EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Hit Highest Level Since 2024 as Russian Supply Dries Up

Ferro Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports rose to their highest level in more than a year in the first quarter, supported by robust demand from steel mills and cored-wire producers. The increase also reflected a market shift as Russian receipts effectively disappeared and European suppliers captured more share.

EU ferro-titanium imports reached 8,431t in January-March, up 19% from a year earlier and 13% from the previous quarter. The total was the highest since the fourth quarter of 2024, when Russian material was still moving into the bloc in significant volumes.

EU ferro-titanium imports were concentrated in Estonia, Poland, Latvia and the UK. These destinations took a combined 5,119t, equal to 61% of the first-quarter total, up from 51% a year earlier.

The figures show how sanctions, scrap availability and steel-sector buying are reshaping the European ferro-titanium market. Demand has improved, but the supply base has changed sharply.

Sanctions Redirect Russian Ferro-Titanium Toward Asia

Russian ferro-titanium flows into Europe have effectively stopped since sanctions were imposed on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. That removed a major historical source of supply from the European market.

Before sanctions, the EU was still receiving 2,000-3,000 t/quarter of Russian ferro-titanium. Those flows helped lift imports to 11,661t in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Now, Russian material has shifted toward Asia. China has become the dominant buyer of Russian ferro-titanium, with imports from Russia rising to a record 3,855t in the first quarter, up from 816t a year earlier.

This shift matters because Europe still needs titanium units for steel and cored-wire production. Ferro-titanium is used to add titanium to steel, where it supports deoxidation, grain refinement and stabilisation in selected grades.

Market participants have said some Russian material may still be reaching Europe through third countries in circumvention of sanctions. That claim highlights the continuing importance of origin control, documentation and compliance in ferro-alloy trade.

Non-EU imports, excluding the UK, reached 1,388t in the first quarter, up from 1,179t a year earlier. India was the leading non-EU supplier, shipping 426t, double the year-earlier level but down 38% from the previous quarter.

Scrap Tightness Supports Ferro-Titanium Price Recovery

Titanium scrap availability became another pressure point. EU imports of unsanctioned titanium scrap from Russia fell sharply to just 37t in the first quarter, all into Germany.

This is a major change for the Baltic route. Estonia imported no Russian titanium scrap in the quarter, compared with an average of 601 t/quarter last year.

Lower scrap availability matters because titanium scrap is a key feedstock for ferro-titanium production. Tighter scrap supply can raise production costs and reduce prompt availability for alloy producers.

European standard-grade ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.70-4.97/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in the first quarter, down from $5.68-6.02/kg Ti a year earlier. However, the market strengthened through the quarter.

Prices opened at $4.30-4.60/kg Ti and closed at $4.85-5.30/kg Ti. The rally was initially triggered by the insolvency of Austrian trader LL-Resources, although its ferro-titanium subsidiary LLR-Ecotech said operations were unaffected.

The price rise then gained support from stronger mill demand under long-term contracts, prompt buying and quarterly spot enquiries. Tighter titanium scrap availability also added cost pressure.

The rally continued into the second quarter, suggesting that buyers remain sensitive to reduced Russian availability and constrained scrap flows.

For Europe, the key issue is not only volume. The region must secure compliant titanium units for steelmaking while avoiding sanctioned material and managing higher feedstock costs.

The first-quarter data therefore point to a more regionalised ferro-titanium market. Europe is relying more on domestic and approved suppliers, while Russian material is increasingly absorbed in Asia.

EU, Fe-Ti Import

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s ferro-titanium market is becoming a compliance-driven supply chain. The real advantage will go to producers that can secure clean titanium scrap, prove origin and deliver reliable alloy supply into steel and cored-wire demand.

Asian Aluminium Premiums Stay Subdued as QMJP Offers Test Buyer Resistance

Aluminum

Asian aluminium premiums remained subdued this week as buyers assessed sharply higher quarterly cif main Japan port offers for July-September delivery. Two major producers opened QMJP negotiations at $460/t and $480/t, far above the April-June settlement of $350-353/t.

Asian aluminium premiums are now being pulled in two directions. Western-origin metal has tightened after the Iran war disrupted supply, giving producers a basis for higher offers. However, weak demand and greater availability of alternative units are limiting spot-market momentum.

Asian aluminium premiums also remain below the new QMJP offers. Current spot indications are around $320-380/t, while P1020 fca Korea indications for non-Russian material were heard at $320-350/t.

The gap between producer offers and spot levels suggests buyers may resist paying the full proposed premium. If QMJP settles above $400/t, non-western brands could continue trading below the benchmark.

Western-Origin Tightness Supports Higher Producer Offers

The higher QMJP offers reflect tighter availability of western-origin aluminium in Asia. Supply disruption linked to the Iran war has reduced confidence in some traditional flows, pushing producers to test stronger premium levels.

This is important because QMJP remains a key reference for aluminium trade across Asia. A high settlement can influence physical premiums, contract pricing and buyer behaviour beyond Japan.

However, the market is not uniformly tight. Some Asian smelters have received enquiries and are willing to sell into Europe or offer small volumes in Asia. Others prefer to wait for clearer direction from the QMJP negotiations.

This cautious behaviour shows how benchmark talks can freeze spot activity. Buyers do not want to commit at high levels before the benchmark is settled, while sellers do not want to underprice material if premiums rise.

The immediate market signal is therefore uncertainty, not shortage. Western-origin units command support, but broader aluminium availability remains mixed.

Stranded Wire and Russian Units Cap Spot Upside

Alternative supply is limiting the impact of higher QMJP offers. Stranded wire and Russian-origin aluminium units are weighing on sales of other brands, especially where buyers are more price-sensitive.

China’s exports of aluminium stranded wire rose sharply in April. Shipments under HS code 761490 increased by 166% year on year to 15,567t.

South Korea and Vietnam absorbed much larger volumes. Chinese shipments to South Korea surged to 2,911t, while shipments to Vietnam climbed to 2,288t. Exports to Thailand also rose to 619t.

These flows matter because stranded wire can create substitute supply pressure in regional aluminium markets. When alternative units are available, buyers have less urgency to accept premium increases for standard brands.

Russian-origin aluminium also remains a price-sensitive factor. Some buyers continue to avoid Russian material for policy or corporate reasons, but availability still affects regional market balance and non-western brand pricing.

Demand remains the bigger constraint. Buyers are likely to reduce volumes if both LME prices and QMJP premiums stay high. This limits the ability of producers to convert tight western-origin supply into broad spot-market price gains.

The next quarter may therefore produce a divided market. Western-origin material could secure stronger contract premiums, while non-western and alternative units trade at discounts.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Asia’s aluminium market is not rejecting higher premiums; it is questioning which metal deserves them. The real split is between tight western-origin supply and a softer regional market still supported by stranded wire, Russian units and weak demand.

