LEO Semiconductor Demand Rises as US-China Space Race Accelerates

LEO chip

LEO semiconductor demand is accelerating as low earth orbit satellite deployment expands and the US-China space technology race intensifies. Greater satellite density is increasing the semiconductor content required for communications, sensing, computing and power management.

LEO semiconductor demand is also creating new opportunities for advanced materials including gallium nitride, silicon germanium and indium phosphide. These materials support high-frequency communications, radio-frequency power, photonics and other functions where conventional silicon can face performance limits.

LEO semiconductor demand is moving beyond traditional government space programmes as private capital enters satellite broadband, direct device connectivity and potential orbital data centres. The shift is increasing launch frequency and expanding the commercial market for space-qualified electronics.

The development has strategic implications for gallium and indium supply chains. Higher deployment of GaN and InP devices could increase demand for high-purity materials already considered strategically sensitive.

GaN and InP Gain From Higher Satellite Semiconductor Intensity

Modern LEO constellations require increasingly sophisticated radio-frequency chips, optical communications devices, sensors and power electronics.

GaN is particularly important for RF power amplifiers because it performs efficiently at high frequencies and power levels. This makes it suitable for satellite communications, phased-array antennas and future 6G networks integrating space, air and ground infrastructure.

China is building more domestic capability across this value chain as US technology controls increase pressure for semiconductor self-sufficiency.

CETC-linked companies are already supplying advanced components for Chinese spacecraft and communications systems. Recent mass production of millions of GaN RF chips indicates that China is moving some advanced compound semiconductor technology from specialised programmes toward higher-volume deployment.

Indium phosphide could benefit from another part of the satellite market. InP is important for high-speed optical communications and photonic systems, which could become increasingly valuable as satellite networks move larger volumes of data.

Silicon germanium also offers advantages in high-frequency and radiation-sensitive electronics, adding another specialty materials route into the expanding space semiconductor market.

The result is a broader materials opportunity. Satellite growth is no longer only about aluminium structures, titanium components and propulsion materials; semiconductor-grade gallium, indium and germanium are becoming increasingly important.

Orbital Manufacturing Could Open a New Semiconductor Investment Cycle

The US is also considering greater policy support for semiconductor manufacturing in space. Proposed legislation would clarify that semiconductor manufacturing in LEO can qualify for incentives under the CHIPS and Science Act.

The objective reflects growing concern that China could gain an early advantage in orbital manufacturing.

Microgravity manufacturing is attracting interest because some semiconductor materials could potentially be produced with fewer defects and improved uniformity compared with terrestrial processes.

Private companies are accelerating that development. SpaceX, Blue Origin, Google and specialist manufacturers are exploring concepts ranging from orbital data centres to in-space semiconductor production.

The economic model of the space industry is also changing. Commercial investment now represents a much larger share of total space spending than government budgets, increasing the pace at which new technologies can move from development into deployment.

Reusable rockets, lighter satellites and higher-volume manufacturing have reduced the cost of deploying large constellations. Advanced antennas and semiconductor systems originally developed for military applications are also moving into commercial markets.

For metals and materials suppliers, this creates another high-growth demand channel. Aerospace-grade titanium and nickel alloys remain important, but the next phase of the space economy will increasingly depend on advanced semiconductor materials and high-purity minor metals.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The LEO race is becoming a materials race as much as a satellite race. Gallium, indium and germanium could gain strategic value as communications, computing and semiconductor manufacturing move increasingly into orbit.

Shin-Etsu Rare Earth Refining Plant Strengthens Japan’s Domestic Supply Chain

Shin-Etsu Chemical

Shin-Etsu rare earth refining plant plans will add new domestic processing capacity in Fukui prefecture as Japan moves to reduce its exposure to Chinese rare earth supply. The company will invest at least ¥35bn in the project, with about half expected to come from government subsidies.

Shin-Etsu rare earth refining plant development marks the company’s first new domestic refining facility since 2008. The project therefore represents a significant expansion of Japan’s downstream rare earth capability after an 18-year gap.

Shin-Etsu rare earth refining plant also builds on the company’s existing magnet and refining operations in Fukui. Shin-Etsu says it has technical capability to separate and refine 16 of the 17 rare earth elements.

The exact elements to be processed, final investment amount, location and commissioning schedule have not yet been disclosed.

Domestic Refining Supports Magnet and High-Tech Manufacturing

Shin-Etsu already uses refined rare earth materials primarily in its high-performance magnets, while supplying some material to external customers.

This gives the new project strategic value beyond standalone refining capacity. It connects separated rare earth materials directly with domestic magnet manufacturing.

Rare earth magnets are critical for electric vehicles, wind turbines, smartphones, industrial motors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Secure access to separated oxides and metals is therefore increasingly important for Japan’s manufacturing base.

The project could be particularly important for heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, although Shin-Etsu has not confirmed which elements the new plant will handle.

Dysprosium and terbium are used to improve the high-temperature performance of permanent magnets. Their supply is especially sensitive because global refining remains heavily concentrated in China.

Expanding domestic processing gives Japanese manufacturers another layer of protection against disruptions in imported refined materials.

Chinese Export Controls Accelerate Japan’s Supply Diversification

China’s tightening control over rare earth exports has increased urgency around Japanese supply security.

Export restrictions introduced in April 2025 affected seven rare earth elements, including dysprosium and terbium. Additional dual-use controls introduced this year have further complicated shipments to Japan.

This creates risk even for companies with diversified raw material sourcing because separation and refining remain concentrated in China.

Japan has responded by expanding financial support for domestic critical mineral projects under its economic security framework.

The expected ¥17.5bn subsidy for Shin-Etsu is the eighth project supported under the programme. Public funding is being used to reduce the commercial risk of building strategic processing capacity that may struggle to compete with established Chinese suppliers on cost alone.

The long-term objective is not complete self-sufficiency. Instead, Japan is trying to create enough alternative refining and processing capacity to prevent a single external supplier from becoming a critical industrial bottleneck.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Shin-Etsu’s investment matters because Japan is moving beyond securing rare earth resources and into the harder part of the supply chain: separation and refining. Its existing magnet expertise gives the project added strategic value by linking raw materials directly to high-performance manufacturing.

China Zirconium Oxychloride Prices Hit Three-Year High on Hafnium Demand

Zirconium Oxychloride

China zirconium oxychloride prices have climbed to their highest level in more than three years as higher zircon sand costs, stronger hafnium demand and tighter spot availability reshape the market. Prices for 36% grade material reached 17,500-18,000 yuan/t on 2 June.

China zirconium oxychloride prices have risen by about 35% at the midpoint since early March. Producers began lifting offers after falling prices compressed margins between July 2025 and March 2026.

