US Army Critical Minerals Leases Bring Processing Onto Military Installations

US, critical minerals

US Army critical minerals leases will place four commercial processing facilities on military installations for the first time, marking a new approach to securing domestic supplies of graphite, lithium, boron and rare earths.

US Army critical minerals leases were conditionally awarded to Empire State Mines, Energy X, Ioneer USA and REalloys on 25 June. The facilities are expected to begin development in 2027, with initial operating capacity targeted by or before 2028.

US Army critical minerals leases are strategically significant because they move critical mineral processing directly onto federal military property. The model reduces the need for the government to build and operate the facilities itself while creating a dedicated pathway for private investment.

The initiative also reflects a broader shift in US industrial policy. Washington is increasingly focused on processing capacity, not just access to mineral deposits, because refining and conversion remain major vulnerabilities in defense supply chains.

Military Land Becomes a Platform for Mineral Processing

The four companies will focus on different critical materials. Empire State Mines will process graphite, Energy X will target lithium, Ioneer USA will process boron, and REalloys will handle rare earths.

These materials serve different markets, but all have strategic relevance. Graphite and lithium are key battery inputs, rare earths support permanent magnets, and boron is used in advanced materials, glass, ceramics and selected defense applications.

The projects will be developed through the Army’s Enhanced Use Lease model. This allows underutilized military land to be leased to private-sector companies while the Army remains the landlord.

The commercial operators will bear the costs of financing, designing, building, operating, securing and eventually decommissioning the facilities. They must also pay rent at or above fair market value.

This structure limits direct government construction risk while still giving the Army influence over where strategic processing capacity is located.

The model could also shorten parts of the project-development process if sites already have suitable infrastructure, security and federal oversight. That could make military installations attractive locations for strategically sensitive processing projects.

Defense Policy Shifts Toward Domestic Processing Capacity

The leases are part of the Army’s Strategic Capital Initiatives, which aim to use private investment to accelerate military modernization and supply-chain resilience.

The significance lies in the processing stage. The US has identified numerous domestic and allied mineral resources, but many still depend on overseas refining or conversion before they can enter defense manufacturing.

Locating commercial plants on military property signals that processing is increasingly viewed as strategic infrastructure. The Army is effectively using its land base to support industrial capacity that private markets have struggled to build quickly enough.

The approach has already been tested outside critical minerals. The Army has used similar lease structures for a Hanwha Defense USA munitions facility and data center projects involving Carlyle and CyrusOne.

If the mineral projects reach production on schedule, the EUL model could become a repeatable tool for other materials. It offers the government a way to support domestic capacity without taking full ownership or construction responsibility.

For the wider market, the message is clear. US critical minerals policy is moving further downstream, with processing, refining and conversion becoming central to defense supply security.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The Army’s lease awards turn underused military land into industrial infrastructure for critical minerals. The model could become important if it proves capable of moving processing projects from policy support to commercial production faster than conventional development routes.

Brazil ETS Calendar Sets Phased Path for Industrial Emissions Reporting

Brazil

Brazil ETS calendar proposals would bring heavy industry into the country’s emerging emissions trading system through phased reporting from 2027, 2029 and 2031. The finance ministry’s preliminary schedule is designed to give companies more visibility before mandatory emissions limits are applied.

Brazil ETS calendar plans would first cover paper and cellulose, ferrous metals and steel, cement, primary aluminum, oil and gas exploration and production, refining and air transport. These sectors sit at the centre of Brazil’s industrial emissions base.

Brazil ETS calendar development is strategically important for metals producers because steel, aluminum and mining will face rising scrutiny over carbon intensity. The system could gradually reshape investment decisions, energy sourcing and competitiveness.

Brazil’s emissions trading system, known as SBCE, is expected to be regulated by the end of this year. The government plans to launch a public consultation in July.

Steel and Primary Aluminum Enter the First Phase

The first phase places steel and primary aluminum among the earliest industrial sectors to report emissions. This is important because both industries are energy-intensive and increasingly exposed to carbon-related trade and customer requirements.

For steelmakers, emissions reporting will create a clearer baseline for future decarbonization planning. Companies will need to measure process emissions, energy use and operating practices before sector limits are introduced.

Primary aluminum producers will face similar pressure. Aluminum’s carbon footprint depends heavily on power source, smelting efficiency and upstream alumina supply.

The proposed structure gives companies time to prepare. Each phase would last four years, beginning with emissions monitoring before setting total emissions limits for each sector.

Reductions would remain non-mandatory during the initial phases. This lowers immediate compliance pressure, but still pushes companies to build emissions data systems and prepare for future regulation.

Mining and Recycled Aluminum Follow in Second Phase

The second phase would add mining, recycled aluminum, electricity, glass, food and beverages, chemicals, ceramics and waste. This expands the ETS from core heavy emitters into broader industrial supply chains.

Mining’s inclusion matters because Brazil is a major supplier of iron ore, bauxite, manganese, nickel, lithium and other critical minerals. Emissions reporting could become part of how mineral exports are assessed by customers and financiers.

Recycled aluminum entering the second phase also matters. Secondary aluminum usually carries a lower carbon profile than primary metal, but reporting requirements may still shape scrap processing, remelting efficiency and product certification.

Electricity’s inclusion is also critical. Power-sector emissions influence the carbon footprint of metals, chemicals and downstream manufacturing.

The third phase would cover road, waterways and rail transport. That could eventually affect logistics costs and emissions accounting across mineral exports, domestic freight and industrial supply chains.

The finance ministry said the proposal aims to create predictability for a gradual transition to decarbonization. That predictability will be essential if Brazil wants industry to invest before binding limits arrive.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil’s ETS proposal is not yet a hard cap on industry, but it is the start of carbon accounting discipline. For metals and mining companies, early preparation could become a competitive advantage once customers and regulators begin pricing emissions more directly.

Defu Copper Foil Facility Targets AI and New Energy Demand Growth

Defu Technology

Defu copper foil facility plans will add another major layer of Chinese capacity for high-end electronic circuit materials as artificial intelligence, communications and energy transition sectors lift demand for specialised copper products. Defu Technology will invest 3.1bn yuan to build the project in Jiujiang, Jiangxi province.