Dark-Fleet Vessel Recycling Enters Regulated Channel With US License for GMS

GMS

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has entered a new regulatory phase after Dubai-based ship and offshore asset recycler GMS secured a US government license to buy and recycle sanctioned vessels. The approval creates a formal pathway for disposing of ships tied to sanctions risk.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling has historically operated through opaque channels, especially as older tankers linked to Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil trades moved outside mainstream shipping markets. GMS said this is the first time a cash buyer has legally acquired and recycled sanctioned vessels under a fully authorised US licensing framework.

Dark-fleet vessel recycling now has a potential model for governments seeking to combine sanctions enforcement, environmental oversight and asset disposal. The license followed nearly seven months of review by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, with support from the US State Department.

The company has not disclosed the number or names of vessels acquired. But the approval itself is significant because aging sanctioned tonnage is becoming a larger safety, compliance and environmental challenge for global shipping.

OFAC License Creates a Compliance Route for Sanctioned Vessel Disposal

The OFAC license gives GMS legal approval to purchase and recycle several sanctioned vessels from the dark fleet. This matters because sanctioned ships are difficult to handle through normal commercial channels.

Banks, insurers, brokers, ports, shipyards and recyclers often avoid sanctioned assets because of legal and reputational risk. That leaves vessels exposed to informal transactions, weak oversight and poor end-of-life management.

A regulated license changes that structure. It allows disposal to take place under documented compliance checks, government review and controlled transaction procedures.

The dark fleet consists of sanctioned and unsanctioned older tankers used to move oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela while bypassing western sanctions. Many of these vessels operate outside mainstream shipping systems and may carry higher safety and environmental risks.

GMS said more than 30 sanctioned vessels have been recycled in India and elsewhere in recent years through opaque and largely unregulated channels. A licensed route could reduce that leakage into informal markets.

The development could also influence Europe. GMS views the approval as a possible model for other governments that need a lawful way to remove sanctioned vessels from global trade.

Ship Recycling Becomes a Sanctions and Materials Issue

The industrial significance extends beyond vessel disposal. Ship recycling produces ferrous and non-ferrous scrap that can re-enter steel and metals supply chains if handled under proper environmental and compliance standards.

Older tankers contain large volumes of recyclable steel, along with machinery, copper-bearing equipment, aluminium components and other recoverable materials. But sanctioned origin and weak documentation can complicate resale and downstream acceptance.

Regulated recycling pathways can improve traceability. They can also help ensure that scrap generated from sanctioned vessels does not move through hidden channels that undermine sanctions policy.

This creates a new intersection between shipbreaking, sanctions enforcement and circular metals. Recycling is no longer only about recovering material value. It is also about proving legal origin, environmental responsibility and financial accountability.

The timing is important. Aging dark-fleet tonnage is likely to keep rising as sanctions, insurance limits and safety concerns restrict normal fleet operations. Without formal disposal routes, more vessels could end up in poorly monitored recycling channels.

For cash buyers and recyclers, the GMS license may create a more legitimate business model. For governments, it provides a tool to remove risky vessels while controlling the financial and material flow around them.

The broader market should watch whether this becomes a repeatable framework. If more sanctioned vessels are recycled under licensed systems, ship recycling could become a meaningful part of sanctions implementation and circular metals governance.

The Metalnomist Commentary

GMS has turned sanctioned vessel recycling into a compliance business rather than a grey-market disposal problem. The next challenge is whether regulators can scale this model before aging dark-fleet tankers create larger safety, environmental and financial risks.

China-Russia Energy Cooperation Deepens as Beijing and Moscow Broaden Industrial Ties

China-Russia

China-Russia energy cooperation is set to deepen after both countries agreed to expand collaboration across energy, chemicals, metallurgy, agriculture and manufacturing. The pledge followed Russian president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing on 19-20 May.

China-Russia energy cooperation remains the core of the bilateral relationship. Oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables all featured in the joint statement, showing that energy security remains central to both countries’ strategic alignment.

China-Russia energy cooperation also has wider industrial meaning. Stable Russian energy flows support China’s manufacturing base, while Russian suppliers gain a critical long-term market as western sanctions continue to reshape trade.

The two countries also agreed to extend their treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation. That move reinforces a long-term political framework for resource trade, industrial projects and supply-chain coordination.

Energy and Nuclear Ties Anchor Strategic Partnership

Energy remains the strongest pillar of China-Russia trade. Russia is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas, delivering through a 38bn m³/yr pipeline and accounting for about 45% of China’s pipeline gas imports.

However, the joint statement did not confirm progress on a second major gas pipeline. That omission suggests that both sides still have commercial or political issues to resolve before expanding pipeline capacity further.

Russian crude also remains important to China. China imported an average of 2.53mn b/d of Russian crude in January-April, up from 2.01mn b/d a year earlier.

The buyer structure is shifting. State-owned Chinese refiners have reduced some purchases since tighter US sanctions began last October, while independent refiners remain more focused on margins and cargo economics.

Nuclear energy is another strategic link. China and Russia will continue work on the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear projects, which are expected to come online around 2026-28.

The two countries also plan to cooperate on advanced nuclear technologies, including fast reactors, fusion power and closed fuel cycle systems. This gives the relationship a long-term technology dimension beyond fossil fuel trade.

Renewable energy also appeared in the statement, including green power certificates. That language shows both sides want energy cooperation to cover low-carbon systems, even while oil, gas and coal remain central.

Agriculture, Metallurgy and Manufacturing Deepen Trade Flows

Agriculture is becoming a larger part of the partnership. China and Russia agreed to expand bilateral trade in meat, seafood, grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils and feed protein meals.

China already allows Russian beef and by-products that meet registration and disease-free zone requirements. It also lifted restrictions on Russian pork exports after a long ban linked to African swine fever.

Russia has become a key supplier of sunflower and rapeseed oils to China. It is also China’s largest source of non-GM soybean imports, making food security another strategic layer in the relationship.

Metallurgy and chemicals also remain important. China’s non-ferrous sector imports selected Russian raw materials, including antimony concentrate.

This matters because antimony is a critical material for flame retardants, lead alloys, ammunition, batteries and defence-related applications. Russian supply can help China manage raw material availability in niche but strategic metals.

The two countries also plan to deepen cooperation in automotive manufacturing, shipbuilding and civil aviation. Chinese automakers have already invested in Russian production, while Russia remains an important market for Chinese vehicles, including electric vehicles.

The wider industrial direction is clear. China and Russia are not only increasing commodity trade. They are building a broader economic partnership that connects energy, raw materials, food, manufacturing and strategic technologies.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China and Russia are building a resource-and-industry bloc designed to withstand western pressure. The metals market should watch the metallurgy and critical minerals angle closely, because raw material flows such as antimony can become strategically important even when volumes are small.

VSMPO-Avisma Titanium Pipes to Support Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Plant

VSMPO-Avisma

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes will be supplied to Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant, strengthening Russia’s role in critical materials supply for nuclear infrastructure. The Russian titanium producer will deliver 150t of titanium pipes for integrated equipment in unit 4 of the project.

