Brazil Critical Minerals Bill Moves Country Toward Domestic Processing Strategy

Critical Minerals

Brazil critical minerals bill approval by the lower house marks a major step toward turning the country’s mineral reserves into a domestic industrial development strategy. The bill establishes the national policy of critical and strategic minerals and creates incentives for companies to process and transform those materials inside Brazil.

Brazil critical minerals bill measures include a new mineral activity guarantee fund backed by R2bn in federal money. The fund will support projects linked to the production of critical and strategic minerals.

Brazil critical minerals bill incentives also include R5bn in tax credits over five years to encourage processing and transformation. This shows that Brazil does not want to remain only an exporter of raw materials.

The bill will now move to the senate. Mines and energy minister Alexandre Silveira said he will work directly with senators to accelerate approval, framing critical minerals as a matter of economic modernisation and national sovereignty.

Processing Incentives Target Value Creation Inside Brazil

The bill creates the national council for the industrialisation of critical and strategic minerals. The council will decide which minerals qualify as critical and strategic and will update the list every four years.

This structure is important because Brazil has large resource potential but still needs stronger domestic processing capacity. Without refining, separation, transformation and recycling, mineral wealth can leave the country as low-value raw material.

The proposed guarantee fund and tax credits are designed to change that pattern. They will support projects considered strategic under the national policy, with a focus on minerals that can strengthen Brazil’s industrial base.

Congress member Arnaldo Jardim, the bill’s rapporteur, said critical minerals represent a development opportunity for Brazil. He argued that the country should become a major rare earths producer, stimulate recycling through urban mining and make its processing industry more competitive.

That message reflects a broader shift in resource policy. Brazil is trying to position critical minerals as a tool for industrial development, not only export revenue.

Rare earths are especially important. Brazil has significant rare earth potential, and global buyers are searching for alternatives to China-dominated supply chains. If Brazil can move beyond mining into separation and processing, it could become more relevant to magnet, defence, electronics and clean energy markets.

Urban mining also deserves attention. Recycling can strengthen domestic supply, reduce waste and create secondary sources of critical materials from electronics, batteries, industrial scrap and end-of-life equipment.

US Interest Raises Brazil’s Strategic Importance

The bill comes as Brazil and the US are discussing critical minerals more actively. Presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Donald Trump are expected to meet this week, and critical minerals are likely to be part of the agenda.

The US has long sought a critical minerals agreement with Brazil. Goias state has already signed a cooperation agreement with the US, although Brazil’s federal government has challenged its legal validity.

That dispute shows how politically sensitive critical minerals have become. Foreign partnerships can bring investment and market access, but the federal government wants to ensure that strategic minerals serve national interests.

Brazil holds about 10% of global critical minerals reserves, according to domestic research and mining institutions. The sector is expected to attract $21.3bn in investment by 2030.

This gives Brazil strong leverage. The country has rare earths, niobium, graphite, nickel, lithium and other minerals that are increasingly important to batteries, magnets, aerospace, electronics and energy transition technologies.

However, reserves alone will not determine Brazil’s role. The country must build processing capacity, permitting efficiency, infrastructure, financing tools and reliable industrial partnerships.

The new policy could help unlock that pathway. If approved by the senate and implemented effectively, it could shift Brazil from a raw material supplier toward a more integrated critical minerals economy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil is making the right strategic move by linking critical minerals to processing, tax incentives and industrial policy. The real test will be execution: Brazil must convert resource potential into refining, separation, recycling and customer-ready supply before global competitors secure the next wave of investment.

Heavy Rare Earth Supply Push Gains US Defense Backing Through REalloys

REalloys

Heavy rare earth supply has moved further into the US defense priority list after REalloys received a memorandum from the Department of Defense highlighting the need to secure domestic production of critical heavy rare earth elements. The document specifically identified dysprosium and terbium as the most critical and high-value materials.

The signal is important because heavy rare earth supply remains one of the weakest points in western permanent magnet value chains. Dysprosium and terbium are essential for high-performance magnets that must operate under heat, stress and demanding defense conditions.

REalloys said the Department of Defense is treating heavy rare earths as a national security priority. The company also said Washington is renewing support through financial investment, strategic policy and public-private partnerships.

The company is now expanding its North American metallisation platform to produce defense-grade dysprosium and terbium at commercial scale. That step targets one of the most important bottlenecks between rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing.

Dysprosium and Terbium Become Defense-Critical Materials

Dysprosium and terbium are not large-volume rare earths, but their industrial importance is high. They help improve the thermal stability and performance of neodymium-iron-boron magnets used in advanced motors, actuators, sensors and defense systems.

This makes them strategically different from ordinary raw materials. Even small shortages can affect high-value manufacturing programmes if qualified metal, alloy or magnet feedstock is unavailable.

The US defense focus reflects a wider shift in rare earth policy. Governments are no longer concerned only with mining rare earth ore. They are increasingly focused on separated oxides, metals, alloys and magnet-ready materials.

That is where heavy rare earth supply becomes difficult. China remains dominant across heavy rare earth processing and magnet material production, leaving western defense and industrial users exposed to export controls and licensing risk.

REalloys’ focus on defense-grade dysprosium and terbium is therefore strategically relevant. It addresses the material form that downstream manufacturers need, not only the upstream resource question.

Metallisation Capacity Is the Midstream Bottleneck

REalloys is expanding its North American metallisation platform with support from a long-term offtake agreement with the Saskatchewan Research Council facility in Canada. The agreement can provide feedstock sufficient to produce up to 530 t/yr of rare earth metals.

This feedstock link is important because rare earth metal production requires reliable separated material, technical process control and customer qualification. Without metallisation, separated rare earth oxides cannot fully support magnet and defense supply chains.

The North American rare earth supply chain still has several missing links. Mining and separation projects are advancing, but metal-making, alloy production and magnet manufacturing capacity remain limited.

REalloys’ platform could help close part of that gap. Producing dysprosium and terbium metal at commercial scale would give defense and magnet customers a more secure regional source of high-value heavy rare earth inputs.

The larger implication is clear. Western rare earth resilience will depend on building each stage of the chain, from feedstock to separated oxides, metals, alloys and final magnets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The REalloys announcement shows that heavy rare earth strategy is moving beyond resource ownership into usable metal production. For defense supply chains, dysprosium and terbium security will depend on metallisation capacity, not only rare earth mining.

Mercuria Venezuela Offtake Agreements Signal Push to Reopen Mineral Exports

Mercuria

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements mark a significant attempt to reconnect Venezuelan mineral supply with international markets. The Switzerland-based trading and mining group has signed strategic offtake agreements with investment firm Heeney Capital covering Venezuelan bulk commodities and gold projects.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements are expected to support initial mineral exports worth about $2.2bn/yr. The partners are also advancing possible transactions in aluminium, nickel and ferrous products that could represent another $3bn/yr in export value, subject to regulatory approvals.

The agreements come as US government officials and industry participants visited Caracas to support new investment frameworks and supply agreements in oil and mining. The timing shows how raw materials trade is becoming more closely tied to diplomacy, sanctions policy and western supply-chain security.

