxide, a critical light rare earth used in permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems and high-technology manufacturing.

Arafura Nolans rare earths project will also produce 470 t/yr of mixed medium-heavy rare earth oxide and 144,000 t/yr of fertilizer-grade phosphoric acid. This gives the project a broader industrial profile beyond magnet materials alone.

The final investment decision was enabled by offtake support that lifted contracted NdPr volumes above Arafura’s 80% target. The project now has 3,570 t/yr of NdPr committed, equal to 80.4% of nameplate capacity.

NdPr Offtake Converts Nolans Into a Bankable Magnet Supply Asset

Export Finance Australia provided a non-binding letter of support for 500 t/yr of NdPr under Australia’s Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. That commitment helped push Nolans over the targeted offtake threshold.

The EFA support followed a A$200mn investment from Australia’s National Reconstruction Fund and a 500 t/yr NdPr offtake agreement with Traxys North America.

Arafura also has offtake agreements with Hyundai, Siemens and Traxys Europe. These customers give Nolans a diversified demand base across automotive, industrial and trading channels.

This structure matters because rare earth projects need committed buyers before construction risk becomes acceptable. Mining, processing and customer qualification all require long timelines and large capital commitments.

NdPr oxide is the key commercial product. It feeds rare earth permanent magnets, which remain essential for high-efficiency motors and generators.

Arafura will sell the remaining 870 t/yr of NdPr on the spot market. That gives the company some exposure to future price upside while maintaining enough contracted volume to support project financing and development.

Australia Strengthens Non-China Rare Earth Supply

Nolans has a planned mine life of 38 years and is projected to meet around 4% of global NdPr demand. That makes it strategically important for buyers seeking supply outside China-dominated rare earth chains.

The project’s value lies not only in mining. It adds processed NdPr oxide supply, which is closer to the material form needed by magnet makers and downstream industrial users.

This is critical because the rare earth bottleneck is often in processing, separation and qualification rather than ore alone. A project that can deliver NdPr oxide into contracted channels has more strategic value than an undeveloped resource.

Australia’s role is also growing. Government support through the Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve and National Reconstruction Fund shows that Canberra is willing to use public finance to support strategic materials projects.

For automakers and industrial manufacturers, Nolans offers a long-term alternative source of magnet feedstock. That matters as companies try to reduce exposure to Chinese export controls and supply-chain concentration.

The project will still face execution risk. Construction, commissioning, product qualification and cost control will determine whether Nolans can deliver on schedule and at commercial scale.

But reaching FID is a major milestone. It moves the project from policy ambition and offtake negotiation into physical development.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Arafura’s FID shows that rare earth diversification is moving from announcements into construction-backed supply. Nolans matters because it combines government support, long-term offtake and NdPr oxide output in one non-China supply platform.

European Ferro-Molybdenum Prices Hit Three-Year High on Concentrate Squeeze

Ferro-Molybdenum

European ferro-molybdenum prices have climbed to a three-year high as tight molybdenum concentrate supply, stronger Chinese steel demand and logistical constraints push the market higher. The rally has lifted prices sharply since the start of the year.

European ferro-molybdenum prices were last assessed at $70.90-71.50/kg in-warehouse Rotterdam on 19 May, up by about 25% from the start of the year. Molybdenum oxide prices also rose to $30.50-30.80/lb duty unpaid Rotterdam, up by 28% over the same period.

European ferro-molybdenum prices are being driven mainly by raw material tightness rather than a broad recovery in European steel demand. Molybdenum concentrate availability has tightened structurally, limiting oxide and ferro-molybdenum production flexibility.

The key problem is that molybdenum is mostly produced as a by-product of copper mining. That means supply cannot quickly respond to higher prices, leaving the market exposed when concentrate availability tightens or downstream demand rises.

Concentrate Tightness Drives the Molybdenum Chain Higher

Molybdenum concentrate is the starting point for the supply chain. It is converted into molybdenum oxide, which then feeds ferro-molybdenum production for alloy steel and stainless steel applications.

Concentrate prices in China have risen by about 29% since January, peaking at 5,235 yuan/mtu on 13 May. That cost increase has moved through the value chain and supported higher oxide and ferro-molybdenum prices.

Chinese steel demand has intensified the squeeze. Mills purchased around 30,000t of ferro-molybdenum in March-April, up 10% from a year earlier.

This buying absorbed much of China’s available spot concentrate and oxide supply. As a result, less material has been available for export to other consuming regions.

Market participants initially expected demand to slow after pre-holiday buying ahead of the 1-5 May Labour Day holiday. Instead, sustained steel mill demand kept buyers active and tightened availability further.

The Centerra Gold Langeloth outage in the US also supported the rally. An explosion near the facility’s acid unit on 29 January led to a suspension of operations, removing an important source of molybdenum oxide and ferro-molybdenum from the prompt market.