Defu copper foil facility development will be focused on high-end AI electronic circuit copper foil. The project will be built in two phases, each with 25,000 t/yr of production capacity.

Defu copper foil facility timing has not yet been disclosed. But the investment signals continued confidence in downstream copper demand linked to AI infrastructure, 5G and 6G communications, low-earth-orbit satellites and new energy applications.

The company already had 175,000 t/yr of copper foil capacity at the end of 2025. Its output rose by 50% to 139,600t last year, while sales increased by 52% to 140,900t.

AI Infrastructure Adds New Demand Layer for Copper Foil

Copper foil is becoming more strategically important as electronics, batteries and data infrastructure demand higher-performance materials. AI systems require dense electronic circuits, high-speed signal transmission and reliable thermal and electrical performance.

Defu’s new project targets that shift. High-end electronic circuit copper foil is used in printed circuit boards and advanced electronics, where quality, thickness control and surface performance can determine reliability.

AI-related demand is still emerging, but it is already becoming relevant to copper markets. Some market participants estimate global copper demand from AI-related applications could reach around 350,000t in 2026.

That demand does not come only from data-centre power cables. It also includes circuit materials, cooling systems, electrical equipment, grid connections, transformers and backup power infrastructure.

Defu is therefore positioning itself closer to higher-value copper demand. The company is not simply expanding commodity capacity; it is targeting sectors where copper foil quality and customer qualification matter.

New Energy and Electronics Support Capacity Expansion

Energy transition sectors remain a key driver for electrolytic copper foil demand. Copper foil is widely used in lithium-ion batteries, especially as current collector material for anodes.

China’s copper foil operating rates improved significantly in 2025. Average electrolytic copper foil operating rates rose to 77.1%, up by 18.8 percentage points from a year earlier.

That recovery reflects stronger downstream demand from battery, electronics and new energy markets. It also helps explain why producers such as Defu are still adding capacity despite competition across China’s materials sector.

The planned Jiujiang facility will lift Defu’s ability to serve multiple growth markets. These include AI hardware, communications equipment, satellites, batteries and other high-end electronics.

However, expansion also raises competitive pressure. As more Chinese copper foil capacity enters the market, producers will need to differentiate through product quality, customer qualification and exposure to higher-margin applications.

For copper demand, the project reinforces a broader structural point. Electrification is no longer limited to EVs and grids. AI, satellites, communications and advanced electronics are adding new copper-intensive demand channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Defu’s investment shows that copper demand is becoming more technology-driven and more specialised. The strongest copper foil producers will be those that can move beyond volume growth and qualify into AI, battery and high-end electronics supply chains.

Mt Marion Lithium Expansion Advances as MinRes and Ganfeng Lift Spodumene Supply

Mineral Resources

Mt Marion lithium expansion is moving ahead after Mineral Resources and Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium reached a final investment decision on a A$490mn upgrade at the Western Australian mine. The project will raise 6% spodumene concentrate output from 500,000 t/yr to 600,000 t/yr.

Mt Marion lithium expansion reflects renewed confidence in spodumene markets after a period of stronger pricing, Chinese demand and supply disruption from Zimbabwean export controls. The decision also reinforces Australia’s role as a core lithium feedstock supplier to global battery material chains.

Mt Marion lithium expansion includes A$220mn for underground mine development, A$240mn for a flotation plant and A$30mn for non-processing infrastructure. Construction is scheduled to begin in July-September.

The partners expect to commission the mine within 12 months of construction starting, with production ramp-up over the following six months. That timeline makes Mt Marion an important near-term growth project in the Australian hard-rock lithium sector.

Underground Mining Extends Mine Life and Feed Flexibility

The underground mine will supplement ore from the existing open pit and contribute up to 40% of processing feed. This will extend Mt Marion’s remaining mine life by six years beyond the previous estimate of 10 years.

That is strategically important because mine life extension improves supply visibility for customers and investors. Battery chemical producers need stable spodumene feedstock to support long-term lithium hydroxide and lithium carbonate production.

The underground development also gives MinRes and Ganfeng more operational flexibility. Combining open-pit and underground ore can support feed blending, grade control and continuity as the mine matures.

The project will cause minimal disruption to existing operations, according to the company. That matters because the mine is already a major producing asset and any downtime could affect near-term shipments.

Mt Marion is also backed by a strong downstream partner. Ganfeng is one of China’s leading lithium companies, giving the project a direct link to one of the world’s largest battery materials markets.

Flotation Plant Targets Higher-Grade Product Mix

The new flotation plant will remove SC3.5 product from MinRes’ mix and deliver a minimum SC5 grade product. This is a key upgrade because higher-grade concentrate can improve processing efficiency for downstream converters.

SC6 remains the benchmark product for hard-rock lithium supply. Increasing SC6 output to 600,000 t/yr gives Mt Marion stronger exposure to higher-value concentrate markets.

The investment economics are highly sensitive to price. At an assumed SC6 price of $2,700/t, MinRes expects the expansion payback period to be less than one year.

Spodumene prices have risen in recent months, supported by Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export controls and strong Chinese demand. The latest Australian SC6 assessment was $2,661/t on 19 May, down from $2,811/t a week earlier but still elevated enough to support renewed investment.

MinRes also cited higher lithium prices as a reason for restarting operations at its Bald Hill mine in Western Australia. Together, these moves suggest producers are again positioning for stronger lithium feedstock demand.

The broader lithium market remains volatile, but the Mt Marion decision shows that high-quality Australian assets can still attract capital when pricing, partners and mine-life extension align.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Mt Marion’s expansion shows that lithium investment is returning first to established, scalable assets with strong downstream links. The key lesson is that the next lithium cycle will reward producers that can improve grade, extend mine life and secure reliable routes into China’s battery supply chain.

Asian Investor Climate Policy Advocacy Rises as Transition Finance Needs Clearer Rules

AIGCC

Asian investor climate policy advocacy is accelerating as more asset owners and managers push governments for clearer frameworks to support climate investment. The Asia Investor Group on Climate Change said investors across the region are moving beyond broad net zero pledges toward more direct engagement on policy.

Asian investor climate policy advocacy is becoming more important because Asia’s energy transition depends heavily on regulation, project approvals and national transition roadmaps. Markets across the region differ widely in policy maturity, carbon rules, disclosure standards and grid planning.