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes are commercially pure welded products made at the company’s Verkhnyaya Salda facility. The company launched serial production of CP welded titanium pipes in March.

VSMPO-Avisma titanium pipes are relevant because CP titanium is widely used in heat exchangers and cooling systems. Its corrosion resistance makes it suitable for nuclear power plants that rely on seawater cooling or other aggressive operating environments.

The supply deal also reinforces the strategic link between titanium manufacturing and nuclear energy construction. As countries build new reactors, demand rises for corrosion-resistant, qualified and reliable metal components.

CP Titanium Supports Nuclear Cooling Reliability

Commercially pure titanium is valued in heat exchangers because it resists corrosion in chloride-rich environments. That makes it especially useful in power plants located near seawater sources.

El Dabaa’s equipment will require materials that can operate reliably over long periods. Titanium pipes can reduce corrosion risk, extend service life and improve the reliability of cooling-related systems.

The 150t order also shows that nuclear projects create specialised demand for titanium beyond aerospace and defence. Energy infrastructure can absorb high-value titanium products where performance and durability are essential.

VSMPO-Avisma has already supplied welded titanium tubes for unit 4 of Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant. That project was also built using a Russian design.

This track record gives the company a stronger position in Rosatom-linked international nuclear projects. It also shows how Russia can bundle reactor construction with domestic metal and component supply.

El Dabaa Extends Russia’s Nuclear Industrial Reach

Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom is building the 4.8GW El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt. Phase one is expected to come online in 2028, while all four units are planned to be operational by 2030.

Construction of unit 4 began in January 2024. The titanium pipes supplied by VSMPO-Avisma will support that unit’s equipment package.

The project is important for Egypt’s long-term energy strategy. Nuclear power can provide baseload electricity, reduce fuel import exposure and diversify the country’s energy mix.

For Russia, El Dabaa extends its industrial influence through nuclear technology, engineering services and material supply. Titanium pipes are only one component, but they show how nuclear export projects can support wider Russian industrial chains.

For titanium markets, the order confirms that corrosion-resistant CP titanium remains a strategic material for energy infrastructure. Demand from nuclear, desalination, chemical processing and marine systems can provide industrial support outside cyclical aerospace markets.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The El Dabaa order shows that titanium’s strategic value extends well beyond aircraft structures. Nuclear projects need materials that can survive corrosive environments for decades, and CP titanium remains one of the key metals for that role.

Sibanye PGM Production Rises in South Africa as US Output Falls

Sibanye

Sibanye PGM production improved in South Africa during the first quarter, but the company’s US mine output weakened because of lower production quality at East Boulder. The mixed result highlights the company’s uneven exposure across primary mining, recycling, zinc and lithium.

Sibanye PGM production in South Africa rose by 2% year on year to 383,241oz of 4E metals, covering platinum, palladium, rhodium and gold. Growth projects supported the increase and helped keep the company on track with its full-year guidance.

Sibanye PGM production in the US moved in the opposite direction. Output of 2E metals, covering platinum and palladium, fell by 5% to 68,386oz, with regular production expected to resume by the end of June.

The company maintained full-year guidance for both regions. South African operations are expected to produce 1.65mn-1.75mn oz, while US operations remain guided at 280,000-300,000oz.

South African Growth Offsets US Mine Weakness

Sibanye’s South African PGM operations remain the stronger side of the portfolio. The 2% increase in first-quarter output shows that ongoing growth projects are helping offset broader pressure across the PGM sector.

This matters because South Africa remains the world’s most important primary PGM supply base. Stable output from large producers supports automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, chemicals, electronics and industrial applications.

The US Stillwater operations faced a weaker quarter. Lower production quality at East Boulder reduced output, although Sibanye expects normal production to return by the end of June.

The US decline is important because North American primary PGM supply is limited. Any disruption at Stillwater assets can affect regional availability of palladium and platinum, especially for customers seeking non-Russian and traceable supply.

Recycling helped offset the weaker US mine performance. Sibanye’s US recycled PGM output rose by 50% to 107,597oz, supported by better optimisation of material flows.

That increase reinforces the strategic value of secondary supply. PGM recycling can provide flexible metal units when mine output is uneven, while also supporting lower-carbon and circular supply chains.

Zinc Weakness and Keliber Progress Broaden the Portfolio Story

Sibanye’s Australian Century zinc operation produced 20,000t in the first quarter, down by 25,000t from a year earlier. Above-average rainfall reduced capacity and operating flexibility at the zinc operation.

The decline shows the weather sensitivity of tailings and zinc operations. Heavy rainfall can affect mining rates, processing efficiency, transport and operating continuity.

Century’s weaker output also matters because zinc remains important for galvanizing steel, infrastructure, construction, die casting and industrial manufacturing. Lower production from a major operation can tighten regional supply if weather disruption persists.

Meanwhile, Sibanye’s Keliber lithium project in Finland reached full completion during the first quarter. The first mining blast took place at the Syvajarvi mine in February.

Keliber gives Sibanye a strategic entry into Europe’s lithium supply chain. The project connects the company to battery materials demand and supports Europe’s effort to build more domestic critical mineral capacity.

Sibanye’s portfolio is therefore becoming more diversified. PGMs remain the core earnings and strategic base, but recycling, zinc and lithium all add exposure to different industrial cycles.

The first-quarter results show the benefits and risks of that structure. South African PGMs and US recycling improved, US mine output weakened, zinc suffered weather disruption, and lithium moved closer to future production.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Sibanye’s quarter shows why diversified metals exposure can protect a company from single-asset weakness, but also adds execution complexity. The strongest strategic signal is the rise in recycled PGM output, which could become increasingly valuable as customers seek secure and lower-carbon platinum and palladium supply.

China Vanadium Prices Weaken as Supply Rises and Steel Demand Slows

China Vanadium

China vanadium prices are under renewed pressure as higher spot availability, weak alloy demand and softer steel mill tenders weigh on the market. Domestic 98% grade vanadium pentoxide flake prices fell to 82,000-87,000 yuan/t on 8 May, their lowest level since 20 April.

China vanadium prices began to soften in late April after alloy producers slowed purchases and cut procurement bids. Most ferro-vanadium producers lowered feedstock buying levels after steel mill tender prices came in below market expectations.

China vanadium prices are also being pressured by rising output. Domestic vanadium production reached 56,040t of vanadium pentoxide in January-April, up 7.6% from a year earlier.

The market is now facing a classic supply-demand imbalance. Higher vanadium flake and slag production has increased spot availability, while steel-sector demand remains weak and export outlets are slowing.

Higher Flake and Slag Output Increases Spot Availability

China’s vanadium supply increased because stronger earlier prices encouraged producers to lift output from vanadium-bearing steel slag. Vanadium-containing steel slag production rose to 49,320t in January-April, up 8% from a year earlier.

Higher flake prices in the first four months improved margins for slag-based production. Domestic 98% grade vanadium pentoxide flake averaged 80,812 yuan/t ex-works during January-April, up 9.5% from a year earlier.