China zirconium oxychloride prices are expected to remain supported as major international zircon sand suppliers increase third-quarter offers into China. Higher raw material costs are combining with expanding aerospace, nuclear and industrial gas turbine demand.

The market is also tightening structurally as some Chinese producers divert material away from the spot market and into higher-value zirconium and hafnium processing.

Zircon Sand Costs Push Oxychloride Production Higher

Zircon sand is the main feedstock for zirconium oxychloride production, making changes in concentrate pricing critical to downstream economics.

Major suppliers outside China have raised third-quarter export offers. South African producer Richards Bay Minerals increased new-business pricing significantly from first-quarter levels, with 66% zircon sand expected at $1,680-1,780/t cif China.

Tronox has also lifted third-quarter prices. Australian-origin 66% zircon sand is now offered at $1,950-1,975/t cif China, while South African-origin material is priced at $1,935-1,955/t.

The increases reflect tighter availability, higher operating costs and reduced production by some heavy mineral producers following weaker margins.

Chinese domestic zircon sand prices have moved in the same direction. Prices for 65% grade material reached 10,100-10,300 yuan/t in early June, up about 11% from mid-March.

These increases are squeezing zirconium chemical producers. Higher feedstock costs must increasingly be passed through into oxychloride pricing to protect margins.

Spot availability has tightened further because some producers have reduced commercial supply. Zibo Huantuo stopped supplying the open market after its acquisition by Shenzhen SinoHf, with production redirected into high-purity and nuclear-grade hafnium and zirconium feedstock.

Liaoning Huaxiang has also remained offline after suspending its 13,000 t/yr oxychloride operation in November 2025 because of losses.

Hafnium and Export Demand Tighten Zirconium Feedstock

Hafnium has become one of the strongest sources of incremental zirconium oxychloride demand. New projects have emerged to meet demand from industrial gas turbines, aerospace and nuclear applications.

China’s hafnium sector consumed around 43,000t of oxychloride in 2025, representing roughly 15% of domestic output of about 280,000t.

Demand has accelerated further this year. Hafnium producers purchased an estimated 15,975t of oxychloride in January-April, up 69% from a year earlier.

This growth is strategically important because hafnium and zirconium are chemically closely associated and require complex separation. Rising demand for high-purity hafnium can therefore pull more zirconium oxychloride into specialised downstream processing.

Export demand is also strengthening. China exported 19,709t of zirconium oxychloride in January-April, up 24% from a year earlier.

Japan was the largest growth market, with imports more than doubling to 10,510t. Shipments to India and the UK also increased significantly.

Unlike several other strategic metals, zirconium is not currently covered by China’s dual-use export control scheme. That has allowed international demand to continue flowing through normal commercial channels.

However, higher raw material prices and reduced spot availability are tightening the market regardless of export controls. Many regular buyers have already secured June-July contracts to reduce exposure to further price increases.

The combination of rising zircon sand costs, stronger hafnium consumption and shrinking spot supply suggests zirconium oxychloride prices could remain firm into the third quarter.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The zirconium market is being pulled upward by more than raw material inflation. Hafnium demand from aerospace, nuclear and gas turbines is converting zirconium oxychloride into a strategically tighter feedstock, increasing the value of integrated Zr-Hf processing capacity.

BYD EV Sales Recover in May as Export Demand Offsets China Weakness

BYD

BYD EV sales returned to year-on-year growth in May as surging overseas demand offset continued weakness in China. The company sold 383,453 new energy vehicles during the month, up 0.3% from a year earlier.

BYD EV sales had declined for consecutive months since October 2025 as domestic policy changes, weaker incentives and government pressure against aggressive price competition weighed on China’s automotive market.

BYD EV sales are now increasingly dependent on international markets. Exports jumped to 160,644 units in May from 89,047 a year earlier, showing how rapidly the company is building a global sales base.

The recovery also highlights a broader shift in China’s EV industry. Domestic competition remains intense, while manufacturers are increasingly using overseas markets to absorb expanding production capacity.

Exports Become BYD’s Main Growth Engine

BYD sold 376,990 passenger NEVs in May and another 6,463 commercial vehicles. Battery electric vehicle sales fell by 2.8% year on year to 198,674 units, while plug-in hybrid sales rose by 3.3% to 178,316 units.

The split shows that plug-in hybrids continue to play an important role in BYD’s product mix. PHEVs can appeal to buyers that want electrification without relying entirely on charging infrastructure.

China classifies battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and fuel-cell vehicles as new energy vehicles. For battery material demand, however, the distinction matters because BEVs generally require larger battery packs than PHEVs.

BYD’s January-May NEV sales fell by 20% year on year to 1.4mn units. The decline followed government and industry efforts to reduce destructive price competition in China’s vehicle market.

The rollback of vehicle purchase tax incentives from 1 January also weakened domestic demand. At the same time, major automakers have committed to paying suppliers within 60 days to improve financial stability across the supply chain.

Exports are increasingly compensating for that pressure. Brazil has become one of BYD’s most important international markets and is now the largest destination for Chinese NEV exports.

Easing import restrictions in markets including Canada could provide additional export opportunities. This strengthens the case for Chinese automakers to continue expanding assembly, logistics and distribution networks overseas.

EV Export Growth Supports Battery Materials Demand

Higher oil prices have also improved the relative economics of electric vehicles. Rising crude prices since the escalation of Middle East tensions have increased operating costs for combustion-engine vehicles and strengthened EV competitiveness.

This can support demand for lithium, graphite, copper and other battery materials if EV exports continue to rise. However, the material impact will depend on the mix between BEVs and smaller-battery plug-in hybrids.

BYD’s shift also matters for the wider automotive metals market. Growing EV output supports copper demand through motors, wiring and power electronics, while alu

minium remains important for lightweight structures and battery enclosures.

The company has been fully committed to electrified vehicles since ending production of gasoline-only cars in March 2022. BYD sold 4.626mn NEVs in 2025, up 8.3% from the previous year.

The challenge now is geographic balance. Domestic growth is slowing, while overseas markets are becoming more important to utilisation rates and future production growth.

That shift could accelerate localisation outside China. As export volumes rise, BYD and other Chinese automakers may increasingly invest in overseas assembly and regional supply chains to manage tariffs, logistics and local-content rules.

The Metalnomist Commentary

BYD’s May recovery shows that China’s EV growth story is becoming increasingly export-driven. For battery metals, the key variable is no longer only Chinese vehicle sales, but how quickly Chinese manufacturers can convert overseas demand into sustained BEV and PHEV production growth.