Asian investor climate policy advocacy now extends beyond emissions targets. Investors are calling for stronger sector transition plans, technology support, physical climate risk frameworks, nature-related disclosures and just transition policies.

The shift matters for metals and industrial supply chains. More investible climate policy can unlock capital for energy storage, renewable power, transmission, low-carbon transport and green infrastructure, all of which require large volumes of copper, aluminium, battery materials, electrical steel and critical minerals.

Energy Storage and Grid Investment Draw More Capital

Energy storage has become one of the clearest winners from stronger climate policy interest. The share of surveyed investors interested in energy storage doubled to 82% in 2025 from 40% in 2023.

This is an important signal for battery metals. Storage growth can support demand for lithium, iron phosphate, graphite, copper, aluminium and power electronics materials, even when electric vehicle growth becomes uneven.

Renewable power generation and transmission are also attracting investor attention. These sectors require long-term policy certainty because projects depend on grid access, permitting, tariff structures and reliable revenue models.

Green infrastructure, low-carbon transport and nature-based solutions are also gaining interest. But capital will move fastest where governments provide clear investment rules, predictable transition pathways and credible national targets.

The report shows that investors are becoming more practical. They are no longer only setting portfolio-level climate targets. They are asking governments to create the conditions needed for real projects to be financed.

Transition Plans Remain the Missing Link

Investor climate commitments are rising, but implementation remains uneven. The share of investors with net zero portfolio pledges increased to 45% in 2025 from 40% in 2024, while 33% have set interim targets.

However, only 22% of investors published a climate transition plan in 2025, unchanged from the previous year. This gap matters because transition plans connect targets with capital allocation, engagement priorities and risk management.

Just transition strategies are even less developed. Only 11% of investors have adopted one, showing that social and regional impacts remain under-integrated in climate finance.

Asia’s transition will require place-based planning. Coal-heavy markets, export-driven manufacturing hubs, emerging economies and advanced financial centres all need different pathways.

For metals producers and industrial companies, this creates both opportunity and scrutiny. Investors will increasingly prefer companies with credible decarbonisation strategies, resilient supply chains and exposure to climate-enabling materials.

The broader message is clear. Climate finance in Asia is moving from ambition toward execution, but policy certainty and transition planning must improve before capital can scale at the speed required.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Asian investors are telling governments that climate capital needs bankable rules, not slogans. For metals markets, the strongest signal is energy storage: policy clarity could turn climate finance into real demand for copper, aluminium, lithium and grid materials.

Hancock Lithium Mine Plan Advances as Spodumene Prices Recover

Hancock Lithium Mine

Hancock lithium mine plans in Western Australia are moving forward as stronger lithium concentrate prices revive confidence in large-scale spodumene development. Hancock Prospecting plans to build the A$1bn Andover mine, targeting production of up to 1.1mn t/yr of lithium concentrate.

Hancock lithium mine construction is scheduled to start in November 2028, with a two-year construction period. The project is planned for a 30-year operating life and would process 6mn t/yr of ore.

Hancock lithium mine development reflects a shift in lithium sentiment after the deep price collapse that forced project delays and suspensions across the sector. Spodumene prices have rebounded as Chinese battery demand improves and supply expectations tighten.

The Andover project is strategically important because Australia remains one of the world’s key hard-rock lithium supply bases. New capacity from Western Australia could support converters, battery producers and electric vehicle supply chains seeking long-term spodumene feedstock.

Andover Adds Scale to Western Australia’s Spodumene Pipeline

The Andover mine would become a major new lithium concentrate source if developed as planned. Annual output of up to 1.1mn t would give the project meaningful weight in the seaborne spodumene market.

The project sits within a broader ownership structure shaped by recent consolidation. Hancock Prospecting and Chilean lithium producer SQM partnered to acquire Azure Minerals in a A$1.7bn deal completed in May 2024 through their jointly owned company, SH Mining.

Andover is 60% owned by Azure, while Croydon Gold, a subsidiary of the Creasy Group, holds the remaining 40%. The involvement of Hancock and SQM gives the project both Australian mining strength and global lithium-market experience.

SQM’s role is especially relevant. The Chilean producer brings downstream lithium market knowledge, while Hancock adds financial capacity and Australian project execution capability.

The planned 30-year mine life also matters. Battery supply chains need long-duration feedstock sources, not only short-cycle spot supply. A project of this scale could support long-term offtake and conversion strategies.

Price Recovery Revives Lithium Project Economics

The Andover plan comes after a sharp recovery in spodumene concentrate prices. Prices rose in April as tighter supply expectations followed Zimbabwe’s introduction of export quotas for lithium concentrate.

Spodumene prices had previously collapsed to $900-1,100/t cif China in January 2024, down 83% after supply growth outpaced demand. That downturn forced many lithium developers to slow, delay or reassess projects.

Prices later began recovering in late 2025 as demand from China’s lithium-ion battery sector improved market sentiment. Stronger pricing has now made large hard-rock projects more attractive again.

However, lithium remains a volatile market. New supply from Australia, Africa, South America and China can quickly change balances if demand growth slows or inventories rebuild.

For Hancock, timing will be critical. Construction is not expected to start until late 2028, meaning the project will enter the market after the current price recovery has already been tested by several more years of battery demand and supply growth.

The strategic value remains clear. If lithium demand continues to rise from electric vehicles and energy storage, Andover could become an important feedstock source for global converters. If supply again expands too quickly, project economics may face renewed pressure.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hancock’s Andover plan shows that lithium investment confidence is returning, but only for projects with scale, strong sponsors and long-term strategic value. The market has recovered from its deepest downturn, but future winners will still need cost discipline and secure downstream demand.

Global Recycled Metals Output Rises as China and Emerging Regions Expand Capacity

Recycled Metals

Global recycled metals output increased further in 2025 as China maintained its leading position and emerging regions expanded recycling capacity. Production of recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc reached about 59.2mn t, up 5.6% from a year earlier.

Global recycled metals output is becoming more important to non-ferrous supply security as mining, processing and trade flows face rising geopolitical and cost pressures. Recycling now provides a larger secondary source of industrial metal units for manufacturers, smelters and battery supply chains.