New capacity has also added pressure. Qinhuangdao Baigong Steel started a 10,000 t/yr vanadium pentoxide flake production line in Hebei province in February.

This additional output arrived just as downstream buying slowed. Major flake suppliers had not finalised some contracts by 8 May, while some alloy producers were buying only limited volumes at lower cash prices.

The increase in spot availability has changed buyer behaviour. Alloy producers are no longer rushing to secure feedstock because they expect further price weakness.

That expectation can reinforce the decline. When buyers delay purchases, sellers face more pressure to reduce offers, especially when inventories rise and steel demand remains poor.

Weak Steel Tenders and Export Slowdown Limit Demand

Ferro-vanadium demand remains the main drag on the vanadium market. Domestic 50% grade ferro-vanadium prices fell to 93,000-94,000 yuan/t ex-works on 8 May, their lowest level since 1 April.

Steel mill tender prices also declined. Prices paid by steelmakers fell to 94,000-95,000 yuan/t delivered, including VAT and payable by acceptance bill, down from late-April levels.

Steelmakers are lowering bids because steel margins remain weak. This is especially important for vanadium because much of its demand comes from alloying in rebar and other steel products.

China’s rebar production fell to 29.54mn t in January-April, down 8.6% from a year earlier, as the real estate slowdown continued to reduce construction-related steel demand.

Steelmakers purchased an estimated 6,865t of vanadium alloys in April, down 17% from a year earlier. This confirms that weaker steel consumption is now feeding directly into lower vanadium alloy demand.

Export conditions are also turning less supportive. China’s vanadium flake exports are expected to decline in the coming months as international production increases.

Canadian producer Largo more than doubled vanadium pentoxide output in the first quarter to 2,616t, supported by higher-grade ore and steadier processing at its Brazilian mine. Russian producer Evraz also started a new 15,000 t/yr vanadium pentoxide flake plant in March and is expected to ramp up by June.

These additions reduce the need for some overseas buyers to rely on Chinese flake. That weakens a potential outlet for excess Chinese supply.

The near-term outlook remains soft. Unless steel mill tenders recover or vanadium exports improve, rising spot availability will likely keep pressure on vanadium pentoxide flake and ferro-vanadium prices.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China’s vanadium market is being hit by the wrong combination: rising supply, weak rebar output and cautious alloy buying. The longer-term battery storage story remains attractive, but near-term pricing still depends heavily on steel demand and feedstock discipline.

AMG Chrome Metal Plant Strengthens US Aerospace Alloy Supply

AMG Critical Materials

AMG chrome metal plant start-up in Pennsylvania will add new US production capacity for a specialty metal used in aerospace, defence and energy applications. AMG Critical Materials plans to open the 6,500 t/yr aluminothermic chrome metal facility in New Castle on 17 June.

The AMG chrome metal plant is strategically important because the US remains heavily dependent on imported unwrought chromium and chromium powders. In 2025, the US imported 11,153t of these products, with the UK supplying 51% and China supplying 34.9%.

The AMG chrome metal plant will sit next to AMG’s existing titanium facility, which produces titanium master alloys and other specialty alloys for aerospace, defence and energy markets. That location creates a stronger domestic cluster for high-performance alloy inputs.

Chrome metal is used in superalloys because it improves corrosion resistance and high-temperature performance. These properties are essential for aircraft engines, defence systems, industrial turbines and other demanding applications.

New Castle Facility Adds Domestic Chrome Capacity

AMG’s new Pennsylvania facility will use aluminothermic production to make chrome metal. The process is important for producing material suitable for high-performance alloy markets.

AMG already has established chrome expertise through AMG Chrome, its UK-based subsidiary. The Rotherham site produces chrome metal, high-purity degassed chrome metals and chrome powders.

The New Castle plant extends that capability into the US market. This gives American aerospace and defence customers another domestic source of chrome metal at a time when supply-chain security has become a higher priority.

The facility’s proximity to AMG’s titanium operation also matters. Titanium master alloys, chrome metal and specialty alloy inputs often serve overlapping customers in aerospace, defence and energy.

That creates potential operational and commercial advantages. AMG can support customers that need multiple alloying materials with stronger domestic logistics, qualification support and supply visibility.

Tariffs and Russian Supply Loss Reshape Chromium Trade

The US chrome market has been reshaped by sanctions, tariffs and trade disruption. Russian supplies became less available after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, forcing buyers to rely more heavily on other sources.

China became a more important supplier as Russian material disappeared from western trade flows. However, the US imposed a 25% Section 301 tariff on Chinese-origin chrome metal in September 2024.

That tariff increased the cost and complexity of Chinese supply. It also strengthened the case for domestic production capacity, especially for aerospace and defence applications where supply continuity matters.

Europe’s own supply behaviour has also changed. The loss of Russian supplies pushed French producers to keep more material within Europe rather than ship volumes to the US.

This leaves the US exposed to a narrow set of import routes. AMG’s Pennsylvania plant helps reduce that vulnerability by adding domestic chrome metal capacity linked to an established specialty materials producer.

For aerospace superalloy supply chains, this is more than a metal availability issue. Engine and defence programmes require qualified, traceable and reliable materials. Domestic production can reduce risk around tariffs, sanctions, shipping and geopolitical disruption.

The Metalnomist Commentary

AMG’s New Castle plant shows that specialty alloy security is moving beyond titanium and nickel into smaller but critical inputs such as chrome metal. The US cannot build resilient aerospace and defence supply chains without domestic capacity for the alloying elements that make superalloys perform.

Nornickel Nickel Output Holds Flat as Copper and PGM Production Decline

Nornickel

Nornickel nickel output was broadly stable in the first quarter, while the Russian multi-metals producer reported lower copper and platinum group metal production from a high year-earlier base. Consolidated nickel production edged up by 0.3% on the year to 41,746t in January-March.

Nornickel nickel output stability contrasts with weaker copper, palladium and platinum volumes. Copper output fell by 10% to 98,679t, palladium production dropped by 18% to 608,000oz, and platinum output declined by 24% to 136,000oz.

Nornickel said the lower copper and PGM figures reflected a high production base in the first quarter of 2025 and the redistribution of commercial product volumes between quarters. The company maintained its full-year 2026 production guidance.

The result shows that Nornickel nickel output remains comparatively steady, while quarterly copper and PGM figures can move sharply because of timing, ore processing patterns and product shipment schedules.

Nickel Stability Supports Core Production Outlook

Nickel remains one of Nornickel’s most important products because of its role in stainless steel, high-performance alloys, batteries and industrial manufacturing. Stable first-quarter output suggests that the company’s core nickel operations remain within its planned production range.

Nornickel kept its 2026 Russian feedstock guidance unchanged at 193,000-203,000t for nickel. This indicates that the company does not currently view the flat first-quarter result as a signal of operational weakness.

The nickel market remains sensitive to supply from Russia because Nornickel is a major producer of high-grade material. Even when global nickel markets face oversupply from Indonesian growth, Russian nickel still has strategic relevance for stainless steel, alloy and battery-linked consumers.