BTR Anode Capacity Expansion Strengthens China’s Battery Materials Base

BTR

BTR anode capacity is expanding again as the Chinese battery materials producer starts construction of a new 120,000 t/yr anode material project in Changzhou, Jiangsu province. The project will deepen the city’s role as BTR’s largest anode production hub in China.

BTR anode capacity in Changzhou already includes an 80,000 t/yr facility completed in June 2023. The new project will significantly increase the company’s local production base, although a commissioning timeline has not yet been disclosed.

BTR anode capacity reached 782,500 t/yr in 2025, including 622,500 t/yr in China and 160,000 t/yr in Indonesia. The latest investment shows that the company is continuing to add scale both domestically and overseas.

The expansion comes as Chinese anode material shipments continue to grow, supported by higher new energy vehicle production and rapid battery energy storage deployment.

Changzhou Location Strengthens Links to Battery Customers

BTR selected Changzhou because Jiangsu province hosts several major battery manufacturers, including CATL, CALB and Svolt. Proximity to these customers can lower logistics costs and strengthen supply-chain coordination.

This matters because anode materials are a core component of lithium-ion batteries. Battery manufacturers require consistent chemistry, particle characteristics, coating performance and large-volume supply.

Locating capacity near major cell producers can also shorten qualification and delivery cycles. As battery makers scale output, suppliers that can provide reliable local volumes gain an operational advantage.

China’s anode material market remains large and fast-growing. Domestic research groups estimated shipments of 2.9mn-3.12mn t in 2025 and expect volumes to rise to 3.3mn-3.7mn t in 2026.

That growth reflects demand from both EVs and stationary energy storage. The latter is becoming increasingly important as China and other markets deploy larger battery storage systems for renewable power integration.

Overseas Expansion Broadens BTR’s Supply Footprint

BTR is also expanding outside China. Its Indonesian cathode plant is operational and ramping toward its designed 160,000 t/yr capacity.

The company’s Morocco project remains under construction, with planned cathode capacity of 60,000 t/yr. These investments show that BTR is building a broader international battery materials network alongside its large Chinese production base.

Overseas expansion gives the company access to regional customers and can help manage trade, localization and supply-chain requirements. This is becoming more important as battery markets fragment across Asia, Europe and North America.

At the same time, continued capacity growth raises competition. Chinese anode producers will need to balance scale with utilisation, pricing and product differentiation as more capacity enters the market.

BTR’s Changzhou project therefore reflects both confidence and pressure. Demand is still growing, but success will depend increasingly on customer integration, cost control and international market access.

The Metalnomist Commentary

BTR’s expansion shows that battery materials competition is shifting from simple capacity growth toward location, customer proximity and global footprint. The strongest producers will be those that combine scale in China with regional production in key overseas markets.

China-Russia Energy Cooperation Deepens as Beijing and Moscow Broaden Industrial Ties

China-Russia

China-Russia energy cooperation is set to deepen after both countries agreed to expand collaboration across energy, chemicals, metallurgy, agriculture and manufacturing. The pledge followed Russian president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing on 19-20 May.

China-Russia energy cooperation remains the core of the bilateral relationship. Oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables all featured in the joint statement, showing that energy security remains central to both countries’ strategic alignment.

China-Russia energy cooperation also has wider industrial meaning. Stable Russian energy flows support China’s manufacturing base, while Russian suppliers gain a critical long-term market as western sanctions continue to reshape trade.

The two countries also agreed to extend their treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation. That move reinforces a long-term political framework for resource trade, industrial projects and supply-chain coordination.

Energy and Nuclear Ties Anchor Strategic Partnership

Energy remains the strongest pillar of China-Russia trade. Russia is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas, delivering through a 38bn m³/yr pipeline and accounting for about 45% of China’s pipeline gas imports.

However, the joint statement did not confirm progress on a second major gas pipeline. That omission suggests that both sides still have commercial or political issues to resolve before expanding pipeline capacity further.

Russian crude also remains important to China. China imported an average of 2.53mn b/d of Russian crude in January-April, up from 2.01mn b/d a year earlier.

The buyer structure is shifting. State-owned Chinese refiners have reduced some purchases since tighter US sanctions began last October, while independent refiners remain more focused on margins and cargo economics.

Nuclear energy is another strategic link. China and Russia will continue work on the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear projects, which are expected to come online around 2026-28.

The two countries also plan to cooperate on advanced nuclear technologies, including fast reactors, fusion power and closed fuel cycle systems. This gives the relationship a long-term technology dimension beyond fossil fuel trade.

Renewable energy also appeared in the statement, including green power certificates. That language shows both sides want energy cooperation to cover low-carbon systems, even while oil, gas and coal remain central.

Agriculture, Metallurgy and Manufacturing Deepen Trade Flows

Agriculture is becoming a larger part of the partnership. China and Russia agreed to expand bilateral trade in meat, seafood, grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils and feed protein meals.

China already allows Russian beef and by-products that meet registration and disease-free zone requirements. It also lifted restrictions on Russian pork exports after a long ban linked to African swine fever.

Russia has become a key supplier of sunflower and rapeseed oils to China. It is also China’s largest source of non-GM soybean imports, making food security another strategic layer in the relationship.

Metallurgy and chemicals also remain important. China’s non-ferrous sector imports selected Russian raw materials, including antimony concentrate.

This matters because antimony is a critical material for flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, batteries and defence-related applications. Russian supply can help China manage raw material availability in niche but strategic metals.

The two countries also plan to deepen cooperation in automotive manufacturing, shipbuilding and civil aviation. Chinese automakers have already invested in Russian production, while Russia remains an important market for Chinese vehicles, including electric vehicles.

The wider industrial direction is clear. China and Russia are not only increasing commodity trade. They are building a broader economic partnership that connects energy, raw materials, food, manufacturing and strategic technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China and Russia are building a resource-and-industry bloc designed to withstand western pressure. The metals market should watch the metallurgy and critical minerals angle closely, because raw material flows such as antimony can become strategically important even when volumes are small.

China Gallium Exports Collapse in April as Restrictions Hit Japan Supply

Gallium

China gallium exports collapsed in April as export restrictions sharply reduced shipments to Japan and buying from other key markets slowed after earlier purchases. Customs data showed China exported only 3kg of gallium during the month, all of it wrought material shipped to Malaysia.

China gallium exports were dramatically lower than April 2025, when shipments totalled 4,777kg. That earlier volume included 4,627kg of wrought gallium and 150kg of unwrought material.

China gallium exports remain highly sensitive to licensing controls because the metal is a strategic input for compound semiconductors, radio-frequency electronics, power devices and advanced manufacturing. The April data show how policy restrictions can quickly override normal trade patterns in a small but critical materials market.