Global recycled metals output accounted for around 34% of total non-ferrous metal production in 2025. The sector also delivered cumulative savings of about 1.2bn t of primary mineral resources, underlining its growing role in resource conservation.

The growth shows that recycled metals are no longer a secondary environmental story. They are becoming a core part of industrial raw material strategy across copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and battery metals.

China Leads as Regional Recycling Capacity Expands

China remained the world’s largest recycled base metals producer in 2025, with output of 20.57mn t. That represented 34.7% of global production.

The country’s scale gives it a major role in recycled copper, aluminium, lead and zinc supply. It also strengthens China’s position across non-ferrous metals at a time when primary raw material security is under pressure.

Europe produced more than 10mn t of recycled base metals, while the US produced more than 6mn t. India and southeast Asia reached around 6mn t and 4mn t, respectively.

These figures show that recycling capacity is becoming more geographically distributed. Emerging regions are no longer only consumers of recycled raw materials. They are becoming processing centres in their own right.

Battery-related recycling is also growing quickly. Nickel, cobalt and lithium recovery is supporting the new energy industry as electric vehicle and energy storage supply chains look for more secure material sources.

China aims to increase domestic recycled material recovery to 23mn t by 2030 under its next five-year plan. That target implies annual growth of around 7%.

The country is also expected to strengthen recycled product certification and explore the inclusion of recycled materials in carbon trading systems. This could make recycled metal more valuable for customers seeking traceable and lower-carbon supply.

Trade Flows and Technology Move Toward Asia

Global recycled raw material trade is becoming more regional, more Asia-focused and more diversified. Europe and North America remain major exporters of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock.

Europe exports around 2mn t/yr of recycled copper and aluminium feedstock, while North America exports about 4.2mn t/yr. China and India remain the largest importers, with imports exceeding 4mn t and 2mn t, respectively.

Southeast Asia is becoming a key transshipment hub. Regional recycled aluminium feedstock trade reached about 1.3mn t of imports and 900,000t of exports.

Black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries is also increasingly moving toward Asian processing centres. This reflects Asia’s stronger battery materials processing base and growing demand for recovered nickel, cobalt and lithium units.

Technology is improving the recycling value chain. Advances in laser sorting, intelligent dismantling, multi-metal battery recovery and digital process control are raising recovery rates and product quality.

Leading producers have achieved recycling rates above 94% for aluminium and 95% for lithium. These levels show how recycling is moving closer to industrial-grade resource recovery rather than simple scrap handling.

New products are also expanding. High-strength recycled aluminium alloys, high-purity recycled copper and recycled rare-earth permanent magnets are gaining traction.

This matters because recycled metal must meet customer specifications before it can displace primary material. Better sorting, cleaner chemistry and stronger certification will determine how much recycled metal can enter high-value applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Recycling is becoming a strategic metals supply pillar, not just a sustainability tool. The next competitive edge will come from producers that can turn complex scrap and battery waste into certified, high-purity and customer-ready materials.

India Critical Minerals Supply Chain Faces Funding Gap Despite Policy Push

Indonesia nickel mining

India critical minerals supply chain ambitions face a major financing test as the country tries to reduce dependence on imported lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth materials. A new report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis warns that funding gaps, slow policy execution and raw material import dependence could delay India’s strategy.

India critical minerals supply chain development is becoming urgent because the country imports 100% of the lithium, cobalt and nickel used in clean energy manufacturing. Demand is expected to rise as India targets 30% electric vehicle penetration by 2030, along with 230GW of solar capacity and 140GW of wind capacity.

India critical minerals supply chain policy has moved quickly on paper. The government launched the National Critical Mineral Mission in January 2025 with a seven-year budget of 343bn rupees to support exploration and auctions.

However, the mission still lacks enough direct capital expenditure support for large-scale mining, refining and processing. That is the central weakness in India’s current critical minerals push.

Exploration Targets Need Processing Capital

The National Critical Mineral Mission targets 1,200 exploration projects and more than 100 critical mineral block auctions by 2030-31. This can improve domestic resource visibility, but exploration alone will not create battery, magnet or semiconductor supply chains.

Critical minerals projects require large upfront capital, long permitting timelines and technical processing capability. Mining projects can take 10-15 years to move from exploration to commercial production, creating long periods of uncertainty for investors.

India has identified major resource potential. The country reported 5.9mn t of inferred lithium resources in Jammu and Kashmir as of 2023. It also holds 13.15mn t of monazite deposits containing an estimated 7.23mn t of rare earth oxides.

The Geological Survey of India also identified 482.6mn t of rare earth ore resources through exploration projects in February. These figures suggest significant geological potential, but they do not solve the refining and separation challenge.

Rare earths are a clear example. Monazite and rare earth ore must be separated, purified, converted into metals or alloys, and qualified by downstream users before they can support magnets, defence systems, electronics or clean energy applications.

India’s midstream sector also faces pressure from Chinese overcapacity. China controls around 60-70% of global refining and processing capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt, and about 90% of rare earth refining.

That dominance suppresses margins and makes new Indian refining projects harder to finance. Without price support, offtake contracts or direct capital backing, investors may hesitate to fund projects that compete against established Chinese capacity.

Import Dependence Extends Beyond Battery Metals

India’s critical minerals strategy now reaches beyond battery materials. The government classified coking coal as a critical and strategic mineral in January to reduce import dependence and support steel expansion.

This widens the funding challenge. India aims to increase crude steel production capacity to 300mn t/yr by 2030 and 500mn t/yr by 2047. Its Mission Coking Coal targets domestic output of 140mn t/yr by 2030, up from 66.49mn t/yr in fiscal 2025-26.

These goals will require long-term investment in mining, washing, transport, processing and related infrastructure. That makes critical minerals policy a broader industrial financing issue, not only an energy transition issue.

India is also seeking overseas supply partnerships. It is working with Australia, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and Côte d’Ivoire to secure access to critical minerals.

State-backed Khanij Bidesh India is also pursuing overseas lithium and cobalt assets. These efforts can reduce raw material risk, but they still need downstream processing and domestic industrial integration.

The global funding requirement is enormous. The International Energy Agency estimates that mining and refining will need $915bn in new investment during 2026-35 under its Announced Pledges Scenario.

For India, the strategic question is how to convert policy ambition into bankable projects. Auctions and exploration can identify resources, but refining plants, processing hubs, offtake agreements and financing tools will decide whether domestic supply chains actually emerge.