Mercuria Venezuela offtake agreements also fit the trader’s broader expansion into metals and minerals. The company is using offtake structures to secure future supply while positioning itself in markets where conventional financing remains difficult.

Venezuela’s Aluminium and Nickel Revival Will Require Capital

Venezuela has historically been an important producer and exporter of aluminium, iron ore and other bulk commodities. However, its industrial base has weakened after years of underinvestment, power shortages, sanctions constraints and operational deterioration.

The aluminium sector is a clear example. Restarting or expanding output will require reliable electricity, working capital, plant rehabilitation, spare parts, logistics and customer confidence.

Nickel and ferrous products offer additional potential, but they face similar execution challenges. Resource availability alone will not be enough. Venezuela must rebuild industrial reliability and prove that export flows can operate consistently.

This makes Mercuria’s role important. A trading group can provide offtake, financing support, logistics expertise and market access without taking the same full risk as a mine owner or plant operator.

For Venezuela, the agreements could help generate export revenues and attract additional foreign capital. For western buyers, they could create another source of raw materials outside more concentrated supply chains.

Still, regulatory approval remains critical. Sanctions, compliance requirements and political risk will determine how quickly these agreements can move from announcement to physical trade.

Offtake Deals Reflect a New Metals Geopolitics

The structure of the agreements shows how metals trading is changing. Offtake deals are no longer just commercial purchase contracts. They are becoming tools for supply security, project restart and geopolitical alignment.

Commodity traders can secure future material while helping producers revive exports. This model is especially useful in jurisdictions where banks may hesitate, governments want fast results and buyers need alternative supply.

Mercuria’s Venezuela strategy also reflects the wider shift in western raw materials policy. The US and its allies are looking for new sources of industrial materials as supply chains become more fragmented and politically exposed.

This does not mean Venezuela can quickly return to full historical production levels. The country’s mining and metals infrastructure needs investment, operational discipline and credible long-term governance.

However, the strategic logic is clear. If Venezuela can reopen parts of its extractive industry under workable investment frameworks, it could become a useful supplementary source for aluminium, nickel, ferrous products and gold.

For Mercuria, the opportunity is to move early. By securing offtake and building relationships before assets fully recover, the trader can gain access to material flows that may become more valuable as western supply chains diversify.

The broader metals market should watch whether these agreements lead to actual export volumes. The first test will be regulatory clearance, followed by financing, rehabilitation and shipment execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mercuria’s Venezuela agreements show that metals offtake is becoming a geopolitical instrument. The opportunity is large, but the real test will be whether Venezuela can rebuild reliable production and export systems after years of industrial decline.

 

Appalachian Lithium Reserves Could Strengthen US Domestic Supply Security

USGS

Appalachian lithium reserves could give the US a much larger domestic resource base than previously recognised, according to a new assessment from the US Geological Survey. The agency said the eastern US Appalachian region may contain enough undiscovered, economically recoverable lithium to replace 328 years of US imports at 2025 levels.

Appalachian lithium reserves are hosted in pegmatites, large-grained rocks similar to granite. The southern Appalachian region is estimated to contain 1.43mn t of lithium oxide, while the northern Appalachian region holds another 0.90mn t.

Appalachian lithium reserves matter because the US still depends heavily on imported lithium. The country has only one current lithium producer and relied on imports for more than half of its supply in 2025.

The assessment adds another possible domestic supply route alongside lithium brine projects in the Smackover formation. Together, these resources could reshape US lithium strategy if they can be converted into permitted, economic and commercially scalable projects.

Pegmatite Resources Add a Hard-Rock Lithium Option

The Appalachian assessment points to hard-rock lithium potential in the eastern US. Pegmatite-hosted lithium is different from brine-based production because it usually requires mining, concentration and chemical conversion.

This gives the US another possible supply pathway. Hard-rock projects can produce spodumene concentrate, which can then be converted into lithium chemicals for batteries, energy storage and industrial uses.

Albemarle is already planning a lithium concentrator facility at Kings Mountain, North Carolina. The project is designed to produce 420,000 t/yr of lithium concentrate from spodumene.

That project is important because it could help rebuild a US hard-rock lithium supply chain. Domestic spodumene production would reduce reliance on foreign raw material and support future US conversion capacity.

However, resource estimates alone do not guarantee supply. Appalachian lithium projects would still need exploration, permitting, mine development, processing investment, environmental approvals and downstream customer qualification.

The strategic significance is still clear. The US lithium conversation is expanding beyond Nevada brines and western projects into eastern hard-rock resources with long-term supply potential.

Smackover Brines and Appalachian Pegmatites Broaden US Lithium Strategy

The Appalachian estimate follows earlier USGS work on the Smackover formation in southwest Arkansas. In 2024, the agency assessed that Smackover brines contain 5mn-19mn t of lithium, although it did not define economically recoverable volumes.

Several companies, including Equinor, ExxonMobil, EnergyX and Standard Lithium, are developing lithium projects in the Smackover region. Some are targeting commercial output around 2027.

The Smackover and Appalachian resource bases are strategically different but complementary. Smackover projects depend on brine extraction and processing technologies, while Appalachian projects would likely depend on hard-rock mining and spodumene concentration.

This diversification matters for US supply security. A lithium strategy based on multiple geological sources is more resilient than one dependent on a single basin, technology or company.

The US will still need processing capacity. Mining lithium ore or extracting lithium from brine does not automatically create battery-grade lithium carbonate or hydroxide.

That midstream gap remains the critical issue. Domestic resources must be connected to refining, chemical conversion, permitting, infrastructure and offtake agreements before they can reduce import dependence.

For battery manufacturers, the Appalachian assessment offers a long-term signal. More domestic resource potential could support future supply chains for electric vehicles, grid storage and defence-related battery applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Appalachian lithium assessment is a resource-security signal, not an immediate supply solution. The US has the geology, but the decisive bottleneck will be converting resources into permitted mines, concentrators and battery-grade lithium chemicals.

HyProMag Rare Earth Magnet Recycling Plant Opens in Germany

HyProMag

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling has moved into commercial-scale production in Germany after the company opened a new recycling and manufacturing plant in Pforzheim. The facility strengthens Europe’s effort to build a circular rare earth magnet supply chain outside China.

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling will focus on neodymium-iron-boron magnets and alloys. The plant will start with 100 t/yr of production capacity, with plans to increase output to 350 t/yr.

HyProMag rare earth magnet recycling is strategically important because NdFeB magnets are critical for electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, electronics, defence systems and industrial motors. Europe needs more local magnet capacity as China continues to dominate rare earth processing and magnet production.

The plant is permitted for production of up to 750 t/yr. HyProMag and parent company Mkango Resources are evaluating a scale-up to that level over the next three years.

HPMS Technology Targets Magnet Scrap Recovery

The Pforzheim plant will use Hydrogen Processing of Magnet Scrap technology, known as HPMS. The process was developed at the University of Birmingham and is designed to recover rare earth magnets from scrap streams more efficiently.

This technology matters because magnet recycling can reduce dependence on mined rare earth feedstock and conventional separation routes. It can also shorten supply chains by recovering material already embedded in end-of-life products and industrial scrap.