The sharp monthly fall also highlights the fragility of gallium supply for downstream users. Even when year-to-date exports remain higher, licensing shifts can leave individual buyers exposed to sudden supply gaps.

Japan Restrictions Reshape Gallium Trade Flows

Japan has traditionally been one of China’s most important gallium export destinations. China exported 42t of gallium to Japan in 2025 before bilateral relations worsened and export controls tightened.

China has prohibited exports of dual-use items for Japanese military use and introduced tighter controls on exports to 40 Japanese companies since January. The measures followed comments by Japan’s leadership on Taiwan that deepened political tensions between the two countries.

These restrictions are expected to continue because bilateral relations show no clear sign of easing. That creates a direct supply-chain issue for Japanese semiconductor, electronics and advanced materials users.

Gallium’s industrial importance is larger than its physical volume. It is used in materials such as gallium nitride and gallium arsenide, which support high-frequency, high-efficiency and high-performance electronic applications.

Japan’s exposure therefore matters for more than one metal trade route. It affects supply security for sectors tied to semiconductors, defence electronics, optoelectronics and advanced manufacturing.

The April collapse also shows how export controls work in practice. They do not need to stop all global shipments to disrupt specific customers. Targeted licensing limits can redirect trade flows and force buyers to rely on inventories, alternative suppliers or delayed procurement.

German Buying Masks Underlying Weakness in Year-to-Date Exports

The January-April export picture looks stronger than April alone. China exported 16,353kg of gallium in the first four months of the year, up 14% from 14,294kg in the same period of 2025.

That increase was mainly driven by German buying earlier in the year. Germany received 16t from China in January-March, but buyers there did not renew purchases in April.

China shipped 22.3t of gallium to Germany in 2025, mostly in the second half, after a major Chinese supplier obtained export permission. This shows how gallium flows now depend heavily on licence availability and timing.

The contrast between strong early German purchases and almost no April exports is important. It suggests that year-to-date data can hide short-term supply stress when licensing-driven shipments are concentrated in a few windows.

For buyers, the key issue is no longer only price. It is whether export licences can be obtained, how much volume is approved and whether shipments can be repeated consistently.

For western semiconductor supply chains, gallium remains a strategic vulnerability. China still has strong influence over supply availability, and small changes in export permissions can have outsized effects on downstream procurement.

The April data therefore reinforce a broader critical minerals lesson. Thin markets such as gallium can become highly unstable when trade policy, diplomatic tensions and dual-use controls intersect.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Gallium is proving that strategic materials risk often appears first in licensing volumes, not headline prices. Japan’s exposure shows why semiconductor supply chains must treat gallium security as a policy risk as much as a procurement issue.

Tronox Zircon Sand Prices Rise as China Faces Higher Third-Quarter Import Costs

Tronox

Tronox zircon sand prices have increased for third-quarter deliveries to China as higher mining input costs and delivery expenses push exporters to raise offers. The US-based titanium dioxide and zircon producer lifted prices for both Australian-origin and South African-origin zircon sand.

Tronox zircon sand prices for 66% grade Australian-origin material rose by $225/t from the April-June quarter to $1,950-1,975/t cif China. South African-origin material also increased by $225/t to $1,935-1,955/t cif China.

Tronox zircon sand prices are important because China remains a major importer and processor of zircon sand and concentrates. Higher import costs can quickly feed into domestic zirconium chemicals, ceramics, refractories and zirconium-titanium beneficiation markets.

The move also raises expectations that Iluka Resources may increase third-quarter export offers to China. Iluka’s heavy minerals output fell sharply in the first quarter, tightening expectations around premium supply.

Higher Export Offers Reflect Cost and Supply Pressure

Tronox cited continued inflation in key inputs across its global mining operations, along with rising delivery costs. These pressures are now being passed into third-quarter zircon sand offers.

The increase comes as supply from major producers remains under scrutiny. Iluka produced 47,600t of heavy minerals in the first quarter, down sharply from 130,700t a year earlier.

Lower output from major suppliers can strengthen sellers’ pricing power, especially when buyers need consistent quality from established origins such as Australia and South Africa.

China’s import data also show a tighter year-on-year supply picture. Imports of zircon sand and concentrates fell by 18% in January-March to 498,703t.

March imports reached 156,526t, down 23% from a year earlier but up 30% from February. Australia, South Africa and Nigeria were the top suppliers during the month.

This mixed import pattern shows that Chinese buyers are still active, but overall availability has weakened compared with last year. That gives overseas miners more room to lift offers.

Chinese Domestic Prices Move Higher Ahead of New Contracts

Domestic Chinese zircon sand prices have also been rising since mid-March. Prices for 65% grade zircon sand reached 9,800-10,000 yuan/t ex-works with value-added tax unpaid.

This domestic increase reflects anticipation of higher third-quarter export offers from overseas mining companies. Zirconium-titanium beneficiation producers have already lifted offers in response.

The price movement matters for downstream users. Zircon sand is a key feedstock for ceramics, foundry applications, refractories, zirconium chemicals and specialty materials.

Higher zircon sand costs can squeeze processors if downstream demand does not fully absorb the increase. But if supply remains tight, buyers may have limited ability to resist higher offers.

For China, the market is increasingly dependent on imported material from Australia, South Africa and other producing countries. That import reliance makes domestic pricing sensitive to overseas mining costs, freight and output discipline.

The third-quarter pricing round will therefore be a key test. If Iluka follows Tronox with higher offers, Chinese processors may face a broader reset in zircon feedstock costs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Tronox’s price increase shows that zircon sand is moving with the same logic affecting many industrial minerals: higher costs, tighter supply and stronger producer discipline. China’s processors may accept higher prices if major suppliers align, but downstream demand will decide how much of the increase can be passed through.

Southeast Asia Aluminium Premiums Could Decouple From Japan on Chinese Semi Flows

Aluminium

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums could begin to decouple from Japan as Vietnamese buyers increasingly accept Chinese-origin semi-finished products for remelting. The shift suggests regional aluminium pricing may become more dependent on origin acceptance than on traditional Asian premium benchmarks.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums are still supported for Western-origin and free-trade-agreement cargoes, with some deals above $300/t on a cif Thailand and Vietnam basis. However, cheaper Chinese semi-finished products are creating a parallel supply route.

Southeast Asia aluminium premiums may therefore face a different pricing path from Japan, where origin requirements and customer preferences can be more restrictive. Vietnam’s willingness to buy and remelt Chinese-origin material is changing the regional supply equation.

The key issue is whether low-priced Chinese semi exports remain available. If they do, southeast Asian buyers may have less reason to pay Japan-linked premiums for standard P1020 supply.