The Metalnomist Commentary

India has recognised the critical minerals problem, but recognition is not the same as industrial capacity. The next stage must focus on project finance, refining economics and guaranteed demand, or India will remain dependent on imported materials despite its resource potential.

Novandino Lithium Investment Targets $3.5bn Expansion in Chile’s Atacama

Novandino

Novandino lithium investment plans could reshape Chile’s lithium supply outlook as the producer prepares to spend more than $3.5bn to expand output and extend operations at the Atacama salt lake until 2060.

Novandino lithium investment will focus on the Salar Futuro project, which is designed to take production, sustainability and community engagement to a higher level. The company is close to submitting the project’s environmental impact study.

Novandino lithium investment remains subject to environmental approval. That approval is essential because the company needs authorisation for its Atacama operations in northern Chile’s Antofagasta region to continue beyond 2030.

The company is a joint venture between Chile’s state copper miner Codelco and SQM. Its expansion is strategically important because Chile remains one of the world’s most important lithium producers, but new project approvals have moved slowly.

Salar Futuro Could Extend Atacama Output to 2060

Salar Futuro is central to Novandino’s long-term growth strategy. The project would support continued operations at the Atacama salt lake while lifting production and improving environmental performance.

The company expects to produce 270,000t of lithium carbonate equivalent in 2026. Output is then expected to rise to 300,000t in 2027-2028, compared with 233,000t last year.

That growth would strengthen Chile’s position in global lithium supply at a time when Argentina is expanding rapidly and challenging Chile’s regional leadership.

The environmental impact study will be the key near-term milestone. Without approval, the company cannot secure the long operating extension needed to justify the investment.

Chile’s lithium sector has enormous resource strength, but regulatory complexity has slowed new supply. Novandino’s ability to advance Salar Futuro will therefore be closely watched by battery makers, automakers and lithium chemical buyers.

Technology Mix Targets Higher Efficiency and Lower Water Use

Novandino plans to use a combination of next-generation technologies to improve production efficiency and sustainability. The company is considering membrane filtration, mechanical evaporation and direct lithium extraction.

This technology mix matters because Chile’s lithium expansion is increasingly tied to environmental and community expectations. Brine operations must show better water performance, lower ecological impact and stronger local engagement.

The company said its water intensity per unit of production has fallen by 75% since 2016. That improvement is strategically important in the Atacama, where water use remains one of the most sensitive issues for lithium development.

Direct lithium extraction could also become an important part of Chile’s future production model. However, DLE must be adapted to each brine chemistry, making execution, cost control and scale-up critical.

For Chile, the project is more than a company-level expansion. It is a test of whether the country can grow lithium supply while meeting stricter sustainability standards and maintaining state participation through Codelco.

For the battery supply chain, higher Atacama output would provide more lithium carbonate equivalent from an established producing region. But timing will depend on environmental approval, technology deployment and project execution.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Novandino’s $3.5bn plan shows that Chile still has the resource base to defend its lithium position. The real challenge is whether regulatory approval and new extraction technologies can move fast enough to keep pace with Argentina’s accelerating project pipeline.

Sibanye PGM Production Rises in South Africa as US Output Falls

Sibanye

Sibanye PGM production improved in South Africa during the first quarter, but the company’s US mine output weakened because of lower production quality at East Boulder. The mixed result highlights the company’s uneven exposure across primary mining, recycling, zinc and lithium.

Sibanye PGM production in South Africa rose by 2% year on year to 383,241oz of 4E metals, covering platinum, palladium, rhodium and gold. Growth projects supported the increase and helped keep the company on track with its full-year guidance.

Sibanye PGM production in the US moved in the opposite direction. Output of 2E metals, covering platinum and palladium, fell by 5% to 68,386oz, with regular production expected to resume by the end of June.

The company maintained full-year guidance for both regions. South African operations are expected to produce 1.65mn-1.75mn oz, while US operations remain guided at 280,000-300,000oz.

South African Growth Offsets US Mine Weakness

Sibanye’s South African PGM operations remain the stronger side of the portfolio. The 2% increase in first-quarter output shows that ongoing growth projects are helping offset broader pressure across the PGM sector.

This matters because South Africa remains the world’s most important primary PGM supply base. Stable output from large producers supports automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, chemicals, electronics and industrial applications.

The US Stillwater operations faced a weaker quarter. Lower production quality at East Boulder reduced output, although Sibanye expects normal production to return by the end of June.

The US decline is important because North American primary PGM supply is limited. Any disruption at Stillwater assets can affect regional availability of palladium and platinum, especially for customers seeking non-Russian and traceable supply.

Recycling helped offset the weaker US mine performance. Sibanye’s US recycled PGM output rose by 50% to 107,597oz, supported by better optimisation of material flows.

That increase reinforces the strategic value of secondary supply. PGM recycling can provide flexible metal units when mine output is uneven, while also supporting lower-carbon and circular supply chains.

Zinc Weakness and Keliber Progress Broaden the Portfolio Story

Sibanye’s Australian Century zinc operation produced 20,000t in the first quarter, down by 25,000t from a year earlier. Above-average rainfall reduced capacity and operating flexibility at the zinc operation.

The decline shows the weather sensitivity of tailings and zinc operations. Heavy rainfall can affect mining rates, processing efficiency, transport and operating continuity.

Century’s weaker output also matters because zinc remains important for galvanizing steel, infrastructure, construction, die casting and industrial manufacturing. Lower production from a major operation can tighten regional supply if weather disruption persists.

Meanwhile, Sibanye’s Keliber lithium project in Finland reached full completion during the first quarter. The first mining blast took place at the Syvajarvi mine in February.

Keliber gives Sibanye a strategic entry into Europe’s lithium supply chain. The project connects the company to battery materials demand and supports Europe’s effort to build more domestic critical mineral capacity.

Sibanye’s portfolio is therefore becoming more diversified. PGMs remain the core earnings and strategic base, but recycling, zinc and lithium all add exposure to different industrial cycles.