Copper showed a weaker quarterly result. Output from the company’s own Russian feedstock, excluding Trans-Baikal, totalled 80,000t during the period.

However, the Bystrinsky copper project in the Trans-Baikal division performed better. Copper in concentrate output rose by 6% on the year to 18,545t, supported by higher ore processing volumes and higher metal content in ore.

This improvement at Bystrinsky partly offsets the wider copper decline. It also shows the importance of ore grade and processing throughput in quarterly copper performance.

Nornickel maintained its 2026 Russian feedstock copper guidance at 336,000-356,000t. Guidance for Trans-Baikal copper in concentrate also remained unchanged at 69,000-73,000t.

PGM Decline Reflects Timing Rather Than Guidance Change

Nornickel’s platinum group metals output fell sharply in the first quarter, but the company did not adjust its full-year forecast. Palladium output fell by 18%, while platinum declined by 24%.

The company attributed the weaker figures to a high comparison base and quarterly timing effects in commercial products. This suggests the decline may not translate directly into lower full-year supply.

Nornickel kept its 2026 palladium guidance at 2.415mn-2.465mn oz and platinum guidance at 616,000-636,000oz. These metals remain important for automotive catalysts, electronics, chemicals, hydrogen technologies, jewellery and industrial applications.

The PGM market remains highly concentrated, with Russia and South Africa playing major roles in primary supply. Any sustained change in Russian production can therefore influence availability, trade flows and customer procurement strategies.

For buyers, the first-quarter data point to the need to separate operational weakness from quarterly timing. Lower reported output can affect sentiment, but unchanged guidance suggests Nornickel expects production to normalise across the year.

The broader strategic issue remains Russian supply exposure. Nornickel’s metals are important to global nickel, copper and PGM supply chains, but geopolitical risk, sanctions compliance and trade route uncertainty continue to shape how buyers handle Russian-origin material.

The first-quarter result therefore carries a mixed message. Nickel output remained stable, Bystrinsky copper improved, and full-year guidance was unchanged. However, lower copper and PGM production underline the importance of monitoring quarterly timing, product flows and operating consistency.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Nornickel’s first-quarter figures suggest stability in nickel but greater quarterly volatility in copper and PGMs. For global buyers, the bigger issue is not only production volume, but how Russian-origin metals move through increasingly complex trade and compliance channels.

US Sanctions on Hengli Refinery Tighten Pressure on Iranian Crude Flows to China

Hengli Petrochemical

US sanctions on Hengli refinery mark a renewed escalation in Washington’s effort to restrict Iranian crude flows into China. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese independent refiner Hengli Petrochemical, accusing it of importing Iranian crude in violation of US sanctions.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery affect one of China’s largest independent refiners, with capacity of around 400,000 b/d. Hengli has relied heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, while also holding a term supply contract with Saudi Aramco.

US sanctions on Hengli refinery could therefore reshape its crude slate more directly than earlier measures. The sanctions may block future access to Saudi crude, limiting Hengli’s flexibility at a time when Iranian forward cargo availability is already tightening.

The action also comes as the US continues its naval blockade of Iranian trade and the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed to navigation. This raises the pressure on crude logistics, shadow fleet operations and Chinese refinery procurement.

Hengli Sanctions Target China’s Independent Refining System

The Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a wind-down license allowing Hengli’s counterparties to end business with the refinery by 24 May. This gives suppliers, banks, traders and shipping partners a short window to reduce exposure.

The practical impact could be wider than the direct US designation. Sanctions can affect financing, insurance, shipping, letters of credit, crude supply contracts and trading relationships.

Hengli is particularly exposed because it sits between sanctioned crude flows and more conventional supply channels. The company has relied mostly on Iranian and Russian crude, but it also has access to Saudi term supply.

Losing access to Saudi crude would reduce feedstock optionality. It would also make Hengli more dependent on discounted, politically risky barrels or alternative spot procurement.

The sanctions follow earlier US actions against Chinese independent refiners, ports and terminals in 2025. Those measures failed to stop Iranian crude exports to China, but they increased compliance risk across the trade.

Washington paused new sanctions after October as US-China diplomatic talks resumed. The latest action signals that energy sanctions are again moving ahead despite planned high-level talks between the US and China.

The timing is sensitive. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing next month after delaying an earlier trip because of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Shadow Fleet Logistics Face Renewed Pressure

Iranian crude still reaches China through a complex network of intermediaries, shadow fleet tankers and ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia and Indonesia. These routes obscure origin and help cargoes reach independent refiners.

The US blockade has already reduced offers of Iranian forward cargoes to Chinese buyers. This is important because Chinese refiners depend on predictable discounted flows to maintain margins.

China’s imports from Malaysia and Indonesia reached a record 2.54mn b/d last month. These origins are often used as reported loading points for Iranian crude delivered through transhipment networks.

Floating storage trends also suggest logistics stress. Iranian crude floating storage off China has risen to nearly 20mn bl, while floating storage off Malaysia has fallen sharply from early-year levels.

This may limit future arrivals if fewer cargoes are available for onward delivery. It also suggests that some barrels are waiting near China because discharge, documentation or refinery acceptance has become more complicated.

OFAC also sanctioned 19 shadow fleet vessels accused of moving Iranian crude, LPG and petroleum products to the UAE, Bangladesh and China. This was the second vessel-focused sanctions wave under Operation Economic Fury.

The vessel sanctions matter because shadow fleet capacity is now a strategic part of sanctioned oil trade. If Washington continues to target tankers, freight availability, insurance risk and ship-to-ship transfer costs could rise.

For Chinese refiners, the sanctions increase procurement uncertainty. Iranian crude may remain available, but the cost of handling it could increase through higher freight, longer waiting times and greater compliance risk.

For the broader oil market, the impact depends on whether sanctions reduce actual flows or simply push them through more opaque channels. The US tried similar measures before, but Chinese demand for discounted crude has proven resilient.

Still, the current environment is more fragile. The Strait of Hormuz disruption, higher geopolitical risk and tighter enforcement against tankers make the logistics chain more vulnerable than usual.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The US is targeting the weakest link in Iranian crude flows to China: not demand, but logistics, financing and refinery access. Hengli’s case shows that sanctions are moving from broad pressure toward specific chokepoints in crude procurement and shadow fleet infrastructure.

EU Russia Sanctions Package Tightens Shadow Fleet and Metals Trade Controls

EU, Russia

EU Russia sanctions package measures have formally expanded as Brussels adds new pressure on Russia’s oil logistics, maritime services and raw materials trade. The 20th sanctions package adds 46 vessels to the EU’s shadow fleet list and creates the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services linked to Russian crude and oil product shipments.

The EU Russia sanctions package brings the total number of designated shadow fleet tankers to 632. These vessels face port access bans and restrictions on a broad range of maritime transport services.