Recycled NdFeB magnets can support European manufacturers that need secure and traceable supply. Automotive, wind power, electronics and defence customers increasingly want material with clearer origin and lower supply-chain risk.

The initial 100 t/yr capacity is modest compared with China’s magnet industry. However, the strategic value lies in proving that commercial-scale recycling and magnet manufacturing can operate inside Europe.

The planned expansion to 350 t/yr, and potentially 750 t/yr, would make the site more meaningful for regional supply. It would also help Europe develop technical expertise in magnet scrap collection, processing, alloying and remanufacturing.

EU Critical Raw Materials Strategy Gains Recycling Base

HyProMag’s German plant fits directly into Europe’s critical raw materials strategy. The EU wants to reduce dependence on imported rare earth materials by supporting domestic mining, separation, recycling and manufacturing capacity.

Mkango Resources adds another layer to this strategy. The Canadian company owns a rare earths project in Malawi and a proposed rare earths separation plant in Poland.

Both projects have been selected as strategic projects under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act. This gives Mkango a broader position across upstream rare earth resources, midstream separation and downstream magnet recycling.

The German plant therefore is not just a standalone recycling facility. It could become part of a wider European rare earth value chain connecting African feedstock, European separation and recycled magnet production.

For Europe, this model is important. Mining alone will not solve rare earth dependence if separation, metal making, alloying and magnet manufacturing remain concentrated elsewhere.

HyProMag’s Pforzheim facility helps address one of the most difficult parts of the chain: turning rare earth scrap into usable magnet products. If the company scales successfully, it could support a more resilient European magnet ecosystem.

The Metalnomist Commentary

HyProMag’s plant shows that Europe’s rare earth strategy is moving from policy ambition into industrial execution. The key test will be whether recycling capacity can scale fast enough to supply real magnet demand in EVs, wind power and defence.

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan Targets Supply Chain Security

US EU

EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan marks a deeper transatlantic effort to secure strategic raw materials as China export controls and global protectionism reshape industrial supply chains. The US and EU have signed the plan to diversify sourcing, strengthen resilience and coordinate responses to mineral supply disruptions.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan is significant because it moves beyond general diplomatic language. It allows both sides to use trade and market tools, including border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies to close price gaps and offtake agreements.

The EU US Critical Minerals Action Plan also includes stockpile cooperation, technical coordination, regulatory alignment and standards for mining, processing and recycling. This shows that Washington and Brussels are now treating critical minerals as industrial security assets, not only commodity inputs.

Price Floors and Offtake Tools Signal Stronger Market Intervention

The plan highlights a major shift in western raw materials policy. The US and EU are preparing to coordinate tools that can make non-China supply more commercially viable.

Border-adjusted price floors could help protect strategic mineral projects from low-cost competition. This matters because many western projects struggle to compete against established Chinese processing chains when prices fall.

Subsidies to address price gaps serve the same purpose. They can help bridge the cost difference between secure, traceable supply and cheaper material from dominant incumbent producers.

Offtake agreements are also central. Long-term purchase commitments can give miners, refiners and recyclers the revenue visibility needed to finance new capacity.

This is especially important for rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and other strategic materials. Many of these markets are small, volatile or heavily concentrated in processing.

The plan also points to standards-based markets. This could support supply chains where environmental, labour, traceability and security standards become part of pricing.

For suppliers, the message is clear. Western buyers may increasingly pay for origin, compliance and resilience, not only the lowest spot price.

Transatlantic Coordination Raises Pressure on China-Linked Supply Chains

The plan will be implemented by the office of the US trade representative and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for trade and economic security. That structure places critical minerals directly inside trade and economic security policy.

The US has already moved aggressively in critical minerals. It has used the Defense Production Act, supported price floors and offtake agreements, and invested in overseas mineral assets to reduce reliance on China.

The EU has historically been more cautious about direct market intervention. However, its position is changing as supply risks increase and European manufacturers face tighter access to strategic raw materials.

Earlier this month, the European Commission launched a critical raw materials platform to match EU buyers with suppliers and aggregate demand. The new US-EU action plan builds on that direction and gives Europe a broader external coordination channel.

Rapid response mechanisms are also important. Export controls, shipping disruption, sanctions or sudden shortages can quickly affect defence, semiconductors, batteries, magnets, aerospace and clean energy manufacturing.

Stockpile cooperation could provide a temporary buffer. But the larger strategic goal is to build durable supply, processing and recycling capacity across allied economies.

The plan therefore strengthens the policy architecture for western mineral security. It also raises the likelihood that future raw material trade will be shaped by origin rules, price support, industrial standards and government-backed purchasing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU-US plan shows that critical minerals policy is moving from risk awareness to market design. The decisive question is whether price floors, offtakes and subsidies can create real processing capacity before the next supply shock hits.

China EU Dual-Use Export Controls Raise Rare Earth Supply Risk for Europe

China EU

China EU dual-use export controls have escalated after Beijing added seven military-related European entities to its export control list. The move signals a sharper trade dispute between China and the EU and could increase uncertainty around rare earths and critical metals supply to Europe.

China EU dual-use export controls prohibit domestic exporters from supplying listed entities with controlled dual-use goods, technologies and services. Overseas organisations and individuals are also barred from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to those entities.

China EU dual-use export controls are significant because rare earths, tungsten, antimony, germanium and gallium have all gained stronger military and strategic relevance. Many of these materials are already covered by China’s dual-use export control framework.

The targeted entities include defence, aerospace and military-linked companies in Europe. Beijing said the companies had engaged in arms sales to Taiwan or had links with Taiwan-related activity.

Rare Earths and Critical Metals Become Trade Policy Tools

China’s decision marks the first time Beijing has imposed dual-use export restrictions specifically targeting EU entities. It shows that critical materials policy is increasingly being used as a geopolitical instrument.

The move follows growing friction between China and the EU, including disputes around cybersecurity rules and alleged discriminatory treatment of Chinese companies. Beijing has warned that it could take broader countermeasures if Chinese firms continue to face restrictions.

This matters for Europe because the region remains a major buyer of Chinese rare earths and critical minerals. The Netherlands, Italy, France and Spain all received rare earth shipments from China in the first quarter.

Rare earths are essential for permanent magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, robotics, defence systems, aerospace components and precision electronics. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are especially important for high-performance magnets used in demanding operating environments.

Other controlled critical metals also carry strategic weight. Tungsten is used in hard metals, defence systems and high-temperature applications. Antimony supports flame retardants, ammunition and alloys. Germanium and gallium are critical for semiconductors, optics, satellites and power electronics.

China’s use of export controls has become more systematic. Beijing has already tightened critical minerals exports to Japan this year, which disrupted shipments of dysprosium and terbium and forced buyers to seek alternative supply.

Europe Faces Higher Security Premiums for Heavy Rare Earths

Europe’s immediate risk is not a full loss of Chinese supply. The more likely impact is higher compliance risk, licensing uncertainty and greater pressure on buyers that need controlled materials for defence, aerospace and advanced manufacturing.

This could widen the security premium for non-China rare earths and minor metals. Buyers without reliable export licences may need to pay more for material available in the Atlantic market.