The facility’s direct global supply share is limited. However, its outage tightened nearby availability and strengthened bullish sentiment, allowing traders and producers to raise offers more aggressively.

Supply Constraints Outweigh European Demand Recovery

The current rally is largely supply-led. European steel demand has not recovered strongly enough to explain the scale of the price increase on its own.

Logistical constraints have made the situation worse. Financing, freight and inventory bottlenecks have reduced spot availability among trading firms.

Some sellers have also withheld material in expectation of further price gains. At the same time, buyers have resisted higher offers, reducing spot liquidity and creating sharper price movements.

Truckload enquiries have remained limited in recent weeks. This suggests that physical tightness and cautious seller behaviour are driving prices more than a surge in end-user consumption.

For alloy producers and steelmakers, the rally raises cost pressure. Ferro-molybdenum is used to improve strength, corrosion resistance and high-temperature performance in steels used across energy, chemicals, engineering, defence and industrial equipment.

The market’s vulnerability reflects molybdenum’s by-product nature. Even if prices rise sharply, copper mines cannot quickly increase molybdenum output just to meet alloy demand.

That makes the molybdenum chain highly sensitive to disruptions. Concentrate shortages, converter outages, Chinese buying and trading bottlenecks can all create price moves that exceed the underlying change in steel consumption.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The molybdenum rally shows how by-product metals can move violently when small supply disruptions meet concentrated demand. European buyers are not facing a simple steel-demand story; they are facing a raw material chain where concentrate availability now controls ferro-alloy pricing.

China Gallium Exports Collapse in April as Restrictions Hit Japan Supply

Gallium

China gallium exports collapsed in April as export restrictions sharply reduced shipments to Japan and buying from other key markets slowed after earlier purchases. Customs data showed China exported only 3kg of gallium during the month, all of it wrought material shipped to Malaysia.

China gallium exports were dramatically lower than April 2025, when shipments totalled 4,777kg. That earlier volume included 4,627kg of wrought gallium and 150kg of unwrought material.

China gallium exports remain highly sensitive to licensing controls because the metal is a strategic input for compound semiconductors, radio-frequency electronics, power devices and advanced manufacturing. The April data show how policy restrictions can quickly override normal trade patterns in a small but critical materials market.

The sharp monthly fall also highlights the fragility of gallium supply for downstream users. Even when year-to-date exports remain higher, licensing shifts can leave individual buyers exposed to sudden supply gaps.

Japan Restrictions Reshape Gallium Trade Flows

Japan has traditionally been one of China’s most important gallium export destinations. China exported 42t of gallium to Japan in 2025 before bilateral relations worsened and export controls tightened.

China has prohibited exports of dual-use items for Japanese military use and introduced tighter controls on exports to 40 Japanese companies since January. The measures followed comments by Japan’s leadership on Taiwan that deepened political tensions between the two countries.

These restrictions are expected to continue because bilateral relations show no clear sign of easing. That creates a direct supply-chain issue for Japanese semiconductor, electronics and advanced materials users.

Gallium’s industrial importance is larger than its physical volume. It is used in materials such as gallium nitride and gallium arsenide, which support high-frequency, high-efficiency and high-performance electronic applications.

Japan’s exposure therefore matters for more than one metal trade route. It affects supply security for sectors tied to semiconductors, defence electronics, optoelectronics and advanced manufacturing.

The April collapse also shows how export controls work in practice. They do not need to stop all global shipments to disrupt specific customers. Targeted licensing limits can redirect trade flows and force buyers to rely on inventories, alternative suppliers or delayed procurement.

German Buying Masks Underlying Weakness in Year-to-Date Exports

The January-April export picture looks stronger than April alone. China exported 16,353kg of gallium in the first four months of the year, up 14% from 14,294kg in the same period of 2025.

That increase was mainly driven by German buying earlier in the year. Germany received 16t from China in January-March, but buyers there did not renew purchases in April.

China shipped 22.3t of gallium to Germany in 2025, mostly in the second half, after a major Chinese supplier obtained export permission. This shows how gallium flows now depend heavily on licence availability and timing.

The contrast between strong early German purchases and almost no April exports is important. It suggests that year-to-date data can hide short-term supply stress when licensing-driven shipments are concentrated in a few windows.

For buyers, the key issue is no longer only price. It is whether export licences can be obtained, how much volume is approved and whether shipments can be repeated consistently.

For western semiconductor supply chains, gallium remains a strategic vulnerability. China still has strong influence over supply availability, and small changes in export permissions can have outsized effects on downstream procurement.

The April data therefore reinforce a broader critical minerals lesson. Thin markets such as gallium can become highly unstable when trade policy, diplomatic tensions and dual-use controls intersect.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Gallium is proving that strategic materials risk often appears first in licensing volumes, not headline prices. Japan’s exposure shows why semiconductor supply chains must treat gallium security as a policy risk as much as a procurement issue.