The EU Russia sanctions package aims to close loopholes around the G7 oil price cap. Brussels is targeting vessels, ports, terminals, tanker sales and service providers that may help Russia move crude and oil products outside the sanctioned framework.

The package also expands trade restrictions to several raw materials and metals, including aluminium products, silicon, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium. This widens the impact from energy sanctions into industrial supply chains.

Shadow Fleet Measures Push Sanctions Deeper Into Maritime Logistics

The main focus of the package is Russia’s shadow fleet. These tankers have become central to Moscow’s efforts to move crude and products while avoiding price-cap restrictions and western maritime services controls.

The EU has now banned transactions with the Russian ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, as well as the oil terminal at Karimun in Indonesia. Brussels said these locations are being used to bypass the price cap.

Earlier sanctions already covered Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The wider port and terminal coverage shows that the EU is moving from targeting ships alone to targeting the infrastructure that supports Russian oil flows.

Georgia’s Kulevi port was not included after EU officials said they received strong commitments. This shows that Brussels is also using sanctions pressure to influence third-country port behaviour.

The package introduces mandatory due diligence and a “no-Russia” clause for tanker sales. This is intended to prevent vessels from moving into Russian-linked fleets through resale channels.

The EU has also prohibited maintenance and other services for Russian LNG tankers and icebreakers. From January 2027, LNG terminal services to Russian entities, or entities controlled by Russian nationals or operators, will also become illegal.

The future maritime services ban is especially important. Under current rules, shipping, insurance and other services are still allowed for Russian oil shipments sold at or below the G7 price cap.

The new framework prepares the legal basis for a stricter system. The EU plans to co-ordinate any future ban with G7 partners and other price-cap countries.

This would mark a significant escalation. A broader maritime services ban could reduce Russia’s ability to use western-linked insurance, shipping support, technical services and terminal access even when cargoes claim price-cap compliance.

Metals Restrictions Extend Pressure Into Industrial Supply Chains

The sanctions package also expands pressure beyond oil and gas. It adds 120 individuals and entities to the EU sanctions list, including 36 designations linked to the upstream and downstream oil sector.

Some listings involve entities based in third countries. This reflects the EU’s increasing focus on sanctions circumvention through non-EU jurisdictions.

The trade measures are also important for metals and industrial materials. The EU introduced a yearly ammonia import quota of 688,000t and widened import restrictions to additional raw materials and metals.

The restricted materials include steel, aluminium products, silicon, salt, calcium oxide, rubber, lithium oxide, cobalt, molybdenum, magnesium, platinum, rhodium and iridium.

This matters because Russia remains connected to several industrial raw material flows. Even when volumes are not dominant, sanctions can affect procurement, compliance, documentation and alternative sourcing decisions.

Platinum, rhodium and iridium are particularly sensitive because they support automotive catalysts, hydrogen technologies, electronics, chemicals and high-performance industrial applications. Any restrictions on Russian-linked flows could increase attention on South African, recycled and alternative supply.

Cobalt, molybdenum and magnesium restrictions also carry strategic relevance. These materials feed batteries, superalloys, specialty steels, aerospace, automotive and defence-related supply chains.

Aluminium product restrictions may add another layer of complexity to European aluminium procurement, especially as the market already faces higher premiums, energy cost pressure and disrupted trade flows.

The package was adopted after Russian pipeline crude flows resumed to Hungary and Slovakia through the Druzhba system. That restart removed a political obstacle that had delayed approval.

The EU also formally adopted a €90bn loan package for Ukraine. Disbursements could begin next month to support urgent budgetary and defence needs in 2026 and 2027.

The combined measures show that Brussels is linking sanctions enforcement, energy security, Ukraine financing and industrial trade policy more tightly. Russia sanctions are no longer limited to direct oil and gas restrictions. They now reach vessels, ports, financing, raw materials, metals and third-country trade channels.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The 20th EU Russia sanctions package shows that enforcement is moving from headline bans toward logistics, ports and material flows. For metals buyers, the key risk is not only direct Russian origin, but the growing compliance burden around third-country routing, documentation and restricted raw materials.

EU Russian Energy Imports Ban Holds Firm Despite New Energy Crisis

EU Russian Energy

EU Russian energy imports will not return under the European Commission’s current policy direction, even as the bloc faces renewed energy pressure from the Middle East conflict. EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said Brussels will continue phasing out Russian gas and still plans to cut Russian oil imports.

EU Russian energy imports have become a strategic red line for Brussels. The Commission argues that returning to Russian supply would recreate the dependency that exposed Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

EU Russian energy imports are again being debated because higher oil and gas costs are hitting parts of the European economy. However, Brussels is treating the current disruption as a reason to accelerate energy diversification, not reopen Russian supply channels.

The position links energy security directly to industrial resilience. Europe now wants less exposure to both Russian energy and Middle East supply disruption, while shifting more demand toward domestic, renewable and alternative energy systems.

Russian Oil Phase-Out Remains Politically Sensitive

The Commission has not yet presented new legal measures to phase out Russian oil imports. It delayed a proposal originally scheduled for 15 April and has not set a new publication date.

Still, Brussels says a permanent Russian oil ban remains a priority. That matters because Hungary and Slovakia remain the only EU importers of Russian crude, keeping pipeline supply through Druzhba at the centre of political negotiations.

Hungary had opposed blocking Russian oil imports under Viktor Orban. His successor, Peter Magyar, has acknowledged that Hungary cannot end Druzhba imports immediately, but has pledged to eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.

Slovakia has also linked Russian oil flows to its support for further sanctions against Moscow. Bratislava has indicated it could support another sanctions package once Russian oil reaches Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline.

This shows the difficulty of EU energy policy. The bloc wants a unified strategic position, but member states still have different infrastructure, refinery configurations and supply dependencies.

The Druzhba pipeline therefore remains more than a crude route. It is a political lever in sanctions, energy security and Ukraine-related financing discussions.

Energy Crisis Reinforces Clean Supply Strategy

The current Middle East energy crisis has intensified the EU’s focus on supply security. Jorgensen said the disruption is comparable in seriousness to the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 Russian energy shock.

The Commission expects LNG prices to take years to stabilise. It also expects oil capacity to need months to normalise after the war ends, showing that energy disruption can outlast military events.

This strengthens the EU case for domestic and clean energy. The Commission wants to reduce import dependence through renewables, electrification, storage, hydrogen and alternative fuels.

For industry, the implication is clear. Europe’s energy security strategy will increasingly affect metals, grids, chemicals, transport fuels and clean technology supply chains.

Lower Russian energy dependence also raises demand for infrastructure. Europe will need more copper, aluminium, electrical steel, transformers, batteries, renewable equipment and grid materials to replace fossil fuel exposure with domestic power systems.

The policy challenge is execution. Europe must cut Russian dependence while managing fuel prices, refinery supply, LNG volatility, industrial competitiveness and political pressure from member states.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Europe’s refusal to return to Russian energy shows that energy security has become an industrial sovereignty issue. The next test is whether the EU can replace fossil dependency with real domestic energy infrastructure fast enough to protect industry from repeated external shocks.