Heavy rare earth prices outside China have already surged because of tight availability and stronger Japanese buying. Yttrium oxide prices in Europe have climbed sharply this year, reflecting the scarcity of prompt non-China supply.

If EU-China tensions continue, European buyers may accelerate efforts to diversify supply. That could benefit projects in Australia, Brazil, Estonia, the US and other jurisdictions trying to build rare earth separation, metal-making and magnet capacity outside China.

However, diversification will not be quick. Rare earth supply chains require mining, separation, refining, metal conversion, alloying and magnet manufacturing. Each stage needs qualification, capital and technical expertise.

For European manufacturers, the policy signal is clear. Critical metals procurement can no longer rely only on price and delivery time. Buyers must now evaluate origin risk, licensing exposure, dual-use classification and strategic inventory needs.

The broader market implication is that China’s critical minerals controls are becoming a routine part of trade policy. Europe must now treat rare earths and minor metals as supply-chain security issues, not just raw material inputs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s latest export control move shows that rare earths and minor metals are becoming geopolitical leverage points. Europe’s challenge is no longer just finding alternative supply, but building a complete industrial chain that can survive licensing shocks.

XTC New Energy LFP LMFP Capacity Expansion Targets Higher-Density Battery Materials

XTC New Energy

XTC New Energy LFP LMFP capacity will expand in Sichuan as the Chinese battery materials producer adds another 40,000 t/yr of lithium iron phosphate and lithium ferro-manganese phosphate production. The second-phase project will be built in Ya’an city and is expected to start production in June 2028.

XTC New Energy LFP LMFP capacity at the Ya’an plant will reach 80,000 t/yr after both phases are completed. The first phase already provides 40,000 t/yr of LFP capacity, while the new phase will add flexible LFP and LMFP output.

XTC New Energy LFP LMFP capacity expansion reflects China’s continued investment in lower-cost and manganese-enhanced battery chemistries. The project will be operated by subsidiary Ya’an XTC New Energy, with total investment expected at 743mn yuan.

The move comes as Chinese battery material producers position for growing power battery demand and greater interest in manganese-based cathode active materials.

LMFP Gains Momentum as Producers Seek Better Energy Density

LMFP is gaining attention because it can offer higher energy density than conventional LFP. This makes it attractive for battery makers seeking to improve driving range while keeping costs below higher-nickel chemistries.

However, LMFP still faces trade-offs. Batteries using LMFP cathode active material generally have shorter cycle life and lower charge-discharge efficiency than LFP batteries.

This means LMFP is not a simple replacement for LFP. Instead, it is likely to develop as a complementary chemistry for applications where higher energy density is more valuable than maximum cycle life.

The expansion also shows how manganese is becoming more important in battery materials. Manganese-based chemistries can reduce reliance on more expensive or supply-sensitive metals while supporting performance improvements.

For XTC, adding LMFP capacity gives the company more flexibility. It can serve established LFP demand while preparing for customers that want manganese-enhanced phosphate materials.

China’s Cathode Supply Chain Expands Into Manganese-Based Materials

XTC is not alone in expanding LMFP capacity. Several Chinese battery material producers are adding or building manganese-based phosphate projects.

Ningxia Hengchuang Nami began building the first phase of a 30,000 t/yr LMFP plant in Yinchuan in March. Hunan Yuneng, China’s largest LFP producer, is also building an LMFP materials plant.

Jiangxi Greatpower launched the first phase of a 20,000 t/yr LMFP plant in Pingxiang in January. These projects show that China’s battery materials industry is preparing for broader adoption of LMFP.

The trend is strategically important for the cathode supply chain. LFP has already become a major chemistry in electric vehicles and energy storage because of its cost advantage, safety and long cycle life.

LMFP could extend that platform by adding more energy density while preserving some of LFP’s cost and safety benefits. If technical limitations improve, LMFP may become a larger part of China’s battery chemistry mix.

For raw materials, the shift could support manganese demand in battery applications. It also reinforces China’s lead in scaling new cathode chemistries from pilot production to industrial capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

XTC’s Ya’an expansion shows that China’s battery materials race is moving beyond simple LFP scale. LMFP is becoming a serious development path because it offers a practical route to higher energy density without fully moving into costlier high-nickel systems.

Lopal Marble Bar Lithium Project Deal Extends Chinese Battery Material Supply Strategy

Lopal

Lopal Marble Bar lithium project acquisition will give China’s battery cathode material producer Lopal Tech another upstream position in Western Australia’s lithium sector. The company has agreed to acquire the Marble Bar project from Global Lithium Resources for A$14.85mn.

The Lopal Marble Bar lithium project is located in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The project has an estimated resource of 18mn t grading 1.0% lithium oxide.

The Lopal Marble Bar lithium project deal reflects a continuing push by Chinese battery material producers to secure upstream lithium resources. Cathode and battery material companies are looking beyond processing capacity and moving closer to mine supply.

This matters because lithium raw material security remains central to battery supply chains. Even as lithium prices fluctuate, companies with long-term access to spodumene resources can better protect conversion plants, cathode output and customer supply.

Marble Bar Adds Pilbara Resource Exposure

The Marble Bar project gives Lopal direct exposure to a known lithium-bearing region. Western Australia remains one of the world’s most important hard-rock lithium supply bases, with spodumene projects feeding converters and battery material producers across Asia.

The project’s 18mn t resource at 1.0% lithium oxide gives Lopal a potential raw material position, although the acquisition price suggests the asset is still at an early development stage.

For Global Lithium Resources, the sale allows the company to focus more heavily on its larger Manna lithium project. Manna has a resource estimate of 52mn t grading 1.0% lithium oxide.

This creates a clearer portfolio structure. Lopal gains Marble Bar, while GL1 retains its larger Manna asset and existing downstream-linked partnerships.

The transaction also shows that Chinese battery material producers remain willing to invest in Australian lithium assets despite market volatility. Long-term supply security continues to matter more than short-term price weakness.

Manna Links Lopal to Future Offtake Supply

Lopal already has exposure to GL1 through the Manna project. It holds a 5% equity interest in Manna and has signed an offtake agreement to buy 40% of the project’s output.

China’s Canmax has agreed to take another 30% of Manna’s output and also holds a 9.45% stake in GL1. Australian lithium miner Mineral Resources owns 9.85% of GL1.

These relationships show how lithium supply chains are being structured around equity stakes and offtake agreements. Battery material companies want secured feedstock before projects enter production.

For Lopal, the Marble Bar acquisition adds another layer to its Australian lithium strategy. It gives the company project ownership while maintaining future offtake exposure through Manna.

The broader industrial meaning is clear. Chinese battery material producers are not relying only on spot markets. They are building upstream positions, offtake rights and strategic relationships to support long-term lithium chemical and cathode material supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Lopal’s Marble Bar deal shows that lithium strategy is shifting from price speculation to resource control. Even in a weaker lithium market, Chinese battery material companies continue to secure upstream positions that can support future conversion and cathode supply.

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge exports are expected to rise over the next five years as western aerospace supply chains look for additional qualified raw material sources. Chinese producer Chaoyang Jinda Titanium expects international shipments of qualified aerospace-grade sponge to increase from around 1,000t this year to 10,000t by 2030.