Chinese Semi-Finished Products Create a Remelting Alternative

Chinese semi-finished aluminium products are attracting stronger interest from Vietnamese and Korean buyers. Traders pointed to low-priced offers for products such as aluminium wires under HS code 76149000.

Offers for high-purity aluminium stranded wires were reported at between an $80/t discount and a $100/t premium to London Metal Exchange prices. That is below the more typical $50-100/t premium range seen in recent months.

The economics become competitive after remelting. With remelting costs estimated at $150-200/t, buyers can effectively convert wire into P1020-equivalent ingot at a total premium of about $200-300/t.

That is competitive against direct P1020 purchases, especially when standard ingot premiums remain elevated. For price-sensitive buyers, remelting offers a practical way to secure metal units while avoiding higher conventional premiums.

This does not mean all customers will accept the route. Some buyers still require Western-origin or free-trade-agreement cargoes because of compliance, quality, customer specification or trade-policy considerations.

But the presence of a cheaper remelting route can weaken the connection between southeast Asia and Japan premiums. If Vietnam accepts material that Japan will not, the two markets may price differently.

Export Rebates Could Decide Sustainability

China’s 13% export tax rebate for certain aluminium products is central to the pricing gap. Some Chinese suppliers can offer semi-finished products at very low premiums, or even discounts to LME, because the rebate supports export economics.

This creates a policy-driven arbitrage. Instead of exporting primary aluminium directly, suppliers can export semi-finished products that receive more favourable tax treatment.

The sustainability of the trend depends on Beijing’s response. If Chinese authorities decide export volumes are excessive or distortive, they could remove or adjust the rebate.

That would quickly change the economics. Without the rebate, low-priced Chinese semis may become less competitive as a remelting feedstock for southeast Asian buyers.

For now, the trade flow matters because western aluminium supply remains tight and regional premiums are elevated. Buyers are looking for workable alternatives, and Chinese semis provide one.

The broader market implication is clear. Aluminium premiums are becoming more segmented by origin, trade rules and customer acceptance. Regional benchmarks may no longer move together if buyers have different views on acceptable supply.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The possible split between southeast Asia and Japan premiums shows how trade policy can reshape aluminium pricing as much as physical supply. If Chinese semi exports remain cheap, Vietnam could become a more flexible remelting market while Japan stays tied to stricter origin premiums.

EU EV Transition Faces Energy Cost and Trade Policy Pressure

EU energy

EU EV transition plans are facing growing pressure from high energy costs, tougher global competition and a regulatory model that industry leaders say may be weakening Europe’s automotive position. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car Summit warned that Europe must rethink how it competes with China and other industrial economies.

EU EV transition policy has relied heavily on regulation, including the planned 2035 phase-out of new internal combustion engine car sales. But carmakers and suppliers argue that regulation alone cannot deliver a competitive electric vehicle industry if energy prices, subsidies and supply-chain costs remain unfavourable.

EU EV transition challenges are becoming more visible as Chinese automakers gain share in Europe, southeast Asia and Latin America. Chinese producers have built cost-competitive EV platforms through subsidies, domestic competition, supply-chain control and fast industrial scaling.

The debate matters for metals because slower or more expensive electrification can reshape demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper, aluminium and rare earth magnets. Automotive materials demand will still grow, but the path may become less direct and more exposed to policy choices.

China’s EV Scale Forces Europe to Rethink Trade Strategy

European automotive suppliers are calling for a more realistic approach to global competition. The industry is facing rivals that operate under different labour, subsidy and industrial policy conditions.

China has become one of the world’s strongest EV exporters. It accounted for around 40% of global EV exports in 2024, while leading Chinese brands have expanded aggressively with lower-cost, technology-rich vehicles.

This creates a competitive problem for European carmakers. Europe has focused on setting strict emissions targets, while China has focused on making EVs cheaper, scalable and export-ready.

Several industry executives now argue that collaboration may become unavoidable. Western manufacturers may need to partner with Chinese or other international competitors that already have a technological lead in EV platforms, batteries, software and power electronics.

This could change European supply chains. Rather than developing every technology internally, carmakers may increasingly combine European assembly and branding with externally sourced EV systems.

That strategy could support faster electrification, but it also creates dependence on imported components, battery materials and processed inputs. It may help automakers compete on cost, but it does not solve Europe’s strategic materials vulnerability.

Energy Costs Could Slow Consumer Adoption and Metals Demand

High charging and energy costs are another major barrier to Europe’s EV push. If consumers face much higher charging costs than drivers in China or other regions, the economic case for EV adoption weakens.

This is critical because EV demand is highly sensitive to total ownership cost. Batteries may become cheaper, but charging costs, highway tariffs and energy price volatility can still shape consumer decisions.

For battery metals, this matters directly. Slower EV adoption would reduce the speed of demand growth for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, especially in full battery electric vehicles with large battery packs.

Copper and aluminium remain better positioned across multiple automotive pathways. EVs require copper for wiring, motors, charging systems and power electronics, while aluminium supports lightweighting, battery enclosures and structural components.

However, Europe’s automotive metals demand will increasingly depend on which technology mix wins. Full BEVs support larger battery metals demand, while hybrids and lower-cost EV platforms could shift consumption toward smaller batteries, more electronics and continued use of conventional automotive materials.

The policy challenge is therefore industrial as much as environmental. Europe must reduce emissions while keeping manufacturing competitive, securing raw materials and lowering energy costs for consumers.

If Europe cannot align regulation, energy prices and trade strategy, its EV transition could become a market for imported vehicles rather than a platform for domestic industrial growth.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s EV problem is not only about regulation or consumer demand. It is about whether the region can build a cost-competitive industrial system around energy, materials, technology and trade before Chinese EV platforms define the market.

Automotive Raw Material Supply Chains Hit Localisation Limits

Automotive

Automotive raw material supply chains are becoming the main constraint on electric vehicle localisation as carmakers seek more control over strategic components. Automakers want regional supply chains, but battery metals, rare earths and processed inputs still depend on global mining and refining networks.

Automotive raw material supply chains have shifted from pure efficiency toward resilience, security and geopolitical risk management. The industry is no longer trying only to minimise cost. It is trying to protect production from export controls, licensing delays, trade restrictions and raw material shortages.

Automotive raw material supply chains therefore cannot be fully localised by assembling batteries, motors or electronics closer to vehicle plants. The deeper constraint sits upstream, where lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and rare earth materials remain tied to global extraction and processing capacity.

The result is a more selective supply-chain model. Automakers will regionalise the components they can control, while still relying on global raw materials for the minerals and refined products they cannot replace quickly.

EV Localisation Still Depends on Global Critical Minerals

Jaguar Land Rover has decided to control three critical parts of electric propulsion: battery assembly, electric drive units and energy management systems. This gives the company more control over the final systems that define EV performance.