The first-quarter results show the benefits and risks of that structure. South African PGMs and US recycling improved, US mine output weakened, zinc suffered weather disruption, and lithium moved closer to future production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sibanye’s quarter shows why diversified metals exposure can protect a company from single-asset weakness, but also adds execution complexity. The strongest strategic signal is the rise in recycled PGM output, which could become increasingly valuable as customers seek secure and lower-carbon platinum and palladium supply.

Brazil Critical Minerals Bill Moves Country Toward Domestic Processing Strategy

Critical Minerals

Brazil critical minerals bill approval by the lower house marks a major step toward turning the country’s mineral reserves into a domestic industrial development strategy. The bill establishes the national policy of critical and strategic minerals and creates incentives for companies to process and transform those materials inside Brazil.

Brazil critical minerals bill measures include a new mineral activity guarantee fund backed by R2bn in federal money. The fund will support projects linked to the production of critical and strategic minerals.

Brazil critical minerals bill incentives also include R5bn in tax credits over five years to encourage processing and transformation. This shows that Brazil does not want to remain only an exporter of raw materials.

The bill will now move to the senate. Mines and energy minister Alexandre Silveira said he will work directly with senators to accelerate approval, framing critical minerals as a matter of economic modernisation and national sovereignty.

Processing Incentives Target Value Creation Inside Brazil

The bill creates the national council for the industrialisation of critical and strategic minerals. The council will decide which minerals qualify as critical and strategic and will update the list every four years.

This structure is important because Brazil has large resource potential but still needs stronger domestic processing capacity. Without refining, separation, transformation and recycling, mineral wealth can leave the country as low-value raw material.

The proposed guarantee fund and tax credits are designed to change that pattern. They will support projects considered strategic under the national policy, with a focus on minerals that can strengthen Brazil’s industrial base.

Congress member Arnaldo Jardim, the bill’s rapporteur, said critical minerals represent a development opportunity for Brazil. He argued that the country should become a major rare earths producer, stimulate recycling through urban mining and make its processing industry more competitive.

That message reflects a broader shift in resource policy. Brazil is trying to position critical minerals as a tool for industrial development, not only export revenue.

Rare earths are especially important. Brazil has significant rare earth potential, and global buyers are searching for alternatives to China-dominated supply chains. If Brazil can move beyond mining into separation and processing, it could become more relevant to magnet, defence, electronics and clean energy markets.

Urban mining also deserves attention. Recycling can strengthen domestic supply, reduce waste and create secondary sources of critical materials from electronics, batteries, industrial scrap and end-of-life equipment.

US Interest Raises Brazil’s Strategic Importance

The bill comes as Brazil and the US are discussing critical minerals more actively. Presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Donald Trump are expected to meet this week, and critical minerals are likely to be part of the agenda.

The US has long sought a critical minerals agreement with Brazil. Goias state has already signed a cooperation agreement with the US, although Brazil’s federal government has challenged its legal validity.

That dispute shows how politically sensitive critical minerals have become. Foreign partnerships can bring investment and market access, but the federal government wants to ensure that strategic minerals serve national interests.

Brazil holds about 10% of global critical minerals reserves, according to domestic research and mining institutions. The sector is expected to attract $21.3bn in investment by 2030.

This gives Brazil strong leverage. The country has rare earths, niobium, graphite, nickel, lithium and other minerals that are increasingly important to batteries, magnets, aerospace, electronics and energy transition technologies.

However, reserves alone will not determine Brazil’s role. The country must build processing capacity, permitting efficiency, infrastructure, financing tools and reliable industrial partnerships.

The new policy could help unlock that pathway. If approved by the senate and implemented effectively, it could shift Brazil from a raw material supplier toward a more integrated critical minerals economy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Brazil is making the right strategic move by linking critical minerals to processing, tax incentives and industrial policy. The real test will be execution: Brazil must convert resource potential into refining, separation, recycling and customer-ready supply before global competitors secure the next wave of investment.

Zhongke Anode Material Sales Surge as Energy Storage Demand Accelerates

Zhongke

Zhongke anode material sales rose sharply in 2025 as China’s lithium-ion battery sector expanded across new energy vehicles and power storage. Hunan Zhongke Electric sold 363,253t of anode materials during the year, up 62% from 2024.

Zhongke anode material sales were supported by strong downstream demand and higher operating rates. The company’s output increased by 66% to 378,469t, reflecting a rapid scale-up in response to battery market growth.

Zhongke anode material sales also lifted revenue. Revenue from anode materials rose by 60% to 7.99bn yuan, broadly in line with the increase in shipment volumes.

The result shows how anode materials remain one of the key beneficiaries of battery expansion. Demand is no longer driven only by electric vehicles. Grid storage, industrial storage and AI-related power demand are becoming increasingly important.

Capacity Utilisation Tightens as China Battery Demand Expands

Zhongke’s anode material capacity reached 348,683 t/yr in 2025, up 46% from a year earlier. The increase followed equipment and technology upgrades across its production base.

Capacity utilisation rose to 108.6% from 95.7% in 2024. This shows that Zhongke was operating above nameplate capacity as demand outpaced available production capability.

The company is now expanding further. A third-phase project at its Zhaotong site in Yunnan province is under construction and will add 100,000 t/yr of anode material capacity by the end of 2026.

Zhaotong has become a key growth platform. The first phase, with 15,000 t/yr of capacity, started production in April 2020. The second phase, with 100,000 t/yr of capacity, began operations in March 2024.

Zhongke is also planning a 300,000 t/yr anode material complex in Luzhou, Sichuan province. This would further strengthen its position in China’s graphite anode supply chain.

The expansion reflects a broader industry trend. Anode producers are adding capacity to serve battery makers that need reliable supply, stable quality and lower-cost materials for high-volume cell production.

Overseas Expansion Targets Storage and Non-China Customers

Zhongke is also building a 100,000 t/yr anode material plant in Tangier, Morocco. The project targets customers outside China and reflects the growing need for regionalised battery material supply chains.

Morocco offers strategic value because it is close to European markets and has become more attractive for battery-related investment. For Chinese anode producers, overseas capacity can help serve customers facing localisation, trade and supply-chain security requirements.

Energy storage is becoming a major long-term demand driver. Global energy storage battery shipments reached 651.5GWh in 2025, up 76.2% from a year earlier. Chinese companies accounted for 614.7GWh, or 94.4% of global shipments.