The shift reflects a deeper change in the aerospace titanium supply chain. Western aircraft manufacturers and ingot melters are trying to reduce exposure to Russian supply, while aircraft build rates are expected to rise from 2027.

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge is therefore moving from a limited export niche into a potential supply-chain balancing tool. However, tariffs, qualification risk and geopolitical uncertainty will limit how quickly US and European buyers adopt Chinese material.

The opportunity is strongest in standard-quality structural titanium grades. Premium-quality sponge for engine, landing-gear and other critical applications is likely to remain controlled by established suppliers with long qualification histories.

Western Aerospace Buyers Face a Supply-Diversification Challenge

Aerospace-grade sponge demand is expected to recover from 2027 after a weaker 2026 caused by inventory normalisation. Mills have been reducing stocks of semi-finished titanium parts and raw materials, but aircraft production plans point to higher requirements later in the decade.

The timing is important. Airbus and Boeing both carry long aircraft backlogs, creating a decade of production visibility. This forces mills and original equipment manufacturers to look beyond short-term demand swings and secure raw material sources for future build-rate increases.

Western OEMs also continue to reassess Russian titanium exposure. If procurement from Russia declines, the market will need alternative aerospace-qualified sponge to fill the gap. Japan’s Toho Titanium and Osaka Titanium are expanding, while China is preparing to supply more qualified material.

Global approved aerospace-grade sponge supply excluding Russian products is expected to rise from about 74,000t this year to around 91,000t by 2030. Demand is expected to grow at a similar pace, leaving the market sensitive to which suppliers are included in purchasing programmes.

The supply-demand picture changes significantly depending on China and Russia. Excluding both suppliers creates a tighter market. Including them creates more apparent supply availability. This makes qualification and geopolitical acceptability just as important as physical capacity.

Some US ingot producers began qualifying Chinese titanium sponge in 2024. US imports from China rose to a 10-year high of 1,069t that year, showing that buyers were willing to test Chinese material when diversification pressure increased.

However, imports fell to 155t last year and no Chinese sponge imports were reported in January-February 2026. Tariff volatility, high mill inventories and policy uncertainty discouraged further purchasing.

This shows the main barrier for China aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Aerospace qualification requires multi-year commitments, stable documentation, repeatable quality and customer confidence. Buyers will not qualify a new source quickly if they fear trade rules could change again.

Titanium is exempt from the latest 10% US tariff, and overall duties have fallen back to 40% from 60%. But the rate itself is not the only issue. For aerospace buyers, volatility can be more damaging than the actual tariff level.

A mill can absorb or price a known tariff. It cannot easily build a long-term qualification strategy around unpredictable policy. This is why US buyers may limit Chinese sponge procurement to 15-20% of requirements, even if the material is technically acceptable.

Europe and Asia-Pacific may offer more immediate export channels. China already supplies aerospace-grade sponge to buyers in those regions, supporting shipments even when US demand is limited.

Capacity Expansion Could Change the Titanium Sponge Balance

China is preparing a large wave of aerospace-grade sponge capacity additions. Several major projects are scheduled to come on line soon, with combined new capacity of around 110,000 t/yr.

The scale is unprecedented. The planned additions exceed the combined existing capacity of Japan’s Toho and Osaka Titanium, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, and Saudi Arabia’s ATTM.

China’s expansion is driven by two demand streams. Domestic aerospace demand is rising from the Comac C919 programme and military aircraft production. At the same time, producers expect higher export demand as western OEMs diversify away from Russia.

China’s titanium mill product demand already has a meaningful aerospace base. Aerospace applications accounted for about 20% of China’s titanium mill product demand in 2025, or roughly 31,280t. The chemicals industry remained the largest segment at 48%.

The domestic base gives Chinese sponge producers a stronger platform for quality improvement. Aerospace production experience matters because sponge qualification depends on consistency over time, not only nameplate capacity.

Still, some market participants question whether all new capacity can secure international aerospace qualification. New lines may need years of operating history before western melters and OEMs accept material for aircraft applications.

This is a critical distinction. China may have large physical capacity, but aerospace supply depends on approved, audited and repeatable production. Capacity alone does not guarantee market access.

Price competitiveness may support adoption. Domestic China aerospace-grade sponge prices have recently held firm at 55,000-57,000 yuan/t ex-works because of cost pressure. That remains competitive against some western supply routes, especially if buyers need alternative non-Russian material.

However, qualification is likely to split the market by application. Standard structural titanium grades are more likely to accept Chinese sponge over time. These grades support airframes and less critical structural components where qualification remains strict but less restrictive than engine-grade applications.

Premium-quality sponge will be harder to penetrate. Engine, landing-gear and other demanding aerospace uses require deeper qualification, tighter chemistry control and stronger confidence from prime contractors and tier suppliers.

Airbus’ titanium demand outlook adds another layer. The A350 is a high titanium-bearing platform, with titanium representing around 15% of aircraft weight. As A350 production rises toward 2027 and 2028, titanium demand visibility should improve across the supply chain.

That demand pull could make Chinese material more attractive if western supply tightens. But buyers will still balance cost, qualification, geopolitics and supply security.

For Chinese producers, the path is clear but difficult. They must prove consistent aerospace-grade quality, build long-term customer trust, manage export documentation and navigate trade policy risk.

For western OEMs, the decision is strategic. China aerospace-grade titanium sponge could reduce Russia exposure and improve supply flexibility. But it also introduces another geopolitical dependency at a time when aerospace and defence supply chains are under closer scrutiny.

The most likely outcome is partial adoption. Chinese sponge may become a growing supplement for standard-quality structural grades, while established Japanese, Kazakh, Saudi and other qualified suppliers remain central to premium aerospace applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge will become harder for western aerospace supply chains to ignore as aircraft build rates rise and Russian exposure narrows. The decisive issue is not capacity, but whether Chinese producers can convert new output into trusted, qualified and politically acceptable supply.

EU Raw Materials Platform Targets Strategic Metals Supply Security

EU, Raw Materials Platform

EU raw materials platform development has advanced as the European Commission launched a new online mechanism to connect European offtakers with suppliers of strategic raw materials. The EU raw materials platform is designed to support demand aggregation, joint purchasing and better market information across critical supply chains.

The platform covers all 17 strategic raw materials listed under the Critical Raw Materials Act. These materials are central to batteries, rare earth magnets, defence systems, semiconductors, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing and industrial resilience.

EU raw materials platform activity will take place through structured rounds. The first diversification round will target operational projects where materials are already available or expected in the near term, with a focus on rare earths, defence-related materials and battery metals.

The mechanism will not provide financing or directly support negotiations. However, it can improve visibility across supply, demand, storage, investment opportunities and financing options, which are often fragmented in strategic raw material markets.

Demand Aggregation Could Strengthen Minor Metals Markets

Demand aggregation is the most important function of the platform. Many strategic materials are needed in small volumes by individual companies, but they carry high industrial and defence value.

This is especially true for minor metals such as gallium and germanium. These materials are used in semiconductors, optics, solar technologies, defence electronics and advanced communications systems, but individual buyers may not require large enough volumes to support new supply projects alone.