However, vertical integration has limits. Even if an automaker controls battery assembly or electric drive units, it may not control the lithium chemicals, nickel sulphate, cobalt, manganese, graphite or rare earth magnets inside those systems.

Permanent magnet motors remain one of the clearest pressure points. Electric drive units depend on rare earth materials that are still heavily exposed to Chinese processing, magnet production and export licensing.

Obtaining magnet raw materials from China has become more difficult from a licensing perspective. This shows how export controls can affect vehicle production even when the final assembly line is located in Europe or the US.

Battery supply chains face the same structural problem. Automakers can localise pack assembly, module production and software integration, but raw material exposure remains global.

Lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese supply depends on mine locations, refining capacity, chemical conversion and government policy. These inputs cannot be made local simply by building a battery plant near an auto factory.

This changes the meaning of automotive localisation. The next phase will be less about full independence and more about reducing exposure to single-country bottlenecks.

Recycling and Traceability Become Strategic Tools

Critical minerals recycling is becoming a strategic issue for automakers, not only an environmental goal. Black mass recovery can eventually return lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper and other materials into the supply chain.

Recycling can reduce raw material exposure over time. But it depends on enough end-of-life batteries, reliable collection systems, safe transport, processing capacity and customer acceptance of recovered materials.

The UK’s critical minerals strategy reflects this reality. Domestic production, partner-country supply agreements and recycling can improve resilience, but full self-sufficiency is not realistic.

That point matters for manufacturers. Supply security will depend on diversified sourcing, trusted partners, recycling loops and traceable material flows rather than a complete break from global markets.

The shift will also affect pricing. Materials may increasingly carry value based on origin, regulatory acceptability, sustainability documentation and licensing risk.

A battery metal or rare earth input from a secure and traceable source may command a premium over lower-cost material with higher geopolitical or compliance risk.

For automakers, the strategic challenge is clear. They must control more of the EV system while accepting that critical mineral supply will remain globally contested.

For metals suppliers, the opportunity is also clear. Producers that can offer traceable, compliant and secure supply will become more valuable to automotive customers than suppliers competing only on price.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Automakers are learning that EV localisation stops where raw material dependence begins. The winners in automotive supply security will be those that connect local manufacturing with diversified minerals, recycling capacity and credible traceability.

Battery Metals Demand Faces Slower Path as Hybrid Vehicle Growth Extends

Battery Metals

Battery metals demand could face a slower growth path as carmakers and suppliers expect hybrids and range extenders to remain important for longer than earlier electric-only transition models assumed. Speakers at the FT Future of the Car summit said vehicle decarbonisation should be measured by emissions reduction, not only battery electric vehicle share.

Battery metals demand remains structurally supported by electrification. However, a longer hybrid phase could reduce near-term demand intensity for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese because hybrid vehicles use smaller battery packs than full battery electric vehicles.

Battery metals demand assumptions are therefore becoming more complex. Automotive electrification is still progressing, but the industry is moving toward a mixed powertrain future rather than a simple shift from combustion engines to full BEVs.

Horse Powertrain chief executive Matias Giannini said half of passenger vehicles could still be produced with some form of combustion or hybrid powertrain by 2040. That outlook would keep investment flowing into efficient hybrid systems alongside EV platforms.

Hybrid Growth Changes the Battery Raw Materials Curve

Hybrid vehicle growth could temper the pace of battery raw material demand without reversing electrification. Hybrids and range extenders still require electric motors, inverters, wiring and batteries, but their battery packs are much smaller than those used in BEVs.

This matters most for nickel. High-nickel NCM and NCA batteries are closely tied to longer-range BEVs, where larger packs are needed to deliver performance and driving range.

A slower BEV ramp-up could delay some of the nickel sulphate demand growth that has supported investment cases for new battery-grade nickel projects. It could also affect cobalt and manganese demand in cathode chemistries exposed to full EV penetration rates.

Lithium remains supported across almost every electrification pathway. Still, a longer hybrid transition could slow the rate at which large-format BEV batteries absorb lithium units.

The shift does not mean automotive metals demand will weaken across the board. Hybrids use more copper than conventional combustion vehicles because they require electric motors, power electronics and more complex wiring systems.

Continued hybrid and combustion production also supports aluminium castings, stainless steel, exhaust components and engine-related materials. Meanwhile, BEV growth still supports aluminium lightweighting, copper wiring, charging infrastructure and battery materials.

The result is a less linear automotive metals outlook. Battery metals may grow more slowly than aggressive BEV scenarios suggest, while broader automotive metals consumption remains supported by platform complexity and mixed powertrain production.

Policy Flexibility Could Reshape European Metal Demand

European suppliers are pushing for more flexibility in the EU regulatory framework. Current policy remains heavily weighted toward full electrification through tailpipe emissions targets.

The EU targets a 100% reduction in tailpipe emissions from new cars and vans from 2035. That effectively ends new combustion engine sales unless future exemptions are created.

Industry participants increasingly want a more technology-neutral route. They argue that hybrids, range extenders, renewable fuels and lower-carbon manufacturing should contribute to emissions reduction alongside BEVs.

This policy debate matters for metals. Battery material demand depends heavily on BEV penetration, average pack size and chemistry choice.

If Europe allows a longer role for hybrids and range extenders, lithium-ion battery capacity demand per vehicle could grow more slowly. That would affect demand forecasts for lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese.

Chinese EV and hybrid technology is also improving quickly. This puts pressure on European and US automakers to share development costs across BEV, hybrid and range-extender platforms.

For suppliers, the strategic issue is flexibility. Companies tied only to high-growth BEV battery assumptions may face demand timing risk, while suppliers serving copper, aluminium, stainless steel, electronics and hybrid systems may benefit from a broader platform mix.

The automotive transition is still real, but the material demand path is becoming more diversified. Metals markets must now track powertrain mix, not only EV sales headlines.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Hybrid growth does not weaken the energy transition, but it changes the metals timing. Battery metals demand will still rise, yet copper, aluminium and hybrid-related materials may capture more value if automakers choose a longer mixed-powertrain route.

China Vanadium Prices Weaken as Supply Rises and Steel Demand Slows

China Vanadium

China vanadium prices are under renewed pressure as higher spot availability, weak alloy demand and softer steel mill tenders weigh on the market. Domestic 98% grade vanadium pentoxide flake prices fell to 82,000-87,000 yuan/t on 8 May, their lowest level since 20 April.

China vanadium prices began to soften in late April after alloy producers slowed purchases and cut procurement bids. Most ferro-vanadium producers lowered feedstock buying levels after steel mill tender prices came in below market expectations.