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge Exports Set to Rise as OEMs Diversify Supply

China Aerospace-Grade Titanium Sponge

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge exports are expected to rise over the next five years as western aerospace supply chains look for additional qualified raw material sources. Chinese producer Chaoyang Jinda Titanium expects international shipments of qualified aerospace-grade sponge to increase from around 1,000t this year to 10,000t by 2030.

The shift reflects a deeper change in the aerospace titanium supply chain. Western aircraft manufacturers and ingot melters are trying to reduce exposure to Russian supply, while aircraft build rates are expected to rise from 2027.

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge is therefore moving from a limited export niche into a potential supply-chain balancing tool. However, tariffs, qualification risk and geopolitical uncertainty will limit how quickly US and European buyers adopt Chinese material.

The opportunity is strongest in standard-quality structural titanium grades. Premium-quality sponge for engine, landing-gear and other critical applications is likely to remain controlled by established suppliers with long qualification histories.

Western Aerospace Buyers Face a Supply-Diversification Challenge

Aerospace-grade sponge demand is expected to recover from 2027 after a weaker 2026 caused by inventory normalisation. Mills have been reducing stocks of semi-finished titanium parts and raw materials, but aircraft production plans point to higher requirements later in the decade.

The timing is important. Airbus and Boeing both carry long aircraft backlogs, creating a decade of production visibility. This forces mills and original equipment manufacturers to look beyond short-term demand swings and secure raw material sources for future build-rate increases.

Western OEMs also continue to reassess Russian titanium exposure. If procurement from Russia declines, the market will need alternative aerospace-qualified sponge to fill the gap. Japan’s Toho Titanium and Osaka Titanium are expanding, while China is preparing to supply more qualified material.

Global approved aerospace-grade sponge supply excluding Russian products is expected to rise from about 74,000t this year to around 91,000t by 2030. Demand is expected to grow at a similar pace, leaving the market sensitive to which suppliers are included in purchasing programmes.

The supply-demand picture changes significantly depending on China and Russia. Excluding both suppliers creates a tighter market. Including them creates more apparent supply availability. This makes qualification and geopolitical acceptability just as important as physical capacity.

Some US ingot producers began qualifying Chinese titanium sponge in 2024. US imports from China rose to a 10-year high of 1,069t that year, showing that buyers were willing to test Chinese material when diversification pressure increased.

However, imports fell to 155t last year and no Chinese sponge imports were reported in January-February 2026. Tariff volatility, high mill inventories and policy uncertainty discouraged further purchasing.

This shows the main barrier for China aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Aerospace qualification requires multi-year commitments, stable documentation, repeatable quality and customer confidence. Buyers will not qualify a new source quickly if they fear trade rules could change again.

Titanium is exempt from the latest 10% US tariff, and overall duties have fallen back to 40% from 60%. But the rate itself is not the only issue. For aerospace buyers, volatility can be more damaging than the actual tariff level.

A mill can absorb or price a known tariff. It cannot easily build a long-term qualification strategy around unpredictable policy. This is why US buyers may limit Chinese sponge procurement to 15-20% of requirements, even if the material is technically acceptable.

Europe and Asia-Pacific may offer more immediate export channels. China already supplies aerospace-grade sponge to buyers in those regions, supporting shipments even when US demand is limited.

Capacity Expansion Could Change the Titanium Sponge Balance

China is preparing a large wave of aerospace-grade sponge capacity additions. Several major projects are scheduled to come on line soon, with combined new capacity of around 110,000 t/yr.

The scale is unprecedented. The planned additions exceed the combined existing capacity of Japan’s Toho and Osaka Titanium, Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, and Saudi Arabia’s ATTM.

China’s expansion is driven by two demand streams. Domestic aerospace demand is rising from the Comac C919 programme and military aircraft production. At the same time, producers expect higher export demand as western OEMs diversify away from Russia.

China’s titanium mill product demand already has a meaningful aerospace base. Aerospace applications accounted for about 20% of China’s titanium mill product demand in 2025, or roughly 31,280t. The chemicals industry remained the largest segment at 48%.

The domestic base gives Chinese sponge producers a stronger platform for quality improvement. Aerospace production experience matters because sponge qualification depends on consistency over time, not only nameplate capacity.

Still, some market participants question whether all new capacity can secure international aerospace qualification. New lines may need years of operating history before western melters and OEMs accept material for aircraft applications.

This is a critical distinction. China may have large physical capacity, but aerospace supply depends on approved, audited and repeatable production. Capacity alone does not guarantee market access.

Price competitiveness may support adoption. Domestic China aerospace-grade sponge prices have recently held firm at 55,000-57,000 yuan/t ex-works because of cost pressure. That remains competitive against some western supply routes, especially if buyers need alternative non-Russian material.

However, qualification is likely to split the market by application. Standard structural titanium grades are more likely to accept Chinese sponge over time. These grades support airframes and less critical structural components where qualification remains strict but less restrictive than engine-grade applications.

Premium-quality sponge will be harder to penetrate. Engine, landing-gear and other demanding aerospace uses require deeper qualification, tighter chemistry control and stronger confidence from prime contractors and tier suppliers.

Airbus’ titanium demand outlook adds another layer. The A350 is a high titanium-bearing platform, with titanium representing around 15% of aircraft weight. As A350 production rises toward 2027 and 2028, titanium demand visibility should improve across the supply chain.

That demand pull could make Chinese material more attractive if western supply tightens. But buyers will still balance cost, qualification, geopolitics and supply security.

For Chinese producers, the path is clear but difficult. They must prove consistent aerospace-grade quality, build long-term customer trust, manage export documentation and navigate trade policy risk.

For western OEMs, the decision is strategic. China aerospace-grade titanium sponge could reduce Russia exposure and improve supply flexibility. But it also introduces another geopolitical dependency at a time when aerospace and defence supply chains are under closer scrutiny.

The most likely outcome is partial adoption. Chinese sponge may become a growing supplement for standard-quality structural grades, while established Japanese, Kazakh, Saudi and other qualified suppliers remain central to premium aerospace applications.

The Metalnomist Commentary

China aerospace-grade titanium sponge will become harder for western aerospace supply chains to ignore as aircraft build rates rise and Russian exposure narrows. The decisive issue is not capacity, but whether Chinese producers can convert new output into trusted, qualified and politically acceptable supply.

EU Ferro-Titanium Imports Fell to 2009 Low After Russian Ban

Ferro-Titanium

EU ferro-titanium imports fell to their lowest level since 2009 in 2025 after sanctions blocked Russian material from entering the bloc directly or through Baltic transit routes. EU countries imported 30,171t of ferro-titanium last year, down 36% from 47,296t in 2024.

The sharp decline showed how deeply the European ferro-titanium market had depended on Russian supply and Baltic logistics. Estonia, Poland, and Latvia together accounted for 12,830t of EU supply, but the structure of that supply changed significantly once Russian-origin ferro-titanium was barred.