Pooling demand can change that equation. If several European buyers aggregate requirements, suppliers may see larger, more stable offtake volumes. This can improve confidence for upstream mining, refining, recycling and midstream processing projects.

The same logic applies to rare earths. Magnet makers, motor producers, defence manufacturers and clean-energy equipment suppliers often need secure access to neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Aggregated demand could make European purchasing more credible to non-EU suppliers.

Battery metals may also benefit. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and graphite supply chains are increasingly shaped by long-term offtake, regional qualification and industrial policy. A shared platform can help buyers identify supply options before shortages become acute.

The platform therefore addresses a structural weakness in Europe’s critical materials strategy. Europe has strong downstream industries, but many of those industries purchase strategic metals in fragmented, company-by-company channels.

By collecting and exchanging market data, the mechanism could help convert dispersed demand into more bankable offtake signals. That is important for suppliers seeking financing, customers and predictable long-term buyers.

Platform Supports EU Diversification but Does Not Replace Financing

The EU raw materials platform is part of a broader strategy to reduce external dependencies under the Critical Raw Materials Act. Europe wants to diversify supply, strengthen domestic processing and secure access to materials needed for the energy transition and defence.

However, the mechanism is not a full project-financing tool. Negotiations will take place outside the system, and the platform will not guarantee deals or provide direct financial backing.

This limits what the mechanism can achieve by itself. Strategic raw material projects still need permitting, capital, technology, customer qualification, logistics and long-term price visibility.

But the platform can still play a useful role. It can bring buyers and suppliers into the same market framework, improve demand transparency and identify where joint purchasing could support supply diversification.

The first diversification round will be important because it focuses on projects close to availability. This avoids the problem of relying only on long-dated mining projects that may take years to enter production.

The inclusion of storage options is also relevant. Strategic materials supply security is not only about production. It also depends on inventories, emergency access, buffer stocks and coordinated procurement during disruption.

The broader platform also includes gas and hydrogen mechanisms. This shows that the EU is applying a similar strategic procurement model across energy and raw materials, where fragmented buying can weaken market leverage.

For Europe’s industrial base, the key issue is execution. The platform must move beyond data sharing and create real commercial connections between offtakers and suppliers. Otherwise, it risks becoming another policy tool without enough market impact.

For suppliers, the opportunity is clearer. A credible pool of European demand could make projects more attractive, especially in rare earths, gallium, germanium and battery materials where supply diversification is politically urgent.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU raw materials platform is not a financing solution, but it could become an important demand-signalling tool. Its success will depend on whether Europe can turn fragmented buyer interest into real offtake volumes that support new strategic metals supply.

China Vanadium Consumption Set to Rise in 2026 as VRFB Demand Accelerates

Vanadium

China vanadium consumption is expected to rise in 2026 as vanadium redox flow batteries, steelmaking, lithium iron phosphate cathode materials and denitration catalysts increase demand. The strongest growth is likely to come from VRFB-based energy storage, where projects are entering a more concentrated construction and commissioning phase.

China vanadium consumption reached 125,900t of vanadium pentoxide equivalent in 2025, up 6.1% from 2024. The market is now shifting from a steel-dominated structure toward a more diversified demand base.

China vanadium consumption still depends heavily on steel, but the share of energy storage has expanded quickly. Steel accounted for 70.9% of total demand in 2025, down from 87.9% in 2021. Energy storage rose to 20% of total use from only 4% over the same period.

This change is strategically important for vanadium producers. Demand is no longer driven only by construction steel, rebar and alloy additions. It is increasingly tied to long-duration energy storage, grid stability, batteries, catalysts and higher-value industrial applications.

VRFB Storage and Steel Demand Drive the 2026 Consumption Outlook

Vanadium demand from VRFB energy storage is expected to increase sharply in the second half of 2026. China’s National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration issued a notice on 30 January to improve the generation-side capacity price mechanism, supporting longer-duration storage.

This policy direction matters because VRFB technology is better suited to long-duration applications than many short-duration battery systems. VRFBs offer long cycle life, high safety, deep-discharge capability and easier electrolyte reuse.

China’s VRFB installations in 2026 are preliminarily estimated at 4-5GWh. This forecast reflects projects already under construction and the availability of high-purity vanadium for electrolyte production.

That installation level would require around 32,000-40,000t of V2O5 equivalent. This would represent an increase of 8,000-16,000t from the previous year, making VRFBs the largest source of incremental vanadium demand.

The growth builds on rapid progress in 2025. VRFB projects with completed electrolyte filling totalled about 3,037.5MWh last year, up 1,027.3MWh from 2024. China’s cumulative VRFB installed capacity reached about 6,064.5MWh by the end of 2025, with an average duration of 4.12 hours.

The market is now moving from pilot-stage expansion to larger system deployment. As more long-duration storage projects reach construction and commissioning, vanadium electrolyte demand could become more predictable.

Steel remains the largest end-use sector. Vanadium demand from China’s steel industry is expected at 92,000-95,000t in 2026, up 3,000-6,000t from 2025.

The increase is tied to stronger demand from machinery, energy, shipbuilding, automotive and rail sectors. These ferro-vanadium end-use segments are expected to grow by around 1.2% in 2026.

The steel demand signal was already visible in the first quarter. Steel-sector vanadium consumption reached around 22,600t, up 1,800t from a year earlier.

Rebar could also provide support. Output of higher-grade steel reinforcement bar is expected to rise as infrastructure investment accelerates. Production licence rules for construction rebar took effect on 1 April, while quality traceability requirements have expanded.

These rules should raise the share of vanadium-nitrogen micro-alloyed hot-rolled rebar. That would support demand for vanadium-nitrogen alloy, especially in higher-strength construction products.

The 2025 steel data show a more complicated picture. Vanadium consumption in the steel sector reached around 89,300t, up 1,700t from 2024. However, vanadium-nitrogen alloy consumption fell by 3.8% to 36,690t because rebar’s share of vanadium use declined.

China’s rebar output fell to 186.3mn t in 2025, down 4.5% from a year earlier. This reduced vanadium demand from traditional construction steel.

Ferro-vanadium performed better. FeV50-equivalent consumption rose by 10.4% to around 39,985t, supported by stronger downstream output in several industrial sectors.

Automotive production reached 34.778mn units in 2025, up 9.8%. Civil steel shipbuilding totalled 52.295mn deadweight tonnes, up 18%. Excavator output rose by 17% to 379,643 units.

Machine tool output also increased. Metal-cutting machine tool production rose by 9.7%, while metal-forming machine tool output increased by 7.2%. These sectors helped offset weakness in rebar.

Vanadium intensity also rose. China’s vanadium use per tonne of crude steel increased to 51g of vanadium metal equivalent in 2025 from 48g in 2024. Rebar intensity edged up to 152.5g, while other steel products rose to 26.6g.

LFP cathode materials will provide another smaller but fast-growing demand source. Vanadium consumption from LFP cathodes is estimated at 2,000-2,500t in 2026, assuming a typical 0.2% V2O5 addition rate.

That would be up by 1,000-1,500t, representing growth of 100-150%. The base remains small, but the rate of increase is significant.