China vanadium prices are also being pressured by rising output. Domestic vanadium production reached 56,040t of vanadium pentoxide in January-April, up 7.6% from a year earlier.

The market is now facing a classic supply-demand imbalance. Higher vanadium flake and slag production has increased spot availability, while steel-sector demand remains weak and export outlets are slowing.

Higher Flake and Slag Output Increases Spot Availability

China’s vanadium supply increased because stronger earlier prices encouraged producers to lift output from vanadium-bearing steel slag. Vanadium-containing steel slag production rose to 49,320t in January-April, up 8% from a year earlier.

Higher flake prices in the first four months improved margins for slag-based production. Domestic 98% grade vanadium pentoxide flake averaged 80,812 yuan/t ex-works during January-April, up 9.5% from a year earlier.

New capacity has also added pressure. Qinhuangdao Baigong Steel started a 10,000 t/yr vanadium pentoxide flake production line in Hebei province in February.

This additional output arrived just as downstream buying slowed. Major flake suppliers had not finalised some contracts by 8 May, while some alloy producers were buying only limited volumes at lower cash prices.

The increase in spot availability has changed buyer behaviour. Alloy producers are no longer rushing to secure feedstock because they expect further price weakness.

That expectation can reinforce the decline. When buyers delay purchases, sellers face more pressure to reduce offers, especially when inventories rise and steel demand remains poor.

Weak Steel Tenders and Export Slowdown Limit Demand

Ferro-vanadium demand remains the main drag on the vanadium market. Domestic 50% grade ferro-vanadium prices fell to 93,000-94,000 yuan/t ex-works on 8 May, their lowest level since 1 April.

Steel mill tender prices also declined. Prices paid by steelmakers fell to 94,000-95,000 yuan/t delivered, including VAT and payable by acceptance bill, down from late-April levels.

Steelmakers are lowering bids because steel margins remain weak. This is especially important for vanadium because much of its demand comes from alloying in rebar and other steel products.

China’s rebar production fell to 29.54mn t in January-April, down 8.6% from a year earlier, as the real estate slowdown continued to reduce construction-related steel demand.

Steelmakers purchased an estimated 6,865t of vanadium alloys in April, down 17% from a year earlier. This confirms that weaker steel consumption is now feeding directly into lower vanadium alloy demand.

Export conditions are also turning less supportive. China’s vanadium flake exports are expected to decline in the coming months as international production increases.

Canadian producer Largo more than doubled vanadium pentoxide output in the first quarter to 2,616t, supported by higher-grade ore and steadier processing at its Brazilian mine. Russian producer Evraz also started a new 15,000 t/yr vanadium pentoxide flake plant in March and is expected to ramp up by June.

These additions reduce the need for some overseas buyers to rely on Chinese flake. That weakens a potential outlet for excess Chinese supply.

The near-term outlook remains soft. Unless steel mill tenders recover or vanadium exports improve, rising spot availability will likely keep pressure on vanadium pentoxide flake and ferro-vanadium prices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s vanadium market is being hit by the wrong combination: rising supply, weak rebar output and cautious alloy buying. The longer-term battery storage story remains attractive, but near-term pricing still depends heavily on steel demand and feedstock discipline.

Yunnan Germanium Recycling Project Targets Feedstock Security for Strategic Metal Supply

Germanium Scrap

Yunnan Germanium recycling project plans will strengthen China’s largest germanium producer’s control over feedstock as demand from downstream high-end manufacturing remains strategically important. The company plans to invest 200.66mn yuan in a fully automated facility to process germanium-bearing waste slag.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project will have capacity to process 150,000 t/yr of germanium-bearing waste slag. The company has not disclosed the construction timetable or launch date.

The Yunnan Germanium recycling project is designed to improve germanium resource utilisation and support raw material supply for downstream deep-processing products. This matters because germanium is a strategic minor metal used in defence, infrared optics, fibre optics, semiconductors and high-performance electronics.

The project also reflects a broader industry shift. Producers of critical and minor metals are increasingly trying to secure secondary feedstock as primary supply becomes more politically controlled and price volatility rises.

Recycling Capacity Reduces Dependence on External Raw Materials

Yunnan Germanium said partial reliance on externally sourced raw materials exposes it to germanium price volatility. Prices are influenced by global supply-demand conditions and demand from high-end manufacturing sectors.

The new recycling line should help reduce that exposure. By processing waste slag, the company can recover more germanium units from secondary material and support its downstream production chain.

This is strategically important because Yunnan Germanium already consumes significant germanium internally. In 2025, the company produced 29.7t of raw-material-grade germanium metal equivalent for external sales, excluding 68.95t used for internal consumption and third-party processing.

That internal use shows how the company is moving more material into higher-value products rather than selling all output into the merchant market. Recycling can strengthen that model by expanding available feedstock.

Yunnan Germanium also plans to diversify external suppliers of germanium-bearing waste slag. It will seek medium- to long-term supply agreements with quality provisions and emergency replenishment clauses.

The company also plans to build a raw material inventory reserve and a price-alert mechanism. It will adjust production and inventory strategies when germanium prices move by more than 10%.

These measures show a more disciplined approach to minor-metal procurement. In markets such as germanium, small disruptions can produce large price movements because supply is concentrated and liquidity is limited.

Export Controls Increase Strategic Value of Germanium Recovery

Germanium has become more strategically sensitive since China placed the metal under strict dual-use export controls in September 2023. China accounts for an estimated 60-70% of global germanium capacity.

This gives Chinese producers significant influence over global availability. It also makes domestic resource recovery more valuable, especially when export controls, defence demand and semiconductor-related applications increase policy attention.

Yunnan Germanium’s revenue rose to 1.07bn yuan in 2025 from 767mn yuan in 2024. Higher prices for key products, including raw-material-grade germanium, supported the increase despite lower external raw metal output.

The company’s recycling investment therefore supports both security and profitability. More stable feedstock access can improve operating flexibility when prices rise or external raw material supply tightens.

For downstream customers, the project may improve Yunnan Germanium’s ability to supply deeper-processed products. These include materials linked to optics, fibre communication, photovoltaics, infrared systems and compound semiconductors.

The broader market implication is clear. Germanium supply security will depend not only on mine output or primary production, but also on recycling, waste recovery, inventory control and long-term feedstock agreements.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Yunnan Germanium’s recycling plan shows that strategic minor metals are moving toward closed-loop resource control. In germanium, the advantage will belong to producers that can combine primary supply, secondary recovery and downstream processing under one feedstock strategy.

Airbus 2026 Delivery Guidance Holds Despite Engine and Delivery Bottlenecks

Airbus

Airbus 2026 delivery guidance remains unchanged even after supply constraints and administrative delays reduced first-quarter deliveries. The European aircraft manufacturer is still targeting around 870 commercial aircraft deliveries this year and adjusted earnings before interest and taxes of about €7.5bn.