EV Tank expects global energy storage battery shipments to exceed 2TWh by 2030. If this forecast materialises, anode material demand will continue rising across China and overseas markets.

Policy is also supporting growth. China is moving new energy storage from mandatory allocation toward a more market-oriented system, including capacity pricing support for independent grid-side storage.

AI data centres are adding another demand layer. Rapid growth in electricity consumption from AI infrastructure is increasing the need for power storage, grid stability and backup capacity.

Europe is also expanding storage under energy security strategies. EU member states installed 27.1GWh of new battery energy storage systems in 2025, up 45% from the previous year.

For Zhongke, this demand mix supports a larger and more international anode strategy. The company is positioning itself to serve China’s dominant battery ecosystem while preparing for overseas demand linked to storage, EVs and grid resilience.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Zhongke’s growth shows that anode materials are moving from an EV-driven market into a broader energy infrastructure market. The next competitive phase will depend on overseas localisation, graphite supply security and the ability to serve storage demand outside China.

Lithium-Ion Battery Copper Foil Shipments Surge as Ultra-Thin Products Gain Share

Copper Foil

Lithium-ion battery copper foil shipments rose sharply in 2025 as global battery production expanded and manufacturers shifted toward thinner materials to reduce copper costs. Global shipments reached 1.302mn t, up 41.7% from 2024, according to Chinese research institute EV Tank.

Lithium-ion battery copper foil demand remains closely tied to electric vehicle and energy storage growth. Copper foil is a key current collector in lithium-ion batteries, making it essential to cell performance, energy density and manufacturing cost.

Lithium-ion battery copper foil shipments were dominated by China, which accounted for 82.9% of global deliveries in 2025. EV Tank expects global shipments to reach 2.615mn t by 2030, implying continued expansion as battery output scales.

The product mix changed quickly during the year. The share of 8μm foil declined, while 6μm remained the mainstream product and accounted for more than 70% of total shipments.

Ultra-Thin Foil Gains Momentum on Copper Cost Pressure

Ultra-thin copper foil gained share as battery producers looked for ways to reduce copper input costs. Persistently high global copper prices pushed cell manufacturers to use thinner foil while maintaining battery performance.

The combined share of 5μm and 4.5μm ultra-thin foil rose to 24% in 2025. This is a major shift for a material category that requires tighter production control, better surface quality and stronger consistency.

Thinner copper foil can help reduce battery weight and improve energy density. It also lowers the amount of copper used per cell, which becomes increasingly important when copper prices remain elevated.

EV Tank expects 5μm and thinner foil to become a key material for high-end batteries. This reflects the industry’s move toward lighter, higher-energy-density cell designs.

However, thinner foil also raises manufacturing difficulty. Producers must control pinholes, tensile strength, elongation, surface roughness and coating compatibility more precisely.

That technical barrier could separate higher-end suppliers from lower-cost producers. As battery customers shift toward thinner grades, qualification and process reliability will become more important than simple capacity.

China Leads Supply as Competition Intensifies

China’s 82.9% share of global shipments shows its dominant role in battery copper foil supply. The country has built large-scale capacity around its lithium-ion battery ecosystem, supported by domestic EV, energy storage and cell manufacturing growth.

Competition intensified in 2025 as the market recovered and producers brought earlier-built capacity on line. This created a more fluid ranking among suppliers.

Longdian Wason ranked first with a 12.2% market share. Huachuang New Material followed after capacity ramp-ups lifted output and sales.

Defu Technology and Jiayuan Technology ranked third and fourth, respectively. Seven companies in the top 10 changed positions during the year, showing how quickly capacity, customer access and product mix are reshaping the sector.

Battery makers also increased procurement from second-tier suppliers to improve supply stability. This suggests buyers are trying to diversify supplier bases rather than rely only on leading producers.

For copper markets, the trend is strategically important. Battery copper foil growth creates a direct link between copper demand and battery technology. But the move toward ultra-thin foil also means battery growth will not translate into copper demand on a simple one-to-one basis.

The sector is therefore entering a more technical phase. Volume growth remains strong, but material intensity, foil thickness, supplier qualification and copper price pressure will all shape future demand.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The copper foil market shows how battery growth can lift copper demand while also forcing material thrift. High copper prices are pushing battery makers toward thinner foil, making technology and process control as important as raw capacity.

LB Titanium Dioxide Output Falls as Sponge and Battery Materials Expand

LB Titanium

LB titanium dioxide output fell in 2025 as weaker prices, slower demand and rising trade barriers pressured the global pigment market. China’s largest titanium producer reported titanium dioxide production of 1.28mn t, down 1.5% from a year earlier.

LB titanium dioxide output declined even as sales edged higher to 1.26mn t. Domestic sales accounted for 45% of volumes, while international sales made up 55%, showing that overseas markets remain critical to the company’s TiO2 business.

LB titanium dioxide output came under pressure from structural oversupply. New capacity entered the market, prices weakened and several domestic producers cut operating rates to protect margins.

The company also pointed to anti-dumping duties imposed by the EU, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and the Eurasian Economic Union, along with higher US tariffs on Chinese material. These measures have fragmented trade flows and made the global titanium dioxide market more difficult for Chinese exporters.

Titanium Sponge Offers a Stronger Counterweight

LB’s titanium sponge business moved in the opposite direction. Titanium sponge output rose by 2.3% on the year to 71,300t, while sales increased by 0.9% to 67,500t.

The stronger sponge result matters because titanium sponge sits closer to aerospace, industrial titanium mill products and high-performance alloy supply chains. It gives LB a more diversified titanium platform beyond pigment markets.

Titanium sponge prices were also firmer. Domestic 99.7% grade sponge prices averaged 49,665 yuan/t ex-works in 2025, up from 48,270 yuan/t a year earlier.

LB has 80,000 t/yr of titanium sponge capacity, the largest globally. That scale gives the company a major position in a market where feedstock security, product quality and downstream demand from titanium processors remain strategically important.

Titanium concentrate output fell by 3% to 1.45mn t, but LB did not sell concentrate externally. All concentrate was consumed internally to produce titanium dioxide and titanium sponge.

This internal use highlights the company’s integrated titanium value chain. LB can direct feedstock toward different downstream products depending on market conditions, although weak TiO2 demand still affects overall profitability.