Denitration catalysts should also support demand. Chemical-sector vanadium consumption is expected at around 7,000t in 2026, up about 500t, or 7.7%. Demand will be supported by catalyst replacement, new coal-based thermal power projects and higher sulphuric acid output.

In 2025, chemical-sector vanadium use was around 6,500t, up 200t from 2024. Titanium-alloy-related consumption fell by around 400t, tracking weaker Chinese titanium product exports.

Supply Growth Remains Limited by Feedstock and Cost Pressure

China’s vanadium supply remains highly concentrated, but output growth is not straightforward. The country accounted for 68.8% of global vanadium capacity in 2025 and 72.4% of global production.

China’s total vanadium capacity reached 277,600t in 2025. Actual output was 163,900t, down 900t from 2024.

The production base is dominated by vanadium slag. Output from vanadium slag reached 141,300t in 2025, broadly unchanged from the previous year.

Some producers reduced supply. Xinjiang Da’an and Yunnan Yukun did not produce, cutting combined output by about 8,000t. Other producers, including Chengsteel, Desheng and Dagang, raised output by around 15%, offsetting part of the loss.

Stone-coal-based vanadium output fell more sharply. Production declined to 7,600t in 2025, down 2,600t from 2024, as lower prices left all stone-coal producers loss-making.

This route remains highly price-sensitive. At current price levels, only one large-scale stone-coal producer is operating, with output of around 100-120 t/month of ammonium metavanadate on a V2O5-equivalent basis.

A Shaanxi-based producer with capacity of 300-350 t/month has been suspended since early 2026 because of safety issues. It is unlikely to restart in the first half.

Vanadium flake prices rose to 83,000-84,000 yuan/t in March, prompting some stone-coal producers to consider restarts. However, current prices still appear insufficient to drive a large supply response.

Even when prices approached 110,000 yuan/t in 2023, stone-coal-based output only reached about 11,000t. This suggests that 2026 output growth from stone coal will likely remain limited.

Secondary resources are becoming more important. Vanadium output from spent catalysts and other secondary sources rose to 15,100t in 2025, up 1,900t from 2024.

This included about 6,700t from alumina by-product recovery, up around 1,700t. Output from spent catalysts and petroleum residues stayed broadly stable despite lower vanadium prices.

The reason is co-product economics. Vanadium is often recovered alongside molybdenum and tungsten from secondary feedstocks. Higher molybdenum and tungsten prices supported operating rates and helped keep secondary recovery viable.

Secondary output is expected to remain broadly unchanged in 2026. Feedstock availability is relatively stable, but China’s restrictions on solid-waste imports since 2017 limit the potential for major raw material growth.

Vanadium slag-based supply may edge higher in 2026, but feedstock constraints create uncertainty. Qinhuangdao Baigong completed a 10,000 t/yr V2O5 line in early 2026 and is ramping toward normal operations. Its 2026 output guidance is around 5,000t.

However, tighter domestic feedstock availability could offset this addition. Vanadium-titanium magnetite supply in the Panzhihua area is particularly constrained, potentially cutting output by about 4,500-5,000t of V2O5 equivalent.

Producers in Sichuan and Yunnan may need to source vanadium-titanium magnetite from the Chengde area or increase imports to keep output in line with 2025. A northeastern steelmaking-based vanadium producer has also reduced vanadium-titanium magnetite imports since December 2025.

This creates a cautious supply outlook. China’s vanadium output may edge higher in 2026, but the increase depends on whether new slag-based capacity can offset feedstock tightness and further weakness in stone-coal production.

The market therefore faces a potential demand-led tightening risk. VRFB demand is rising quickly, steel demand is improving modestly and smaller sectors are growing. Supply growth, meanwhile, remains constrained by feedstock, cost pressure and limited secondary resource availability.

For vanadium producers, the key opportunity lies in high-purity electrolyte-grade material. VRFB demand requires reliable vanadium quality, stable supply and long-term availability. Producers that can supply battery-grade vanadium will be better positioned than those focused only on metallurgical demand.

For steel users, the issue is price exposure. If VRFB demand absorbs more vanadium units, ferro-vanadium and vanadium-nitrogen alloy buyers could face stronger competition from the energy storage sector.

For energy storage developers, the issue is raw material security. VRFB growth depends on enough high-purity vanadium to support electrolyte production. Supply constraints could affect project economics if demand accelerates faster than conversion capacity.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s vanadium market is entering a new phase where steel remains the base, but VRFBs set the growth direction. The strategic tension in 2026 will be whether constrained supply can keep pace with energy storage demand without pricing steel users out of the market.

Indonesia HPAL Nickel Ore Costs Rise as New HPM Formula Hits Limonite Feedstock

Nickel ore

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are set to rise sharply after the government’s revised mineral benchmark price lifted the mandated price floor for limonite ore. The new HPM formula is expected to increase limonite ore costs by at least 50%, adding immediate margin pressure to mixed hydroxide precipitate producers.

The revised HPM for limonite ore containing 1.2% nickel, 0.1% cobalt and 2% chromium is calculated at $45.24/wmt under the updated Harga Mineral Acuan. That is around 50% higher than early April transacted prices of about $30/wmt for 1.2% limonite ore.

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are also far above the previous benchmark level. Under the old formula, the HPM for similar ore was only $17.17/wmt, meaning the new benchmark is nearly three times higher.

The change matters because HPAL operations rely on limonite ore as feedstock to produce MHP, which is used in battery-grade nickel and cobalt supply chains. A higher government-mandated ore floor will raise raw material costs, increase royalty payments and pressure margins across Indonesia’s battery nickel industry.

Limonite Ore Repricing Raises MHP Cost Pressure

The new HPM framework has the strongest impact on limonite ore because this material typically trades closer to benchmark values than saprolite ore. HPAL producers therefore face a more direct cost increase than rotary kiln-electric furnace operators.

MHP producers will now have to absorb higher ore purchase costs and higher royalties. Since royalties are linked to official valuation, the total cost increase could exceed the headline 50% rise in limonite ore pricing.

The revised formula also changes how Indonesia captures ore value. It includes cobalt, iron and chromium in nickel ore valuation, making these contained elements taxable. This is especially important for limonite ore because cobalt content adds value to HPAL feedstock.

The correction factor for cobalt is set at 30% when ore contains at least 0.05% cobalt. Iron carries a 30% correction factor when content is 35% or lower, while chromium carries a 10% correction factor.

This means Indonesia is no longer valuing nickel ore mainly by nickel grade. The government is moving toward a broader contained-metal pricing model, capturing more value from battery-related by-products and ore chemistry.

For MHP producers, this creates a structural cost problem. HPAL projects were built around access to Indonesian limonite ore, sulphuric acid and integrated processing infrastructure. If ore costs rise by more than a third to half, the cost floor for MHP production moves higher.

This could affect downstream nickel sulphate and cathode material economics. Producers with stronger integration, lower acid costs and better logistics will be better positioned. Higher-cost operators may face squeezed margins if MHP prices do not rise enough to offset the new ore benchmark.

The change also comes as Indonesia tightens wider nickel policy. Mining quota uncertainty, export tax discussions and stricter pricing formulas all point to a broader state strategy of capturing more mineral value before material moves downstream.