Airbus 2026 delivery guidance now depends on another heavily backloaded delivery year. The company delivered only 114 aircraft in January-March, leaving a large volume to be handed over across the remaining nine months.

Airbus 2026 delivery guidance is being tested by two separate issues. The first is the continuing dispute with Pratt & Whitney over geared-turbofan engine supply. The second is a temporary delivery delay involving nearly 20 aircraft for Chinese customers.

The company said its commercial programme ramp targets remain unchanged. However, the first-quarter result shows that aircraft production is still constrained by engines, quality repairs, customer delivery timing and geopolitical cost risks.

Pratt & Whitney Dispute Shifts Focus Toward 2027 Engine Supply

Airbus said scheduled Pratt & Whitney engine deliveries for 2026 are confirmed. The dispute with the RTX subsidiary now centres more heavily on 2027 supply.

This matters because Pratt & Whitney’s GTF engines are used on the Airbus A320neo family. A shortage of engines has already affected Airbus’ narrowbody production planning.

In February, Airbus cut its A320 build target to 70-75 aircraft a month in 2027. The adjustment was based on this year’s expected GTF receipt levels and the outlook for future engine availability.

Airbus is working with Pratt & Whitney to resolve the issue. Chief executive Guillaume Faury said the company is also assessing its contractual rights.

Airbus has leaned on alternative engine supplier CFM International where possible. However, Faury said CFM supply is not enough to offset the significant number of missing Pratt & Whitney engines.

The company is not currently producing A320 gliders, or completed aircraft without engines. That indicates Airbus is still trying to keep production and final delivery flows aligned rather than building unfinished inventory.

The engine issue remains strategically important for aerospace suppliers. Narrowbody aircraft output depends on a deep chain of titanium parts, nickel superalloy components, forgings, castings, powder metal parts, fan blades, disks and certified MRO capacity.

China Deliveries and Panel Repairs Add Short-Term Inventory Pressure

Airbus also faced an administrative delay that prevented the delivery of nearly 20 aircraft to Chinese customers in the first quarter. The issue increased inventory to €5bn, up €1.5bn from a year earlier.

The China delivery delay has now been resolved, and aircraft handovers resumed after the end of the first quarter. This should support second-quarter delivery recovery if no new bottlenecks emerge.

Airbus manufacturing and deliveries have also been misaligned because of repairs on fuselage panels disclosed last December. The company expects to resolve that panel quality issue and realign production with deliveries by the end of this quarter.

These issues show how sensitive aircraft deliveries remain to late-stage disruptions. Even when aircraft are built, certification, paperwork, engines, interior systems or quality repairs can delay revenue recognition and cash conversion.

Airbus said it has not experienced direct supply disruption from the Middle East crisis. However, it is monitoring higher oil and derivative product prices and their possible effects on global air traffic.

That risk matters because airline profitability can influence delivery schedules, fleet decisions and aftermarket demand. Higher fuel costs can also ripple through plastics, chemicals, logistics and aerospace supply costs.

For now, Airbus is keeping confidence in its full-year plan. But the company will need a much stronger delivery pace through the rest of 2026 to meet its 870-aircraft target.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Airbus’ unchanged guidance shows confidence, but the first quarter highlights how fragile the aerospace ramp-up still is. Engine availability, quality repairs and delivery timing are now as important as final assembly capacity in determining real aircraft output.

South32 Manganese Ore Export Prices Fall as China Demand Weakens

South32 Manganese Ore

South32 manganese ore export prices to China have fallen for June shipments as weak alloy demand, ample port inventories and cautious buying pressure the import market. The Australian diversified metals producer lowered offers for both Australian and South African manganese ore, according to Chinese importers.

South32 manganese ore export prices for Australian 42% lumpy ore fell to $5.40/mtu cif China for June delivery. This was down by $0.50/mtu from May.

South32 also reduced its offer for South African 37% manganese ore to $5/mtu cif China. This was down by $0.40/mtu from the previous month.

South32 manganese ore export prices are an important signal for the wider manganese chain because China remains the largest global buyer of seaborne ore. When Chinese alloy plants slow purchases, overseas miners often need to adjust export offers to maintain sales momentum.

Chinese Alloy Weakness Cuts Restocking Appetite

Chinese importers have shown limited interest in restocking manganese ore because inventories remain sufficient and alloy prices are weakening. This has reduced spot buying urgency before the Labour Day holiday on 1-5 May.

Many alloy plants postponed ore feedstock purchases while waiting for clearer market direction after the holiday. This cautious behaviour has weakened the negotiating position of overseas ore suppliers.

The pressure is also visible in Chinese port prices. Australian 44-46% lumpy manganese ore fell to 43-47 yuan/mtu delivery ex quay on 28 April, down from 47-50 yuan/mtu on 31 March.

The decline shows that domestic buyers are not only resisting new import offers. They are also repricing available port material lower as downstream demand fails to improve.

Manganese ore demand is closely linked to ferro-manganese and silico-manganese production. These alloys are used in steelmaking, where manganese improves strength, deoxidation and performance.

When steel consumption slows, alloy plants reduce purchasing activity. This immediately affects ore demand because manganese alloy producers are the main consumers of imported ore.

Steel Demand Remains the Main Constraint

The deeper issue is weak steel demand in China. Slower economic growth and subdued construction activity have limited recovery in steel consumption, leaving alloy producers cautious about raw material buying.

Without a stronger steel recovery, manganese alloy prices are likely to remain under pressure. This limits the ability of alloy plants to pay higher ore prices, even when miners try to defend margins.

South32’s price cut also reflects wider seaborne competition. Mining firms outside China need to respond when Chinese buyers have enough stock and are unwilling to chase cargoes.

Australian high-grade lumpy ore usually commands stronger interest because of its quality and processing value. However, even higher-grade material can weaken when alloy margins are poor and port inventories are sufficient.

South African ore also remains exposed to Chinese demand swings. Lower-grade material can face sharper price pressure when buyers reduce procurement and focus only on immediate needs.

For the manganese market, the June price cut suggests that miners are prioritising volume discipline and customer access over holding elevated offers. The next price direction will depend on whether Chinese alloy plants return after the holiday with real restocking demand.

If steel demand remains weak, manganese ore prices could face further downside pressure. If alloy prices stabilise and inventories fall, importers may resume buying, but recovery is likely to be gradual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

South32’s price cut shows that the manganese market is being driven by demand absorption, not supply shortage. Until Chinese steel and alloy demand improves, seaborne manganese ore suppliers will remain exposed to cautious restocking and lower port prices.