EU ferro-titanium imports from Estonia halved on the year to 6,384t. The decline suggests that Estonian flows now more closely reflect local production rather than Russian material transiting through the country.

Sanctions Shifted Supply Toward Estonia, Poland and India

Estonia remained the EU’s largest ferro-titanium supplier in 2025, while Poland became the second-largest intra-EU source. Polish shipments rose by a quarter to 3,834t, showing that European buyers were turning more heavily to regional producers after the Russian ban.

Imports from the UK fell 27% to 3,468t after the closure of TiVac last summer. Most of TiVac’s former volumes are expected to shift to Estonia, where FE Mottram is scaling up operations in Ahtme, while Transition Metals continues to operate in the UK.

India became a larger alternative supplier as exports to the EU rose 171% to 2,310t. Turkey’s shipments also surged to 1,000t, although these flows remain unclear because Turkey is not a known ferro-titanium producer.

Russian ferro-titanium imports fell to just 463t in 2025 after full implementation of EU sanctions on Russian ferro-alloys in December 2024. Russian exports largely moved to Asia, with Chinese imports from Russia reaching a record 6,381t last year.

Russian Scrap Flows Rose Before Late-Year Slowdown

Titanium scrap became a temporary workaround because Russian titanium scrap was not covered by EU sanctions. EU imports of Russian scrap doubled to 2,517t in 2025, with 2,406t entering Estonia.

Estonia then re-exported 2,277t of titanium scrap last year, showing how scrap flows supported the regional ferro-titanium supply chain after the ban on Russian ferro-alloys. However, this trade also weakened sharply toward year-end, with EU imports falling to 36t in December and 37t in January 2026.

European ferro-titanium prices averaged $4.98-5.33/kg Ti dp/df Rotterdam in 2025, down 28% from 2024. Weak steel mill consumption kept prices under pressure for most of the year.

The market later rebounded from multi-year lows in December. Supply concerns linked to Latvian producer LLR-Ecotech first supported the recovery, before higher scrap costs allowed other producers to raise offers.

The Metalnomist Commentary

The EU ferro-titanium market is now being rebuilt around sanctions compliance, regional production, and scrap availability. The Russian ban reduced headline imports, but it also exposed Europe’s dependence on flexible titanium scrap flows and a small group of regional producers.

Rusal 2025 Loss Highlights Cost Pressure on Russian Aluminium Producer

Rusal

Rusal 2025 loss results show how currency pressure, higher raw material costs, and disrupted sales routes continue to weigh on Russia’s aluminium sector. The Russian aluminium producer posted a net loss of $455 million in 2025 despite higher revenue and stronger aluminium selling prices.

Rusal 2025 loss was driven largely by $431 million in exchange rate losses as the strong rouble reduced earnings. The company also faced a 12.4% rise in production costs to $2,276/t, mainly because raw petroleum coke prices increased by 21.8%.

The Rusal 2025 loss also reflects the cost of operating under sanctions. Selling expenses rose by 25% as logistics costs increased and the company continued to adjust sales chains after western markets restricted exchange-traded Russian-origin aluminium.

Higher Revenue Failed to Offset Sanctions and Cost Inflation

Rusal’s revenue rose by 22.6% to $14.81 billion in 2025, supported by stronger aluminium buying prices. Average aluminium selling prices increased by 5.23% to $2,652/t, while alumina prices fell by 23.26% to $386/t.

However, stronger sales did not translate into profit recovery. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation fell by 29.5% to $1.05 billion, showing that higher volumes and better aluminium prices were not enough to absorb cost inflation and foreign exchange losses.

Aluminium production declined by 1.85% to 3.92 million tonnes. However, sales rose by 16.35% to 4.49 million tonnes as Rusal sold down stocks that had built up in the previous year.

Upstream Growth Expands Alumina and Bauxite Supply Base

Rusal increased alumina output by 6.66% to 6.86 million tonnes in 2025. The increase was supported by its 30% stake in Chinese alumina producer Hebei Wenfeng New Materials and a 26% stake in India’s Pioneer Aluminium Industries.

The company also expanded bauxite production by 16.17% to 18.45 million tonnes. Growth came from capacity expansion projects at its Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia and Dian-Dian mines in Guinea.

These upstream gains strengthen Rusal’s raw material position. Still, they do not fully remove the strategic pressure from sanctions, logistics disruption, currency volatility, and rising input costs.

The Metalnomist Commentary

Rusal’s results show that aluminium producers can face margin pressure even when headline prices improve. For Russian aluminium, the central challenge is no longer only production scale, but the cost of reaching markets under sanctions and fragmented trade routes.

ATTM Titanium Sponge Operations Continue Despite Middle East Freight Risk

ATTM

ATTM titanium sponge operations remain normal despite rising logistics pressure from the war in the Middle East. The Saudi Arabian titanium sponge producer has reported no direct operational impact and does not expect material disruption to exports at this stage.

The company is a joint venture between Saudi group AMIC and Japan’s Toho Titanium. Its plant is located in Yanbu, on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, giving the facility strategic access to international titanium feedstock and export routes.

ATTM titanium sponge operations matter because the company supplies aerospace-grade titanium sponge to major Western markets, including the US, UK, France, and Italy. It also supplies ferro-titanium grades to Estonia, with smaller volumes shipped elsewhere.

Titanium Supply Chain Faces Freight and Feedstock Exposure

Regional freight markets have become more volatile as conflict disrupts shipping routes and energy-linked supply chains across the Middle East. Several aluminium production facilities have already faced production pressure because they could not secure imported feedstocks, energy supplies, or export access.

ATTM said it is actively managing logistics and does not anticipate material export disruption. This is important because Saudi Arabia imports most of its titanium ore and concentrate feedstocks from Mozambique and Australia.

ATTM titanium sponge operations therefore depend not only on plant performance, but also on inbound ore logistics and outbound sponge shipment routes. Any sustained disruption in freight availability, insurance costs, or port access could still affect titanium supply timing even if production remains stable.

Aerospace Sponge Output Remains Strategically Important

ATTM produced 12,000t of titanium sponge in 2025, compared with a nameplate capacity of 15,600 t/yr. That makes the company a meaningful non-Russian and non-Chinese titanium sponge source for aerospace and industrial customers.

The company’s relationship with Toho Titanium also strengthens its technical position. Aerospace-grade sponge requires strict control over chemistry, trace elements, and production consistency, making qualification and supplier reliability more important than spot-market availability.

For Western aerospace supply chains, stable ATTM titanium sponge operations provide reassurance during a period of geopolitical stress. However, the situation also highlights a broader vulnerability: titanium sponge supply remains concentrated in a small number of qualified producers, while feedstock logistics depend on long-distance maritime routes.

The Metalnomist Commentary

ATTM’s stability is positive for aerospace titanium buyers, but the real risk sits in logistics rather than furnace operations. Titanium sponge customers should treat Middle East freight disruption as a supply-chain risk that can emerge before production itself is affected.