Sulphuric Acid Tightness Adds a Second Cost Shock

Indonesia HPAL nickel ore costs are rising at the same time as sulphuric acid prices surge. This creates a double pressure point for MHP producers.

HPAL operations require large volumes of sulphuric acid to leach nickel and cobalt from limonite ore. Any disruption in sulphur or acid supply directly affects processing costs and production reliability.

The US-Iran conflict has stranded several sulphur cargoes bound for Indonesian HPAL producers, preventing them from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, producers have shifted toward buying sulphuric acid directly.

That market was already tight because of limited copper concentrate availability. Sulphuric acid supply is expected to tighten further as China suspends exports from May.

Southeast Asian sulphuric acid prices have risen sharply. Prices reached $277.50/t cfr on 9 April, up 71% from $162.50/t before the conflict.

This is a major issue for Indonesian HPAL plants. Higher limonite ore costs increase feedstock expenses, while higher sulphuric acid prices increase processing costs. Together, they raise the full cost of producing MHP and weaken the advantage of low-cost Indonesian battery nickel.

Saprolite ore faces less immediate disruption. Saprolite is mainly used in RKEF operations to produce nickel pig iron and ferronickel. Although the new HPM for typical saprolite ore containing 1.6% nickel, 18% iron and 2% chromium rises to $52.90/wmt from $29.94/wmt, it remains below early April transacted prices of about $70/wmt.

This means RKEF producers may see limited immediate transaction impact because market prices are already above the benchmark. HPAL producers, by contrast, face a direct reset of the cost floor.

The difference could reshape relative economics between Indonesia’s stainless-linked and battery-linked nickel chains. NPI producers remain supported by high saprolite prices, while HPAL producers now face rising limonite, royalty and acid costs.

For the global battery supply chain, the key risk is that Indonesia’s MHP cost curve shifts upward. That could support nickel sulphate prices over time, especially if acid tightness persists or HPM-linked royalty costs remain elevated.

For Indonesia, the policy strengthens resource rent capture. The government is recognising that limonite ore contains not only nickel but also cobalt and other valuable elements. This gives Jakarta a stronger fiscal claim over battery material feedstock.

However, the policy also increases operating uncertainty. HPAL investors need predictable ore pricing, acid availability and tax treatment to justify large-scale expansion. A sharp change in HPM could force producers to revisit cost assumptions, procurement strategies and product pricing.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Indonesia’s new HPM formula marks a turning point for HPAL economics. The country is capturing more value from limonite ore, but the combined shock of higher ore prices, royalties and sulphuric acid costs could reset the cost floor for global MHP supply.

Chifeng Gold Laos Rare Earth Output Plan Targets Medium and Heavy Rare Earth Growth

Chifeng Gold

Chifeng Gold Laos rare earth output plans are moving into a faster ramp-up phase as the Chinese diversified mining firm targets higher production from its Mengkang mine this year. The company plans to reach designed output capacity of 3,675t of mixed rare earth oxide at the Laos site.

The Chifeng Gold Laos rare earth output strategy is focused on meeting rising demand from upstream oxide plants. The plan also strengthens China-linked access to medium and heavy rare earth resources outside China’s domestic mining base.

The company produced 998t of rare earth ores at Mengkang in 2025, with sales of 853t and inventories of 145t. The mine only started operating in the third quarter of 2025, meaning 2026 will be an important test of its ramp-up capability.

Chifeng Gold also plans to build a 3,000 t/yr rare earth separation plant in Savannakhet province with Xiamen Tungsten. This would move the Laos platform beyond mining and into early-stage processing, improving value capture and supply-chain control.

Mengkang Ramp-Up Strengthens Medium and Heavy Rare Earth Supply

The Mengkang rare earth project is strategically important because it contains medium and heavy rare earth oxides. These materials remain among the most sensitive parts of the rare earth supply chain because they are essential for high-performance magnets, defense systems, electric vehicles, robotics, wind turbines and advanced electronics.

Chifeng Gold had total proven rare earth resource reserves of 60,000t by the end of 2025. The Mengkang site accounts for 25,500t of medium and heavy rare earth oxide resources, with an average grade of 0.025%.

Some market participants expect the Mengkang project to meet 8-10% of global demand for medium and heavy rare earths once fully operational. If achieved, that would give Laos a more important role in global rare earth supply and strengthen Chifeng Gold’s position in a high-value segment.

Chifeng Gold also holds the Saipan rare earth mining site in Laos. Saipan has proven resources of 32,000t of medium and heavy rare earth oxide, with an average grade of 0.045%.

The presence of both Mengkang and Saipan gives Chifeng Gold a broader Laos rare earth platform. This matters because medium and heavy rare earth supply is difficult to expand quickly, and new projects face technical, environmental and permitting challenges.

The Chifeng Gold Laos rare earth output plan therefore comes at a sensitive time. Global consumers are looking for supply diversification, while Chinese companies are also trying to secure more overseas resources to support oxide separation, metals production and magnet manufacturing.

Xiamen Tungsten Partnership Links Laos Ore to Separation Capacity

Chifeng Gold’s partnership with Xiamen Tungsten gives the Laos rare earth strategy more downstream depth. The two companies signed an agreement in September 2022 to establish Chijin Xiamen Tungsten, a joint venture focused on developing rare earth minerals in Laos.

The joint venture has registered capital of 60mn yuan, or about $8.79mn. Chifeng Gold holds 51%, while Xiamen Tungsten holds 49%.

Chijin Xiamen Tungsten completed its acquisition of the Mengkang project in March 2024 and obtained mining rights from the Laos government in March 2025. This sequence shows that the project has moved from acquisition into operational development within a relatively short period.

Under the partnership, Xiamen Tungsten and its subsidiaries receive priority access to rare earth minerals in Laos. Chifeng Gold will support the joint venture’s registration, launch and policy coordination in Laos.

This arrangement is commercially important because Xiamen Tungsten brings downstream rare earth processing and metals experience. Chifeng Gold brings resource ownership and project development. Together, they can connect mining, separation and downstream supply more effectively.

The planned 3,000 t/yr separation plant in Savannakhet would further strengthen that connection. If delivered, the plant would reduce dependence on exporting raw or semi-processed material and allow more value to remain in the regional processing chain.

Chifeng Gold is also active in other metals. The company holds 583t of gold resources, 590,000t of copper resources, 560,000t of zinc and lead resources, and 80,000t of molybdenum resources.

Its cathode copper output rose by 9.07% on the year to 6,754t in 2025, while sales increased by 9.5% to 6,869t. Copper concentrate output more than doubled to 3,160t, with sales rising to 3,122t.

However, performance across other metals was mixed. Lead concentrate output fell by 9% to 3,680t, while molybdenum concentrate production slipped by 1.6% to 675t.

This broader metals base gives Chifeng Gold diversification, but the rare earth strategy is likely to receive more attention because of its strategic value. Medium and heavy rare earths carry stronger supply-chain importance than most conventional base metal outputs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Chifeng Gold’s Laos rare earth push shows how Chinese companies are building overseas control in medium and heavy rare earths before supply pressure intensifies. The key issue is whether Laos can move from ore production into reliable separation capacity without becoming only another upstream resource base.