Iron ore concentrate output fell more sharply, dropping by 18% to 3.04mn t. Sales decreased by 2.1% to 2.94mn t, showing softer performance in another mineral by-product stream.

Iron Phosphate Growth Signals Battery Materials Diversification

LB’s battery materials business showed much stronger momentum. Iron phosphate output jumped by 72% to 97,600t, while sales rose by 59% to 96,000t.

The growth was driven by firm demand from the lithium-ion battery sector. Iron phosphate is a key precursor for lithium iron phosphate cathode materials, which are widely used in electric vehicles and energy storage systems.

This diversification is strategically important. Titanium dioxide remains LB’s largest product line, but the pigment market is facing oversupply, trade restrictions and weaker pricing. Battery materials offer a different growth channel tied to China’s expanding LFP ecosystem.

LB has 100,000 t/yr of iron phosphate capacity and 50,000 t/yr of LFP capacity. It also has 25,000 t/yr of graphite anode capacity and 50,000 t/yr of graphitisation capacity.

That product base positions LB across titanium, zirconium and battery materials. The company is no longer only a titanium dioxide producer, even though it remains the world’s largest TiO2 producer with 1.51mn t/yr of capacity.

The 2025 results show a clear split in the business. Titanium dioxide is under pressure from oversupply and trade action. Titanium sponge is holding stronger. Iron phosphate is growing with battery demand.

For LB, the industrial challenge is to manage a mature pigment business while expanding higher-growth materials platforms. Its integrated mineral base gives it flexibility, but market conditions across TiO2, sponge and battery materials are moving in different directions.

The Metalnomist Commentary

LB’s results show how Chinese titanium producers are moving beyond pigment exposure into sponge and battery materials. The strategic value lies in feedstock integration, because companies that can shift internal mineral flows between TiO2, titanium sponge and battery precursors will be better positioned in volatile markets.

Nickel Deficit Forecast Emerges as Indonesia Tightens Ore Supply

Nickel manufacturing

Nickel deficit conditions are expected to return in 2026 as Indonesia tightens ore supply controls and stainless steel demand continues to grow. The International Nickel Study Group forecasts global primary nickel production of 3.715mn t against usage of 3.747mn t, implying a deficit of 32,000t.

The nickel deficit would mark a sharp change after three consecutive years of surplus. The market recorded surpluses of 175,000t in 2023, 116,000t in 2024 and 283,000t in 2025.

The nickel deficit forecast remains modest, but it carries strategic significance because it depends heavily on Indonesian policy. Indonesia has been the main driver of global nickel supply growth, and tighter controls on ore mining could slow the expansion that previously pushed the market into surplus.

The Middle East conflict is adding another layer of uncertainty. Higher energy prices, inflation pressure and disrupted sulphur flows could affect nickel production costs, especially for high-pressure acid leach operations in Indonesia.

Indonesia Ore Controls Reshape Nickel Supply Growth

Indonesia’s approved nickel ore mining quota for 2026 has been set significantly lower than in 2025. The quota can still be revised, but the initial reduction has already changed market expectations.

The country’s revised mineral benchmark pricing mechanism also took effect on 15 April. The new HPM formula raises base prices for all nickel ore grades and includes cobalt, iron and chromium in the valuation for the first time.

This matters because Indonesian nickel supply is no longer expanding under the same low-cost conditions that drove rapid output growth. Ore access, ore pricing, royalties and contained metal values are all becoming more tightly managed.

The policy impact is not evenly distributed. Eramet’s PT Weda Bay Nickel mine is preparing to enter care and maintenance in May after receiving an initial ore quota of just 12mn wet metric tonnes. This is far below last year’s final permit of up to 42mn wmt.

In contrast, Nickel Industries received quota approvals of 14.3mn wmt, up from 10.5mn wmt in 2025. This shows that Indonesia’s controls are not simply cutting all supply. They are also reshaping which operators receive ore access.

The quota system could therefore become a major competitive factor. Producers with larger approved volumes may gain stronger operating flexibility, while others face lower utilisation, higher costs or temporary shutdowns.

HPAL producers are especially exposed. These plants require steady limonite ore supply and large volumes of sulphuric acid or sulphur-linked feedstock. Tighter ore availability and higher reagent costs can quickly pressure margins.

Disrupted sulphur flows from the Middle East conflict have raised concern over HPAL feedstock availability. This is important because Indonesian HPAL projects have become key suppliers of mixed hydroxide precipitate for battery material production.

If sulphur costs remain elevated and ore prices rise under the new HPM formula, HPAL production costs could increase materially. That would weaken the low-cost supply advantage that helped Indonesia dominate battery-linked nickel intermediates.

Stainless Steel Supports Demand as Batteries Disappoint

Stainless steel remains the main support for nickel demand. INSG said the stainless steel sector grew in 2025 and is expected to expand further in 2026.

This is important because stainless steel still consumes far more nickel than the battery sector. Demand from stainless steel, alloys and industrial uses continues to anchor the primary nickel market.

Battery demand has grown more slowly than earlier expectations. Lithium iron phosphate chemistries have gained market share, reducing nickel intensity in parts of the electric vehicle market.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle demand has also outpaced fully battery-electric vehicle demand in some markets. This has limited the speed at which nickel-rich battery chemistries absorb new supply.

The result is a market caught between two forces. Supply growth is slowing because of Indonesian ore controls and higher input costs. However, battery demand is not rising fast enough to create a large structural shortage.

This makes the 2026 nickel deficit highly sensitive to policy and disruption. If Indonesia raises quotas, supply could recover. If sulphur, energy or ore costs worsen, the deficit could deepen.

The forecast also changes the market narrative. Nickel has spent recent years under pressure from surplus supply and rising inventories. A move into deficit, even a small one, could stabilise sentiment and support prices.

Still, the deficit is not yet a sign of broad scarcity. It is a warning that Indonesia’s supply discipline, not battery demand alone, is now determining the market balance.

For producers, cost control and ore access will become more important. For buyers, the focus will shift toward supplier reliability, feedstock route and exposure to Indonesian policy.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The nickel market is not tightening because batteries suddenly absorbed the surplus. It is tightening because Indonesia is putting discipline into ore supply while HPAL costs rise. That makes the nickel deficit more policy-driven than demand-driven.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.